WO2009067934A1 - A wapi unicast secret key negotiation method - Google Patents
A wapi unicast secret key negotiation method Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2009067934A1 WO2009067934A1 PCT/CN2008/073053 CN2008073053W WO2009067934A1 WO 2009067934 A1 WO2009067934 A1 WO 2009067934A1 CN 2008073053 W CN2008073053 W CN 2008073053W WO 2009067934 A1 WO2009067934 A1 WO 2009067934A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- key negotiation
- unicast
- packet
- unicast key
- entity
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1458—Denial of Service
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
- H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
- H04L9/0844—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
- H04L9/3273—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
- H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
- H04W12/0433—Key management protocols
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
- H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
- H04W12/126—Anti-theft arrangements, e.g. protection against subscriber identity module [SIM] cloning
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the field of information security technologies, and in particular, to a WAPI unicast key negotiation method. Background technique
- Wired Equivalent Privacy Wired Equivalent Privacy
- WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
- WAPI implements authentication and key distribution functions using certificates or pre-shared key authentication and key management protocols.
- This security mechanism better solves the security problem of WLAN, but since it is designed with more security considerations and does not consider the availability of the protocol too much, its unicast key agreement protocol may suffer from denial of service DoS ( Denial of Service) The problem of attack. This is because the unicast key negotiation request packet in the WAPI unicast key agreement protocol does not take protection measures, and the exposed unicast key negotiation request packet may be used by the attacker.
- DoS Denial of Service
- the authenticator entity AE Authenticator Entity
- ASUE Authentication Supplicant Entity
- the authentication requester entity ASUE cannot use the same policy. If the authentication requester entity ASUE is configured to be in a full state, that is, only a response of a particular message is expected, it is now considered that the authentication requester entity ASUE receives the unicast key negotiation request packet and issues a unicast key negotiation response packet. If the unicast key negotiation response packet is lost for various reasons, the discriminator entity AE will not get the desired unicast key negotiation response packet, so the discriminator entity AE will re-broadcast the key negotiation request packet after timeout.
- the authentication requester entity ASUE since the authentication requester entity ASUE only expects to receive the unicast key negotiation acknowledgement packet, the retransmitted unicast key negotiation request packet is discarded, causing the protocol to fail, and the attacker can use this to be preemptively legal.
- the spoofed unicast key negotiation request packet is sent before the unicast key negotiation request packet, causing the authentication requester entity ASUE to block the protocol. Therefore, during the handshake process, the requester entity ASUE is authenticated. Multiple unicast key negotiation request packets must be allowed to accept to ensure that the protocol can continue, ie the authentication requester entity ASUE must allow multiple handshake instances to run simultaneously.
- the protocol blocking attack is caused by the weakness of the unicast key negotiation request packet.
- the authentication requester entity ASUE can store multiple unicast session keys USK (Unicast Session Key) when the protocol is implemented. It is a legal unicast session key, and the rest is a temporary unicast session key. Only the temporary unicast session key is updated when the unicast key negotiation request packet is received, and only the unicast key negotiation confirmation packet with the valid message integrity code MIC (Message Integrity Code) is received. Unicast session key.
- USK Unicast Session Key
- the authentication requester entity ASUE must use considerable storage.
- the space stores all the received Nonce, the locally generated Nonce, and the corresponding temporary unicast session key in the received unicast key negotiation request packet until it completes the handshake and obtains a valid unicast session key.
- the calculation of the unicast session key is not expensive, it does not cause a CPU exhaustion attack, but if the attacker intentionally increases the transmission frequency of the forged unicast key negotiation request packet, there is a danger that the storage is exhausted. This kind of forgery attack is easy to implement and the damage is serious. A successful attack will make the early efforts of the authentication process impossible.
- the present invention provides a WAPI unicast key negotiation method for solving the above technical problem existing in the background art, so as to prevent Dos attacks by forging a unicast key to negotiate a request packet.
- the technical solution is as follows:
- a WAPI unicast key negotiation method includes:
- the discriminator entity AE sends a new unicast key negotiation request packet to the authentication requester entity ASUE, the new unicast key negotiation request packet is: added on the originally defined content of the unicast key negotiation request packet a request packet formed by a message integrity code MIC;
- the authentication requester entity ASUE After the authentication requester entity ASUE receives the unicast key negotiation confirmation packet, performs unicast key negotiation confirmation packet verification, and if the verification is successful, the unicast is successfully completed between the discriminator entity AE and the authentication requester entity ASUE.
- the key negotiation process negotiates a consistent unicast session key.
- the content of the originally defined content, the unicast key negotiation response packet, and the unicast key negotiation confirmation packet of the unicast key negotiation request packet are the same as those defined in the standard text of GB 15629.11-2003/XG1-2006, respectively.
- the verification process of the new unicast key negotiation request packet, the unicast key negotiation response packet, and the unicast key negotiation confirmation packet is the same as the definition in the standard text of GB 15629.11-2003/XG1-2006, respectively.
- the message integrity code MIC in the step 1) is a hash value calculated by the discriminator entity AE using the negotiated base key BK for all fields preceding the MIC field.
- the invention adds a message integrity code MIC to the unicast key negotiation request packet of the original WAPI unicast key agreement protocol, so as to prevent the attacker from forging the unicast key negotiation request packet to enhance the security of the protocol.
- Sexuality and robustness solve the problem of DoS attacks in the unicast key agreement protocol in the current WAPI security mechanism.
- the present invention is applicable to the security of a WAPI framework method (Access Control method based on Tri-element Peer Authentication) in a specific network such as a wireless local area network or a wireless metropolitan area network. protocol.
- WAPI framework method Access Control method based on Tri-element Peer Authentication
- a specific network such as a wireless local area network or a wireless metropolitan area network. protocol.
- the discriminator entity AE adds the message integrity code MIC to the content of the original definition of the unicast key negotiation request packet, and forms a new unicast key negotiation request packet, and sends it to the authentication requester entity ASUE;
- the integrity code MIC is a hash value calculated by the discriminator entity AE using all the fields preceding the MIC field using the base key BK (Base Key) negotiated during the authentication phase;
- the authentication requester entity ASUE After the authentication requester entity ASUE receives the new unicast key negotiation request packet, it performs an inspection. Verify that the MIC is correct. If not, discard the packet directly; if it is correct, perform the original verification. If the verification is successful, respond to the discriminator entity AE with the unicast key negotiation response packet; unicast key The content of the negotiation response packet is the same as the original definition;
- the original definition and the original verification refer to the definition and verification in the standard text of GB 15629.11-2003/XG1-2006.
- the discriminator entity AE After the discriminator entity AE receives the unicast key negotiation response packet, performs original verification, and if the verification is successful, responds to the authentication requester entity ASUE with a unicast key negotiation confirmation packet; the unicast key negotiation confirmation packet The content is the same as the original definition;
- the authentication requester entity AE After the authentication requester entity AE receives the unicast key negotiation confirmation packet, the original verification is performed. If the verification succeeds, the unicast key negotiation process is successfully completed between the discriminator entity AE and the authentication requester entity ASUE. A consistent unicast session key is negotiated.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP08855081A EP2214368A1 (en) | 2007-11-16 | 2008-11-14 | A wapi unicast secret key negotiation method |
JP2010533419A JP2011504332A (ja) | 2007-11-16 | 2008-11-14 | Wapiユニキャストシークレットキー交渉方法 |
US12/743,032 US20100250941A1 (en) | 2007-11-16 | 2008-11-14 | Wapi unicast secret key negotiation method |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CNB2007100190928A CN100566240C (zh) | 2007-11-16 | 2007-11-16 | 一种wapi单播密钥协商方法 |
CN200710019092.8 | 2007-11-16 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2009067934A1 true WO2009067934A1 (en) | 2009-06-04 |
Family
ID=39307479
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/CN2008/073053 WO2009067934A1 (en) | 2007-11-16 | 2008-11-14 | A wapi unicast secret key negotiation method |
Country Status (7)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20100250941A1 (zh) |
EP (1) | EP2214368A1 (zh) |
JP (1) | JP2011504332A (zh) |
KR (1) | KR20100072105A (zh) |
CN (1) | CN100566240C (zh) |
RU (1) | RU2448427C2 (zh) |
WO (1) | WO2009067934A1 (zh) |
Families Citing this family (10)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN100566240C (zh) * | 2007-11-16 | 2009-12-02 | 西安西电捷通无线网络通信有限公司 | 一种wapi单播密钥协商方法 |
CN100593936C (zh) | 2008-05-09 | 2010-03-10 | 西安西电捷通无线网络通信有限公司 | 一种基于wapi的漫游认证方法 |
CN101527905A (zh) * | 2009-04-08 | 2009-09-09 | 刘建 | 无线局域网鉴别与保密基础结构单播密钥协商方法及系统 |
CN101557591B (zh) * | 2009-05-14 | 2011-01-26 | 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 | 会聚式wlan中由wtp完成wpi时的sta切换方法及其系统 |
CN102006671B (zh) * | 2009-08-31 | 2014-06-18 | 中兴通讯股份有限公司 | 一种实现来电转接的系统及方法 |
CN101741548B (zh) | 2009-12-18 | 2012-02-01 | 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 | 交换设备间安全连接的建立方法及系统 |
CN101729249B (zh) * | 2009-12-21 | 2011-11-30 | 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 | 用户终端之间安全连接的建立方法及系统 |
CN102131199B (zh) * | 2011-03-21 | 2013-09-11 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种wapi认证方法和接入点 |
US8806633B2 (en) * | 2011-08-22 | 2014-08-12 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Coordinated detection of a grey-hole attack in a communication network |
CN118102139B (zh) * | 2024-04-24 | 2024-06-25 | 云南云电信息通信股份有限公司 | 一种带ris相控阵的wapi无线设备及其防护机构 |
Citations (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN101159543A (zh) * | 2007-11-16 | 2008-04-09 | 西安西电捷通无线网络通信有限公司 | 一种wapi单播密钥协商方法 |
Family Cites Families (6)
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CN1181648C (zh) * | 2002-09-06 | 2004-12-22 | 联想(北京)有限公司 | 一种网络上设备间自动查找的方法 |
TWI268083B (en) * | 2004-11-17 | 2006-12-01 | Draytek Corp | Method used by an access point of a wireless LAN and related apparatus |
JP4804454B2 (ja) * | 2005-03-04 | 2011-11-02 | パナソニック株式会社 | 鍵配信制御装置、無線基地局装置および通信システム |
CN100358282C (zh) * | 2005-03-23 | 2007-12-26 | 西安电子科技大学 | Wapi认证机制中的密钥协商方法 |
US20070097934A1 (en) * | 2005-11-03 | 2007-05-03 | Jesse Walker | Method and system of secured direct link set-up (DLS) for wireless networks |
CN100456725C (zh) * | 2007-03-15 | 2009-01-28 | 北京安拓思科技有限责任公司 | 用于wapi的获取公钥证书的网络系统和方法 |
-
2007
- 2007-11-16 CN CNB2007100190928A patent/CN100566240C/zh not_active Expired - Fee Related
-
2008
- 2008-11-14 EP EP08855081A patent/EP2214368A1/en not_active Withdrawn
- 2008-11-14 RU RU2010123944/08A patent/RU2448427C2/ru active
- 2008-11-14 WO PCT/CN2008/073053 patent/WO2009067934A1/zh active Application Filing
- 2008-11-14 JP JP2010533419A patent/JP2011504332A/ja not_active Withdrawn
- 2008-11-14 US US12/743,032 patent/US20100250941A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2008-11-14 KR KR1020107013120A patent/KR20100072105A/ko active Search and Examination
Patent Citations (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN101159543A (zh) * | 2007-11-16 | 2008-04-09 | 西安西电捷通无线网络通信有限公司 | 一种wapi单播密钥协商方法 |
Non-Patent Citations (2)
Title |
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GBI5629.II-2003/XGI-2006,27 Jan 2006 pages 1,2,26,33-35 * |
ZHANG H.: "Reasearch and Design of Authentication Security Infrastructure ofWLAN", CHINESE DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS FULL-TEXT DATABASE, 15 May 2007 (2007-05-15), pages 64 - 67 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
EP2214368A1 (en) | 2010-08-04 |
KR20100072105A (ko) | 2010-06-29 |
RU2448427C2 (ru) | 2012-04-20 |
JP2011504332A (ja) | 2011-02-03 |
RU2010123944A (ru) | 2011-12-27 |
US20100250941A1 (en) | 2010-09-30 |
CN100566240C (zh) | 2009-12-02 |
CN101159543A (zh) | 2008-04-09 |
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