Classifications

• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
  • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
  • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
  • H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
  • H04L9/0844—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
  • H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
  • H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
  • H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
  • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
  • H04W36/0005—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off
  • H04W36/0011—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection
  • H04W36/0019—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection adapted for mobile IP [MIP]
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
  • H04L2209/80—Wireless
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W40/00—Communication routing or communication path finding
  • H04W40/34—Modification of an existing route
  • H04W40/36—Modification of an existing route due to handover
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W80/00—Wireless network protocols or protocol adaptations to wireless operation
  • H04W80/04—Network layer protocols, e.g. mobile IP [Internet Protocol]

Definitions

• the present invention relates to the field of communications technologies, and in particular, to a mobile IPv6 fast handover protection method and device. Background technique
• Mobile IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6, Internet Protocol version 6
• MN Mobile Node
• Switching, switching scenarios is shown in Figure 1.
• the MN cannot send or receive data packets for a period of time due to link transition delay and IPv6 protocol operation.
• This handover delay due to standard mobile IPv6 procedures ie, mobile detection, new care-of address configuration, and binding updates, etc.
• VoIP voice over IP, voice-based IP
• reducing switching latency can also bring significant benefits.
• FMIPv6 Fast handover for Mobile IPv6, Mobile IPv6 Fast Handover
• Mobile IPv6 fast handoff enables the mobile node to quickly detect if it has moved to a new subnet, which is done by providing new access points and associated subnet prefix information when the mobile node is still connected to the current subnet.
• Mobile IPv6 fast handover establishes a tunnel between PCoA (Previous Care of Address) and nCoA (new care of address), and MN sends an FBU to pAR (Previous Access Router). Fast Binding Update, fast binding update) message.
• the pAR receives FBU After confirming the validity of the MN's nCoA through the interaction with the nAR (New Access Router), the FBAck (Fast Binding Acknowledgement) is sent to the MN, and the PCoA and the PCA are established on the pAR.
• the nCoA establishes a binding, so that the traffic sent to the pAR link PCoA is redirected to the nCoA of the new access link.
• the SeND is used to protect the proxy router request and the proxy router advertisement message.
• the MN and the AR transmit an encrypted, shared handover key.
• the MN generates a public-private key pair for the exchange of the encryption and decryption shared switching key, which is the same as the shared key used by the SeND.
• the MN sends an RtSolP Router Solicitation for Proxy Advertisement message, in which the handover key request option is carried, and the option includes a public key for encrypting the handover key.
• the source address of the RtSolPr message is the CoA (Care of Address) generated by the MN based on CGA (Cryptographically Generated Address).
• the message needs to be signed with the MN CGA key, including the CGA parameter option.
• the AR uses SeND to verify the message. After the verification, the public key is used to encrypt a shared switching key.
• the encrypted switching key is placed in the switching key response option in the PrRtAdv (Proxy Router Advertisement) message. And sent to the MN, the MN decrypts the shared switching key, and when the MN sends the FBU to the AR, the switching key can be used to generate its authorized MAC.
• PrRtAdv Proxy Router Advertisement
• the scheme needs to support SeND, where CoA is generated based on CGA, so it is not applicable to CoA generated by other means.
• CGA is based on public key cryptography
• the calculation is complicated. Therefore, those computing powers are not strong, and storage resources are more valuable.
• the resource overhead of this mechanism is large.
• the MN also needs to verify the message sent by the AR, so the AR uses its public key cryptography mechanism to sign the message it sends, which also requires more computational overhead and public key certificate mechanism. stand by. Summary of the invention
• the embodiments of the present invention provide a method and a device for protecting a mobile IPv6 fast handover, which are used to implement fast handover signaling protection between a mobile node and a network side in a mobile IPv6 fast handover scenario.
• Embodiments of the present invention provide a method for protecting a mobile IPv6 fast handover, including the following steps:
• the verification code is added in the fast handover signaling and sent to the routing device.
• Embodiments of the present invention also provide a method for protecting a mobile IPv6 fast handover, including the following steps:
• An embodiment of the present invention further provides a mobile node, including:
• a protection key generation unit configured to generate a fast handover signaling protection key by using a key shared with the network side
• a verification code generating unit configured to generate a verification code according to the protection key generated by the protection key generating unit
• An embodiment of the present invention further provides a routing device, including:
• a verification code obtaining unit configured to acquire a verification code carried in the fast handover signaling from the mobile node
• a protection key acquisition unit configured to acquire, from a local or network side device, a protection key used by the mobile node to generate the verification code, where the protection key is generated by the mobile node by using a key shared by the network side ;
• the verification unit is configured to verify the verification code acquired by the verification code acquisition unit according to the protection key acquired by the protection key acquisition unit, and send the response to the mobile node when the verification is passed.
• Embodiments of the present invention also provide a mobile IPv6 fast handover protection system, including the mobile node described above and the routing device described above.
• the embodiment of the invention has the following advantages:
• the protection key of the fast handover signaling is used for the protection of the fast handover signaling, and the security problem of the fast handover message in the mobile IPv6 fast handover scenario is solved.
• the storage and computation process overhead is relatively small, and can be used for protection of the next fast handover signaling that the mobile node does not support the SeND protocol.
• FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a handover scenario of a mobile node in the prior art
• FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a fast handover process of a mobile node in the prior art
• FIG. 3 is a flowchart of a method for protecting a mobile IPv6 fast handover according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention
• FIG. 4 is a flowchart of a method for protecting a mobile IPv6 fast handover in Embodiment 2 of the present invention
• FIG. 5 is a flowchart of a method for protecting a mobile IPv6 fast handover according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
• FIG. 6 is a flowchart of a method for protecting a mobile IPv6 fast handover in Embodiment 4 of the present invention
• FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of a protection system for mobile IPv6 fast handover in Embodiment 5 of the present invention. detailed description
• a first embodiment of the present invention provides a method for protecting a mobile IPv6 fast handover, as shown in FIG. 3, including the following steps:
• Step s301 The mobile node generates a fast handover signaling protection key by using a key shared with the network side.
• the shared key may be: an MSK (Master Session Key) generated by the mobile node and the network side generated during the access authentication process of the mobile node. It is also possible to use a key that has been shared between other mobile nodes and the network side.
• MSK Master Session Key
• Step s302 The mobile node generates a verification code according to the protection key.
• protection key may be involved in the process of generating the protection key, including: mobile node device identifier, front router identifier, rear router identifier, preset string, forward care-of address, new care-of address, and protection key.
• mobile node device identifier identifier
• front router identifier identifier
• rear router identifier preset string
• forward care-of address new care-of address
• protection key One or more of length and random number.
• Step s303 The mobile node adds the verification code to the fast handover signaling and sends the verification code to the router.
• the fast handover signaling may be an RtSolPr message for the route requesting agent, or a fast binding update FBU message.
• Step s304 The router verifies the verification code in the fast handover signaling, and returns a response message after the verification succeeds.
• the router needs to obtain the protection key first, and use the protection key to verify the verification code.
• the acquisition of the protection key can be obtained by the protection key verification function entity on the router or the protection key verification function entity in the network.
• the response message may acknowledge the FBack message for the proxy router advertisement message PrRtAdv, or the fast binding update.
• the shared key derives the protection key of the fast handover signaling for fast handover signaling protection, and solves the security problem of fast handover message in the mobile IPv6 fast handover scenario.
• the storage and computation process overhead is compared. Small, and can be used for protection of the next fast handover signaling that the mobile node does not support the SeND protocol.
• the mobile node when the MN switches to an nAR during the mobile process, in order to acquire information of the new access link (such as a subnet prefix, etc.), the mobile node sends an RtSolPr message to the current access router pAR; After the message, the current access router pAR sends a PrRtAdv message to the mobile node, in which the information of the new access link is notified.
• the mobile node can learn the new subnet prefix while still located on the front access router link, and acquire the new care-of address nCoA, which can eliminate the delay caused by the new prefix discovery after the handover.
• the current access router has the function of verifying the access authentication of the mobile node as an example, wherein the authentication function entity Authenticator on the former access router is verified for the mobile node access authentication.
• a protection method for the mobile IPv6 fast handover in this embodiment is as shown in FIG. 4, and includes:
• Step s401 When the MN sends an FBU message to the pAR, the FBU message carries the identifier of the MN and the authentication code generated by the fast handover key Kf derived by using the MSK.
• the MN after performing the access authentication on the network side, the MN obtains the MSK shared with the network side, and uses the MSK to derive the key Kf.
• the derivative method of Kf can be specifically:
• Kf KDF (MSK, Label
• KDF Key Derivation Function
• Label is a string
• Label "FMIPv6" can be set here.
• pAR—ID is the former router identifier
• nAR-ID is the new router identifier
• nCoA is the new care-of address identifier
• pCoA is the forward care-of address identifier
• Key_length is the key length.
• the MN may further generate a verification code, and the verification code and the MN The identity is added in the FBU message.
• the KDF algorithm used by the above-mentioned derived Kf needs to be carried in the FBU message.
• the timestamp option can also be carried in the FBU message.
• the MN sends the FBU message to the pAR.
• Step s402 The pAR verifies the verification code in the FBU message, and sends an FBack message to the MN after the verification succeeds.
• the pAR receives the FBU message from the MN, and the internal mobile IPv6 fast handover function entity sends a key request to the verification function entity Authenticator, and the verification function entity Authenticator determines the MSK shared with the MN according to the identifier of the MN, and according to the FBU
• the KDF algorithm carried by the message generates Kf using the same method as the MN, and distributes the key Kf to the mobile IPv6 fast handover function entity, and the mobile IPv6 fast handover entity uses Kf to verify the verification code in the FBU message.
• the pAR When the verification is passed, the pAR generates an FBack message and sends it to the MN.
• the method provided by the embodiment of the present invention uses the key MSK shared by the mobile node MN and the network side to derive the protection key Kf of the fast handover signaling for fast handover signaling protection, and solves the problem of fast handover in the mobile IPv6 fast handover scenario.
• the security problem of the handover message is small for the mobile node MN, and can be used for the protection of the next fast handover signaling of the mobile node MN not supporting the SeND protocol.
• the current access router does not have the function of verifying the access authentication of the mobile node as an example.
• the verification function entity that authenticates the mobile node access authentication is the external access router. Authenticator.
• a protection method for the mobile IPv6 fast handover in this embodiment is as shown in FIG. 5, and includes:
• Step s501 When the MN sends the FBU message to the pAR, the FBU message carries the identifier of the MN, the verification code generated by the Kf derived by using the main session key MSK, and the information required for verifying the access authentication.
• the MN after performing the access authentication on the network side, the MN obtains the MSK shared with the network side, and uses the MSK to derive the key Kf.
• the derivative method of the Kf can refer to the above step s401.
• the MN uses Kf to generate a verification code of the FBU message, and adds the verification code and the identifier of the MN to the FBU message.
• the FBU message carries the algorithm of deriving Kf, and the information required for verifying the access authentication, such as pAR-ID and Authenticator-ID.
• the MN sends the FBU message to the pAR.
• Step s502 The pAR sends a key acquisition request to the authentication function entity Authenticator.
• the pAR When the pAR receives the FBU message from the MN, it extracts the content included in the message and sends a key acquisition request to the Authenticator.
• the key acquisition request message includes information such as MN-ID, pAR-ID, length of Kf, and a derivative algorithm.
• the key request acquisition message can be protected by cryptography, and the protection method can be IPSec (IP Security), TLS (Transport Layer Security), and the like.
• Step s503 The verification function entity Authenticator sends a key acquisition response to the pAR, where the response message carries the key Kf.
• the authentication function entity Authenticator After receiving the key acquisition request from the pAR, the authentication function entity Authenticator determines the MSK shared with the MN according to the MN-ID, generates Kf in the same manner as the MN in step s501, and sends a key acquisition response message to the pAR, The key Kf is distributed to the pAR. In addition, the key reply message also requires cryptographic protection.
• Step s504 The pAR verifies the verification code in the FBU message, and sends a FBack message to the MN after the verification succeeds.
• the pAR After receiving the Kf distributed by the Authenticator, the pAR uses Kf to verify the verification code in the FBU message. After the verification is passed, an FBack message is generated and sent to the MN.
• the protection key Kf of the fast handover signaling is used to protect the fast handover signaling by using the key MSK shared by the MN and the network side, and the fast handover in the fast handover scenario of the mobile IPv6 is solved.
• the security of the message is small for the MN, and can be used for the protection of the next fast handover signaling that the MN does not support the SeND protocol.
• the routing request agent advertises that the RtSolPr and the proxy router advertise the PrRtAdv message to establish a key to protect the mobile IPv6 fast handover to protect the fast handover of the mobile IPv6.
• the authentication function entity Authenticator outside the former access router is used to verify the mobile node access authentication, and the method for protecting the mobile IPv6 fast handover by using the RtSolPr/PrRtAdv message is described.
• FIG. 6 a method for protecting a mobile IPv6 fast handover is shown in FIG. 6, which includes:
• Step s601 The MN sends an RtSolPr message to the pAR, where the RtSolPr message carries the identifier of the MN, and an authentication code generated by the Kf derived by using the primary session key MSK, and information required for verifying the access authentication.
• Kf KDF (MSK, Label
• an Nc (Casual Number) generated by the MN is used when generating Kf.
• the MN uses Kf to generate the verification code of the RtSolPr message, and carries the algorithm of deriving Kf, and the information such as Nc, pAR-ID, nAR_ID, Authenticator-ID in the RtSolPr message, and sends the RtSolPr message to the forward access router.
• Step s602 The pAR sends a key acquisition request to the authentication function entity Authenticator.
• the pAR When the pAR receives the RtSolPr message from the MN, it extracts the content included in the message and sends a key acquisition request to the Authenticator corresponding to the Authenticator-ID.
• the key acquisition request message includes information such as MN-ID, pAR-ID, Nc, nAR_ID, length of Kf, and a derivative algorithm, and may also carry a temporary value Na generated by the pAR for preventing replay attacks.
• the key request acquisition message can be protected by cryptography, and the protection methods used may be IPSec (IP Security), TLS (Transport Layer Security), and the like.
• Step s603 the verification function entity Authenticator sends a key acquisition to the pAR.
• the response message carries the key Kf.
• the authentication function entity Authenticator After receiving the key acquisition request from the pAR, the authentication function entity Authenticator determines the MSK shared with the MN according to the MN-ID, generates Kf in the same manner as the MN in step s601, and sends a key acquisition response message to the pAR, The key Kf is distributed to the pAR.
• the message also includes the Na received in the previous step to prevent replay attacks.
• the key reply message also requires cryptographic protection.
• Step s604 The pAR verifies the verification code in the RtSolPr message, and the verification sends a PrRtAdv message to the MN.
• the pAR After receiving the key response message of the authentication function entity Authenticator, the pAR first performs the verification by Na, extracts the Kf, and uses Kf to verify the verification code in the RtSolPr message. When the verification is passed, a PrRtAdv message and its verification code are generated and sent to the MN;
• Step s605 The MN sends an FBU message to the pAR.
• the MN After receiving the PrRtAdv message sent by the pAR, the MN uses the Kf to verify the verification code carried in the message. When the verification succeeds, the FBU message is generated, and the verification code of the FBU message is generated by using the Kf, and the FBU carrying the newly generated verification code is carried. The message is sent to pAR. Since the Kf used by the MN is already stored on the pAR, the following fast handover procedure can be continued according to the method in the prior art, except that the subsequent signaling interactions are protected by Kf.
• the privacy identifier MN-PID may be generated for the MN according to the shared key between the Authenticator and the MN, and the MN-ID in all messages may be replaced by the privacy identifier, and The use of a privacy identifier is identified in the message.
• MN-PID PRF ( Kp, MN-ID
• Kp is the shared key between MN and Authenticator. It can be Kf, MSK or its derived key.
• PRF Pseudo Random Function
• MN-PID MN-PID
• the interface identifier of the nCoA may be generated in the following manner. nCoA IID to replace nCoA in all messages:
• nCoA— IID PRF ( Knr, nCoA_prefix
• the Knr is a shared key between the MN and the pAR, and the prefix nCoA_prefix and the interface identifier of the new access link of the nCoA in the PrRtAdv are connected together to generate the nCoA.
• the pAR After generating the nCoA IID, the pAR needs to announce in the PrRtAdv message that the MN needs to use the nCoA-IDID;
• the protection key of the fast handover signaling is derived by using the key shared by the mobile node and the network side for fast handover signaling protection, and the mobile IPv6 fast handover scenario is solved.
• the security problem of fast switching messages is small for the storage and computation process of the mobile node, and can be used for the protection of the next fast handover signaling that the mobile node does not support the SeND protocol.
• a mobile IPv6 fast handover protection system is further provided.
• the structure is as shown in FIG. 7, and includes: a mobile node 10 and a routing device 20, which are shared with the network side by using a mobile node.
• the key derives the protection key for fast handover signaling for fast handover signaling protection.
• the mobile node 10 further includes:
• the protection key generation unit 11 is configured to generate a fast handover signaling protection key by using a key shared with the network side.
• the shared key may be: an MSK generated by the mobile node and the network side generated during the access authentication process of the mobile node.
• the verification code generating unit 12 is configured to generate a verification code based on the protection key generated by the protection key generating unit 11. Other parameters may be involved in the process of generating the protection key, including: mobile node device identification, front router identification, post router identification, preset string, forward care-of address, new care-of address, protection key length, and random One or more of the numbers.
• the verification code adding unit 13 is configured to add the verification code generated by the verification code generating unit 12 to the fast switching signaling and transmit it to the router.
• the fast handover signaling may be an RtSolPr message for the route requesting agent or a fast binding update FBU message for fast switching signaling.
• the mobile node 10 may further include:
• the shared key storage unit 14 is configured to store a key shared with the network side and provide the key to the protection key generating unit 11 for protecting the key.
• the shared key may be: a primary session key MSK generated by the mobile node and the network side generated during the access authentication process of the mobile node.
• the routing device 20 further includes:
• the verification code obtaining unit 21 is configured to acquire a verification code carried in the fast handover signaling from the mobile node 10.
• the protection key acquisition unit 22 is configured to acquire, from the local or network side device, a protection key used by the verification code generated by the mobile node 10, and the protection key is generated by the mobile node 10 using a key shared with the network side.
• the verification unit 23 is configured to verify the verification code acquired by the verification code acquisition unit 21 according to the protection key acquired by the protection key acquisition unit 22, and send a response to the mobile node 10 when the verification is passed.
• routing device 20 may further include:
• the protection key verification function unit 24 is configured to acquire the protection key and provide it to the protection key acquisition unit 22 according to the key shared with the mobile node 10 and the parameters required to generate the protection key. In a specific network environment, the protection key verification functional unit 24 may also be located outside of the routing device 20 as a separate functional entity.
• the protection key of the fast handover signaling is derived by using the key shared by the mobile node and the network side for fast handover signaling protection, and the mobile IPv6 fast handover is solved.
• the security problem of the fast handover message in the scenario is that the storage and computation process overhead of the mobile node is relatively small, and can be used for the protection of the fast handover signaling of the mobile node that does not support the SeND protocol.
• the present invention can be implemented by hardware, or can be implemented by means of software plus a necessary general hardware platform.
• the technical solution of the present invention may be embodied in the form of a software product, which may be stored in a non-volatile storage medium (which may be a CD-ROM, a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, etc.), including several Command to make a computer device (can be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.)
• a non-volatile storage medium which may be a CD-ROM, a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, etc.
• the methods described in various embodiments of the invention are performed.

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• 2007
  • 2007-11-09 CN CN2007101881069A patent/CN101431753B/zh not_active Expired - Fee Related
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