WO2009012676A1 - Procédé et équipement pour générer une adresse temporaire, procédé et système pour améliorer la sécurité d'optimisation de route - Google Patents

Procédé et équipement pour générer une adresse temporaire, procédé et système pour améliorer la sécurité d'optimisation de route Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2009012676A1
WO2009012676A1 PCT/CN2008/071269 CN2008071269W WO2009012676A1 WO 2009012676 A1 WO2009012676 A1 WO 2009012676A1 CN 2008071269 W CN2008071269 W CN 2008071269W WO 2009012676 A1 WO2009012676 A1 WO 2009012676A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
address
binding
care
mobile node
module
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2008/071269
Other languages
English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
Chunqiang Li
Original Assignee
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. filed Critical Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Publication of WO2009012676A1 publication Critical patent/WO2009012676A1/fr

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W80/00—Wireless network protocols or protocol adaptations to wireless operation
    • H04W80/04—Network layer protocols, e.g. mobile IP [Internet Protocol]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
    • H04W88/14—Backbone network devices

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of mobile communications, and in particular, to a method and apparatus for generating a care-of address and a method and system for improving route optimization security.
  • IPV6 is a solution for mobility at the network layer.
  • MN Mobile Node
  • CN Correspondent Node, communication node or communication peer
  • HA Home Agent
  • a mobile node can be uniquely identified by HoA (Home Address), which is a global unicast routable address assigned to the mobile node.
  • HoA Home Address
  • the Mobile IPv6 specification requires that the mobile node move from one link to another without interrupting the ongoing communication using the home address, and the mobility of the node is transparent to the transport layer and other higher layer protocols.
  • the mobile node When the mobile node roams to the foreign network, it will generate a CoA (Care of Address) in a certain way, and notify the home agent through the BU (Binding Update).
  • the home agent intercepts the message sent to the mobile node's home network to communicate with the mobile node, and then forwards the message to the mobile node through the tunnel mode.
  • the mobile node sends a message to the communication node, the packet is encapsulated and sent to the home agent.
  • the home agent decapsulates the tunnel message and forwards it to the communication node. After receiving the message, the communication node returns a BA (Binding Acknowledge) message to confirm the BU message.
  • BA Billing Acknowledge
  • Such a communication method in which a mobile node and a communication node transit through a home agent is called a triangular routing mode.
  • the two-corner routing mode increases the communication delay, the overhead of the packet header that communicates with the mobile node is large, the burden of the mobile node's home link is increased, and the route may not be optimized enough.
  • Another communication mode of the mobile node and the communication node is a route optimization mode, that is, the current location information (ie, CoA) of the mobile node is notified to the communication node by the BU, and the communication node and the mobile node do not go through the home agent transfer but directly Communication.
  • the communication between the mobile node and the communication node is vulnerable to attack. For example, if the attacker replaces the CoA in the BU message with a forged CoA, the mobile node cannot receive the message sent by the communication node; the attacker can also replay the BU message previously sent by the mobile node, and the communication node will follow the The old address in the BU message sends the data packet instead of its current location; if the CoA is not checked, the malicious node can also forge the BU message to use a victim node address as the CoA, thereby causing the communication node to send a large amount of data to the victim node.
  • the interface identifier may adopt a method of randomly selecting one data as an interface identifier, or may generate an interface identifier according to the MAC address of the mobile node.
  • the inventors have found that at least the following problems exist in the prior art for generating a care-of address: For a method of randomly selecting one data as an interface identifier, the communication node cannot obtain the verification information of the care-of address; The method of generating the interface identifier and the care-of address, when the communication node and the mobile node are not in the same subnet, the packet header sent by the mobile node to the communication node does not carry the MAC address of the mobile node, so the communication node cannot Verifying the care-of address; Since the care-of address cannot be verified, the mobile node and the communication node are very insecure when communicating, such as the communication node sending data to the wrong care-of address and so on.
  • the MN sends a HoTI (Home Test Init) message to the CN.
  • the inner source IP address of the message is HoA (for tunneling by the home agent to the CN), and requests to obtain a home secret generation token (Home Keygen Token) ), which can also carry a cookie (a random number generated by MN - a small dessert).
  • a home secret generation token (Home Keygen Token)
  • the following method is used to calculate the home secret generation token:
  • Ken is the secret that only CN knows, and Nonce is a random number generated by CN.
  • the CN After generating the home secret generation token, the CN sends the home secret generation token to the HoT (Home Test, Home Test) message (ie, the response message to the HoTI message) to the MN, and will also receive the received HoTI message.
  • the cookie is placed in the HoT message.
  • the MN also sends a CoTI (Care of Test Init) message to the CN, transmits the MN's CoA to the CN, and requests a Care-of Keygen Token, which can also be carried. Cookie.
  • CoTI Care of Test Init
  • the CN receives the CoTI message, the following method is used to calculate the handover secret generation token:
  • Care-of Keygen Token First (64, HMAC-SHA1 (Ken, CoA ( Nonce
  • the CN After generating the handover secret generation token, the CN sends the handover secret generation token to the MN (Care of Test) message (that is, the response message to the CoTI message), and also sends the received cookie to the MN. Send it in the CoT message.
  • MN Care of Test
  • the MN After receiving the HoT and CoT messages returned by the CN, the MN performs a cookie check respectively. After the verification is passed, the home secret generation token is taken out from the HoT, and the secret generation token is taken out from the CoT, and then the Kbm is calculated as follows:
  • Kbm SHA1 (Home Keygen Token
  • the MAC Message Authentication Code
  • the binding authorization data is placed in the BU message.
  • the Kbm is generated by the same method.
  • a MAC is generated to verify the MAC in the BU message, thereby determining the correctness of the received BU message.
  • Kbm SHA1 (Home Keygen Token) ;
  • the generated Kbm is then used to generate the MAC in the BU message as a verification of the BU message.
  • the attacker can illegally obtain the HoT message and the CoT message, and use the same method to calculate and generate the Kbm, thereby forging the BU message.
  • the attacker sneaked out the CoT message sent by the CN to MNa, extracted the handover secret generation token, intercepted the HoT message sent by the CN to the MNb, extracted the home secret generation token, and then calculated the Kbm, and the CoAa Binding with the HoTb sends a BU message to the CN.
  • the BU can be verified and accepted by the CN. Therefore, the traffic sent by the CN to the MNb through route optimization is redirected to the MNa, resulting in reduced security of data transmission.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a method and apparatus for generating a care-of address.
  • the technical solution is as follows:
  • a method of generating a care-of address comprising:
  • the interface identifier is combined with a prefix of an external network accessed by the mobile node to generate a care-of address.
  • An apparatus for generating a care-of address comprising:
  • An interface identifier generating module configured to generate an interface identifier by using a one-way function operation with the home address of the mobile node as an input; the care-of address generating module, configured to use the interface identifier generated by the interface identifier generating module and the external access of the mobile node The prefix of the network is combined to generate a care-of address.
  • the CN can obtain the verification information of the care-of address, which limits the attack caused by the misuse of the mobile mechanism, and improves the attack.
  • Mobile IPv6 CoA security By inputting the home address HoA of the mobile node MN and using the one-way function operation to generate the interface identifier and the care-of address CoA, the CN can obtain the verification information of the care-of address, which limits the attack caused by the misuse of the mobile mechanism, and improves the attack. Mobile IPv6 CoA security.
  • the embodiment of the invention provides a method for improving route optimization security. And system.
  • the technical solution is as follows:
  • the embodiment of the present invention provides a method for improving route optimization security, where the method includes: the mobile node generates an interface identifier by using a one-way function operation with the home address as an input;
  • the mobile node combines the interface identifier with a prefix of an external network accessed by the mobile node to generate a care-of address
  • the mobile node and the communication node perform a return route reachability process by using the home address and the care-of address, and then generate the same binding management key respectively;
  • the mobile node and the communication node respectively generate binding authorization data by using the binding management key generated by the mobile node, and the mobile node sends a binding update message including the home address, the care-of address, and the binding authorization data generated by itself to the mobile node.
  • the communication node After receiving the binding update message, the communication node verifies the binding authorization data in the binding update message, and if the binding authorization data generated by itself is consistent, the mobile node is allowed to perform routing with the communication node. Communication in optimized mode.
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides a method for improving route optimization security, where the method includes: the mobile node generates an interface identifier by using a one-way function operation with the home address as an input, and the home address is passed through a cryptographic method.
  • the mobile node combines the interface identifier with a prefix of an external network accessed by the mobile node to generate a care-of address
  • the mobile node and the communication node perform a return route reachability process by using the home address and the care-of address; the mobile node signs a binding update message with its own private key as the binding authorization data of the binding update message; Sending, by the mobile node, the binding update message that includes the home address, the care-of address, and the binding authorization data to the communication node, and carrying the public key of the mobile node in the binding update message;
  • the communication node After receiving the binding update message, the communication node extracts the public key of the mobile node, and uses the public key of the mobile node to verify the binding authorization data in the binding update message. The mobile node is then allowed to communicate with the communication node in a route optimization mode.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a system for improving route optimization security, where the system includes a mobile node and a communication node, and the mobile node includes:
  • a care-of address generating module configured to generate an interface identifier by using a one-way function operation with the home address of the mobile node as an input; and combining the interface identifier with a prefix of an external network accessed by the mobile node to generate a care-of address;
  • a key generation module configured to perform a return route reachability process by using the home address and the care-of address generated by the care-of address generation module together with the communication node, and then generate a binding management key
  • An authorization data generating module configured to generate binding authorization data by using a binding management key generated by the key generation module
  • a sending module configured to send a care-of address generated by the home address, the care-of address generating module, and a binding update message of the binding authorization data generated by the authorization data generating module to the communication node;
  • the communication node includes:
  • a key generation module configured to perform a return route reachability process by using the home address and the care-of address generated by the care-of address generation module together with the mobile node, and then generate a key generation module generated by the mobile node Bind the management key with the same management key;
  • An authorization data generating module configured to generate binding authorization data by using a binding management key generated by a key generation module of the communication node
  • a receiving module configured to receive a binding update message sent by the sending module
  • a comparison module configured to compare the binding authorization data in the binding update message received by the receiving module with the binding authorization data generated by the authorization data generating module of the communication node;
  • control module configured to allow the mobile node to perform communication in a route optimization mode with the communication node when the comparison module matches the result.
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides a system for improving route optimization security, where the system includes a mobile node and a communication node, and the mobile node includes:
  • a care-of address generating module configured to generate an interface identifier by using a one-way function operation by using a home address of the mobile node as an input; and combining the interface identifier with a prefix of an external network accessed by the mobile node to generate a care-of address, where the hometown The address is generated by a cryptographic method;
  • a route reachable execution module configured to perform a return route reachability process by using the home address and the care-of address generated by the care-of address generation module together with the communication node;
  • An authorization data generating module configured to sign, by using a private key of the mobile node, a binding update message as binding authorization data of the binding update message;
  • a sending module configured to send the binding update message that includes the home address, the care-of address generated by the care-of address generating module, and the binding authorization data generated by the authorization data generating module, to the communication node, and
  • the binding update message carries a public key of the mobile node
  • the communication node includes:
  • a route reachable execution module configured to perform a return route reachability process by using the home address and the care-of address generated by the care-of address generation module together with the mobile node;
  • a receiving module configured to receive a binding update message sent by the sending module
  • a verification module configured to extract a public key of the mobile node in a binding update message received by the receiving module, and use The public key of the mobile node verifies the binding authorization data in the binding update message;
  • control module configured to allow the mobile node to perform communication in a route optimization mode with the communication node when the verification module passes the verification.
  • the return route reachability procedure RRP is performed using the CoA; then the binding management key Kbm is calculated, and the binding authorization data is generated by using Kbm, which is used for the BU The message is verified.
  • the HoA is generated by CGA (Cryptographically Generated Addresses)
  • the BU message is verified by using the MN's private key to sign the BU message as the binding authorization data.
  • the MN and the MN are authenticated.
  • the CN can perform communication in the route optimization mode, which limits the attacks caused by the misuse of the mobile mechanism, and improves the security of the communication in the route optimization mode of the mobile IPv6.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a return route reachable process in the prior art
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a method for generating a care-of address according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention
  • FIG. 3 is a structural diagram of an apparatus for generating a care-of address according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a structural diagram of a system for improving roadway optimization security according to Embodiment 4 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 6 is a flowchart of another method for improving route optimization security according to Embodiment 5 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 7 is a structural diagram of another system for improving route optimization security according to Embodiment 6 of the present invention. detailed description
  • a care-of address CoA is generated on the basis of the home address HoA of the mobile node, and the return route reachable process RRP is performed by using the CoA, and then the binding management key Kbm is calculated, and the binding authorization data is generated by using Kbm.
  • the BU message is verified by using the MN's private key signature BU message as the binding authorization data; after the verification is passed, the MN and the CN can perform the communication in the route optimization mode.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for generating a care-of address, which specifically includes:
  • Step 101 Generate an identifier OID by a one-way function operation with the HoA of the MN as an input.
  • the formula for calculating the operation using the one-way function PRF is as follows:
  • the Expression can be the HoA of the MN, or the combination of the network prefix (Subnet Prefix) and the HoA of the external network accessed by the MN;
  • the PRF is a one-way cryptographic function, which can be MD5, SHA-1, SHA256 or AES- One-way function such as XCBC-PRF. Therefore the above formula can take many forms, for example:
  • OID SHA-1 (HoA);
  • OID MD5 (HoA I Subnet Prefix) and so on.
  • Step 102 After generating the OID, the MN processes the OID to obtain an interface identifier (Interface ID) of 64 bits in length. If the length of the OID exceeds 64 bits, there are several ways to process it. For example, it can be processed as follows:
  • Interface ID Abs (64, n, OID);
  • the first 64 bits starting from the n bit are selected as the interface ID from the OID.
  • the interface identifier and the corresponding CoA can be regenerated by changing the value of n.
  • the OID is divided into multiple blocks according to 64 bits. If the last block in the division process is less than 64 bits, the content of the corresponding length is arbitrarily added to 64 bits from other blocks, assuming that the OID is divided into N blocks, respectively
  • Blockl, Block2, ..., BlockN the interface identifier can be calculated as follows:
  • Interface ID Blockl ⁇ Block2 ten...10 BlockN;
  • Step 103 After generating the interface identifier of the CoA, the MN combines the prefix Subnet Prefix of the accessed external network with the interface identifier to generate a CoA of the MN.
  • prefix Subnet Prefix is 0x31223344 and the interface identifier is 0x55667788, then 0x31223344 and 0x55667788 are connected together to get 0x3122334455667788, which is the MN CoA.
  • the foregoing step 101 may be specifically as follows:
  • the MN's HoA is combined with the MN's public key as an input, or the prefix of the external network accessed by the MN is combined with the HoA and the public key as input, and the interface identifier is generated by a one-way function operation, that is, the Expression may also include the MN. Public key information.
  • the interface identifier and the CoA are generated by using a one-way function operation, so that the CN can obtain the verification information of the care-of address, which limits the attack caused by the misuse of the mobile mechanism, and improves the mobile IPv6.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides an apparatus for generating a care-of address, which specifically includes:
  • an interface identifier generating module 201 configured to generate an interface identifier by using a one-way function operation with the home address of the mobile node as an input;
  • the care-of address generation module 202 is configured to combine the interface identifier generated by the interface identifier generation module 201 with the prefix of the external network accessed by the mobile node to generate a care-of address.
  • the interface identifier generation module 201 may specifically include:
  • a combination unit configured to combine a prefix of an external network accessed by the mobile node with a home address of the mobile node
  • a generating unit is configured to input the data obtained by combining the combined units as an input, and generate an interface identifier by a one-way function operation.
  • the interface identifier generating module 201 may specifically include:
  • a combination unit configured to combine the home address of the mobile node with the public key of the mobile node, or combine the prefix of the external network accessed by the mobile node with the home address and the public key;
  • a generating unit is configured to input the data obtained by combining the combined units as an input, and generate an interface identifier by a one-way function operation.
  • the above device may further include:
  • the length processing module is configured to determine whether the length of the interface identifier generated by the interface identifier generating module 201 exceeds 64 bits, and if yes, set a start bit, starting from the start bit, and taking 64 bits as a new interface identifier. Send to the care-of address generation module 202.
  • the above device may also include:
  • a length processing module configured to determine whether the length of the interface identifier generated by the interface identifier generating module 201 exceeds 64 bits, and if yes, divide the interface identifier into multiple blocks according to 64 bits, if the last block is less than 64 bits, From its Any content in the block whose corresponding length is taken is added to 64 bits, and then bit logic operations are performed on the plurality of blocks, and the result of the operation is sent to the care-of address generation module 202 as a new interface identifier.
  • the above apparatus may further include:
  • the address checking module is configured to: when the care-of address generating module 202 generates the care-of address, determine whether the care-of address is the same as the used IP address in the network, if the same, set the increment, and set the start bit of the length processing module. The quantity is summed, and the result of the operation is a new start bit, taking 64 bits as an interface identifier and generating a new care-of address.
  • the interface identifier generation module 201 takes the HoA of the MN as an input, generates a interface identifier by using a one-way function operation, and the care-of address generation module 202 generates a CoA according to the interface identifier, so that the CN can obtain the verification information of the care-of address, which limits the The attack caused by the misuse of the mobile mechanism improves the security of the mobile IPv6 CoA.
  • the address check module performs an address check on the generated CoA to avoid address conflicts in the network and improve the security of generating the care-of address.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for improving route optimization security, which specifically includes the following steps: Step 301: The MN generates an interface identifier by using a one-way function operation with HoA as an input.
  • Step 302 The MN combines the interface identifier with the prefix of the external network accessed by the MN to generate a CoA.
  • the duplicated address detection may be performed on the generated CoA, that is, whether the generated CoA is the same as the used IP address in the network. If the address conflict occurs, the interface ID is regenerated according to the following steps. Then regenerate an available CoA:
  • Step 303 The MN and the CN both use the HoA of the MN and the generated CoA to perform a return route reachability process.
  • the CN When the MN first initiates the registration with the CN, the CN generates the home secret generation token and the handover secret generation token respectively in the return route reachability process, and transmits the secret generation token to the MN through HoT and CoT.
  • the MN does not register the CN with the peer for the first time, only the CoTI and the CoT can be executed in the return route reachable process, and the CN only generates the handover secret generation token and transmits it to the MN through the CoT.
  • the MN deregisters the binding relationship with the CN
  • only the HoTI and the HoT can be executed in the process of returning the reachable route, and the CN generates only the home secret generation token and transmits it to the MN through the HoT.
  • Step 304 The CN generates Kbm according to the token generated in the return route reachable process, and the MN generates Kbm according to the token extracted from the received test response message; the Kbm generated by the MN is the same as the Kbm generated by the CN.
  • Step 305 The MN and the CN respectively generate binding authorization data by using the respective generated Kbm.
  • Step 306 The MN sends a BU message including the HoA and the CoA of the MN to the CN, and carries the binding authorization data generated by the MN in the BU message.
  • the MN may further set a minimum time interval for performing RRP and sending a BU message. Accordingly, the CN may also limit the maximum number of BU messages received per unit time according to requirements, and the like.
  • Step 307 After receiving the BU message, the CN verifies the binding authorization data in the BU message, and compares the binding authorization data generated by the CN with the binding authorization data in the BU message. If they are consistent, the CN and the CN are allowed. The MN performs communication in the route optimization mode. If it is inconsistent, it indicates that the BU message received by the CN is incorrect at this time, and the MN and the CN are not allowed to perform communication in the route optimization mode.
  • step of verifying the CoA in the BU message may be added before the binding authorization data in the CN verification BU message (step 307), as follows:
  • the CN extracts the HoA of the MN from the received BU message, and generates a temporary CoA according to the same method as the steps 301 to 302 according to the HoA, and then compares the generated CoA and the CoA in the BU message to be consistent. If the agreement is consistent, the binding authorization data is verified. If the current BU message is incorrect, the original BU message may be a forged BU message.
  • the MN and the CN are not allowed to perform communication in the route optimization mode.
  • the handover address CoA is generated on the basis of the home address HoA of the mobile node MN, and the return route reachability procedure RRP is performed by using the CoA, and then the binding management key Kbm is calculated, and the binding authorization data is generated by using Kbm. It is used to verify the BU message. After the verification is passed, the MN and the CN can communicate in the route optimization mode, which limits the attack caused by the misuse of the mobile mechanism, thereby improving the security of the communication in the route optimization mode of the mobile IPv6. . Before verifying the binding authorization data, the CoA in the BU message can be further verified, which can further improve the security of the communication in the route optimization mode.
  • an embodiment of the present invention further provides a system for improving route optimization security, specifically including a mobile node 401 and a communication node 402.
  • the mobile node 401 includes:
  • the care-of address generation module 4011 is configured to generate an interface identifier by using a one-way function operation with the home address of the mobile node 401 as an input; and combining the interface identifier with a prefix of the external network accessed by the mobile node 401 to generate a care-of address;
  • a key generation module 4012 configured to perform a return route reachability process with the care-of address generated by the home address and the care-of address generation module 401 together with the communication node 402, and then generate a binding management key;
  • an authorization data generating module 4013 configured to generate a binding by using a binding management key generated by the key generation module 4012.
  • Authorization data
  • a sending module 4014 configured to send a binding update message including a home address, a care-of address generated by the care-of address generating module 4011, and a binding authorization data generated by the authorization data generating module 4013 to the communication node 402;
  • Communication node 402 includes:
  • the key generation module 4021 is configured to use the home address and the care-of address generation module together with the mobile node 401.
  • the care-of address generated by 4011 performs a return route reachability process, and then generates a binding management key identical to the binding management key generated by the key generation module 4012 of the mobile node 401;
  • an authorization data generating module 4022 configured to generate binding authorization data by using a binding management key generated by the key generation module 4021 of the communication node 402;
  • the receiving module 4023 is configured to receive a binding update message sent by the sending module 4014.
  • the matching module 4024 is configured to compare the binding authorization data in the binding update message received by the receiving module 4023 with the binding authorization data generated by the authorization data generating module 4022 of the communication node 402.
  • the control module 4025 is configured to allow the mobile node 401 to communicate with the communication node 402 in the route optimization mode when the comparison result of the comparison module 4024 is consistent.
  • the foregoing communication node 402 may further include:
  • the care-of address matching module is configured to extract the home address of the mobile node 401 from the binding update message received by the receiving module 4023 before the comparison module 4024 is compared, and use the care-of address generation module 4011 according to the home address
  • the method of generating the same care-of address generates a temporary care-of address, and verifies whether the temporary care-of address is consistent with the care-of address in the binding update message. If they are consistent, the comparison module 4024 is triggered to work.
  • the care-of address ACA is generated by the care-of address generation module 4011 on the basis of the home address HoA of the mobile node 401MN, and the key generation module 4012 uses the CoA to perform the return route reachability process RRP, and then calculates the binding management key.
  • Kbm the authorization data generating module 4013 uses Kbm to generate binding authorization data, which is used to verify the BU message.
  • the MN and the CN can perform communication in the route optimization mode, which limits the misuse of the mobile mechanism. Attack, thereby improving the security of communication in the mobile IPv6 route optimization mode.
  • the CoA in the BU message is verified by the care-of address matching module, which can further improve the security of the communication in the route optimization mode.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for improving route optimization security, which specifically includes the following steps: Step 501: The MN generates an interface identifier by using a one-way function operation with HoA as an input, where the HoA is generated based on a CGA manner. .
  • the MN can also use the network prefix (Subnet Prefix) of the external network accessed by the MN and the public key of the MN.
  • the HoA combination is used as an input to generate an interface identifier through a one-way function operation.
  • Step 502 The MN combines the interface identifier with the prefix of the external network accessed by the MN to generate a CoA.
  • the duplicated address detection may be performed on the generated CoA, that is, whether the generated CoA is the same as the used IP address in the network. If the address conflict occurs, the interface ID is regenerated according to the following steps. Then regenerate an available CoA:
  • Interface ID Abs (64, n, OID).
  • Step 503 The MN and the CN both use the HoA of the MN and the generated CoA to perform a return route reachability process.
  • the CN When the MN first initiates the registration with the CN, the CN generates the home secret generation token and the handover secret generation token respectively in the return route reachability process, and transmits the secret generation token to the MN through HoT and CoT.
  • the MN does not register the CN with the peer for the first time, only the CoTI and the CoT can be executed in the return route reachable process, and the CN only generates the handover secret generation token and transmits it to the MN through the CoT.
  • the MN deregisters the binding relationship with the CN
  • only the HoTI and the HoT can be executed in the process of returning the reachable route, and the CN generates only the home secret generation token and transmits it to the MN through the HoT.
  • Step 504 After returning the route reachable process, the MN signs the BU message with the private key of the MN, and acts as the binding authorization data in the BU message, and then sends the BU message to the CN, and carries the CGA parameter information in the BU message. This includes the MN's public key.
  • Step 505 After receiving the BU message sent by the MN, the CN extracts the public key of the MN in the CGA parameter information in the BU message, and uses the public key to verify the binding authorization data in the BU message. If the verification succeeds, the binding is generated.
  • the entry allows the CN and the MN to communicate in the route optimization mode; if the verification fails, the CN sends an error code to the MN, and does not allow the CN and the MN to perform communication in the route optimization mode.
  • the MN may further set a minimum time interval for performing RRP and sending a BU message. Accordingly, the CN may also limit the maximum number of BU messages received per unit time according to requirements, and the like.
  • the CN may further generate a random number Ks, and encrypt the random number Ks by using the public key of the MN, and then send the encrypted Ks to the MN in the BA message; and the CN may also use the following The method generates Kbm, and combines Ks with the transfer secret generation token to perform a one-way function operation to generate Kbm, and uses the Kbm to generate binding authorization data as a basis for verifying the BA message;
  • Kbm PRF(Ks, Care-ofKeygen Token);
  • the MN After receiving the BA message, the MN extracts the encrypted random number Ks in the BA message, and decrypts it using the MN's private key to obtain Ks, and generates a new Kbm using the same method as the CN generates the above Kbm:
  • the MN can use the newly generated Kbm to generate new binding authorization data, which is used as the basis for verifying the BU message in the subsequent peer registration process, and can also use the new binding authorization data to verify the BA message, if it is in the BA message.
  • the binding authorization data is consistent, that is, the authentication is passed, and the CN and the MN are allowed to perform communication in the routing mode; otherwise, the CN and the MN are not allowed to perform communication in the routing mode.
  • the MN may further carry the identifier information in the BU message, indicating that the CoA of the MN is generated by a one-way function operation, and correspondingly, before the binding authorization data in the BU message is verified by the CN, the verification BU message is added.
  • the steps of the CoA are as follows:
  • the CN initiates verification of the CoA in the BU message according to the identifier information in the received BU message, extracts the drawn HoA from the BU message, and generates a temporary according to the HoA according to the same method as steps 501 to 502.
  • the CoA is then consistent with the CoA in the generated temporary CoA and the BU message. If the CoA is valid, the CoA authentication is passed, and the binding authorization data in the BU message can be verified. If not, the CoA authentication fails.
  • the current BU message is incorrect. It may be a forged BU message.
  • the CN sends an error code to the MN.
  • the CN and the MN are not allowed to communicate in the route optimization mode.
  • the MN may also carry the parameter involved in generating the interface identifier in step 502 in the BU message.
  • the MN may carry the parameters used by the CGA to generate the HoA in the BU message, for example, the public key information of the MN, the collision count and the modifier (ie, the random number), and the like;
  • the parameters used by the CGA to generate the HoA in the BU message for example, the public key information of the MN, the collision count and the modifier (ie, the random number), and the like;
  • the CN After receiving the BU message, the CN extracts the above parameters, and calculates a temporary HoA by using the same CGA method as in step 501, and then compares with the HoA in the temporary HoA and the BU message. If they are consistent, the HoA verification is performed. The CN can continue to verify the CoA and the binding authorization data in the BU message; otherwise, the HoA authentication fails, indicating that the BU message is incorrect, the CN sends an error code to the MN, and the MN and the CN are not allowed to perform communication in the route optimization mode.
  • the above method generates a handover address CoA based on the home address HoA of the mobile node MN, uses the CoA to perform a return route reachability procedure RRP, and then uses the MN's private key to sign the BU message as the binding authorization data in the BU message. It is used to verify the BU message. After the verification is passed, the MN and the CN can perform communication in the route optimization mode, which limits the attack caused by the misuse of the mobile mechanism, and improves the security of the communication in the route optimization mode of the mobile IPv6. By adding the steps of verifying the HoA and CoA in the BU message and verifying the BA message, the security of the communication in the route optimization mode can be further improved.
  • the HoA is generated based on the CGA, which ensures that the HoTI/HoT message is not required to be generated in the subsequent peer registration, which reduces the routing optimization signaling overhead. It reduces the dependence of the route optimization on the HA and improves the robustness of the system. The delay and complexity of the update of the binding of the mobile node to the communication node during link switching.
  • an embodiment of the present invention further provides a system for improving route optimization security, specifically including a mobile node 601 and a communication node 602;
  • Mobile node 601 includes:
  • the care-of address generation module 6011 is configured to generate an interface identifier by using a one-way function operation with the home address of the mobile node 601 as an input; and combine the interface identifier with the prefix of the external network accessed by the mobile node 601 to generate a care-of address, and the home address passes Cryptographic method generation;
  • a return route reachable execution module 6012 configured to perform a return route reachability process using the care-of address generated by the home address and the care-of address generation module 6011 together with the communication node 602;
  • an authorization data generating module 6013 configured to use the private key of the mobile node 601 to sign the binding update message as the binding authorization data of the binding update message;
  • the sending module 6014 is configured to send a binding update message including the home address, the care-of address generated by the care-of address generating module 6011, and the binding authorization data generated by the authorization data generating module 6013 to the communication node 602, and update the binding
  • the message carries the public key of the mobile node 601;
  • Communication node 602 includes:
  • a return route reachable execution module 6021 configured to perform a return route reachable process using the care-of address generated by the home address and the care-of address generation module 6011 together with the mobile node 601;
  • the receiving module 6022 is configured to receive a binding update message sent by the sending module 6014.
  • a verification module 6023 configured to extract a public key of the mobile node 601 in the binding update message received by the receiving module 6022, and verify the binding authorization data in the binding update message by using the public key of the mobile node 601;
  • the control module 6024 is configured to allow the mobile node 601 to perform communication in the route optimization mode with the communication node 602 when the verification module 6023 passes the verification.
  • the communication node 602 can also include:
  • the care-of address verification module is configured to: before the verification module 6023 performs verification, extract the home address of the mobile node 601 from the binding update message received by the receiving module 6022, and generate a care-of address according to the home address and the care-of address generation module 6011. The same method generates a temporary care-of address, and verifies whether the temporary care-of address is consistent with the care-of address in the binding update message. If they are consistent, the verification module 6023 is triggered to work.
  • the sending module 6014 is further configured to carry, in the binding update message, parameters used when generating the home address by using the foregoing cryptographic method, for example, the public key information, the collision count, and the modifier (ie, the random number) of the mobile node 601. And so on; correspondingly, the communication node 602 may further include:
  • the home address verification module is configured to receive the binding from the receiving module 6022 before the verification module 6023 performs verification.
  • the above parameters are extracted in the update message, and a temporary home address is generated according to the extracted parameters, and the temporary home address is verified to be consistent with the home address in the binding update message. If they are consistent, the verification module 6023 is triggered to work.
  • control module 6024 may specifically include:
  • a new authorization data generating unit configured to generate a random number when the verification module 6023 passes the verification, using the mobile node
  • the public key of 601 is encrypted; after the random number is combined with the handover secret generation token generated by the communication node 602 in the process of performing the return route reachability, the one-way function is used to generate a new binding management key; Binding the management key to generate new binding authorization data;
  • a binding confirmation message sending unit configured to send a binding confirmation message to the mobile node 601, where the binding confirmation message carries the random number encrypted by the new authorization data generating unit and the generated new binding authorization data;
  • the mobile node 601 further includes:
  • a binding confirmation message receiving module configured to receive a binding confirmation message sent by the binding confirmation message sending unit
  • a binding confirmation message verification module configured to: after the binding confirmation message receiving module receives the binding confirmation message, extracting The encrypted random number is decrypted by the private key of the mobile node to obtain a random number; according to the random number, a temporary binding management key is generated by the same method as the new authorization data generating unit generates a new binding management key, and according to the method The temporary binding management key generates a temporary binding authorization data in the same manner as the new authorization data generating unit generates new binding authorization data, and then compares the new binding authorization in the temporary binding authorization data and the binding confirmation message. Whether the data is consistent;
  • control module configured to allow the mobile node 601 to perform communication in the route optimization mode with the communication node 602 when the binding confirmation message verification module matches the result.
  • the system generates a care-of address CoA based on the home address HoA of the mobile node 601MN by the care-of address generation module 6011, and the return route reachability execution module 6012 uses the CoA to perform a return route reachability procedure RRP, which is used by the authorization data generation module 6013.
  • the MN's private key signature BU message generates binding authorization data, which is used to verify the BU message. After the verification is passed, the MN and the CN can perform communication in the route optimization mode, which limits the attack caused by the misuse of the mobile mechanism, and improves The security of communication in the route optimization mode of mobile IPv6.
  • the handover address verification module may further verify the CoA in the BU message, and the home address verification module verifies the HoA in the BU message, and the binding confirmation message verification module is The BA message is verified, which can further improve the security of communication in the route optimization mode.
  • the HoA is generated based on the CGA, which ensures that the HoTI/HoT message is not required to be generated in the subsequent peer registration, which reduces the routing optimization signaling overhead. It reduces the dependence of the route optimization on the HA and improves the robustness of the system.
  • the technical solution in the embodiment of the present invention can be implemented by using software, and the corresponding program can be stored in a readable storage medium.
  • Quality such as a computer's hard disk or non-volatile memory such as flash memory.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention propose un procédé et un équipement pour générer une adresse temporaire, et un procédé et un système pour améliorer la sécurité d'optimisation de route. L'invention appartient au domaine des communications mobiles. Le procédé qui génère l'adresse temporaire comprend les étapes suivantes : l'identifiant d'interface est généré par la fonction unidirectionnelle utilisant l'adresse mère (HoA) comme entrée ; l'adresse temporaire (CoA) est générée par combinaison de l'identifiant d'interface et du préfixe d'un réseau externe qui est visité par le nœud mobile (MN). Le procédé qui améliore la sécurité d'optimisation de route comprend les étapes suivantes : l'adresse temporaire CoA est générée par l'utilisation du procédé précédent ; le nœud mobile MN et le nœud correspondant (CN) effectuent la procédure RRP ; MN signe des informations de mise à jour d'association (BU) en utilisant la clé privée pour obtenir les données d'autorisation d'association ; MN transmet les informations BU comprenant HoA, CoA et les données d'autorisation d'association à CN, CN les valide en utilisant la clé publique, en cas de succès, la communication entre MN et CN se déroule dans le mode d'optimisation de route. L'équipement comprend un module de génération d'identifiant et un module de génération d'adresse temporaire. Le système comprend MN et CN. L'adresse temporaire CoA générée par la présente invention limite l'attaque car le mécanisme mobile est mal appliqué, et la sécurité de communication est améliorée dans le mode d'optimisation de route IPv6 mobile.
PCT/CN2008/071269 2007-07-25 2008-06-11 Procédé et équipement pour générer une adresse temporaire, procédé et système pour améliorer la sécurité d'optimisation de route WO2009012676A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN2007101194803A CN101106568B (zh) 2007-07-25 2007-07-25 生成转交地址及提高路由优化安全性的方法、装置和系统
CN200710119480.3 2007-07-25

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2009012676A1 true WO2009012676A1 (fr) 2009-01-29

Family

ID=39000242

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/CN2008/071269 WO2009012676A1 (fr) 2007-07-25 2008-06-11 Procédé et équipement pour générer une adresse temporaire, procédé et système pour améliorer la sécurité d'optimisation de route

Country Status (2)

Country Link
CN (1) CN101106568B (fr)
WO (1) WO2009012676A1 (fr)

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US8499146B2 (en) 2008-10-31 2013-07-30 Chengdu Huawei Symantec Technologies Co., Ltd. Method and device for preventing network attacks
CN110622491A (zh) * 2017-05-16 2019-12-27 高通股份有限公司 蜂窝上以太网

Families Citing this family (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN101106568B (zh) * 2007-07-25 2010-06-02 华为技术有限公司 生成转交地址及提高路由优化安全性的方法、装置和系统
CN101299668A (zh) * 2008-06-30 2008-11-05 华为技术有限公司 一种通信的建立方法、系统和装置
US8982815B2 (en) * 2012-04-24 2015-03-17 Mediatek Inc. Apparatuses and methods for IPV6 address acquisition
CN105989477A (zh) * 2014-11-07 2016-10-05 天地融科技股份有限公司 数据交互方法

Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN1457170A (zh) * 2002-05-09 2003-11-19 佳能株式会社 公钥证明书发行装置
CN1498484A (zh) * 2001-03-13 2004-05-19 �ձ�������ʽ���� 移动网络中管理移动节点的系统
WO2006106712A1 (fr) * 2005-03-31 2006-10-12 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. Procede de commande de communication, nœud de communication et nœud mobile
CN1972317A (zh) * 2005-11-24 2007-05-30 华为技术有限公司 转交地址及其转交地址配置信息的获取方法及系统
CN101106568A (zh) * 2007-07-25 2008-01-16 华为技术有限公司 生成转交地址及提高路由优化安全性的方法、装置和系统

Family Cites Families (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN101001261B (zh) * 2006-01-09 2010-09-29 华为技术有限公司 一种MIPv6移动节点的通信方法
CN100456742C (zh) * 2006-04-30 2009-01-28 国家数字交换系统工程技术研究中心 移动互联网协议路由处理方法和系统及路由器

Patent Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN1498484A (zh) * 2001-03-13 2004-05-19 �ձ�������ʽ���� 移动网络中管理移动节点的系统
CN1457170A (zh) * 2002-05-09 2003-11-19 佳能株式会社 公钥证明书发行装置
WO2006106712A1 (fr) * 2005-03-31 2006-10-12 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. Procede de commande de communication, nœud de communication et nœud mobile
CN1972317A (zh) * 2005-11-24 2007-05-30 华为技术有限公司 转交地址及其转交地址配置信息的获取方法及系统
CN101106568A (zh) * 2007-07-25 2008-01-16 华为技术有限公司 生成转交地址及提高路由优化安全性的方法、装置和系统

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US8499146B2 (en) 2008-10-31 2013-07-30 Chengdu Huawei Symantec Technologies Co., Ltd. Method and device for preventing network attacks
CN110622491A (zh) * 2017-05-16 2019-12-27 高通股份有限公司 蜂窝上以太网
CN110622491B (zh) * 2017-05-16 2023-01-03 高通股份有限公司 用于无线通信的方法和设备

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN101106568B (zh) 2010-06-02
CN101106568A (zh) 2008-01-16

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
CN101965722B (zh) 安全性关联的重新建立
EP1633107B1 (fr) Authentification de la propriété d'adresses dans des réseaux mobile IPv6
US8726019B2 (en) Context limited shared secret
US20020120844A1 (en) Authentication and distribution of keys in mobile IP network
JP4917596B2 (ja) 対応ノードとセッション中にある移動ノードへの匿名性の提供
JP5007341B2 (ja) モバイルノードとコレスポンデントノードとの間でのバインディングアップデートのための方法および装置
US20080291885A1 (en) METHOD FOR COMMUNICATION OF MIPv6 MOBILE NODES
WO2008034368A1 (fr) Procédé, système, noeud mobile et noeud correspondant pour la production d'une clé de gestion de liaison
JP2003324419A (ja) アドレス・ベースド・キ−を使用して対応情報更新を保護する方法
JP5159878B2 (ja) インターネットプロトコル認証とモビリティシグナリングとを結合するための方法と装置
US20080028459A1 (en) Method for managing security in a mobile communication system using proxy mobile internet protocol and system thereof
US20050246769A1 (en) Method of generating an authentication
WO2009012676A1 (fr) Procédé et équipement pour générer une adresse temporaire, procédé et système pour améliorer la sécurité d'optimisation de route
Chuang et al. SF-PMIPv6: A secure fast handover mechanism for Proxy Mobile IPv6 networks
WO2009094939A1 (fr) Procédé pour protéger une signalisation d'optimisation d'une voie d'acheminement ip mobile, système, noeud, et agent domestique associés
Ameur et al. Secure Reactive Fast Proxy MIPv6-Based NEtwork MObility (SRFP-NEMO) for Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs).
Modares et al. Securing binding update in mobile IPv6 using private key base binding update protocol
Susanto Functional Scheme for IPv6 Mobile Handoff
Leu et al. A handover security mechanism employing diffie-Hellman PKDS for IEEE802. 16e wireless networks
WO2014205846A1 (fr) Procédé de transmission de données, terminal de communication de type machine et serveur d'adressage

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application

Ref document number: 08757680

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1

NENP Non-entry into the national phase

Ref country code: DE

122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase

Ref document number: 08757680

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1