WO2009044355A2 - Circuit et procédé de détection d'horodateurs multiniveau - Google Patents

Circuit et procédé de détection d'horodateurs multiniveau Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2009044355A2
WO2009044355A2 PCT/IB2008/054007 IB2008054007W WO2009044355A2 WO 2009044355 A2 WO2009044355 A2 WO 2009044355A2 IB 2008054007 W IB2008054007 W IB 2008054007W WO 2009044355 A2 WO2009044355 A2 WO 2009044355A2
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
event
signal
tamper
circuit
switch
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/IB2008/054007
Other languages
English (en)
Other versions
WO2009044355A3 (fr
Inventor
Giovanni Genna
Aleksandar Zhelyazkov
Markus Hintermann
Original Assignee
Nxp B.V.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Nxp B.V. filed Critical Nxp B.V.
Priority to EP08835577A priority Critical patent/EP2210207A2/fr
Priority to CN2008801099267A priority patent/CN101952833A/zh
Priority to US12/679,911 priority patent/US8504326B2/en
Publication of WO2009044355A2 publication Critical patent/WO2009044355A2/fr
Publication of WO2009044355A3 publication Critical patent/WO2009044355A3/fr

Links

Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/86Secure or tamper-resistant housings
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/71Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
    • G06F21/72Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in cryptographic circuits
    • G06F21/725Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in cryptographic circuits operating on a secure reference time value
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2151Time stamp

Definitions

  • the present disclosure generally relates to circuits and methods that detect and report physical events.
  • Timestamping can be an important security tool for authentication and critical event flagging. For example, it can be desirable to monitor for physical events indicative of tampering with electronic equipment so that such events can be detected and recorded.
  • Various aspects of the present disclosure involve using a single input to a multiple level detection circuit on a Real Time Clock (RTC) to distinguish from among more than one event so each event can be separately flagged and timestamp- recorded.
  • RTC Real Time Clock
  • the present disclosure provides multiple-event detection circuits that include a RTC integrated-circuit chip with an input port to receive an input signal indicative of an event and with a multiple input- level detection circuit, first-event and second-event switches, and an interface circuit to couple a first-event signal from the first-event switch to the input port and to couple a second-event signal from the second-event switch to the input port.
  • the multiple input- level detection circuit distinguishes the first-event signal from the second-event signal
  • the RTC integrated-circuit chip records a first timestamp for and in response to the first-event signal and records a second timestamp for and in response to the second-event signal.
  • the present disclosure provides multiple-event detection circuits that include a RTC integrated-circuit chip with an input port to receive an input signal indicative of an event and with a multiple input- level detection circuit, means for providing a first-event signal upon occurrence of a first event, means for providing a second-event signal upon occurrence of a second event, and means for coupling the first-event signal and the second-event signal to an input port of the
  • the RTC integrated-circuit chip can include means for providing distinguishing the first-event signal from the second-event signal and means for recording a first timestamp for and in response to the first-event signal and to record a second timestamp for and in response to the second-event signal.
  • the present disclosure also provides methods for distinguishing and timestamping multiple events, including steps of modulating a first-event signal indicative of a first-event relative to a second-event signal indicative of a second- event, coupling the first-event signal and second-event signal into an input port of a RTC integrated-circuit chip that includes a multiple input-level detection circuit, distinguishing the first-event signal from the second-event signal using the multiple input- level detection circuit, and recording a first timestamp for and in response to the first-event signal and a second timestamp for and in response to the second-event signal.
  • the present disclosure further provides for electronic devices that include a housing having a first cover and a second cover, and a tamper-event detection circuit.
  • the tamper-event detection circuit includes a first tamper-event switch associated with the first cover to produce a first tamper-signal indicative of tampering with the first cover, a second tamper-event switch associated with the second cover and to produce a second tamper-signal indicative of tampering with the second cover, a RTC integrated-circuit chip having an input port coupled to a multiple input-level detection circuit, and an interface circuit to couple the first tamper-signal and the second tamper-signal to the input port.
  • the multiple input- level detection circuit distinguishes the first tamper-signal from the second tamper- signal, and the RTC integrated-circuit chip records a first timestamp for and in response to the first tamper-signal and to record a second timestamp for and in response to the second tamper-signal.
  • the present disclosure also provides for multiple-event tamper detection circuits that include a RTC integrated-circuit chip with an input port to receive an input signal indicative of a tamper-event and with a multiple input- level detection circuit, a first tamper-event switch configured to produce a first tamper-signal indicative of a first tamper-event state, a second tamper-event switch configured to produce a second tamper-signal indicative of a second tamper-event state, and an interface circuit directly coupling the first tamper-event switch to the input port, and coupling the second tamper-event switch to the input port through a resistor.
  • a RTC integrated-circuit chip with an input port to receive an input signal indicative of a tamper-event and with a multiple input- level detection circuit
  • a first tamper-event switch configured to produce a first tamper-signal indicative of a first t
  • the multiple input-level detection circuit includes a first comparator biased to detect the first tamper-event state and the second tamper-event state, and a second comparator biased to detect only the first tamper-event state.
  • FIG. 1 shows a generalized electronic device that may utilize multilevel timestamp detection in accordance with the present disclosure
  • FIG. 2 is a generalized diagram of a circuit including multilevel timestamp detection in accordance with the present disclosure
  • FIG. 3 is a circuit arrangement according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the present invention is believed to be applicable to a variety of circuits and approaches involving and/or benefiting from the ability to timestamp multiple events using a single input pin of a RTC.
  • an electronic device e.g., computer or other CPU-based device, mobile or handheld device such as a cell phone, media player or PDA, and the like
  • it may be desirable to monitor for multiple different critical events such as attempts to tamper with the device by accessing one or more housing covers.
  • cover-tamper detection implementations a timestamp input detector of a
  • RTC circuit can be used to monitor the voltage at the timestamp input pin, and when a negative edge is detected, the current date and time can be stored in some internal registers, a time stamp flag can be set and an interrupt on the interrupt pin (if it exists) can be generated. If multiple timestamp detections are desired, it is customary to implement using multiple timestamp input pins, one for each event to be monitored.
  • the present disclosure provides circuits and methods to distinguish and separately timestamp different events using a single RTC input. The ability to monitor and distinguish signals indicative of different events using a single input of a RTC can provide significant advantages, including reducing the number of dedicated connections to the RTC. Given the high demands for circuitry "real estate", the ability to monitor, detect and record multiple events using a single input can provide distinct advantages.
  • FIG. 1 shows a generalized electronic device 100 that includes a housing 110 having a first cover 112 and a second cover 114.
  • cover 114 might house a battery compartment, maintenance circuitry, or other circuitry or components, particularly those for which it may be desirable to record timestamps when attempts have been made to access them through cover 114.
  • cover 112 can be a device such as an electronic display, touch input pad, or other device that, while being a functional device, also serves to cover circuitry and components of the electronic device 100 in which it is housed.
  • Some applications where it can be important to monitor for tampering attempts include mobile devices that communicate with a network using proprietary and protected protocols, public access devices such as automated teller machines, information kiosks, vending machines (e.g., train and bus ticketing, food) or gaming and entertainment machines, keyless entry systems, utility meters (e.g., for electricity, gas, water, oil, etc.), public phones, and any other application where unauthorized access can compromise the integrity of the system.
  • Circuits and methods of the present disclosure allow detection of multiple tamper-event signals (for example) using the same RTC input pin by modulating the tamper-event signals relative to one another so that multiple-level detection circuitry within the RTC can distinguish from among the individual tamper-event signals.
  • FIG. 2 shows an embodiment of a multiple tamper-event timestamp detection circuit of the present disclosure.
  • Circuit 220 includes a first tamper-event switch 222 and second tamper-event switch 224 arranged in parallel. Switches 222 and 224 are shown as push-buttons for the sake of simplicity, although any switch suitable for the particular application can be used.
  • the signal from tamper-event switch 224 is modulated by a signal modulator 234, which can be internal to the switch 234 or an external component such as a resistor, capacitor, or the like.
  • the signal from tamper-event switch 222 can optionally be modulated as well, although it can be sufficient to modulate just one signal.
  • the signal modulator 234 modulates the signal corresponding to tamper-event switch 224 in such a way that multiple distinguishable signal levels are integrated into one signal 240 that connects to RTC 250 via input port 252.
  • RTC 250 includes multiple-level detection circuitry (not detailed in FIG. 2) that distinguishes the signal levels to determine which, if any, tamper-events have occurred so that RTC 250 can record the timestamp for such tamper-event(s), and so that a timestamp flag can be set, if desired.
  • an interrupt can be generated on an interrupt pin 262 that is connected to a processor 260 such as an MCU.
  • the processor can then implement a desired responsive command.
  • FIG. 3 shows a circuit diagram of an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • Multiple event detection circuit 320 includes a signal integration portion 340 and a RTC portion 350 that includes multiple-level detection circuitry.
  • the signal integration portion 340 includes a first-cover switch 322 and a second-cover switch 324, each connected to ground (VSS) on one end.
  • the signal of the second-cover switch 324 is modulated by a resistor R2.
  • the signals from both the first-cover switch 322 and the second-cover switch 324 are integrated as a single input into RTC 350 at input pin 352.
  • Input 352 of RTC 350 is connected to voltage VDD through pull-up resistor Rl.
  • first-cover switch 322 When first-cover switch 322 is closed, the event generates a VSS level in the input pin, and when second-cover switch 324 is closed, the event generates an intermediate voltage level equal to [R2/(R1+R2)]*VDD.
  • the values of Rl and R2 can be selected so that the circuitry onboard the RTC can distinguish the different signal levels and set different flags for each event. For example, if Rl and R2 are equal (e.g., each resistor being 200 kOhm), the intermediate level is VDD/2. This provides sufficient separation between the highest level (VDD) and the lowest level (VSS) to resolve the various signal levels. Referring back to FIG.
  • the comparator outputs can then be processed by logic circuit 359 having two outputs, one of which can be used to generate a flag when the first-cover switch indicates a tamper-event, the other of which can be used to generate a flag when the second- cover switch indicates a tamper-event.
  • logic circuit 359 having two outputs, one of which can be used to generate a flag when the first-cover switch indicates a tamper-event, the other of which can be used to generate a flag when the second- cover switch indicates a tamper-event.
  • any suitable method of modulating the event signals can be used to create multiple signal levels in the composite signal to allow the multiple-event detection circuit of the RTC to distinguish among events even though a single input pin is used.
  • resistors were selected to create voltage levels of VDD, VDD/2, and VSS.
  • one or more capacitors can be used to modulate one or more of the event signals.
  • each event signal can be produced by a different R-C circuit having distinct time constants. The different events can then be distinguished based on the slope of the detected signal edge.
  • different push-button de-bouncing characteristics can be used to distinguish among events.
  • the de-bouncing periods or frequencies can be selected so that the signals can be distinguished. Selection might simply involve using a high-grade push-button switch and a low-grade push-button switch, thereby providing sufficient differentiation. Other suitable methods of distinguishing the signals will be appreciated by those of skill in the art based on the present disclosure. In addition, those of skill in the art will appreciate that more than two event signals can be integrated and distinguished.
  • the various steps that can be performed using methods and circuitry according to the present disclosure include the following.
  • the event- signals associated with at least two different events are distinguished by modulating one of the event-signals relative to the other.
  • the event-signals are coupled into the same input port of a RTC as a composite signal that can have different signal levels (or other signal characteristics) based on the states of the event switches.
  • a multiple input-level detection circuit on the RTC is then used to distinguish from among the various possible signal levels, thereby distinguishing signals associated with one event from signals associated with another event. If an event-signal is detected, the event type can be flagged and a timestamp recorded. In the absence of any event- signal, continuous monitoring proceeds.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Mathematical Physics (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Signal Processing For Digital Recording And Reproducing (AREA)
  • Tests Of Electronic Circuits (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne des procédés et des circuits de détection et d'enregistrement d'horodateurs pour des événements multiples (222/322, 224/324) au moyen d'une broche d'entrée simple (252, 352) dans une horloge temps réel (RTC) (250, 350). Des signaux associés à chacun des événements sont modulés pour créer un signal composite multiniveau (240). La RTC comprend un circuit de détection de niveaux de signal multiples qui permet de distinguer divers niveaux de signal de sorte que chaque événement puisse être marqué séparément et horodaté. Par exemple, l'ouverture d'au moins deux couvercles (112, 114) sur le boîtier (110) d'un dispositif électronique (100) peut être surveillé, distingué et marqué séparément par utilisation d'un seul port d'entrée RTC.
PCT/IB2008/054007 2007-10-02 2008-10-01 Circuit et procédé de détection d'horodateurs multiniveau WO2009044355A2 (fr)

Priority Applications (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP08835577A EP2210207A2 (fr) 2007-10-02 2008-10-01 Circuit et procédé de détection d'horodateurs multiniveau
CN2008801099267A CN101952833A (zh) 2007-10-02 2008-10-01 多电平时间戳检测电路和方法
US12/679,911 US8504326B2 (en) 2007-10-02 2008-10-01 Multilevel timestamp detection circuit and method

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US97683407P 2007-10-02 2007-10-02
US60/976,834 2007-10-02

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2009044355A2 true WO2009044355A2 (fr) 2009-04-09
WO2009044355A3 WO2009044355A3 (fr) 2009-06-04

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PCT/IB2008/054007 WO2009044355A2 (fr) 2007-10-02 2008-10-01 Circuit et procédé de détection d'horodateurs multiniveau

Country Status (4)

Country Link
US (1) US8504326B2 (fr)
EP (1) EP2210207A2 (fr)
CN (1) CN101952833A (fr)
WO (1) WO2009044355A2 (fr)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2015073495A1 (fr) * 2013-11-14 2015-05-21 Microchip Technology Incorporated Dispositif à circuit intégré comportant une entrée de détection de fraude et comportant son journal d'horloge temps réel et de calendrier

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US10192076B1 (en) 2016-08-29 2019-01-29 Square, Inc. Security housing with recesses for tamper localization

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FR2757628A1 (fr) * 1996-12-20 1998-06-26 Eaton Controls Procede et dispositif de mesure numerique de positions angulaires
EP0969346A2 (fr) * 1998-07-01 2000-01-05 International Business Machines Corporation Système de surveillance d'ordinateurs contre la manipulation
US6233339B1 (en) * 1996-10-25 2001-05-15 Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd. Physical property based cryptographics
US6289238B1 (en) * 1993-09-04 2001-09-11 Motorola, Inc. Wireless medical diagnosis and monitoring equipment

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US5189700A (en) 1989-07-05 1993-02-23 Blandford Robert R Devices to (1) supply authenticated time and (2) time stamp and authenticate digital documents
DE4214949A1 (de) * 1992-05-06 1993-11-11 Nokia Deutschland Gmbh Anordnung zur zeitlichen Detektion einer Signalflanke eines auf einer Übertragungsleitung übertragenen elektrischen Signals
US6993656B1 (en) * 1999-12-10 2006-01-31 International Business Machines Corporation Time stamping method using aged time stamp receipts
US7287169B2 (en) * 2002-10-10 2007-10-23 Stmicroelectronics, Inc. Electronic device and timer therefor with tamper event stamp features and related methods
US7358628B2 (en) * 2003-05-09 2008-04-15 Stmicroelectronics, Inc. Configurable circuit and method for detecting the state of a switch
US7253548B2 (en) 2003-06-16 2007-08-07 Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. Method and apparatus for controlling an electric machine
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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6289238B1 (en) * 1993-09-04 2001-09-11 Motorola, Inc. Wireless medical diagnosis and monitoring equipment
US6233339B1 (en) * 1996-10-25 2001-05-15 Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd. Physical property based cryptographics
FR2757628A1 (fr) * 1996-12-20 1998-06-26 Eaton Controls Procede et dispositif de mesure numerique de positions angulaires
EP0969346A2 (fr) * 1998-07-01 2000-01-05 International Business Machines Corporation Système de surveillance d'ordinateurs contre la manipulation

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2015073495A1 (fr) * 2013-11-14 2015-05-21 Microchip Technology Incorporated Dispositif à circuit intégré comportant une entrée de détection de fraude et comportant son journal d'horloge temps réel et de calendrier
US9602895B2 (en) 2013-11-14 2017-03-21 Microchip Technology Incorporated Integrated circuit device with tamper detection input and having real time clock calendar logging thereof

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
WO2009044355A3 (fr) 2009-06-04
US8504326B2 (en) 2013-08-06
CN101952833A (zh) 2011-01-19
EP2210207A2 (fr) 2010-07-28
US20100198558A1 (en) 2010-08-05

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