WO2008135768A2 - Autorisation de signatures sur des documents - Google Patents
Autorisation de signatures sur des documents Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2008135768A2 WO2008135768A2 PCT/GB2008/001588 GB2008001588W WO2008135768A2 WO 2008135768 A2 WO2008135768 A2 WO 2008135768A2 GB 2008001588 W GB2008001588 W GB 2008001588W WO 2008135768 A2 WO2008135768 A2 WO 2008135768A2
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- document
- signature
- authenticator
- token
- secure
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B42—BOOKBINDING; ALBUMS; FILES; SPECIAL PRINTED MATTER
- B42D—BOOKS; BOOK COVERS; LOOSE LEAVES; PRINTED MATTER CHARACTERISED BY IDENTIFICATION OR SECURITY FEATURES; PRINTED MATTER OF SPECIAL FORMAT OR STYLE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; DEVICES FOR USE THEREWITH AND NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; MOVABLE-STRIP WRITING OR READING APPARATUS
- B42D15/00—Printed matter of special format or style not otherwise provided for
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06K—GRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
- G06K19/00—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
- G06K19/06—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code
- G06K19/08—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code using markings of different kinds or more than one marking of the same kind in the same record carrier, e.g. one marking being sensed by optical and the other by magnetic means
- G06K19/10—Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the kind of the digital marking, e.g. shape, nature, code using markings of different kinds or more than one marking of the same kind in the same record carrier, e.g. one marking being sensed by optical and the other by magnetic means at least one kind of marking being used for authentication, e.g. of credit or identity cards
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/04—Payment circuits
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/04—Payment circuits
- G06Q20/042—Payment circuits characterized in that the payment protocol involves at least one cheque
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/389—Keeping log of transactions for guaranteeing non-repudiation of a transaction
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
- G06Q20/4014—Identity check for transactions
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
- G06Q20/4014—Identity check for transactions
- G06Q20/40145—Biometric identity checks
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
- G07C9/22—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder
- G07C9/25—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07D—HANDLING OF COINS OR VALUABLE PAPERS, e.g. TESTING, SORTING BY DENOMINATIONS, COUNTING, DISPENSING, CHANGING OR DEPOSITING
- G07D7/00—Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/12—Card verification
- G07F7/122—Online card verification
Definitions
- This invention relates to the authentication and authorisation of signatures applied to documents. It is particularly concerned with signatures applied to cheques but is also applicable to signatures applied to other financial or fiduciary documents, including but not limited to monetary papers, visas and passports, which may be in physical or electronic form, where the signature is an indication of the validity of the document and may need to be authenticated.
- WO 01/41082 (Al Amri) discloses the use of a magnetic strip or chip which can store information about the cheque. On presentation of the cheque this stored information can be read to verify the cheque with the stored data. This approach increases security and lends itself to automation of the cheque clearing process.
- US-A-5,491 ,325 discloses a system in which a bar code is applied to a cheque or other payment document and serves as an index to a corresponding data file which can be communicated to a drawee bank so that the bank has prior knowledge of information relating to the cheque. This can be used to verify the authenticity of the cheque and the amount of the funds permitted. Once the cheque has been honoured, the corresponding data file is updated to show that the cheque is no longer live.
- Various other approaches to cheque authentication are described in the art. For example, in US-A-6,611,596 (Unisys Corp) and GB-A-2,40,6690 (Neopost Industrie S.A). Many of these prior documents disclose encoding cheque related information which is stored in a glyph such as a bar code applied to the cheque and from which the information can be retrieved for verification and authentication.
- 'Positive Pay' One known cheque security mechanism for cheques is known as 'Positive Pay'. Positive Pay is used by many banks around the world and is an automated fraud detection tool offered by the credit management department of most banks. It exists in a number of forms, but in its simplest form matches account number, cheque number and amount of each cheque presented for payment against a list previously authorised and issued by a company. If all three components of the cheque do not match exactly, the cheque is not authorised.
- an exception is raised.
- the bank will follow a variety of actions depending on its rules and policies; for example the bank notifies the client, which may be by sending an image of the exception item.
- the client reviews the image and instructs the bank to pay or return the cheque as a result of its own scrutiny of the cheque.
- Positive Pay is an effective way of combating fraud but is not foolproof.
- Positive Pay systems identify high value cheques, which may then be checked further manually. This may involve comparing the signature on the cheque with specimen signatures. This is a process that is difficult to automate as any medium sized company will have a large number of people who can sign cheques on behalf of the company and so a large number of signatures must be compared. Indeed the resources including processing resources, required to compare signatures automatically typically exceed the resources required by the rest of the Positive Pay system.
- cheques clear over a three-day period. The Positive Pay system generally works during the second of those three days, which gives limited time to check errors revealed by the checking system.
- Positive Pay systems can, in theory, handle signature checking, it is a time consuming and expensive process. As a result, Positive Pay systems tend not to check signatures so reducing the reliability of the authentication process.
- Signature checking of cheques presents a number of difficulties, partly because an individual's signature is not identical every time, so that any signature authentication process is necessarily subjective and cannot produce an absolute guarantee that the signature is authentic.
- a signature created with a writing instrument or with a rubber stamp can easily be copied or forged.
- Modern duplication methods make signature replication easy.
- a conventional signature is only used as one of a number of methods of risk mitigation.
- the present invention aims to address the problem of signature authorisation and authentication on documents.
- One aspect of the invention replaces a physical signature with an electronically generated signature, which is issued to an authorised user on request and following authentication of the user.
- this electronic signature is issued as a secure signature token.
- the invention provides secure signature tokens, which are generated by an authenticator in response to a request from an authorised signatory.
- the tokens are applied to the document to be signed and can be validated by the authenticator to authenticate the document.
- Authorised signatories supply biometric data in advance to the authentication that is stored.
- a request for a signature is accompanied by biometric data such as a fingerprint, iris or facial scan which is compared with the stored data and a signature token is provided only if the data with the request matches the stored data.
- the secure signature token may be encoded in a glyph and applied to the document by any convenient manner including printing or laser etching. It may be applied directly or on a substrate such as a label or hologram, which can be securely fixed to the document.
- a label or hologram may additionally include other tamper-evident features.
- a secondary mark or token embodying anticopying technology may be used in conjunction with the secure signature token.
- the document is a cheque and the secure signature token is accompanied by positive pay data or other document specific data.
- This data may be encoded within the same glyph as the secure signature token or applied separately to the document, for example encoded within a separate glyph.
- the secure signature token may be combined with a physical signature wherein, on authentication of the token, the physical signature is compared with a stored record of the physical signature of the signatory to whom the token relates. This is advantageous as comparison with only a single signature is required rather than all authorised signatories for a company. This makes comparison of physical signatures economically viable.
- the Security may be increased by the use of a PIN mechanism with the secure signature token.
- the token may have a Personal Identification Number or similar functioning representation assigned to it which can perform different roles in or as part of the authentication process.
- Security may also be increased by cryptographically signing the token with a private key enabling the token only to be read by parties to whom the corresponding public key has been distributed.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic illustration of a system embodying the invention.
- Figure 2 is a flow chart illustrating steps in generation and application of an electronic signature.
- the embodiment of the invention to be described replaces a conventional physical signature with an electronic signature that is provided to a trusted party by an authenticator on authentication of that party to the authenticator.
- the electronically generated signature may be provided as a secure signature token which may then be applied to a document encoded within a glyph or in some other manner.
- the token may be secured using a private key methodology and the corresponding public key distributed to authorised recipients.
- the public key can be used to identify the holder of the private key establishing a direct relationship of the party that created the Secure Signature Token.
- Public/private key encryption is, of course, well known in the art.
- the document to which the signature, electronic or physical, is applied is a cheque (or check).
- the invention is not limited to cheques and is applicable to the authentication of a signature applied to any document and particularly any monetary paper or identification document.
- the system is illustrated broadly in Figure 1.
- a bank 10 has a number of corporate customers 20a to 2On.
- the bank hosts a signature generation and provision service that is provided to its trusted customers. Rather than the signature being generated, physically or electronically, by the customer, who is the party issuing the cheque, signatures are generated electronically by the bank and distributed to authorised persons of the customer securely once the authorised person has authenticated themselves to the bank.
- the bank is both the generator of the signatures and the authenticator at the cheque clearing process.
- the signatures so generated are also stored at the bank, which is the authenticator, for comparison with signature tokens retrieved from cheques presented for clearing.
- the electronic signature token may replace a physical signature on the document or may be placed on the document in addition to the physical signature. In the latter case, authentication of the physical signature is much quicker as the authenticator knows the identity of the signor from the signature token.
- a signature recognition system need only to compare the physical signature against a single stored signature unlike the presently available systems which require a physical signature to be stored against all authorised signatories for a party.
- This approach enables the provision of authenticable single use signatures for printed or electronic documents.
- the holder of the authentication service is the corporate customer of the bank.
- Data that can be authenticated is sent from a customer server 30a to 3On to a database and server 40 held at the bank.
- This database may hold not only signature information but other data relating to transactions such as positive pay information in the case of cheques, as will be discussed.
- the database 40 is a master database which also records all SST generation and authentication lifecycle events such as the identification of the authenticator, the time of authentication and the results of authentication.
- the configuration shown in Figure 1 permits authentication only by the bank, as the party issuing the single use secure signature token (SST).
- SST single use secure signature token
- other trusted parties may be able to authenticate signatures as part of the process through which the document passes.
- authentication may take place between the two principal parties.
- Each party may be assigned different permissions to activate a particular action or further event such as a change in status of the cheque, for example authorisation for the cheque to be paid.
- the service may be provided more broadly enabling users to log in and request generation of a secure signature token (SST) for use on a document, subject to satisfying the issuing authority, such as the bank, of their identification.
- SST secure signature token
- the SST is generated as a single use signature by the bank and communicated via the secure server to the user, upon successful authentication of the user to the bank.
- the SST may be applied to the cheque or other document.
- One way of applying the SST is to encode it into a glyph which is then applied to the cheque.
- An example of a suitable glyph is a 2D barcode such as a data matrix.
- the glyph may be printed on the document or applied to a secondary substrate such as a label with a non-removable or tamper evident seal.
- the glyph maybe applied by one of a number of known marking processes such as, but not limited to, laser etching.
- marking processes such as, but not limited to, laser etching.
- the use of glyphs to carry data relating to the document to which they are applied is well known in the art.
- the glyph is applied at a location remote from the generation of the SST it encodes. It is therefore important to ensure that the glyph is applied to the correct document and not fraudulently copied and placed on another document. Thus, a secure direct link between the creation of the document and the sealing of that document with the SST is necessary.
- the link between the SST and the document may, in the case of cheque generation and clearance, may be achieved through the Positive Pay process described above.
- the SST may be appended to Positive Pay data such as amount, account number and cheque number, that is sent to the bank and against which the bank authenticates the cheque.
- the Positive Pay system operates by matching the details received with details already sent by the cheque issuer.
- the inclusion of the SST ensures that the cheque signatory can be validated simply within the simple Positive Pay systems described above without the need for complex signature comparison presently required. If a physical signature is compared in addition to the SST, the processing required is greatly reduced, as only a single signature needs to be compared rather than all authorised signatories for the payor.
- embodiments of the invention create an electronically generated signature which is provided by the authenticator and which replaces, or is in addition to a physical signature. This signature may be used on its own or with additional authentication data such as Positive Pay data.
- the use of an electronically generated signature is not to be confused with the process of digital signature or digital certification, although both of these may be used in embodiments of the invention.
- the electronic signature represented by the SST is an identifier of a party or parties who is/are authorised to execute a document, for example to sign a cheque.
- FIG. 2 is a flow chart that illustrates the process further.
- the corporate customer sets up an SST authentication service account with their bank.
- the account is allocated authorised signatories. These are people within the customer organisation who are authorised to sign cheques on behalf of the customer. The customer initially nominates the signatories and sets up which accounts, permissions and authorisations apply.
- the authorised signatories supply biometric credentials to the central server 40 at the bank. This enables the authorised signatories to be securely logged onto the system.
- the nature of the biometric credentials may vary from system to system.
- at least one fingerprint is used, via a fingerprint scanner.
- iris scanning is used, utilising an iris scanner.
- Other options such as facial recognition are possible.
- Two or more types of biometric identification may be used for additional security.
- the customer raises a cheque through its accounts department and places it in a queue for printing. This may be a single cheque or a batch of cheques.
- This may be a single cheque or a batch of cheques.
- Positive Pay payment data and account data for the new cheque are held.
- the authorised signatory or signatories depending on the value of the cheque and the company policy or legal requirements, log onto the SST server 40 and identify themselves using the biometric data supplied at step 104.
- the authorised signatory may now apply signature permissions by a number of routes depending on the manner in which the system is set up.
- the server 40 generates an electronic signature which is provided to the authorised signatory and encoded as an SST 1 for example, in a glyph, and applied to the cheque by printing or otherwise.
- a single authentication by the signatory will generate a single unique SST.
- the signatory would have to authenticate themselves for each cheque to be signed. This approach may be attractive for high value cheques.
- the signatory may be required to keep their finger on a fingerprint scanner, or their eye aligned to an iris scanner or retina scanner, for a set of SSTs to be generated for a batch of cheques.
- two or more signatories are required, they maybe required to submit fingerprint / iris / retina scan details simultaneously, or consecutively at the choice of the system operator.
- each SST generated is unique, but this is not necessarily the case as SSTs could be generated on a batch basis. Although this is not as inherently secure, it may offer effective security when used in conjunction with other security techniques such as Positive Pay and cheque sealing techniques.
- the customers may be provided with portable scanning devices so that the owner of the device can apply their signature to cheques one by one.
- portable scanning devices may be wirelessly linked to the customer's secure servers.
- the bank scans the glyph to retrieve the SST and compares the SST against its records. Only if it agrees, is the cheque authenticated. It will be appreciated that the data string in the glyph can only be interpreted by the master authenticating system and it is not possible to transfer a glyph from one cheque to another successfully without knowledge of the signatory to the cheque or to which cheque it refers.
- the SST functions as a digital fingerprint for every signature.
- the SST may be read at various points, for example at handheld and desktop products at the bank teller where the cheque is first presented or in a branch back office.
- the cheque may be read by the customer at any stage of the process, for example prior to dispatch as a double check or at a later stage when they view the signature.
- a secure audit trail may be generated and recorded as part of monitoring the lifecycle of the SST from creation to eventual redemption.
- the SST may replace, or be in addition to the original physical signature. Where the physical signature is retained, automated comparison of the signature with a stored record is much easier than in prior art systems. As a large organisation will have many authorised signatories, the prior art systems require that the signature is compared against all of the signatures, as it has no way of knowing which is the correct one. Embodiments of the invention enable this comparison to be streamlined such that, on decoding the SST, the comparator knows the alleged identity of the signatory and only has to compare the physical signature against the stored record for that signatory. This saves a lot of time and makes automated signature checking economically feasible.
- An additional level of security may be incorporated into the SST by using a PIN mechanism into the body of the SST.
- the PIN may be included in the SST or the SST may include a flag indicating that a PIN is required as part of the authorisation and authentication process.
- a PIN may be required when a cheque is of particularly high value or to be exchanged for cash.
- a PIN may be used to restrict or lock access to various stages of the cheque authentication or clearing process.
- a single high value transaction for example may have a PIN associated at with it so that the transaction cannot progress further without the PIN being entered onto the system by the individual or entity that holds the appropriate PIN.
- Further security may be provided by signing the SST with a private key which is unique to a payor.
- a party receiving a signed cheque may verify, by means of a public key supplied to them, that the SST had been produced by the correct party.
- the embodiments described provide an SST from which a non-repudiable glyph-based signature can be generated and authenticated as part of a secure business flow.
- the SST signature is a non-repudiable token which may be incorporated into or with other cheque data, such as Positive Pay data, to provide a cheque token which can carry all the cheque's data.
- a corporate cheque may include a secure cheque token which includes Positive Pay data, written or printed transaction and other relevant account data, a first signature as a printed SST glyph, and a second signature as a printed SST glyph.
- the two SST glyphs could be combined into a single glyph holding both SSTs or all the signatories' SSTs where more than two are required.
- signatories may authenticate themselves sequentially, in which case an individual SST may be produced for each signatory.
- the signatories may be required to authenticate themselves at the same time; that is, authentication cannot take place unless both, or all, are logged onto the system at the same time. In that case it may be desirable to generate a single SST containing data relating to all the signatories.
- biometric authentication may vary from system to system and from use to user.
- a biometric scanner such as a fingerprint scanner may be built into a portable computer such as a laptop. This enables authentication and authorisation to take place anywhere and may be particularly suited to the personal, rather that corporate customer.
Abstract
Selon l'invention, des jetons de signature sécurisée sont fournis par une entité d'authentification telle qu'une banque à un générateur de document tel qu'un client. Le jeton de signature sécurisée est appliqué à un document tel qu'un chèque. Des signataires autorisés fournissent des données biométriques à l'entité d'authentification qui sont stockées au niveau de l'entité d'authentification. Pour obtenir un jeton de signature sécurisée, le signataire accède à l'entité d'authentification avec une requête de signature en fournissant des données biométriques. Ces données sont comparées aux données stockées et l'accès est autorisé si elles concordent. Un seul jeton de signature sécurisée peut être fourni pour chaque requête, ou un lot de jetons peut être fourni. Les jetons peuvent être fournis seulement à la fourniture de données biométriques provenant de deux signataires autorisés ou plus. Des jetons peuvent être appliqués à des documents tels que des chèques codés dans un infoglyphe. Lorsque le chèque est présenté pour son paiement, le jeton est décodé à partir de l'infoglyphe et est comparé à une version stockée afin d'authentifier le chèque.
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
GB0708839A GB2449415A (en) | 2007-05-08 | 2007-05-08 | Authorisation of signatures on documents |
GB0708839.6 | 2007-05-08 |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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WO2008135768A2 true WO2008135768A2 (fr) | 2008-11-13 |
WO2008135768A3 WO2008135768A3 (fr) | 2008-12-31 |
Family
ID=38198894
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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PCT/GB2008/001588 WO2008135768A2 (fr) | 2007-05-08 | 2008-05-08 | Autorisation de signatures sur des documents |
Country Status (2)
Country | Link |
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GB (1) | GB2449415A (fr) |
WO (1) | WO2008135768A2 (fr) |
Cited By (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN109150528A (zh) * | 2018-11-07 | 2019-01-04 | 杭州海兴电力科技股份有限公司 | 一种电表数据访问方法、装置、设备及可读存储介质 |
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WO2002059712A2 (fr) * | 2000-12-01 | 2002-08-01 | First Usa Bank, N.A. | Systeme et procede de creation a distance d'instruments |
US20030219122A1 (en) * | 2002-02-15 | 2003-11-27 | Servicios Especializados Y Tecnologia Informatica, S.A. | Check anti-fraud security system |
US20040138991A1 (en) * | 2003-01-09 | 2004-07-15 | Yuh-Shen Song | Anti-fraud document transaction system |
WO2005098741A2 (fr) * | 2004-04-01 | 2005-10-20 | Solidus Networks, Inc. | Systeme de verification de transaction electronique |
WO2006059124A1 (fr) * | 2004-12-03 | 2006-06-08 | First Ondemand Ltd | Generation et authentification d'articles en ligne |
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US5491325A (en) * | 1992-08-25 | 1996-02-13 | Huang; Dorge O. | Method and system for payment and payment verification |
CA2123456C (fr) * | 1993-05-24 | 1998-09-15 | William Berson | Systeme d'authentification de documents utilisant une etiquette transparente |
US6553494B1 (en) * | 1999-07-21 | 2003-04-22 | Sensar, Inc. | Method and apparatus for applying and verifying a biometric-based digital signature to an electronic document |
US7676439B2 (en) * | 2001-06-18 | 2010-03-09 | Daon Holdings Limited | Electronic data vault providing biometrically protected electronic signatures |
AT504444A1 (de) * | 2002-11-28 | 2008-05-15 | Hueck Folien Gmbh | Sicherheitselemente mit kombinierten maschinell erkennbaren merkmalen |
GB0305606D0 (en) * | 2003-03-12 | 2003-04-16 | Univ The Glasgow | Security labelling |
GB2406690B (en) * | 2003-10-02 | 2008-09-03 | Neopost Ind Sa | Item authentication |
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2007
- 2007-05-08 GB GB0708839A patent/GB2449415A/en not_active Withdrawn
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2008
- 2008-05-08 WO PCT/GB2008/001588 patent/WO2008135768A2/fr active Application Filing
Patent Citations (5)
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WO2002059712A2 (fr) * | 2000-12-01 | 2002-08-01 | First Usa Bank, N.A. | Systeme et procede de creation a distance d'instruments |
US20030219122A1 (en) * | 2002-02-15 | 2003-11-27 | Servicios Especializados Y Tecnologia Informatica, S.A. | Check anti-fraud security system |
US20040138991A1 (en) * | 2003-01-09 | 2004-07-15 | Yuh-Shen Song | Anti-fraud document transaction system |
WO2005098741A2 (fr) * | 2004-04-01 | 2005-10-20 | Solidus Networks, Inc. | Systeme de verification de transaction electronique |
WO2006059124A1 (fr) * | 2004-12-03 | 2006-06-08 | First Ondemand Ltd | Generation et authentification d'articles en ligne |
Cited By (1)
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CN109150528A (zh) * | 2018-11-07 | 2019-01-04 | 杭州海兴电力科技股份有限公司 | 一种电表数据访问方法、装置、设备及可读存储介质 |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
GB0708839D0 (en) | 2007-06-13 |
GB2449415A (en) | 2008-11-26 |
WO2008135768A3 (fr) | 2008-12-31 |
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