WO2007079628A1 - Procédé de communication pour les noeuds mobiles mipv6 - Google Patents

Procédé de communication pour les noeuds mobiles mipv6 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2007079628A1
WO2007079628A1 PCT/CN2006/002120 CN2006002120W WO2007079628A1 WO 2007079628 A1 WO2007079628 A1 WO 2007079628A1 CN 2006002120 W CN2006002120 W CN 2006002120W WO 2007079628 A1 WO2007079628 A1 WO 2007079628A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
address
mobile node
care
pid
home
Prior art date
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PCT/CN2006/002120
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Fuyou Miao
Hongke Zhang
Hongmei Lu
Shen Yang
Hui Zhang
Original Assignee
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Beijing Jiaotong University
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., Beijing Jiaotong University filed Critical Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Priority to EP06775438.2A priority Critical patent/EP1978698B1/en
Publication of WO2007079628A1 publication Critical patent/WO2007079628A1/zh
Priority to US12/169,321 priority patent/US20080291885A1/en

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Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0407Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0407Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden
    • H04L63/0414Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden during transmission, i.e. party's identity is protected against eavesdropping, e.g. by using temporary identifiers, but is known to the other party or parties involved in the communication
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W60/00Affiliation to network, e.g. registration; Terminating affiliation with the network, e.g. de-registration
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W8/00Network data management
    • H04W8/02Processing of mobility data, e.g. registration information at HLR [Home Location Register] or VLR [Visitor Location Register]; Transfer of mobility data, e.g. between HLR, VLR or external networks
    • H04W8/08Mobility data transfer
    • H04W8/14Mobility data transfer between corresponding nodes
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W80/00Wireless network protocols or protocol adaptations to wireless operation
    • H04W80/04Network layer protocols, e.g. mobile IP [Internet Protocol]

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of mobile communication technologies, and in particular, to a communication method of a MIPv6 mobile node.
  • Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6, Mobile IP Version 6)
  • MN Mobile Node
  • CN Correspondent Node
  • the home address (HoA, home address) is a unicast routable address assigned to the mobile node and serves as the permanent address of the mobile node.
  • the mobile node notifies the home agent (HA, H.me Ag en t) of the binding message of the home address and the care-of address.
  • the communication node communicates with the mobile node and still uses the home address of the mobile node, and the data packet is still sent to the home network segment of the mobile node; the home agent intercepts the data packets, and forwards the data packet to the mobile node according to the obtained mapping relationship. Handover address.
  • the mobile node can communicate directly with the correspondent node.
  • the basic working process of the above mobile IPv6 is only for the ideal state of the Internet, and does not consider security issues.
  • An existing IPv6 mobile node communication method one is to configure a temporary home address, adopting Pro Time-shifting identifier (TMI, Temporary Mobile Identifier), which changes periodically.
  • TMI Pro Time-shifting identifier
  • the Temporary Mobile Identifier TMI draws 16 bits from the 128-bit IPv6 address space as the TMI prefix. The address using this prefix is treated as TMI, and the TMI is specified as non-routable.
  • Each MN is assigned a 128-bit TMI. The TMI is periodically changed.
  • the home agent (HA) and the communication node (CN) use the TMI to identify the MN.
  • the CN uses the TMI to identify the corresponding IPsec SA (Ipsec Security Association), and the firewall also uses TMI for filtering.
  • the MN uses the route optimization mode.
  • the TMI home address (HoA, Home Address) option the real home address HoA is in the newly defined binding update sub-option.
  • CN binds TMI, home address and care-of address together.
  • the data packet between the MN and the CN in the home address option and the Type 2 routing header is to contain the TMI instead of the current home address HoA, so the eavesdropper cannot identify the data packets belonging to the particular node.
  • the first 16 bits of the temporary mobility identifier TMI are fixed, so the attacker can easily identify the TMI; the TMI is a substitute for the home address, so the TMI update requires the same security as the home address update. Then the periodically updated TMI will be frequently executed by the RRP (Return Routability Procedure); the binding update BU message sequence number is incremented, and thus can continue tracking.
  • RRP Return Routability Procedure
  • Another existing IPv6 mobile node communication method is to use a replacement identifier (PL, Privacy Lable) instead of a home address to achieve the purpose of hiding the home address.
  • PL replacement identifier
  • the algorithm is:
  • the MN After obtaining the new care-of address, the MN will perform a binding update to the CN.
  • the binding management key (Kbm, binding management key) is first calculated, and the calculation formula is the same as the algorithm for calculating Kpm.
  • Kbm binding management key
  • CN calculates the string and restores the HoA.
  • the home MAC key identifier and Kbm are then used to verify the MAC for the binding update. If the binding update BU is successful, the PL is considered valid.
  • CN stores the current directory And Kbm.
  • the CN then sends a normal BA to the MN.
  • the PL is different after each binding update of the MN, which prevents the eavesdropper from tracking the MN through the home address.
  • the new care-of address becomes the bridge to the old and new PL.
  • Kpm is required in the calculation of PL (the privacy management key is the same as Kbm), so the generation of the new PL cannot be earlier than the binding update (BU) message.
  • the RRP process is performed before the update is bound to the CN.
  • the MN uses the new care-of address and the old PL, which means that the attacker can know the new care-of address of the MN through the old PL.
  • the MN uses the new care-of address and the new PL, at which point the attacker can obtain the new PL of the MN through the new care-of address and continue to track the MN.
  • An object of the present invention is to provide a communication method of a MIPv6 mobile node, which is transmitted by using an identifier updated in synchronization with a care-of address instead of a home address as a destination option to hide a home address, thereby preventing malicious tracking and attack on the mobile node.
  • a communication method of a MIPv6 mobile node includes: a mobile node accessing a network at an access point and obtaining a new care-of address, and calculating a privacy identifier PID by using the handover address,
  • the mobile node replaces its home address with a PID, and populates the PID into the binding update message, and sends it to the home agent and the communication node respectively;
  • the home agent and the communication node After receiving the binding update message, the home agent and the communication node use the PID to restore the home address HoA of the mobile node.
  • the update of the PID is synchronized with the update of the mobile node care-of address.
  • the PID ClearWord XOR HoA, where ClearWord is a random number updated synchronously with the care-of address.
  • the new sequence number of the mobile node binding update message is an exclusive OR operation of the Clearword and the original sequence number of the binding update message, and the new serial number is used instead of the original serial number to fill in the binding update.
  • the new serial number is used instead of the original serial number to fill in the binding update.
  • the new serial number is restored to the original serial number. More suitably, when the mobile node moves to a different location, the communication node discovers through the IPv6 neighbor The mechanism obtains a corresponding care-of address, the prefix of the care-of address is a prefix of the foreign network address, and forwards the data packet to the off-site network segment to which the care-of address belongs.
  • the method further comprises:
  • the mobile node encrypts the ClearWord with the binding management key Kbm, and sends the BU message to the communication node through the binding update;
  • the communication node After receiving the binding update message BU, the communication node first calculates the Kbm and verifies the validity of the message verification code MAC. After the MAC verification is passed, the ClearWord is obtained.
  • the communication method of the IPv6 mobile node of the present invention configures a care-of address for the mobile node when it accesses the network link at the current access point, and uses a logical operation to obtain a hidden identifier PID that is updated synchronously with the care-of address, and the mobile node replaces the hometown with the PID.
  • HoTI Home Test Init:
  • HoT Home Test
  • the communication node receives the binding update message and uses the PID to restore the home address. In this way, the home address no longer appears during the entire communication process. Moreover, the care-of address update and the privacy identifier update are synchronized, preventing the eavesdropper from performing RRP-related attacks and continuing to track the mobile node.
  • the random number updated synchronously with the care-of address and the original sequence number of the binding update message are XORed, and the new serial number is used instead of the original serial number to fill in the binding update message.
  • the communication node receives the binding update message and restores the original sequence number.
  • the binding confirmation message of the mobile node response also uses the new serial number instead of the original serial number, so that the BU serial number is also random and cannot be tracked. The attacker is prevented from tracking messages according to the BU serial number.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a communication process of a mobile IPv6 route optimization mode
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram showing the application of the communication method of the IPv6 mobile node in the round-trip routing process in the present invention
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram showing the application of the communication method of the IPv6 mobile node of the present invention in the binding update process. detailed description
  • the basic idea of the method for hiding the home address of the IPv6 mobile node of the present invention is that after the mobile node accesses the network link and obtains the care-of address, the mobile node replaces the home address with a privacy identifier (PID), and will include
  • PID privacy identifier
  • the binding update message of the PID and the care-of address mapping relationship is sent to the home agent and the communication node, and in the Return Routability Procedure (RRP) between the mobile node, the home agent, and the communication node, there is also a BU.
  • the binding update process, the home test initialization HoTI and the home test HoT message use the address of the home agent and the PID to communicate, thereby hiding the home address of the mobile node.
  • the mobile terminal To maintain communication continuity during the process of Layer 3 network switching, the mobile terminal must ensure that the mobile is transparent to the communication application, that is, the network layer identification of the communication application - the IP address remains unchanged.
  • the Internet routing mode selects the route according to the destination address of the network layer, and sends the data packet to the network where the destination address is located, thereby reaching the node represented by the destination address.
  • the network layer mobility must address the IP address that is available to the network segment where the routing node is currently located, while using the fixed IP address for the entire communication application.
  • the solution of mobile IPv6 to keep communication flowing smoothly during the network layer movement can be summarized into three points: (1) The home address HoA is defined, and the upper-layer communication application uses the home address to ensure the transparency of the application; 2) The care-of address CoA is defined, and the care-of address is obtained from the foreign network to ensure the communication is reachable in the existing routing mode. (3) The mapping between the home address and the care-of address, and the network layer identifier and network layer used by the upper-layer application are established. The relationship between the destination identifiers used by the route.
  • the mobile node When the mobile node moves to the foreign site, it obtains one or more care-of addresses through the IPv6 neighbor discovery mechanism, usually stateless address autoconfiguration, and the prefix of the care-of address is the prefix of the foreign subnet, and the mobile node sets the home address and the care-of address.
  • the binding information informs the communication node that when the communication node knows the care-of address of the mobile node, it can directly forward the data packet to the foreign network segment where the care-of address is located. In this way, normal communication can be directly performed between the communication node and the mobile node.
  • This communication process is called the route optimization mode communication process, as shown in Figure 1.
  • the mobile node After the mobile node obtains the care-of address, it needs to register the care-of address to his home agent, and send the binding update and message to the home agent, and the home agent response 'binding confirmation' to complete the registration.
  • the packet from the communication node to the mobile node is sent directly to the mobile node's care-of address (route optimization mode).
  • the communication node queries the obtained binding cache according to the IP address of the packet. If there is a match in the binding buffer, the communication node uses the second type of routing header (a type of packet header of the mobile IP).
  • the destination address of the packet is replaced by a query to obtain a care-of address
  • the address in the second type of routing header is the home address of the mobile node.
  • the home address option is used to set the source address of the packet as the care-of address of the mobile node
  • the address in the home address option is the home address of the mobile node.
  • the relationship between the mobile node MN and the communication node CN is arbitrary, and is not suitable for a method in which a security association needs to be established in advance. To ensure the security of the binding, you can use the binding management key.
  • the mobile node and the communication node negotiate a binding process through a round-trip routable process (RRP).
  • the mobile IPv6 protocol message between the MN and the CN includes: a binding update BU sent by the MN to the CN, and a binding confirmation (BA, Binding Acknowledgment) sent by the CN to the MN.
  • the purpose of the round-trip routable process is to ensure that both the home address and the care-of address in the binding update are truly reachable and belong to the mobile node.
  • the main purpose of the round-trip routable process is to ensure that the communication node receives the authenticity and reliability of the binding update, including the home test process and the handover test process.
  • the home test process first initiates a home test initialization message by the mobile node, and forwards it to the communication node via the home agent through the tunnel, thereby informing the communication node of the work required to initiate the home test.
  • the communication node After receiving the home test initialization message, the communication node will use the home address and two random numbers Ken and nonce to generate a home keygen token, and then use the home test message returned to the mobile node. 4 home keygen token* and nonce cable The number tells the mobile node;
  • the handover test firstly sends the handover test initialization message directly to the communication node, and the communication node performs the corresponding operation on the care-of address carried in the message with ken and nonce to generate care-of keygen token*, and then returns the test information of the mobile node. It carries the care-of keygen token and the nonce index number.
  • the mobile node generates the binding management key Kbm by using the home keygen token and the care-of keygen token, and then uses the kbm and the binding update message to perform corresponding operations to generate the verification code 1, which is carried in the binding update message.
  • the home keygen token, the care-of keygen token, and the nonce number are used to perform corresponding operations with the binding message to obtain the verification code 2. Compare the two verification codes. If they are the same, the communication node can judge whether the binding message is authentic or not. Otherwise, it will be considered invalid.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram showing the application of the communication method of the IPv6 mobile node of the present invention in the round-trip routing reachable process.
  • the RRP is performed by the exchange of signaling information (HoTI information and HoT information, and CoTl information and CoT information) between the mobile node and the communication node.
  • the mobile node transmits HoTI and CoTI information almost simultaneously.
  • the mobile node first generates two 64-bit random numbers, Hot cookie and CoT cookie, and sends them to the communication node as parameters of the information.
  • the HoTI information and the COT1 area are located in the following: The HoTI information is first sent to the original proxy by the reverse tunneling technology, and then forwarded to the communication node; and the CoTl information is directly sent to the communication node by using the normal routing mechanism.
  • PID Privacy Identifier
  • the identifier is defined as follows:
  • ClearWord First ( 128, HMAC_SHA1 ( CN
  • Seed is a random number generated by the mobile node. Since Seed is not sent in plaintext, the same Seed value can be used for all CN/HAs.
  • Joining Seed is to ensure the randomness of ClearWord. Adding the address of CN in ClearWord calculation can ensure that each CN gets different ClearWord.
  • Joining CoA can ensure the synchronization of ClearWord and CoA.
  • the HoTI Home Test Initialization
  • the HoT Home Test
  • PID Home Address option
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram showing the application of the communication method of the IPv6 mobile node of the present invention in the binding update process.
  • a new Word option is added to the binding update.
  • the content is ClearWord (or EncryptedWord).
  • the mobile node calculates and uses the new PID immediately after obtaining the new care-of address. That is, the update of the PID and the update of the care-of address are synchronized.
  • the PID home address option that is, the location instead of the HoA
  • ClearWord in the BU Word option the Word option is protected by IPsec encryption.
  • the BU message is protected by ESP encryption (transmission mode), which guarantees the security of ClearWord.
  • ESP encryption transmission mode
  • the PID is used as the source address in the BU message, so the new PID does not affect the IPsec operation.
  • the MN uses the new PID in the process of RJ P. At this time, the CN does not need to verify the validity of the PID.
  • the MN will get a binding management key Kbm, and the MN encrypts ClearWord with Kbm. ,
  • EncryptedWord Encrypt ( ClearWord ) Kbm
  • Encrypt ( ) Kbm indicates that the content in ( ) is encrypted with the key Kbm .
  • EncryptedWord fills in the Word option of the BU message and sends it to the CN along with the BU 4 text.
  • the algorithm is as follows:
  • the care-of address update and the privacy identifier update are synchronized, preventing the eavesdropper from continuing the tracking of the mobile node by performing an RR-related attack.
  • the first 16 bits of the clearword are XORed with the serial number of the BU message:
  • newSequence# clearword ( 16 ) XOR Sequence#, Fill in the BU message with the original sequence number of newSequence? ⁇ .
  • CN recovers the clearword
  • newSequence#fe re-realizes the serial number, and the algorithm is as follows:
  • Sequence# clearword ( 16 ) XOR newSequence# ,
  • the CN message of the CN response also uses newSequencdM to replace the original serial number, so that the serial number is also random and cannot be traced.
  • the communication method of the IPv6 mobile node of the present invention is sent by using the configuration replacement identifier instead of the home address as a destination option.
  • the serial number in the BU message is improved to make it random, preventing the eavesdropper from passing through the hometown.
  • the address continues to track the mobile node.

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  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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Description

一种 MIPv6移动节点的通信方法
技术领域 本发明涉及移动通信技术领域, 特别涉及一种 MIPv6移动节点的通 信方法。
背景技术
移动 IPv6 ( MIPv6, Mobile IP Version 6 ) 网络的发展方向是向多元 化的无缝宽带接入网络演进, 各种有线、 无线接入方式对于用户业务体 验需要提供通用的移动性, 使用户随时随地可以享受到统一的业务特性。 当移动节点 (MN, Mobile Node)在家乡网段中时, 它与通信节点 (CN, Correspondent Node)之间按照传统的路由技术进行通信,不需要移动 IPv6 的介入。 当移动节点移动到外地链路时, 移动节点的家乡地址保持不变, 同时获得一个临时的 IP地址, 即转交地址(CoA, Care- of Address )。 家 乡地址( HoA, home address )是分配给移动节点的一个单播可路由地址, 并作为移动节点的永久地址。 移动节点把家乡地址与转交地址的绑定报 文告知家乡代理 (HA, H。me Agent)。 通信节点与移动节点通信仍然使用移 动节点的家乡地址, 数据包仍然发往移动节点的家乡网段; 家乡代理截 获这些数据包, 并根据已获得的映射关系通过隧道方式将其转发给移动 节点的转交地址。 移动节点则可以直接和通信节点进行通信。 上述移动 IPv6的基本工作过程只是针对于理想状态的互联网, 并没有考虑安全方 面的问题。 实际的网络中, 会存在各种对报文的窃听或者篡改等攻击。 如果攻击者截取了绑定报文, 并且修改内容中转交地址为攻击者的地址, 然后再继续发送给 HA或者 CN, 那么攻击者就会截取到发往移动节点的 通信数据。 同样对于移动 IPv6中目的选项或者路由报头的攻击, 也会影 响到通信的安全。为了保证移动 IPv6和不使用移动 IPv6的系统同样安全, 就必须保护绑定报文, 防止它被非法更改, 防范对移动节点的恶意攻击。 为了防止窃听者的跟踪和恶意攻击, 移动节点的通信方法中必须向窃听 者隐藏自己的家乡地址。
现有的 IPv6移动节点的通信方法,一种是配置临时家乡地址,采用临 时移动标识符(TMI, Temporary Mobile Identifier ), 使其周期性变化。 临 时移动标识符 TMI从 128位的 IPv6地址空间中划出 16位作为 TMI的前缀, 使用此前缀的地址都看成是 TMI, TMI被规定为不可路由的。 每个 MN分 配一个 128位的 TMI, TMI是周期性改变的, 其算法是 digest = SHA-112 (Public Key | imprint) , 公共密钥 ( kpm )和 imprint发送到通信方和用私有 密钥签署的报文中, imprint是 128位的临时随机数。 家乡代理(HA )和通 信节点(CN )用 TMI来识别 MN。 CN用 TMI来标识相应的 IPsec SA ( Ipsec 安全联盟) , 防火墙也使用 TMI进行过滤。 MN使用路由最优化模式, 在 绑定更新 (BU, Binding Update)中, TMI在家乡地址( HoA, Home Address ) 选项里, 真正的家乡地址 HoA在新定义的绑定更新子选项中。 CN将 TMI、 家乡地址和转交地址绑定在一起。 接下来, 在家乡地址选项和类型 2路由 头中 MN和 CN之间的数据包要包含 TMI来代替当前家乡地址 HoA,因此而 窃听者不能识别属于特定节点的数据包。 但这种方法中, 临时移动标识 符 TMI的前 16位是固定的, 因此攻击者可以很容易的识别 TMI; TMI是 家乡地址的替代品, 因此 TMI更新要求具有家乡地址更新相同的安全性, 那么周期更新的 TMI就会 I起往返可路由过程 ( RRP , Return Routability Procedure ) 的频繁执行; 绑定更新 BU报文序列号是递增的, 可由此继续 跟踪。
现有的另一种 IPv6移动节点通信方法是使用替换标识符( PL, Privacy Lable )代替家乡地址来达到隐藏家乡地址的目的。 使用替换标识符 PL代 替家乡地址作为目的选项被发送。 其算法是:
Privacy-Label = String XOR HoA
其中, String = First (128, H AC_SHA1 (Kbm, (CoA | Home Nonce
Index |Care-of Nonce Index)))。
MN在获得新的转交地址后,要对 CN进行绑定更新。 当通信节点收 到携带含有 PL的新的目的选项时,首先计算绑定管理密钥(Kbm, binding management Key ) , 计算式和计算 Kpm的算法一样。 使用 Kbm, CN计 算字符串并且恢复 HoA。然后利用家乡密钥标识和 Kbm为绑定更新验证 MAC。 如果绑定更新 BU成功, PL就被认为有效。 CN就存储当前目录 和 Kbm。 然后 CN就向 MN发送一个正常的 BA。 MN每次绑定更新后 PL都是不同的, 这可以防止窃听者通过家乡地址跟踪 MN。 但是, 由于 标识符(PL )和转交地址更新的不同步, 新的转交地址成为联系新旧 PL 的桥梁。 PL的计算中需要用到 Kpm ( privacy management key与 Kbm相 同) , 所以新 PL的产生不可能早于绑定更新 ( BU )报文。 当 MN获得 新的转交地址后, 在向 CN绑定更新之前要执行 RRP过程。 在这个过程 中, MN使用的是新的转交地址和旧的 PL, 也就是说攻击者通过旧的 PL 可以知道 MN的新转交地址。在 BU之后, MN使用新的转交地址和新的 PL, 这时攻击者可以通过新的转交地址获得 MN 的新的 PL, 继续跟踪 丽。 发明内容
本发明的目的是提供一种 MIPv6移动节点的通信方法, 通过采用与 转交地址同步更新的标识符代替家乡地址作为目的选项被发送来隐藏家 乡地址, 从而防止对移动节点的恶意跟踪和攻击。
根据本发明提供的一种 MIPv6移动节点的通信方法, 包括: 移动节点在接入地接入网络并获得新的转交地址, 利用所述转交地 址计算隐私性标识符 PID,
移动节点用 PID代替其家乡地址,并将 PID填充到绑定更新报文中, 分别发送到家乡代理和通信节点;
家乡代理和通信节点收到绑定更新报文后利用 PID恢复移动节点的 家乡地址 HoA。
更适宜地, 所述 PID的更新与移动节点转交地址的更新同步。
所述 PID=ClearWord XOR HoA, 其中 ClearWord是与转交地址同步 更新的一个随机数。
优选地,所述移动节点绑定更新报文的新序列号为 Clearword与绑定 更新报文的原序列号进行异或运算得到的结果, 用新序列号代替原序列 号填入绑定更新才艮文中。
通信节点恢复出 Clearword之后, 将新序列号恢复为原序列号。 更适宜地, 当移动节点移动到异地时, 通信节点通过 IPv6邻居发现 机制, 获得相应的转交地址, 所述转交地址的前缀是外地网络地址的前 缀, 并将数据包转发到转交地址所属的异地网段。
更适宜地, 该方法进一步包括:
移动节点用绑定管理密钥 Kbm对所述 ClearWord进行加密, 并通过 绑定更新 BU报文发送给通信节点;
通信节点收到绑定更新报文 BU后, 首先计算 Kbm并验证消息验证 码 MAC的合法性, MAC验证通过后解得到 ClearWord。
与现有技术相比,
本发明的 IPv6移动节点的通信方法在移动节点在当前接入地接入网 络链路时为其配置转交地址, 利用逻辑运算得到与转交地址同步更新的 隐藏标识符 PID, 移动节点用 PID代替家乡地址, 并将包含 PID和转交 地址映射关系的的绑定更新报文发送到家乡代莩和通信节点; 在移动节 点、 家乡代理和通信节点之间的 RRP过程中, 家乡测试初始化( HoTI, Home Test Init:)和家乡测试( HoT, Home Test ) 艮文都使用家乡代理的 地址和 PID进行通信。 通信节点接收所述绑定更新报文并使用所述 PID 恢复家乡地址。 这样, 在整个通信过程中, 家乡地址都不再出现。 而且 转交地址更新和隐私性标识符更新同步, 防止了窃听者进行 RRP相关攻 击而继续跟踪移动节点。
在移动节点, 利用与转交地址同步更新的随机数和绑定更新报文的 原序列号进行异或运算, 用新序列号代替原序列号填入绑定更新报文中。 通信节点收到绑定更新报文并恢复出原序列号, 移动节点响应的绑定确 认报文也使用新序列号代替原序列号, 这样使 BU序列号也具有随机性, 不可追踪。 避免了攻击者根据 BU序列号跟踪报文。 附图说明
图 1为移动 IPv6路由优化模式通信过程示意图;
图 2为说明本发明 IPv6移动节点的通信方法在往返路由可达过程中 应用的示意图;
图 3为说明本发明 IPv6移动节点的通信方法在绑定更新过程中应用 的示意图。 具体实施方式
下面结合附图对本发明的具体实施方式做详细说明。
本发明的 IPv6移动节点家乡地址的隐藏方法的基本思路是移动节点 在当前接入地接入网络链路并获得转交地址后, 移动节点用隐私性标识 符(PID )代替家乡地址, 并将包含所述 PID和转交地址映射关系的绑定 更新报文发送到家乡代理和通信节点 , 在移动节点、 家乡代理和通信节 点之间的往返可路由过程(RRP, Return Routability Procedure ) 中, 还有 BU绑定更新过程, 家乡测试初始化 HoTI和家乡测试 HoT报文都使用家 乡代理的地址和 PID进行通信, 从而隐藏了移动节点的家乡地址。
移动终端要在三层网络切换的过程中保持通信畅通就必须保证移动 对于通信应用的透明, 即通信应用的网絡层识别—— IP地址保持不变。 互联网路由模式是根据网络层目的地址来进行选路, 并将数据包发送到 该目的地址所在的网络, 从而到达该目的地址所代表的节点。 网络层移 动必须解决对通信应用全程使用固定 IP地址的同时, 使用路由节点当前 所在网段可达的 IP地址。
移动 IPv6对于实现通信在网络层移动过程中保持通畅的解决方案可 以筒单地归纳为三点: (1)定义了家乡地址 HoA, 上层通信应用全程使用 家乡地址保证了对应用的移动透明; (2)定义了转交地址 CoA, 从外地网 络获得转交地址, 保证了现有路由模式下通信可达; (3)家乡地址与转交 地址的映射, 建立了上层应用所使用的网络层标识与网络层路由所使用 的目的标识之间的关系。 当移动节点移动到外地时, 通过 IPv6邻居发现 机制, 通常是无状态地址自动配置, 获得一个或多个转交地址, 转交地 址的前缀是外地子网的前缀, 移动节点将家乡地址与转交地址的绑定信 息告知通信节点, 当通信节点知道了移动节点的转交地址就可以直接将 数据包转发到其转交地址所在的外地网段。 这样通信节点与移动节点之 间就可以直接进行正常通信。 这个通信过程被称作路由优化模式通信过 程, 如图 1 所示。 移动节点获得转交地址后, 需要 —个转交地址注册 到他的家乡代理上, 通过向家乡代理发送绑定更新和消息, 以及家乡代 理应答 '绑定确认' 完成注册。 在通信节点完成它的当前绑定后, 通信节点到移动节点的分組直接 发送到移动节点的转交地址 (路由优化模式)。 当发送任何移动 EPV6分组 时, 通信节点根据分组的 IP地址查询获得的绑定緩存, 如果绑定緩存中 存在匹配, 通信节点使用第二类路由头(移动 IP的一种报文头)。 分組的 目的地址换成查询获得转交地址, 第二类路由头中的地址是移动节点的 家乡地址。 移动节点发送分组给通信节点时, 在目的扩展报头中, 使用 家乡地址选项设置分組的源地址为移动节点的转交地址, 家乡地址选项 中的地址是移动节点的家乡地址。
移动节点 MN与通信节点 CN的关系带有任意性, 不适合需要预先 建立安全关联的方式。 为保证绑定的安全性, 可以使用绑定管理密钥
( Kbm,Binding Management Key )来保护。 通过往返可路由过程 ( RRP ) 建立移动节点和通信节点协商绑定过程。 MN与 CN之间的移动 IPv6协 议消息包括: MN发往 CN的绑定更新 BU, CN发往 MN的绑定确认 ( BA, Binding Acknowledgment )。 往返可路由过程的目的是要确保绑定更新中 的家乡地址和转交地址都是真实可达的, 都属于移动节点。 往返可路由 过程主要目的在于保证通信节点接收到绑定更新的真实性和可靠性, 其 包括家乡测试过程和转交测试过程。
家乡测试过程首先由移动节点发起家乡测试初始化消息, 通过隧道 经由家乡代理转发给通信节点, 以此告知通信节点启动家乡测试所需的 工作。 通信节点收到家乡测试初始化消息后, 会利用家乡地址及两个随 机数 Ken与 nonce,进行运算生成 home keygen token, 然后会利用返回给 移动节点的家乡测试消息 4巴 home keygen token*以及 nonce索 ]号告诉移 动节点;
转交测试首先是移动节点直接向通信节点发送转交测试初始化消 息,通信节点会将消息中携带的转交地址与 ken和 nonce进行相应运算生 成 care-of keygen token* , 然后在返回移动节点的转交测试息中携带 care-of keygen token以及 nonce索引号。移动节点利用 home keygen token 和 care-of keygen token生成绑定管理密钥 Kbm, 再利用 kbm和绑定更新 消息进行相应运算生成验证码 1 , 携带在绑定更新消息中。 通信节点收到 邦定更新消息后利用 home keygen token, care-of keygen token以及 nonce 数, 与绑定消息进行相应运算, 得出验证码 2。 比较两个验证码, 如果相 同, 通信节点就可以判断绑定消息真实可信, 否则, 将视为无效。
图 2为说明本发明 IPv6移动节点的通信方法在往返路由可达过程中 应用的示意图。 如图 2所示, RRP由移动节点和通信节点之间信令信息 ( HoTI信息和 HoT信息, 以及 CoTl信息和 CoT信息) 的交换来完成。 为了加快返回可路由过程的处理速度, 移动节点几乎同时发送 HoTI和 CoTI信息。 移动节点首先产生两个 64比特的随机数 Hot cookie和 CoT cookie, 并作为信息的参数发送给通信节点。 HoTI信息和 COT1的区另 'J 在于: HoTI 信息利用反向隧道技术首先发送到原代理, 然后再转发给 通信节点; 而 CoTl信息则是利用正常的路由机制直接发送给通信节点。
定义新的标识符: 隐私性标识符(PID, Privacy Identifier ), 它是随 转交地址改变的, 它代替家乡地址作为目的选项被发送,通信节点使用这 个标识从绑定更新数据包中恢复家乡地址, 它的更新和转交地址的更新 是同步的。 下面详细介绍:
标识符的定义如下:
PID = ClearWord XOR HoA
其中: ClearWord = First ( 128, HMAC_SHA1 ( CN|Seed|HoA|CoA ) )。 其中, Seed是移动节点生成的一个随机数, 由于 Seed并不以明文的 形式发送, 所以可以对所有的 CN/HA使用相同的 Seed值。 加入 Seed是 为了保证 ClearWord的随机性, 在 ClearWord的计算中加入 CN的地址可 以保证每个 CN获得不同的 ClearWord,加入 CoA可以保证 ClearWord与 CoA的更新同步。 在 MN与 CN的 RJ P过程中或采用双向隧道模式通信 时, HoTI (家乡测试初始化)报文和 HoT (家乡测试)报文都不再使用 家乡地址, 而是使用家乡代理的地址和 PID进行通信(为了避免攻击者 通过 CN追踪 MN )。
移动节点发送到家乡代理的 HoTI报文格式:
IPv6 header (source = care-of address,
destination = home agent) ESP header in tunnel mode
IPv6 header (source = home address,
destination = correspondent node)
Mobility Header
Home Test Init
移动节点转发到通信节点的 ΗοΉ报文格式:
IPv6 header (source = home agent,
destination = correspondent node)
Destination Options header
Home Address option (PID)
Mobility header
Home Test Init
通信节点返回到家乡代理的 HoT报文格式:
IPv6 header (source = correspondent node,
destination =home agent)
Routing header (type 2)
PID
Mobility header
Home Test
通信节点到达移动节点的 HoT报文格式:
IPv6 header (source = home agent,
destination =care-of address)
ESP header in tunneling mode
IPv6 header (source = correspondent node,
destination = home address)
Mobility header
Home Test
图 3为说明本发明 IPv6移动节点的通信方法在绑定更新过程中应用 的示意图。 如图 3所示, 在绑定更新 ^艮文中新增加一个 Word选项, 选项 内容是 ClearWord (或 EncryptedWord )。 在移动节点端, 移动节点在获得 新的转交地址后立即计算并使用新的 PID。 也就是 PID的更新和转交地 址的更新同步。 对 HA的绑定更新中, PID在家乡地址选项中(也就是代 替 HoA的位置), ClearWord在 BU的 Word选项中, Word选项受 IPsec 加密保护。 在 HA端, BU报文是受到 ESP加密保护的 (传输模式), 可 以保证 ClearWord的安全性。 虽然在传输模式时, SA是建立在家乡地址 上的, 但 PID在 BU报文中是作为源地址使用的, 因此新的 PID不会对 IPsec操作造成影响。 HA在解密 BU报文后可以在 Word选项中得到 ClearWord, 并恢复 HoA, Ho A= PID XOR ClearWord。
对 CN的绑定更新, 在 RJ P的过程中 MN使用新的 PID, 这时 CN 不需要验证 PID的合法性, RRP过程结束时 MN会得到一个绑定管理密 钥 Kbm, MN用 Kbm加密 ClearWord,
EncryptedWord=Encrypt ( ClearWord ) Kbm,
其中, Encrypt ( ) Kbm 表示用密钥 Kbm 加密 ( ) 中的内容。 EncryptedWord填入 BU报文的 Word选项中,随 BU 4艮文一起发送到 CN。
在 CN端, CN收到 BU后,首先计算 Kbm并验证消息验证码( MAC ) 的合法性, MAC验证通过后再解密 EncryptedWord以得到 ClearWord, Clear Word=Decrypt ( EncryptedWord ) Kbm, Decrypt ( ) Kbm表示用密 4月 Kbm解密 () 中的内容。 CN用 PID和 ClearWord就可以恢复 HoA, 算 法如下:
HoA=PID XOR ClearWord;
最重要的是, 这样得到的 PID和 HoA的对应关系的正确性是可以得 到保证的。
这样, 在整个通信过程中, 家乡地址都不再出现。 而且转交地址更 新和隐私性标识符更新同步,防止了窃听者进行 RR相关攻击而继续跟踪 移动节点。
由于通过 BU 报文中的序列号可以继续追踪移动节点, 所以取 clearword的前 16 bit与 BU报文的序列号进行异或地运算:
newSequence# = clearword ( 16 ) XOR Sequence#, 用 newSequence?^^^^原序列号填入 BU报文中。 在通信节点, CN恢 复出 clearword之后, newSequence#fe复真正的序列号, 算法如下:
Sequence# = clearword ( 16 ) XOR newSequence# ,
CN响应的 BA报文也要使用 newSequencdM 替原序列号,这样使序 列号也具有随机性, 不可追踪。
本发明的 IPv6移动节点的通信方法利用配置替换标识符代替家乡地 址作为目的选项被发送, 通过设置 PID及其算法, 改进 BU报文中的序 列号使其具有随机性, 防止了窃听者通过家乡地址继续跟踪移动节点。
虽然通过上述实施例描绘了本发明, 但本发明不仅限于此。 本领域 普通技术人员知道, 本发明有许多变形和变化而不脱离本发明的实质, 这些变形和变化落入所附的权利要求的保护范围。

Claims

权 利 要 求
1、 一种 MIPv6移动节点的通信方法, 其特征在于, 包括: 移动节点在接入地接入网络并获得新的转交地址, 利用所述转交地 址计算隐私性标识符 PID,
移动节点用 PID代替其家乡地址,并将 PID填充到绑定更新报文中, 分别发送到家乡代理和通信节点;
家乡代理和通信节点收到绑定更新报文后利用 PID恢复移动节点的 家乡地址 HoA。
2、如权利要求 1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述 PID的更新与移动节 点转交地址的更新同步。
3、如权利要求 2所述的方法,其特征在于,所述 PID=ClearWord XOR Ho A, 其中 ClearWord是与转交地址同步更新的一个随机数。
4、 如权利要求 1或 2或 3所述的方法, 其特征在于,所述移动节点绑 定更新报文的新序列号为 Clearword与绑定更新报文的原序列号进行异 或运算得到的结果, 用新序列号代替原序列号填入绑定更新报文中。
5、如权利要求 4所述的方法,其特征在于,通信节点恢复出 Clearword 之后, 将新序列号恢复为原序列号。
6、 如权利要求 1所述的方法, 其特征在于,进一步包括:
当移动节点移动到异地时, 通信节点通过 IPv6邻居发现机制, 获得 相应的转交地址, 所述转交地址的前缀是外地网络地址的前缀, 并将数 据包转发到转交地址所属的异地网段。
7、 如权利要求 1所述的方法, 其特征在于, 进一步包括:
移动节点用绑定管理密钥 Kbm对所述 ClearWord进行加密, 并通过 绑定更新 BU报文发送给通信节点;
通信节点收到绑定更新报文 BU后, 首先计算 Kbm并验证消息验证 码 MAC的合法性, MAC验证通过后解得到 ClearWord。
PCT/CN2006/002120 2006-01-09 2006-08-21 Procédé de communication pour les noeuds mobiles mipv6 WO2007079628A1 (fr)

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