WO2007041933A1

WO2007041933A1 - An updating method of controlled secret keys and the apparatus thereof

Info

Publication number: WO2007041933A1
Application number: PCT/CN2006/002475
Authority: WO
Inventors: Fei Liu; Zhengwei Wang
Original assignee: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Priority date: 2005-10-10
Filing date: 2006-09-21
Publication date: 2007-04-19
Also published as: CN101160780B; CN1859734A; CN101160780A; CN100479569C

Abstract

An updating method of controlled secret keys applied in the 3G communication network includes: at the network side setting control parameters for controlling the updating of authentication secret key; after the terminal has passed the consistency authentication of the network side, it generates the Resynchronization Token according to the authentication secret key of itself, the received random numbers, the control parameters reserved by itself or input by the user, and by replacing the sequence number of the terminal with particular values, sends the requesting command of the resynchronization to the network side and attaches the Resynchronization Token; when the network side receives the requesting command of the resynchronization and determines that the sequence number of the terminal is the particular value, it performs the consistency authentication for the Resynchronization Token according to the set control parameters, random numbers, and the authentication secret key of the network side, if the authentication is passed, the secret key updating is performed, otherwise the related processes are performed. In the invention, the control parameters are added when generating the resynchronization token, thereby to prevent illegal users updating the authentication secret key by illegally cloning user cards.

Description

Controlled key update method and device

Technical field

The present invention relates to communication security technologies, and in particular, to a controlled authentication key update method and apparatus.

Background technique

In the existing third generation (3G, 3 ^rd Generation) mobile communication system, an International Mobile Subscriber Identification (IMSI), an authentication key KI and a serial number SQNMS, a home location register are stored in the mobile terminal. In the HLR/AUC (Home Location Register/Authentication Center), the IMSI, the KI, and the serial number SQNHE are saved for the mobile terminal for mutual authentication between the mobile terminal and the network.

The existing authentication procedures for 3G communication systems are mainly:

HLR/AUC generates random number RAND, generates expected response XRES, encryption key CK, integrity key IK according to RAND and KI; generates message authentication code according to RAND, SQNHE, authentication key KI and authentication management domain AMF MAC-A; According to MAC-A, SQNHE, the anonymous key AK and AMF get the authentication token AUTN (Authentication Token).

The authentication quintuple is composed of RAND and XRES, CK, IK and AUTN, and the quintuple is sent to the mobile switching center/visit location register (MSC/VLR, Mobile Switch Center/Visit Location Register) for saving. Of course, in practice, the HLR/AUC sends the corresponding one or more 5-tuples to the MSC/VLR at the request of the MSC/VLR. The terminal verifies the consistency of the AUTN according to the KI saved by itself; if the consistency verification fails, the authentication failure information is returned to the MSC/VLR; if the consistency verification is passed, it is determined whether the SQNHE is in an acceptable range: if it belongs, The terminal determines that the network authentication is passed, the terminal returns its own authentication response to the MSC/VLR, and updates the SQNMS according to the SQNHE in the AUTN; the MSC/VLR compares the authentication response returned by the terminal with the XRES in the corresponding quintuple. Consistently determine the legitimacy of the terminal. If it is judged that SQNHE is not within the acceptable range, then The terminal generates a resynchronization flag AUTS (Resynchi-onisation Token) according to the SQNMS, and returns a resynchronization request or a synchronization failure (Synchronisation Failure) message to the MSC/VLR, and attaches the generated resynchronization flag AUTS, that is, the message includes AUTS; When receiving the resynchronization flag AUTS, the /VLR sends the AUTS and the RAND in the corresponding quintuple to the HLR/AUC; the HLR/AUC determines the legality of the AUTS according to the corresponding saved KI and the received RAND; if not, Then the HLR/AUC returns AUTS invalid information to the MSC/VLR; if it is determined that the AUTS is legal, the HLR/AUC updates the SQNHE according to the SQNMS in the AUTS, and generates a new authentication quintuple to send to the MSC/VLR; MSC/ After receiving the new quintuple, the VLR deletes the corresponding old quintuple and re-authenticates the terminal with the new quintuple.

The terminal determines whether the SQNHE is acceptable by comparing whether the SQNMS in the saved SQNMS and the AUTN meets a predetermined condition, and the predetermined condition may be that the difference between the SQNHE and the SQNMS is within a predetermined range, for example, whether (SQNHE - SQNMS) ) is greater than 0, or whether (SQNHE - SQNMS ) is greater than 0 and less than 256. If the difference between the SQNHE and the SQNMS is within the predetermined range, it is determined that the SQNHE is acceptable; otherwise, it is determined that the SQNHE is unacceptable.

In reality, there is a phenomenon of user card cloning, which not only causes losses to legitimate users, but also affects the service quality of operators. In the prior art, a legitimate user card is avoided or discovered by continuously updating the authentication key of the user card.

For example, in the prior art, there is a method for updating an authentication key by using a pseudo-synchronization. When a synchronization flag is generated, a specific value is used instead of the SQNMS, so that the network-side HLR/AUC can determine that the synchronization request is a fake synchronization according to the specific value. That is, a synchronization to update the authentication key, instead of updating the synchronization of the SQNHE, therefore, the HLR/AUC and the user card can complete the negotiation of updating the authentication key, thereby completing the update of the authentication key. According to this method, by updating the authentication key, it is possible to effectively prevent the simultaneous use of the legitimate user card and the cloned user card. For example, by updating the authentication key, the legitimate user card can make the cloned user card unable to pass the authentication, and thus cannot continue to use.

However, before the legal user card updates the authentication key, that is, when the cloned user card and the authentication key held by the legitimate user card are the same, if the cloned user card preemptively initiates the negotiation process of updating the authentication key, the save is saved. Authentication key in HLR/AUC and authentication key in cloned user card After the synchronization update is made, the authentication key in the legal user card becomes an invalid authentication key because it is not updated, and the legitimate user card cannot be used.

Although, in this case, when the legitimate user finds that his user card cannot be used, he can realize that the user card is cloned, and can change the authentication key in the HLR/AUC to the business hall, and refresh the user card. The weight key makes the authentication key in the HLR/AUC and the authentication key of the user card again consistent, so that the legitimate user card can continue to be used, and the illegally cloned user card can no longer be used. However, this process can cause problems for the user and also increase the workload of the staff of the business hall.

Therefore, how to effectively control the update of the authentication key makes it impossible for the cloned user card to implement an effective authentication key update, which is a problem worth studying.

Summary of the invention

The present invention provides a controlled key update method and apparatus, which can prevent an illegal user from updating the authentication key by cloning the user card, thereby causing the legitimate user card to continue to be used.

According to an aspect of the present invention, a controlled key update method is provided on a network side for controlling a control parameter for controlling an authentication key update; the method comprising:

After the terminal passes the network side consistency verification, the resynchronization flag is generated according to the authentication key of the terminal, the received random number, the control parameter saved by the terminal or the user input, and the terminal serial number is replaced by a specific value, and sent to the network side. Synchronizing the request command, attaching the resynchronization flag;

Receiving, by the network side, the resynchronization request command, when the terminal serial number is a specific value, performing consistency verification on the resynchronization flag according to the preset control parameter, the random number, and the network side authentication key; Perform a key update when passing verification.

Optionally, the determining, by the terminal, the network side consistency verification and the generating the resynchronization flag further includes: determining, by the terminal according to the terminal serial number, that the network side serial number is within an acceptable range.

Optionally, after the terminal passes the network side consistency r certificate, the method further includes: the terminal determining, according to the terminal serial number, that the serial number of the network side is not within an acceptable range, according to the terminal serial number, the own authentication key, The received random number is used to generate a resynchronization flag, and a resynchronization request command is sent to the network side, and the resynchronization flag is attached.

Optionally, the method further includes: when the terminal serial number is not a specific value, the network side performs the consistency verification on the resynchronization flag according to the random number and the network side authentication key, Synchronization is performed during verification.

Optionally, when the consistency verification of the resynchronization flag fails, the home location register/authentication center of the network side sends a synchronization processing result message to the mobile switching center/visit location register, where the message includes illegal synchronization. information.

Optionally, performing the consistency verification on the network side refers to performing consistency verification on the authentication mark sent by the network side according to the authentication key saved by the terminal and the random number sent by the network side.

Optionally, the method further includes: when the terminal fails to pass the consistency verification on the network side, sending the authentication failure information to the network side.

Optionally, the terminal includes a user equipment and a user card.

Optionally, the control parameter preset by the terminal refers to a control parameter set in the user equipment or a control parameter set in the user card.

Optionally, the control parameter is a password, or an identity of the terminal, or any user-defined value.

Optionally, the method further includes: after generating the new authentication key, the terminal and the network side respectively re-initialize the serial number saved by the terminal and the value of the serial number saved by the network side.

Optionally, the specific value is a specified value, or is a highest byte or any specified byte or some specified bit is any value of the specified value.

According to another aspect of the present invention, an apparatus for implementing controlled key update includes: a control parameter storage unit for storing control parameters for controlling an authentication key update; a specific value storage unit for storing an alternate terminal The serial number to generate a specific value for the resynchronization tag;

The resynchronization flag generating unit is configured to generate a resynchronization according to the terminal's authentication key, the received random number, the terminal saved or the user input control parameter, and replace the terminal serial number with a specific value.

Optionally, the device is located in the terminal; the terminal includes a user equipment and a user card; the specific value storage unit and the resynchronization flag generating unit are located in the user card; and the control parameter storage unit is located in the user equipment or the user card. Inside.

According to still another aspect of the present invention, an apparatus for implementing controlled key update includes: a control parameter saving unit, configured to save a control parameter for controlling the update of the authentication key; and a specific value discriminating unit, configured to determine, when the resynchronization request command is received, whether the terminal serial number is a specific value;

a resynchronization flag verification unit, configured to verify, according to the control parameter saved by the control parameter saving unit, the consistency of the synchronization flag attached to the received resynchronization request command;

The authentication key update unit is configured to implement an update of the authentication key when the determination result of the specific value is YES, and the re-synchronization mark verification unit verifies the pass.

Optionally, the device is located in a home location register/authentication center on the network side.

In the above technical solution provided by the present invention, when the terminal generates the resynchronization flag, the control parameter is added, and the network side may perform the consistency verification on the resynchronization flag according to the control parameter. Therefore, the illegal user cannot clone the user card even if the user card is cloned. The user card updates the authentication key, thereby preventing the illegal user from updating the authentication key through the illegally cloned user card.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS Figure 1 is a flow chart of an embodiment of the present invention.

2 is a flow chart of a first embodiment of a specific embodiment of the present invention.

3 is a flow chart of a second embodiment of a specific embodiment of the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS The key update method controlled by the present invention sets a key update control parameter. In the synchronization process of the negotiation key update, the terminal uploads the control parameter information to the network side HLR/AUC, and the HLR/AUC passes the judgment. Whether the synchronization tag contains the control parameter information to determine whether to perform a corresponding authentication key update operation.

In the present invention, control parameters for controlling the authentication of the authentication key may be set in the subscription data of the HLR/AUC terminal user. By extending the synchronization process in the existing authentication process, when the terminal needs to negotiate with the HLR/AUC to update the authentication key, the terminal introduces a control parameter saved by itself or input by the user in the generated resynchronization tag; Correspondingly, when the HLR/AUC verifies the consistency of the resynchronization marker, it also performs according to the control parameters set by itself. Therefore, when the control parameters saved by the terminal or input by the terminal user are consistent with the control parameters set by the HLR7AUC, the HLR/AUC can determine the consistency of the resynchronization marker. Because the clone user card is not Knowing the control parameter information corresponding to the legal user card setting in the HLR/AUC, therefore, when the cloned user card negotiates with the HLR/AUC to update the authentication key, the resynchronization tag generated by the cloned user card cannot pass the HLR/AUC consistency. Sexual verification, the cloned user card also cannot effectively negotiate the update of the authentication key with the HLR/AUC.

The modification of the existing authentication process of the present invention can be limited to the user card and the HLR/AUC, that is, the intermediate devices involved in the synchronization process, including the base station (NodeB), the base station controller (RNC, Radio Network Controller), and the core network. No changes are required to the device (eg MSC). Thus, the present invention is easier to implement with respect to methods that result in control authentication key updates that require one or more of the NodeB, RNC, and MSC to be changed.

The control parameter used to control the key update of the present invention may be a password, such as a user PIN code (SPIN, Subscriber Personal Identification Number); or an identity of a terminal, such as an international mobile station device identifier of the terminal. (IMEI, International Mobile Station Equipment Identity); Of course, it can also be an arbitrary value customized by the user, for example, the user's alias, the user's avatar information, or the summary information of the user's avatar data, and the like.

The specific embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

In this embodiment, a control parameter for controlling the authentication key update is set in the subscription data of the corresponding end user in the HLR/AUC. The user can save the control parameters in his own subscription data in the HLR/AUC through the business hall or through the service telephone interface or service website provided by the business hall. The terminal includes a user equipment (UE, User Equipment) and a user card. The user card refers to a USIM (UMTS Subscriber Identity Module) for a Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) system.

Referring to Figure 1, when the authentication key needs to be updated, the following process is performed:

In step 101, the terminal initiates a location update request to the network side.

This step may also be to initiate a service request to the network side. In practice, any message sent by the terminal that can cause the network side to authenticate the terminal may be used.

Step 102: The network side MSC/VLR sends the corresponding authentication parameter in the generated authentication tuple to the terminal after receiving the location update request. The authentication tuple may include a random number RAND, a desired response XRES, an encryption key CK:, an integrity key IK, and an authentication token AUTN.

The corresponding authentication parameters include RAND and AUTN.

When the authentication tuple is generated, the HLR/AUC calculates the XRES, CK, and IK by using the RAND generated by the random number generator and the authentication key KI stored by itself; and also according to RAND, KI, serial number SQNHE, and the authentication management domain. AMF generates AUTN.

The authentication token AUTN is 16 bytes long and includes the following contents:

1) SQNHE ^A AK, that is, SQNHE is encrypted with an anonymous key AK, where SQNHE and AK are 6 bytes long, SQNHE refers to SQN stored on the network side to distinguish it from SQNMS stored in the terminal; When SQNHE needs to be encrypted , HLR / AUC generates AK according to RAND and KI, uses AK to XOR the SQNHE, thereby encrypting SQNHE; when it is not necessary to encrypt SQNHE, AK = 0;

2) Authentication management domain AMF is 2 bytes long.

3) Message authentication code MAC-A is 8 bytes long; MAC-A is used to verify the data integrity of RAND, SQNHE, AMF, and is used for terminal authentication of HLR/AUC. The HLR/AUC calculates the MAC-A in the AUTN based on RAND, SQNHE, KI, and AMF.

Thus, the quintuple is composed of RAND, AUTN, XRES, CK, IK, and the like. After the HLR/AUC generates the authentication quintuple, it sends the corresponding International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSSI) and the authentication quintuple RAND, CK, IK, XRES and AUTN to the MSC/VLR. The MSC/VLR is a circuit domain device. For a packet domain network, the corresponding device may be a Serving General Packet Radio Service Support Node (SGSN). When the authentication is performed, the MSC/VLR on the network side will receive the self. The RAND and AUTN in the authentication tuple of the HLR/AUC are transmitted to the terminal.

Step 103: The terminal receives the corresponding authentication parameters (ie, RAND and AUTN) sent by the MSC/VLR, and determines that the consistency verification of the AUTN is passed, and performs calculation according to RAND and KI to obtain a new authentication key NewKI; Controlling parameters, and according to the control parameters, replacing the SQNMS with the specified specific value to generate the resynchronization flag AUTS, initiating a resynchronization request command to the network, and attaching the resynchronization flag AUTS. The initiating a resynchronization request command to the network and attaching the resynchronization flag AUTS, that is, sending the synchronization failure to the network side Message, the message contains AUTS.

It should be noted that the terminal includes a user equipment UE and a user card. In practice, the UE receives the authentication request, and sends the authentication parameters (RAND and AUTN) to the user card, and the user card performs the consistency verification on the received AUTN according to the KI saved by itself. .

The resynchronization flag AUTS includes the following:

1) SQNMS ^A AK, which is an SQNMS encrypted with AK, where SQNMS and AK are respectively 6 bytes long, and SQNMS refers to SQN stored on the terminal side to distinguish it from SQNHE stored on the network side; When SQNMS needs to be encrypted The terminal generates an AK according to RAND and KI, and performs an exclusive OR operation on the SQNMS by using AK to encrypt the SQNMS; when it is not necessary to encrypt the SQNMS, AK = 0;

2) Message authentication code MAC-S, length 8 bytes; MAC-S is used to verify the data integrity of RAND and SQNMS, and is also used for HLR/AUC to authenticate the terminal, that is, for HLR/AUC authentication. The legality of AUTS. In the authentication process of the present invention, the terminal calculates the MAC-S by replacing the specific value of the SQNMS, the self-preserved or user-entered control parameter, the KI, the received RAND, and the AMF, and then according to the specific value. , AK and MAC-S generate resynchronization flag AUTS.

Specifically, after receiving the RAND and AUTN sent by the network side MSC/VLR, the terminal calculates the MAC in the AUTN according to the received RAND and the KI saved by itself and the SQNHE and the AMF in the received AUTN and the HLR/AUC. The A-based algorithm calculates a calculation result, and the terminal compares the calculation result calculated by itself with the MAC-A in the received AUTN (for example, whether it is the same). If it is inconsistent, it returns the authentication failure to the MSC/VLR. Information; if it is consistent, the SQNMS is replaced by the specific value of the agreement to calculate the MAC-S according to its own KI, the self-preserved or user-entered control parameters, the received RAND, and the AMF in the AUTN, etc., according to the specific The value replaces the SQNMS to generate a resynchronization flag AUTS with the AK and the MAC-S, that is, the specific value is encrypted with AK, and the ciphertext and the MAC-S are combined to generate the AUTS. After generating the AUTS, the terminal sends a resynchronization request command to the network side and attaches the resynchronization flag AUTS, or sends a synchronization failure message to the network side, and includes AUTS in the message. When the terminal generates the MAC-S, it can first perform the digest calculation with the control parameter and the KI to obtain a calculation result Resultl, and then use the Resultl and the specific value for the digest calculation to obtain a calculation result Result2, and then use the Result2 and the RAND to perform The calculation is performed to obtain a calculation result R _esu lt3 , and then the summary calculation is performed by Result3 and the AMF, and the obtained calculation result is taken as MAC-S.

In practice, since the generation of the MAC-S can be completely implemented in the user card, if the control parameter is set in the user equipment UE, the UE needs to transmit the control parameter to the user when the user card needs to calculate the MAC-S according to the control parameter. card. For example, at the time of authentication, the UE transmits the control parameters to the user card while transmitting the RAND and AUTN to the user card. If the control parameter is set in the user card, when the user card needs to calculate the MAC-S according to the control parameter, the control parameter saved by itself can be directly obtained, and the UE does not need to transmit the control parameter to the user card.

Of course, the process of generating the MAC-S and the digest algorithm used may be determined according to the actual situation. The algorithm for generating the AUTS and the algorithm used in the generation may also refer to the relevant 3GPP specifications, and details are not described herein.

The terminal acquiring the control parameter may be: the UE corresponding to the terminal saves the control parameter, and the terminal directly acquires the control parameter saved by the UE; or the user card saves the control parameter, and the terminal directly obtains the control parameter saved by the user card; The user is prompted to input a control parameter, and the terminal acquires the control parameter according to the user input.

When the MAC-S is generated by the user card, when it is performed according to the control parameters, and when it is not performed according to the control parameters, it can be determined by the UE. For example, when the control parameter is saved in the UE, when the UE transmits the control parameter and the RAND and the AUTN to the user card when authenticating, when the user card generates the MAC-S, it is performed according to the control parameter; when authenticating, the UE only When RAND and AUTN are transmitted to the user card, and the control parameters are not included, when the user card generates the MAC-S, it is no longer performed according to the control parameters. Correspondingly, in the case that the control parameter is saved in the user card, when the UE transmits the RAND and AUTN and a special flag indicating whether to generate the MAC-S according to the control parameter to the user card, the user card generates the MAC-S. When it is determined according to the special flag, it is determined according to the control parameters. Generally, the UE may periodically decide to update the authentication key, that is, periodically. Determine the user card ^ ^: Generate MAC-S according to the control parameters. Of course, it is also possible for the user card to decide when to update the authentication key, that is, when the MAC-S is generated according to the control parameter, for example, the control parameter is saved in the UE, and when the power is turned on, the terminal transmits the control parameter. To the user card, the user card saves the control parameter and generates a MAC-S based on the control parameter when an authentication key update is required. The user card may decide to update the authentication key according to the special value set by the authentication management domain AMF in the authentication token.

When neither the UE nor the user card saves the control parameter, when the MAC-S needs to be generated according to the control parameter, the UE prompts the user to input the control parameter, and the UE transmits the control parameter input by the user and the RAND to the user card in the AUTN. , or transfer the control parameters to the user card separately. The advantage of storing the control parameters in the UE or the card of the terminal is that the user is not required to enter the control parameters each time the authentication key is updated, which results in a better user experience.

Step 104: After receiving the resynchronization request command, the MSC/VLR sends the RAND in the quintuple corresponding to the current authentication and the AUTS received from the terminal to the HLR/AUC.

Step 105: After receiving the resynchronization request command, the HLR/AUC first parses out from the AUTS.

SQNMS, and when it is determined that the SQNMS is the specific value, the AUTS is consistently verified according to the saved KI and the set control parameter, and after the consistency verification of the AUTS is passed, step 106 is performed; otherwise, Go to step 107.

The HLR/AUC performs conformance verification on the AUTS according to the saved KI and the set control parameters. The HLR/AUC adopts according to the KI, the control parameter, the AMF, the specific value and the RAND in the synchronization message. The terminal performs calculation according to the KI, the control parameter, the AMF, the specific value, and the RAND-generated MAC-S algorithm, and obtains a calculation result, and compares the calculated result and the MAC-S in the AUTS in the synchronization message. Whether it is consistent, if it is consistent, it is judged that the consistency verification by AUTS; otherwise, it is judged that the consistency risk of AUTS cannot pass.

The SQNMS is parsed from the AUTS: when the SQNMS adopts the encryption mode, the HLR/AUC first calculates the AK according to the KI and the RAND, and decrypts the SQNMS plaintext from the AUTS by using the AK; when the SQNMS adopts the plaintext mode, that is, the AK value is set. In the case of 0, the HLR/AUC directly obtains the SQNMS plaintext from the AUTS. Step 106: The HLR/AUC calculates the new authentication key NewKI according to the method that the KI and the RAND are consistent according to the terminal computing the new authentication key NewKI.

After updating the authentication key, a new authentication tuple can also be generated, and a synchronization processing result message is sent to the MSC/VLR, and the new authentication tuple is included in the message.

Step 107: The HLR/AUC determines that the resynchronization message is illegal, and ends the processing. Before ending the processing, the method may further include sending a synchronization processing result message to the MSC/VLR, and including illegal synchronization information in the message.

In the foregoing step 103, before the terminal generates a new authentication key, the terminal may further include the step of determining whether the SQNHE is within an acceptable range, and when the SQNHE is acceptable, determining that the network authentication is passed, and the terminal is updated according to the SQNHE update. The SQNMS performs a subsequent operation of generating a new authentication key or the like; otherwise, that is, when the SQNHE is unacceptable, it determines that the synchronization fails, and performs a normal synchronization processing flow, that is, generates a resynchronization flag AUTS according to the SQNMS, that is, The MAC-S is calculated according to the SQ MS, the KI, and the received RAND and AMF, and then the resynchronization flag AUTS is generated according to the SQNMS, A, and MAC-S, that is, the SQNMS is encrypted by the AK, and the ciphertext and the MAC-S are combined. To produce AUTS. After the terminal generates the AUTS, it returns a resynchronization request command or a synchronization failure message to the network side MSC, and attaches the generated resynchronization flag AUTS.

The terminal and the HLR/AUC pre-agreed: After receiving the resynchronization request command of the terminal, the HLR/AUC performs an operation of generating a new authentication key NewKI if it is determined that the SQNMS is a specific value of the agreement. Of course, in order to update the security of the negotiation of the authentication key, the HLR/AUC also needs to verify the validity of the resynchronization request message.

After receiving the resynchronization request command, the HLR/AUC determines that the SQNMS is not the specific value of the agreement, and processes according to the normal synchronization process, that is, when the AUTS is determined to be legal, the SQNHE is updated according to the SQNMS, and a new authentication tuple is generated. The synchronization processing result message is returned to the MSC/VLR, and the message includes a new authentication tuple. When it is determined that the AUTS is illegal, the synchronization processing result message is returned to the MSC/VLR, and the message includes illegal synchronization information.

After receiving the synchronization processing result message, the MSC/VLR still performs corresponding processing according to the normal synchronization processing flow.

In order to better demonstrate the idea and meaning of the present invention, the following will be The invention is elaborated.

Please refer to FIG. 2. FIG. 2 is a specific embodiment 1 of a specific embodiment of the present invention. The embodiment is a process for performing the authentication key update control by using the controlled key update method of the present invention. In this embodiment, the terminal and the HLR/AUC negotiate a controlled update of the authentication key, and the control is passed. The control parameter for controlling the update of the authentication key is set in the subscription data of the corresponding user in the HLR/AUC. Correspondingly, in this embodiment, the control parameter is also saved in the UE of the terminal. This embodiment also stipulates that the specific value 125 indicates that the authentication key needs to be updated, and the content corresponding to the specific value, that is, the content executed when the network side recognizes the specific value, is "generating a new authentication key to be based on the new one. The authentication key is authenticated." The terminal includes a user equipment UE and a user card.

When the authentication key needs to be updated, the following process is performed:

In step 201, the terminal initiates a location update request to the network;

In step 202, after receiving the request, the network side MSC/VLR authenticates the terminal, and sends an authentication request to the terminal, and the authentication parameters RAND and AUTN in the current authentication quintuple corresponding to the terminal are Send to the terminal.

Specifically, the HLR/AUC generates RAND based on the random number generator, and calculates XRES and CK IK based on RAND and KI, respectively. MAC-A is generated based on RAND, SQNHE, KI, and AMF calculations, and AUTN is generated based on MAC-A, SQNHE, AK, and AMF. Here, when it is necessary to encrypt the SQNHE, the HLR/AUC generates an AK according to the RAND and the KI, and performs an exclusive OR operation on the SQNHE by using the AK to encrypt the SQNHE; when it is not necessary to encrypt the SQNHE, AK = 0;

The HLR/AUC then sends the quintuple of RAND, AUTN, XRES, CK, and IK and the corresponding IMSI to the MSC/VLR. The HLR/AUC sends the generated authentication tuple to the MSC/VLR after receiving the request of the MSC/VLR request authentication quintuple.

During authentication, the MSC/VLR initiates an authentication request to the terminal, and simultaneously transmits the authentication parameters RAND and AUTN in the quintuple to the terminal.

Step 203: When receiving the authentication request, the terminal first receives the KI according to the saved KI. The AUTN performs the consistency verification, that is, first performs the consistency verification on the AUTN according to the KI and the RAND saved by itself. If the verification is passed, step 205 is performed; otherwise, step 204 is performed.

Specifically, when the terminal receives the RAND and AUTN from the MSC/VLR, it calculates the MAC-A in the AUTN based on the KI stored by itself, the received RAND, and the SQNHE in the received AUTN and the AMF. The algorithm generates MAC-A, and then the terminal compares the MAC-A generated by itself with the MAC-A in the AUTN. If they are equal, it determines that the AUTN consistency verification is passed. Otherwise, it determines that the AUTN consistency verification is not by.

It should be noted that, since the terminal includes the user equipment UE and the user card, in practice, the UE receives the authentication request, and sends the authentication parameters RAND and AUTN to the user card, and the user card is based on the KI saved by the user. The received AUTN performs consistency verification.

Therefore, in practice, the step may be further: when the UE receives the authentication request, the saved control parameter and the received RAND and AUTN are transmitted to the user card, and the user card first performs consistency on the received AUTN according to the KI saved by the user. Verification, that is, the AUTN is first verified according to the KI and the RAND saved by itself. If the verification is passed, step 205 is performed; otherwise, step 204 is performed. Specifically, when the user card receives the control parameters, RAND, and AUTN from the UE, the user calculates the MAC in the AUTN according to the KI stored by itself, the received RAND, and the SQNHE in the received AUTN, and the AMF adopts the HLR/AUC. The -A algorithm generates MAC-A, and then compares the MAC-A generated by itself with the MAC-A in the AUTN. If they are equal, it determines that the AUTN consistency verification is passed. Otherwise, it determines that the AUTN is consistent. Sexual verification failed.

In step 204, the terminal returns the information of "authentication failure" to the network, and then ends the process of updating the authentication key. In practice, the user card may return "information failure" to the UE, and the UE returns "authentication failure" information to the network.

Step 205: The terminal determines whether the SQNHE is within an acceptable range. If yes, it determines that the network authentication is passed, and performs step 207; otherwise, determines that the synchronization fails, and performs step 206.

In practice, the user card may determine whether the SQNHE is within an acceptable range. If yes, if it is determined that the network authentication is passed, step 207 is performed; otherwise, the synchronization failure is determined. After step 206 is performed.

Step 206: The terminal directly generates a resynchronization flag AUTS according to the SQNMS, and initiates a resynchronization request command to the network, and attaches an AUTS. Then step 208 is performed. Specifically, the terminal calculates the MAC-S according to its own KI, SQNMS, and received RAND and AMF, and then generates an AUTS according to the SQNMS, AK, and MAC-S, and then initiates a resynchronization request command to the network side, and attaches The AUTS. That is, a synchronization failure message is sent to the MSC/VLR, and the synchronization failure message includes AUTS. In practice, this step may further be that the user card directly generates a resynchronization flag AUTS according to the SQNMS, and initiates a resynchronization request command to the network, and attaches the AUTS. Then step 208 is performed. Here, the UE forwards the synchronization request command of the user card to the network.

Step 207: The terminal updates the saved SQNMS according to the SQ HE, and generates a new authentication key NewKI according to the RAND and the KI. The terminal generates the resynchronization flag AUTS according to the control parameter and replaces the SQNMS with the specified specific value 125, and initiates the network. Resynchronize the request command with the resynchronization flag AUTS attached. Then step 208 is performed. Specifically, the terminal replaces the SQNMS with a specific value of 125 to calculate the MAC-S according to the KI, the control parameters, and the received RAND and AMF, and then encrypts the specific value 125 with the AK, and the ciphertext and the MAC- S combines to produce AUTS. The terminal sends a resynchronization request command to the network side and attaches the AUTS. That is, a synchronization failure message is sent to the MSC/VLR, and the synchronization failure message includes AUTS. In practice, the step may further be that the user card generates the resynchronization flag AUTS according to the control parameter saved by the UE, and replaces the SQNMS with the specified specific value 125, and initiates a resynchronization request command to the network, and attaches a resynchronization flag AUTS. Then step 208 is performed. Here, the UE forwards the synchronization request command of the user card to the network.

Since the MAC-S is generated by the user card, in step 203, the UE transmits the control parameters to the user card together when transmitting the RAND and the AUTN to the user card. Of course, an alternative method is for the UE to transmit the control parameters to the user card in response to a corresponding request from the user card.

Step 208: When receiving the synchronization failure message sent by the terminal, the MSC/VLR on the network side sends the AUTS in the message and the RAND in the corresponding quintuple to the HLR/AUC. Then step 209 is performed.

In practice, when the MSC/VLR on the network side receives the synchronization failure message sent by the terminal, A new authentication tuple is requested from the HLR/AUC, and the request message includes the AUTS received from the terminal and the RAND in the corresponding authentication quintuple.

Step 209: The HLR/AUC determines whether the SQNMS in the AUTS is the agreed specific value 125. If it is a specific value 125, step 212 is performed; if it is not a specific value 125, step 210 is performed.

It should be noted that if the SQNMS in the AUTS is encrypted according to the AK, the HLR/AUC may generate an AK according to the RAND and the KI to decrypt the SQNMS ciphertext and obtain the SQNMS plaintext.

Step 210: When receiving the AUTS and RAND sent by the MSC/VLR, the HLR/AUC performs consistency verification on the AUTS according to the KI, that is, according to the AMF, the saved KI, the received RAND, and the SQNMS in the AUTS, etc. KI, SQNMS, RAND, and AMF generate a MAC-S-based algorithm to calculate a calculation result, and then compare whether the calculated calculation result is consistent with the MAC-S in the received AUTS. If they are consistent, the judgment is passed. For the consistency verification of the AUTS, then step 211; otherwise, it is determined that the consistency verification of the AUTS is not passed, and then step 214 is performed;

Step 211: The HLR/AUC updates the SQNHE according to the value of the SQNMS, generates a new authentication tuple, and sends a synchronization processing result message to the MSC/VLR, where the message includes a new authentication tuple.

Step 212: When receiving the AUTS and RAND sent by the MSC/VLR, the HLR/AUC performs consistency verification on the AUTS according to the KI and the control parameter, that is, according to the AMF, the saved KI, the control parameter, the received RAND, and the AUTS. The SQNMS and the like calculate a calculation result based on the algorithm that the terminal generates a MAC-S according to the KI, the control parameter, the RAND, the specific value, and the AMF, and then compares the calculated result with the MAC of the received AUTS. -S is consistent, if it is consistent, it is determined by the consistency verification of the AUTS, and then step 213; otherwise, it is determined that the consistency verification of the AUTS is not passed, and then step 214 is performed;

Step 213: The HLR/AUC executes the agreed content corresponding to the specific value 125, that is, performs an authentication key update action, that is, performs an algorithm according to an algorithm that is consistent with the terminal generating a new authentication key according to RAND and KI, and generates a new authentication. The key NewKI, then uses NewKI to generate a new authentication tuple, and sends a synchronization processing result message to the MSC/VLR, which includes the new authentication tuple.

Step 214: Send a synchronization processing result message to the MSC/VLR, where the message includes an illegal Step information.

After the terminal and the HLR/AUC generate a new authentication key, the values of the SQNMS and the SQNHE may be re-initialized separately. For example, the terminal does not update the saved SQNMS according to SQNHE in step 207, but initializes the value of the SQNMS to 0; correspondingly, the HLR/AUC initializes the value of SQNHE to a random value less than 65536 in step 213. In this way, the conversion part of SQNHE can be kept short to achieve normal authentication. Because the terminal and the HLR/AUC can perform the authentication key update when the SQNHE has not traversed all the changes, the terminal can ensure the rationality of the network authentication.

Based on the security enhancement caused by the constant update of the key and the initialization of the SQNMS and SQNHE each time the key is updated, it can be known that the length of the actually required SQNMS and SQNHE can be shorter than the length specified by the prior art. For example, the length of the original SQN (referred to as SQNMS > SQNHE) is 6 bytes and 48 bits (bits). In the present invention, the SQN can only require 5 bytes and 40 bits, so that the algorithm does not need to ensure authentication and key negotiation. Because the SQN length changes, the 5-byte SQN can be expanded to 6 bytes, the extended byte is at the upper level of the SQN, thus, the extended SQNHE for calculating the MAC-A; the extended SQNMS is used when calculating the MAC-S; When judging the novelty of SQNHE according to the SQNMS, that is, whether the SQNHE is within the acceptable range according to the SQNMS, the non-extended 5-byte SQNMS is still used to compare with the unexpanded 5-byte SQNHE to determine the SQNHE. Whether it is updated, that is, whether SQNHE is within acceptable limits. Here, the extra extended bytes have no other meaning except for participating in the calculation of MAC-A and MAC-S in order to be compatible with the original algorithm operation. Thus, the present invention can further use this extended byte to express other information.

In the present invention, the method further includes: when the re-synchronization flag AUTS is generated by using the specific value instead of the terminal sequence number SQNMS, the specific value is a 6-byte number, and the highest byte is a specific value, and the other status is 5 The bytes are arbitrary values. For example, in step 207 above, the terminal generates the resynchronization flag AUTS according to the control parameter and replaces the SQNMS with the specified specific value 125, and may use such a 6-byte special value instead of the SQNMS to generate the AUTS. , one byte of the highest bit of this special value is set to 125 or some other specific value such as 255, and the lower 5 bits of the special value can be set to an arbitrary value, for example, a 6-byte random number can be generated. Set one byte of the most significant bit of the random number to 125. Then, the random value of the high byte value is changed as the substitute SQNMS to calculate the special value of the AUTS. Correspondingly, in step 209, when the HLR/AUC determines whether the SQNMS in the AUTS is the specified specific value 125, it is actually determining whether the high byte value of the SQ MS is 125, and no longer determining whether the value of the entire SQNMS is specific. The value is 125. Obviously, the special values produced in this way are more random and therefore have higher security.

Please refer to FIG. 3, which is a specific embodiment 2 of a specific embodiment of the present invention. The embodiment is a process for performing the authentication key update control by using the controlled key update method of the present invention. In this embodiment, the terminal and the HLR/AUC negotiate a controlled update of the authentication key, and the control is passed. The control parameter for controlling the update of the authentication key is set in the subscription data of the corresponding user in the HLR/AUC. Correspondingly, in this embodiment, the control parameter is also saved in the UE of the terminal. The embodiment also stipulates that the specific value is represented by any number with the highest byte of 125, and uses the specific value to indicate that the authentication key needs to be updated, and the specific content corresponds to the agreed content, that is, the network side recognizes the SQNMS. The content of the highest byte being the 125 is "generate a new authentication key to authenticate against the new authentication key". The terminal includes a user equipment UE and a user card.

In step 301, the terminal initiates a location update request to the network.

In step 302, after receiving the request, the network side MSC/VLR authenticates the terminal, and sends an authentication request to the terminal, and the authentication parameters RAND and AUTN in the current authentication quintuple of the terminal are corresponding. Send to the terminal.

Specifically, the HLR/AUC generates RAND based on the random number generator, and calculates XRES, CK, and IK based on RAND and KI, respectively. MAC-A is generated based on RAND, SQNHE, KI, and AMF calculations, and AUTN is generated based on MAC-A, SQNHE, AK, and AMF. Here, when SQNHE needs to be encrypted, HLR/AUC generates AK according to RAND and KI, uses AK to XOR the SQNHE, and encrypts SQNHE; when it is not necessary to encrypt SQNHE, AK = 0;

Then HLR/AUC combines pent, AUTN. XRES, CK and IK into a quintuple and The corresponding IMSI is sent to the MSC/VLR. The HLR/AUC sends the generated authentication tuple to the MSC/VLR after receiving the request of the MSC/VLR for requesting the authentication quintuple.

Step 303: When receiving the authentication request, the terminal first receives the KI according to the saved KI.

The AUTN performs the consistency verification, that is, the AUTN is first verified according to the saved KI and the RAND. If the verification is successful, step 305 is performed; otherwise, step 304 is performed.

Specifically, when the terminal receives the RAND and AUTN from the MSC/VLR, it calculates the MAC-A in the AUTN according to the KI stored by itself, the received RAND, and the SQNHE in the received AUTN and the AMF. The algorithm generates MAC-A, and then the terminal compares the MAC-A generated by itself with the MAC-A in the AUTN. If they are equal, it determines that the AUTN consistency verification is passed. Otherwise, it determines that the AUTN consistency verification is not by.

It should be noted that, since the terminal MS includes the user equipment UE and the user card, in actuality, the UE receives the authentication request, and sends the authentication parameters RAND and AUTN to the user card, and the user card performs the KI according to the KI saved by itself. The received AUTN performs consistency verification.

Therefore, in practice, the step may be further: when the UE receives the authentication request, the saved control parameter and the received RAND and AUTN are transmitted to the user card, and the user card first performs consistency on the received AUTN according to the KI saved by the user. Verification, that is, the AUTN is first verified according to the KI and the RAND saved by itself. If the verification is passed, step 305 is performed, and step ^{1 is} performed. Specifically, when receiving the control parameters, RAND, and AUTN from the UE, the user card calculates the MAC in the AUTN according to the KI stored by itself, the received RAND, and the SQNHE in the received AUTN, and the AMF adopts the HLR/AUC. - A-based algorithm generates MAC-A, and then compares the MAC-A generated by itself with the MAC-A in AUTN. If they are equal, it determines that the consistency verification of AUTN is passed. Otherwise, it determines that the AUTN is consistent. Sexual verification failed.

In step 304, the terminal returns the information of the authentication failure to the network, and then ends the process of updating the negotiation authentication key. In practice, the user card may return the information of the authentication failure to the UE, the UE. Return the information of "authentication failure" to the network. Step 305: The terminal determines whether the SQNHE is within an acceptable range. If yes, it determines that the network authentication is passed, and performs step 307; otherwise, determines that the synchronization fails, and performs step 306.

In practice, the user card may determine whether the SQNHE is within an acceptable range. If yes, it is determined that the network authentication is passed, and then step 307 is performed; otherwise, the synchronization is determined to be failed, and then step 306 is performed.

Step 306: The terminal directly generates a resynchronization flag AUTS according to the SQNMS, and initiates a resynchronization request command to the network, and attaches an AUTS. Then step 308 is performed. Specifically, the terminal calculates the MAC-S according to its own KI, SQNMS, and received RAND and AMF, and then generates an AUTS according to the SQNMS, AK, and MAC-S, and then initiates a resynchronization request command to the network side, and attaches The AUTS. That is, a synchronization failure message is sent to the MSC/VLR, and the synchronization failure message includes AUTS. In practice, this step may further be that the user card directly generates a resynchronization flag AUTS according to the SQNMS, and initiates a resynchronization request command to the network, and attaches the AUTS. Then step 308 is performed. Here, the UE forwards the synchronization request command of the user card to the network.

Step 307, the terminal initializes the value of the SQNMS, for example, set to 0, and generates a new authentication key NewKI according to RAND and KI; the terminal generates an arbitrary number, for example, generates a random number, and sets the highest byte of the arbitrary digit. Is 125, and sets the most significant byte to any number of 125 as a specific value; then, the terminal generates a resynchronization flag AUTS according to the control parameter and replaces the SQNMS with a specific value of the highest byte of 125 generated. , initiate a resynchronization request command to the network, and attach a resynchronization flag AUTS. Then step 308 is performed.

Specifically, the terminal replaces the SQNMS with a specific value generated by the terminal to calculate the MAC-S according to the KI, the control parameters, and the received RAND and AMF, and then encrypts the specific value with the AK, and the ciphertext and the MAC- S combines to produce AUTS. The terminal sends a resynchronization request command to the network side and attaches the AUTS. That is, a synchronization failure message is sent to the MSC/VLR, and the synchronization failure message includes AUTS. In practice, the step may further be that the user card generates the resynchronization flag AUTS according to the control parameter saved by the UE, and replaces the SQNMS with the generated specific value, and initiates a resynchronization request command to the network, and attaches a resynchronization flag AUTS. Then step 308 is performed. Here, the UE forwards the synchronization request command of the user card to the network. Since the MAC-S is generated by the user card, in step 303, the UE transmits the control parameters to the user card together when transmitting the RAND and the AUTN to the user card.

Step 308: When receiving the synchronization failure message sent by the terminal, the MSC/VLR on the network side sends the AUTS in the message and the RAND in the corresponding quintuple to the HLR/AUC. Then step 309 is performed.

In actuality, when receiving the synchronization failure message sent by the terminal, the MSC/VLR on the network side requests a new authentication tuple from the HLR/AUC, and the request message includes the AUTS received from the terminal and the RAND in the corresponding authentication quintuple.

Step 309, the HLR/AUC determines whether one byte of the highest bit of the SQNMS in the AUTS is 125. If it is 125, step 312 is performed; if it is not 125, step 310 is performed.

Step 310: When receiving the AUTS and RAND sent by the MSC/VLR, the HLR/AUC performs consistency verification on the AUTS according to the KI, that is, the terminal and the terminal according to the AMF, the saved KI, the received RAND, and the SQNMS in the AUTS. According to KI, SQNMS, RAND and AMF, a MAC-S-generated algorithm is used to calculate a calculation result, and then the self-calculated calculation result is compared with the MAC-S in the received AUTS. If they are consistent, it is determined. After the consistency verification of the AUTS, then step 311 is performed; otherwise, it is determined that the consistency verification of the AUTS is not passed, and then step 314 is performed;

Step 311: The HLR/AUC updates the SQNHE according to the value of the SQNMS, generates a new authentication tuple, and sends a synchronization processing result message to the MSC/VLR, where the message includes a new authentication tuple. Then perform step 314.

Step 312: When receiving the AUTS and RAND sent by the MSC/VLR, the HLR/AUC performs consistency verification on the AUTS according to the KI and the control parameter, that is, according to the AMF, the saved KI, the control parameter, the received RAND, and the AUTS. The SQNMS calculates a calculation result based on the algorithm that the terminal generates a MAC-S based on the KI, the control parameter, the RAND, the specific value, and the AMF, and then compares the calculated result with the MAC in the received AUTS. -S is consistent, if it is consistent, it is judged to pass the consistency verification of AUTS, and then step 313 is performed; otherwise, it is judged that the consistency verification of AUTS is passed, and then Step 314;

Step 313: The HLR/AUC performs the corresponding agreement content when the highest byte of the SQNMS is 125, that is, performs an authentication key update action, that is, an algorithm that is consistent with the terminal to generate a new authentication key according to the RAND and the KI. Perform calculation, generate a new authentication key NewKI, and then initialize the value of SQNHE, for example, set to an arbitrary value less than 65536, and use NewKI to generate a new authentication tuple, and send a synchronization processing result message to the MSC/VLR, message Includes new authentication tuples.

Step 314: Send a synchronization processing result message to the MSC/VLR, where the message includes illegal synchronization information.

It can be seen that the specific value in the present invention may be a specified value, such as a value of 125 bytes in length or 48 bits, or an arbitrary value of 48 bits in length of 125, or a certain value. Any specified number of bytes or some specified bit is a specified value with a length of 48 bits.

The above MSC/VLR is a circuit domain device. For a packet domain network, the corresponding MSC/VLR device is an SGSN, so the present invention can be equally applied to a packet domain.

In each of the foregoing specific implementations or embodiments, the terminal and the HLR/AUC generate a new authentication key, which may be a mature digest algorithm. For the corresponding digest algorithm, refer to the book Applied Cryptography or related algorithm papers or reports; When a new key is generated, it may also be performed using an algorithm for generating an encryption key CK or an integrity key IK by the random number RAND and the authentication key KI mentioned in the 3GPP protocol.

In each of the foregoing specific embodiments or embodiments, the terminal determines whether the SQNHE is in an acceptable range for the AUTN-conformity verification, the HLR/AUC verifies the validity of the AUTS, and the HLR/AUC generates the authentication tuple. The update of the SQNHE; the algorithm for generating the authentication tuple, and the algorithm for generating the AUTS in the synchronous processing flow under normal conditions, etc., can be referred to the 3GPP related protocol, and is not described here because it is a well-known technology.

When the AUTS is generated in the present invention, when the AUTS is generated, the terminal additionally generates the MAC-S according to the control parameter, and the terminal may first perform the digest calculation with the control parameter and the KI to obtain a calculation result. Resultl, and then use Resultl and the specific value for the digest calculation to obtain a calculation result Result2, and then use Result2 and the RAND to perform The calculation is performed to obtain a calculation result Result3, and then the summary calculation is performed by Result3 and the AMF, and the obtained calculation result is taken as MAC-S. Correspondingly, when determining the AUTS consistency, the HLR/AUC calculates the calculation process and the used algorithm and terminal according to the AMF, the saved KI, the set control parameters, the received RAND, and the SQNMS in the AUTS. The process of generating MAC-S is consistent with the algorithm used. Of course, the process of generating the MAC-S and the digest algorithm used may be determined according to the actual situation. For the specific AUTS process, and the algorithm used in the generation, the 3GPP related specifications may also be referred to, and details are not described herein.

The control parameter used to control the key update of the present invention may be a password, for example, a password similar to the user card PIN code, for example, may be a user PIN code SPIN set by the network side for the user to change the service; The identifier of a terminal, for example, the IMEI of the terminal; of course, an arbitrary value customized by the user, for example, the alias of the user, the avatar information of the user, or the summary information of the avatar data of the user, and the like.

In an embodiment of the invention, the apparatus for implementing controlled key update includes:

a control parameter storage unit, configured to store a control parameter for controlling the update of the authentication key; a specific value storage unit, configured to store the substitute terminal serial number to generate a specific value of the resynchronization flag;

a resynchronization flag generating unit, configured to generate a resynchronization flag according to the terminal's authentication key, the received random number, the control parameter storage unit or the user input control parameter, and the specific value saved by the specific value storage unit, replacing the terminal serial number .

The device is located in the terminal; the terminal includes a user equipment and a user card; the specific value storage unit and the resynchronization flag generating unit are located in the user card; and the control parameter storage unit is located in the user equipment or the user card.

In another embodiment of the present invention, the apparatus for implementing controlled key update includes: a control parameter holding unit, configured to save a control parameter for controlling an authentication key update; and a specific value discriminating unit, configured to receive resynchronization When requesting a command, determine whether the terminal serial number is a specific value;

a resynchronization flag verification unit, configured to verify consistency of the resynchronization flag attached to the received resynchronization request command according to the control parameter saved by the control parameter saving unit; The authentication key update unit is configured to implement the update of the authentication key when the determination result of the specific value is YES, and the resynchronization mark verification unit verifies the pass.

The device is located in the home location register/authentication center on the network side.

It should be noted that each unit may be a separate entity, and may be combined according to actual conditions and requirements, and details are not described herein.

It is understood that the above description is only the preferred embodiment of the present invention, and is not intended to limit the present invention, and any modifications, equivalents, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the present invention are included in the present invention. Within the scope of protection.

Claims

Rights request

A control key update method, wherein a control parameter for controlling an authentication key update is preset on a network side; the method includes:

After the terminal passes the network side consistency verification, the resynchronization flag is generated according to the authentication key of the terminal, the received random number, the control parameter saved by the terminal or the user input, and the terminal serial number is replaced by a specific value, and sent to the network side. a synchronization request command, the resynchronization flag is attached; the network side receives the resynchronization request command, and when the terminal serial number is a specific value, according to the preset control parameter, the random number, and the network side authentication secret The key performs consistency verification on the resynchronization flag; performs key update when passing verification.

The method according to claim 1, wherein: the determining, by the terminal, the network side consistency verification and the generating the resynchronization flag further comprises: determining, by the terminal, the serial number of the network side according to the terminal serial number is acceptable Within the scope.

The method according to claim 2, wherein: after the terminal passes the network side consistency verification, the method further comprises: determining, by the terminal, the serial number of the network side according to the terminal serial number is not within an acceptable range, according to The terminal serial number, its own authentication key, and the received random number are used to generate a resynchronization flag, and a resynchronization request command is sent to the network side, and the resynchronization flag is attached.

The method according to claim 3, further comprising: when the terminal serial number is not a specific value, the network side performs the resynchronization flag according to the random number and the network side authentication key. Sexual verification, performing synchronization processing when passing verification.

The method according to claim 4, wherein: when the consistency-face certificate fails to pass the resynchronization flag, the home location register/authentication center of the network side moves to the mobile switching center/visiting The location register sends a synchronization processing result message, and the message includes illegal synchronization information.

The method according to claim 1, wherein the performing the consistency verification on the network side refers to performing the authentication mark sent by the network side according to the authentication key saved by the terminal and the random number sent by the network side. Consistency verification.

The method according to claim 1, further comprising: transmitting, by the terminal to the network side, the authentication failure information to the network side when the risk certificate fails.

8. The method according to claim 1, wherein: the terminal comprises a user equipment And user card.

9. The method according to claim 8, wherein: the control parameter preset by the terminal refers to a control parameter set in the user equipment or a control parameter set in the user card.

10. The method according to claim 1, wherein: the control parameter is a password, or an identity of the terminal, or any value customized by the user.

The method according to claim 1, further comprising: after the terminal and the network side generate a new authentication key, respectively re-initializing the serial number saved by the terminal and the value of the serial number saved by the network side.

12. The method according to claim 1, wherein: the specific value is a specified value, or a highest byte or any specified byte or some specified bit is a specified value. .

13. An apparatus for implementing controlled key update, comprising:

a control parameter storage unit, configured to store a control parameter for controlling an update of the authentication key;

a resynchronization flag generating unit, configured to generate resynchronization according to the authentication key of the terminal, the received random number, the control parameter saved by the control parameter storage unit or the user input, and the specific value stored by the specific value storage unit mark.

The device according to claim 13, wherein the device is located in a terminal; the terminal comprises a user equipment and a user card; and the specific value storage unit and the resynchronization flag generating unit are located in the user card; The control parameter storage unit is located in the user equipment or the user card.

15. An apparatus for implementing controlled key update, comprising:

a control parameter saving unit, configured to save a control parameter for controlling the update of the authentication key; and a specific value determining unit, configured to determine, when the resynchronization request command is received, whether the terminal serial number is a specific value;

a resynchronization flag verification unit, configured to: according to the control parameter saved by the control parameter holding unit, the consistency of the resynchronization flag attached to the received resynchronization request command;

An authentication key update unit, configured to determine that the specific value is YES, and the same The step mark verification unit verifies the update of the authentication key when it passes.

16. The apparatus according to claim 15, wherein the apparatus is located in a home location register/authentication center on the network side.