WO2012028010A1

WO2012028010A1 - Authentication method, apparatus and system

Info

Publication number: WO2012028010A1
Application number: PCT/CN2011/075823
Authority: WO
Inventors: 和峰
Original assignee: 中兴通讯股份有限公司
Priority date: 2010-09-03
Filing date: 2011-06-16
Publication date: 2012-03-08
Also published as: CN101931955A; CN101931955B

Abstract

An authentication method, apparatus and system are disclosed by the present invention. The method includes that: a Relay Node (RN) receives a device authentication request, wherein the device authentication request carries device authentication data generated by using a user authentication vector (S402); the RN generates a corresponding device authentication response value according to the device authentication data, and sends a device authentication response carrying the device authentication response value to a network side for RN authentication (S404). The present invention ensures the validity of the RN as a base station, thereby the security of user equipments served by the RN is improved.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD The present invention relates to the field of communications, and in particular to an authentication method, apparatus, and system. A Long Term Evolution (LTE) network, as shown in FIG. 1, is an Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) and an Evolved Packet Switching Center (Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network). Evolved Packet Core (referred to as EPC), the network is flat. The EUTRAN is connected to the EPC through the S1 interface. The EUTRAN is composed of a plurality of interconnected Evolved NodeBs (eNBs), and each eNB is connected through an X2 interface; the EPC is composed of a Mobility Management Entity (MME) and a monthly service gateway. The entity (Serving Gateway, S-GW for short) is composed. In addition, in the system architecture, there is also a Home Environment (HE), which is a Home Subscriber Server (HSS) or a Home Location Register (HLR). User database. It contains user profiles that perform user authentication and authorization, and provides information about the user's physical location. In order to meet the growing demand for large-bandwidth high-speed mobile access, the Third Generation Partnership Projects (3GPP) 4 danced the Long-Term Evolution advance (LTE-Advanced) standard. . LTE-Advanced retains the core of LTE for the evolution of Long-Term Evolution (LTE) system. Based on this, a series of technologies are used to expand the frequency domain and airspace to improve spectrum utilization. Increase system capacity and other purposes. Wireless relay technology is one of the core technologies in LTE-Advanced. It aims to extend the coverage of cells, reduce dead zones in communications, balance load, transfer services in hotspots, and save user equipment ( User Equipment , Referred to as UE), that is, the transmit power of the terminal. 2 is a schematic diagram of an access network architecture after a relay node is introduced according to the related art. As shown in FIG. 2, a new relay node (Relay-Node, referred to as RN) is added to the existing network architecture. A wireless connection is used between this new RN and the donor evolved base station (Donor-eNB). The interface between the Donor-eNB and the RN is called the Un port. The radio link between the two is called the backhaul link. The interface between the RN and the UE is called the Uu port. The wireless link between them is called the Uu port. The path is called the access link. The downlink data arrives at the Donor-eNB first and then passes to the RN, RN. Then transmit to the UE, and vice versa. In the subsequent description of the present application, the donor evolved base station Donor-eNB is uniformly described as an evolved base station eNB. In the actual communication process, the RN can be used as a common terminal device or as a base station. When the RN acts as a terminal device, the RN can access the wireless network like a normal UE. The normal UE will authenticate the user and authenticate the Key Agreement (AKA) on the network side. In the LTE system, the process is also called the Evolved Packet System (referred to as the Evolved Packet System). FIG. 3 is a flow chart of the AKA process of the UE according to the related art. As shown in FIG. 3, the process includes the following steps: Step 301: The MME initiates an authentication data request message to the HSS, where The user of the UE is only information, such as: International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) of the UE, and the Internet Service Identity (SN ID) and network type information (Network type). Step 303: The HSS generates an authentication vector {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} according to the request message, and sends it to the UI through the authentication data response message. The meaning of each component in the authentication vector is: RAND is the random challenge generated by the HSS, XRES is the expected user response of the network side, and Kasme is an intermediate key generated by the HSS. The key is mainly used to derive the non-connected key. The security key of the Non-access stratum (NAS) and the Access Stratum (AS), and the AUTN is an authentication token, which contains multiple fields, specifically AUTN = SQN * AK || AMF || MAC, where SQN* AK refers to the exclusive OR operation of the serial number SQN generated by the HSS and the anonymous key AK, the AMF is the authentication management i or (Authentication Management field), and the MAC is the message-risk Certificate code. Step 305: The MME sends a User Authentication Request message to the UE, where the authentication data RAND and AUTN generated by the HS S are carried. Step 4: 307: UE) After the AUTN-risk certificate, the method of the danger certificate is to use the SQN*AK in RAND, AUTN, and the UE's talent key K to generate a message-risk code XMAC, and - Whether the XMAC and the AUTN have the same MAC value, if they are consistent, they are recognized as the AUTN-risk certificate, then the RES value is calculated according to the agreement algorithm according to the RAND and the key K, and the user authentication response is passed. The message is sent to the MME. Step 4: 309: After receiving the MME, the MME compares the RES sent by the UE with the XRES originally received from the HSS. If the two are consistent, the user's AKA process is considered to be successfully completed. It should be noted that, in the above description, the UE is a general term for a mobile device (Mobile Equipment, ME for short) and a Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM). The foregoing process is actually performed by the USIM. The USIM certification is completed, that is, user authentication. After the above process is completed, the USIM generates IK and CK according to the root key K and sends it to the ME. The ME generates the intermediate key Kasme according to IK and CK, and completes the USIM authentication (or contract authentication) of the network to the terminal through the above process. Subscription Authentication ) and key agreement. In the related art, the above authentication method can only implement the USIM authentication of the RN when the RN is accessed as a terminal, but the above authentication cannot ensure the legitimacy of the RN as a base station, and the security of the user equipment of the RN service is relatively low. . SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION A primary object of the present invention is to provide an authentication method, apparatus, and system for solving the problem that the authentication method in the related art cannot guarantee the legitimacy of the RN as a base station, and the security of the user equipment served by the RN is relatively low. An aspect of the present invention provides an authentication method, including: a relay node RN receiving a device authentication request, where the device authentication request carries device authentication data generated using a user authentication vector; and the RN generates a corresponding device according to the device authentication data. The authentication response value is sent, and the device authentication response carrying the device authentication response value is sent to the network side for authenticating the RN. Preferably, before the RN receives the device authentication request, the method further includes: the network side acquiring the device identifier of the RN or the device certificate information of the RN by using the received non-access stratum (NAS) message; the network side according to the device identifier of the RN or the network side The device certificate information determines the device-related key of the RN; the network side uses the device-related key to generate the device authentication data, and sends the device authentication data to the RN through the device authentication request. Preferably, the device related key is one of the following: the device related key is a RN device subscription information or a pre-shared key or parameter in the device certificate; the device related key is a new key generated by a pre-shared key or parameter. Or new parameters. Preferably, the network side uses the device-related key to generate the device authentication data, including: using the device-related key of the RN, optional parameters, RAND and/or AUTN in {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} in the user authentication vector. The predetermined algorithm performs encryption and generates device authentication data RAND D and/or AUTN_D; or uses device related keys, optional parameters, RAND and/or AUTN in {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} in the user authentication vector. Field according to pre The algorithm performs encryption and generates device authentication data RAND D and/or AUTH_D1, where RAND is a random number generated by the network side, XRES is a desired device response, Kasme is an intermediate key, AUTN is a network authentication flag, and contains many Fields, specifically AUTN = SQN * AK || AMF || MAC, where SQN* AK refers to the exclusive OR operation of the serial number SQN and the anonymous key AK generated by the home subscriber server HSS, AMF is the authentication management domain, MAC For the message-risk code, the optional parameters are one of the following: RN and data shared by the network side; random numbers generated by the network side and/or the RN. Preferably, the RN generates a corresponding device authentication response value according to the device authentication data, including: the RN decrypts according to a predetermined algorithm using a device-related key, an optional parameter, the received RAND_D and/or AUTN_D, and obtains RAND and/or AUTN; Generating a user response value RES according to the user authentication method of the packet evolution system authentication and key agreement EPS AKA using RAND and/or AUTN, and determining that the user response value RES is the device authentication response value RES D; or the device related to the RN using the RN The key, the optional parameter, the received RAND_D and/or AUTH_D1 are decrypted according to a predetermined algorithm, and RAND and/or AUTH are obtained; the user response value RES is generated according to the user authentication method of the EPS AKA using RAND and/or AUTN, and is determined. The user response value RES is the device authentication response value RES D. Preferably, the network side uses the device-related key to generate the device authentication data, including: selecting RAND and AUTN in the user authentication vector {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} as device authentication data; using the device-related key, the user authentication vector {RAND The desired user response XRES and optional parameters in XRES, Kasme, AUTN} generate a desired device authentication response XRES_D according to a predetermined algorithm, and determine XRES_D as device authentication data, where RAND is a random number generated by the network side, and Kasme is a medium density The key, AUTN is a network authentication flag, and the optional parameters are one of the following: RN and data shared by the network side; random numbers generated by the network side and/or the RN. Preferably, the RN generates a corresponding device authentication response value according to the device authentication data, including: the RN generates a user response value RES according to the user authentication method of the EPS AKA; and generates a device authentication response value according to a predetermined algorithm by using the device related key, the RES, and the optional parameter. RES_D. Preferably, the network side uses the device-related key to generate the device authentication data, including: generating a new random value RAND D according to a predetermined algorithm by using a device-related key, a random value RAND generated by the network side, and an optional parameter, where the optional parameter is One of the following: RN and network side shared data; network side and / or RN generated random number; use RAND_D as a random password to calculate the user authentication vector to generate a new user authentication vector {RAND_D, XRES D, Kasme D, AUTN D }; and determine that the device authentication data sent to the RN is RAND and AUTN_D, where RAND is generated by the network side The random number, XRES_D is the new network side expected response after calculation, Kasme_D is the new intermediate key after calculation, and AUTN_D is the new network authentication mark after calculation. Preferably, the RN generates a corresponding device authentication response value according to the device authentication data, where the RN uses the device-related key, the optional parameter, and the received RAND to generate a new random value RAND D according to a predetermined algorithm; the RN performs user authentication according to the EPS AKA. The method uses the new random value RAND D to perform a risk check on the received AUTN_D, and generates a device authentication response value RES D. Preferably, after the device authentication response value is sent to the network side for authenticating the RN, the method further includes: The network side receives the device authentication response value RES D; determines whether the device authentication response value RES D is consistent with the expected device response XRES_D; if the determination result is consistent, it is determined that the RN authentication is passed. Preferably, after determining that the RN authentication is passed, the method further includes: The RN and the network side set an association key, where the association key is one of the following: a device-related key; a new key generated by using a device-related key and a parameter according to a predetermined derivation algorithm, parameters include: Kasme, derived from Kasme Key, key or parameter related to the user subscription information of the RN. Preferably, setting the letter in the device authentication request Instructing the RN to perform device authentication; or setting an existing cell or field in the device authentication request to indirectly instruct the RN to perform device authentication. Preferably, the network side includes: a mobility management entity MME and a home subscriber server HSS. An aspect of the present invention provides a relay node, including: a first receiving module, configured to receive a device authentication request, where the device authentication request carries device authentication data generated by using a user authentication vector; and the first generating module is configured to be based on the device The authentication module generates a corresponding device authentication response value, and the first sending module is configured to send the device authentication response carrying the device authentication response value to the network side for authenticating the RN. The first generating module includes: a first decryption submodule, Set to use the device-related key, optional parameters, received RAND_D and/or AUTN_D to decrypt according to a predetermined algorithm, and get RAND and AUTN; first device authentication response value generation sub-module, set to use RAND and / or AUTN User authentication method based on packet evolution system authentication and key agreement EPS AKA The user response value RES and determining that the user response value RES is the device authentication response value RES_D. Preferably, the first generation module comprises: a second decryption sub-module configured to use the device-related key, the optional parameter, the received RAND_D, and / or AUTH_D1 decrypted according to a predetermined algorithm, and get RAND and / or AUTH; Second device authentication response value generation sub-module, set to use RAND And/or AUTN generates a user response value RES according to the user authentication method of the EPS AKA, and determines that the user response value RES is the device authentication response value RES D. Preferably, the first generation module includes: a user response value generation module, which is set to follow the EPS The user authentication method of the AKA generates a user response value RES; the third device authentication response value generation sub-module is configured to generate the device authentication response value RES D according to a predetermined algorithm using the device-related key, RES and optional parameters. Preferably, the first The generating module includes: a first random value generating submodule configured to generate a new random value RAND D according to a predetermined algorithm by using a device related key, a random value generated by the network side, and an optional parameter, and the optional parameter is one of the following: RN Data shared with the network side; random number generated by the network side and/or the RN; a fourth device authentication response value generation sub-module, configured to perform the received AUTN_D using the new random value RAND D according to the user authentication method of the EPS AKA - a risk certificate, and a device authentication response value RES D „ D. Preferably, the device further includes: a first associated key setting module, Set to set the association key, where the association key is one of the following: device-related key; device-related key and parameter-generated new key generated according to a predetermined derivation algorithm, parameters include: Kasme, a key derived from Kasme, The key or parameter associated with the RN's user subscription information. A further aspect of the present invention provides a network side, including: an obtaining module, configured to acquire, by using a received non-access stratum NAS message, a device identifier of the RN or device credential information of the RN; and a determining module, configured to be according to the RN The device identifier or the device certificate information on the network side determines the device-related key of the RN; the second generation module is configured to generate the device authentication data according to the device-related key; and the second sending module is configured to send the device authentication data through the device authentication request To the RN. Preferably, the second generation module comprises: a first device authentication data generation submodule, configured to use a device related key of the RN, an optional parameter, and a RAND in the {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} in the user authentication vector. / or AUTN is encrypted according to a predetermined algorithm, and generates device authentication data RAND_D and / or AUTN_D; or a second device authentication data generation sub-module, set to use the device-related key, optional parameters, user authentication vector {RAND, XRES, The fields in RAND and/or AUTN in Kasme, AUTN} are encrypted according to a predetermined algorithm, and device authentication data RAND_D and/or AUTH_D 1 are generated, where RAND is a random number generated by the network side, and XRES is a desired device response, Kasme Is an intermediate key, AUTN is a network authentication flag, and contains multiple fields, specifically AUTN = SQN * AK || AMF || MAC, where SQN* AK refers to the serial number SQN and anonymous key AK generated by the HSS XOR operation, AMF is the authentication management domain, MAC is the message-risk code, The optional parameters are one of the following: data shared by the RN and the network side; random numbers generated by the network side and/or the RN. Preferably, the second generating module comprises: a selecting submodule, configured to select RAND and AUTN in the user authentication vector {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} as device authentication data; and third device authentication data generating submodule, set to use The device-related key, the desired user response XRES and optional parameters in {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} in the user authentication vector generate a desired device authentication response XRES_D according to a predetermined algorithm, and determine XRES_D as device authentication data, wherein RAND It is a random number generated by the network side, Kasme is an intermediate key, and AUTN is a network authentication flag. The optional parameters are one of the following: RN and data shared by the network side; and random numbers generated by the network side and/or the RN. Preferably, the second generating module includes: a second random value generating submodule, configured to generate a new random value RAND_D according to a predetermined algorithm by using a device-related key of the RN to randomly generate a random value RAND and an optional parameter on the network side, where The optional parameter is one of the following: RN and network side shared data; network side and/or RN generated random number; fourth device authentication data generation submodule, set to use RAND_D as random password generation for calculating user authentication vector A new user authentication vector {RAND D, XRES D, Kasme D, AUTN D}; and determine that the device authentication vector sent to the RN is RAND and AUTN_D, where RAND is a random number generated by the network side, and XRES D is calculated. The new network side expects a response, Kasme_D is the calculated new intermediate key, and AUTN D is the calculated new network authentication flag. Preferably, the foregoing apparatus further includes: a second receiving module, configured to receive a device authentication response value

The RES_D; the authentication response value judging module is configured to determine whether the device authentication response value RES_D is consistent with the expected device response XRES_D; and the authentication module is configured to determine that the RN authentication is passed when the judgment result of the authentication response value judging module is consistent. Preferably, the apparatus further includes: a second associated key setting module, configured to set an association key, wherein the association key is one of: a device-related key; a device-related key and a parameter generated according to a predetermined derivation algorithm The new key, parameters include: Kasme, the key derived from Kasme, the key or parameter associated with the user subscription information of the RN. Preferably, the foregoing apparatus further includes: a first setting module, configured to: set a cell in the device authentication request to instruct the RN to perform device authentication; and a second setting module, configured to set an existing cell or a field indirect indication in the device authentication request The RN performs device authentication. Preferably, the network side comprises: a mobility management entity (MME) and a home subscriber server (HSS). According to still another aspect of the present invention, an authentication system is provided, including: the foregoing RN and a network side. According to the present invention, the relay node receives the device authentication request for authentication, and sends the generated corresponding device authentication response value to the network side for authentication of the RN, which solves the problem that the authentication method in the related art cannot guarantee the RN. The legality of the base station, which in turn leads to the problem that the security of the user equipment of the RN service is relatively low, thereby ensuring the legitimacy of the RN as a base station, thereby improving the security of the user equipment of the RN service. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS The accompanying drawings, which are set to illustrate,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1 is a schematic diagram of an LTE network architecture according to the related art; FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of an access network architecture after introducing a relay node according to the related art; FIG. 3 is a flowchart of an AKA process of a UE according to the related art; 4 is a flowchart of an authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG. 5 is a flowchart of device authentication according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention; FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of generating a device association key according to the present invention; FIG. 8 is a block diagram showing a preferred structure of a relay node according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG. 9 is a structural block diagram of a network side according to an embodiment of the present invention; A preferred block diagram of the network side of the embodiment of the invention; and FIG. 11 is a block diagram showing the structure of the authentication system according to an embodiment of the present invention. BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION Hereinafter, the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be noted that the embodiments in the present application and the features in the embodiments may be combined with each other without conflict. The present embodiment provides an authentication method. FIG. 4 is a flowchart of an authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 4, the method includes: Step S402: A RN receives a device authentication request, where the device authentication request is carried in There is device authentication data generated using the user authentication vector. Step S404: The RN generates a corresponding device authentication response value according to the device authentication data, and sends a device authentication response carrying the device authentication response value to the network side for authenticating the RN. Through the above steps, the RN receives the device authentication request for authentication, and sends the generated device authentication response value to the network side for authenticating the RN, which solves the problem that the authentication method in the related art cannot guarantee the legitimacy of the RN as the base station. The problem that the security of the user equipment of the RN service is relatively low is achieved, thereby ensuring the legitimacy of the RN as a base station, thereby improving the security of the user equipment of the RN service. Preferably, the device authentication request message and the device authentication response message used in steps S402 and S404 may multiplex the user authentication request message and the user authentication response message in the current EPS AKA process. Preferably, before the step S402, the method further includes: the network side acquires the device identifier of the RN or the device certificate information of the RN by using the received NAS message; the network side determines the RN according to the device identifier of the RN or the device certificate information of the network side. Device-related key; The network side uses the device-related key to generate device authentication data, and sends the device authentication data to the RN through the device authentication request. Through the determining step of the preferred embodiment, the network side determines the device related key, and then generates the device authentication data according to the relevant key, thereby improving the reliability of the authentication method. Preferably, the device related key is one of the following: the device related key is a RN device subscription information or a pre-shared key or parameter in the device certificate; the device related key is a new key generated by a pre-shared key or parameter. Or new parameters. With the preferred embodiment, the device-related key of an RN is known only by the RN and the legitimate network operator, and the attacker cannot obtain the information, thereby realizing the flexibility of key setting and improving the reliability of the system. . A preferred embodiment of the device-side key generation device authentication data used by the network side in the above steps will be described below. First, using the RN's device-related key, optional parameters, RAND and/or AUTN in the user authentication vector {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} to perform encryption according to a predetermined algorithm, and generate device authentication data RAND_D and/or AUTN_D; or Use the device-related key in the AUTN, optional parameters, RAND in the {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} in the user authentication vector and/or fields in the AUTN (such as the MAC field) to encrypt according to a predetermined algorithm to generate the device. Authentication data RAND_D and/or AUTN_D 1; wherein RAND is a random number generated by the network side, XRES is a user response expected by the network side, Kasme is an intermediate key, AUTN is a network authentication flag, and includes a plurality of fields, specifically AUTN = SQN * AK || AMF (I MAC, where SQN* AK refers to the exclusive OR operation of the serial number SQN generated by the HSS and the anonymous key AK, AMF is the authentication management domain, MAC is the message authentication code, optional parameters One of the following: data shared by the RN and the network side; random number generated by the network side and/or the RN. By the generating step of the preferred embodiment, encryption of the RAND and/or AUTN in the user authentication vector is implemented, The reliability of the authentication parameter is described below. The following describes a preferred embodiment in which the RN of step S404 generates a corresponding device authentication response value according to the device authentication data. The RN first uses the device-related key and optional parameters. The received RAND D and/or AUTN_D are decrypted according to a predetermined algorithm, and RAND and/or AUTN in the original user authentication vector are obtained, and the user response method of the EPS AKA is used to generate the RES of the user response value, and the user response is determined. Value is the device authentication response value RES_D; or

The RN uses the device-related key of the RN, optional parameters, receives RAND_D and/or AUTH_D1 to decrypt according to a predetermined algorithm, and obtains RAND and/or AUTH, and generates a user response according to the user authentication method of EPS AKA using RAND and/or AUTN. The value RES and the user response value RES is determined to be the device authentication response value RES_D. Through the generating step of the preferred embodiment, it is ensured that only the legal device can correctly decrypt the authentication data, thereby generating a legal authentication response value, thereby ensuring the legality and accuracy of the device. Next, another preferred embodiment of generating the device authentication data in the above steps will be described. Select RAND and AUTN in the user authentication vector {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} as the device authentication data; use the device-related key and the desired device response XRES and optional in the user authentication vector {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} The parameter generates a desired device authentication data response XRES D according to a predetermined algorithm, and determines XRES_D as device authentication data, where RAND is a random number generated by the network side, Kasme is an intermediate key, AUTN is a network authentication flag, and optional parameters are as follows One: data shared by the RN and the network side; a random number generated by the network side and/or the RN. The preferred embodiment ensures that only legitimate devices can correctly decrypt the authentication data, thereby generating a legal authentication response value, which ensures the legality and accuracy of the device. A preferred embodiment in which the RN of step S404 generates a corresponding device authentication response value based on the device authentication data will be described below. RN generates user response value according to user authentication method of EPS AKA RES , a device authentication response value RES_D is generated according to a predetermined algorithm using a device-related key, RES, and optional parameters. Through the generating step of the preferred embodiment, the device authentication response value is generated according to a predetermined algorithm by using the device-related key and the random value, and the legality of the device authentication response value is ensured. A preferred embodiment of generating device authentication data in the above steps will be described below. First, a new random value RAND_D is generated according to a predetermined algorithm by using a device-related key, a random value RAND generated by the network side, and an optional parameter, where the optional parameter is one of the following: RN and data shared by the network side; Or the random number generated by the RN; secondly, use RAND_D as a random password for calculating the user authentication vector to generate a new user authentication vector {RAND_D, XRES D, Kasme D, AUTN D}, and finally determine the device authentication data sent to the RN as RAND and AUTN_D Sent to the RN. Through the generating step of the preferred embodiment, the encryption of the random value is implemented, and then the device-related (or bound) device authentication vector is generated, which improves the reliability of the device authentication data. A preferred embodiment in which the RN of step S404 generates a corresponding device authentication response value based on the device authentication data will be described below. The RN uses the device-related key, optional parameters, and the received RAND to generate a new random value RAND D according to a predetermined algorithm; and uses the RAND_D to perform a risk certificate on the received AUTN_D according to the user authentication method of the EPS AKA and generate a device authentication response. The value RES_D. The device authentication response value is generated by the network side and the RN of the preferred embodiment according to a predetermined algorithm by using the device related key and the random value. The legality and accuracy of the device certification response value are ensured. Preferably, after the device authentication response value is sent to the network side for authenticating the RN, the method further includes: a network side receiving device authentication response value RES D; determining whether the device authentication response value RES D is consistent with the expected device response XRES_D; The result is consistent, then it is determined that the RN authentication is passed. It is implemented to determine whether the device authentication response value and the network side expected device response are consistent. In the case of consistency, it is determined that the RN authentication is passed. The RN is used as the legality authentication of the base station, which effectively improves the security of the RN and the user equipment it serves. Preferably, after determining that the RN authentication is passed, the method further includes: the RN and the network side setting an association key, where the association key is one of the following: a device-related key; using the device-related key and the parameter generated according to a predetermined derivation algorithm The new key, parameters include: Kasme, a key derived from Kasme, a key or parameter associated with the user subscription information of the RN. With the preferred embodiment, the setting of the association key is implemented, thereby effectively preventing the attacker from eavesdropping and tampering with the communication content, thereby ensuring information security of the network side network element. Preferably, the device is set to indicate that the RN performs device authentication in the device authentication request, or the existing cell or field is set in the device authentication request to indirectly instruct the RN to perform device authentication. Multiplex authentication request cancellation A certain cell or field in the information, for example, may use the reserved bit of the AMF field in the AUTN cell as the indication information, and notify the R _{N to} perform device authentication. Increased flexibility in authentication requests. Preferably, in the process of generating the authentication data (such as RAND_D, or AUTN_D, or XRES_D, etc.) of all the above embodiments, in addition to using the above mandatory parameters, other parameters may be used, such as the network side (ie, MME and / or HSS) a parameter shared with the RN, or a random number generated by the network side and/or the RN, etc.; if the latter, the random value needs to be notified to the opposite end in the corresponding request and/or response message . Preferably, after determining, by the foregoing step, that the RN authentication is passed, the method further includes: the RN setting an association key, where the association key is one of the following: a device-related key; generating the device-related key and the parameter according to a predetermined key derivation algorithm The new key, parameters include: Kasme or a key derived from Kasme, a key or parameter associated with the RN's user subscription information. Preferably, the foregoing predetermined algorithm includes: a Key Derivation Function (KDF) or an encryption algorithm. With the preferred embodiment, the existing key derivation algorithm or encryption algorithm is used to reduce development costs. Embodiment 1 In this embodiment, the foregoing embodiment and its preferred embodiments are combined. The embodiment provides a device authentication method, where the method includes: Step 1: The RN sends the device identification information to the MME by using a NAS message; The identifier information of the RN may be a device identifier of the RN, such as an International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) of the RN, or device certificate information of the RN. Step 2: The MME initiates a device authentication request to the RN according to the device authentication data, and notifies the RN to perform device authentication, and the RN generates a device authentication response value according to the device authentication request, and sends the device authentication response value to the MME, and the MME confirms the device authentication. whether succeed. Preferably, the authentication process initiated by the RN device may reuse an existing AKA process or may use a new message flow. Preferably, the method for notifying the RN to perform device authentication may be: in the device authentication request message, the RN may be notified by adding an explicit cell to perform device authentication; The message is implicitly notified to the RN, that is, a certain cell or field in the multiplex device authentication request message. For example, the reserved bit of the AMF field in the AUTN cell can be used as the indication information, and the RN is notified to perform device authentication. Preferably, the device authentication data in step 4 can be generated in one of the following ways: (1) using a device-related key pair specifying parameters (such as a user authentication vector {RAND, XRES,

Kasme, RAND and / or AUTN in AUTN}, or one or more fields in AUTN, are encrypted according to the convention algorithm to generate new parameters (such as RAND_D and / or AUTN_D )

(2) Generate a new expected device response value XRES_D according to the agreed algorithm using the device-related key and the expected response value XRES in the user authentication vector {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN}. (3) Using the device-related key and the network-side randomly generated before the user authentication vector is generated

RAND generates a new random value RAND D according to the agreed algorithm, then uses RAND_D to generate other authentication vector components, and finally generates a new device authentication vector {RAND , XRES D , Kasme D, AUTN D }. (The other components outside RAND are calculated according to the new random value RAND D). Preferably, the foregoing authentication data may be generated by the MME, or may be generated by the HSS and sent to the HSS.

MME. Preferably, in order to increase the security of the device authentication data, when the network side calculates the authentication data or the RN generates the device response value, other parameters may also be introduced, such as a certain parameter shared by the RN and the network side, or generated by the network side/RN. If a random number parameter is used, the corresponding parameter needs to be carried in the authentication process message to notify the other party. It should be noted that, corresponding to different device authentication data generating methods, the information carried in the device request message may be RAND or RAND_D, and AUTN or AUTN_D. That is, if there is a new RAND_D and / or AUTN_D, replace RAND and / or AUTN in the message, otherwise do not replace. Preferably, corresponding to different device authentication data generating methods, the RN generating device authentication response value in step 2 may be generated by using one of the following methods:

(1) The RN first decrypts the parameters in the authentication request message (such as RAND D and/or AUTN_D, or one or more fields in AUTN_D) according to the agreed algorithm by using the device-related key information to obtain RAND and/or AUTN. Then according to the processing method of the ordinary UE, first to the AUTN After verification, the authentication response value RES is calculated according to the existing calculation method after verification, and the response value RES is also the device authentication response value RES D„

(2) The RN first performs AUTN verification according to the existing method, and generates a user authentication response value RES. The RN then calculates the new device response value RES_D in the same way as the network side generates XRES_D using the device-related key and RES.

(3) First, RAND D is obtained by using the same method as the network side calculation new random value RAND D according to the RAND value in the device authentication request message, and then using AUTN_D in the RAND_D and device request according to the processing method of the ordinary UE to the AUTN D Conduct a risk certificate and generate RES_D. Preferably, if other parameters (such as random numbers generated by the RN) are also used when the RN generates the device response value, the time used by the network side to calculate the expected device response XRES may be postponed until after the device authentication response message is received. The convention algorithm in this embodiment may be a known Key Derivation Function (KDF) or an encryption algorithm, which is not described in detail. It should be noted that, in the specific implementation process, the method for generating the above authentication data and the method for generating the response value of the corresponding RN may also be combined with each other according to actual conditions, but are all within the scope of the present invention. Preferably, the agreement on the device association key may also be completed in the device authentication process. The device association key refers to a key associated with the authenticated device identity, which can be used to protect the communication between the device and the network side, and can also be used to protect the device and the network side. Other keys for secure communication between. The device association key may be a key related to the RN device, or may be a new key derived by using the RN device-related key and additional input. The additional input may be the intermediate key Kasme of the user authentication process agreement, or other keys derived from Kasme, or a value shared by other RNs and the network side, such as a key in the user subscription data of the RN. Or parameters, etc. The above-mentioned RN device-related key information refers to a pre-shared key (which may be a symmetric key or an asymmetric key) known to both the RN and the network side. The above network side may be an MME or an HSS. Embodiment 2 In this embodiment, the foregoing embodiment and its preferred embodiments are combined. This embodiment provides a device authentication method. The process of the device authentication method in this embodiment multiplexes the user authentication message flow, and the new message is used. The notification RN displayed by the indication cell performs device authentication, and multiplexes the cells in the request message as authentication data. FIG. 5 is a flowchart of device authentication according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 5, the method includes: Step S501: The RN initiates a NAS (such as an Attach Request) message to the MME, where the message carries the device identification information IMEI of the RN. Step S503: The MME sends an Authentication Data Request message to the HSS, and the message carries the RN device identification information IMEI. Step 4: S505: The HSS first generates the user authentication vector of the RN {RAND, XRES, Kasme,

AUTN}, according to the RN's IMEI index RN corresponding device-related key information, and the user authentication vector and the RN's device-related key information are sent to the MME through an Authentication Data Response message. Preferably, the device-related key information of the RN in the foregoing process may also be obtained by the MME itself according to the device identification information of the RN, for example, from the RN device related to the MME, or from other network elements, such as OAM. Step S507: The MME encrypts the AUTN in the user authentication vector of the RN according to the device-related key information (such as K_D) according to a predetermined encryption algorithm, generates new authentication data AUTN_D, and then sends an authentication request message to the RN. The RAND and the authentication data AUTN_D are carried, and the RN device authentication indication information is also carried in the message. The expected device response value XRES_D corresponding to the above-described authentication data still uses the expected response value XRES in the user authentication vector. Preferably, other encryption parameters may be used in the encryption process of the foregoing authentication data. The other input parameters may be a certain value shared by the MME and the RN, and/or a random number generated by the MME, and the MME needs to pass the random number. The message is sent to the RN. Preferably, the authentication data may also multiplex the RAND in the request message, and the MME encrypts the RAND according to a predetermined algorithm by using the key associated with the RN device to obtain the authentication data RAND D, and the MME sends the request message to the RN. The authentication data is the encrypted RAND value (RAND_D) and AUTN. After receiving the RN, the RN can decrypt the RAND D to obtain the initial RAND value, and then perform subsequent AUTN-risk and RES calculations, etc. The UE is consistent. Step S509: After the RN receives the message, if the message indicates that the device is authenticated, the RN first decrypts the authentication data AUTN_D to obtain the AUTN, and then authenticates the AUTN by using the same authentication method as the normal UE, and if the authentication is passed, the UT is used. The same method of the UE generates a response RES, which also serves as the device authentication response value RES_D. The RES_D (ie RES) is then sent to the MME via an authentication response message. It should be noted that, in the process of encrypting and decrypting the device in response to RAND_D and/or AUTN_D in the foregoing process, other parameters may be input, such as a new random value generated by the MME, and the calculation method is the same, but only the MME is required at this time. The random value is sent to the RN in the request message. Step S 511: After receiving the MME, the MME compares the RES D with the expected device response value XRES D . If the two are consistent, the RN successfully completes the device authentication. Preferably, after the foregoing process is completed, the MME and the RN may also complete the agreement of the RN device association key K_RN. FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of generating a device association key according to the present invention. As shown in FIG. 6, the K_RN may directly use the RN device. The associated key K_D can also be derived using K_D and other additional input-constellation key derivation algorithms. Other additional inputs can include the intermediate key Kasme agreed by the AKA process, such as K_RN = KDF(Kasme, KD), or A value shared by the RN and the network side. It should be noted that, in this embodiment, the device is authenticated by the notification RN displayed by the newly added indicator cell in the message, and the cell in the request message is used as the authentication data. In the actual application, the authentication process may also be hidden. In this way, the RN is notified to perform device authentication. For example, one or some reserved bits in the AMF field in the AUTN_D can be falsified, and the RN is used to notify the RN to perform device device authentication. Embodiment 3 In this embodiment, the foregoing embodiment and its preferred embodiments are combined. This embodiment provides a device authentication method. In this embodiment, the process of the device authentication method multiplexes the user authentication message flow, and the message is passed. The notification RN displayed by the newly added indicator cell performs device authentication, and multiplexes the cell in the request message as the authentication data. The method includes the following steps: Step 1: Step S501 of the second embodiment. Step 4: 2: Step S4 of the second embodiment is combined with S503. Step 3: The HSS first generates a random number RAND, and then uses the device-related key information (such as K_D) and RAND as input according to the RN's IMEI index RN corresponding device-related key information. The derived algorithm calculates the new RAND_D: RAND D = KDF ( RAND, KD ), optionally, other input parameters can be used in the calculation. Then, using the RAND_D as a random challenge for calculating the user authentication vector, a new user authentication vector {RAND_D, XRES D, Kasme D, AUTN D} for generating the RN is calculated (the generation method of the authentication vector is known content, Do a narrative ;). The HSS then uses the initial random value RAND instead of the random password RAND D in the new authentication vector to obtain the new authentication vector {RAND , XRES D , Kasme D , AUTN D} and authenticates the new authentication with an Authentication Data Response message. The vector is sent to the MME. Alternatively, the process of forming a new authentication vector using the initial RAND instead of RAND_D may also be done by the MME. Correspondingly, the new user authentication vector {RAND , XRES D , Kasme D , AUTN D } and the initial random value RAND need to be sent to the MME by the HSS. Step 4: The MME initiates an authentication request to the RN, where the message carries the initial RAND and the authentication data AUTN_D, and the device authentication indication information, which is used to instruct the RN to perform device authentication. Step 5: After the RN receives the message, if the message indicates that the device is authenticated, the RN first calculates the RAND_D according to the agreed algorithm by using the RAND and the RN device-related key, and then uses RAND_D to perform the risk certificate on the AUTN D, and the specific-risk method and In the user authentication process, the UE-risk AUTN method is the same. If the risk certificate passes, the response value RES D is generated (the calculation method is consistent with the UE generation RES method in the user authentication process;), and then the RES D is sent to the MME through the authentication response message. . Step 6: After receiving the MME, the MME compares the RES D with the XRES_D sent by the previous HSS. If the two are consistent, the RN successfully completes the device authentication. Preferably, the agreement of the RN device association key Kasme_D is also completed by the above procedure. This key can be used to secure communication between the RN and the network side, and can also be used to derive other keys for securing communication between the RN and the network side. It should be noted that, in this embodiment, the device is authenticated by the notification RN displayed by the newly added indicator cell in the message, and the RN may be notified in the implicit manner to perform device authentication, for example, the AMF field in the AUTN_D may be modified. Some/some reserved bits, which are used to inform the RN to perform device authentication. Embodiment 4 In this embodiment, the foregoing embodiment and its preferred embodiments are combined. This embodiment provides a device authentication method. In this embodiment, the process of the device authentication method multiplexes the user authentication message flow in the multiplexing message. The cell implicitly notifies the RN to perform device authentication, and also uses RAND and AUTN in the user authentication vector as device authentication data. The method includes: Step 1: Step S501 of the second embodiment. Step 4: 2: Step S4 of the second embodiment is combined with S503. Step 3: Same as step S505 of the second embodiment. Step 4: The MME uses the key associated with the XRES and the RN device (K_D) to calculate a new expected device response XRES D = KDF(XRES, K_D) according to the convention derivation algorithm. The MME then sends an authentication request message to the RN, where the device authentication data multiplexes the RAND and the AUTN in the user authentication vector, that is, the message carries RAND and AUTN, where the AMF field in the AUTN is multiplexed, and the reserved bit is used to indicate the RN. Equipment certification is required. Optionally, the calculation of the authentication data in the foregoing process may also be completed in the HSS, and then sent by the HSS to the MME, and the calculation method is the same as the calculation method of the MME in the foregoing process. Step 4: After receiving the RN, the RN and the AUTN use the same user authentication process as the normal UE, first authenticate the AUTN, and then generate the response value RES, and if the RN finds that the AMF indication in the AUTN requires device authentication. Then, the RN uses the RN device-related key (such as K_D) and RES to generate the device response value RES D according to the same derived algorithm as the MME generates XRES_D: RES D = KDF(RES, KD), and RES D through the authentication response message Send to the MME. Preferably, the device authentication response message in the above process may also carry RES and RES_D at the same time. At this time, the MME compares RES and XRES, and RES D and XRES_D respectively after owing.

It is consistently stated that the RN successfully completes device authentication. It should be noted that other parameters may be used in the calculation process, such as a parameter shared by the RN and the MME, or a random number generated by the network side/RN. If a random number parameter is used, the corresponding parameter needs to be authenticated. The response message carries the parameter to notify the MME. In this case, the time for the MME to calculate the XRES_D in step 5 needs to be placed after the MME receives the device authentication response. Step 6: After the MME receives the comparison, the RES D and the XRES_D calculated by the MME are compared. This indicates that the RN successfully completed device authentication. Preferably, after the foregoing process is completed, the MME and the RN may also complete the agreement of the device association key K RN . FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of generating a device association key according to the present invention, as shown in FIG. 6 , where the K_RN may directly use the RN device. The associated key K_D can also be derived using K_D and other additional input-constellation key derivation algorithms. Other additional inputs can include the intermediate key Kasme through the AKA process agreement, such as K_RN = KDF (Kasme, KD), or A value shared by the RN and the network side. Embodiment 5 In this embodiment, the foregoing embodiment and its preferred embodiments are combined. This embodiment provides a device authentication method. In this embodiment, the device that notifies the RN implicitly by multiplexing the AMF field in the AUTN is used. Authentication, and the newly calculated RAND_D and AUTN_D in the request message are used as authentication data. The method includes: Step 1: Step S501 of the second embodiment. Step 4: 2: Step S4 of the second embodiment is combined with S503. Step 3: The HSS first generates a user authentication vector {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} of the RN, and indexes the corresponding device-related key information of the RN according to the IMEI of the RN. Then, the HSS encrypts the MAC fields in the RAND and AUTN of the user authentication vector according to the RN device-related key (such as K_D) to obtain the authentication data RAND_D and AUTN_D (where only the MAC field is secretly encrypted, and the others are the same as the AUTN;), And ί 爹爹爹 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A The related key information is sent to the MME through an authentication data response message. Preferably, the calculation of the authentication data in the above process may also be completed in the MME, and the calculation method is consistent with the calculation method of the HSS in the above process. 4: The MME sends an authentication request message to the RN, where the message carries RAND_D and AUTN_D, wherein the expected device response value XRES_D corresponding to the device authentication data uses the expected user response XRES in the user authentication vector, that is, XRES D = XRES. Step 5: After receiving the RN, the RN indicates through the AMF field in the AUTN_D that device authentication is required. Therefore, the device-related key root is used first. Conventions algorithm RAND_D AUTN_D the MAC field and decrypts the obtained initial RAND and AUTN. RN then preclude the use of ordinary The same authentication method of the UE authenticates the AUTN, and uses the RAND to generate a response value RES, which is also used as the device authentication response value RES D, and then sends the RES to the MME through the authentication response message. It should be noted that, in the encryption process of the device responding to RAND_D and AUTN_D in the foregoing process, other input parameters, such as random values generated by the MME, may be used, and the calculation method is the same, and finally the corresponding device response value RES_D is generated. Correspondingly, the MME needs to send the random value to the RN in the request message. Step 6: The MME compares the RES_D (ie RES) and the XRES_D (ie, XRES). If the MME is consistent, the RN successfully completes the device authentication. . Preferably, after the foregoing process is completed, the MME and the RN also complete the agreement of the device association key K_RN. FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of generating a device association key according to the present invention, as shown in FIG. 6, where the K_RN can directly use the RN device. The key K_D can also be derived using K_D and other additional input-constellation key derivation algorithms. Other additional inputs can include the intermediate key Kasme through the AKA process agreement, such as K_RN = KDF (Kasme, KD), or RN A value shared with the network side. Embodiment 6 In this embodiment, the foregoing embodiment and its preferred embodiments are combined. This embodiment provides a device authentication method. In this embodiment, the notification RN is displayed by adding a new cell in the request message. Device authentication, and add new cells as authentication data in the response message. The method includes the following steps: Step 4: 1 is the same as step 4 of the second embodiment. Step 4: 2: Same as step 4 of Example 2, 03. Step 3: The HSS first calculates the user authentication vector {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} of the RN, and sends the authentication data to the MME through an Authentication Data Response message. Step 4: The MME sends an authentication request message to the RN, where the message carries the authentication data RAND and AUTN, and the device authentication indication information. Step 5: After receiving the RN, the RN first authenticates the AUTN by using the same authentication method as the normal UE. If the authentication passes and uses the same authentication method of the UE, the response RES is generated. The indication information indicates that device authentication is required, and the RN uses the RES, the RN device-related key K_D, and the random parameter RAND_D to generate a device response RES_D according to the agreed algorithm: RES D = KDF(RES RAND D, KD), and passes the authentication response. The message sends the RES to the MME along with the new cell RES_D and RAND D. Step 6: After receiving the MME, compare the RES and the XRES sent by the HSS. If they are consistent, the user authentication of the RN is successfully completed. At the same time, the MME uses the XRES and the received RAND_D and the RN device to generate the XRES_D in the same way as the RN, and compares the received RES_D with the XRES_D calculated by the MME. If the RN is consistent, the RN successfully completes the device authentication. . Preferably, the calculation of the authentication data in the foregoing process may also be completed in the HSS. At this time, the HSS generates new authentication data by using the same method as the foregoing process MME, and sends the new authentication data to the MME, and the subsequent process is consistent with the foregoing process. Preferably, the key information related to the RN device in the MME may be obtained from O AM or HS S. Preferably, after the foregoing process is completed, the MME and the RN also complete the agreement of the device association key K_RN. FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of generating a device association key according to the present invention, as shown in FIG. 6, where the K_RN can directly use the RN device. The key K_D can also be derived using K_D and other additional input-constellation key derivation algorithms. Other additional inputs can include the intermediate key Kasme through the AKA process agreement, such as K_RN = KDF (Kasme, KD), or RN A value shared with the network side. The present embodiment provides a relay node. FIG. 7 is a structural block diagram of a relay node according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 7, the relay node includes: a first receiving module 72, and a first generating module 74. And the first sending module 76, the foregoing structure is described in detail: the first receiving module 72 is configured to receive a device authentication request, where the device authentication request carries the device authentication data generated by using the user authentication vector; 74. Connect to the first receiving module 72, and set to generate a corresponding device authentication response value according to the device authentication data received by the first receiving module 72. The first sending module 76 is connected to the first generating module 74, and is configured to carry The device authentication response of the device authentication response value generated by the first generation module 74 is sent to the network side for authenticating the RN. FIG. 8 is a block diagram of a preferred structure of a relay node according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 8, the relay node includes a first associated key setting module 82. The first generating module 74 includes: a first decrypting submodule 801, a first device authentication response value generation submodule 802; a second decryption submodule 803, a second device The authentication response value generation sub-module 804; the user response value generation module 805, the third device authentication response value generation sub-module 806; the first random value generation sub-module 807, the fourth device authentication response value generation sub-module 808, The foregoing structure is described in detail: the first decryption sub-module 801 is configured to decrypt using a device-related key of the RN, an optional parameter, the received RAND_D and/or AUTN_D according to a predetermined algorithm, and obtain RAND and AUTN; The authentication response value generation sub-module 802 is connected to the first decryption sub-module 801, and is configured to use the RAND and/or AUTN obtained by the first decryption sub-module 801 according to the packet evolution system authentication authentication and the key agreement EPS AKA user authentication method. Generating a user response value RES and determining that the user response value RES is a device authentication response value RES D „ second decryption sub-module 803, set to use the device-related key of the RN, optional parameters, received RAND_D and AUTH_D1 according to a predetermined algorithm Decrypting, and obtaining RAND and / or AUTH; second device authentication response value generation sub-module 804, connected to the second decryption sub-module 803, set The RAND and/or AUTN obtained using the second decryption sub-module 803 generates a user response value RES according to the user authentication method of the EPS AKA, and determines that the user response value RES is the device authentication response value RES D. The user response value generation module 805 is set to Generating a user response value RES according to the user authentication method of the EPS AKA; a third device authentication response value generation sub-module 806, connected to the user response value generation module 805, configured to generate a device-related key, RES, and optional parameters according to a predetermined algorithm The device authentication response value RES D „ the first random value generation sub-module 807 is configured to generate a new random value RAND D according to a predetermined algorithm using a device-related key of the RN, a random value generated by the network side, and an optional parameter, and an optional parameter. One of the following: data shared by the RN and the network side; a random number generated by the network side and/or the RN; a fourth device authentication response value generation sub-module 808, connected to the first random value generation sub-module 807, set to follow the EPS The user authentication method of AKA performs a risk certificate on the received AUTN_D using the new random value RAND D generated by the first random value generation sub-module 807, and generates Preparation of the authentication response value RES_D. The relay node further includes: a first association key setting module 82 configured to set an association key, wherein the association key is one of: a device-related key; a device-related key and a parameter generated according to a predetermined derivation algorithm The key, parameters include: Kasme or a key derived from Kasme, a key or parameter related to the user subscription information of the RN. This embodiment also provides a network side. FIG. 9 is a structural block diagram of a network side according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 9, the network side includes: an obtaining module 92, a determining module 94, and a second generation. The module 96 and the second sending module 98 are described in detail below. The obtaining module 92 is configured to obtain the device identifier of the RN or the device certificate information of the RN by using the received NAS message. The determining module 94 is connected to the acquiring module. And determining, according to the device identifier of the RN or the device certificate information of the network side acquired by the obtaining module 92, the device-related key of the RN; the second generating module 96 is connected to the determining module 94, and is configured to determine by the determining module 94. The device-related key generates the device authentication data. The second sending module 98 is connected to the second generating module 96, and is configured to send the device authentication data generated by the second generating module 96 to the RN through the device authentication request. FIG. 10 is a block diagram showing a preferred structure of a network side according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in FIG.

The MME further includes: a second associated key setting module 101, a first setting module 102, a second setting module 104, a second receiving module 106, an authentication response value determining module 108, and an authentication module 109. The second generating module 96 includes: a device authentication data generation sub-module 942, a second device authentication data generation sub-module 944, a selection sub-module 945, a third device authentication data generation sub-module 946, a second random value generation sub-module 948, and a fourth device authentication data generator. Module 949, the above structure is described in detail below: First device authentication data generation sub-module 942, set to use the device-related key of the RN, optional parameters, {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} in the user authentication vector The RAND and/or AUTN are encrypted according to a predetermined algorithm, and generate device authentication data RAND_D and/or AUTN D, where RAND is a random number generated by the network side, XRES is a user response expected by the network side, and Kasme is an intermediate key. AUTN is a network authentication flag and contains multiple fields, specifically AUTN = SQN * AK || AMF || MAC, where SQN* AK refers to the sequence generated by HSS The XOR of the SQN and the anonymous key AK, the AMF is the authentication management domain, the MAC is the message-risk code, and the optional parameters are one of the following: RN and data shared by the network side; network side and/or RN generated random number. The second device authentication data generation sub-module 944 is configured to use a device-related key of the RN, an optional parameter, a field in the RAND and/or AUTN in {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} in the user authentication vector according to the predetermined The algorithm performs encryption and generates device authentication data RAND_D and/or AUTH_D 1 , where RAND is a random number generated by the network side, XRES is a desired device response, Kasme is an intermediate key, AUTN is a network authentication flag, and includes multiple Field, specifically AUTN = SQN * AK || AMF || MAC, where SQN* AK refers to the serial number SQN generated by the HSS and The XOR of the anonymous key AK, the AMF is the authentication management domain, and the MAC is the message-risk code. The optional parameters are one of the following: RN and data shared by the network side; and random numbers generated by the network side and/or the RN. The sub-module 945 is selected to select RAND and AUTN in the user authentication vector {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} as device authentication data; the third device authentication data generation sub-module 946 is connected to the selection sub-module 945, and is set to use The device-related key, the XRES and optional parameters in {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} in the user authentication vector generate a desired device authentication response XRES_D according to a predetermined algorithm, and determine the XRES_D as device authentication data, wherein, The parameters are one of the following: data shared by the RN and the network side; random numbers generated by the network side and/or the RN, RAND is a random number generated by the network side, XRES is a user response expected by the network side, Kasme is an intermediate key, AUTN Is the network certification mark. The second random value generation sub-module 948 is configured to encrypt the random value RAND and the optional parameter randomly generated by the network side according to a predetermined algorithm by using the device-related key of the RN, and generate a new random value RAND D, where The parameter is one of the following: data shared by the RN and the network side; a random number generated by the network side and/or the RN; a fourth device authentication data generation submodule 949 connected to the second random value generation submodule 948, set to use The RAND_D generated by the two random value generating sub-module 948 is used as the random password generating device authentication data {RAND_D, XRES D , Kasme D , AUTN D} for calculating the user authentication vector; and determining that the device authentication vectors sent to the RN are RAND and AUTN D, Where RAND is the random number generated by the network side, XRES_D is the calculated new network side user response, Kasme_D calculates the new intermediate key, and AUTN_D is the calculated new network authentication flag. The foregoing MME further includes: a first setting module 102, configured to: set a cell in the device authentication request to instruct the RN to perform device authentication; and the second setting module 104 is configured to set an existing cell or a field indirect indication in the device authentication request. The RN performs device authentication. The MME further includes: a second receiving module 106, configured to receive a device authentication response value RES_D; an authentication response value determining module 108, connected to the second receiving module 106, configured to determine a device authentication response value received by the second receiving module 106 The authentication module 109 is connected to the authentication response value judging module 108, and is configured to determine that the RN authentication is passed when the judgment result of the authentication response value judging module 108 is consistent. The MME further includes: a second association key setting module 101, configured to set an association key, where the association key is one of the following: a device-related key; the device-related key and the parameter are distributed according to a predetermined The new key generated by the algorithm, the parameters include: Kasme, the key derived from Kasme, the key or parameter related to the user subscription information of the RN. 11 is a structural block diagram of an authentication system according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 11, the authentication system includes: RN 2 and network side 4, and the specific structure of the RN 2 and the network side 4 is as shown above, and is no longer Praise. With the above-mentioned embodiment, the relay node receives the device authentication request for authentication, and sends the generated device authentication response value to the MME, which is used to authenticate the RN, and can implement authentication of the relay node device by the network to ensure The legality of the RN effectively protects the security of the RN and the user equipment it serves. Minimize changes to current standard protocols to ensure maximum version compatibility issues. Obviously, those skilled in the art should understand that the above modules or steps of the present invention can be implemented by a general-purpose computing device, which can be concentrated on a single computing device or distributed over a network composed of multiple computing devices. Alternatively, they may be implemented by program code executable by the computing device, such that they may be stored in the storage device by the computing device and, in some cases, may be different from the order herein. The steps shown or described are performed, or they are separately fabricated into individual integrated circuit modules, or a plurality of modules or steps are fabricated as a single integrated circuit module. Thus, the invention is not limited to any specific combination of hardware and software. The above is only the preferred embodiment of the present invention, and is not intended to limit the present invention, and various modifications and changes can be made to the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the scope of the present invention are intended to be included within the scope of the present invention.

Claims

Claim

1. An authentication method, including:

The relay node RN receives the device authentication request, where the device authentication request carries the device authentication data generated by using the user authentication vector;

The RN generates a corresponding device authentication response value according to the device authentication data, and sends a device authentication response carrying the device authentication response value to the network side for authenticating the RN.

The method according to claim 1, wherein before the RN receives the device authentication request, the method further includes:

Obtaining, by the network side, the device identifier of the RN or the device certificate information of the RN by using the received non-access stratum NAS message;

Determining, by the network side, a device-related key of the RN according to the device identifier of the RN or the device certificate information of the network side;

The network side generates the device authentication data by using the device related key, and sends the device authentication data to the RN by using the device authentication request.

The method according to claim 2, wherein the device related key is one of: the device related key is a pre-shared key or parameter in the RN device subscription information or the device certificate;

The device related key is a new key or new parameter generated by the pre-shared key or the parameter.

The method according to claim 2, wherein the generating, by the network side, the device authentication data by using the device related key comprises:

Encrypting according to a predetermined algorithm using a device-related key of the RN, an optional parameter, RAND and/or AUTN in {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} in the user authentication vector, and generating device authentication data RAND_D and / or AUTN_D; or

Encrypting according to the predetermined algorithm using the device-related key, the optional parameter, a field in RAND and/or AUTN in {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} in the user authentication vector, and generating Equipment certification data RAND D and / or AUTH Dl , where RAND is a random number generated by the network side, XRES is the expected device response, Kasme is the intermediate key, AUTN is the network authentication flag, and contains multiple fields, specifically AUTN = SQN * AK || AMF | MAC, where SQN* AK refers to the exclusive OR operation of the serial number SQN and the anonymous key AK generated by the home subscriber server HSS. The AMF is the authentication management domain, and the MAC is the message-risk code. The optional parameter is one of the following: : data shared by the RN and the network side; a random number generated by the network side and/or the RN. The method according to claim 4, wherein the generating, by the RN, the corresponding device authentication response value according to the device authentication data comprises:

Decrypting the RN and/or AUTN using the device-related key, the optional parameter, the received RAND_D and/or AUTN_D, and obtaining the RAND and/or AUTN; using the RAND and/or the The AUTN generates a user response value RES according to the user authentication method of the packet evolution system authentication authentication and the key agreement EPS AKA, and determines that the user response value RES is the device authentication response value RES D; or

Determining, by the RN, the device-related key of the RN, the optional parameter, the received RAND D and/or AUTH_D1 according to a predetermined algorithm, and obtaining RAND and/or AUTH; using the RAND and/or the The AUTN generates a user response value RES according to the user authentication method of the EPS AKA, and determines that the user response value RES is a device authentication response value RES_D. The method according to claim 2, wherein the generating, by the network side, the device authentication data by using the device related key comprises:

Selecting RAND and AUTN in the user authentication vector {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} as device authentication data;

Generating a desired device authentication response XRES_D according to a predetermined algorithm using the device-related key, the desired user response XRES and optional parameters in the user authentication vector {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN}, and determining the XRES D as device authentication data The RAND is a random number generated by the network side, Kasme is an intermediate key, and the AUTN is a network authentication flag, and the optional parameter is one of the following: the RN and the data shared by the network side; And/or a random number generated by the RN. The method according to claim 6, wherein the generating, by the RN, the corresponding device authentication response value according to the device authentication data comprises:

The RN generates a user response value RES according to the user authentication method of the EPS AKA; Generating a device authentication response value RES D according to the predetermined algorithm using the device related key, the RES, and the optional parameter

And generating, by using a device-related key, a random value RAND generated by the network side, and an optional parameter, a new random value RAND_D according to a predetermined algorithm, where the optional parameter is one of the following: the RN and the network side share Data; the network side and/or the random number generated by the RN;

Generating a new user authentication vector {RAND_D, XRES D, Kasme D, AUTN D} using the RAND_D as a random password for calculating the user authentication vector; and determining that the device authentication data sent to the RN is the RAND and the AUTN_D, where RAND is a random number generated by the network side, XRES_D is the new network side expected response after the calculation, Kasme_D is the calculated new intermediate key, and AUTN_D is the new network authentication flag after the calculation. .

9. The method according to claim 8, wherein the RN generates a corresponding device authentication response value according to the device authentication data, including:

The RN generates the new random value RAND D according to the predetermined algorithm by using the device related key, the optional parameter, and the received RAND;

The RN performs a risk certificate on the received AUTN D according to the user authentication method of the EPS AKA, and generates a device authentication response value RES D using the new random value RAND D.

The method according to claim 5, 7 or 9, wherein, after the device authentication response value is sent to the network side, for authenticating the RN, the method further includes:

The network side receives the device authentication response value RES_D;

Determining whether the device authentication response value RES D is consistent with the expected device response XRES_D;

If the judgment result is consistent, it is determined that the RN authentication is passed.

The method according to claim 10, after determining that the RN authentication is passed, the method further includes: The RN and the network side set an association key, where the association key is one of: the device related key;

A new key generated using the device-related key and parameters in accordance with a predetermined derivation algorithm, the parameters including: Kasme, a key derived from Kasme, a key or parameter associated with user subscription information of the RN.

The method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, wherein

Setting a cell in the device authentication request to instruct the RN to perform device authentication; or setting an existing cell or field in the device authentication request to indirectly instruct the RN to perform device authentication.

The method according to any one of claims 1-9, wherein the network side comprises: a mobility management entity MME and a home subscriber server HSS.

14. A relay node RN, comprising:

The first receiving module is configured to receive a device authentication request, where the device authentication request carries device authentication data generated by using a user authentication vector;

a first generation module, configured to generate a corresponding device authentication response value according to the device authentication data;

The first sending module is configured to send a device authentication response carrying the device authentication response value to the network side for authenticating the RN.

The RN according to claim 14, wherein the first generating module comprises:

a first decryption sub-module, configured to use the device-related key, the optional parameter, the received RAND_D and/or AUTN_D to decrypt according to a predetermined algorithm, and obtain RAND and AUTN;

a first device authentication response value generation submodule, configured to generate a user response value RES according to a user authentication method of the packet evolution system authentication authentication and the key agreement EPS AKA using RAND and/or the AUTN, and determine the user response value RES is the device authentication response value RES D. The RN according to claim 14, wherein the first generation module comprises: a second decryption sub-module, configured to decrypt using a device-related key, an optional parameter, the received RAND_D and/or AUTH_D1 according to a predetermined algorithm, and obtain RAND and/or AUTH;

a second device authentication response value generating submodule, configured to generate a user response value RES according to the user authentication method of the EPS AKA using the RAND and/or the AUTN, and determine that the user response value RES is a device authentication response value RES_D.

The RN according to claim 14, wherein the first generating module comprises:

a user response value generating module, configured to generate a user response value RES according to a user authentication method of the EPS AKA;

The third device authentication response value generating submodule is configured to generate the device authentication response value RES_D according to a predetermined algorithm using the device related key, the RES, and the optional parameter.

The RN according to claim 14, wherein the first generating module comprises:

And a first random value generating submodule, configured to generate a new random value RAND D according to a predetermined algorithm by using the device related key, a random value generated by the network side, and an optional parameter, where the optional parameter is one of the following: Determining data shared by the RN and the network side; a random number generated by the network side and/or the RN;

The fourth device authentication response value generating submodule is configured to perform the risk on the received AUTN_D using the new random value RAND D according to the user authentication method of the EPS AKA, and generate a device authentication response value RES_D.

The RN according to claim 14, further comprising:

a first associated key setting module, configured to set an association key, where the associated key is one of: the device related key;

The device-related key and the parameter are generated according to a predetermined derivation algorithm, and the parameters include: Kasme, a key derived from Kasme, a key or a parameter related to the user subscription information of the RN.

20. A network side that includes:

An acquiring module, configured to acquire, by using the received non-access stratum NAS message, a device identifier of the RN or device credential information of the RN; a determining module, configured to determine a device related key of the RN according to the device identifier of the RN or the device certificate information of the network side;

a second generating module, configured to generate the device authentication data according to the device related key;

The second sending module is configured to send the device authentication data to the RN by using the device authentication request.

The network side according to claim 20, wherein the second generating module comprises:

a first device authentication data generating submodule, configured to use a device related key of the RN, an optional parameter, RAND and/or AUTN in {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} in the user authentication vector according to a predetermined The algorithm performs encryption and generates device authentication data RAND D and/or AUTN D; or

a second device authentication data generating submodule, configured to use a field in the RAND and/or AUTN in the device related key, the optional parameter, the user authentication vector {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} The predetermined algorithm performs encryption and generates device authentication data RAND D and/or AUTH_D1, where RAND is a random number generated by the network side, XRES is a desired device response, Kasme is an intermediate key, AUTN is a network authentication flag, and contains many Fields, specifically AUTN = SQN * AK || AMF || MAC, where SQN* AK refers to the exclusive OR operation of the serial number SQN and the anonymous key AK generated by the HSS, AMF is the authentication management domain, and MAC is the message verification. The optional parameter is one of the following: data shared by the RN and the network side; a random number generated by the network side and/or the RN.

22. The network side according to claim 20, wherein the second generating module comprises:

Selecting a submodule, and setting RAND and AUTN in the user authentication vector {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} as device authentication data;

a third device authentication data generating submodule configured to generate a desired device authentication according to a predetermined algorithm using the device related key, the expected user response XRES in the {RAND, XRES, Kasme, AUTN} in the user authentication vector and optional parameters Responding to XRES_D, and determining the XRES_D as device authentication data, where RAND is a random number generated by the network side, Kasme is an intermediate key, AUTN is a network authentication flag, and the optional parameter is one of the following: Data shared by the network side; a random number generated by the network side and/or the RN. The network side according to claim 20, wherein the second generation module comprises: a second random value generating submodule, configured to generate a new random value RAND D according to a predetermined algorithm by using a device-related key of the RN to randomly generate a random value RAND and an optional parameter on the network side, where the optional parameter One of the following: data shared by the RN and the network side; a random number generated by the network side and/or the RN;

a fourth device authentication data generating submodule configured to generate a new user authentication vector {RAND_D, XRES D, Kasme D, AUTN D} using the RAND_D as a random password for calculating the user authentication vector; and determining to send to the The device authentication vector of the RN is the RAND and the AUTN_D, where RAND is a random number generated by the network side, XRES_D is the calculated new network side expected response, and Kasme_D is the calculated new intermediate density. The key, AUTN_D, is the calculated new network authentication flag.

24. The network side of claim 20, further comprising:

The second receiving module is configured to receive the device authentication response value RES_D; and the authentication response value determining module is configured to determine whether the device authentication response value RES_D is consistent with the expected device response XRES_D;

The authentication module is configured to determine that the RN authentication is passed when the judgment result of the authentication response value judging module is consistent.

25. The network side of claim 20, further comprising:

a second associated key setting module, configured to set an association key, where the associated key is one of: the device related key;

The device-related key and the parameter are generated according to a predetermined derivation algorithm, and the parameters include: Kasme, a key derived by Kasme, a key or a parameter related to the user subscription information of the RN.

26. The network side according to claim 20, further comprising:

a first setting module, configured to set a cell in the device authentication request to instruct the RN to perform device authentication;

The second setting module is configured to set an existing cell or field in the device authentication request to indirectly instruct the RN to perform device authentication.

The network side according to claim 20, wherein the network side comprises: a mobility management entity MME and a home subscriber server HSS.

An authentication system, comprising: the RN according to any one of claims 14-19 and the network side according to any one of claims 20-27.