WO2006017949A1 - Dispositif et procede de cryptage a l'aide de l'invariance logarithmique globale pour la repartition des cles - Google Patents

Dispositif et procede de cryptage a l'aide de l'invariance logarithmique globale pour la repartition des cles Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2006017949A1
WO2006017949A1 PCT/CH2005/000427 CH2005000427W WO2006017949A1 WO 2006017949 A1 WO2006017949 A1 WO 2006017949A1 CH 2005000427 W CH2005000427 W CH 2005000427W WO 2006017949 A1 WO2006017949 A1 WO 2006017949A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
noise
random
receiver
modulator
signal
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PCT/CH2005/000427
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German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Ralf Otte
Hartmut Müller
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Tecdata Ag
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Application filed by Tecdata Ag filed Critical Tecdata Ag
Priority to EP05759820A priority Critical patent/EP1779587A1/fr
Priority to JP2007526158A priority patent/JP2008511195A/ja
Publication of WO2006017949A1 publication Critical patent/WO2006017949A1/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/065—Encryption by serially and continuously modifying data stream elements, e.g. stream cipher systems, RC4, SEAL or A5/3
    • H04L9/0656—Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/12—Transmitting and receiving encryption devices synchronised or initially set up in a particular manner
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a device and a method for encrypting messages.
  • the device and the method are suitable for encrypting digital data.
  • the invention is applicable in many areas of information transfer, z. B. in telecommunications, metrology, sensors, medical technology, telecommunications, banking and insurance, and more.
  • the receiver implements this decryption (deciphering, decoding) with a so-called key, i. information that usually only he and the sender own and which is necessary and sufficient to make the message readable again.
  • m f (k, c) where k is usually the shared, secret key for sender and receiver.
  • An important type of encryption is referred to as symmetric encryption in which both sender and receiver - but in the best case only these - know the secret key k.
  • symmetric encryption for example so-called block ciphers and stream ciphers are known.
  • block ciphers and stream ciphers are known.
  • symmetric encryption methods are very powerful, they are only applicable if both sender and receiver possess the secret key, so that just the transmission, ie the exchange of keys for example by postal or electronic means is a point of attack.
  • asymmetric encryption methods are known in which each participant in the system is assigned a private (secret) key d and a public key e.
  • the asymmetric encryption algorithm f calculates a ciphertext c for each plaintext m using the public key e
  • Both some symmetrical but in particular asymmetrical encryption methods are generally based on mathematical algorithms and are not protected by physical effects or properties.
  • a physically supported, secret transmission of messages would be the use of special ink and the like, as was common in the past.
  • Today's transmission of secret messages is often based on the encryption by means of mathematical algorithms.
  • the so-called public-key method the mathematical encryption idea is based, for example, on using so-called mathematical one-way functions, functions which are difficult to reverse.
  • One of the- Such a one-way function is, for example, the factorization of large numbers: While the multiplication of two very large primes p and q is trivial, their inversion, ie the factorization of the resulting number n back into the two primes p and q, is very complex. For example, the largest figure up to the year 2003 had 155 digits and it is estimated that the decomposition of a number n of 220 digits can take several thousands of years with the best methods known today [ibid]. Thus, these public-key methods were considered to be relatively secure until the recent past.
  • the attacks are typically distinguished in the following ways:
  • Ciphertext-only attack The attacker wants to determine the associated plaintext or the used key k from the knowledge of some home text
  • Quantum computers extremely.
  • the theoretical idea behind this is that quantum computers can simultaneously perform millions of arithmetic operations, since quanta, so-called qubits in information theory, simultaneously occupy several states and, in the processing of qubits, several states are simultaneously calculated. This allows mathematical algorithms and thus factorizing large numbers or deciphering procedures to be implemented faster by orders of magnitude.
  • the length of the key k corresponds to the length of the plaintext m 2.
  • Each key k consists of an absolutely random string
  • Each key k may only be used once and must then be safely destroyed.
  • a method based on these principles is called one-time pad method. It is well known that these ideal one-time pad methods are perfect methods whose safety can even be proved theoretically.
  • abbreviated keys e.g. TAN numbers
  • TAN numbers which become invalid after each transmission.
  • the exchange of the new keys which must permanently take place between transmitter and receiver in this way, could be intercepted under certain circumstances, so that the security is impaired.
  • Quanta such as the polarization direction of photons, and their superposition. From the quantum theory it follows that, for example, photons which have been polarized vertically pass with a 50 percent probability also a polarization grid rotated by 45 degrees thereto, i. In fact, 50% of the photons following the vertical grating pass the subsequent rotated grating.
  • This property of quanta is exploited in the well-known BB84 protocol, simplified as follows:
  • the known methods are thus not suitable for transmitting keys over very large distances using small technical means.
  • Another disadvantage of classical quantum cryptography is the verification of the schemes between sender and receiver in order to determine the random string. and in determining the acceptable error rate to detect if third parties have been listening to the key.
  • the object of the invention is to develop a method for encryption in which a simple, faster, always possible, permanent and interceptable exchange of keys takes place between the sender of a message and the recipient of the message, for example by means of a so-called.
  • One-time pad method to ensure transmission with maximum security.
  • a further object of the invention is that the recipient should automatically recognize when the key was received without authorization by a third party.
  • Another object is to provide a device for encrypting messages, resp. Data, in particular for GS cryptography GS - Global Scaling). This object is achieved with the features of claim 13.
  • a secret, random and arbitrarily long one-time key is synchronously generated or exchanged between transmitter and receiver, in which coupled local random processes are used to generate a key which is then suitable, for example based on a One-time pad method to exchange encrypted messages via conventional media.
  • Advantageous embodiments are specified in the respective subclaims.
  • the message m is converted into a sequence of bits and the key k is a secret random sequence of bits known only to the transmitter and receiver.
  • the decryption takes place, for example, in that the receiver adds the encrypted message c with its key k, which is identical to that of the transmitter, modulo2 (XOR) and thus obtains the plaintext m back.
  • Global Scaling is an established physical term that illustrates that frequency distributions of physical quantities such as masses, temperatures, weights and frequencies of real systems are logarithmically scale-invariant.
  • the publications by Hartmut Müller in Ehlers-Verlag on Global Scaling are hereby expressly included in the disclosure content of this patent application.
  • the large z represents the so-called partial counter whose value is set to the value 2 according to GS for subsequent frequency analyzes.
  • integer part denominators [no, ni, r) 2 ...] must always be greater than the numerator in terms of their absolute value due to the convergence condition for continued fractions and are always divisible by 3 integers.
  • a given physical quantity e.g. a frequency is decomposed according to the GS chain fraction method and converted into a so-called chain break code. This is to be described by way of example by a GS fraction breaking fraction decomposition for a frequency fo.
  • Equation (3) results in a fraction breakage decomposition and the calculation of the partial denominators n 0 , n i, n 2 , n 3 , n 4 , etc.
  • the frequency 2032 Hz corresponds to the so-called GS chain fraction code [-48; 9086].
  • a device for information processing for example of data or signals, consists of a transmitter S and a receiver E for the analysis and manipulation of a coupled random process.
  • the device and the method use coupled random processes, in particular coupled noise processes as information carriers
  • a high degree of correspondence of the fine structure can be recognized from the fact that the histograms of the underlying random processes are very similar even in their smaller expressions, so that not only their statistical parameters such as mean values, variances, etc. agree, but also the frequencies of certain Measured values in the respective histograms very often coincide. However, according to GS, this overlap is only analyzed for non-smoothed histograms.
  • Fig. 1 Tool GSC 3000 for GS analysis of frequencies
  • Fig. 2 Scheme for data transmission
  • Fig. 3 transmitting and receiving unit
  • Fig. 4 Background noise of a semiconductor device
  • Fig. 7 transmission of an encrypted message (example character "E").
  • Embodiment I Phenomena of coupled local random processes taking advantage of findings of the GS theory for transmitting and receiving a key k from a transmitter S to a receiver E, which can be explained in accordance with the prior art with a quantum physical mode and the
  • Exemplary embodiment II coupled local random processes at the transmitter and receiver using the findings of the GS theory for the synchronous readout of an external source, for example the global white noise with which the local random processes in S and E are synchronized under suitable conditions.
  • the transmitter and the receiver are implemented by technical terminals, which firstly contain a technical noise source or the connection of a allow technical noise source and secondly, the subsequent processing steps 1-8 can perform in real time. Between transmitter and receiver is a transmission path 5 for coupled random processes.
  • Transmitting and receiving unit are executed in more detail in Fig. 3.
  • a commercially available computer for example a laptop, is used in each case.
  • the transfer of keys k via coupled random processes is now achieved according to the invention with subsequent method steps 1 to 8.
  • the terminals are commercially available computers.
  • the method is abe "r to other devices, other sampling frequencies f 0 and other random processes applicable.
  • the method is falling process in particular for each technically produced and manipulable supply, for example, devices based on external or internal noise generators, Halbleiter ⁇ , processors, modems, etc. . applicable.
  • exemplary embodiment I can furthermore be implemented in various technical variants, of which two methods, example la and example 1b are shown in detail by way of example: Exemplary embodiment la
  • a commercially available computer for example a laptop with integrated sound card, is used for receiver 1 and receiver 2, respectively.
  • Tuning a transmitter and receiver to a common frequency band (e.g., from 5Hz to 16.4MHz) of a technical noise process.
  • a common frequency band e.g., from 5Hz to 16.4MHz
  • the sound card of a commercial computer or laptop can be used.
  • the frequency band of the noise is thereby for example between 100 Hz and 15 kHz.
  • Other technical noise sources would be e.g. Semiconductor elements or computer processors.
  • a typical noise signal from a technical noise source is shown in FIG. 4 over its time course.
  • the noise signals of the sound card are accessed by means of software, for example by means of Windows commands, and the respective noise levels are made available to a subsequent evaluation software.
  • Other node frequencies can be determined by means of equation (3).
  • the two random number sequences Zs or Z E at the transmitter or receiver are usually not synchronized in time without technical precautions.
  • the synchronous sampling can be realized for example by the control of an external radio clock on both terminals.
  • the precision of the synchronous clock should be at least an order of magnitude more accurate than the sampling frequency.
  • the exemplary embodiment Lb uses the timer function of a computer and can alternatively be used to implement the described steps 1 and 2. That is, the generation and processing of coupled random processes can be realized based on the temporal fluctuations of the timer function of a computer.
  • BIOS basic input output system
  • the basic input output system (BIOS) of a computer implements the interface between hardware and operating system (Windows, Dos).
  • BIOS data area 0040: 0000 - 0040: 00FF can be read directly via command lines of the operating system.
  • the BIOS stores the 32-bit value of the counter of the system clock.
  • This value is incremented several times per second in the BIOS each time a timer is called.
  • the speed of this accumulation process (accumulation rate) is subject to temporal fluctuations which generate a physical noise process.
  • This noise process takes place in the already described steps 1 and 2.
  • FIG. 5 shows a possible result fs ⁇ of the derivative of the signal Zs from a noise process according to FIG. 4.
  • Partnumber n 2 in this example is -3.
  • the GS modulation takes place, for example, by a change of the partial denominator n 2 , for example by a sign reversal of n 2 .
  • this frequency f R 1 mathematically represents a rate of change of the random numbers and by reversing the derivation according to L. Euler from equation (4) the new random number Z s (t n ) is calculated in the sender based on this ⁇ which is coupled to the transmitter at time t n in the noise process.
  • the manipulated random number Z's (t n ) were calculated on the transmitter side, before a new random number was generated at the transmitter or receiver via the noise process.
  • equation (3) is also reversible.
  • the new random number (Z's (t n ) 192) is thus converted into a noise value on the transmitter side and physically output via the sound card. Due to this coupling in of the noise level value belonging to Z ' s (t n ), the noise was modulated on the transmitter side.
  • the noise signal in the receiver is coupled out by sampling with f 0 at time t n and converted into random numbers by the same method as on the transmitter side.
  • the receiver analyzes all available frequencies for the frequency band from [n 0 , ⁇ 1-1 ] to [n 0 , ni + 1] previously determined by the transmitter and based on the newly determined random number Z ' E (t n ) within the frequency band by a GS analysis and determines the unique frequency f R for which the continued fraction code [n 0 , ni, -n 2 ] exists.
  • the receiver can now detect whether the n 2 value has been manipulated on the transmitter side.
  • the expected sign of n 2 can be determined mathematically solely from the combination of sampling period ⁇ ts, no and ni, since the frequency band is uniquely determined by no and ni by the expected global scaling resonance frequency f R of the random process got to.
  • ⁇ t s 4.92e-4 seconds
  • a frequency f R with the associated continued fraction code [-48, -27, -n 2 ] is expected on the receiver side, which for the non-modulated case in the transmitter on the receiver side also applies.
  • the receiver since an n 2 value of -3 was expected on the receiver side, the receiver has learned that the n 2 value of the resonant frequency f R has been modulated on the transmitter side. Thus, the receiver recognizes the manipulation on the transmitter side, if it is present. According to the invention, the manipulation from the transmitter side is coded with the bit value 1 and the non-manipulation with the bit value 0.
  • the technical transmission rate via the random process shown here is determined and limited by the processing speed of method steps 1-8 and the sampling frequency f 0 .
  • An increase in the transmission rate is possible, for example, through the use of other sampling frequencies fo, faster computers, improved GS modulation of the continued fraction n 2 (or higher elements of the chain fraction n 3 , n 4 , etc.) or the parallel use of multiple transmission channels.
  • transmitter S and receiver E takes place according to exemplary embodiment I, method steps 1-3.
  • FIG. 5 again shows a possible result f s ⁇ of the derivative of the signal Zs from a noise process according to FIG. 4.
  • the receiver is calculated within the same predetermined frequency band, a similar sequence of frequency values fE ⁇ , based on a local random process.
  • a key can be exchanged between a transmitter S and a receiver E, which key is known only to the transmitter and receiver and can therefore be used for symmetrical encryption.
  • the sensor recognizes catcher in the event that the transmitter is not synchronized with the desired recipient E but a third party E 'and exchanges the key with this.
  • the synchronicity is created by targeted manipulation of the selected chain fraction code [n 0 , n ⁇ n 2 , ...], which mathematically corresponds to a manipulation of entangled quantum states and therefore can not be bugged unnoticed.
  • the synchronicity is created by high precision when ausle ⁇ sen the local random processes. Only if the times of the read-out at the transmitter and at the receiver take place exactly at the same time, wherein the term "exact" is to be selected depending on the application and bandwidth, a synchronization arises as a result of the method steps from step 3.
  • the exact read-out thus represents a quantum-physical measurement process. For example, if 3 or more devices are used which scan the exact same time of the noise processes, then there are exactly two that achieve the synchronicity. These processes then remain in sync to generate the key until the abort is enforced by the user.
  • the third or further measuring process can not be synonymous with the two.
  • the receiver receives a non-synchronous sequence of numbers which can not be used as a key.
  • the sender and receiver are recognized and the synchronization process would have to be restarted.
  • the simplest variant is the modulo2 or XOR operation between key k and plaintext m.
  • the plaintext 31 of the letter "E" in ASCII is to be transmitted.
  • the encrypted text 32 is deciphered and is again read as plain text 41 of the letter in ASCII.
  • the receiver If the receiver was or was not in sync with the sender during the key transmission, it has another random number sequence k ', which it interprets as key k'.
  • the secret message C KENN U NG transmitted by the sender is then not the agreed plain text ⁇ KENN U N G, ie ITIKENNUNG) ⁇ > f (k ⁇ C «ENN UNG ). SO that the receiver notifies the sender to stop the synchronization via conventional forward paths. After this, the sender and the receiver again try to generate a key synchronously until the receiver receives the agreed clear text ⁇ K ENNUNG .
  • the key k is synchronous between transmitter and receiver and can no longer be intercepted by third parties.
  • the generation of the key k can take place immediately before or during the message transmission or at any other time known to both parties.
  • the next exact time of synchronous key generation is transmitted so i.a. only sender and receiver know the exact coordinates of the next key generation and the likelihood of external synchronization can be reduced. Otherwise, according to the o.g. The key exchange process is repeated until the sender and recipient exchange the known and agreed clear text ITICENCE and thus the key k is identical to both.
  • the above-mentioned method is also suitable for realizing the first and thus critical start of a key generation, even if unauthorized persons have experienced the exact time of the synchronization, which with exactly the same frequency [no, ni, n 2 ,...] would have to take exactly the same time points, which is unlikely. If such an unauthorized person receives the key, the receiver notices it according to the above-mentioned method of identification transmission and the key exchange starts again. The next exact times of the key generation are transmitted in deciphered form, so that listening is no longer possible.
  • a GSKT04 protocol is defined in which the sender continues and cyclically after an agreed cycle time a defined plaintext I ⁇ I KENNUNGI .
  • a defined plaintext I ⁇ I KENNUNGI For example, sends the name of the sender, who must ent ⁇ the recipient after decrypting with his key as plain text and gives the recipient the security to decrypt with the correct key k.
  • Another possibility is the direct comparison of selected bits between sender and receiver. If the error rate exceeds a previously defined value, the entire key is discarded.
  • the generation of secret, unique keys between transmitter and receiver is realized by effects based on the GS communication, and the message transmission of the payload is then carried out by conventional means, but encrypted with the secret key k, which, since i.a. is used only once, which makes decryption impossible or almost impossible.
  • the method can also be expanded and used, for example, for block ciphers.
  • the method thus has all the advantages of the most modern known quantum cryptographic methods and in comparison to these the additional advantage that it aus ⁇ without any cabling between the transmitter and receiver, ie without fiber connection aus ⁇ , since the key exchange via coupled random processes, such as the coupling of local thermal noise processes with the globalchirau ⁇ rule takes place.
  • any eavesdropping can be recognized by third parties, since the result the key changed and this can be detected at any time via the GSKT04 protocol.

Abstract

Procédé de cryptage de données selon lequel toutes les informations nécessaires sont transmises sur la base d'une modulation ou démodulation d'invariance logarithmique globale (global scaling) via des processus aléatoires. Une modulation, une injection, une extraction et une démodulation de fréquences de résonance de processus de bruit couplés sont effectuées.
PCT/CH2005/000427 2004-08-20 2005-07-20 Dispositif et procede de cryptage a l'aide de l'invariance logarithmique globale pour la repartition des cles WO2006017949A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP05759820A EP1779587A1 (fr) 2004-08-20 2005-07-20 Dispositif et procede de cryptage a l'aide de l'invariance logarithmique globale pour la repartition des cles
JP2007526158A JP2008511195A (ja) 2004-08-20 2005-07-20 キー分配のためにグローバルスケーリングを使用するエンコーディングのためのデバイスおよび方法

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

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DE102004040654.5 2004-08-20
DE200410040654 DE102004040654A1 (de) 2004-08-20 2004-08-20 Einrichtung und Verfahren zur Verschlüsselung

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WO2006017949A1 true WO2006017949A1 (fr) 2006-02-23

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JP (1) JP2008511195A (fr)
DE (1) DE102004040654A1 (fr)
WO (1) WO2006017949A1 (fr)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
DE102011114409A1 (de) * 2011-09-26 2013-03-28 Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh Vorrichtung und Verfahren zur Personalisierung von kontaktlosen Datenträgern

Citations (4)

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US4688257A (en) * 1984-07-17 1987-08-18 General Electric Company Secure wireless communication system utilizing locally synchronized noise signals
US20020176578A1 (en) * 2001-04-07 2002-11-28 Lapat Ronald H. Methods and systems for securing information communicated between communication devices
GB2388279A (en) * 2002-12-20 2003-11-05 Peter Courtney Secure transmission of audio signals
WO2005081433A1 (fr) * 2004-02-19 2005-09-01 Tecdata Ag Procede et dispositif de transmission de donnees sans fil

Patent Citations (4)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US4688257A (en) * 1984-07-17 1987-08-18 General Electric Company Secure wireless communication system utilizing locally synchronized noise signals
US20020176578A1 (en) * 2001-04-07 2002-11-28 Lapat Ronald H. Methods and systems for securing information communicated between communication devices
GB2388279A (en) * 2002-12-20 2003-11-05 Peter Courtney Secure transmission of audio signals
WO2005081433A1 (fr) * 2004-02-19 2005-09-01 Tecdata Ag Procede et dispositif de transmission de donnees sans fil

Non-Patent Citations (1)

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Title
MUELLER H: "EPOCHALE ENTDECKUNG: TELEKOMMUNIKATION OHNE ELEKTROSMOG!", RAUM & ZEIT, VERLAG, UNION VPM. WIESBADEN, DE, vol. 114, November 2001 (2001-11-01), pages 99 - 108, XP009045424, ISSN: 0722-7949 *

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JP2008511195A (ja) 2008-04-10
EP1779587A1 (fr) 2007-05-02

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