WO2006013699A1 - 無線通信装置、無線通信システム及び無線通信方法 - Google Patents
無線通信装置、無線通信システム及び無線通信方法 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2006013699A1 WO2006013699A1 PCT/JP2005/012679 JP2005012679W WO2006013699A1 WO 2006013699 A1 WO2006013699 A1 WO 2006013699A1 JP 2005012679 W JP2005012679 W JP 2005012679W WO 2006013699 A1 WO2006013699 A1 WO 2006013699A1
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Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B7/00—Radio transmission systems, i.e. using radiation field
- H04B7/02—Diversity systems; Multi-antenna system, i.e. transmission or reception using multiple antennas
- H04B7/04—Diversity systems; Multi-antenna system, i.e. transmission or reception using multiple antennas using two or more spaced independent antennas
- H04B7/0413—MIMO systems
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0875—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords based on channel impulse response [CIR]
Definitions
- Wireless communication apparatus Wireless communication system, and wireless communication method
- the present invention relates to a radio communication system using MIMO (Multiple Input Multiple Output) technology for performing radio communication by receiving radio signals transmitted from a plurality of antenna elements using a plurality of antenna elements, and to this system. It relates to a wireless communication device and a wireless communication method used.
- MIMO Multiple Input Multiple Output
- Non-Patent Document 1 shows that the propagation path characteristics in a mobile radio communication system vary irregularly over time, and the propagation path correlation before and after the slight fluctuation of the transmission / reception position is abrupt. Taking advantage of the decrease and generally the reversibility of the electric wave, the wireless communication devices on the transmitting side and the receiving side individually measure the propagation path characteristics. The information obtained from the measurement result is secretly shared to generate the same secret key, thereby realizing encrypted communication between these wireless communication devices.
- FIG. 1 shows an overview of the technique described in Non-Patent Document 1.
- the base station and the mobile station respectively transmit and receive pilot signals alternately in a time division duplex (TDD) system in a short period of time, and the propagation path characteristics, that is, the received pilot signals.
- Propagation path characteristic information is shared by measuring the amplitude and phase of each channel individually.
- the base station and the mobile station quantize the shared channel characteristics information to quantize the binary data of 0 and 1. Is generated. Then, the generated quantized data is selected by a predetermined method, combined, repeated, or error-corrected as necessary to generate a secret key.
- Non-Patent Document 1 Motoaki Horiike, Shuichi Kajioka, “Secret Key Sharing Method Based on Irregular Fluctuations in Land Mobile Communication Channels”, IEICE Technical Report, RCS2002-173
- Non-Patent Document 1 a secret key used for encrypted communication is generated based on propagation path characteristic information. Therefore, when a pilot signal is intercepted by a third party whose propagation path characteristics are close to that of a mobile station, the pilot signal power intercepted by the third party also generates a secret key by itself to generate a base station. There is a problem that it becomes possible to eavesdrop on the encrypted communication between the mobile station and the mobile station.
- FIG. 2 shows a state in which the encrypted communication between the base station and the mobile station in FIG. 1 is wiretapped by an eavesdropper.
- an eavesdropper is positioned where the propagation path characteristics approximate that of a mobile station, and this eavesdropper intercepts the pilot signal transmitted from the base station.
- the channel estimation value calculated from the pilot signal intercepted by this eavesdropper necessarily has a high correlation with the channel estimation value calculated by the mobile station. For this reason, this eavesdropper can also independently generate the noil signal power obtained by secretly intercepting the secret key used for encrypted communication between the base station and the mobile station. As a result, it is possible to eavesdrop on encryption communication between the base station and the mobile station.
- An object of the present invention is to provide a wireless communication apparatus, a wireless communication method, and the like that can prevent eavesdropping of encrypted communication even if a wireless signal is intercepted by a third party in a wireless communication system using MIMO technology. That is. Means for solving the problem
- a wireless communication apparatus includes a plurality of antennas that receive a radio signal of a MIMO channel, channel estimation means that calculates a channel estimation value of a reception signal by the antenna, and a calculated channel estimation value. Based on the channel correlation calculation means for calculating the channel correlation value between channels in the MIMO channel, and channel selection for selecting one of the channels in the MIMO channel based on the calculated channel correlation value! And a key generation means for generating a channel estimation value secret key of the selected channel.
- FIG. 1 is a diagram showing a generation mode of a secret key for encryption communication in a conventional wireless communication system
- FIG. 2 is a diagram showing a mode in which an eavesdropper generates a secret key for encryption communication in a conventional wireless communication system.
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a base station provided with a radio communication apparatus according to Embodiment 1.
- FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing a detailed configuration of a part of the radio communication apparatus according to Embodiment 1.
- FIG. 5 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a mobile station provided with the wireless communication apparatus according to Embodiment 1.
- FIG. 6 is a diagram for explaining the operation of the wireless communication system according to Embodiment 1.
- FIG. 7 A diagram showing how the secret key is updated in the wireless communication system according to the first embodiment.
- FIG. 8 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a base station including a radio communication apparatus according to Embodiment 2
- FIG. 9 is a diagram for explaining the operation of the wireless communication system according to the second embodiment.
- FIG. 10 is a diagram for explaining the outline of the operation of the wireless communication system according to the third embodiment.
- FIG. 11 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a base station provided with a radio communication apparatus according to Embodiment 3.
- FIG. 12 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a mobile station provided with a radio communication apparatus according to Embodiment 3. The figure explaining the operation
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a base station provided with radio communication apparatus 100 according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
- the wireless communication device 100 includes two antenna elements 101-1, 101-2, two pilot receivers 102-1, 102-2, a channel estimation unit 103, an interchannel correlation calculation unit 104, a channel selection unit 105, and a secret key. It has a generation unit 106, an inter-channel correlation monitoring unit 110, a pilot transmission control unit 121, and two pilot transmission units 122-1, 122-2.
- Each of the antenna elements 101-1, 101-2 captures a MIMO channel radio signal transmitted from two antenna elements of a mobile station described later.
- Each of the no-lot receivers 102-1, 102-2 has a band-pass filter, an analog Z digital converter, a low noise amplifier, and the like.
- the pilot signals are received from the antenna elements 101-1, 101-2.
- the signal is extracted, the received pilot signal processing is performed on the extracted pilot signal, and the processed pilot signal is input to channel estimation section 103.
- Channel estimation section 103 calculates channel estimation values for all four channels in the MIMO channel based on the pilot signals input from pilot receiving sections 102-1, 102-2, and calculates the calculated four The channel estimation values are input to the inter-channel correlation calculation unit 104 and the channel selection unit 105, respectively.
- Interchannel correlation calculation section 104 calculates channel correlation values between two channels in the MIMO channel based on the four channel estimation values input from channel estimation section 103, and calculates all the calculated six channels. The correlation value is input to channel selection section 105. The calculation of the channel correlation value between two channels in the MIMO channel will be described in detail later. [0017] Channel selection section 105 selects the smallest channel correlation value among the six channel correlation values input from inter-channel correlation calculation section 104, and 2 corresponding to the selected channel correlation value. In addition to notifying the inter-channel correlation monitoring unit 110 of the two channels, the channel estimation values of the two channels are input to the secret key generation unit 106.
- Secret key generating section 106 generates quantized data by quantizing the two channel estimation values input from channel selecting section 105, and selects or combines the generated quantized data by a predetermined method.
- a secret key is generated by repeating, repeating, or performing error correction as necessary, and the generated secret key is input to a control unit or the like, not shown.
- the inter-channel correlation monitoring unit 110 for the two channels notified from the channel selection unit 105, the control unit is not shown in the figure, the channel correlation value between the two channels (pilot)
- the channel estimation value (measured based on the data signal received until the signal is received again) is calculated and monitored.
- inter-channel correlation monitoring section 110 inputs a pilot control signal that instructs pilot transmission control section 121 to transmit a pilot signal.
- pilot transmission control unit 121 When a pilot control signal is input from the inter-channel correlation monitoring unit 110, the pilot transmission control unit 121 immediately generates a pilot signal, and the generated pilot signal is transmitted to the pilot transmission unit 122-1, Enter each of 122-2.
- Each of the pilot transmitters 122-1, 122-2 has a bandpass filter, a digital / analog converter, a low noise amplifier, and the like, and the pilot signal input from the pilot transmission controller 121 is provided. Is subjected to predetermined transmission signal processing. The processed pilot signal is wirelessly transmitted to the mobile station via the antenna elements 101-1 and 101-2 via the MIMO channel.
- FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing a more detailed configuration of the inter-channel correlation monitoring unit 110.
- the inter-channel correlation monitoring unit 110 includes a monitoring channel extraction unit 111, a monitoring channel correlation calculation unit 112, and a monitoring channel correlation threshold determination unit 113.
- the monitoring channel extraction unit 111 does not show channel estimation values of all four channels in the MIMO channel at the time of data transmission. Only the channel estimation values of the two channels notified from the selection unit 105 are continuously input to the monitoring channel correlation calculation unit 112. In wireless communication apparatus 100, channel estimation is continuously performed for all channels in the MIMO channel in order to separate the data signal from the received signal power during data transmission after the start of encrypted communication.
- the monitoring channel correlation calculation unit 112 calculates a channel correlation value from the two channel estimation values input from the monitoring channel extraction unit 111 by a method described later, and uses the calculated channel correlation value as a monitoring channel correlation threshold value. Input to the determination unit 113.
- the inter-monitor channel correlation threshold value determination unit 113 monitors the channel correlation value input from the inter-monitor channel correlation calculation unit 112. When the channel correlation value becomes equal to or greater than a predetermined threshold value, the pilot signal is immediately detected. A pilot control signal for instructing to generate and transmit to the mobile station is input to pilot transmission control section 121.
- FIG. 5 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a mobile station provided with radio communication apparatus 300 according to the present embodiment.
- the wireless communication apparatus 300 includes two antenna elements 301-1, 301-2, two pilot receiving units 302-1, 302-2, a channel estimation unit 303, an inter-channel correlation calculation unit 304, a channel selection unit 305, and a secret. It has a key generation unit 306, a pilot transmission control unit 321, and two pilot transmission units 322-1 and 322-2.
- the antenna elements 301-1 and 301-2 respectively capture MIMO channel radio signals transmitted from the two antenna elements 101-1 and 101-2 of the base station.
- Each of the noil reception units 302-1, 302-2 has a bandpass filter, an analog Z digital converter, a low noise amplifier, and the like, and pilot signals are received from the signals received by the antenna elements 301-1, 301-2.
- the signal is extracted, and the received signal processing is performed on the extracted pilot signal.
- the processed pilot signal is powered by a channel estimation unit 303 and a pilot transmission control unit 321.
- Channel estimation section 303 calculates channel estimation values for all four channels in the MIMO channel based on the pilot signals input from pilot reception sections 302-1, 302-2, and calculates the calculated four The channel estimation values are input to the inter-channel correlation calculation unit 304 and the channel selection unit 305, respectively.
- the inter-channel correlation calculation unit 304 has four channels input from the channel estimation unit 303.
- the channel correlation value between the two channels is calculated based on the channel estimation value, and all the calculated six channel correlation values are input to the channel selection unit 305.
- Channel selection section 305 selects the smallest channel correlation value from among the six channel correlation values input from inter-channel correlation calculation section 304, and corresponds to the selected channel correlation value 2
- the channel estimation values of one channel are input to the secret key generation unit 306.
- Secret key generation section 306 quantizes the two channel estimation values input from channel selection section 305 to generate quantized data, and selects or combines the generated quantized data by a predetermined method.
- a secret key is generated by repeating, repeating, and correcting errors as necessary. The generated secret key is not shown in FIG.
- pilot transmission control section 321 When a pilot signal is input from pilot receiving section 302, pilot transmission control section 321 immediately generates a pilot signal and inputs the generated pilot signal to pilot transmitting sections 322 1 and 322-2, respectively. .
- the pilot transmission units 322-1 and 322-2 each have a bandpass filter, a digital / analog converter, a low noise amplifier, and the like, and the pilot signals input from the pilot transmission control unit 321. Is subjected to predetermined transmission signal processing.
- the processed pilot signal is wirelessly transmitted to the base station via the antenna elements 301-1 and 301-2 via the MIMO channel.
- FIG. 6 shows a mode in which a base station and a mobile station are performing cipher communication in a wireless communication system using MIMO technology, and a third party intercepts a wireless signal in the vicinity thereof.
- a channel formed between antenna element 101-1 of the base station and antenna element 30 1 1 of the mobile station is denoted as C.
- a channel formed between the element 101-2 and the antenna element 301-1 of the mobile station is denoted as C. Also, the antenna element 101-1 of the base station and the antenna of the mobile station
- the channel formed between the tenor elements 301-2 is denoted as C.
- the channel formed between the antenna element 101-2 to be operated and the antenna element 301-2 of the mobile station is denoted as C. [0037]
- the mobile station since the mobile station returns the pilot signal as soon as it receives the pilot signal of the base station power, the channel estimation of channel C calculated by the base station and the mobile station respectively.
- the values can be considered almost identical. Similarly, the channel estimation values of channels C, C, and C calculated by the base station and the mobile station can be regarded as substantially the same. Therefore
- the channel estimation values of channel C at the base station and mobile station are both h and
- the channel estimate for channel C is denoted as h.
- the inter-channel correlation calculation unit 104 of the base station or the inter-channel correlation calculation unit 304 of the mobile station combines two of the four channel estimation values h 1, h 2, h and h in a brute force manner.
- Channel correlation values related to all six combinations are calculated, and all the calculated six channel correlation values are input to the channel selection unit 105 or the channel selection unit 305.
- Equation 2 the channel correlation value p for any combination of two channel estimates h, h (h ⁇ h) is It is expressed by “Expression 2”.
- “m” in the channel matrix H represents the total number of antenna elements 101 in the base station
- the channel selection unit 105 or the channel selection unit 305 has the six channels inputted.
- the smallest channel correlation value is selected from among the channel correlation values, and the channel estimation values of the two channels corresponding to the selected channel correlation values are input to the secret key generation unit 106 or the secret key generation unit 306.
- the combination of channel estimate h and channel estimate h is the combination of channel estimate h and channel estimate h
- the channel selector 105 Since the channel correlation value / 0 is minimum, the channel selector 105 or
- the channel selection unit 305 receives the channel estimation value h and the channel estimation value h from the secret key generation unit 10.
- channel selection section 105 or channel selection section 305 has the same meaning as selecting a channel, selecting a channel estimation value, and selecting antenna elements 101 and 301. is there.
- Secret key generation section 106 or secret key generation section 306 receives input channel estimation value h and
- a secret key with a predetermined data length is generated by selecting, combining, and repeating data in a predetermined manner, or by correcting errors as necessary.
- the channel estimate of channel C calculated by a third party is the channel estimate of a and channel C.
- a third party In order to select two channel estimates h and h with the smallest channel correlation value p, that is, the difference in channel fluctuation is the largest, a third party temporarily uses the same method as the base station or mobile station.
- this third party is likely to select a channel that is completely different from the channel selected by the base station or mobile station. Therefore, in the wireless communication system according to the present embodiment, even if a third party intercepts the pilot signal of the MIMO channel from the base station and the mobile station located in a place where the propagation path characteristics approximate to that of the mobile station. It is extremely difficult to generate the same secret key as that generated by this base station or mobile station. It is difficult to eavesdrop on encryption communication.
- FIG. 7 shows, in chronological order, the manner in which the secret key used in the encrypted communication is updated between the base station and the mobile station.
- the base station and the mobile station share the secret key secretly by sending and receiving pilot signals
- encrypted communication is started immediately.
- the inter-channel correlation monitoring unit 110 of the base station continuously monitors the channel correlation value between the two channels selected at the time of generating the secret key, and the monitored channel correlation value.
- a pilot control signal that instructs the mobile station to transmit a pilot signal is input to the pilot transmission control unit 121.
- the base station and the mobile station retransmit / receive pilot signals to each other to recalculate all four channel estimation values in the MIMO channel, and the channel correlation value p is minimized based on the recalculated channel estimation values.
- the secret key is generated or updated again.
- channel selection section 105 of the base station or channel selection section 305 of the mobile station selects two channels in the MIMO channel, and channel estimation of the selected channel is performed. Since the secret key generator 106 or secret key generator 306 generates a secret key, it is unknown to the third party which channel is selected even if the third party intercepts the radio signal. As a result, it is possible to prevent eavesdropping on encryption communication by a third party.
- the channel correlation value between the two channels selected when the secret key is generated by the inter-channel correlation monitoring unit 110 is continuously monitored, and the channel correlation being monitored is monitored. Since the secret key is updated when the value exceeds the predetermined threshold, wiretapping by a third party can be prevented more reliably.
- channel selection section 105 or channel selection section 305 selects two channels with the smallest channel correlation value, a third party who intercepts the radio signal encrypts it. It is possible to further reduce the probability of generating a private key used for communication.
- the base station has the inter-channel correlation monitoring unit 110 and determines the necessity of updating the secret key.
- the present invention is limited to this case.
- the mobile station may be provided with the wireless communication apparatus 100 shown in FIG. 3, while the base station may be provided with the wireless communication apparatus 300 shown in FIG.
- channel selection section 105 of the base station or channel selection section 305 of the mobile station selects x two channel estimation values h and h that have the lowest channel correlation value p.
- the present invention is not limited to this case.
- the channel selection unit 105 or the channel selection unit 305 selects the signal to noise ratio (SNR) in descending order of the channel power. You can do it! ,.
- SNR signal to noise ratio
- channel selection section 105 or channel selection section 305 selects two channels in the MIMO channel is not limited to this case.
- the number of channels to be selected may be increased or decreased.
- each of the base station and the mobile station periodically updates the secret key to maintain the confidentiality of the secret key.
- the base station and the mobile station periodically updates the secret key to maintain the confidentiality of the secret key.
- FIG. 8 is a block diagram showing a configuration of a base station having radio communication apparatus 600 according to the present embodiment.
- Radio communication apparatus 600 is the same as radio communication apparatus 100 in the first embodiment, but further includes timer unit 631.
- Timer unit 631 inputs a pilot control signal instructing to generate a pilot signal and transmit it to the mobile station to pilot transmission control unit 121 at a predetermined period.
- FIG. 9 shows channel estimation values h selected by channel selection section 105 or channel selection section 305 in time series. As shown in Fig. 9, at the beginning of encrypted communication between the base station and mobile station, channel estimates h and h are selected, and channel estimates h and h
- a secret key is also generated. Subsequently, after At elapses, a pilot control signal is input from the timer unit 631 to the pilot transmission control unit 121, and the channel estimation values h and h are selected by transmitting and receiving the pilot signal between the base station and the mobile station. The secret key is updated. That
- a pilot control signal is input from the timer unit 631 to the pilot transmission control unit 121, and the base station and the mobile station transmit and receive the pilot signal to update the secret key. It is.
- the pilot control signal is input from the timer unit 631 to the pilot transmission control unit 121 with the predetermined period At, so that the base station and the mobile station have a secret. Since the key is updated, even if the same secret key is accidentally generated by a third party during the use of the secret key, the confidentiality of the encryption communication can be recovered.
- the power described in the case where a pilot control signal is input to pilot transmission control unit 121 in parallel from timer unit 631 and inter-channel correlation monitoring unit 110 is the present invention.
- the inter-channel correlation monitoring unit 110 is removed, and the pilot control signal is input to the pilot transmission control unit 121 only from the timer unit 631.
- a base station having four antenna elements and a mobile station having three antenna elements can switch the antenna elements of the antennas, and increase the diversity of channel estimation values. After that, a secret key is generated and encrypted communication is performed.
- a secret key is generated and encrypted communication is performed.
- FIG. 10 shows an outline of the operation of the radio communication system according to the present embodiment.
- the four antenna elements 101-1 to 101-4 of the base station are a first set of antenna elements 101 1, 101-2 and a second set of antenna elements 101-3, 101-4. It is divided into and.
- the three antenna elements 301-1 to 301-3 of the mobile station are also the first thread of the antenna elements 301-1, 301-2 and the second thread of the antenna elements 301-2, 301-3. And is divided into
- each time the base station and the mobile station each need to update the secret key, the first set of antenna elements and the second set of antenna elements Are used alternately.
- FIG. 11 is a block diagram showing a configuration of radio communication apparatus 900 provided in the base station in FIG.
- the wireless communication device 900 includes four antenna elements 101-1 to 101-4, four pilot receiving units 102-1 to 102-4, a channel estimating unit 103, a secret key generating unit 106, and a pilot transmission control.
- the antenna control unit 951 generates an antenna switching request signal when a control unit equal force (not shown) receives a pilot control signal, and wirelessly transmits the generated antenna switching request signal to the mobile station via the antenna element 101. Send. Subsequently, the antenna control unit 951 receives a confirmation signal that is a response of the mobile station to the antenna switching request signal via the antenna element 101, and then transmits and receives a pilot signal to the switching units 952 and 953. An antenna control signal instructing to switch the set of antenna elements 101 is input.
- the switching units 952 and 953 switch the currently used antenna element group to the other group, respectively.
- FIG. 12 is a block diagram showing a configuration of radio communication apparatus 1000 included in the mobile station in FIG.
- components that perform the same functions as the components in radio communication apparatus 300 according to Embodiment 1 are given the same reference numerals as those in radio communication apparatus 300. The description is omitted.
- the wireless communication apparatus 1000 includes three antenna elements 301-1 to 301-3, three pilot receivers 302-1 to 302-3, a channel estimator 303, a secret key generator 306, and a pilot transmission control.
- Unit 321 three pilot transmission units 322-1 to 322-3, antenna control unit 1051, and two switching units 1052 and 1053.
- the antenna control unit 1051 is an antenna that transmits and receives a noise signal to the switching units 1052 and 1053 when receiving the antenna switching request signal wirelessly transmitted from the wireless communication device 900 via the antenna element 301.
- An antenna control signal is input to instruct to switch the set of elements 301. Then, the antenna control unit 1051 wirelessly transmits a confirmation signal indicating that the switching of the pair of antenna elements 301 in the switching units 1052 and 1053 is completed to the wireless communication apparatus 900 via the antenna element 301.
- FIG. 13 shows, in a time series, modes in which the base station and the mobile station switch the antenna element pair used for encryption / decommissioning in the wireless communication system according to the present embodiment.
- an antenna switching request is generated by interrupting encryption communication. Then, the base station transmits this antenna switching request signal to the mobile station. Upon receiving the antenna switching request signal, the mobile station switches the currently used antenna element group to another group, and wirelessly transmits a confirmation signal notifying that the switching has been completed to the base station.
- the antenna element that receives the pilot signal is switched when the secret key is updated, the channel estimation value calculated before and after the update changes completely. Even if a private key used by encrypted communication by a third party can be generated accidentally, the confidentiality of the encrypted communication can be restored by updating the private key.
- the number of antenna elements that are subject to channel estimation is constant even if each of the base station and the mobile station has three or more antenna elements.
- the amount of computation in channel estimation and the overhead of pilot signals can be reduced.
- the switching units 952, 953, 1052, and 1053 may select antenna elements in accordance with instructions from the antenna control units 951 and 1051 or randomly. Furthermore, for example, the switching units 952, 953, 1052, and 1053 may each appropriately adjust the number of antenna elements to be selected. In this way, the variance of channel estimation values can be increased and the diversity of secret keys can be improved.
- Each functional block used in the description of each of the above embodiments is typically realized as an LSI which is an integrated circuit. These may be individually made into one chip, or may be made into one chip so as to include a part or all of them. Here, it is sometimes called IC, system LSI, super LSI, or ultra LSI, depending on the difference in power integration.
- circuit integration is not limited to LSI's, and implementation using dedicated circuitry or general purpose processors is also possible.
- An FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
- reconfigurable 'processor that can reconfigure the connection and settings of circuit cells inside the LSI may be used.
- a first aspect of the present invention is based on a plurality of antennas that receive a radio signal of a MIMO channel, channel estimation means that calculates a channel estimation value of a reception signal by the antenna, and the calculated channel estimation value
- a channel correlation calculation means for calculating channel correlation values between channels in the MIMO channel, and a channel selection means for selecting V / MI channels in the MIMO channel based on the calculated channel correlation values.
- a key generation means for generating a secret key from the channel estimation value of the selected channel.
- any channel in the MIMO channel is selected, and the secret key used for encryption communication is generated from the channel estimation value of the selected channel. Even if a radio signal is intercepted, since it is unknown to a third party whether to select a channel estimation value of a misaligned channel, it is possible to prevent the third party from eavesdropping on encryption communication.
- the wireless communication apparatus further includes an inter-channel correlation monitoring unit for selecting one of the channels again.
- the channel correlation value between the selected channels is monitored, and when the channel correlation value being monitored is equal to or greater than the predetermined threshold value, the MIMO channel Since one of the channels is selected again and the secret key is updated, wiretapping by a third party can be prevented more reliably.
- any channel in the MIMO channel is periodically transmitted to the channel selection unit based on the channel correlation value calculated by the inter-channel correlation calculation unit.
- the wireless communication apparatus further comprises timer means for selecting again.
- the channel selection unit selects any channel in the MIMO channel having the lowest channel correlation value calculated by the inter-channel correlation calculation unit.
- a wireless communication device
- a fifth aspect of the present invention is the wireless communication apparatus according to the present invention, wherein the channel selecting means selects a channel different from any one of the previously selected MIMO channels.
- a sixth aspect of the present invention is a wireless communication system including a plurality of wireless communication apparatuses according to the present invention.
- any channel in the MIMO channel is selected, and the secret key used for encryption communication is generated from the channel estimation value of the selected channel. Even if a radio signal is intercepted, since it is unknown to a third party whether to select a channel estimation value of a misaligned channel, it is possible to prevent the third party from eavesdropping on encryption communication.
- a reception step of receiving a radio signal of a MIMO channel with a plurality of antennas, a channel estimation step of calculating a channel estimation value of a reception signal by the antenna, and a calculated channel estimation A channel correlation calculation step for calculating a channel correlation value between channels in the MIMO channel based on the value, and a channel selection step for selecting any channel in the MIMO channel based on the calculated channel correlation value; And a key generation step of generating a secret key from the channel estimation value of the selected channel.
- any channel in the MIMO channel is selected, and the secret key used for the encryption communication is generated from the channel estimation value of the selected channel. Even if a radio signal is intercepted, since it is unknown to a third party whether to select a channel estimation value of a misaligned channel, it is possible to prevent the third party from eavesdropping on encryption communication.
- the wireless communication apparatus and wireless communication method according to the present invention have the effect of preventing eavesdropping on encrypted communication even if a wireless signal is intercepted by a third party, and wireless using MIMO technology. It is useful as a communication system.
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US11/573,057 US20080069251A1 (en) | 2004-08-04 | 2005-07-08 | Radio Communication Device, Radio Communication System, and Radio Communication Method |
EP05758317A EP1775875A1 (en) | 2004-08-04 | 2005-07-08 | Radio communication device, radio communication system, and radio communication method |
BRPI0513074-3A BRPI0513074A (pt) | 2004-08-04 | 2005-07-08 | dispositivo de comunicação via rádio, sistema de comunicação via rádio e método de comunicação via rádio |
JP2006531343A JPWO2006013699A1 (ja) | 2004-08-04 | 2005-07-08 | 無線通信装置、無線通信システム及び無線通信方法 |
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Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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JP2008529413A (ja) * | 2005-01-27 | 2008-07-31 | インターデイジタル テクノロジー コーポレーション | 他と共有されないジョイント乱数性(jrnso)を用いて暗号鍵を導出する方法とシステム |
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WO2021013317A1 (en) * | 2019-07-19 | 2021-01-28 | Nokia Technologies Oy | Apparatus, method and computer program for wireless key generation |
CN112188491A (zh) * | 2020-09-24 | 2021-01-05 | 江苏恒宝智能系统技术有限公司 | 一种基于mimo的数据安全传输基站、移动终端和方法 |
WO2023056165A1 (en) * | 2021-10-01 | 2023-04-06 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Channel for eavesdropping-mitigation and secret key generation |
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WO2006130725A2 (en) * | 2005-05-31 | 2006-12-07 | Interdigital Technology Corporation | Authentication and encryption methods using shared secret randomness in a joint channel |
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- 2005-07-08 CN CNA2005800266095A patent/CN1993924A/zh active Pending
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- 2005-07-08 RU RU2007104173/09A patent/RU2007104173A/ru not_active Application Discontinuation
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Cited By (9)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP2008529413A (ja) * | 2005-01-27 | 2008-07-31 | インターデイジタル テクノロジー コーポレーション | 他と共有されないジョイント乱数性(jrnso)を用いて暗号鍵を導出する方法とシステム |
JP4734344B2 (ja) * | 2005-01-27 | 2011-07-27 | インターデイジタル テクノロジー コーポレーション | 他と共有されないジョイント乱数性(jrnso)を用いて暗号鍵を導出する方法とシステム |
US8238551B2 (en) | 2005-01-27 | 2012-08-07 | Interdigital Technology Corporation | Generation of perfectly secret keys in wireless communication networks |
US9130693B2 (en) | 2005-01-27 | 2015-09-08 | Interdigital Technology Corporation | Generation of perfectly secret keys in wireless communication networks |
US8280046B2 (en) | 2005-09-12 | 2012-10-02 | Interdigital Technology Corporation | Method and system for deriving an encryption key using joint randomness not shared by others |
EP3101011A1 (fr) | 2008-05-26 | 2016-12-07 | Arkema France | Procédé de préparation de lactames comprenant une étape de photonitrosation suivie d'une étape de transposition de beckmann |
US8098750B2 (en) | 2008-07-10 | 2012-01-17 | Infineon Technologies Ag | Method and device for transmitting a plurality of data symbols |
JP2012209652A (ja) * | 2011-03-29 | 2012-10-25 | Advanced Telecommunication Research Institute International | 無線通信システム、通信装置、情報機器、及び無線通信方法 |
JP2015023578A (ja) * | 2013-07-17 | 2015-02-02 | 韓國電子通信研究院Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute | 無線通信システムにおける保安データ伝送装置および方法 |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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US20080069251A1 (en) | 2008-03-20 |
EP1775875A1 (en) | 2007-04-18 |
CN1993924A (zh) | 2007-07-04 |
RU2007104173A (ru) | 2008-08-10 |
BRPI0513074A (pt) | 2008-04-22 |
JPWO2006013699A1 (ja) | 2008-05-01 |
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