WO2005116834A1 - Authentisierung von steuergeräten in einem fahrzeug - Google Patents
Authentisierung von steuergeräten in einem fahrzeug Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2005116834A1 WO2005116834A1 PCT/EP2004/004666 EP2004004666W WO2005116834A1 WO 2005116834 A1 WO2005116834 A1 WO 2005116834A1 EP 2004004666 W EP2004004666 W EP 2004004666W WO 2005116834 A1 WO2005116834 A1 WO 2005116834A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- authentication
- authentication request
- vehicle
- signature
- control device
- Prior art date
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 44
- 230000015654 memory Effects 0.000 claims description 4
- 238000004590 computer program Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 230000000295 complement effect Effects 0.000 claims description 2
- 230000004913 activation Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000013475 authorization Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000001419 dependent effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/305—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals by remotely controlling device operation
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
- G06F21/575—Secure boot
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2103—Challenge-response
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2129—Authenticate client device independently of the user
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/84—Vehicles
Definitions
- the invention relates in particular to a method for authenticating control devices in a bus system of a motor vehicle according to the preamble of claim 1.
- the authorization can be checked using cryptographic measures.
- the object of the present invention is in particular to specify a method which effectively prevents manipulation of a sequence control stored in a control unit at low costs.
- a first control device of a plurality of control devices of the motor vehicle transmits an authentication request to an authentication device via the bus system.
- the authentication request is preferably a random number or the like generated by the control device, which is only generated once.
- the authentication device is preferably a central control device which has access to a symmetrical, cryptographic key and can carry out a symmetrical cryptographic method.
- a symmetrical cryptographic method requires the resources, in particular the processor, the control unit or the authentication device, significantly less than an asymmetrical method, so that control units can be designed significantly more cost-effectively when using the invention.
- the authentication device signs the authentication request using a first symmetrical key and transmits the signed authentication request or only the signature to the first control device.
- the signature or the generation of the signature takes place by applying a hash algorithm to the authentication request or authentication data.
- the hash algorithm delivers a hash value that is characteristic of the specific authentication data.
- the hash value is encrypted with the first symmetrical key and the encrypted hash value is added to the authentication request or to the authentication data and transmitted together with the authentication request to the first control device.
- only the signature or the encrypted hash value can be transmitted to the first control device, because the authentication request was generated there and is therefore already present.
- the first control device compares the transmitted signature with a signature determined by the first control device using the symmetrical key for the authentication request.
- the signature can be determined by the first control device in that the same hash algorithm that has been applied by the authentication device to the authentication request to determine the signature is also applied by the first control device to the authentication request. Again there is a hash value. This hash value or the one based on of the hash value using the symmetrical key is compared with the transmitted signature or the hash value obtained from the transmitted signature again using the symmetrical key.
- the first control device and the authentication device are considered to be mutually authenticated, i.e. for the control device, the authentication device is considered to be genuine or authorized and vice versa. Accordingly, the first control device is preferably made ready for operation in the event of a positive comparison or agreement. As an alternative or in addition, the authentication device could be granted write and / or read access to an electronic memory of the first control device.
- one or more further control devices of the bus system carry out an authentication with the authentication device in the manner described. These measures can therefore be used to check whether there are unauthorized control units or an unauthorized authentication device in the bus system.
- the authentication of the control devices is compared to. the authentication device in order. This reduces the hardware resources required.
- the motor vehicle can only be put into operation when largely all control units of the bus system have carried out the authentication method with a positive comparison result. This ensures the operational safety of the bus system and the compatibility of the bus users. This measure also increases the theft protection of the motor vehicle equipped with the bus system of the invention if an immobilizer is integrated in the bus system or in the control units.
- the authentication method is carried out in each case before the driver is started. Stuff is made, preferably after opening the vehicle. This measure periodically checks operational safety, compatibility, etc.
- the authentication method according to the invention is largely carried out only for those control devices which must be available when the vehicle is started in order to have the vehicle ready for operation with a short lead time, if necessary.
- the authentication method according to the invention can then be carried out for the other control units after the vehicle has started, without impeding the startup of the motor vehicle.
- the symmetrical key varies from vehicle to vehicle and a control device of a first vehicle when performing the authentication method according to the invention for a first symmetrical key and the same control device of a second vehicle when performing the method on one accesses second symmetric key.
- the symmetrical key is preferably “housed” in the bus system in such a way that it can only be read by the authentication device and by the control units involved in the method, ie it remains secret and cannot be changed without authorization.
- the symmetrical key is symmetrical Keys are stored in the non-externally readable or changeable boot area of each control unit and in the corresponding area of the authentication device. Because the symmetrical key varies from vehicle to vehicle, spying out the symmetrical key of a specific vehicle is comparatively harmless. This would, of course, be completely different when spying out a symmetrical key from a vehicle that "fits" all vehicles of the same type.
- the method according to the invention runs in the opposite direction, i.e. that the authentication device transmits an authentication request to the first control device, the first control device signs the authentication request with the first symmetrical key and transmits the signed authentication request to the authentication device.
- the comparison is shifted from the control device to the authentication device. This goes hand in hand with a resource relief for each control device and a resource load with the authentication device.
- the multiple resource relief compared to a single resource load saves hardware costs.
- the authentication device carries out a further authentication check using an asymmetrical encryption method with a device external to the vehicle, in particular a public key method.
- the authentication device transmits an authentication request or authentication data to the device external to the vehicle.
- the device external to the vehicle applies a hash algorithm to the authentication request or the authentication data, as a result of which a hash value is obtained.
- the hash value is encrypted with a secret personal key and the encrypted hash value is added to the authentication request or to the authentication data, ie the authentication request is signed, and the signed authentication request or only the signature, ie the one with the secret Key encrypted hash value is transmitted to the authentication device.
- the AU- The authentication device also applies the hash algorithm to the authentication request, the result being a second hash value.
- the authentication device decrypts the encrypted hash value obtained from the device external to the vehicle with the public key which is complementary to the personal, secret key and compares the first with the second hash value. If the comparison is positive, ie if both hash values match, then the device external to the vehicle has the authentication device successfully authenticated in the vehicle. On this basis, the device external to the vehicle, under the control of the authentication device, can be granted write and / or read access to one or more memories of one or more control units.
- the vehicle-external device is enabled to provide the memory of one or more control units with a new sequence control or software and / or with an activation code.
- the new sequence control can in particular be a sequence control that the previous sequencer has been updated to remove software problems and / or provide additional functionality to the controller.
- the new sequence control can be an addition to the sequence control already stored in the control unit, which in particular provides additional functions of the control unit.
- the activation code can, in particular, be data which activates a sequence control or software kept ready to run in the control unit or elsewhere in the vehicle, in particular for a limited time. I.e. the sequence control or software already stored in the vehicle can only be executed after the activation code has been provided in the vehicle.
- the invention enables a bus system of a motor vehicle with control devices, in which an authentication device is provided in the bus system and an inventive method is carried out in the bus system. Furthermore, the invention enables a computer program product for the authentication of control devices in a bus system of a motor vehicle, which allows a method to run according to one or more of the preceding method claims.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Lock And Its Accessories (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (5)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP2007509884A JP4469892B2 (ja) | 2004-04-29 | 2004-04-29 | 車両内の制御機器の認証 |
CN200480042875.2A CN100492248C (zh) | 2004-04-29 | 2004-04-29 | 验证汽车中的控制设备 |
PCT/EP2004/004666 WO2005116834A1 (de) | 2004-04-29 | 2004-04-29 | Authentisierung von steuergeräten in einem fahrzeug |
EP04730262A EP1741019A1 (de) | 2004-04-29 | 2004-04-29 | Authentisierung von steuergeräten in einem fahrzeug |
US11/588,235 US20070118752A1 (en) | 2004-04-29 | 2006-10-27 | Authentication of control units in a vehicle |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP2004/004666 WO2005116834A1 (de) | 2004-04-29 | 2004-04-29 | Authentisierung von steuergeräten in einem fahrzeug |
Related Child Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US11/588,235 Continuation US20070118752A1 (en) | 2004-04-29 | 2006-10-27 | Authentication of control units in a vehicle |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2005116834A1 true WO2005116834A1 (de) | 2005-12-08 |
Family
ID=34957499
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP2004/004666 WO2005116834A1 (de) | 2004-04-29 | 2004-04-29 | Authentisierung von steuergeräten in einem fahrzeug |
Country Status (5)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20070118752A1 (de) |
EP (1) | EP1741019A1 (de) |
JP (1) | JP4469892B2 (de) |
CN (1) | CN100492248C (de) |
WO (1) | WO2005116834A1 (de) |
Cited By (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
FR2898564A1 (fr) * | 2006-03-14 | 2007-09-21 | Peugeot Citroen Automobiles Sa | Procede de configuration d'une unite de traitement d'informations configurable embarquee dans un vehicule automobile. |
WO2012126547A1 (de) | 2011-03-22 | 2012-09-27 | Audi Ag | Kraftwagen-steuergerät mit kryptographischer einrichtung |
DE102015225787A1 (de) | 2015-12-17 | 2017-06-22 | Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Empfängerauthentifikation in einem Fahrzeugnetzwerk |
WO2019016294A1 (de) * | 2017-07-19 | 2019-01-24 | Audi Ag | Infotainmentsystem für ein kraftfahrzeug |
Families Citing this family (18)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE102007052993A1 (de) * | 2007-11-05 | 2009-05-07 | Volkswagen Ag | Kommunikationsknoten und Verfahren zur Kommunikation zwischen mindestens zwei Kommunikationsknoten in einem Car2X-Kommunikationsnetzwerk |
CN101559745B (zh) * | 2009-05-15 | 2011-03-02 | 华南理工大学 | 一种防盗抢的车辆控制系统及其实现方法 |
US11042816B2 (en) * | 2009-10-30 | 2021-06-22 | Getaround, Inc. | Vehicle access control services and platform |
JP5310761B2 (ja) | 2011-03-04 | 2013-10-09 | トヨタ自動車株式会社 | 車両ネットワークシステム |
US8756430B2 (en) * | 2011-04-14 | 2014-06-17 | GM Global Technology Operations LLC | Exploiting application characteristics for multiple-authenticator broadcast authentication schemes |
JP5900007B2 (ja) * | 2012-02-20 | 2016-04-06 | 株式会社デンソー | 車両用データ通信認証システム及び車両用ゲートウェイ装置 |
DE102013101508A1 (de) | 2012-02-20 | 2013-08-22 | Denso Corporation | Datenkommunikationsauthentifizierungssystem für ein Fahrzeug, Netzkopplungsvorrichtung für ein Fahrzeug, Datenkommunikationssystem für ein Fahrzeug und Datenkommunikationsvorrichtung für ein Fahrzeug |
ES2805290T3 (es) | 2012-03-29 | 2021-02-11 | Arilou Information Security Tech Ltd | Dispositivo para proteger un sistema electrónico de un vehículo |
US8918251B2 (en) * | 2013-02-14 | 2014-12-23 | Stephan A Tarnutzer | CAN based vehicle immobilizer |
US9061645B2 (en) * | 2013-02-15 | 2015-06-23 | Clever Devices, Ltd | Methods and apparatus for transmission control of a transit vehicle |
US9450757B2 (en) * | 2014-05-07 | 2016-09-20 | Oxcept Limited | Method and device for communication security |
DE102016212230A1 (de) * | 2016-07-05 | 2018-01-11 | Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft | Verfahren zur sicheren Authentifizierung von Steuervorrichtungen in einem Kraftfahrzeug |
US10664413B2 (en) * | 2017-01-27 | 2020-05-26 | Lear Corporation | Hardware security for an electronic control unit |
JP6884600B2 (ja) * | 2017-03-02 | 2021-06-09 | 任天堂株式会社 | 無線通信システム、通信方法、情報処理装置、および、情報処理プログラム |
US10218499B1 (en) | 2017-10-03 | 2019-02-26 | Lear Corporation | System and method for secure communications between controllers in a vehicle network |
US10812257B2 (en) | 2017-11-13 | 2020-10-20 | Volkswagen Ag | Systems and methods for a cryptographically guaranteed vehicle identity |
RU2716871C1 (ru) * | 2019-03-19 | 2020-03-17 | Дмитрий Михайлович Михайлов | Система и способ защиты электронных систем управления транспортных средств от несанкционированного вторжения |
US20230072454A1 (en) * | 2021-08-24 | 2023-03-09 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | System and method for generating random numbers within a vehicle controller |
Citations (7)
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US6032257A (en) * | 1997-08-29 | 2000-02-29 | Compaq Computer Corporation | Hardware theft-protection architecture |
EP1225510A2 (de) * | 2001-01-20 | 2002-07-24 | Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft | Vorrichtung und Verfahren zum Prüfen eines Steuergerätes für ein Fahrzeug |
US20020152398A1 (en) * | 2001-03-16 | 2002-10-17 | Rainer Krumrein | Authorization process for the communication with a data bus |
US6526460B1 (en) * | 1998-08-28 | 2003-02-25 | Daimlerchrysler Ag | Vehicle communications system |
DE10141737C1 (de) * | 2001-08-25 | 2003-04-03 | Daimler Chrysler Ag | Verfahren zur sicheren Datenübertragung innerhalb eines Verkehrsmittels |
DE10148323A1 (de) * | 2001-09-29 | 2003-04-10 | Daimler Chrysler Ag | Verfahren zum Funktionstest von Steuergeräten und Programmen |
DE10238093A1 (de) * | 2002-08-21 | 2004-03-11 | Audi Ag | Verfahren zum Schutz gegen Manipulationen in einem Steuergerät für mindestens eine Kfz-Komponente und Steuergerät |
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DE4411450C1 (de) * | 1994-04-01 | 1995-03-30 | Daimler Benz Ag | Fahrzeugsicherungseinrichtung mit elektronischer Nutzungsberechtigungscodierung |
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DE19909140A1 (de) * | 1999-03-03 | 2000-09-21 | Daimler Chrysler Ag | Elektronische Entfernungsbestimmungsvorrichtung und damit ausgerüstete elektronische Sicherungsanlage |
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US7000115B2 (en) * | 2001-06-19 | 2006-02-14 | International Business Machines Corporation | Method and apparatus for uniquely and authoritatively identifying tangible objects |
US7010682B2 (en) * | 2002-06-28 | 2006-03-07 | Motorola, Inc. | Method and system for vehicle authentication of a component |
-
2004
- 2004-04-29 EP EP04730262A patent/EP1741019A1/de not_active Ceased
- 2004-04-29 WO PCT/EP2004/004666 patent/WO2005116834A1/de not_active Application Discontinuation
- 2004-04-29 JP JP2007509884A patent/JP4469892B2/ja not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2004-04-29 CN CN200480042875.2A patent/CN100492248C/zh not_active Expired - Lifetime
-
2006
- 2006-10-27 US US11/588,235 patent/US20070118752A1/en not_active Abandoned
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US6032257A (en) * | 1997-08-29 | 2000-02-29 | Compaq Computer Corporation | Hardware theft-protection architecture |
US6526460B1 (en) * | 1998-08-28 | 2003-02-25 | Daimlerchrysler Ag | Vehicle communications system |
EP1225510A2 (de) * | 2001-01-20 | 2002-07-24 | Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft | Vorrichtung und Verfahren zum Prüfen eines Steuergerätes für ein Fahrzeug |
US20020152398A1 (en) * | 2001-03-16 | 2002-10-17 | Rainer Krumrein | Authorization process for the communication with a data bus |
DE10141737C1 (de) * | 2001-08-25 | 2003-04-03 | Daimler Chrysler Ag | Verfahren zur sicheren Datenübertragung innerhalb eines Verkehrsmittels |
DE10148323A1 (de) * | 2001-09-29 | 2003-04-10 | Daimler Chrysler Ag | Verfahren zum Funktionstest von Steuergeräten und Programmen |
DE10238093A1 (de) * | 2002-08-21 | 2004-03-11 | Audi Ag | Verfahren zum Schutz gegen Manipulationen in einem Steuergerät für mindestens eine Kfz-Komponente und Steuergerät |
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Title |
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Cited By (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
FR2898564A1 (fr) * | 2006-03-14 | 2007-09-21 | Peugeot Citroen Automobiles Sa | Procede de configuration d'une unite de traitement d'informations configurable embarquee dans un vehicule automobile. |
WO2012126547A1 (de) | 2011-03-22 | 2012-09-27 | Audi Ag | Kraftwagen-steuergerät mit kryptographischer einrichtung |
US9479329B2 (en) | 2011-03-22 | 2016-10-25 | Audi Ag | Motor vehicle control unit having a cryptographic device |
DE102015225787A1 (de) | 2015-12-17 | 2017-06-22 | Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft | Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Empfängerauthentifikation in einem Fahrzeugnetzwerk |
WO2019016294A1 (de) * | 2017-07-19 | 2019-01-24 | Audi Ag | Infotainmentsystem für ein kraftfahrzeug |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN1942843A (zh) | 2007-04-04 |
JP2007534544A (ja) | 2007-11-29 |
CN100492248C (zh) | 2009-05-27 |
US20070118752A1 (en) | 2007-05-24 |
EP1741019A1 (de) | 2007-01-10 |
JP4469892B2 (ja) | 2010-06-02 |
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