WO2005109739A1 - 暗号用鍵情報を格納したicカードの発行方法 - Google Patents
暗号用鍵情報を格納したicカードの発行方法 Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2005109739A1 WO2005109739A1 PCT/JP2005/008656 JP2005008656W WO2005109739A1 WO 2005109739 A1 WO2005109739 A1 WO 2005109739A1 JP 2005008656 W JP2005008656 W JP 2005008656W WO 2005109739 A1 WO2005109739 A1 WO 2005109739A1
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- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- card
- key information
- encryption key
- encryption
- issuing
- Prior art date
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/341—Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/355—Personalisation of cards for use
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/409—Device specific authentication in transaction processing
- G06Q20/4097—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners
- G06Q20/40975—Device specific authentication in transaction processing using mutual authentication between devices and transaction partners using encryption therefor
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
- H04L9/0833—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
- H04L9/0897—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a method for issuing an IC card storing cryptographic key information, and more particularly, to a method in which a plurality of IC cards each storing unique cryptographic key information are transferred to a specific individual belonging to a specific group.
- a method for issuing an IC card storing cryptographic key information and more particularly, to a method in which a plurality of IC cards each storing unique cryptographic key information are transferred to a specific individual belonging to a specific group.
- the IC card is used for various purposes as a highly confidential portable information recording medium. Recently, more and more companies are distributing a multifunctional IC card that also serves as an employee ID card to each employee. Focusing on such confidentiality, there are many cases where an IC card is used as a recording medium for storing key information used for encrypting and decrypting information.
- a secret encryption key or an encryption key table (herein, these are collectively referred to as encryption key information) are used as seeds in the encryption algorithm. Is often done. In the encryption process for converting predetermined plaintext data into ciphertext data, processing using this secret encryption key information is performed.
- the secret encryption key information used in the encryption process is an essential element in the decryption process that returns the ciphertext data to plaintext data. That is, unless the secret encryption key information is available, decryption cannot be performed. Therefore, if this secret encryption key information is stored in the IC card, the encryption It becomes very difficult to access the key, and the security of the ciphertext itself can be improved.
- decryption of ciphertext data should be permitted only to the person authorized by the person who performed the encryption, so the encryption key information differs for each individual. Must be unique data. Therefore, a multifunctional I that doubles as an employee ID.
- a unique encryption key information is determined for each employee, and when issuing an IC card, a process of storing the unique encryption key information in each IC card is performed. As a result, the IC card issued to each employee will have different unique encryption key information stored.
- the encryption key information is a secret key code used by the processing device in the encryption and decryption processes, the employee who owns the IC card usually does not need to know the same.
- the encryption key information stored in the IC card is supposed to be handled as secret data that even the person who owns the IC card does not know. It is preferable that the data be present only inside the card and not be known by anyone. For example, if a code generated randomly using a random number inside the IC card is stored as it is in the IC card as encryption key information, information that no one can know will be used as the encryption key information. It will be stored only in the card.
- the method of storing the encryption key information outside the IC card in this way has no problem on the premise that the storage is performed under the strict control of a trusted administrator.
- a problem that sufficient security cannot be ensured in practical use.
- the IC card provider for example, a major printing company
- the IC card provider will handle the data of the encryption key information provided by the client company for each employee with due care to ensure the perfect security. However, it cannot be guaranteed that there are absolutely no fraudsters among the staff involved in the IC card issuing business.
- the IC card provider generally receives orders from a plurality of customers, and unintentionally, if unintentional, stores the encryption key information for the employee of the customer company A in another form. There is also a possibility that a problem may occur that is passed to the person in charge of the customer company B.
- the present invention provides a method for reissuing a plurality of IC cards each storing unique encryption key information to a specific individual belonging to a specific group. It is an object of the present invention to provide an IC force issuance method that stores encryption key information that can perform an issuance process in a manner that can perform issuance and that can ensure sufficient security. Disclosure of the invention
- a first aspect of the present invention provides an IC card that stores a plurality of IC cards each storing unique encryption key information to a specific individual belonging to a specific group.
- the memory uses at least two pieces of data to perform arithmetic processing based on a predetermined algorithm.
- a second aspect of the present invention is the method for issuing an IC force storing the encryption key information according to the first aspect
- a third aspect of the present invention is a method for issuing an IC card storing encryption key information according to the first aspect
- the encryption key information As the encryption key information, a part of it generates a key table used as an encryption key used for encryption or decryption.
- a fourth aspect of the present invention is the method for issuing an IC card storing encryption key information according to the third aspect
- Two kinds of codes are written as secret personal codes, a first key table is generated based on the first secret personal code and the secret group code, and a second key table is generated based on the second secret personal code and the secret group code.
- Generate a second key table store these two key tables as encryption key information in the IC card, and combine a part of the first key table and a part of the second key table.
- an encryption key used for encryption or decryption can be obtained.
- a routine that records an instruction to prohibit subsequent execution of the key information 'generation program in the IC card after a predetermined number of executions on the IC card, and a routine that prohibits execution if this instruction is recorded And are included so that the key information generation processing is executed only a predetermined number of times.
- the encryption key information is stored in the IC card, and this is stored in the IC card storing the encryption key information. It is provided as.
- a key information generation program for executing the method according to the first to fifth aspects is prepared and stored in an IC card. .
- a ninth aspect of the present invention relates to an IC card used for executing an encryption process or a decryption process using unique encryption key information
- a program for generating key information and storing it in a memory By performing arithmetic processing based on a predetermined algorithm using the first data and the second data stored in the second storage location, a symbol for a symbol uniquely determined according to the two data is obtained.
- a tenth aspect of the present invention relates to an IC card used to execute an encryption process or a decryption process using unique encryption key information
- a CPU central processing unit
- a memory a main memory
- an I / O unit that exchanges information with the outside
- a program for executing processing for storing data for generating encryption key information given from the outside in the first storage location and the second storage location in the memory, respectively, and a program for storing the program in the first storage location By performing arithmetic processing based on a predetermined algorithm using the first data and the second data stored in the second storage location, an encryption key uniquely determined according to the two data A program that generates information and stores it in memory;
- the encryption key information is created inside the IC card using the secret group code and the secret personal code, and the IC card is used as it is.
- the secret group code is a code defined for the group to which the individual to be issued belongs, and can be stored, for example, by the administrator of the IC card provider.
- the secret personal code is a code specified by the individual to be issued and can be kept by the individual himself. Neither the secret group code nor the secret personal code are themselves encryption key information, so after all, the encryption key information in the IC card must be stored in a state that is unknown to anyone. Become.
- the administrator can enter the secret group code stored by the administrator and the secret personal code stored by the individual into the new IC card. Since the same encryption key information can be created again inside the IC card, the IC card can be reissued. Therefore, according to the present invention, when a plurality of IC passwords each storing unique encryption key information are issued to a specific individual belonging to a specific group, reissue is possible. In addition, the issuing process can be performed in such a manner that sufficient security can be ensured.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating the configuration of a general IC card that is currently widely used and a process of an encryption process using the IC card.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing an embodiment in which the encryption / decryption processing is performed not in the IC card 100 but in an external arithmetic processing device 200.
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing how the IC card provider X issues an IC card functioning as an employee ID card to each of the employees belonging to the customer company A and the customer company B.
- FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing a processing process of a key information generation program prepared in the IC card according to the present invention.
- FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing a basic procedure of an IC card issuing method according to the present invention.
- FIG. 6 is a block diagram showing an embodiment in which the issuing method according to the present invention is applied to the specific case shown in FIG.
- FIG. 7 is a diagram showing the concept of a table used for encryption / decryption processing.
- FIG. 8 is a diagram showing a developed form using two sets of the key tables shown in FIG. BEST MODE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INVENTION
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating the configuration of a general IC card 100 widely used at present, and a process of encryption processing using the IC card 100.
- the IC card 100 has a memory 110, a CPU 120, and an IZO unit 130.
- the memory 110 is composed of a ROM 111 that is a non-rewritable nonvolatile memory, an EEPROM 112 that is a rewritable nonvolatile memory, and a RAM 113 that is a rewritable volatile memory. I have.
- the ROM 111 stores a program for executing the basic processing functions of the IC card 100.
- the EEPROM 112 stores various programs to be recorded on the IC card 100. Data is stored.
- the RAMI 13 is used as a work area when the CPU 120 executes various processes.
- the memory 110 can be accessed only by the CPU 120, and cannot directly access the memory 110 from outside. External access is performed via the IZO unit 130. That is, the CPU 120 executes a command externally supplied through the IZO unit 130 based on the program in the ROM 111, and returns the execution result as a response to the outside through the I / 0 unit 130.
- the illustrated example is an example of an IC card having a function of executing an encryption process for converting plaintext data into ciphertext data and a conversely, a decryption process for converting ciphertext data into plaintext data.
- a program for performing the encryption and the decryption is stored in 1, and a key for the symbol used by the program is stored in the EEPROM 112.
- the CPU 120 receives the given command based on the program in the ROM 111.
- the encryption command is executed, the given plaintext data is subjected to a predetermined encryption process, and the obtained ciphertext data is output to the outside together with the response via the IZO unit 130.
- a symbol key stored in the EEPROM 112 is used.
- the CPU 120 is given based on the program in the ROM 111. Executes the decryption command —Perform a predetermined decryption process on the evening to restore the original plaintext data,
- the encryption / decryption processing program is provided in the ROM 111, but this program may be provided in the EE PROM 112. If an encryption / decryption processing program is prepared in the EE PROM 112, it is possible to rewrite this processing program as needed. Also, here, for convenience of explanation, the IC card 100 having only the encryption and decryption processing functions is shown. However, in practice, the IC card 100 is used for various purposes, so that the ROM 111 or the EE PROM is used. 1 12 stores programs for executing various processes in these various uses.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing an embodiment in which the encryption / decryption processing is performed not in the IC card 100 but in an external arithmetic processing device 200.
- plaintext data when plaintext data is given to the external processing unit 200, it is output as ciphertext data, and conversely, when ciphertext data is given, it is output as plaintext data.
- the encryption / decryption processing is performed by the external arithmetic processing unit 200, the symbol key stored in the EEPROM 112 is transmitted to the external arithmetic processing unit via the I / 0 unit 130. Read out to the device 200 side.
- a program for encryption and decryption is provided in the external processing unit 200, and the program performs the encryption Z decryption process by ffl using the encryption key read from the IC card 100. Will run.
- the embodiment shown in FIG. 1 since the encryption key stored in the EEPROM 112 is read out of the IC card 100, security From a viewpoint, the embodiment shown in FIG. 1 is superior. In the embodiment shown in FIG. 1, the code key stored in the EEPROM 110 is not read out of the IC card 100, so that the encryption key is stored in the EEPROM 112. After that, it is extremely unlikely to be known by illicit means.
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing how the IC card provider X issues an IC card functioning as an employee ID card to each of the employees belonging to the client company A and the client company B.
- unique encryption keys are stored for three employees a, ⁇ , and ⁇ belonging to customer company A and three employees ⁇ , ⁇ , and ⁇ belonging to customer company ⁇ .
- An example is shown where an IC card is issued as an employee ID card. In practice, IC cards will be issued to a larger number of employees, and there will be more customer companies.
- the symbol key stored in each IC card is a unique key different from each other.
- the unique encryption keys K (a), K (j8), K (a) , ⁇ ( ⁇ ), ⁇ ( ⁇ ), and ⁇ ( ⁇ ) are stored.
- the IC card provider X prepares the data for these symbols and prepares each IC card at the time of issuance. In general, a process of writing an individual encryption key to the device is performed.
- the encryption key data is stored at the IC card provider X side, or stored by the management personnel of the customer company ⁇ and the customer company ⁇ . Will do.
- the encryption key data is provided to the IC card provider X. Therefore, it is undeniable that there is a possibility that the cryptographic key will be leaked due to cheating or negligence on the IC card provider X side. It is also undeniable that there is something wrong with customer company A or customer company B.
- the encryption key used for encryption / decryption processing should be managed under strict security so that such leakage does not occur.
- the present invention provides a method for issuing an IC card that can ensure sufficient security and that can be reissued.
- FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing a processing process of a key information generation program prepared in the IC card according to the present invention.
- the key information generation program used in the present invention performs an arithmetic process based on a predetermined algorithm using at least two data, so that encryption key information (encryption key) determined uniquely according to the two data. ) Is generated.
- Fig. 4 shows an example where cryptographic key information K is generated as a result of performing an arithmetic process based on a predetermined algorithm A using two data, a secret group code G and a secret personal code P. ing. The meaning of the secret group code G and the secret personal code P and the differences between them will be described later.
- any algorithm may be used as the predetermined algorithm A, but in the figure, as an example, a secret group code G consisting of four digits and a secret group code consisting of four digits are also shown.
- a simple algorithm is shown in which the sum with the personal code P is obtained, and the last four digits of the sum are used as the encryption key information K.
- the secret group code G is a number “6 7 8 9” and the secret personal code P is a number “5 1 5 1”, as shown in the figure, a key for a symbol consisting of a number “1 9 4 0” Information K will be generated.
- the algorithm for generating the encryption key information K is not necessarily limited to an arithmetic process based on two data, and at least two data, a secret group code G and a secret personal code P, are used. As long as the algorithm can obtain the encryption key information K uniquely determined according to one data, the calculation using the third data or the fourth data may be performed.
- the encryption key information K is generated by an algorithm using two data, the secret group code G and the secret personal code P, the request to ensure sufficient security and the need to re- It will be possible to satisfy both the demand for enabling issuance.
- two codes, a secret group code G and a secret personal code P are required to obtain the encryption key information K, and only one of them is required. Since the encryption key information K cannot be generated, if the secret group code G and the secret personal code P are set in different management environments, the encryption key information K is obtained by an unauthorized method. Possibilities can be greatly reduced.
- the encryption key information K can be generated at any time as information uniquely determined based on these two codes. In this case, it will be possible to reissue the IC card.
- FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing a basic procedure of the IC card issuing method according to the present invention.
- step S1 the configuration as shown in FIG. 1, that is, the memory 110, the CPU 120, and the exchange of information with the outside 10 1
- a program for executing the encryption key information generation process shown in FIG. 4 is prepared in the memory 110. That is, in step S1, a key information generation program that generates an encryption key information uniquely determined according to the two data by performing an arithmetic processing based on a predetermined algorithm using at least two data.
- An IC card in which is stored will be prepared.
- step S2 the secret group code G is written, and in step S3, the secret personal code P is written.
- step S3 the secret personal code P is written.
- These writing processes are actually performed by giving the IC card 100 data to be written together with a predetermined write command.
- step S4 a process of generating encryption key information K is performed. That is, the process shown in FIG. 4 is executed inside the IC card 100, and the generated encryption key information is directly written and stored in the EEPROM 112.
- the process of generating the encryption key information K is actually performed by giving an execution command to the IC card 100 to execute the key information generation program.
- steps S2 and S3 may be performed on the EEPROM 112 or may be performed on the RAM 113.
- the RAMI 13 is a non-volatile memory, if a process of temporarily stopping the power supply to the IC card 100 is performed before the execution of step S4, writing to the EEPROM 112, which is a non-volatile memory, should be performed. Need to be
- the IC card provider X entrusted by the client company A and the client company B sends a unique encryption code to the employees ⁇ , ⁇ , r, ⁇ , ⁇ , and ⁇ .
- This is an example of issuing an IC card that stores the keys ⁇ (), K (j3), K (r)> ⁇ ( ⁇ ), ⁇ ( ⁇ ), ⁇ ( ⁇ ).
- IC card provider X defines a secret group code G for each company.
- a secret group code G (A) is defined for customer company A
- a secret group code G (B) is defined for customer company B.
- These codes G (A) and G (B) may be any codes as long as they are different from each other.
- G (C) and G (D ) Is defined.
- the secret group code in the present invention is a unique code commonly assigned to one group.
- a secret group code is written to the IC card.
- this process is performed by the IC card provider X.
- the process of writing the secret group code G (A) on the IC card to be delivered to the customer company A, and the process of writing the secret group code G (B) on the IC card to be delivered to the customer company B Eventually, in the case of the embodiment shown in Fig. 6, the IC card provider X delivers three IC cards with the secret group code G (A) written to the customer company A, and Three IC cards with the group code G (B) written can be delivered to customer company B.
- steps S1 and S2 shown in the first half of FIG. 5 is processing performed on the IC card provider X side, but the processing in steps S3 and S4 shown in the second half of FIG.
- the processing is performed on each customer company A and B side.
- customer Company A is delivered three IC cards with the secret group code G (A) already written, so the person in charge of customer company A sends these IC cards to each employee ⁇ , i3, key It distributes and instructs the user to execute a predetermined initialization process to initialize the IC card.
- steps S3 and S4 in FIG. 5 are executed.
- the employee, ⁇ , and a perform the process of writing the unique secret personal codes P (a), P (] 3), and P (end) in their IC card, and then write the IC card to the IC card.
- Command to execute the key information generation program and use the secret group code G (A) and the secret personal codes P ( ⁇ ), ⁇ ( ⁇ ), and P (r) written by each user.
- the encryption key information ⁇ ( ⁇ ), K (i3), and K (r) are generated inside the IC card, respectively, and are stored in the EE PROM 112 in the IC card as they are.
- each of the IC cards owned by the employees ⁇ , ⁇ , and 7 has its own encryption key information K (0;), K (j8), ⁇ (r) is stored and becomes usable for encryption / decryption processing.
- the customer company B is delivered with three IC cards in which the secret group code G (B) is already written, so that the employees ⁇ , ⁇ , and ⁇ have their own secret personal codes ⁇ ( ⁇ 5), ⁇ ( ⁇ ), and ⁇ ( ⁇ ) are written, and then an execution command to execute the key information generation program is given, and the key information for the symbol ⁇ ( ⁇ 5), ⁇ .
- An IC card in which ⁇ ) and ⁇ ( ⁇ ) are stored can be obtained.
- a computer equipped with a reader / writer device for an IC card and a dedicated initialization program it is preferable to prepare a computer equipped with a reader / writer device for an IC card and a dedicated initialization program. Specifically, when an employee inserts his or her IC card into the computer's reader / writer and executes the initialization program, a message prompting the user to enter the secret personal code P is displayed on the computer screen. Employees enter any code as the secret personal code P Then, a command for writing the arbitrary code into the IC card (step S3 in FIG. 5) is given to the IC card, and subsequently, processing for executing the key information generation program (FIG. 5) The command for performing step S 4) may be given to the IC card.
- the secret group code G used in the present invention is defined for the group (each company in the illustrated example) to which the individual to be issued (each employee in the illustrated example) belongs.
- the secret personal code P is a code specified by the individual to be issued.
- the secret group codes G (A) and G (B) are the managers of the IC card provider X (in other words, the management that does not belong to any of the groups A and B). ) Will be stored and managed. These codes are indispensable for generating each key information for encryption, but the substance is not the key information itself, but a secret code assigned to each group. Therefore, the manager has no way of knowing what kind of data is the encryption key information stored in the IC card carried by each employee belonging to companies A and B.
- the contents that the manager on the IC card provider X side can know is that the IC card shipped to customer company A has a secret group code G (A) written on it, and the customer company B It is just the fact that the IC card shipped to has the secret group code G (B). Therefore, even if these secret group codes G (A) and G (B) are leaked due to the cause of the IC card provider X, it does not lead to a serious situation in terms of security protection.
- the secret group code is stored and managed by the person in charge at each customer company. It does not matter. For example, for the secret group code G (A), the person in charge of the customer company A performs storage management, and for the secret group code G (B), the person in charge of the client company B performs storage management.
- the IC card provider X may not store or manage these codes at all. Of course, it is also possible to store and manage both the staff at the customer companies A and B and the manager at the IC card provider X.
- the secret personal code P is the code entered by the employee ⁇ in the initialization process for his IC card, and can be a secret code known only to ⁇ .
- the secret personal code entered in the initialization process will not be forgotten. It is preferably a code, preferably a confidential memo.
- the advantage of the present invention is that, as described above, the security for the key information stored in each IC card is sufficiently secured, and in the unlikely event that the IC card can be reissued, It is a point. For example, if an employee loses or damages his or her IC card, it will be impossible to recover the data encrypted in the past without using the IC card. would. In such a case, the employee simply obtains a new I from IC card provider X. If the card is delivered and the initialization process is performed using the same secret personal code ⁇ () as the previous time, the reissued IC card can be obtained.
- the IC card provider X is a delivery to the customer company ⁇ , it is delivered with the secret group code G (A) written on the IC card. Therefore, as long as the employee performs the initialization process using the same private personal code P () as the previous time, the same encryption key information K (a) as in the previous time is stored in the reissued IC card. Because it is stored, it is possible to restore data that was encrypted in the past.
- FIGS. 1 and 2 show an example in which encryption processing and decryption processing are performed using an encryption key stored in an IC card, but the “encryption key information” in the present invention refers to As described above, not only the encryption key used for encryption or decryption itself, but also a part of it means a broad concept including a key table used as the encryption key used for encryption or decryption. is there.
- FIG. 7 is a diagram showing the concept of such a key table.
- one cell indicates data of one pile, and a key table is composed of a total of 20 piles of data.
- a desired part of the key table can be extracted and used as an encryption key as needed, It can be used as an encryption key with multiple variations. For example, if, during the encryption process, an instruction such as “use the 8th byte from the 7th byte as the encryption key” is given from the outside and the encryption process is executed, as shown in the example in the figure, Only a specified part is extracted from the key table and used as an encryption key.
- the user is given the same key as in the encryption process: use the 8 bytes from the 7th byte as the encryption key. Since it is necessary to specify the user key, security can be further improved.
- the encryption key information K used in the present invention is data generated in the processing process shown in FIG. 4, and by appropriately setting the number of digits of the secret group code G and the number of digits of the secret personal code P, Or a specific algorithm as algorithm A By using, it is possible to generate encryption key information K having an arbitrary number of digits. Therefore, the encryption key information K generated according to the present invention can be sufficiently used as the key table described above.
- the modification shown in FIG. 8 is a further development of the modification using the key table described above.
- step S3 of FIG. 5 two types of codes are written as secret personal codes.
- step S4 a first key table is generated based on the first secret personal code and the secret group code, and a second key table is generated based on the second secret personal code and the secret group code.
- a table is generated, and processing for storing these two key tables as encryption key information in the IC card is performed.
- the two key tables are stored as key information for encryption, by combining a part of the first key table and a part of the second key table, it is possible to perform encryption or decryption. Since the encryption key to be used can be obtained, security can be further improved.
- an example is shown in which an employee has input two secret personal codes P (1) and P ( ⁇ 2). Since the secret group code G (A) of the customer company ⁇ is already stored in the IC card, a predetermined algorithm is used for the secret personal code P (a1) and the secret group code G (A).
- the first key table can be generated by performing an operation based on the secret key code P (2) and the secret group code G (A) based on a predetermined algorithm. 2 key tables can be generated. Therefore, in step S4, a process of storing these two key tables as they are in the IC card is performed.
- step S4 in FIG. 5 that is, the process of generating the encryption key information
- a predetermined command is given to the IC card and the ROM 111 1 (or the EEPROM 111 2 This is done by executing the key information generation program embedded in).
- the same command can be given to an IC card many times, and if a program corresponding to the given command is prepared in the memory, the IC card can send this command many times. Can also be performed.
- the key information generation program it is preferable to limit the execution of the key information generation program to a predetermined number of times (for example, once). This is because if the IC card is issued in a legitimate manner, the key information generation program only needs to be executed once (or several times in consideration of failure) in the initialization process described above. It is not a process that needs to be repeated. On the other hand, if this IC card is handed over to an unauthorized user, the unauthorized user rewrites the secret group code or the secret personal code by unauthorized means, and repeatedly executes the key information generation program. There is a possibility of analyzing the key information generation algorithm. In view of these points, it makes sense to limit the execution of the key information generation program to a predetermined number of times.
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Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US11/579,080 US20070165860A1 (en) | 2004-05-06 | 2005-05-02 | Method for issuing ic card storing encryption key information |
US13/111,586 US8099771B2 (en) | 2004-05-06 | 2011-05-19 | Method for issuing IC card storing encryption key information |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP2004-137192 | 2004-05-06 | ||
JP2004137192A JP4646050B2 (ja) | 2004-05-06 | 2004-05-06 | Icカードを発行して暗号化/復号化を行う方法 |
Related Child Applications (2)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US11/579,080 A-371-Of-International US20070165860A1 (en) | 2004-05-06 | 2005-05-02 | Method for issuing ic card storing encryption key information |
US13/111,586 Division US8099771B2 (en) | 2004-05-06 | 2011-05-19 | Method for issuing IC card storing encryption key information |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2005109739A1 true WO2005109739A1 (ja) | 2005-11-17 |
Family
ID=35320550
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/JP2005/008656 WO2005109739A1 (ja) | 2004-05-06 | 2005-05-02 | 暗号用鍵情報を格納したicカードの発行方法 |
Country Status (3)
Country | Link |
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US (2) | US20070165860A1 (ja) |
JP (1) | JP4646050B2 (ja) |
WO (1) | WO2005109739A1 (ja) |
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EP2889854A1 (fr) * | 2013-12-30 | 2015-07-01 | Gemalto SA | Dispositif de communication comportant un capteur d'activation lumineux |
EP3128455A4 (en) * | 2014-04-02 | 2017-11-01 | Sony Corporation | Information processing system and computer program |
JP6358009B2 (ja) * | 2014-09-19 | 2018-07-18 | カシオ計算機株式会社 | サーバ装置、データ処理方法およびデータ処理プログラム |
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US20070165860A1 (en) | 2007-07-19 |
JP4646050B2 (ja) | 2011-03-09 |
US20110222686A1 (en) | 2011-09-15 |
US8099771B2 (en) | 2012-01-17 |
JP2005322962A (ja) | 2005-11-17 |
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