WO2005106672A2 - Gestion de memorisation hierarchique de fichiers de donnees cryptees - Google Patents

Gestion de memorisation hierarchique de fichiers de donnees cryptees Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2005106672A2
WO2005106672A2 PCT/US2005/013626 US2005013626W WO2005106672A2 WO 2005106672 A2 WO2005106672 A2 WO 2005106672A2 US 2005013626 W US2005013626 W US 2005013626W WO 2005106672 A2 WO2005106672 A2 WO 2005106672A2
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
volume
card
file
stored
information
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2005/013626
Other languages
English (en)
Other versions
WO2005106672A3 (fr
Inventor
Finis Conner
Anil Nigam
Original Assignee
Storcard, Inc.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Storcard, Inc. filed Critical Storcard, Inc.
Publication of WO2005106672A2 publication Critical patent/WO2005106672A2/fr
Publication of WO2005106672A3 publication Critical patent/WO2005106672A3/fr

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
    • G06F21/77—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in smart cards
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G06F21/6227—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database where protection concerns the structure of data, e.g. records, types, queries

Definitions

  • the hardware architecture to support these OSs stores cipher keys in secure digital logic mounted on the computer system's mother-board or as a pre-assigned value in the microprocessor, with the cipher text is stored in the hard drive. This results in the content becoming "tied” to a specific piece of hardware, and the user required to make periodic decisions as to which file must be deleted to make room for new data.
  • DVR Digital Video Recorder
  • TINO box which are configured with hard drives now having storage capacities of over 400GB in current configurations.
  • a memory card for enabling management of digital rights is provided in a format no larger than a credit card. It includes a magnetic disk for storing information which includes at least a first volume which is a secure volume not accessible to the user of the memory card and which stores an encryption key.
  • the second volume is a non-secure volume within which information may be stored, which is typically encrypted and accessible by using the encryption key.
  • the card is particularly suitable for being coupled to a content server via a reader to enable content from the server to be encrypted and stored in the second volume.
  • a memory card for enabling management of digital rights includes an enclosure no larger than a credit card, a magnetic disk for storing information contained within the enclosure, and a microprocessor affixed to the memory card for processing encrypted information in response to encryption keys stored therein.
  • the invention also provides a method of providing secure downloadable files.
  • a memory card having a rotatable magnetic memory therein is provided.
  • the card is connected to a content supplier to determine if the card can be personalized. If so, the card is personalized to restrict its use. Then security information is stored on the card, and the requested content is also stored on the card.
  • Figure 1 illustrates a secure file server and a method of delivering fully encrypted content with a digital signature of the originating server
  • Figure 2 illustrates a preferred embodiment of a card, with two storage volumes and an identification number that personalizes these two volumes;
  • FIG. 3 illustrates details of the portable card
  • Figure 4 illustrates components inside a card reader
  • Figure 5 illustrates a preferred embodiment of the architecture of the reader
  • Figure 6 illustrates file hierarchy and file migration during archiving
  • Figure 7 illustrates file archiving using file segments.
  • Figure 8 is a flow chart of the events while serving a request for a file download
  • Figure 9 is a flow chart of the sequence of events where the user is provided an option of storing a file in the secondary storage.
  • Figure 10 is a flow chart of the sequence of events during a file playback request.
  • Figure 11 shows the download and personalization sequence using blank cards.
  • Figure 1 shows a typical secure file server environment.
  • Server 1 has a firewall 3
  • files in the storage volume are either encrypted or maintained in text form.
  • the security of individual files on server 1 is not further discussed here because the entire environment is kept behind firewall 3.
  • One specific implementation is presented where a file 5 having content Dj with an entry in the file directory 60 is contained in storage volume 2.
  • a directory of authorized members having access privileges to server 1 is maintained in a second directory 4. For example, member "k" has a preassigned authentication key set k , a symmetric cipher key set k and a file listing information L k athat member "k” has previously downloaded from server 1 with digital signature Sj.
  • Information that leaves the firewall 3 of server 1 can be separated into that which is secure and encrypted, and that which is of primarily promotional or commercial value and transmitted in text form.
  • This typically includes the file title, an advertising clip, a song or a movie preview.
  • Encrypted data is created by an algorithm described as function "f," for which an AES algorithm with k k as the cipher key, or some other algorithm, may be used.
  • the encryption in this embodiment is personalized to the member requesting it.
  • member "k” will be the only one that can convert the file to readable/playable form, and content security is guaranteed even if an open distribution channel is utilized. Also this scheme can protect against rouge users who may sign in to server 1 using some other member "k's" ID and password.
  • the information transmitted would require an additional device such as card 1, shown in Figure 2, to convert the file to readable form.
  • Commercial portion of the content such as file titles, advertising clips, song or movie previews can be transmitted in the clear or processed using a hash function and digitally signed by the issuing server using function "S" and its ID as S;.
  • S hash function
  • the advantage of having digitally signed text data is that it can protect the issuer from third party tampering should that.be required.
  • the authentication scheme utilized could consist of comparing the User ID and a preassigned password, or it can be a more secure system, such as a challenge response sequence using the Pk keys.
  • FIG. 2 illustrates the user environment where card 1, which in a preferred embodiment has the form factor of a credit card, and typically a Smart Card, is used to receive file 6.
  • Card 7 is constructed with two storage volumes, and includes a secure volume 8 with a firewall 10 enforced by an operating system, such as Javacard or other multifunction Smart Card OS.
  • a microcontroller with a secure architecture is implemented in block 8.
  • a simple challenge response hardware algorithm as a "state machine” could be implemented in digital logic in microcontroller 8 such as Atmel's Crypto-memory Smart Card IC.
  • microcontroller 8 includes a secure 8051 -like microcontroller implementation with a Javacard OS and remote personalization capabilities.
  • Controller 8 can be programmed to securely receive and store cipher keys pi, k;, with the digital signature of the server that issued this information, the number printed on the front face of card 7, the member name, address and any other information appropriate to the specific implementation. This forms the personalization sequence for card 7 to communicate with server 1.
  • the cipher keys can be random numbers generated by card 7 or server 1 and exchanged securely during the personalization sequence. These values exist behind security walls 3 for server 1 and 10 for IC 8, and cannot be viewed by the user or a third party.
  • integrated circuit (IC) 8 incorporates an authentication procedure for server 1 utilizing function "g" and the key i. This protocol can be defined or downloaded into controller 8 during a card personalization sequence or it may be incorporated in the card OS.
  • the symmetric encryption keys kj's consist of a list, each related to a content or file downloaded utilizing card 7.
  • a detail list of the file titles can be kept in the IC or on volume 9 as shown in the figure.
  • EEPROM storage capacity available in the IC is expensive; for a typical Smart Card priced at less than $10, this is • about 64 Kbytes.
  • Content 6 and the respective directory 12 are stored in another volume on card 7.
  • this is a magnetic disk 9 with a storage capacity preferably greater than 100MB.
  • Content 6 as received from Server 1 is stored as an encrypted file 13 with a directory entry made in 12.
  • the cipher key for this content is available in IC 8. Consequently, if the disk in accessed independently of the IC, the contents of file 13 would consist of unusable cipher data.
  • a tag file entry 14 is created and associated with directory 12 and file 13.
  • Tag 14 contains information about where the remainder of file 13 is stored.
  • the card includes a Smart Card IC 8, a cover layer 15, another layer 16 which consists of a fabric liner material similar to that used in the common floppy disk.
  • Magnetic disk 9 is protected by liner layers 16 and 17 such that during storage and handling the surfaces of disk 9 do not contact layers 15, 18 or 19. Such contact could result in the surfaces of disk 9 becoming scratched.
  • Layer 19 is the bottom of card 7. In one embodiment this layer is made from metal, more specifically stainless steel.
  • a shutter layer 18 covers opening 56. This construction is utilized to keep contaminants from entering the disk cavity formed between layers 16 and 19.
  • a mechanism in reader 20 actuates shutter 18, moving it such that opening 56 aligns with opening 57 thereby providing access to the magnetic recording surfaces on disk 9.
  • Reader 20 is shown in detail in Figure 4. This mechanism performs reading of the disk. Card 7 is inserted in a slot 23 in receiver 21. Receiver 21 has pins 59 that ride in slots 58. The figure shows the reader with receiver 21 in an exploded form for greater clarity. This mechanism operates such that, as card 7 is inserted into reader 21 the insertion force pushes receiver 12 rearward, moving it in the cam profile machined as slots 58, to a point where the slot profile causes card 7 to have vertical movement.
  • the arrangement of the cam profile is designed to provide movement only when disk 9 gets positioned over the top of spindle motor 24 and aligned with its rotational axis.
  • a magnetic clutch (not shown) attached to disk 9 allows spindle 24 to rotate disk 9.
  • Card 7 has a thickness of about .030 inches, similar to the thickness of the common credit card.
  • the thickness of layers 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 are selected to provide a vertical dimension of about 0.015 inches in which disk 9, which is about 0.0015 inch thick, can rotate uriimpeded.
  • a connector 22 mounted to receiver 21 interfaces with IC 8 on card 7, and head 25 interfaces with disk 9. Head 25 is pivoted at 26 such that it can be positioned at the various data tracks formed on disk 9.
  • Reader 20 has a PCB 28 which contains the electronics to spin motor 24, position head 25, encode/decode magnetic transitions on disk 9 and transfer this information to the outside world using industry standard protocols via connector 27.
  • connector 27 and the communication protocol implemented in reader 20 conforms to USB 2.0.
  • FIG. 5 is a block diagram of reader 20.
  • content 13 is located on disk 9.
  • the cipher keys and authentication protocol are located in IC 8.
  • Processor 29 has a secure communication channel with IC 8.
  • a mutual authentication protocol is executed to establish the validity of card 7 and reader 20. This protocol is described in co-pending commonly assigned U. S. Patent Application entitled “Secure and Portable Data Communicator and Viewer," Application Serial Number 60/564567 filed April 21, 2004, and a corresponding non-provisional application filed contemporaneously herewith.
  • processor 29 Upon completion of this protocol, processor 29 has a valid volume mounted and it can identify itself as a storage unit on the system bus via interface logic 32. Microcode that operates processor 29 is located in ROM 30 or can be downloaded from disk 9 into RAM 31 depending upon the protocol established between processor 29 and IC 8 during mutual authentication, and the hierarchy of execution of the respective code.
  • processor 29 Upon a request for information from the host system, processor 29 will identify file 13 reading directory 12 and command the storage hardware 60 to spin disk 9 and position head 25 to retrieve this file. In addition processor 29 will query IC 8 to obtain the cipher key or keys to decrypt the requested file. The cipher key or key sequence will be loaded into encryption engine 33.
  • An additional feature is implemented in one embodiment where the reader conditions the decrypted text using function "g" implemented in the encryption engine. Function "g" encodes a watermark in the content creating special text 34 as D*. This text is personalized to the user using information available in IC 8. The purpose is to include enough information to identify the originator with a link useable by a policing authority if necessary. This watermark is transparent to the player. This feature could discourage illegal copies and copyright infringement activities. The procedure to encode watermarks in this manner is described in the above referenced U. S. Patent Application.
  • a tag file is created and linked to file 13 with a directory entry in directory 12.
  • the cipher keys remain in IC 8.
  • the remaining portion of file 6 is stored in secondary storage volume 35 as shown in Figure 6, such as file 39, and a tag header 40 consisting of the last three digits, or the entire number 11, file title, user name, and a hash of this data with the digital signature of the issuing server Si.
  • the entire file can be stored on volume 35 such as file 39A, and only a directory entry with destination information 14 kept in file 9.
  • this file could be moved to other storage volumes such as volumes 36 or 37, as necessary.
  • content 39 is married with tag file 40, and to an external system it appears as one file. Because it is encrypted, the file is of little value to third parties.
  • the only way to play or view the content is to install the specific card 7 containing the specific tag file 14 in a reader 20 with access to volumes 35, 36 or 37.
  • card 7 is a portable unit and can be moved from one computer system to another. Volumes 35, 36 and 37 could be public volumes.
  • the user may elect to have the files downloaded into a local scratch volume for temporary storage. It should be recognized that security is preserved since each segment 44, 46 or 48 requires the cipher key stored in IC 8. Again portability of the cipher key is a major benefit of this embodiment.
  • Figure 8 is a flow chart of the events that would occur while serving a request for a file download 61 from a secure Server 1.
  • Server 1 initiates an authentication protocol 62 to establish the validity of the requesting user and the presence of a valid card 7.
  • a number of authentication techniques can be utilized to accomplish this, and these are described in the application referred to above.
  • processor 29 in the reader creates a directory entry in directory 12 on storage volume 9. Additionally, a tag file 14 is also created to support this directory entry.
  • Server 1 identifies the user through directory 4 and procures cipher key ki.
  • Content Dj is sent to reader 20 using a commercial communication channel, for example, over the I-nternet using the TCP/IP protocol.
  • TCP/IP is implemented in the host system and the assembled packets can be sent to reader 20, for example, by the USB protocol.
  • Reader 20 reviews the storage requirements of the respective file 65. If there is space available in volume 9 each record will be stored 66 on the disk as file 13 until the entire file download is completed. If the storage space in volume 9 is exceeded, then either the entire file, or a portion thereof can be stored elsewhere.
  • the data can be stored in a secondary storage volume accessed on the host, for example, via a USB bus, or the user can be requested to insert another card 7 in reader 20.
  • a store volume 35 is not available then the user is informed and requested to supply the destination volume or the communication with server 1 is terminated. Assuming there is available storage in the secondary volume 35 a tag file is created 69 in this volume with a directory entry similar to 40 and data downloading continues using 70 and 71 until the file transfer is complete. If volume 35 runs out of storage capacity the user is flagged 75 to either move files to volumes 36 and 37 or 74 to delete files in volume 35. In one embodiment where reader 20 and volume 35 are both local and attached to microcontroller 29, the user can be queried 74 to identify files that can be deleted from either volume 9 or volume 35 to make space for the new file. Alternatively, in one embodiment this process is automated with the oldest files being removed from volume 35.
  • Figure 8 illustrates another operating environment for such a device where volume 9 in card 7 is utilized to store directory and tag file entries only, and is utilized in the situation where the secondary storage volume is full and does not have room to create the special tag file discussed above 78, and the user is prompted to insert this special card 7 and the respect tag file data is recorded. It should be recognized that this specific card can only keep the tag file information and does not have access to the cipher key stored in the original card.
  • Figure 11 illustrates the sequence of events where the user is provided an option files contained in these volumes. The archived files can be moved to volumes 36 and 37 with a special tag file 100 created in volumes 35 or 41 with the new destination of these files.
  • this tag file is appended to the original tag file containing the information of the originating card 7.
  • this card Whenever this card is inserted into reader 20 it will request the installation of volume 36 and the special tag file will provide information to microcontroller 29 to update the tag file entry in the specific card 7 to show the new destination information of the respective file and the special tag file along with the original tag file in volumes 35 and 41 can be deleted.
  • Figure 9 shows a method of creating a utility card
  • Figure 10 is a flow chart of the sequence of events during a file playback request 79.
  • User authentication 80 is the first event followed by a query regarding the files availability 81. If the file is not available in volume 9, or there is no tag file showing a destination address, the user is request to initiate a file download sequence 82. If the file requested in not in the specific card 7, but a tag file entry is available in the secondary volume such as 36 or 41, the user is instructed to insert the appropriate card 83. If the file is archived as segments, then the user is also instructed to mount the respective volumes 42 and 43.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Multimedia (AREA)
  • Technology Law (AREA)
  • Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Bioethics (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Mathematical Physics (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Signal Processing For Digital Recording And Reproducing (AREA)
  • Information Retrieval, Db Structures And Fs Structures Therefor (AREA)

Abstract

Un dispositif transportable sécurisé permet la gestion de fichiers cryptés. Une carte de mémoire permet la gestion de droits numériques et se présente sous un format comparable à celui d'une carte de crédit et comporte un disque magnétique ayant un premier volume qui est un volume sécurisé au sein duquel une clé de cryptage est mémorisée. Le second volume est un volume non sécurisé au sein duquel l'information cryptée est mémorisée. La carte se prête à un couplage avec un serveur de contenu au moyen d'un module de lecture afin de permettre au contenu provenant du serveur d'être crypté et mémorisé dans le seconde volume.
PCT/US2005/013626 2004-04-21 2005-04-20 Gestion de memorisation hierarchique de fichiers de donnees cryptees WO2005106672A2 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US56461904P 2004-04-21 2004-04-21
US60/564,619 2004-04-21

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2005106672A2 true WO2005106672A2 (fr) 2005-11-10
WO2005106672A3 WO2005106672A3 (fr) 2006-04-20

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Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2008037741A1 (fr) * 2006-09-28 2008-04-03 International Business Machines Corporation Gestion de cryptage pour des volumes dans des groupes de stockage
WO2009064139A1 (fr) * 2007-11-16 2009-05-22 Kookmin Bank Co., Ltd Lecteur de contenus numériques à carte à puce et procédé d'utilisation
WO2009064138A1 (fr) * 2007-11-16 2009-05-22 Kookmin Bank Co., Ltd Carte à puce avec mémoire flash pour fourniture de contenus numériques
CN114615403A (zh) * 2022-02-21 2022-06-10 广东职业技术学院 一种办公室摄像头视频文件的访问方法、装置和系统

Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6340117B1 (en) * 1994-04-19 2002-01-22 Smartdisk Corporation Apparatus and method for transferring information between a removable memory and a computer
US6510125B1 (en) * 1997-06-19 2003-01-21 Kabushiki Kaisha Optrom Storage medium having electronic circuit, apparatus communicating information with the electronic circuit, and system including them
US6538880B1 (en) * 1999-11-09 2003-03-25 International Business Machines Corporation Complementary functional PDA system and apparatus

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6340117B1 (en) * 1994-04-19 2002-01-22 Smartdisk Corporation Apparatus and method for transferring information between a removable memory and a computer
US6510125B1 (en) * 1997-06-19 2003-01-21 Kabushiki Kaisha Optrom Storage medium having electronic circuit, apparatus communicating information with the electronic circuit, and system including them
US6538880B1 (en) * 1999-11-09 2003-03-25 International Business Machines Corporation Complementary functional PDA system and apparatus

Cited By (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2008037741A1 (fr) * 2006-09-28 2008-04-03 International Business Machines Corporation Gestion de cryptage pour des volumes dans des groupes de stockage
WO2009064139A1 (fr) * 2007-11-16 2009-05-22 Kookmin Bank Co., Ltd Lecteur de contenus numériques à carte à puce et procédé d'utilisation
WO2009064138A1 (fr) * 2007-11-16 2009-05-22 Kookmin Bank Co., Ltd Carte à puce avec mémoire flash pour fourniture de contenus numériques
CN114615403A (zh) * 2022-02-21 2022-06-10 广东职业技术学院 一种办公室摄像头视频文件的访问方法、装置和系统
CN114615403B (zh) * 2022-02-21 2023-10-24 广东职业技术学院 一种办公室摄像头视频文件的访问方法、装置和系统

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