WO2005101727A1 - 通信装置、通信システム及び認証方法 - Google Patents
通信装置、通信システム及び認証方法 Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2005101727A1 WO2005101727A1 PCT/JP2005/007096 JP2005007096W WO2005101727A1 WO 2005101727 A1 WO2005101727 A1 WO 2005101727A1 JP 2005007096 W JP2005007096 W JP 2005007096W WO 2005101727 A1 WO2005101727 A1 WO 2005101727A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- authentication
- communication device
- unit
- screen
- device information
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1466—Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
- H04L9/3273—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/50—Secure pairing of devices
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/08—Access security
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
- H04W12/65—Environment-dependent, e.g. using captured environmental data
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W84/00—Network topologies
- H04W84/18—Self-organising networks, e.g. ad-hoc networks or sensor networks
- H04W84/20—Master-slave selection or change arrangements
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a communication device, a communication system, and an authentication method, and more specifically, to a communication device that achieves both improvement in security and simplification of settings in authentication connection between communication devices by a wireless AN or the like. And a communication system including the communication device in the configuration, and an authentication method performed in the communication system.
- wireless LAN does not require complicated wiring connection compared to wired LAN, but requires various settings for wireless connection.
- the setting of security which is an essential item of wireless LAN, is difficult and difficult for ordinary users who are not familiar with technology because the content is specialized and complicated.
- IEEE Standard 802.11 stipulates two partial connection processes, authentication and key generation, and requires that the client and the authentication server or access point (AP) have common information for authentication in advance. Is assumed. For this reason, in order to further popularize wireless LANs in homes, the task of simplifying settings is one of the inevitable issues.
- the first method is a method for performing mutual authentication between an AP and a client using wireless communication (see Patent Document 1).
- both buttons are pressed at the same time to reduce the wireless output power of both, and a special setting mode is entered for automatic setting.
- a kind of secret communication is formed between the AP and the client by controlling the wireless output power, and mutual authentication and setting are performed.
- a second method is a method for performing mutual authentication between a master and a slave using wireless communication (see FIG. 35, Patent Document 2).
- a common key is shared between a master and a slave in advance.
- an authentication request is sent to the master Be trusted.
- the master sends a challenge instruction to the slave.
- the slave sends an authentication request including the challenge encrypted with the common key to the master.
- the master decrypts the encrypted challenge with its own shared key, and if the decryption matches the challenge sent to the slave, the master accepts the authentication according to the user's instruction. I do.
- a third method is a method for performing mutual authentication between a master and a slave using wireless communication (see FIG. 36, Patent Document 3).
- the master and the slave receive the press of the registration button.
- the slave sends a registration application including its own public key and unique information to the master.
- the master sends a registration confirmation including the unique information of the slave encrypted with the slave's public key to the slave.
- the master transmits an authentication notification including the master's common key encrypted with the slave's public key to the slave.
- the slave sends an authentication receipt including the authentication response encrypted with the master's common key to the master.
- a fourth method is a method for performing mutual authentication between two communication apparatuses having display means using wireless communication (see FIG. 37, Patent Document 4).
- the communication device A transmits a key transmission message including its own public key to the communication device B.
- This public key is converted into another value in each of the communication device A and the communication device B, and output using each visual means or auditory means.
- the user verifies whether or not the output converted values of the public key match, and determines permission Z disapproval. If permitted, the communication device B transmits the new key generation information encrypted with the public key of the communication device A to the communication device A. Then, the communication device A and the communication device B generate a common encryption key for communication based on the new key generation information.
- Patent Document 1 JP 2004-215232A
- Patent Document 2 Patent No. 3585422
- Patent Document 3 Patent No. 3628250
- Patent Document 4 Patent No. 3552648
- input means such as a keyboard is required to input a shared common key. For this reason, it is a "mouth" for networked consumer electronics that do not have a keyboard or the like.
- both the communication device A and the communication device B need to have display means.
- merely displaying and verifying the converted value of the public key will result in the user being tampered with another public key that has a similar converted value that is difficult for the user's eyes or ears to distinguish, thereby resulting in an unauthorized third party. There is a possibility that spoofing may occur.
- an object of the present invention is to provide a communication device, a communication system, and an authentication method that prevent impersonation by an unauthorized third party and improve the security and reliability of authentication processing. is there.
- the present invention relates to a communication device that requires authentication for connection to another communication device, a communication device that requests authentication for connection to another communication device, and a system configured with these communication devices. , And the authentication methods performed by this system.
- a communication device requiring authentication includes: a receiving unit that receives an authentication request including device information capable of uniquely identifying a communication device from another communication device; A display unit that displays device information included in the display unit on a screen, an input unit that inputs an instruction determined by a user based on the screen of the display unit, and a communication unit with another communication device according to the instruction input to the input unit. An authentication unit that executes processing of authentication permission or authentication non-permission.
- the communication device that requests authentication according to the present invention includes a transmitting unit that transmits an authentication request including device information capable of uniquely identifying the communication device to another communication device, and a device information corresponding to the authentication request.
- a receiving unit that receives an authentication response including the authentication response from another communication device, a display unit that displays device information included in the authentication response on a screen, and an input unit that inputs an instruction determined by a user based on the screen of the display unit. And an authentication unit that executes a process of permitting or denying authentication with another communication device in accordance with an instruction input to the input unit.
- a display device may be provided in one of the communication device requiring the authentication and the communication device requiring the authentication.
- the display unit displays a plurality of device information included in the plurality of authentication requests or authentication responses on a screen. It may be displayed at the same time.
- the authentication unit may execute a process of disabling authentication of another communication device if there is no user instruction to the input unit after a predetermined time has elapsed.
- the typical device information includes at least the identification number of the communication device and either the public key or the electronic signature.
- the authentication unit generates the common encryption key using the identification number included in the authentication request received from another communication device.
- the device information of the slave requesting authentication is displayed on the master side, or the device information of the master side is displayed on the slave side. This makes it possible for the user to easily determine whether or not the communication device that has transmitted the authentication request is a slave or a master to be authenticated. Therefore, the security and reliability of the authentication process can be improved. Also, if the common encryption key is generated using the device information (ID) confirmed on the screen, the confidentiality in the actual communication can be further improved.
- FIG. 1 is a diagram showing a schematic configuration of a wireless LAN system according to a first embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 2 is a sequence diagram showing a basic authentication procedure performed between two parties.
- FIG. 3 is a flowchart showing processing of an authentication method according to the first embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 4A is a diagram showing an example of an authentication request.
- FIG. 4B is a diagram showing an example of an authentication response.
- FIG. 5A is a diagram showing a screen display example of the display unit 13.
- FIG. 5B is a diagram showing a screen display example of the display unit 13.
- FIG. 6 is a sequence diagram showing an authentication procedure performed between three parties.
- FIG. 7 is a diagram showing an example of a screen display on the display unit 13.
- FIG. 8 is a sequence diagram showing an authentication procedure when an unauthorized person interrupts between two persons.
- FIG. 9 is a diagram showing a schematic configuration of a wireless LAN system according to a second embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 10 is a sequence diagram showing a basic authentication procedure performed between two parties.
- FIG. 11 is a flowchart showing a process of an authentication method according to a second embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 12A is a diagram showing an example of an authentication request.
- FIG. 12B is a diagram showing an example of an authentication response.
- FIG. 12C is a diagram showing an example of a key generation request.
- FIG. 12D is a diagram showing an example of a key generation response.
- FIG. 13 is a sequence diagram showing an authentication procedure performed between three parties.
- FIG. 14 is a sequence diagram showing an authentication procedure when an unauthorized person interrupts between two persons.
- FIG. 15 is a diagram showing a detailed configuration example of the authentication units 12 and 22.
- FIG. 16 is a flowchart showing processing of an authentication method according to a third embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 17 is a diagram showing an example of a format of an authentication request message.
- FIG. 18 is a diagram showing an example of a format of an authentication response message.
- FIG. 19 is a diagram showing an example of a format of a falsified and transferred authentication request message.
- FIG. 20 is a diagram showing an example of a format of a falsified 'transferred authentication response message. It is.
- FIG. 21 is a diagram showing an example of a format of an authentication response message.
- FIG. 22 is a diagram showing an example of the format of a falsified and transferred authentication response message.
- FIG. 23 is a diagram showing an example of the format of a common encryption key generation request message.
- FIG. 24 is a diagram showing an example of a format of a common encryption key generation response message.
- FIG. 25 is a sequence diagram showing an authentication procedure performed in a wireless LAN system according to another embodiment.
- FIG. 26 is a sequence diagram showing an authentication procedure performed in a wireless LAN system according to another embodiment.
- FIG. 27 is a sequence diagram showing an operation procedure of sharing HD information between clients between APs.
- FIG. 28 is a sequence diagram showing an authentication operation between an AP and a client when the client shares ID information.
- FIG. 29 is a sequence diagram of an authentication operation in the case of sharing HD information of a client between APs.
- FIG. 30 is a sequence diagram showing an embodiment in which client HD information is shared by routers.
- FIG. 31 is a sequence diagram showing an authentication operation in the case of an embodiment in which HD information of a client is shared by a router.
- FIG. 32 is a sequence diagram showing an operation of erasing authenticated HD information of a client due to disconnection.
- FIG. 33 is a sequence diagram showing an operation of erasing client-authenticated HD information on a plurality of APs by disconnection.
- FIG. 34 is a sequence diagram showing an operation of deleting client-authenticated HD information on a router by disconnection.
- FIG. 35 is a flowchart showing a processing example of a conventional authentication method.
- FIG. 36 is a flowchart showing a processing example of a conventional authentication method.
- FIG. 37 is a flowchart showing a processing example of a conventional authentication method.
- the present invention provides a communication device connected to various network systems regardless of whether it is wireless Z-wired or short-distance Z-distance, and is particularly characterized in an authentication process performed between the communication devices. is there.
- the present invention will be described using a wireless LAN system including a master (or access point) and a slave (or client) as an example.
- FIG. 1 is a diagram showing a schematic configuration of a wireless LAN system according to a first embodiment of the present invention.
- the wireless LAN system in FIG. 1 has a configuration in which a master 10, a slave 20, and a power wireless LAN 30 are connected.
- the master 10 includes a transmission / reception unit 11, an authentication unit 12, a display unit 13, and an input unit 1.
- the slave 20 includes a transmitting / receiving unit 21, an authentication unit 22, and an input unit 24.
- the transmission / reception unit 11 receives the authentication message from the authentication unit 12, attaches information necessary for reception by the slave 20, such as the address of the slave 20 and the address of the master 10, as a header, and transmits the information via the wireless LAN 30. Send.
- the transmitting / receiving unit 11 determines whether or not the message transmitted from the slave 20 is addressed to the master 10 based on the header information, receives the message, extracts an authentication message part, and passes it to the authentication unit 12.
- the wireless channel information (for example, channel number) in the communication of the wireless LAN 30 used for transmission and reception is notified to the authentication unit 12.
- the transmission / reception unit 21 receives the authentication message from the authentication unit 22, attaches the information necessary for the master 10 to receive, such as the address of the master 10 and the address of the slave 20, as headers, and , Transmitted by the wireless LAN 30. Further, the transmitting / receiving unit 21 determines whether or not the message transmitted from the master 10 is addressed to the slave 20 based on the header information, receives the message, extracts an authentication message part, and passes it to the authentication unit 22. The wireless channel information used for transmission and reception is reported to the authentication unit 22, respectively.
- the authentication units 12 and 22 play a role of performing overall control when connecting to another communication device.
- the authentication units 12 and 22 assemble and disassemble a message such as an authentication request.
- the authentication units 12 and 22 monitor the transmission of the authentication request message for falsification by a third party device.
- the authentication unit 12 also performs control such as channel information display or public key display.
- the authentication units 12 and 22 may be implemented in either a wireless LAN MAC (media 'access' control) layer or a layer higher than the MAC.
- the authentication request message uses the same format as the MAC layer frame.
- the authentication request message and the like use a different format from the MAC layer frame and are transmitted in a form encapsulated in the MAC frame.
- the display unit 13 displays device information included in the authentication request received from the slave 20 on a screen.
- the device information is, for example, a strong identification number (ID) such as a product number or a MAC address, a public key, an electronic signature, and the like. This display is performed to make the user determine that the authentication is permitted and that the Z authentication is not permitted.
- the display unit 13 is a display device such as a liquid crystal.
- the input unit 14 receives data and command input from the user to the master 10, Authentication permission based on the display on the display unit 13 is provided for inputting a determination of authentication non-permission.
- the input unit 24 is provided for a user to input data and commands to the master 10.
- the input units 14 and 24 are constituted by, for example, push buttons.
- the first embodiment is an embodiment relating to a wireless LAN system in which only the master 10 has the display unit 13.
- the slave 20 may be a network camera without a display
- the master 10 may be a network camera controller with a display 13.
- an authentication procedure performed in the wireless LAN system according to the first embodiment will be described.
- the format of the message exchanged between the master 10 and the slave 20 is a known format such as the MAC layer standard of IEEE Standard 802.11. Available.
- FIG. 4A is a diagram illustrating an example of an authentication request.
- the master 10 receives the authentication request (step S301), and displays the device information included in the authentication request on the screen of the display unit 13 (step S302).
- 5A and 5B are diagrams showing examples of the screen of the display unit 13 on which the device information is displayed.
- the user visually confirms the device information displayed on the screen of the display unit 13, determines whether authentication is permitted or not, and instructs the master 10 via the input unit 14 (step S303). This indication is typically made by depressing a push button.
- the master 10 that has been instructed to authenticate the Z-authentication is transmitted a response according to the instruction to the slave 20 (steps S304 and S305).
- the device information of the slave 20 may be directly obtained by the user who checks the display unit 13 of the master 10 (obtained from the internal memory data of the slave 20 or the product specification, etc.), or other information for managing the slave 20.
- the user may be notified (notification by telephone or note writing).
- the timing of acquisition is indicated on the display of Master 10.
- the information may be displayed on the display 13 or before the display.
- FIG. 4B is a diagram showing an example of the authentication response.
- This authentication permission response is received by the slave 20 (step S312).
- the master 10 and the slave 20 communicate with each other based on the public key (PubKey) of the slave 20, the ID (IDm) of the master 10, the ID (IDs) of the slave 20, and the random number (N).
- PubKey public key
- IDm ID of the master 10
- ID (IDs) of the slave 20 the random number (N).
- the common encryption key for communication is generated by the following equation, for example.
- prf () is a pseudorandom function.
- PreMasterKey is a common value set in advance.
- the master 10 creates an authentication disapproval response and creates a (Step S305). If there is no response from the master 10 within a predetermined time after the slave 20 transmits the authentication request, it is determined that the authentication is not permitted, and the master 10 transmits an authentication non-permission response to the slave 20. You don't have to.
- FIG. 7 is a diagram showing an example of a screen of the display unit 13 on which device information is displayed. The user visually checks the two pieces of device information displayed on the screen of the display unit 13, determines whether authentication is permitted or not, and instructs the master 10 via the input unit 14.
- the user since the user knows the device information of the slave 20 to be authenticated, the user selects the slave 20 that has transmitted the device information and performs the authentication permission. If none of the device information displayed on the screen of the display unit 13 matches the known device information, the user determines that the authentication is not permitted.
- the slave 20 transmits an authentication request including the device information [ID1, key 1] to the master 10. However, this authentication request is received by the unauthorized device 90 without reaching the master 10. In order to impersonate the slave, the unauthorized device 90 transmits an authentication request in which the device information [ID1, key 1] is replaced with fake device information [ID1, key 2] to the master 10.
- the master 10 receives the authentication request, and displays the device information included in the authentication request on the screen of the display unit 13. The user visually confirms the device information displayed on the screen of the display unit 13, and among the displayed device information, the public key information does not match the device information of the slave 20 to be authenticated. Judge that.
- the user recognizes that the displayed device information [ID 1, key 2] is different from the obtained device information [ID 1, key 1] of the slave 20.
- the user sends a response indicating that the authentication is not permitted to the device that has made the authentication request. Note that the same operation is performed even when an electronic signature is used for the device information instead of the key.
- device information of a slave that has requested authentication is displayed on the master side on a screen. This makes it possible for the user to easily determine whether the communication device that has transmitted the authentication request is a slave that should be authenticated. Therefore, the security and reliability of the authentication process can be improved.
- FIG. 9 is a diagram showing a schematic configuration of a wireless LAN system according to the second embodiment of the present invention.
- the wireless LAN system in FIG. 9 has a configuration in which a master 40, a slave 50, and a power wireless LAN 30 are connected.
- the master 40 includes a transmission / reception unit 11, an authentication unit 12, and an input unit 14.
- the slave 50 includes a transmitting / receiving unit 21, an authentication unit 22, a display unit 23, and an input unit 24.
- the wireless LAN system according to the second embodiment has a configuration in which the display unit 23 is provided on the slave 50 side instead of the master 40 side.
- the display unit 23 displays device information included in the authentication response received from the master 40 on a screen. This display is performed to make the user determine that the authentication is permitted and that the authentication is not permitted.
- the display unit 23 is a display device such as a liquid crystal.
- the input unit 24 is provided for inputting, in addition to a data input or a command input to the slave 50 by the user, a determination of authentication permission or Z authentication rejection based on the display on the display unit 23.
- the second embodiment relates to a wireless LAN system in which only the slave 50 has the display unit 23.
- the slave 50 is a WiFi telephone handset having a display unit 23 and the master 40 is a WiFi telephone base unit without a display unit.
- an authentication procedure performed in the wireless LAN system according to the second embodiment will be described.
- the format of the message exchanged between the master 40 and the slave 50 is based on known formats such as the MAC layer standard of IEEE Standard 802.11. Format is available.
- FIG. 12A is a diagram illustrating an example of the authentication request.
- the master 40 receives the authentication request (step S1101), and transmits an authentication response including the device information of its own ID and public key (or electronic signature) to the slave 50 (step S1102).
- FIG. 12B is a diagram illustrating an example of the authentication response.
- the slave 50 receives the authentication response (step S1112), and displays the device information included in the authentication request on the screen of the display unit 23 (step S1113).
- An example of the screen display of the display unit 23 is as shown in FIGS. 5A and 5B.
- the user visually checks the device information displayed on the screen of the display unit 23, determines whether authentication is permitted or not, and instructs the slave 50 via the input unit 24 (step S1114). This is typically done by depressing a push button. Authentication permitted Z The slave 50 instructed to disallow authentication performs processing according to the instruction.
- the device information of the master 40 is displayed on the display 23 of the slave 50.
- the user himself / herself may directly obtain the information, or may be notified of the power of another user who manages the master 40.
- the information may be obtained when the information is displayed on the display unit 23 of the slave 50 or before the information is displayed.
- the slave 50 transmits its own device encrypted with the public key of the master 40.
- a key generation request including a public key and a random number is created and transmitted to the master 40 (step S1115).
- FIG. 12C is a diagram illustrating an example of the key generation request.
- master 40 Upon receiving the key generation request (step S1103), master 40 transmits a key generation response including the random number encrypted with the public key of slave 50 to slave 50 (step S1104).
- FIG. 12D is a diagram showing an example of the key generation response. This key generation response is received by the slave 50 (step S1116).
- the master 40 and the slave 50 communicate with the public key (PubKeyM) of the master 40, the public key (PubKeyS) of the slave 50, the ID (IDm) of the master 40, the ID (IDs) of the slave 50, and the random number generated by the slave 50 (PubKeyM). Ns) and the random number (Nm) generated by the master 40, respectively, to generate a common encryption key for communication (steps S1105 and S1117).
- the common encryption key for communication is generated by the following equation, for example.
- the slave 50 ends the authentication process. .
- the slave 50 may be displayed on the display unit 23 and may determine that the authentication is not permitted if neither the power nor the user power is input within a predetermined time.
- the slave 50 receives the authentication responses from the first master 40 and the second master 40, respectively, and displays two pieces of device information on the screen of the display unit 23.
- a screen display example of the display unit 23 is as shown in FIG. The user is displayed on the screen of the display unit 23! (2) The two device information are visually checked, and whether or not authentication is permitted or not is determined via the input unit 24, and the slave 50 is instructed.
- the master 4 that has transmitted the device information is known. Select 0 to permit authentication. If none of the device information displayed on the screen of the display unit 23 matches the known device information, the user determines that the authentication is not permitted.
- the same operation is performed when an electronic signature is used for device information instead of a key.
- the slave 50 sends an authentication request to the master 40.
- the master 40 transmits an authentication response including the device information [ID 1, key 1] to the slave 40 in response to the authentication request. However, this authentication response does not reach the slave 50 and is received by the unauthorized party device 90.
- the unauthorized device 90 transmits an authentication response in which the device information [ID1, key 1] is replaced with fake device information [ID1, key 2] to the slave 50.
- the slave 50 receives the authentication response, and displays the device information included in the authentication response on the screen of the display unit 23. The user is displayed on the screen of the display unit 23! The device information is visually checked and displayed, and it is determined that the public key information among the device information does not match the device information of the master 40 to be authenticated.
- the user recognizes that the displayed device information [ID 1, key 2] is different from the obtained device information [ID 1, key 1] of the master 40.
- the user ends the authentication processing. Note that the same operation is performed even when an electronic signature is used for the device information instead of the key.
- the device information of the master that has responded to the authentication is displayed on the slave side on the screen. This allows the user to easily determine whether or not the communication device that has transmitted the authentication response is a master device that should be authenticated. Therefore, the security and reliability of the authentication process can be further improved.
- FIG. 15 is a diagram showing a detailed configuration example of the authentication units 12 and 22.
- the authentication units 12 and 22 include a public key / private key generation unit 111 , An electronic signature unit 112, an encryption unit 113, a decryption unit 114, a pseudorandom number generation unit 115, a hash function unit 116, and a common encryption key generation unit 117.
- the specific configuration and the example of authentication described below are similarly applicable to the master 40 and the slave 50 described in the second embodiment.
- Public key / private key generation section 111 generates its own public key / private key pair. This is done when the device is started or when it needs to regenerate its public / private key pair.
- the public key is a public key
- the private key is a private key.
- the digital signature unit 112 shortens the message to a fixed length using the hash function unit 116, encrypts the message with the secret key and the algorithm of the encryption unit 113, and encrypts the result as an electronic signature. Add sage to the sage.
- the encryption unit 113 includes an algorithm for performing encryption using the other party's public key, own secret key, or common encryption key shared with the other party.
- the decryption unit 114 includes an algorithm for decrypting using its own secret key, the public key of the partner (in the case of an electronic signature), or a common encryption key shared with the partner.
- the pseudo-random number generation unit 115 has a pseudo-random number generation function that makes it difficult to predict regularity, and generates a non-stable (when necessary) ID. This ID is a random number generated by the pseudo-random number generator 115. Since the ID has the same role as the identification number such as the product number and the MAC address described in the first embodiment, the same “ID” is used. (See Example 4 of the present embodiment).
- the hash function unit 116 includes a one-way hash function for compressing a long bit string into a fixed-length bit string.
- the common encryption key generation unit 117 generates a common encryption key using the pseudo-random number generation unit 115 based on the two nonces (the number of L's).
- the public key / private key generation unit 111, the electronic signature unit 112, the encryption unit 113, the decryption unit 114, the pseudo random number generation unit 115, the hash function unit 116, and the common encryption key generation unit 117 As described above, it may be implemented as an internal module of the authentication units 12 and 22. You can.
- the probe request 1600 and the probe response 1601 adopt a conventional standard format represented by IEEE 802.11.
- the probe confirmation 1602 is a new message type that has a function of performing the connection method of the present invention, which is different from the conventional standard, and a function of informing necessary parameters. All messages after the authentication request 1603 adopt the new format specified in the present invention.
- An example of the format of the authentication request 1603 is shown in FIG.
- HDR cl701 is a header including the address and message type of the client 20, and is the same as the header of the conventional authentication request.
- PLcl702 is the same payload as the conventional one.
- PKc 1704 is the public key of client 20.
- IDcl703 is the ID of the client 20.
- the SIGNcl 705 is obtained by signing all fields including the header using the electronic signature unit 112 of the client 20.
- the transmission / reception unit 21 of the client 20 acquires the public key PKcl704 of the client 20 from the public key / private key generation unit 111.
- SIGNc 1705 is obtained from the electronic signature 112 and the authentication request 1603 is generated together with the IDc 1703 held by the authentication output S.
- the authentication request 1603 allows the public key PKcl704 of the client 20 to be passed to the AP10.
- the transmission / reception unit 11 of the AP 10 extracts the public key PKc 1704 and the electronic signature SIGNc 1705 of the client 20 included in the authentication request 1603, and passes them to the authentication unit 12 of the AP 10.
- the authentication unit 12 decrypts the result of decrypting the SIGNc 1705 using the public key PKc 1704 of the client 20 and the decryption unit 114 of the API 0 with the hash function unit 116 of the AP 10 in response to the received authentication request 1603. Use the function to compare with the result of multiplying the same hash function used when signing client 20 (ie, perform an integrity check).
- the authentication unit 12 displays the ID included in the received authentication request 1603, that is, IDc, and the information of the wireless channel used for reception by the transmission / reception unit 11 of the AP 10 on the display unit 13 of the AP 10. indicate.
- the user is displayed on the display unit 13 of the AP 10 to check whether the IDc and the wireless channel information match the IDc and the wireless channel information of the client to be authenticated.
- Authorization is performed using part 14.
- the IDc included in the received authentication request 1603 and the IDc used in the reception by the transmission / reception unit 11 are used.
- the content of the received authentication request 1603 may be displayed unconditionally without using the electronic signature to confirm the match.
- the AP 10 When the authentication request 1603 is successful, the AP 10 returns an authentication response 1605 to the client 20.
- An example of the format of the authentication response 1605 is shown in FIG. PLal802 contains the authentication result.
- PKal804 is the public key of AP10.
- IDal803 is the ID of AP10.
- SIGNal 805 is a signature for each field of the authentication response 1605 using the secret key of the AP 10 and the electronic signature.
- the transmission / reception unit 11 of the AP 10 acquires the public key PKal804 of the client 20 from the public key / private key generation unit 111. Further, it acquires the SIGNal 805 from the electronic signature unit 112 and generates an authentication response 1605 together with the IDa 1803 held by the authentication unit 21.
- the authentication response 1605 allows the public key PKa of the AP 10 to be passed to the client 20.
- the AP 10 After transmitting the authentication response 1605, the AP 10 monitors whether or not the third party device is transmitting an authentication response 1605 message including the same IDa from any of all predetermined wireless channels. If such a call is made, it is determined that falsification 'transfer has been performed.
- the transmission / reception unit 21 of the client 20 extracts the public key PKal804 and the electronic signature SIGNal805 of the AP 10 included in the authentication response 1605, and passes them to the authentication unit 22 of the client 20. . Then, the message integrity is checked in the same way as AP10. This results in successful authentication.
- the client 20 or the AP 10 monitors whether the authentication request message is tampered with or transferred to a third-party device. If the client 20 can receive all the messages transmitted by the third party device, it is effective for the client 20 to monitor. If the AP 10 can receive both the message transmitted by the client 20 and the message transmitted by the third party device, it is effective for the AP 10 to monitor the message.
- the client 20 performs monitoring, the falsified authentication request of the third-party device received before the authentication response from the AP 10 is returned, except for the public key and signature included in the authentication request transmitted by the client 20 itself. If it is the same as the request, the falsification of the third party device and the transfer action are determined.
- the AP 10 When the AP 10 performs monitoring, if two identical authentication requests except for the public key and the signature are received within a certain period of time, the second Tampering of the three-party device's transfer action is determined.
- the AP 10 receives the authentication response 402 as shown in FIG. 19, the AP 10 has received two identical authentication responses except for the public key PKml904 and the signature SIGNml905, or the client 20 also sends the public key and signature of the authentication request sent by itself. Since it is as if this authentication request has been received with falsification, the falsification of the third party device can be determined.
- the determination of "monitoring" that the authentication response message is tampered with "transferred” to the third party device may be performed by exchanging roles between the client 20 and the AP 10 using the same processing method as the authentication request message.
- the client 20 receives the authentication response 404 as shown in FIG. 20, it receives the same two authentication responses except for the public key PKm2004 and the signature SIGNm2005! /, Or the AP 10 itself sends the authentication response. Since it is as if this authentication response, in which the public key and signature of the response have been falsified, has been received, falsification and transfer of the third party device can be determined by either of them.
- the authentication response 1605 adopts a format as shown in FIG. 21 as an example.
- the encryption unit 113 of the AP 10 encrypts the authentication response information PLa2102, the public key PKa2104 of the AP10, and the IDa2103 of the AP10 with the public key PKc of the client 20 received in the authentication request 1603, and transmits the authentication response 1605 to the client 20. I do.
- Such an authentication response 1605 can be decrypted only by the client 20 having the private key which is a pair of the public key PKc.
- the client 20 or the AP 10 does not receive the authentication response 404 as shown in FIG. . If a third-party device attacks using this authentication response, it will simply be ignored by client 20 and will not be harmful.
- the random number generated by the pseudo-random number generator 115 of the client 20 and the AP 10 is used as the ID of the client 20 or the AP 10 each time a client connection is made. This is even more confidential than the MAC Address MAC product model number. It is possible to use a user-defined name as an ID here. It is troublesome to enter it in advance, and the user must set a unique name (especially different from similar equipment in the neighbor) as much as possible No. Using random numbers will result in a different ID the next time you connect, so there is no problem if it is stolen. [0060] (Specific example 5)
- the client 20 sends a common encryption key generation request 1606 as shown in FIG.
- the portion excluding the header HDRc2301 is encrypted by the encryption unit 113 of the client 20 using the public key PKa of the AP10.
- IDc2302 is the ID of the client 20.
- Nc2303 is a random number (nonce) generated by the client 20.
- the encryption unit 113 of the client 20 acquires and encrypts the IDc held by the transmission / reception unit 21 of the client 20 and the random number Nc generated by the pseudorandom number generation unit 115 of the client 20.
- the transmitting / receiving unit 21 of the client 20 adds the header HDRc2301 to the encrypted IDc and the random number Nc, and transmits a common encryption key generation request 1606.
- the transmission / reception unit 11 of the AP 10 receives the common encryption key generation request 1606, extracts data to be decrypted, and passes it to the decryption unit 114.
- the decryption unit 114 decrypts the data using its own secret key. In the decryption result, confirm that the ID is IDc of the previously authenticated client 20. If confirmed, save the random number Nc obtained from the decryption result and use it for key generation later. Otherwise, the received common encryption key generation request 1606 is discarded, and key generation is stopped.
- the common encryption key generation response 1607 is encrypted using the public key PKc of the client 20 except for the header HDRa2401.
- IDa2402 is the ID of AP10.
- Na2403 is a random number generated by AP10.
- the encryption unit 113 of the AP 10 acquires the IDa held by the transmission / reception unit 11 of the AP 10 and the random number Na generated by the pseudo random number generation unit 115 of the AP 10, and encrypts them.
- the transmitting / receiving unit 11 of the AP 10 adds the header HDRa2401 to the encrypted IDa and the random number Na, and transmits a common encryption key generation response 1607.
- the transmission / reception unit 21 of the client 20 receives the common encryption key generation response 1607, extracts data to be decrypted, and passes it to the decryption unit 114. In decryption section 114, it decrypts with its own secret key. In the decryption result, confirm that the ID is the IDa of the previously authenticated AP10. If confirmed, save the Na obtained from the decryption result and use it for key generation later. Otherwise, the received common encryption key generation response 1607 is discarded, and key generation is stopped.
- the common encryption key generation unit 117 of the AP 10 and the client 20 ID or MAC address A common key to be shared is generated based on the source and the random number.
- the AP 10 and the client 20 will now generate and share the same key.
- the common encryption key generated by the client 20 and the AP 10 is used for creating the next association. That is, the association request 1608 and the association response 1609 in FIG. 16 are also encrypted using this key.
- the receiving side decrypts the received message using the key.
- the generated key may use another key for transmitting and receiving power data used for transmitting and receiving control messages between the client 20 and the AP 10.
- both the AP 10 and the client 20 may perform an operation of selecting the same encryption key to be used for subsequent authentication.
- a challenge instruction from AP 10 to client 20 and an authentication request in which the challenge from client 20 to AP 10 is encrypted are performed (FIG. 25).
- a fixed number is usually used as the ID, but a random number can be used as the ID.
- the fixed number may be assigned to the client 20 in advance, but may be set independently by the user for each client 20. It is easy to set this ID through the input unit 24.
- the present invention can be applied to a system having a router or a home gateway as an upper device of the AP 10 (FIG. 26).
- the display unit 13 and the input unit 14 provided in the AP 10 may be provided in a router or a home gateway, and the same processing as in the AP 10 may be performed in the router or the home gateway.
- the router or home gateway is connected to the AP 10 via a secure communication path, and the access point performs a relay function.
- the present invention can be applied to a connection in a case where a wireless LAN is connected between a router or a home gateway and an access point.
- the client information sharing method includes an AP sharing method in which all AP information of an authenticated client is shared among all APs, and only information of a client authenticated by the AP is managed by itself.
- an AP distributed management method in which all the IDs of the clients are distributed and shared by the entire AP, and a router sharing method in which the router saves and shares all the information of the authenticated clients in the router.
- the authentication response (success) 2700 When the authentication of the client 20 by the AP 10 succeeds, the AP 10 puts the ID of the authenticated client 20.
- Multicast client announcement 2701 to all APas in the network. Each APa that receives the client announcement 2701 may or may not return a response 2702 to the AP 10.
- the AP 10 holds the ID of the client 20 authenticated by the AP 10 as authenticated information, and notifies the authenticated ID from other APs by a multi-cast message, and holds the ID as authenticated information. Therefore, all APs have the same authenticated HD information inside each AP. Thereafter, as shown in FIG.
- the APb determines whether or not it has the authenticated HD information of the client 20. Find out. If the authenticated HD information of the client 20 is held, APb returns an authentication response (success) 2801 to the client 20 as an authenticated processing procedure. If not, the client 20 is regarded as initial authentication, and executes any of the normal authentication procedures described in the first to third embodiments.
- the AP does not multicast the ID information of the client to other APs.
- the APb After receiving the authentication request 2900 from the APb power client 20, if the APb does not have the HD information of the client 20 as the authenticated I-off blue information, it transmits to the other APs including the AP10.
- Client 20 Multicast access request (ID) 2901 with In other words, it inquires of other APs whether they have the authenticated HD information.
- the access response 2902 is returned from the original connection destination AP 10 of the client 20 within the designated time, the APb transmits an authentication response (success) 2903 to the client 20 as an authenticated processing procedure. If no access response is received from any AP, the APb executes the normal authentication procedure, assuming that the authentication request 2900 from the client 20 is initial authentication.
- the AP 10 transmits a client announcement 3001 with the authenticated information of the client 20 to the router.
- the router receiving the client announcement 3001 registers the ID of the client 20 in its own database as authenticated information, and returns a response 3002.
- APb the client 20 responds to the authentication request 3100 because the client 20 is not its own client,
- An access request (ID) 3101 carrying the HD information of the client 20 is transmitted.
- the router searches its own database to determine whether or not the authenticated information of the client 20 has been registered. Reply to APb at 3102. If the authenticated information is registered, the authentication is successful, otherwise the authentication is not permitted.
- APb sends an authentication response (success) 3103 to client 20. If the content of the access response 3102 is unsuccessful, the authentication is regarded as the first authentication with respect to the client 20, and the APb communicates with the client 20 using any of the authentication procedures described in the first to third embodiments. Execute
- the APs In the AP sharing method and the AP distribution management method, the APs have a mutual trust relationship, and secure communication means is used between the APs. In the router sharing method, the AP and the router have a mutual trust relationship and use secure communication means.
- the client 20 send their disconnection message 3202 with their own ID to AP10.
- the AP 10 that has received the disconnection message deletes the HD information of the client 20 from its own database in step 3203. To do this, if the user selects disconnection, a disconnection message is sent to the API, and the authenticated HD information stored in the devices in the network also erases the client 20 information. ,.
- the client 20 attaches its own HD information to the disconnection message 3402 and sends it to the nearest AP.
- the AP transfers the disconnection message 3402 to the router as the disconnection message 3403.
- the router checks whether the received information is authenticated information, and if authenticated, in step 3404, deletes the If green information. Thereafter, a disconnection response 3405 is returned to the AP, and the AP transfers the disconnection response 3406 to the client 20 as a disconnection response 3406.
- the user When the client is permanently disconnected by, for example, turning off the power without disconnecting the client, the user directly deletes the client ID provided in the AP or the router.
- a function may be used.
- the AP or the router is provided with a display unit capable of displaying the authenticated information and an operation unit for deleting any of the displayed authenticated information, and the devices in the network store the authenticated information.
- Information capability A predetermined or desired client can be deauthorized.
- the AP or router that has received the erase request notifies the authenticated I-off blue report to be erased by the multicast erase request message and receives the erase request. Authenticated to be deleted If you have stored a blue report, delete it What should I do?
- the AP when the AP performs authentication, if a plurality of APs are installed at various places in the house, the user needs to move to the place where the APs are installed. In this case, if the information on the display section of the AP can be viewed by the remote control device with the display section, the movement becomes unnecessary. What is necessary is just to be able to set up a secure wireless communication path between the remote control and the AP. Since the remote controller only needs to have a function of confirming information and instructing authentication permission, a simple transmission path without encryption or the like may be applied.
- the display unit and the authentication unit of the AP are provided on the remote control device, a communication path is provided between the main body of the AP and the remote control device, and the user can perform the authentication input at hand.
- the router performs authentication
- similar operations can be performed with a similar remote control configuration.
- the remote control device When the remote control device is inserted into a connection portion provided in the main body of the AP or the router, the remote control device and the main body can be directly coupled to each other. It may be taken out of the unit and made movable by the user.
- the remote control device When the remote control device is removed from the main unit, determine the shared key R for remote control wireless communication between the main unit and the remote control device, transmit display information during the subsequent authentication process, and input authentication permission.
- the main unit and the remote control device such as transmitting information and transmitting an encryption key number for selecting an encryption key
- the transmitted data if the transmitted data is encrypted and decrypted using the shared key R, it can be sent to a third party. The contents of the transmitted data will not be known.
- the shared key R can be newly determined each time the remote control device is removed from the main unit, providing a secure communication path.
- the present invention is applicable to a communication network system or the like for performing an authentication connection between communication devices, and is particularly suitable for a case where it is desired to improve security in authentication processing and to simplify setting.
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US10/579,628 US7603557B2 (en) | 2004-04-15 | 2005-04-12 | Communication device, communication system and authentication method |
JP2006512343A JP4621200B2 (ja) | 2004-04-15 | 2005-04-12 | 通信装置、通信システム及び認証方法 |
Applications Claiming Priority (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP2004-120132 | 2004-04-15 | ||
JP2004120132 | 2004-04-15 | ||
JP2004147422 | 2004-05-18 | ||
JP2004-147422 | 2004-05-18 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2005101727A1 true WO2005101727A1 (ja) | 2005-10-27 |
Family
ID=35150326
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/JP2005/007096 WO2005101727A1 (ja) | 2004-04-15 | 2005-04-12 | 通信装置、通信システム及び認証方法 |
Country Status (3)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US7603557B2 (ja) |
JP (1) | JP4621200B2 (ja) |
WO (1) | WO2005101727A1 (ja) |
Cited By (12)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP2007194788A (ja) * | 2006-01-18 | 2007-08-02 | Nintendo Co Ltd | 通信システム、ならびにそれに用いられる通信プログラムおよび接続制御装置 |
JP2007201851A (ja) * | 2006-01-27 | 2007-08-09 | Hitachi Kokusai Electric Inc | 無線通信装置 |
WO2008118475A1 (en) * | 2007-03-26 | 2008-10-02 | Sibeam, Inc. | Security mechanism for wireless video area networks |
JP2009033585A (ja) * | 2007-07-30 | 2009-02-12 | Nec Infrontia Corp | 無線lan端末接続方法およびその方法を用いた無線lanシステム |
JP2009163546A (ja) * | 2008-01-08 | 2009-07-23 | Nec Corp | ゲートウェイ、中継方法及びプログラム |
JP2010004226A (ja) * | 2008-06-19 | 2010-01-07 | Ricoh Co Ltd | 情報通信装置および公開鍵認証方法 |
JP2010504055A (ja) * | 2006-09-18 | 2010-02-04 | マーベル インターナショナル リミテッド | 多数のデバイス間のアドホックネットワーク構築 |
JP2013137313A (ja) * | 2007-07-26 | 2013-07-11 | Renishaw Plc | 座標位置決め装置用測定プローブシステム |
CN103327489A (zh) * | 2013-06-28 | 2013-09-25 | 宇龙计算机通信科技(深圳)有限公司 | 认证的方法和系统 |
JP2013250999A (ja) * | 2013-08-23 | 2013-12-12 | Panasonic Corp | 車載装置、およびデータ送信処理方法 |
JP2014107766A (ja) * | 2012-11-29 | 2014-06-09 | Brother Ind Ltd | 画像処理システム,画像処理装置,および情報処理装置 |
JP2016189566A (ja) * | 2015-03-30 | 2016-11-04 | 大日本印刷株式会社 | 無線通信装置および無線通信システム |
Families Citing this family (225)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7783756B2 (en) * | 2005-06-03 | 2010-08-24 | Alcatel Lucent | Protection for wireless devices against false access-point attacks |
JP4665617B2 (ja) * | 2005-06-10 | 2011-04-06 | 沖電気工業株式会社 | メッセージ認証システム,メッセージ送信装置,メッセージ受信装置,メッセージ送信方法,メッセージ受信方法およびプログラム |
CN100591011C (zh) * | 2006-08-31 | 2010-02-17 | 华为技术有限公司 | 一种认证方法及系统 |
US8103247B2 (en) * | 2006-10-31 | 2012-01-24 | Microsoft Corporation | Automated secure pairing for wireless devices |
WO2008072353A1 (ja) * | 2006-12-15 | 2008-06-19 | Fujitsu Limited | テレビ録画装置、テレビ受像装置、および制御プログラム |
JP4535119B2 (ja) * | 2007-11-20 | 2010-09-01 | 沖電気工業株式会社 | 共通鍵生成システム、共通鍵生成方法及びそれを用いるノード |
JP5067866B2 (ja) * | 2008-01-08 | 2012-11-07 | キヤノン株式会社 | 通信装置及び制御方法 |
JP4885892B2 (ja) * | 2008-02-22 | 2012-02-29 | 株式会社ソニー・コンピュータエンタテインメント | 端末装置、情報提供システム、ファイルアクセス方法およびデータ構造 |
JP4999736B2 (ja) * | 2008-03-13 | 2012-08-15 | キヤノン株式会社 | データ処理装置 |
TWI585071B (zh) * | 2008-05-23 | 2017-06-01 | 派洛泰克藥物股份有限公司 | 四環素化合物之甲苯磺酸鹽及同素異形體 |
US8504836B2 (en) * | 2008-12-29 | 2013-08-06 | Motorola Mobility Llc | Secure and efficient domain key distribution for device registration |
US9538355B2 (en) | 2008-12-29 | 2017-01-03 | Google Technology Holdings LLC | Method of targeted discovery of devices in a network |
US9148423B2 (en) * | 2008-12-29 | 2015-09-29 | Google Technology Holdings LLC | Personal identification number (PIN) generation between two devices in a network |
CN101447010B (zh) * | 2008-12-30 | 2012-02-22 | 飞天诚信科技股份有限公司 | 登录系统及登录方法 |
US8904172B2 (en) * | 2009-06-17 | 2014-12-02 | Motorola Mobility Llc | Communicating a device descriptor between two devices when registering onto a network |
US8873523B2 (en) * | 2009-09-30 | 2014-10-28 | Apple Inc. | Methods and apparatus for solicited activation for protected wireless networking |
US8830866B2 (en) * | 2009-09-30 | 2014-09-09 | Apple Inc. | Methods and apparatus for solicited activation for protected wireless networking |
US9038188B2 (en) * | 2010-01-15 | 2015-05-19 | Bank Of America Corporation | Protecting data stored in a chip card interface device in the event of compromise |
US20110178903A1 (en) * | 2010-01-15 | 2011-07-21 | Bank Of America Corporation | Personal identification number changing system and method |
US8707413B2 (en) * | 2010-01-15 | 2014-04-22 | Bank Of America Corporation | Authenticating a chip card interface device |
US8464061B2 (en) | 2010-08-30 | 2013-06-11 | Apple Inc. | Secure wireless link between two devices using probes |
EP2666317B1 (en) * | 2011-01-20 | 2014-12-24 | Koninklijke Philips N.V. | Method, cognitive radio device and spectrum manager for authenticating and authorizing a plurality of cognitive radio slave devices |
JP5659046B2 (ja) * | 2011-03-02 | 2015-01-28 | オリンパス株式会社 | 無線通信端末および無線通信方法 |
JP5762991B2 (ja) * | 2012-02-03 | 2015-08-12 | 株式会社東芝 | 通信装置、サーバ装置、中継装置、およびプログラム |
US10148097B1 (en) | 2013-11-08 | 2018-12-04 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for using a predetermined number of communication channels of a wireless power transmitter to communicate with different wireless power receivers |
US9923386B1 (en) | 2012-07-06 | 2018-03-20 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for wireless power transmission by modifying a number of antenna elements used to transmit power waves to a receiver |
US10063105B2 (en) | 2013-07-11 | 2018-08-28 | Energous Corporation | Proximity transmitters for wireless power charging systems |
US9887739B2 (en) | 2012-07-06 | 2018-02-06 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for wireless power transmission by comparing voltage levels associated with power waves transmitted by antennas of a plurality of antennas of a transmitter to determine appropriate phase adjustments for the power waves |
US10223717B1 (en) | 2014-05-23 | 2019-03-05 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for payment-based authorization of wireless power transmission service |
US9843201B1 (en) | 2012-07-06 | 2017-12-12 | Energous Corporation | Wireless power transmitter that selects antenna sets for transmitting wireless power to a receiver based on location of the receiver, and methods of use thereof |
US10992187B2 (en) | 2012-07-06 | 2021-04-27 | Energous Corporation | System and methods of using electromagnetic waves to wirelessly deliver power to electronic devices |
US9368020B1 (en) | 2013-05-10 | 2016-06-14 | Energous Corporation | Off-premises alert system and method for wireless power receivers in a wireless power network |
US9847677B1 (en) | 2013-10-10 | 2017-12-19 | Energous Corporation | Wireless charging and powering of healthcare gadgets and sensors |
US10224758B2 (en) | 2013-05-10 | 2019-03-05 | Energous Corporation | Wireless powering of electronic devices with selective delivery range |
US9899873B2 (en) * | 2014-05-23 | 2018-02-20 | Energous Corporation | System and method for generating a power receiver identifier in a wireless power network |
US10205239B1 (en) | 2014-05-07 | 2019-02-12 | Energous Corporation | Compact PIFA antenna |
US9876379B1 (en) | 2013-07-11 | 2018-01-23 | Energous Corporation | Wireless charging and powering of electronic devices in a vehicle |
US9906065B2 (en) | 2012-07-06 | 2018-02-27 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods of transmitting power transmission waves based on signals received at first and second subsets of a transmitter's antenna array |
US9954374B1 (en) | 2014-05-23 | 2018-04-24 | Energous Corporation | System and method for self-system analysis for detecting a fault in a wireless power transmission Network |
US10199849B1 (en) | 2014-08-21 | 2019-02-05 | Energous Corporation | Method for automatically testing the operational status of a wireless power receiver in a wireless power transmission system |
US9831718B2 (en) | 2013-07-25 | 2017-11-28 | Energous Corporation | TV with integrated wireless power transmitter |
US9887584B1 (en) | 2014-08-21 | 2018-02-06 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for a configuration web service to provide configuration of a wireless power transmitter within a wireless power transmission system |
US9941707B1 (en) | 2013-07-19 | 2018-04-10 | Energous Corporation | Home base station for multiple room coverage with multiple transmitters |
US9847679B2 (en) | 2014-05-07 | 2017-12-19 | Energous Corporation | System and method for controlling communication between wireless power transmitter managers |
US10291066B1 (en) | 2014-05-07 | 2019-05-14 | Energous Corporation | Power transmission control systems and methods |
US10128693B2 (en) | 2014-07-14 | 2018-11-13 | Energous Corporation | System and method for providing health safety in a wireless power transmission system |
US10186913B2 (en) | 2012-07-06 | 2019-01-22 | Energous Corporation | System and methods for pocket-forming based on constructive and destructive interferences to power one or more wireless power receivers using a wireless power transmitter including a plurality of antennas |
US9939864B1 (en) | 2014-08-21 | 2018-04-10 | Energous Corporation | System and method to control a wireless power transmission system by configuration of wireless power transmission control parameters |
US9825674B1 (en) | 2014-05-23 | 2017-11-21 | Energous Corporation | Enhanced transmitter that selects configurations of antenna elements for performing wireless power transmission and receiving functions |
US9893554B2 (en) | 2014-07-14 | 2018-02-13 | Energous Corporation | System and method for providing health safety in a wireless power transmission system |
US10124754B1 (en) | 2013-07-19 | 2018-11-13 | Energous Corporation | Wireless charging and powering of electronic sensors in a vehicle |
US9973021B2 (en) | 2012-07-06 | 2018-05-15 | Energous Corporation | Receivers for wireless power transmission |
US10291055B1 (en) | 2014-12-29 | 2019-05-14 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for controlling far-field wireless power transmission based on battery power levels of a receiving device |
US11502551B2 (en) | 2012-07-06 | 2022-11-15 | Energous Corporation | Wirelessly charging multiple wireless-power receivers using different subsets of an antenna array to focus energy at different locations |
US10256657B2 (en) | 2015-12-24 | 2019-04-09 | Energous Corporation | Antenna having coaxial structure for near field wireless power charging |
US10038337B1 (en) | 2013-09-16 | 2018-07-31 | Energous Corporation | Wireless power supply for rescue devices |
US9787103B1 (en) | 2013-08-06 | 2017-10-10 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for wirelessly delivering power to electronic devices that are unable to communicate with a transmitter |
US9859797B1 (en) | 2014-05-07 | 2018-01-02 | Energous Corporation | Synchronous rectifier design for wireless power receiver |
US10992185B2 (en) | 2012-07-06 | 2021-04-27 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods of using electromagnetic waves to wirelessly deliver power to game controllers |
US9838083B2 (en) | 2014-07-21 | 2017-12-05 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for communication with remote management systems |
US9882427B2 (en) | 2013-05-10 | 2018-01-30 | Energous Corporation | Wireless power delivery using a base station to control operations of a plurality of wireless power transmitters |
US10211682B2 (en) | 2014-05-07 | 2019-02-19 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for controlling operation of a transmitter of a wireless power network based on user instructions received from an authenticated computing device powered or charged by a receiver of the wireless power network |
US10206185B2 (en) | 2013-05-10 | 2019-02-12 | Energous Corporation | System and methods for wireless power transmission to an electronic device in accordance with user-defined restrictions |
US10128699B2 (en) | 2014-07-14 | 2018-11-13 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods of providing wireless power using receiver device sensor inputs |
US9891669B2 (en) | 2014-08-21 | 2018-02-13 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for a configuration web service to provide configuration of a wireless power transmitter within a wireless power transmission system |
US9843213B2 (en) | 2013-08-06 | 2017-12-12 | Energous Corporation | Social power sharing for mobile devices based on pocket-forming |
US10230266B1 (en) | 2014-02-06 | 2019-03-12 | Energous Corporation | Wireless power receivers that communicate status data indicating wireless power transmission effectiveness with a transmitter using a built-in communications component of a mobile device, and methods of use thereof |
US10193396B1 (en) | 2014-05-07 | 2019-01-29 | Energous Corporation | Cluster management of transmitters in a wireless power transmission system |
US9859757B1 (en) | 2013-07-25 | 2018-01-02 | Energous Corporation | Antenna tile arrangements in electronic device enclosures |
US9876648B2 (en) | 2014-08-21 | 2018-01-23 | Energous Corporation | System and method to control a wireless power transmission system by configuration of wireless power transmission control parameters |
US9252628B2 (en) | 2013-05-10 | 2016-02-02 | Energous Corporation | Laptop computer as a transmitter for wireless charging |
US10050462B1 (en) | 2013-08-06 | 2018-08-14 | Energous Corporation | Social power sharing for mobile devices based on pocket-forming |
US10090886B1 (en) | 2014-07-14 | 2018-10-02 | Energous Corporation | System and method for enabling automatic charging schedules in a wireless power network to one or more devices |
US9853692B1 (en) | 2014-05-23 | 2017-12-26 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for wireless power transmission |
US9871398B1 (en) | 2013-07-01 | 2018-01-16 | Energous Corporation | Hybrid charging method for wireless power transmission based on pocket-forming |
US9143000B2 (en) | 2012-07-06 | 2015-09-22 | Energous Corporation | Portable wireless charging pad |
US10263432B1 (en) | 2013-06-25 | 2019-04-16 | Energous Corporation | Multi-mode transmitter with an antenna array for delivering wireless power and providing Wi-Fi access |
US10008889B2 (en) | 2014-08-21 | 2018-06-26 | Energous Corporation | Method for automatically testing the operational status of a wireless power receiver in a wireless power transmission system |
US9867062B1 (en) | 2014-07-21 | 2018-01-09 | Energous Corporation | System and methods for using a remote server to authorize a receiving device that has requested wireless power and to determine whether another receiving device should request wireless power in a wireless power transmission system |
US10211680B2 (en) | 2013-07-19 | 2019-02-19 | Energous Corporation | Method for 3 dimensional pocket-forming |
US10090699B1 (en) | 2013-11-01 | 2018-10-02 | Energous Corporation | Wireless powered house |
US10965164B2 (en) | 2012-07-06 | 2021-03-30 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods of wirelessly delivering power to a receiver device |
US10141791B2 (en) | 2014-05-07 | 2018-11-27 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for controlling communications during wireless transmission of power using application programming interfaces |
US20150326070A1 (en) | 2014-05-07 | 2015-11-12 | Energous Corporation | Methods and Systems for Maximum Power Point Transfer in Receivers |
US9806564B2 (en) | 2014-05-07 | 2017-10-31 | Energous Corporation | Integrated rectifier and boost converter for wireless power transmission |
US10243414B1 (en) | 2014-05-07 | 2019-03-26 | Energous Corporation | Wearable device with wireless power and payload receiver |
US9899861B1 (en) | 2013-10-10 | 2018-02-20 | Energous Corporation | Wireless charging methods and systems for game controllers, based on pocket-forming |
US10063064B1 (en) * | 2014-05-23 | 2018-08-28 | Energous Corporation | System and method for generating a power receiver identifier in a wireless power network |
US10063106B2 (en) | 2014-05-23 | 2018-08-28 | Energous Corporation | System and method for a self-system analysis in a wireless power transmission network |
US9948135B2 (en) | 2015-09-22 | 2018-04-17 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for identifying sensitive objects in a wireless charging transmission field |
US9859756B2 (en) | 2012-07-06 | 2018-01-02 | Energous Corporation | Transmittersand methods for adjusting wireless power transmission based on information from receivers |
US9824815B2 (en) | 2013-05-10 | 2017-11-21 | Energous Corporation | Wireless charging and powering of healthcare gadgets and sensors |
US10075008B1 (en) | 2014-07-14 | 2018-09-11 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for manually adjusting when receiving electronic devices are scheduled to receive wirelessly delivered power from a wireless power transmitter in a wireless power network |
US10439448B2 (en) | 2014-08-21 | 2019-10-08 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for automatically testing the communication between wireless power transmitter and wireless power receiver |
US9893768B2 (en) | 2012-07-06 | 2018-02-13 | Energous Corporation | Methodology for multiple pocket-forming |
US9438045B1 (en) | 2013-05-10 | 2016-09-06 | Energous Corporation | Methods and systems for maximum power point transfer in receivers |
US10103582B2 (en) | 2012-07-06 | 2018-10-16 | Energous Corporation | Transmitters for wireless power transmission |
US9893555B1 (en) | 2013-10-10 | 2018-02-13 | Energous Corporation | Wireless charging of tools using a toolbox transmitter |
US10381880B2 (en) | 2014-07-21 | 2019-08-13 | Energous Corporation | Integrated antenna structure arrays for wireless power transmission |
US10224982B1 (en) | 2013-07-11 | 2019-03-05 | Energous Corporation | Wireless power transmitters for transmitting wireless power and tracking whether wireless power receivers are within authorized locations |
US9991741B1 (en) | 2014-07-14 | 2018-06-05 | Energous Corporation | System for tracking and reporting status and usage information in a wireless power management system |
US9124125B2 (en) | 2013-05-10 | 2015-09-01 | Energous Corporation | Wireless power transmission with selective range |
US10141768B2 (en) | 2013-06-03 | 2018-11-27 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for maximizing wireless power transfer efficiency by instructing a user to change a receiver device's position |
US9941754B2 (en) | 2012-07-06 | 2018-04-10 | Energous Corporation | Wireless power transmission with selective range |
US10312715B2 (en) | 2015-09-16 | 2019-06-04 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for wireless power charging |
US10270261B2 (en) | 2015-09-16 | 2019-04-23 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods of object detection in wireless power charging systems |
US9853458B1 (en) | 2014-05-07 | 2017-12-26 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for device and power receiver pairing |
US10199835B2 (en) | 2015-12-29 | 2019-02-05 | Energous Corporation | Radar motion detection using stepped frequency in wireless power transmission system |
US9812890B1 (en) | 2013-07-11 | 2017-11-07 | Energous Corporation | Portable wireless charging pad |
US9966765B1 (en) | 2013-06-25 | 2018-05-08 | Energous Corporation | Multi-mode transmitter |
US9941747B2 (en) | 2014-07-14 | 2018-04-10 | Energous Corporation | System and method for manually selecting and deselecting devices to charge in a wireless power network |
US9876394B1 (en) | 2014-05-07 | 2018-01-23 | Energous Corporation | Boost-charger-boost system for enhanced power delivery |
US9912199B2 (en) | 2012-07-06 | 2018-03-06 | Energous Corporation | Receivers for wireless power transmission |
US20140008993A1 (en) | 2012-07-06 | 2014-01-09 | DvineWave Inc. | Methodology for pocket-forming |
US10211674B1 (en) | 2013-06-12 | 2019-02-19 | Energous Corporation | Wireless charging using selected reflectors |
US9900057B2 (en) | 2012-07-06 | 2018-02-20 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for assigning groups of antenas of a wireless power transmitter to different wireless power receivers, and determining effective phases to use for wirelessly transmitting power using the assigned groups of antennas |
US9882430B1 (en) | 2014-05-07 | 2018-01-30 | Energous Corporation | Cluster management of transmitters in a wireless power transmission system |
US9793758B2 (en) | 2014-05-23 | 2017-10-17 | Energous Corporation | Enhanced transmitter using frequency control for wireless power transmission |
US10218227B2 (en) | 2014-05-07 | 2019-02-26 | Energous Corporation | Compact PIFA antenna |
US9060344B2 (en) * | 2012-09-07 | 2015-06-16 | Qualcomm Incorporated | Systems, apparatus, and methods for association in multi-hop networks |
CN103237005A (zh) * | 2013-03-15 | 2013-08-07 | 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 | 密钥管理方法及系统 |
CN103220271A (zh) * | 2013-03-15 | 2013-07-24 | 福建联迪商用设备有限公司 | 密钥下载方法、管理方法、下载管理方法及装置和系统 |
JP6260091B2 (ja) * | 2013-03-18 | 2018-01-17 | ブラザー工業株式会社 | 無線通信システム及び無線通信機器 |
US9819230B2 (en) | 2014-05-07 | 2017-11-14 | Energous Corporation | Enhanced receiver for wireless power transmission |
US9538382B2 (en) | 2013-05-10 | 2017-01-03 | Energous Corporation | System and method for smart registration of wireless power receivers in a wireless power network |
US9866279B2 (en) | 2013-05-10 | 2018-01-09 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for selecting which power transmitter should deliver wireless power to a receiving device in a wireless power delivery network |
US9419443B2 (en) | 2013-05-10 | 2016-08-16 | Energous Corporation | Transducer sound arrangement for pocket-forming |
US9537357B2 (en) | 2013-05-10 | 2017-01-03 | Energous Corporation | Wireless sound charging methods and systems for game controllers, based on pocket-forming |
US10103552B1 (en) | 2013-06-03 | 2018-10-16 | Energous Corporation | Protocols for authenticated wireless power transmission |
US10003211B1 (en) | 2013-06-17 | 2018-06-19 | Energous Corporation | Battery life of portable electronic devices |
US10021523B2 (en) | 2013-07-11 | 2018-07-10 | Energous Corporation | Proximity transmitters for wireless power charging systems |
US9979440B1 (en) | 2013-07-25 | 2018-05-22 | Energous Corporation | Antenna tile arrangements configured to operate as one functional unit |
WO2015072037A1 (ja) * | 2013-11-18 | 2015-05-21 | 三菱電機株式会社 | 通信システム及びマスタ装置 |
US9935482B1 (en) | 2014-02-06 | 2018-04-03 | Energous Corporation | Wireless power transmitters that transmit at determined times based on power availability and consumption at a receiving mobile device |
US10075017B2 (en) | 2014-02-06 | 2018-09-11 | Energous Corporation | External or internal wireless power receiver with spaced-apart antenna elements for charging or powering mobile devices using wirelessly delivered power |
US10069802B2 (en) * | 2014-02-18 | 2018-09-04 | Ciena Corporation | Method for securely configuring customer premise equipment |
US10158257B2 (en) | 2014-05-01 | 2018-12-18 | Energous Corporation | System and methods for using sound waves to wirelessly deliver power to electronic devices |
US9966784B2 (en) | 2014-06-03 | 2018-05-08 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for extending battery life of portable electronic devices charged by sound |
US10170917B1 (en) | 2014-05-07 | 2019-01-01 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for managing and controlling a wireless power network by establishing time intervals during which receivers communicate with a transmitter |
US9973008B1 (en) | 2014-05-07 | 2018-05-15 | Energous Corporation | Wireless power receiver with boost converters directly coupled to a storage element |
US9800172B1 (en) | 2014-05-07 | 2017-10-24 | Energous Corporation | Integrated rectifier and boost converter for boosting voltage received from wireless power transmission waves |
US10153653B1 (en) | 2014-05-07 | 2018-12-11 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for using application programming interfaces to control communications between a transmitter and a receiver |
US10153645B1 (en) | 2014-05-07 | 2018-12-11 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for designating a master power transmitter in a cluster of wireless power transmitters |
US9876536B1 (en) | 2014-05-23 | 2018-01-23 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for assigning groups of antennas to transmit wireless power to different wireless power receivers |
US10116143B1 (en) | 2014-07-21 | 2018-10-30 | Energous Corporation | Integrated antenna arrays for wireless power transmission |
US9871301B2 (en) | 2014-07-21 | 2018-01-16 | Energous Corporation | Integrated miniature PIFA with artificial magnetic conductor metamaterials |
US10068703B1 (en) | 2014-07-21 | 2018-09-04 | Energous Corporation | Integrated miniature PIFA with artificial magnetic conductor metamaterials |
US9965009B1 (en) | 2014-08-21 | 2018-05-08 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for assigning a power receiver to individual power transmitters based on location of the power receiver |
US9917477B1 (en) | 2014-08-21 | 2018-03-13 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for automatically testing the communication between power transmitter and wireless receiver |
US10122415B2 (en) | 2014-12-27 | 2018-11-06 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for assigning a set of antennas of a wireless power transmitter to a wireless power receiver based on a location of the wireless power receiver |
CN104601578B (zh) * | 2015-01-19 | 2018-05-22 | 福建星网锐捷网络有限公司 | 一种攻击报文识别方法、装置及核心设备 |
US9608809B1 (en) * | 2015-02-05 | 2017-03-28 | Ionic Security Inc. | Systems and methods for encryption and provision of information security using platform services |
US9893535B2 (en) | 2015-02-13 | 2018-02-13 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for determining optimal charging positions to maximize efficiency of power received from wirelessly delivered sound wave energy |
US10158487B2 (en) * | 2015-07-16 | 2018-12-18 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Dynamic second factor authentication for cookie-based authentication |
US9906275B2 (en) | 2015-09-15 | 2018-02-27 | Energous Corporation | Identifying receivers in a wireless charging transmission field |
US10523033B2 (en) | 2015-09-15 | 2019-12-31 | Energous Corporation | Receiver devices configured to determine location within a transmission field |
US9893538B1 (en) | 2015-09-16 | 2018-02-13 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods of object detection in wireless power charging systems |
US9941752B2 (en) | 2015-09-16 | 2018-04-10 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods of object detection in wireless power charging systems |
US10199850B2 (en) | 2015-09-16 | 2019-02-05 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for wirelessly transmitting power from a transmitter to a receiver by determining refined locations of the receiver in a segmented transmission field associated with the transmitter |
US10186893B2 (en) | 2015-09-16 | 2019-01-22 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for real time or near real time wireless communications between a wireless power transmitter and a wireless power receiver |
US11710321B2 (en) | 2015-09-16 | 2023-07-25 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods of object detection in wireless power charging systems |
US9871387B1 (en) | 2015-09-16 | 2018-01-16 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods of object detection using one or more video cameras in wireless power charging systems |
US10778041B2 (en) | 2015-09-16 | 2020-09-15 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for generating power waves in a wireless power transmission system |
US10008875B1 (en) | 2015-09-16 | 2018-06-26 | Energous Corporation | Wireless power transmitter configured to transmit power waves to a predicted location of a moving wireless power receiver |
US10158259B1 (en) | 2015-09-16 | 2018-12-18 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for identifying receivers in a transmission field by transmitting exploratory power waves towards different segments of a transmission field |
US10211685B2 (en) | 2015-09-16 | 2019-02-19 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for real or near real time wireless communications between a wireless power transmitter and a wireless power receiver |
US10027168B2 (en) | 2015-09-22 | 2018-07-17 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for generating and transmitting wireless power transmission waves using antennas having a spacing that is selected by the transmitter |
US10128686B1 (en) | 2015-09-22 | 2018-11-13 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for identifying receiver locations using sensor technologies |
US10135295B2 (en) | 2015-09-22 | 2018-11-20 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for nullifying energy levels for wireless power transmission waves |
US10033222B1 (en) | 2015-09-22 | 2018-07-24 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for determining and generating a waveform for wireless power transmission waves |
US10135294B1 (en) | 2015-09-22 | 2018-11-20 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for preconfiguring transmission devices for power wave transmissions based on location data of one or more receivers |
US10020678B1 (en) | 2015-09-22 | 2018-07-10 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for selecting antennas to generate and transmit power transmission waves |
US10050470B1 (en) | 2015-09-22 | 2018-08-14 | Energous Corporation | Wireless power transmission device having antennas oriented in three dimensions |
US10153660B1 (en) | 2015-09-22 | 2018-12-11 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for preconfiguring sensor data for wireless charging systems |
US10333332B1 (en) | 2015-10-13 | 2019-06-25 | Energous Corporation | Cross-polarized dipole antenna |
US10734717B2 (en) | 2015-10-13 | 2020-08-04 | Energous Corporation | 3D ceramic mold antenna |
US9853485B2 (en) | 2015-10-28 | 2017-12-26 | Energous Corporation | Antenna for wireless charging systems |
US9899744B1 (en) | 2015-10-28 | 2018-02-20 | Energous Corporation | Antenna for wireless charging systems |
US10135112B1 (en) | 2015-11-02 | 2018-11-20 | Energous Corporation | 3D antenna mount |
US10063108B1 (en) | 2015-11-02 | 2018-08-28 | Energous Corporation | Stamped three-dimensional antenna |
US10027180B1 (en) | 2015-11-02 | 2018-07-17 | Energous Corporation | 3D triple linear antenna that acts as heat sink |
US10038332B1 (en) | 2015-12-24 | 2018-07-31 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods of wireless power charging through multiple receiving devices |
US10079515B2 (en) | 2016-12-12 | 2018-09-18 | Energous Corporation | Near-field RF charging pad with multi-band antenna element with adaptive loading to efficiently charge an electronic device at any position on the pad |
US10027159B2 (en) | 2015-12-24 | 2018-07-17 | Energous Corporation | Antenna for transmitting wireless power signals |
US10141771B1 (en) | 2015-12-24 | 2018-11-27 | Energous Corporation | Near field transmitters with contact points for wireless power charging |
US10256677B2 (en) | 2016-12-12 | 2019-04-09 | Energous Corporation | Near-field RF charging pad with adaptive loading to efficiently charge an electronic device at any position on the pad |
US11863001B2 (en) | 2015-12-24 | 2024-01-02 | Energous Corporation | Near-field antenna for wireless power transmission with antenna elements that follow meandering patterns |
US10320446B2 (en) | 2015-12-24 | 2019-06-11 | Energous Corporation | Miniaturized highly-efficient designs for near-field power transfer system |
US10008886B2 (en) | 2015-12-29 | 2018-06-26 | Energous Corporation | Modular antennas with heat sinks in wireless power transmission systems |
KR20170091951A (ko) * | 2016-02-02 | 2017-08-10 | 에스프린팅솔루션 주식회사 | 전자 디바이스에게 보안을 제공하기 위한 방법 및 장치 |
US10831381B2 (en) * | 2016-03-29 | 2020-11-10 | International Business Machines Corporation | Hierarchies of credential and access control sharing between DSN memories |
US10200862B2 (en) | 2016-10-28 | 2019-02-05 | Nokia Of America Corporation | Verification of cell authenticity in a wireless network through traffic monitoring |
US10923954B2 (en) | 2016-11-03 | 2021-02-16 | Energous Corporation | Wireless power receiver with a synchronous rectifier |
CN110235337A (zh) | 2016-12-12 | 2019-09-13 | 艾诺格思公司 | 选择性地激活近场充电垫的天线区域以最大化所传递无线功率的方法 |
US10680319B2 (en) | 2017-01-06 | 2020-06-09 | Energous Corporation | Devices and methods for reducing mutual coupling effects in wireless power transmission systems |
US10389161B2 (en) | 2017-03-15 | 2019-08-20 | Energous Corporation | Surface mount dielectric antennas for wireless power transmitters |
US10439442B2 (en) | 2017-01-24 | 2019-10-08 | Energous Corporation | Microstrip antennas for wireless power transmitters |
US10613994B2 (en) * | 2017-03-29 | 2020-04-07 | Intel Corporation | Methods and apparatus to establish a connection between a supplicant and a secured network |
WO2018183892A1 (en) | 2017-03-30 | 2018-10-04 | Energous Corporation | Flat antennas having two or more resonant frequencies for use in wireless power transmission systems |
US10511097B2 (en) | 2017-05-12 | 2019-12-17 | Energous Corporation | Near-field antennas for accumulating energy at a near-field distance with minimal far-field gain |
US11462949B2 (en) | 2017-05-16 | 2022-10-04 | Wireless electrical Grid LAN, WiGL Inc | Wireless charging method and system |
US10848853B2 (en) | 2017-06-23 | 2020-11-24 | Energous Corporation | Systems, methods, and devices for utilizing a wire of a sound-producing device as an antenna for receipt of wirelessly delivered power |
US11153077B2 (en) * | 2018-12-14 | 2021-10-19 | Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation | Secure vehicle to vehicle communication |
US10122219B1 (en) | 2017-10-10 | 2018-11-06 | Energous Corporation | Systems, methods, and devices for using a battery as a antenna for receiving wirelessly delivered power from radio frequency power waves |
US11342798B2 (en) | 2017-10-30 | 2022-05-24 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for managing coexistence of wireless-power signals and data signals operating in a same frequency band |
US10615647B2 (en) | 2018-02-02 | 2020-04-07 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for detecting wireless power receivers and other objects at a near-field charging pad |
US11159057B2 (en) | 2018-03-14 | 2021-10-26 | Energous Corporation | Loop antennas with selectively-activated feeds to control propagation patterns of wireless power signals |
US11515732B2 (en) | 2018-06-25 | 2022-11-29 | Energous Corporation | Power wave transmission techniques to focus wirelessly delivered power at a receiving device |
JP7267535B2 (ja) * | 2018-06-29 | 2023-05-02 | ニデックインスツルメンツ株式会社 | 相互認証システム及び相互認証方法 |
US11437735B2 (en) | 2018-11-14 | 2022-09-06 | Energous Corporation | Systems for receiving electromagnetic energy using antennas that are minimally affected by the presence of the human body |
JP2022523022A (ja) | 2019-01-28 | 2022-04-21 | エナージャス コーポレイション | 無線送電のための小型アンテナ用のシステム及び方法 |
KR20210123329A (ko) | 2019-02-06 | 2021-10-13 | 에너저스 코포레이션 | 안테나 어레이에 있어서의 개별 안테나들에 이용하기 위해 최적 위상을 추정하는 시스템 및 방법 |
US11233650B2 (en) * | 2019-03-25 | 2022-01-25 | Micron Technology, Inc. | Verifying identity of a vehicle entering a trust zone |
US11323275B2 (en) | 2019-03-25 | 2022-05-03 | Micron Technology, Inc. | Verification of identity using a secret key |
US11361660B2 (en) | 2019-03-25 | 2022-06-14 | Micron Technology, Inc. | Verifying identity of an emergency vehicle during operation |
US11218330B2 (en) | 2019-03-25 | 2022-01-04 | Micron Technology, Inc. | Generating an identity for a computing device using a physical unclonable function |
EP4032169A4 (en) | 2019-09-20 | 2023-12-06 | Energous Corporation | CLASSIFICATION AND DETECTION OF FOREIGN OBJECTS USING POWER AMPLIFIER CONTROLLER INTEGRATED CIRCUIT IN WIRELESS POWER TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS |
CN115104234A (zh) | 2019-09-20 | 2022-09-23 | 艾诺格思公司 | 使用多个整流器保护无线电力接收器以及使用多个整流器建立带内通信的系统和方法 |
US11381118B2 (en) | 2019-09-20 | 2022-07-05 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for machine learning based foreign object detection for wireless power transmission |
WO2021055898A1 (en) | 2019-09-20 | 2021-03-25 | Energous Corporation | Systems and methods for machine learning based foreign object detection for wireless power transmission |
US11355966B2 (en) | 2019-12-13 | 2022-06-07 | Energous Corporation | Charging pad with guiding contours to align an electronic device on the charging pad and efficiently transfer near-field radio-frequency energy to the electronic device |
US10985617B1 (en) | 2019-12-31 | 2021-04-20 | Energous Corporation | System for wirelessly transmitting energy at a near-field distance without using beam-forming control |
US11799324B2 (en) | 2020-04-13 | 2023-10-24 | Energous Corporation | Wireless-power transmitting device for creating a uniform near-field charging area |
JP2022063537A (ja) * | 2020-10-12 | 2022-04-22 | コニカミノルタ株式会社 | 管理システム、管理装置、およびプログラム |
US11916398B2 (en) | 2021-12-29 | 2024-02-27 | Energous Corporation | Small form-factor devices with integrated and modular harvesting receivers, and shelving-mounted wireless-power transmitters for use therewith |
Citations (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JPH1130953A (ja) * | 1997-07-11 | 1999-02-02 | Hitachi Ltd | 電子財布・電子マネー連携セキュリティシステム |
JPH11313237A (ja) * | 1998-04-28 | 1999-11-09 | Minolta Co Ltd | デジタルカメラ及び画像伝送システム |
JP2002271318A (ja) * | 2001-03-06 | 2002-09-20 | Mitsubishi Materials Corp | 無線通信装置、認証管理サーバ |
JP2003037592A (ja) * | 2001-07-26 | 2003-02-07 | Sharp Corp | 無線通信装置 |
Family Cites Families (9)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
KR100319256B1 (ko) * | 1999-12-30 | 2002-01-05 | 서평원 | 통신 프로토콜 운용 방법 |
JP3585422B2 (ja) | 2000-06-01 | 2004-11-04 | シャープ株式会社 | アクセスポイント装置及びその認証処理方法 |
JP3552648B2 (ja) * | 2000-06-20 | 2004-08-11 | インターナショナル・ビジネス・マシーンズ・コーポレーション | アドホック無線通信用データ送受システム及びアドホック無線通信用データ送受方法 |
JP3628250B2 (ja) | 2000-11-17 | 2005-03-09 | 株式会社東芝 | 無線通信システムで用いられる登録・認証方法 |
JP3702812B2 (ja) | 2001-06-25 | 2005-10-05 | 日本電気株式会社 | 無線lanシステムにおける認証方法と認証装置 |
KR100406525B1 (ko) * | 2001-07-09 | 2003-11-22 | 한국전자통신연구원 | 무선 공개키 기반 구조에서의 인증서 발급 요청/처리 장치및 그 방법과 그를 이용한 인증서 발급 시스템 |
JP2004062417A (ja) * | 2002-07-26 | 2004-02-26 | Nippon Telegr & Teleph Corp <Ntt> | 認証サーバ装置、サーバ装置、およびゲートウェイ装置 |
JP4346413B2 (ja) | 2002-12-19 | 2009-10-21 | 株式会社バッファロー | 暗号鍵設定システム、アクセスポイント、および、暗号鍵設定方法 |
CA2422334C (en) * | 2003-03-17 | 2009-06-09 | British Telecommunications Public Limited Company | Authentication of network users |
-
2005
- 2005-04-12 WO PCT/JP2005/007096 patent/WO2005101727A1/ja active Application Filing
- 2005-04-12 JP JP2006512343A patent/JP4621200B2/ja not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2005-04-12 US US10/579,628 patent/US7603557B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Patent Citations (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JPH1130953A (ja) * | 1997-07-11 | 1999-02-02 | Hitachi Ltd | 電子財布・電子マネー連携セキュリティシステム |
JPH11313237A (ja) * | 1998-04-28 | 1999-11-09 | Minolta Co Ltd | デジタルカメラ及び画像伝送システム |
JP2002271318A (ja) * | 2001-03-06 | 2002-09-20 | Mitsubishi Materials Corp | 無線通信装置、認証管理サーバ |
JP2003037592A (ja) * | 2001-07-26 | 2003-02-07 | Sharp Corp | 無線通信装置 |
Cited By (17)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP2007194788A (ja) * | 2006-01-18 | 2007-08-02 | Nintendo Co Ltd | 通信システム、ならびにそれに用いられる通信プログラムおよび接続制御装置 |
JP2007201851A (ja) * | 2006-01-27 | 2007-08-09 | Hitachi Kokusai Electric Inc | 無線通信装置 |
US8547873B2 (en) | 2006-09-18 | 2013-10-01 | Marvell International Ltd. | Establishment of ad-hoc networks between multiple devices |
US9025493B2 (en) | 2006-09-18 | 2015-05-05 | Marvell World Trade Ltd. | Establishment of ad-hoc networks between multiple devices |
JP2010504055A (ja) * | 2006-09-18 | 2010-02-04 | マーベル インターナショナル リミテッド | 多数のデバイス間のアドホックネットワーク構築 |
WO2008118475A1 (en) * | 2007-03-26 | 2008-10-02 | Sibeam, Inc. | Security mechanism for wireless video area networks |
US8831225B2 (en) | 2007-03-26 | 2014-09-09 | Silicon Image, Inc. | Security mechanism for wireless video area networks |
JP2013137313A (ja) * | 2007-07-26 | 2013-07-11 | Renishaw Plc | 座標位置決め装置用測定プローブシステム |
JP2009033585A (ja) * | 2007-07-30 | 2009-02-12 | Nec Infrontia Corp | 無線lan端末接続方法およびその方法を用いた無線lanシステム |
JP4506999B2 (ja) * | 2007-07-30 | 2010-07-21 | Necインフロンティア株式会社 | 無線lanシステム |
JP2009163546A (ja) * | 2008-01-08 | 2009-07-23 | Nec Corp | ゲートウェイ、中継方法及びプログラム |
JP2010004226A (ja) * | 2008-06-19 | 2010-01-07 | Ricoh Co Ltd | 情報通信装置および公開鍵認証方法 |
JP2014107766A (ja) * | 2012-11-29 | 2014-06-09 | Brother Ind Ltd | 画像処理システム,画像処理装置,および情報処理装置 |
CN103327489A (zh) * | 2013-06-28 | 2013-09-25 | 宇龙计算机通信科技(深圳)有限公司 | 认证的方法和系统 |
CN103327489B (zh) * | 2013-06-28 | 2017-04-05 | 宇龙计算机通信科技(深圳)有限公司 | 认证的方法和系统 |
JP2013250999A (ja) * | 2013-08-23 | 2013-12-12 | Panasonic Corp | 車載装置、およびデータ送信処理方法 |
JP2016189566A (ja) * | 2015-03-30 | 2016-11-04 | 大日本印刷株式会社 | 無線通信装置および無線通信システム |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US20070106894A1 (en) | 2007-05-10 |
US7603557B2 (en) | 2009-10-13 |
JPWO2005101727A1 (ja) | 2008-03-06 |
JP4621200B2 (ja) | 2011-01-26 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
JP4621200B2 (ja) | 通信装置、通信システム及び認証方法 | |
EP1335563B1 (en) | Method for securing communication over a network medium | |
US7957534B2 (en) | System and method for security association between communication devices within a wireless home network | |
KR100943683B1 (ko) | 데이터 전송 안전 확보 방법, 통신 시스템 및 통신 장치 | |
KR100599131B1 (ko) | 홈 네트워크를 위한 보안장치 및 그의 보안 설정 방법 | |
JP4613969B2 (ja) | 通信装置、及び通信方法 | |
KR102349605B1 (ko) | 사용자 기기의 식별자에 기반하여 서비스를 제공하는 방법 및 장치 | |
US20050235152A1 (en) | Encryption key sharing scheme for automatically updating shared key | |
CN102111766B (zh) | 网络接入方法、装置及系统 | |
US20110320802A1 (en) | Authentication method, key distribution method and authentication and key distribution method | |
JP2006025420A (ja) | 無線ローカルエリアネットワークの関連付けのためのデバイスおよびプロセスならびに対応する製品 | |
CN101867530A (zh) | 基于虚拟机的物联网网关系统及数据交互方法 | |
JP2006165984A (ja) | アドホックネットワークの認証方法、および、その無線通信端末 | |
CN1973495A (zh) | 无线局域网关联的设备和方法及相应产品 | |
JP2006345205A (ja) | 無線lan接続管理方法、無線lan接続管理システム及び設定用無線中継装置 | |
KR20090095436A (ko) | 홈 네트워크에서 인증 정보를 관리하는 방법 및 그 장치 | |
CN106576101B (zh) | 用于管理自组织网络中的安全通信的系统和方法 | |
KR20150056076A (ko) | 장치 대 장치 통신 시스템에서 보안키를 관리하는 방법 및 장치 | |
US20100037302A1 (en) | Peer-to-peer access control method of triple unit structure | |
JP2023162296A (ja) | コアネットワークへの非3gppデバイスアクセス | |
CN104012130B (zh) | 通信安全处理方法及装置 | |
CN112202770A (zh) | 设备联网方法及装置、设备、存储介质 | |
EP3229512B1 (en) | Method for device having wlan function to access network and device for implementing method | |
KR100892616B1 (ko) | 무선 센서 네트워크에서의 새로운 장치 참여 방법 | |
US8327140B2 (en) | System and method for authentication in wireless networks by means of one-time passwords |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
AK | Designated states |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): AE AG AL AM AT AU AZ BA BB BG BR BW BY BZ CA CH CN CO CR CU CZ DE DK DM DZ EC EE EG ES FI GB GD GE GH GM HR HU ID IL IN IS JP KE KG KM KP KR KZ LC LK LR LS LT LU LV MA MD MG MK MN MW MX MZ NA NI NO NZ OM PG PH PL PT RO RU SC SD SE SG SK SL SM SY TJ TM TN TR TT TZ UA UG US UZ VC VN YU ZA ZM ZW |
|
AL | Designated countries for regional patents |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): BW GH GM KE LS MW MZ NA SD SL SZ TZ UG ZM ZW AM AZ BY KG KZ MD RU TJ TM AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HU IE IS IT LT LU MC NL PL PT RO SE SI SK TR BF BJ CF CG CI CM GA GN GQ GW ML MR NE SN TD TG |
|
121 | Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application | ||
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 2006512343 Country of ref document: JP |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 2007106894 Country of ref document: US Ref document number: 10579628 Country of ref document: US |
|
NENP | Non-entry into the national phase |
Ref country code: DE |
|
WWW | Wipo information: withdrawn in national office |
Country of ref document: DE |
|
WWP | Wipo information: published in national office |
Ref document number: 10579628 Country of ref document: US |
|
122 | Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase |