WO2004084063A1 - ウィルスの感染を阻止する方法およびシステム - Google Patents
ウィルスの感染を阻止する方法およびシステム Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2004084063A1 WO2004084063A1 PCT/JP2004/003520 JP2004003520W WO2004084063A1 WO 2004084063 A1 WO2004084063 A1 WO 2004084063A1 JP 2004003520 W JP2004003520 W JP 2004003520W WO 2004084063 A1 WO2004084063 A1 WO 2004084063A1
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- Prior art keywords
- virus
- computer
- infection
- network
- attack
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
- G06F21/56—Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
- G06F21/567—Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements using dedicated hardware
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a computer connected to a network, which is infected with a virus, finds the source of the infection, and detects other computers connected to the same network.
- the present invention relates to a technology for preventing transmission to a computer.
- a virus When a virus is detected, it must be located promptly, disconnected from the network, and disinfected using Pectin. However, it may take some time between the detection of a virus and the completion of countermeasures. Over time, damage can spread over time, causing serious damage to the network.
- the present invention is to provide a technique for determining that a computer connected to a network is infected with a virus and preventing the damage to other computers connected to the same network from spreading. It is the purpose.
- a deer accessible via the network is provided on a computer that monitors virus intrusion, and access to the deer is received via the network to acquire communication information, Detects the intrusion of a virus, and when a virus invades it, detects the computer that is the source of the virus based on the communication information obtained in response and becomes the source of the virus.
- a virus attack process that suppresses the activity of a virus on a computer that is running on a network.
- a system that detects virus infection on a network and stops the virus infection.
- a system that detects Wi / less infection on a network and stops Winores infection.
- a system is provided to prevent the transmission of the characteristic virus.
- a program that detects the infection of a virus on a network and causes the computer to stop the infection of the virus.
- a program that detects the infection of a virus on a network and causes the computer to stop the infection of the virus.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a specific example of a system for preventing virus infection.
- FIG. 2 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a detection report.
- FIG. 3 is an explanatory diagram showing an example in which an infected computer is attacked by a plurality of computers.
- Figure 4 is an illustration of a large-scale computer network.
- FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing the basic operation of the monitoring computer.
- Figure 6 is a flowchart showing the cooperative operation of the monitoring computer.
- a beam accessible via the network is provided on a computer (monitoring computer) that monitors the invasion of the virus, and access to the beam is received via the network to obtain communication information.
- a computer monitoring computer
- the computer that is the source of the virus is detected based on the communication information obtained in response to the intrusion of the virus.
- Computer performs virus attack processing that suppresses the virus activity via the network. It also sends a detection report to the administrator of the computer that sent the virus.
- the security of the adult can be reduced by lowering the security of various computers that are supposed to protect against viruses. However, it is not always easy to determine whether it is less secure than other computers.
- the security level of the target computer is often known.
- the security of the adult should be set so that the security of the target computer group is lower than that of the computer with the lowest security. In this way, the adult can be made most susceptible to the virus among the computers that need to be protected against viruses.
- FIG. 1 As shown in FIG. 1, as shown in FIG. 1, providing a folder 14, providing an application 15, and providing a server 13. And the like. These can be used alone or in combination of two or more.
- the pole can be distributed over multiple computers.
- the folder 13 is composed of an application provided in the server that is simulated on the storage device 12 of the computer 10 connected to the network 1. can do.
- Virus intrusion in a folder refers to the situation where a virus / rescue attempts to read or rewrite any file in a folder over the network. Infecting a virus means that the virus itself is a computer Is stored somewhere in the storage device.
- the communication information is information such as a communication route received from the network when the virus invaded the folder.
- This communication information includes the network address of the computer that is the source of the virus.
- the computer from which the virus is sent is the computer infected with the virus. Since it waits in the folder, it can detect the invading virus.
- the content of the detection report is arbitrary.
- the reporting method is also optional. Notify the infected computer administrator and attack the infected computer at the same time.
- the virus to be searched may be a virus having the property of invading a shared folder.
- a virus that invades such a shared folder can detect its activity by setting up a postal folder.
- the title application 15 is configured by an application provided in a title server, which is simulated on a storage device of a computer connected to a network. This is a configuration for detecting viruses that have the property of invading the server.
- This is an example in which an Otori application is provided instead of the Otori folder. For example, if the virus to be searched is a virus that has the property of causing a malfunction of an application, its activity can be detected by providing a pseudo-stop application.
- the adult server 13 detects a virus that has the property of invading the server.
- the top server is composed of a pseudo application, and has data having the configuration of the server. When the server 13 is accessed, the server 13 has a function of returning the same response to the access as the server.
- the assumed server format may be any server that can be accessed. For example, there are a web server and a mail server. Any may be used. This server is designed to respond to server attack viruses. This is a configuration in which the folder is provided in the server which is simulated on the storage device of the computer. It is not affected by virus attacks. That is, no damage occurs. At the same time, they can determine their source while under attack.
- the top server and the top folder may be completely different, or may be configured by an integrated application.
- virus attack processing is performed on the infected computer to suppress the virus activity.
- information for giving a high load is transmitted via a network. The attack will continue until the virus has been removed.
- Anti-virus measures involve removing infected computers from the network or removing viruses.
- a surveillance computer attacks an infected computer by itself.
- the surveillance computer requests an attacking computer located near the infected computer and has an attacking capability, and the requested computer attacks the infected computer.
- a joint attack multiple computers attack an infected computer. Details of these will be described later.
- the surveillance computer can determine the attack method in the case of the request attack and the attack method in the case of the joint attack, so that the attack can be performed uniformly. It is also possible to request that an attack be performed based on the attack capability of each computer of the requestor and the joint partner.
- the present invention in order to suppress the activity of the virus on the infected computer or to stop the activity of the virus in the infected computer, the present invention is applied to the infected computer.
- High communication load, and high load on the CPU of the infected computer Either one or a combination of both may be used. Details of how to attack will be described later.
- a message is sent to warn the user and administrator of the computer to notify of the start of the attack. Furthermore, at the start of the attack or after the start of the attack, an alarm sound is generated at the terminal device of the attack source. This can alert the user of another terminal device that shares the network with the infected computer.
- the type of alarm sound is arbitrary. Also, a display during the attack operation may be displayed on the display.
- prepare defense measures for computers other than the infected computer For example, when receiving a notification of the computer network 1 and the work address that are the source of the virus, the computer is made to execute processing to reject communication from the computer that is the source of the virus. Also, when a computer for network monitoring is notified of an infected computer, it performs processing to refuse communication from the computer that is the source of the virus for protection.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a specific example of a virus protection system.
- a computer 5 is connected to the network 1 and the work 1 via a network interface 4.
- This computer 5 has a storage device 6 Have been. It is assumed that the storage device 6 is infected with the virus 7.
- This computer 5 will be called an infected computer.
- a monitoring computer 10 is connected to the network 1.
- the monitoring computer 10 includes a network interface 11 and a storage device 12.
- the storage device 12 stores a title server 13, a title folder 14, and a title application 15.
- the computer 10 is provided with a communication information analyzing means 16 for monitoring communication information acquired by the network interface 11 as a function realized by the computer 10.
- the output of the communication information analysis means 16 drives the alarm generation means 19.
- the computer attack means 17 and the detection report transmitting means 18 are configured to operate based on the output of the communication information analyzing means 16.
- the communication information analysis means 16, the computer attack means 17, the detection report transmission means 18, and the alarm generation means 19 are all executed by a CPU (not shown) of the computer 10, and the monitoring computer 1
- This is a computer program that causes 0 to execute a predetermined process. These programs are installed in the storage device 12 and loaded into a CPU (not shown) at the time of execution.
- the present invention identifies the computer 5 infected with the virus 7 and causes a high load on the computer 5 until the administrator of the computer 5 removes the virus 7, thereby reducing the activity of the virus 7. Suppress.
- a set server 13 In order to identify the computer 5 infected with the virus 7, a set server 13, a set folder 14 and a set application 15 are set up in the network 1.
- the server 13 and the like are generated in a pseudo manner in the monitoring computer 10.
- the folder 14 may be created at an arbitrary location in the storage device 12 of the monitoring computer 10. Also, they are generated integrally in the post server 13.
- the server 13 be set so that the environment is such that the virus 7 attacks first on the network 1. Seki The lowest level of utility should be used, and the computer name, for example, should be chosen so that it appears at the top of the network computer list. Also, the name of the shared folder to receive the virus is the name of the folder whose virus is attacking and light. This should also be selected as a name that is displayed at the top of the shared folder 1. Also
- the server 13 consists of an application program that operates so as to respond exactly as a response when the virus 7 attempts to invade a real server. It has no effect on blasting activity as it differs from real servers.
- the folder 14 is composed of an application program that operates so as to respond exactly as the response when the virus 7 accesses the real folder. It has no effect on file destruction and other destructive activities since it is different from the actual folder. Since the stop application 15 is different from the actual application, there is no risk of malfunction.
- the communication information analysis means 16 has a function of immediately analyzing the name of the computer of the transmission source from the communication information upon detection of a virus intrusion, and specifying the same. This information includes information such as who is logged on to the computer, what the address of the computer is, and what is the employee code of the employee using the computer.
- an alarm generator 19 is provided.
- the alarm generating means 19 uses a notification means such as a pop-up message to start a countermeasure against the infected computer such as "This computer is infected with a virus. Please disconnect from the network immediately.” It has a function to send a message for notice.
- virus 7 may enter neighboring computer users through the network. In order to issue a warning, for example, it has a function of sounding the speaker 2 or displaying an alarm screen on the display 3.
- FIGS. 2A and 2B are explanatory diagrams showing examples of detection reports.
- the communication information analysis means 16 transfers the source IP address 8 acquired from the communication information to the detection report transmission means 18.
- the detection report transmission means 18 transmits a detection report to the administrator of the infected computer 5 using, for example, an e-mail / fax simulator.
- FIG. 2 (a) is an example of a detection report when a diffusion-type virus is detected.
- Figure 2 (b) is an example of a detection report when a network-shared virus is detected.
- a computer whose IP address is "192.168.10.15" has been attacked by a virus with the pattern shown in the figure. It is a report.
- Innores When Innores is ingested by any computer on the network, it starts its activity at a predetermined time. For example, a virus accesses a shared folder on another computer over the network and rewrites or destroys the files stored there. To say that a virus invades is to access a shared folder in this way. Virus files are not always copied. Therefore, on a computer that has been infected with a virus, under normal conditions, it is not possible to distinguish between access to a file due to the entry of the virus and access to a normal file, and the virus may not be detected.
- a post server and a post folder are provided. Normal applications access only the server or folder specified in advance. Accessing a dummy server or folder created in a simulated manner is extremely likely to be a virus. Furthermore, by confirming the access pattern, it can be confirmed that the virus is a virus. After that, the communication information is used to determine which computer has been infected with the virus. Virus activity on infected computers If the virus is not stopped, the virus will damage various computers through the network.
- the computer attacking means 17 (Fig. 1) has a function to perform a predetermined attack operation on the infected computer.
- the computer attack means 17 applies a high load to the infection computer 5. Since this is to prevent the activity of the virus in the infected computer, there are a method of applying a high communication load to the infected computer 5 and a method of applying a high load to the CPU of the infected computer.
- FIG. 3 is an explanatory diagram showing an example in which the infected computer 5 is attacked by a plurality of computers.
- the monitoring computer 10 and the infected computer 5, the terminal device 20, the terminal device 22, and the terminal device 24 are connected to the network 1 in FIG.
- the terminal device 20 is connected to the network 1 via the network interface 21.
- the terminal device 22 is connected to the network 1 via the network interface 23.
- the terminal device 24 is connected to the network 1 via the network interface 25.
- the terminal device 20 includes computer attack means 31.
- the terminal device 22 includes computer attack means 32.
- the terminal device 24 has a computer attack means 33.
- the computer attack means 31, the computer attack means 32, and the computer attack means 33 all have the same function as the computer attack means 17 of the monitoring computer 10.
- One computer may not be enough to attack an infected computer.
- the monitoring computer 10 requests another computer, for example, the terminal devices 20, 22, and 24 for an attack. Then, with the cooperation of the plurality of computers 10, 20, 22, and 24, one computer 5 is attacked jointly. This limits the function of the infected computer. In the meantime, notify the administrator and allow time to remove the virus.
- the terminal device 20 or the like may be a computer dedicated to attack, or may be a computer used by a general user with the computer attack means 31 or the like installed.
- the monitoring computer 10 may be provided only in the network 1 or may be provided in plurals.
- the attack request sent from the monitoring computer 10 to the computer attack means 31 etc. includes the IP address (network address) of the infected computer. Also, it is preferable to include a command to activate the computer attack means 31 or the like.
- the computer having the computer attack means may be a computer having the same function as the monitoring computer, or may be a computer having only the attack means.
- FIG. 4 is an illustration of a large-scale computer network.
- a large number of computers are connected to a network 52, a network 53, and a network 54, which are interconnected by a router 50 and a router 51, respectively.
- the computer 62 is a monitoring computer.
- the computer 63 is a monitoring computer.
- the computer 66, 67, and 68 connected to the network 54 the computer 68 is a monitoring computer.
- computer 67 may be an infected computer, and computer 62 may detect the intrusion of the virus.
- computer 62 requests the nearest computer 68 connected to the network 54 to which the computer 67 belongs to to attack the computer 67.
- the computer 68 issues an alarm using the above-mentioned speaker or the like, alerts the computer 66, etc., who are in trouble, and then starts attacking the computer 67. In this way, monitoring operations on large-scale networks are also possible.
- FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing the basic operation of the monitoring computer. Specifically, the monitoring computer 10 executes programs to realize various functions. As a result, the monitoring computer 10 is able to analyze the communication information. Step 16, functions as computer attack means 17, detection reporting means 18, and alarm generating means 19.
- the surveillance computer 10 performs initial settings for enabling the stop server 13, the stop folder 14, and the stop application 15 (step S 1). In this state, waiting for a virus is started (step S2).
- the communication information analyzing means 16 monitors communication information processed by the network interface 11.
- the communication information analysis means 16 analyzes the communication information, obtains the source IP address 8, and identifies the infected computer (steps S3, S4, S5). ).
- the detection report transmission means 18 sends a detection report to the administrator (step S6).
- the alarm generating means 19 sounds an alarm sound from the speaker 2 (step 7). Also, a video indicating that the attack is being performed is displayed on the display 3 of the monitoring computer 10. Further, the alarm generating means 19 transmits an attack start message to the infected computer 5 (step S8).
- the computer attack means 17 starts an attack (step S9). Thereafter, it is determined whether or not a report indicating that the antivirus has been completed is received at an arbitrary route (step S10). When a report indicating that the anti-virus measures have been completed is received, the attack using the computer attack means 17 is terminated (Step S 11) 0
- FIG. 6 is a flowchart showing the cooperative operation of the monitoring computers. Even in the case where a trunk computer is attacked with the cooperation of multiple computers, the above-mentioned various functions of the monitoring computer 10 can be used to detect infected computers, request processing for attack cooperation, and An emphasis attack process is performed.
- the monitoring computer 10 first identifies the infected computer (step S21—step S24).
- the processing for identifying the infected computer is the same as the processing shown in FIG. 5 (step S2—step S5) described above.
- the computer attack means 17 investigates the network (step S25). This is to find the nearest monitoring computer.
- search for a surveillance computer that shares a part of the IP address with the infected computer from the prepared surveillance computer list step S26. May be themselves, or, as described in Figure 4, a monitoring computer connected via some network component, such as a norator. Therefore, it is determined whether or not the nearest monitoring computer is itself (step S27). If you are not yourself, determine the attack request destination (step S28).
- an attack request may be transmitted to the plurality of monitoring computers by broadcast transmission.
- step S29 an attack request is transmitted to the corresponding monitoring computer (step S29). Thereafter, the process from step S6 in FIG. 5 is executed at the attack request destination.
- the most effective countermeasure is to quickly disconnect from the network, as infected computers are likely to have been damaged. Once this measure has been completed, the attack on the infected computer may be terminated.
- OS Operating System
- the storage device 6 displays a screen 40 containing a message to that effect on the display. This screen 40 is displayed after the necessary countermeasure is completed until the button 41 is clicked.
- the present invention has a function of reducing the diffusion speed of a type of virus that diffuses through a network. In other words, it puts a heavy load on the infected computer, thereby preventing the spread of the virus. You. Also, this method is suitable when a virus invades a shared file on a certain computer but the operation alone does not make it possible to immediately confirm the intrusion. That is, when a virus is activated, configure the computer so that it is first attacked by the virus. This will find the virus, determine which computer the virus has infected, and identify the target computer. In other words, mere intrusion into a folder is effective in detecting and eliminating viruses that are difficult to detect.
- the above-mentioned computer program may be configured by combining independent program modules, or may be configured by an integrated program. All or some of the processes controlled by the computer program may be configured by hardware having equivalent functions. Further, the above-mentioned computer program may be used by being incorporated into an existing application program.
- the computer program for realizing the present invention as described above is recorded on a computer-readable recording medium such as a CD-ROM, and is used by being installed in an arbitrary information processing device. Can be. It can also be downloaded to the memory of any computer via the network and used.
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Priority Applications (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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US10/549,892 US20060288414A1 (en) | 2003-03-17 | 2004-03-17 | Method and system for preventing virus infection |
JP2005503704A JP4196989B2 (ja) | 2003-03-17 | 2004-03-17 | ウィルスの感染を阻止する方法およびシステム |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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JP2003-072371 | 2003-03-17 | ||
JP2003072371 | 2003-03-17 |
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WO2004084063A1 true WO2004084063A1 (ja) | 2004-09-30 |
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Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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PCT/JP2004/003520 WO2004084063A1 (ja) | 2003-03-17 | 2004-03-17 | ウィルスの感染を阻止する方法およびシステム |
Country Status (4)
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US (1) | US20060288414A1 (ja) |
JP (1) | JP4196989B2 (ja) |
CN (1) | CN1761939A (ja) |
WO (1) | WO2004084063A1 (ja) |
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- 2004-03-17 WO PCT/JP2004/003520 patent/WO2004084063A1/ja active Application Filing
- 2004-03-17 JP JP2005503704A patent/JP4196989B2/ja not_active Expired - Fee Related
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Cited By (10)
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JP2007334536A (ja) * | 2006-06-14 | 2007-12-27 | Securebrain Corp | マルウェアの挙動解析システム |
JP2012527691A (ja) * | 2009-05-19 | 2012-11-08 | サイバーセキュアー, インコーポレイテッド | アプリケーションレベルセキュリティのためのシステムおよび方法 |
JP2015518320A (ja) * | 2012-04-09 | 2015-06-25 | ランディス・ギア イノベーションズ インコーポレイテッドLandis+Gyr Innovations, Inc. | デコイ暗号鍵を使用したネットワーク侵入検知 |
WO2014103115A1 (ja) * | 2012-12-26 | 2014-07-03 | 三菱電機株式会社 | 不正侵入検知装置、不正侵入検知方法、不正侵入検知プログラム及び記録媒体 |
JP2016115072A (ja) * | 2014-12-12 | 2016-06-23 | Necフィールディング株式会社 | 被疑ファイル収集装置、マルウェア検知システム、および、マルウェア検知方法 |
JP2019096223A (ja) * | 2017-11-27 | 2019-06-20 | 東芝三菱電機産業システム株式会社 | 制御システム用マルウェア対策システムおよび制御システム用マルウェアチェックコンピュータ |
JP2020109927A (ja) * | 2019-01-07 | 2020-07-16 | 富士通株式会社 | 検知装置、検知方法、および、検知プログラム |
JP7135870B2 (ja) | 2019-01-07 | 2022-09-13 | 富士通株式会社 | 検知装置、検知方法、および、検知プログラム |
JP2020112946A (ja) * | 2019-01-09 | 2020-07-27 | 富士通株式会社 | 検知装置、検知方法、および、検知プログラム |
JP7120030B2 (ja) | 2019-01-09 | 2022-08-17 | 富士通株式会社 | 検知装置、検知方法、および、検知プログラム |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN1761939A (zh) | 2006-04-19 |
JP4196989B2 (ja) | 2008-12-17 |
US20060288414A1 (en) | 2006-12-21 |
JPWO2004084063A1 (ja) | 2006-06-22 |
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