WO2003060717A1 - System and method for network vulnerability detection and reporting - Google Patents
System and method for network vulnerability detection and reporting Download PDFInfo
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- WO2003060717A1 WO2003060717A1 PCT/US2002/001093 US0201093W WO03060717A1 WO 2003060717 A1 WO2003060717 A1 WO 2003060717A1 US 0201093 W US0201093 W US 0201093W WO 03060717 A1 WO03060717 A1 WO 03060717A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1433—Vulnerability analysis
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L43/00—Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks
- H04L43/50—Testing arrangements
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
- H04L63/0227—Filtering policies
Definitions
- This invention relates to network system security, and more particularly relates to systems and methods for automatic detection, monitoring and reporting of network vulnerabilities.
- simple commands such as traceroute and ping can be used to manually map a network topography, and determine roughly what network addresses are "alive” with a computer “awake” on the network (i.e., determine which computers are on and are responding to network packets).
- a tool such as a port scanner can be used to test an individual target computer on the target network to determine what network ports are open. If open ports are found, these ports may provide access for possible intrusion, and potentially represent a vulnerability that can be exploited by a malicious hacker.
- Some suites combining various network tools attempt to follow a quasi- automated process to test target computers on a target network. These suites provide variations on the tools described above, and provide long-form text-based output based on the outcome of this testing. The output of these security tests are extremely technical, and require extensive knowledge of network communications in order to interpret and provide advice based on the results. Thus, these partially automated suites do not provide comprehensive security to an entity seeking to "harden" its network. [0005] Further, some security suites actually risk substantial damage to the target network. For example, while the use of malformed network packets to test a target computer can provide extensive information from the target and feedback on the security of the target, these malformed packets can destabilize the target computer in unpredictable ways. This sometimes results in a short-term loss of information to the target computer or, in more serious cases, a complete crash of the target computer operating system or hardware.
- a target network or target computer is ranked only as “high risk,” “medium risk,” or “low risk.”
- a three-tier system alone provides very little substantive feedback or comparative information about changes in the network over time, the relative weight of different vulnerabilities in determining the resulting risk level, or objective assessments of network security among otherwise heterogeneous network environment.
- the testing system features include a selected combination of: (1) a nondestructive identification of target computer operating system; (2) a multiple-tier port scanning method for determination of what network addresses are active and what ports are active at those addresses; (3) a comparison of collected information about the target network with a database of known vulnerabilities; (4) a vulnerability assessment of some vulnerabilities on identified ports of identified target computers; (5) an active assessment of vulnerabilities reusing data discovered from previously discovered target computers; (6) an application of a quantitative score to objectively and comparatively rank the security of the target network; and, (7) reduction of detailed results of the information collected into hierarchical, dynamic and graphical representations of the target network, target computers, and vulnerabilities found therein.
- Other features are foreseen and disclosed herein, as well.
- the testing system operates over a modern multilayer packet network such as a corporate intranet or the Internet.
- the network typically includes one or more computers, where a computer includes a desktop station running any operating system, a router, a server, and/or any other networked device capable of sending and receiving packets through standard internet protocols such as TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol), UDP (User Datagram Protocol), and the like.
- TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
- UDP User Datagram Protocol
- the system and method can be run remotely from a monitoring computer outside the target network, or can be run by a monitoring computer included within the target network.
- the target network itself is typically defined as an interconnected set of computers, bounded by a specific pre-designated sub-network address, range of IP addresses or sub-addresses, physical network boundaries, computer names or unique identifiers, presence or connection via a pre-determined network protocol, and the like.
- the target computers comprise all or a portion of the computers found within the target network.
- a target computer with a simple connection to a WAN Wide Area Network
- a distributed network provider can have multiple sub-networks geographically distributed throughout the world but interconnected via an internal protocol, as a WAN target network with thousands of target computers.
- a target network typically runs on one or more IP-based network protocols. Most commonly, the protocol will be TCP/IP and UDP. Similarly, the testing system is typically indifferent to the physical layer structure and topology of the target network. Only structural elements such as firewalls or routers that block, reroute, or change packets will affect the testing system. The testing system, however, attempts to adapt to these structural elements and generally provides accurate results regardless of physical implementation.
- TCP/IP is a fundamental protocol used for packet-based network communications on local area networks, wide area networks, and global telecommunications networks such as the Internet.
- a sample configuration of a TCP/IP is a fundamental protocol used for packet-based network communications on local area networks, wide area networks, and global telecommunications networks such as the Internet.
- SYN (synchronization) packet is shown in Table 1.
- Typical TCP SYN packet [0012]
- a computer typically runs on one or more operating systems. More commonly, these operating systems include those provided by Microsoft ® , such as the Microsoft Windows ® family of operating systems, MacOS ® from Apple ® , various flavors of UNIX including Linux ® , NefBSD, FreeBSD, Solaris ® , and the like.
- devices on the target network may include router operating systems, mobile communication device operating systems, palmtop or handheld operating systems, appliance operating systems, set-top box operating systems, gaming operating systems, digital rights management systems, surveillance systems, smart card transaction systems, transportation management systems, and the like, that assign unique or temporary network addresses and are capable of sending and/or receiving traffic from the target network.
- Target computers are identified by a unique or temporarily unique IP (Internet Protocol) address, typically in the form A.B.C.D, where each of A, B, C and D represent the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class D sub-networks and each has a value between 0 and 255.
- IP Internet Protocol
- the target network is defined by one or more ranges of IP addresses controlled by the target network, but may contain additional target computers or target sub-networks connected to the target network topographically but not part of the predetermined IP range or ranges.
- UDP User Datagram Protocol
- UDP Internet Protocol
- UDP lacks the error correction and receipt acknowledgment features of connection-based protocols such as TCP.
- ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
- ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
- Another aspect of the invention includes non-destructive and relatively non- intrusive identification of the target operating system of a target computer.
- Another aspect of the invention includes parallel testing of multiple target computers on a target network.
- Another aspect of the invention includes an improved testing method to determine whether particular target computers on a target network are alive. [0018] Another aspect of the invention includes an improved method for determining whether a set of commonly used ports are open on a target computer. [0019] Another aspect of the invention includes an improved method for reliably determining whether a set of commonly used UDP ports are open or closed on a target computer.
- Another aspect of the invention includes a method for associating the ports found open on a target computer with a known set of vulnerabilities.
- Another aspect of the invention includes parallel testing of multiple ports and multiple target computers simultaneously.
- Another aspect of the invention includes active assessment of some known set of vulnerabilities at a target computer.
- Yet another aspect of the invention includes application of an objective quantitative score to the vulnerabilities found on a target network.
- Still another aspect of the invention includes compilation of a dynamic, graphical report representing the network topology, network computers, and network vulnerabilities in a hierarchical report including both overview and detail documents.
- the present invention is a system for determining an operating system of a target computer operably connected to a network.
- the system comprises (1) first and second data packets, the first and second data packets compliant with a protocol supported by the network, the first and second data packets transmitted via the network to the target computer; (2) first and second operating system fingerprints comprising data bits stored in a computer-readable medium, the first and second operating system fingerprints associated with a first operating system; (3) a first target computer finge ⁇ rint comprising data bits stored in a computer-readable medium, the first target computer fingerprint including a representation of at least a portion of data received in response to the transmission of the first data packet; (4) a second target computer fingerprint comprising data bits stored in a computer-readable medium, the second target computer fingerprint including a representation of at least a portion of data received in response to the transmission of the second data packet; and (5) finge ⁇ rint comparison instructions executable by a computer to compare the first operating system finge ⁇ rint and the first target computer finge ⁇ rint, to compare the second operating system finge ⁇ rint and the second target computer finge ⁇ rint, and to generate
- the invention further comprises: (6) a third data packet, the third data packet compliant with the protocol, the first range of bits of the third data packet representing a third parameter value different from the first and second parameter values, the third data packet transmitted via the network to the target computer; (7) a third operating system finge ⁇ rint comprising data bits stored in a computer-readable medium, the third operating system finge ⁇ rint associated with the first operating system, the third operating system finge ⁇ rint differing from the first and second operating system finge ⁇ rints; and (8) a third target computer finge ⁇ rint comprising data bits stored in a computer-readable medium, the third target computer finge ⁇ rint including a representation of at least a portion of data received in response to the transmission of the first data packet, the comparison instructions executable by a computer to compare the third operating system finge ⁇ rint and the third target computer finge ⁇ rint before generating the result.
- the invention further comprises: (9) fourth, fifth and sixth operating system finge ⁇ rints comprising data bits stored in a computer-readable medium, the fourth, fifth and sixth operating system finge ⁇ rints associated with a second operating system, at least one of the fourth, fifth and sixth operating system finge ⁇ rints differing from a respective one of the first, second and third operating system finge ⁇ rints; the comparison instructions executable by a computer to compare the fourth operating system finge ⁇ rint and the first target computer finge ⁇ rint, to compare the fifth operating system finge ⁇ rint and the second target computer finge ⁇ rint, to compare the sixth operating system finge ⁇ rint and the third target computer finge ⁇ rint, and to generate a second result indicative of whether the second operating system was running on the target computer.
- Preferred aspects of this embodiment are ones wherein (10) the first parameter value is obtained by setting no bits, the second parameter value is obtained by setting one bit, and the third parameter value is obtained by setting two bits, or (11) wherein the first parameter value is 0, the second parameter value is 128, and the third parameter value is 128 plus a multiple of 256.
- the present invention is a system for determining an operating system of a target computer accessible via a network.
- the system comprises: (1) a plurality of data packets compliant with a protocol supported by the network, the plurality of data packets transmitted via the network to the target computer; (2) a first plurality of operating system finge ⁇ rints, each comprising data bits stored in a computer- readable medium, each associated with a first operating system; (3) a plurality of target computer finge ⁇ rints, each comprising data bits stored in a computer-readable medium, each including a representation of at least a portion of data received in response to the transmission of the plurality of data packets; and (4) finge ⁇ rint comparison instructions executable by a computer to compare the first plurality of the operating system finge ⁇ rint and the plurality of the target computer finge ⁇ rints, and to generate a result indicative of whether the first operating system was running on the target computer.
- a preferred aspect of the embodiment is one wherein the protocol is TCP/IP.
- Another preferred aspect of the embodiment further comprises (5) a second plurality of operating system finge ⁇ rints, each comprising data bits stored in a computer-readable medium, each associated with a second operating system, the finge ⁇ rint comparison instructions comparing the second plurality of the operating system finge ⁇ rints and the plurality of the target computer finge ⁇ rints to generate a second result indicative of whether the second operating system was running on the target computer.
- a further embodiment of the present invention is a method for determining an operating system of a target computer accessible via a network.
- the method comprises the steps of (1) transmitting to the target computer a plurality of data packets compliant with a protocol supported by the network; (2) generating a plurality of target computer finge ⁇ rints, each including at least a portion of data received via the network in response to the transmission of the plurality of data packets; (3) comparing the plurality of target computer finge ⁇ rints to a first set of predetermined operating system finge ⁇ rints, each of the first set of predetermined operating system finge ⁇ rints associated with a first operating system; and (4) generating a result indicative of whether the first operating system was running on the target computer.
- the embodiment comprises the further steps of (5) comparing the plurality of target computer finge ⁇ rints to a second set of predetermined operating system finge ⁇ rints, each of the second set of predetermined operating system finge ⁇ rints associated with a second operating system; and (6) generating a result indicative of whether the second operating system was running on the target computer.
- the protocol is TCP/IP and wherein the value of the MSS option of two of the plurality of data packets is divisible by 128.
- Another preferred aspect of that embodiment is one wherein a first of the plurality of data packets has a maximum segment size option of 0, wherein a second of the plurality of data packets has a maximum segment size option of 128, and wherein a third of the plurality of data packets has a maximum segment size option of 384.
- a still further embodiment of the invention is a method for identifying an operating system of a target computer via a network, the method comprising the steps of: (1) sending a first data packet to the target computer via the network, the first data packet complying with a protocol of the network and having a first pattern of bits in a first range of bits; (2) generating a first response value representing at least a portion of data received via the network in response to the sending of the first data packet; (3) sending a second data packet to the target computer via the network, the second data packet complying with the protocol and having a second pattern of bits in a first range of bits, the second pattern of bits different from the first pattern; (4) generating a second response value representing at least a portion of data received via the network in response to the sending of the second data packet; (5) sending a third data packet to the target computer via the network, the third data packet complying with the protocol and having a third pattern of bits in a first range of bits, the third pattern of bits different from the first or the second pattern; (6)
- a preferred aspect of the embodiment comprises the further steps of: (11) comparing the first response value to a fourth predetermined value associated with a second operating system; (12) comparing the second response value to a fifth predetermined value associated with the second operating system; and (13) comparing the third response value to a sixth predetermined value associated with the second operating system.
- a preferred aspect of that embodiment is one wherein no bit is set in the first pattern of bits, wherein one bit is set in the second pattern of bits, and wherein two bits are set in the third pattern of bits.
- Another preferred aspect of that embodiment is one wherein the number of bytes in the second pattern of bits that have at least one bit set is greater than the number of bytes in the first pattern of bits that have at least one bit set, and wherein the number of bytes in the third pattern of bits that have at least one bit set is greater than the number of bytes in the second pattern of bits that have at least one bit set.
- Yet another embodiment of the present invention is a system for determining whether a target computer is on a network, the system comprising: (1) a first set of port identifiers stored in a computer-readable medium, each of the first set of port identifiers representing a port used by computers to receive data packets compliant with a first protocol of the network, each of the first set of port identifiers representing a port associated with known network services; (2) a first set of data packets, each directed to a port represented by at least one of the first set of port identifiers, each of the first set of data packets compliant with the first protocol and transmitted to the target computer via the network; (3) a first set of acknowledgement packets received via the network in response to the transmission of the first set of data packets, and (4) a list of host identifiers, each host identifier representing a computer on the network that transmits data in response to a packet sent to the respective computer, a host identifier representing the target computer added to the list of host identifiers
- An alternative preferred aspect of the embodiment further comprises: (5a) a second set of port identifiers stored in a computer-readable medium, each of the second set of port identifiers representing a port used by computers to receive data packets compliant with a second protocol of the network, each of the second set of port identifiers representing a port associated with known network services; (6a) a second set of data packets, each directed to a port represented by at least one of the second set of port identifiers, each of the second set of data packets compliant with the second protocol and transmitted to the target computer via the network, at least one of the second set of data packets including data associated with the known network services; (7a) a second set of acknowledgement packets received via the network in response to the transmission of the second set of data packets; and (8a) a host identifier representing the target computer added to the list of host identifiers if the second set of acknowledgment packets indicates a responsiveness of the target computer.
- a preferred aspect of that embodiment is one wherein the first protocol is TCP, wherein the second protocol is UDP, wherein the second set of acknowledgment packets is a nonzero set of UDP data response packets.
- Another alternative preferred aspect of the embodiment further comprises: (5b) a second set of port identifiers stored in a computer- readable medium, each of the second set of port identifiers representing a port used by computers to receive data packets compliant with a second protocol of the network, each of the second set of port identifiers representing a port associated with known network services; (6b) a second set of data packets, each directed to a port represented by at least one of the second set of port identifiers, each of the second set of data packets compliant with the second protocol and transmitted to the target computer via the network, at least one of the second set of data packets including data associated with the known network services; (7b) a second set of acknowledgement packets received via the network in response to the transmission of the second set of data packets; and (8b)
- a preferred aspect of that embodiment is one wherein the first protocol is TCP, wherein the second protocol is UDP, wherein the second set of acknowledgment packets is an empty set of ICMP error packets.
- a further preferred aspect of either alternative embodiment further comprises: (9) a third set of data packets, each directed to a port represented by at least one of the second set of port identifiers, each compliant with the second protocol, the third set of data packets transmitted to the target computer throughout a predetermined maximum latency period; (10) a first response received first in time in response to the transmission of the third set of data packets; (11) a second response received second in time in response to the transmission of the third set of data packets, a time duration between the receipt of the first response and the receipt of the second response defining a target computer latency period.
- a further preferred aspect of the embodiment is one wherein each of the second set of data packets is transmitted continuously to the target computer for the duration of the target computer latency period.
- a still further embodiment of the present invention is a system for testing the accessibility of a target computer via a network.
- the system comprises: (1) a set of port identifiers stored in a computer-readable medium, each of the set of port identifiers representing a UDP-compliant port, at least one of the port identifiers representing a port associated with known network services; (2) a set of UDP-compliant data packets, each associated with a port represented by at least one of the set of port identifiers, each of the UDP-compliant data packets transmitted continuously to the target computer for a duration approximately the same as the latency period of the target computer, at least one of the UDP-compliant data packets including data associated with the known network services; (3) a first list representing computers accessible via the network, the first list including the target computer if a nonzero set of UDP data response packets is received in response to the transmission of the data packets; and (4) a second list representing computers not known to be inaccessible via the network, the second list including the target computer if an empty set of ICMP error packets is received in response to the transmission of the data packets.
- Another embodiment of the present invention is a method for determining whether a target computer is accessible via a network.
- the method comprises the steps of: (1) identifying TCP ports; (2) sending first data packets to the TCP ports of the target computer, each of the first data packets compliant with TCP; (3) receiving first acknowledgment packets in response to the sending of the first data packets; and (4) adding a representation of the target computer to a list representing accessible computers if the first acknowledgment packets are nonzero.
- a preferred aspect of the embodiment comprises the further steps of: (5) identifying UDP ports associated with network services; (6) sending second data packets to the UDP ports of the target computer, at least one of the second data packets sent continuously to the target computer throughout a latency period of the target computer; (7) receiving second acknowledgment packets in response to the sending of the second data packets; and (8) adding a representation of the target computer to a list representing accessible computers if the second acknowledgment packets are nonzero UDP data response packets.
- a further preferred aspect of the embodiment comprises the further step of: (9) determining the latency period of the target computer by measuring the time between responses received in response to packets transmitted to the target computer.
- a further preferred aspect of the embodiment comprises the further step of: (10) adding a representation of the target computer to a list representing computers not known to be inaccessible via the network, the adding performed if the second acknowledgment packets comprise an empty set of ICMP error packets.
- An additional embodiment of the present invention is a method for assessing the vulnerability of a target computer via a network.
- the method comprising the steps of: (1) discovering a set of responsive computers on a network by transmitting a set of ICMP packets, a set of TCP packets and a set of UDP packets to a group of computers on a network; (2) detecting services on each of the set of responsive computers by transmitting TCP packets to first ports of each of the set of responsive computers and by transmitting UDP packets to second ports of each of the set of responsive computers, the first and second ports commonly used by computers to receive data packets over a network, the TCP packets including data associated with at least one computer-based service known to use one of the first ports, the UDP packets including data associated with at least one computer-based service known to use one of the second ports; and (3) generating a list of responsive ports using responses received in response to the transmission of the TCP packets and the UDP packets.
- a preferred aspect of the embodiment comprises the further step of: (4) determining an operating system used by each of the set of responsive computers by comparing predetermined values with portions of responses received from each of the set of responsive computers in response to transmission of a plurality of TCP- compliant packets to each of the set of responsive computers.
- a further preferred aspect of the embodiment comprises the further step of: (5) confirming the presence of vulnerabilities on the network by applying an automated vulnerability script to each responsive port represented in the list of responsive ports, each of the automated vulnerability scripts testing a vulnerability known to be associated with a computer configuration comprising a particular responsive port and a particular operating system.
- a still further preferred aspect of the embodiment comprises the further step of: (6) calculating an objective indicia of security of the network, the calculation based on a weighted summation of confirmed vulnerabilities.
- a preferred aspect of the embodiment comprises the further step of: (7) determining a topology of the network, the topology determination made by transmitting a set of ICMP packets with varying time to live (TTL) settings and by transmitting a set of TCP packets with varying TTL settings.
- Another preferred aspect of the embodiment comprises the further step of: (8) producing a graphical representation of the network, the representation including a topological map of the network, a color-based representation of weighted confirmed vulnerabilities, and an association between the graphical representation and information descriptive of confirmed vulnerabilities and computers on the network.
- Another embodiment of the present invention is a method for creating a topological representation of a network.
- the method comprises the steps of: (1) identifying responsive computers on the network; (2) obtaining a plurality of sequences of IP addresses by sending to each responsive computer a sequence of packets having increasing TTL values, each sequence of IP addresses representing nodes in the network between a source computer and one of the responsive computers, adjacent IP addresses in each sequence representing connected nodes, each of the nodes comprising a computer or a router; (3) generating a list of node structures, each of the node structures including data representing a node and data indicative of other nodes to which it directly connects, the list representing all IP addresses in the plurality of sequences; (4) determining for each IP address a distance count, the distance count representing a number of nodes between a node having the IP address and a source node; (5) creating a router structure for each node structure that represents a node comprising a router; (6) associating with each of the router structures connection data representative of each connecting no
- a preferred aspect of the embodiment comprises the further step of: (9) testing whether a router represented by a router structure and a connecting node represented in connection data comprise two network connections of one node.
- a further preferred aspect of this embodiment is one wherein the graphical shape representing a router is a sphere, and wherein each of the spatially related graphical shapes is a sphere orbiting the sphere representing the router.
- Yet another embodiment of the present invention is a method for calculating an objective security score for a network. The method comprising the steps of: (1) determining a vulnerability value numerically representing a combination of known vulnerabilities of a network; (2) determining an exposure value numerically representing a combination of accessible ports of computers on the network; and (3) deriving a score by combining the vulnerability value and the exposure value.
- a preferred aspect of this embodiment is one wherein the combination of known vulnerabilities is a summation of weighted numeric expressions of particular vulnerabilities, the weighting based on an ease of exploitation ranking and on an access granted ranking for each vulnerability.
- Still another embodiment of the present invention is a method for conducting an automated network vulnerability attack, the method comprising the steps of: (1) selecting a set of vulnerability attacks for each responsive computer on a network, each selected vulnerability attack for each responsive computer designed to expose a vulnerability associated with ports of the respective computer known to be accessible and also associated with an operating system used by the respective computer; (2) encoding the set of vulnerability attacks such that each is represented in a database by a unique identifier; (3) representing each of the set of vulnerability attacks using instructions of an automated scripting language; and (4) executing the vulnerability attacks by processing the instructions with a computer.
- One more embodiment of the present invention is a hierarchical network vulnerability report.
- the report comprises: (1) a first report level comprising: (a) an objective score representing the security of the network; and (b) a graphical representation of a network topology, including a graphical representation of computers accessible via the network and a color-based graphical representation of the vulnerability of at least some of the computers; and (2) a second report level comprising: (a) a textual list describing the computers and their associated vulnerabilities; and (b) an exposure report describing accessible ports and services of the computers.
- An additional embodiment of the present invention is a vulnerability assessment language.
- the vulnerability assessment language comprises: (1) a set of programming language statements used to create executable scripts, the scripts executed in a thread-safe execution architecture wherein all variables are stack variables and wherein a parse tree is treated as a read-only data structure; (2) a set of special scalar data types interchangeable with an integer data type in expressions, each of the set of special scalar data types having a set of constant values configured to support vulnerability assessment operations embodied in scripts; (3) a set of native objects declared in a metascope owning a script scope to make available the native objects to executable scripts, the native objects facilitating network communication, providing callable member functions for building lists of unique ports and directing script execution to certain hosts, and providing IP addresses for scripts; and (4) a vulnerability object behaving to copy itself into a global data area where other scripts may access its information to compromise another machine, facilitating the use by one script of vulnerability data discovered by a different script.
- a further embodiment of the present invention is a method for automated application of a known vulnerability on a target computer.
- the method comprises the steps of: (1) providing a database of known vulnerabilities, the database including a data object; (2) providing an executable script, the executable script associated with the data object; (3) applying the executable script to the target computer, the script performing the known vulnerability on a port of the target computer; and (4) returning a value representing at least one of the success, failure or other outcome of the executable script.
- a still further embodiment of the present invention is a method for automated application of known vulnerabilities to target computers of a network.
- the method comprises the steps of: (1) providing a database of known vulnerabilities; (2) providing a set of executable scripts, each executable to apply a known vulnerability to a specified target computer; (3) executing first executable scripts to apply vulnerabilities on specified target computers; (4) monitoring return values representing a success, failure or other outcome of each of the first executable scripts; and (5) generating a report using the return values, the report representing a security level of the network.
- One preferred aspect of this embodiment comprises the further step of: (6) identifying execution time intervals wherein execution of the first executable scripts commences at the beginning of each of the time intervals and pauses at the end of each of the time intervals, until all of the first executable scripts have executed.
- a prefe ⁇ ed aspect of the embodiment comprises the further step of: (7) automatically repeating the execution of the first executable scripts when the execution of the first executable scripts is completed.
- Another preferred aspect of the embodiment comprises the further steps of: (8) generating a report upon each completed execution of the first executable scripts; and (9) calculating a security trend for the network by comparing a plurality of the reports.
- An alternative prefe ⁇ ed aspect of the embodiment comprises the further step of: (10) executing second executable scripts to apply vulnerabilities to a second network of computers during the execution of the first executable scripts.
- Another prefe ⁇ ed aspect of the embodiment is one wherein the second network is a subset of the network.
- Still another prefe ⁇ ed aspect of the embodiment is one wherein the first executable scripts are configured to apply vulnerabilities to a first port of all of the target computers before applying vulnerabilities to a second port of all of the target computers.
- An additional prefe ⁇ ed aspect of the embodiment comprises the further step of allocating a plurality of packet slots, each packet slot permitting asynchronous transmission of a packet by one of the executable scripts.
- Figure 1 illustrates one embodiment of a target network
- Figure 2 illustrates one embodiment of a target computer on the target network
- Figure 3 illustrates one embodiment of a comprehensive testing method
- Figure 4 illustrates one embodiment of the operating system identification method
- FIG. 5 illustrates one example embodiment of the TCP SYN packet used in the operating system identification method of Figure 3;
- Figure 6 illustrates one embodiment of first phase scanning to determine what target computers are alive
- Figure 7 illustrates one embodiment of second phase scanning to determine what ports are open on a target computer
- Figure 8 illustrates one embodiment of active assessment of a vulnerability of a target computer on a target network
- Figure 9 illustrates one embodiment of a methodology for determining the security score for a target network
- Figure 10 illustrates one embodiment of a hierarchical security report, including a graphical representation of network topology and network vulnerabilities; and [0051] Figure 11 illustrates a second embodiment of a hierarchical security report in greater detail.
- Figure 12 illustrates a second embodiment of the comprehensive testing method. Detailed Description of the Preferred Embodiment
- FIG. 1 illustrates one embodiment of a target network.
- the network security system 100 of the present invention is, in one embodiment, at least one Intel-based server running on a Windows 2000 operating system, although any computer system or operating system capable of handling an IP network and capable of large-scale data processing can be used.
- the network security system 100 may be outside the target network 102 or inside the target network (not shown). In either case, the system 100 is connected to the target network 102 through a network such as the Internet, via one or more nodes 104.
- the target network 102 in one example, consists of an intranet with a central intranet hub 106.
- the target network 102 further includes a firewall 108 which blocks some incoming traffic to or outgoing network traffic leaving the target network 102.
- the target network further comprises a number of hosts 110, defined as within a predetermined range of Internet Protocol (TP) addresses. In some cases, external hosts 112 may lie outside the target network but may nonetheless be connected to the target network 102.
- TP Internet Protocol
- FIG. 2 illustrates one embodiment of a target computer on the target network.
- a host IP address represents a target computer, as more generally defined below, if the address is in use by the target network.
- the target computer 200 is running an operating system 202.
- the operating system preferably contains at least one network TCP/IP stack 204 to provide packet transport, preferably including an interface to provide raw socket 206 connections between the target computer 200 and the network.
- the physical connection to the network 208 is provided, in one embodiment, by a Network Interface Card (NIC) 210.
- NIC Network Interface Card
- a packet can be received at any one of 65,536 logical ports 212 at the target computer 200.
- any number of network services 214 can be provided.
- Figure 3 illustrates one embodiment of a comprehensive testing method in accordance with embodiments of the present invention.
- Figure 3 presents an overview of the method. Additional details of the method are set forth below in connection with Figures 4-11. 1093
- the testing method defines the target network and creates a scan list of IP addresses.
- the scan list is stored in a scan list database 312.
- the method obtains a first batch of IP addresses from the scan list database 312 and begins a detailed analysis of the target network by performing a host discovery routine that begins in a block 320.
- the host discovery routine comprises an ICMP host discovery routine 322, which will be described in more detail below.
- the method pings the target computers identified by the present batch of JP addresses. Based on the responses or lack of responses, the ICMP host discovery routine 322 is able to determine that certain target computers are "live” or "probably live,” and the associated IP addresses are added to a respective live database 324 or probably live database 326 accordingly.
- the method After completing the ICMP host discovery routine 322, the method performs a decision routine 328 wherein the method determines whether all the IP addresses in the cu ⁇ ent batch of IP addresses have been discovered (i.e., whether all the IP addresses have been assigned to the live database 324 or the probably live database 326. If any IP address has not been discovered, the method proceeds to a TCP host discovery routine 330, which will be described in more detail below. During the TCP host discovery routine 330, the method sends TCP packets to the remaining target computers identified by the present batch of IP addresses.
- the TCP host discovery routine 330 is able to determine that certain ones of the remaining target computers are "live” or "probably live,” and the associated IP addresses are added to a respective live database 324 or probably live database 326 accordingly.
- the method After completing the TCP host discovery routine 330, the method performs a decision routine 332 wherein the method determines whether all the IP addresses in the cu ⁇ ent batch of IP addresses have been discovered (i.e., whether all the IP addresses have been assigned to the live database 324 or the probably live database 326. If any IP address has not been discovered, the method proceeds to an intelligent UDP host discovery routine 334, which will be described in more detail below.
- the method sends UDP packets to the remaining target computers identified by the present batch of IP addresses. Based on responses or lack of responses, the intelligent UDP host discovery routine 334 is able to determine that certain ones of the remaining target computers are "live” or "probably live,” and the associated IP addresses are added to a respective live database 324 or probably live database 326 accordingly.
- the method After completing the intelligent UDP host discovery routine 334, the method performs a decision routine 336 wherein the method determines whether all the IP addresses in the cu ⁇ ent batch of IP addresses have been discovered (i.e., whether all the IP addresses have been assigned to the live database 324 or the probably live database 326. If any IP address has not been discovered, the method, in one embodiment, proceeds to an intensive UDP host discovery routine 338, which will be described in more detail below. During the intensive UDP host discovery routine 338, the method sends additional UDP packets to the remaining target computers identified by the present batch of IP addresses.
- the intensive UDP discovery routine 338 is able to determine that certain ones of the remaining target computers are "live” or "probably live,” and the associated IP addresses are added to a respective live database 324 or probably live database 326 accordingly.
- the intensive UDP host discovery routine 338 is optional and may not be included in all embodiments.
- the method preferably proceeds to a service discovery routine that begins in a block 340.
- the foregoing host discovery routines 322, 330, 334, 338 are advantageously repeated to determine whether additional IP addresses co ⁇ esponding to target computers can be assigned to the live database 324 and the probably live database 326.
- the method repeats the host discovery routines a maximum of a predetermined times before continuing to the service discovery routine 340.
- Those IP addresses for which no response is received by any method are, in one embodiment, added to a dead list 339 of hosts.
- the method performs a TCP service discovery routine 342, which will be described in more detail below.
- the method sends TCP packets to selected ports of the discovered target computers in the live list 324 and the probably live list 326 and monitors the responses. Based on the responses or lack of responses, the TCP discovery routine 342 adds info ⁇ nation regarding open ports of the target computers to a target computer database 344.
- the method After performing the TCP service discovery routine 342, the method performs a UDP service discovery routine 346, which will be described in more detail below.
- the UDP service discovery routine 346 the method sends UDP packets to selected ports of the discovered target computers in the live list 324 and the probably live list 326 and monitors the responses. Based on the responses or lack of responses, the UDP discovery routine 346 adds information regarding open ports of the target computers to the target computer database 344.
- the TCP service discovery routine 342 and the UDP service discovery routine 346 are advantageously repeated a limited number of times to determine whether additional open ports are discovered.
- the method proceeds to an operating system (OS) identification routine 350 wherein the method determines the type and version of operating system present on each of the live computers having open ports.
- OS operating system
- the method sends two or more (preferably three) RFC compliant TCP packets to the target computers.
- the TCP packets have predetermined data in at least one selected field.
- Each target computer responds to each of the TCP packets.
- the response information from each computer is treated as a "finge ⁇ rint" for each computer.
- the finge ⁇ rint from each computer is compared with finge ⁇ rints in finge ⁇ rint database 352, and the results of the comparisons are used to identify the target computers with high degrees of accuracy.
- the method proceeds to a traceroute routine that begins in a block 354. lii the traceroute routine, the method first performs an ICMP traceroute routine 356 in which the method uses ICMP tracerouting techniques, described in more detail below. In particular, the method sends a plurality of ICMP echo request packets to the target computer with varying TTL (time to live) values in the TCP/IP header. The method creates a network topology based on the known TTL value, the number of "hops" between the system and the target computer, and the router/host at each "hop.” The information from the ICMP traceroute routine 356 is added to a network map database 358.
- the traceroute step is completed for that target computer.
- the ICMP traceroute steps are repeated until a complete trace is received or a selected predetermined maximum number of passes is completed.
- the method proceeds to a decision routine 360 wherein the method determines whether the trace of the target computer is complete or incomplete. If the trace is incomplete, the method proceed to a TCP traceroute routine 362. Otherwise, the method bypasses the TCP traceroute routine and proceeds directly to a vulnerability assessment routine 364.
- the TCP traceroute routine 362 works similarly to ICMP traceroute routine 354, except that TCP SYN packets are sent to the target computers. As with ICMP tracerouting, the TTL value in each SYN packet is incrementally increased, and the return of ICMP unreachable packets and SYN ACK packets is monitored for all "hops" between the scanning system and the target host. Through the combination of ICMP tracerouting and TCP tracerouting, a complete map to each target computer, and collectively a relatively complete map of the target network topology is advantageously created and stored in the network map database 358. [0068] After completing the TCP traceroute routine 362, the method proceeds to the vulnerability assessment routine 364.
- the method executes vulnerability scripts that apply known vulnerabilities to open ports of the live target computers to determine whether the ports of the target computers exhibit the potential vulnerabilities.
- the method uses information stored in a known vulnerability database 366 to select the vulnerability scripts to executes for each active port. Information collected from vulnerable target computers is advantageously stored to the target computer database 344.
- the vulnerability assessment routine 364 preferably only performs vulnerability checks associated with the identified operating system and open ports of the target computer as determined by the operating system identification routine 350 and service discovery routine 340. If the operating system is not conclusively identified, typically the routine runs all known vulnerabilities for the open ports of the target computer. 1093
- the method proceeds to an active assessment routine 365.
- the active assessment routine 365 uses information collected from target computers in the vulnerability assessment routine 364 to execute further vulnerability scripts to open ports of the live target computers. Specifically, the active assessment routine 365 reuses known vulnerabilities and information collected from target computers to continue to determine whether the ports of the target computers exhibit potential vulnerabilities, using information from the known vulnerability database 366 and information collected in the target computer database 344.
- the method proceeds to a decision routine 368 to determine whether the method has analyzed all the potential target computers. In particular, in the decision routine 368, the method determines whether the last batch of IP address has been analyzed.
- the method proceeds to the routine 314 to obtain the next batch of IP addresses. Otherwise, the method proceeds to a scoring routine 370.
- the scoring routine 370 described in more detail below, the method establishes a vulnerability score for each target computer and for the network based on the results of the active assessment and based on the vulnerability information in the known vulnerability database 366. The method then proceeds to a reporting routine 372, also described in more detail below, wherein the method reports the results of the scanning, active assessment and scoring.
- the method can be advantageously repeated continuously on a target network, and can be scheduled into pre-determined scanning window time periods for execution of the method over time.
- the method is scheduled to scan during off-peak hours when the network is less likely to be less heavily used.
- the method is interruptible at the end of a window of off-peak hours and resumes where it paused at the beginning of the next off-peak window.
- the method operates on multiple target networks concu ⁇ ently by threading to share network resources.
- Vulnerability of and access to a target computer may be heightened by knowing which particular operating system is running on the computer. Identifying a target computer's operating system can be accomplished by examining the operating system's response to a data packet it receives over the network. The forms of the packets and the responses to the packets are generated in accordance with network protocols.
- the written definitions of the protocols used for communications on the Internet are set forth in Internet Request for Comment (RFC) documents.
- RFC Internet Request for Comment
- the TCP/IP protocol is defined in part in RFC 793, inco ⁇ orated herein by reference, and contains a standard model for TCP packet communications over a network. While virtually every operating system includes a TCP/IP stack, each TCP/IP stack is implemented in a slightly different manner. Thus, known responses from a TCP/IP stack unique to a particular operating system can serve as a "finge ⁇ rint" to determine the target computer's actual operating system.
- the present system typically employs a unique set of new features to maximize the accuracy of operating system detection while minimizing intrusiveness and interference with operations of the target computer, hi one embodiment, the invention sends RFC-compliant TCP "SYN" (synchronization) packets to a target computer.
- RFC-compliant TCP packets advantageously reduces the probability that the detection packets are blocked by a router or firewall, and greatly reduces the probability that the detection packets will cause damage or crashes at the target computer.
- the invention uses just three RFC-compliant TCP packets. Thus, network strain is significantly reduced during detection of the operating systems of a large number of target computers on a target network.
- the first packet sent is a completely standard TCP SYN to an open port on the target computer.
- the MSS (maximum segment size) option in the options field of the first packet is set to 0 (i.e., no bits set in the MSS option). See Figure 5.
- an acknowledgement packet a SYN ACK packet
- certain bits from the packet are saved by the system.
- the TCP advertised window, TTL (time-to-live), options, flags, and the DF (don't fragment) fields are saved to a first finge ⁇ rint.
- a second packet is then sent.
- the second TCP SYN packet is again a standard TCP SYN packet; however, the MSS option is set to 128 in the second packet (co ⁇ esponding to the setting of a single bit in the MSS option). Portions of the response SYN ACK from the target computer (preferably the TCP advertised window, TTL, and DF bits) are again saved to a second finge ⁇ rint. Finally, a third TCP SYN packet is sent. The third packet is also a standard TCP SYN packet; however, the MSS option is set to 384 in the third packet (co ⁇ esponding to the setting of two bits in the MSS option).
- portions of the response SYN ACK from the target computer are once again saved to a third finge ⁇ rint.
- the finge ⁇ rint is saved in the following format:
- TTL TCP Options Time to Live
- OPT TCP Options Bytes
- FL TCP Flags.
- the finge ⁇ rints are then compared to a known database of finge ⁇ rints associated with various operating systems and operating system versions.
- Known finge ⁇ rints can be compiled through application of the above methodology to various target computers known to have a particular operating system before testing. For example, testing of known computers running various versions of the Solaris® operating system provide the following operating system finge ⁇ rints: AW, A IM AW 384 QPTQ OPTUS OPT 38 4 TTL DF Flags OS
- Table 2 Sample OS Finge ⁇ rints for Solaris and BSD operating systems [0082] While more than one OS finge ⁇ rint may be associated with each operating system, collisions between finge ⁇ rints of distinct operating systems have been found to be highly unlikely. Tables can be compiled for other operating systems similar to that shown in Table 2. As operating system versions and popularity change over time, the finge ⁇ rint database is advantageously regularly updated to account for patches, version changes, and new operating systems.
- the finge ⁇ rint style shown above is only one embodiment of such a database, and any efficient method to store the operating system finge ⁇ rint can be used, based upon the TCP options altered, number of packets typically sent to a target computer, other TCP fields stored for recognition, and identification field used to represent a particular operating system and version, and the like.
- a unique data string for a particular operating system is compressed and stored using a digest algorithm such as MD5, and the like.
- perfect matching of finge ⁇ rints is not required: a system may employ a percentage match, such as, for example, 90% similarity between two finge ⁇ rints, as sufficient to identify a target computer as having a particular operating system or at least being in particular family of operating systems.
- TCP SYN packets Three standard TCP SYN packets are sent to the remote host.
- the first packet is a SYN packet with no data and no IP or TCP options.
- Packet 2 is also a TCP SYN packet but a TCP Maximum Segment Size of 128 in the TCP options field is set.
- the third and final packet is again a TCP SYN packet but a TCP Maximum Segment Size of 384 is set in the TCP options field.
- flags are single character representations of the TCP flags from 1st response.
- the finge ⁇ rint is compared to a database of known operating system finge ⁇ rints in order to find the closest match that will identify the remote operating system.
- Urgent Pointer 0x0000 (0)
- Urgent Pointer 0x0000 (0)
- Urgent Pointer 0x0000 (0)
- Source port 80 Destination port: 784 Sequence: 0x659B732B (1704686379) Acknowledgement: 0x05100001 (84934657) Header length: 0x06 (6) - 24 bytes Flags: SYN ACK URG: 0 ACK 1 PSH 0 RST 0 SYN 1 FIN 0
- Urgent Pointer 0x0000 (0)
- a network security system 410 first sends a first RFC compliant TCP SYN packet to a target computer 412 via a first packet transmission represented by a line 420.
- the first TCP SYN packet has the TCP Options Maximum Segment Size (MSS) set to a value of 0 (i.e., all bits cleared).
- MSS TCP Options Maximum Segment Size
- the target computer 412 responds to the first TCP SYN packet with a first SYN ACK packet represented by a line 422.
- At least a portion of the information included in the first SYN ACK packet received from the target computer 412 is determined by data in the TCP/TP stack within the target computer 412, and the data is determined, at least in part, by the particular operating system running on the target computer 412.
- the network security system 410 next sends a second RFC compliant TCP SYN packet to a target computer 412 via a second packet transmission represented by a line 430.
- the first TCP SYN packet has the TCP Options Maximum Segment Size (MSS) set to a value of 128 (i.e., bit 7 set).
- MSS TCP Options Maximum Segment Size
- the target computer 412 responds to the second TCP SYN packet with a second SYN ACK packet represented by a line 432.
- at least a portion of the information included in the second SYN ACK packet received from the target computer 412 is also determined by data in the TCP/IP stack within the target computer 412, and the data is determined, at least in part, by the particular operating system running on the target computer 412.
- the network security system 410 next sends a third RFC compliant TCP SYN packet to a target computer 412 via a third packet transmission represented by a line 440.
- the first TCP SYN packet has the TCP Options Maximum Segment Size (MSS) set to a value of 384 (i.e., bits 7 and 8 set).
- MSS TCP Options Maximum Segment Size
- the target computer 412 responds to the third TCP SYN packet with a third SYN ACK packet represented by a line 442.
- At least a portion of the information included in the third SYN ACK packet received from the target computer 412 is also determined by data in the TCP/IP stack within the target computer 412, and the data is determined, at least in part, by the particular operating system running on the target computer 412.
- the information in the three SYN ACK packets received by the network security system 410 from the target computer 412 in response to the TCP SYN packets comprise a finge ⁇ rint that is compared with the finge ⁇ rint database 352 described above in connection with Figure 3.
- FIG. 5 illustrates one example embodiment of the TCP SYN packet 500 used in the operating system identification method of Figure 3.
- IP Internet Protocol
- the packet typically provides source and destination Internet Protocol addresses and unique network addresses (not shown).
- the packet includes the source port 510 from which the packet was sent, and the destination port 512 on the target computer to which the packet is destined.
- the 32 bit sequence number 514 describes the starting point of the data contained in the packet in the data window, and the 32 bit acknowledgement number 516 contains the last byte received by the target computer.
- Data offset 518 and a reserved section 520 are also part of the packet.
- the TCP flags 522 denote important information about the packet.
- SYN denotes the first packet in a new stream
- space in the sequences 514 and 516 is typically reserved for SYN flags besides the single bit in the TCP flags region 522.
- the window 524 describes how much data may be transfe ⁇ ed into the buffer at one of the end point computers in the TCP packet communication.
- the checksum 526 and urgent pointer 528 are included.
- the TCP options 530 typically include a maximum segment size. After packet padding 532, the actual data 534 carried by the packet is attached.
- Port scanning is an essential tool for ensuring network security. Typically, a would-be intruder will apply a port scanner to a chosen target computer to attempt to find open ports. Through these open ports, the intruder may hope to obtain access to the target computer through known or unknown vulnerabilities. In the network security context, applying an ordinary port scanner to all 2 (65,536) ports on each target computer on a target network may significantly drain network resources, take an impracticable amount of time, and not provide an accurate accounting of actual vulnerabilities of target computers. [0095] In one embodiment, the present system employs an iterated port scanning system with at least two phases of operation: host discovery and service discovery.
- host discovery determines which IP addresses represent live target computers (i.e., computers that respond to network packets) and adds each such address to the "live list;” determines which IP addresses represent computers that are partially responsive, as discussed below, and adds each such address to the "potentially live list;” and determines which IP addresses represent computers that are non-responsive, and adds each such address to the "dead list.”
- live target computers i.e., computers that respond to network packets
- live list determines which IP addresses represent computers that are partially responsive, as discussed below, and adds each such address to the "potentially live list
- IP addresses represent computers that are non-responsive, and adds each such address to the "dead list.
- each target computer reported as live in the host discovery phase is subjected to scanning of a known set of ports likely to be open to traffic.
- the host discovery phase applies one, two or three distinct tests to each IP address on the scan list.
- the scan list is scanned in batches, where each batch of IP addresses is scanned in parallel (as described in more detail below) to identify host computers (i.e., live target computers).
- ICMP Ping Request ICMP Ping Request
- a standard ICMP ping request is sent to each target computer. If a response is received, the target computer is removed from the scan list and placed on the live list. In one embodiment, this entails sending out an ICMP echo request packet to each host. Multiple ICMP packets can advantageously be sent out in parallel to more than one IP address in a batch. Typically, the system waits until an ICMP echo reply is received from all IP addresses in the batch or the ICMP echo request is timed out. As a result of this process, for each batch of IP addresses on the scan list, a list of IP addresses that responded to the ICMP echo request is removed from the scan list and placed on the live list. ii. Second Test (Sending TCP Packets)
- TCP full connect a set of TCP packets (either single SYN packets or full TCP connection sequences ("TCP full connect")) are sent to the remaining target computers in the scan list as a second host discovery test.
- TCP discovery ports are selected in one embodiment. The selection is based on the TCP ports that are most likely to be open.
- the TCP discovery port list is advantageously relatively short, and preferably includes well known service ports such as HTTP (hypertext transfer protocol), SMTP (simple mail transfer protocol) and the like.
- HTTP hypertext transfer protocol
- SMTP simple mail transfer protocol
- FTP File Transfer Protocol
- SSH Secure Shell
- Telnet Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
- HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol
- POP3 Post Office Protocol
- NetBios NetBios
- SSL Secure Sockets Layer
- PPTP Point- to-Point Tunneling Protocol
- a standard TCP SYN packet is sent to some or all of the ports on the TCP host discovery list for each target IP address (target computer.)
- target IP address target computer.
- multiple IP addresses are advantageously tested in parallel (i.e., in batches) in a prefe ⁇ ed embodiment. If a target computer responds with a TCP SYN ACK, then the target computer is added to the live list. Otherwise, the TCP SYN request to the target times out (i.e., a maximum time period passes without a response from the target computer).
- TCP scan test a standard TCP full connect request initiated using the standard Window ® Winsock interface. If the operating system confirms that a TCP three-way handshake has been completed, then the target computer is added to the live list. If the target responds with a TCP RST ACK, an ambiguous response, the target computer is added to the "potentially live" list. Otherwise, the TCP request to the target times out.
- IP addresses live target computers
- the target computers on the live list are removed from the scan list. If there are any IP addresses that have not been confirmed on the "live list" or “potentially live list,” then a third step of scanning selected UDP ports on the target computer is performed for IP addresses remaining on the scan list. iii. Third Test (Intelligent UDP Port Scanning)
- IP addresses i.e., target computers
- a third test of intelligent UDP port scanning is performed on the remaining addresses.
- intelligent UDP port scanning differs from traditional scanning of UDP ports, which is notoriously inaccurate.
- TCP ports a response from the target computer signals that the target port on the target computer is open.
- no response from the target computer signals that the target port is open, and a response (an ICMP e ⁇ or message) will only be sent if the UDP port scanned is closed.
- firewalls or routers may detect and filter out malformed packets, and such packets can alert the target network of an attempted security breach.
- the intelligent UDP port scanning test in accordance with this embodiment of the present invention employs an efficient, less intrusive and more accurate method for scanning UDP ports on a target computer.
- a UDP host discovery list of commonly used UDP ports is created.
- An example of an UDP discovery list is shown in Table 4.
- the data contained within the UDP packets sent in accordance with the present invention are specifically designed to prompt a reply from the scanned host (i.e., target computer) based on knowledge of a service typically associated with the UDP port. If no information is available about the UDP port, standard data (for example, the data representing a simple ASCII character return or control character) are placed in a UDP packet.
- standard data for example, the data representing a simple ASCII character return or control character
- an exemplary UDP data probe packet is designed to solicit a response from a NetBIOS name service that typically runs on UDP protocol at port 137.
- An exemplary UDP data probe for UDP port 137 is shown in Table 5. h this case, the probe is advantageously a NetBIOS node status request, which typically results in a known response from the UDP port.
- UDP ports can be advantageously scanned in parallel.
- the system sends a UDP data probe packet to a set of UDP ports on each target computer.
- the system waits until a UDP data reply is received from one or more target computers or until the packets sent have "timed out.” If an ICMP unreachable reply is received, the hosts added to the "potentially live” list. Only those target computer IP addresses not yet determined to co ⁇ espond to live or potentially live target computers after employing ICMP, TCP and UDP scanning are left on the scan list.
- the three-step discovery phase employing ICMP, TCP and UDP scanning steps, optionally is applied multiple times to increase the accuracy of identification of live target computers on the target network.
- ICMP, TCP and UDP scanning steps optionally is applied multiple times to increase the accuracy of identification of live target computers on the target network.
- the ICMP and TCP steps are repeated a predetermined number of times for those remaining scan list target computers.
- the UDP step may also be repeated.
- more intensive UDP scanning techniques employing more ports, different data probe packets or more data packets, can be applied to the target computers remaining on the scan list to provide a more definitive list of live target computers on the network.
- traditional UDP scanning with malformed packets can be attempted.
- One obstacle to the usefulness of UDP scanning is that some target computers will limit the number of ICMP responses sent within a predetermined "response latency" time period, ranging from about 250 milliseconds to about one second. Thus, if a target computer is sent twenty UDP requests to various ports in one response latency period, it may only send one or two ICMP e ⁇ or responses indicating that the ports are closed, even if all twenty ports tested are closed. This results in substantial ambiguity as to UDP port status. In particular, when applying traditional UDP scanning techniques, many "false positives" (i.e., falsely reported open ports) are possible.
- the present invention advantageously overcomes the foregoing problem by (1) determining dynamically the latency period of the target computer, and (2) continuing the UDP port scanning of each target port for at least one entire latency period (or until an ICMP e ⁇ or response or UDP data response is received) to ensure that a non-responsive UDP port is actually open and is not simply masked by the response latency.
- the latency period is determined by selecting a UDP port, preferably one that is known to be closed, and sending UDP datagram requests for a predetermined maximum response latency period (i.e., for a time at least as great as the target computer dead time period (approximately two seconds in particular embodiments)).
- the time between responsive ICMP e ⁇ or messages or the time between UDP response packets represents the standard latency period. This test can be repeated to confirm the latency period (dead time).
- response validity is ensured by sending UDP requests continuously to the target port for at least the pre-determined latency time or until an ICMP e ⁇ or response or UDP data response is received. If an ICMP e ⁇ or response is received, the port associated with the prompting UDP request may be assumed to be closed. If a UDP data response is received, the associated port may be assumed to be open. If no response is received for the entire latency period, the associated port may be assumed to be open unless a router, firewall or packet loss has interfered with UDP port response.
- the discovery phase begins with a scan list 610, which is advantageously parsed into batches of IP addresses 612.
- a batch of IP addresses is obtained for processing.
- the ICMP ping test is performed as discussed above.
- each IP address is added to a live list 632 or remains in the present batch of IP addresses 612.
- the process also operates with a potentially live list 634 and a dead list 636.
- the process determines, in a decision step 638, whether any of the IP addresses in the cu ⁇ ent batch have not been added to the live list. If no IP addresses remain, the process proceeds to a decision step 640 where the process determines whether all batches of IP addresses have been scanned. If batches of IP addresses remain, the process returns to the step 620 and obtains a new batch of IP addresses. Otherwise, the process ends.
- the process determines that one or more JP addresses have not been added to the live list, the process proceeds to a step 650 where the TCP discovery scan described above is performed using a TCP discovery port list 652. IP addresses are added to the live list 632 or to the potentially live list 634 in accordance with the results of the scan. Then, in a decision step 654, the process determines whether any of the IP addresses in the cu ⁇ ent batch has not been added to the live list or the potentially live list. If no IP addresses remain, the process proceeds to the decision step 640 discussed above.
- the process determines that one or more IP addresses have not been added to the live list or the potentially live list, the process proceeds to a step 660 where the intelligent UDP discovery scan described above is performed using a UDP discovery port list 662. IP addresses are added to the live list 632, the potentially live list 634 or the dead list 636 in accordance with the results of the scan. Then, in a decision step 664, the process determines whether any of the IP addresses of the cu ⁇ ent batch have not been added to the live list, the potentially live list or the dead list. If no IP addresses remain, the process proceeds to the decision step 640 discussed above.
- the process proceeds to a step 670 where the intensive UDP discovery scan described above is performed using a second UDP port list 672, which advantageously includes additional ports to scan.
- the second UDP port list 672 is the UDP service port list advantageously described below, but any combination of UDP ports may be used.
- IP addresses are again added to the live list 632, the potentially live list 634 and the dead list 636 in accordance with the results of the intensive scan. Then, in a decision step 674, the process determines whether the discovery testing needs to be repeated.
- the process proceeds to the decision step 640 discussed above. If any remaining IP addresses remain that have not been added to one of the lists, then the process determines whether the scanning steps have been performed a predetermined number of times for the cu ⁇ ent batch of IP addresses. If the steps have been performed a predetermined number of times, the process proceeds to the decision step 640. Otherwise, the process returns to the ICMP ping test 630 to again process the remaining IP addresses.
- the intensive UDP discovery scan 670 is optional. If the intensive UDP discovery scan 670 is not included, then the decision step 664 following the intelligent UDP discover scan 660 advantageously includes the additional decision of whether to repeat the scanning process based on whether the scanning process has been performed a predetermined number of times.
- the present invention then proceeds to examine each host (i.e., target computer) in more detail using the live list and optionally using the potentially live list as well, hi service discovery, a set of common TCP service ports and a set of common UDP service ports are scanned.
- the TCP service discovery list and the UDP service discovery list are typically substantially larger than the TCP host discovery list and the UDP host discovery list.
- Each list typically includes some subset of ports that are commonly used for communications. For example, each list may include anywhere from a few to hundreds of ports.
- each list includes ports such as those shown in Table 6 (an exemplary list of default ports publicly reported by Microsoft ® for Windows ® 2000.) This list is not exhaustive, and changes in technology, protocols, network infrastructure and operating systems frequently change port requirements.
- Table 6 Example Set of UDP and TCP ports for Service Discovery [0121] Because there are 2 16 (65,536) possible ports on each target computer, the selection of a subset of ports is prefe ⁇ ed because time constraints generally preclude scanning of all ports on each target computer, especially on a large network. Similarly, random selection of ports on each target computer is unlikely to be fruitful because an average target computer will run less than a dozen, and in rare cases dozens or hundreds, of services, making the probability of hitting an open port through random selection of a port inefficient and inaccurate.
- TCP service discovery uses the large list of TCP service scan ports, a few of which are shown above, and attempts to connect to each target port on each target computer.
- standard TCP SYN scanning requires waiting for a SYN ACK response from each target port, or TCP "full connect" scanning requires waiting for an operating system message indicating that a three-way handshake between the target computer and scanning system has been completed.
- Target computers that respond positively to either of these attacks are added to a list of vulnerable computers to undergo vulnerability assessment for each open target port found.
- UDP service discovery uses the large list of UDP service scan ports, a few of which are shown above, and attempts to connect to each target port on each target computer.
- the present invention may advantageously use the improved UDP data probe packets for any port recognized to be commonly associated with a particular service.
- packets that include data representing standard characters, such as one or more ASCII character returns may be used.
- Target computers that respond positively to this attack are added to a list of vulnerable computers to undergo vulnerability assessment for each open target port found.
- the vulnerabilities used are typically limited to those associated with the operating system of the target computer as discovered by the operating system identification system described previously, and by those vulnerabilities associated with the open ports found on the target computer. If the operating system of the target computer cannot be conclusively identified, then typically all vulnerabilities associated with the open ports found on the target computer during the service discovery system described herein are tested against the target computer.
- a more intensive UDP scanning regime can be applied to target computers that do not respond to a simple UDP data probe packet.
- the more intensive UDP scanning regime advantageously uses, for example, traditional UDP port scanning in combination with the optional latency time resolution described above.
- an optional active assessment of target computers takes place. Active assessment applies knowledge of target computer operating system, open ports, as well as information recovered from the target network during vulnerability assessment, to further test known vulnerabilities against each target computer.
- the present invention advantageously performs port scanning in "batches,” rather than completing serial scanning of individual ports, one after another. This allows small pieces of a large scan to be completed and saved to a database, not requiring the entire results of a large scan to be held in memory all at once. For example, if a class A network is tested, hundreds of millions of ports need to be scanned merely for host discovery.
- the system may be advantageously adapted to technical limitations in older network equipment to scan ports of computers in a very large target network with multiple, significant IP address ranges. In the event of network or system failure, the system resumes particularly large scans following the last known successfully completed batch.
- prefe ⁇ ed embodiments of the present invention identify small portions or "batches" of the entire scan range of IP addresses, comprising, for example, 64 target computers represented in the scan range.
- Host discovery begins using a first batch of target computers. When all live hosts in the first batch have been discovered, service discovery of TCP and UDP services is performed on the live hosts in the first batch, along with other testing services such as operating system identification, tracerouting of network topology, and active assessment of vulnerabilities, described herein.
- the results are stored in a vulnerability database. Then, the next batch of 64 target computers are similarly processed, and so on, until the entire scan list has been processed for the target network.
- a large number of target computers are tested on one or a small number of ports in parallel, rather than a large number of ports being tested on a single or small number of target computer in parallel.
- the former method prevents undue load on any single target computer, prevents network overload, and reduces the risk of triggering target network security alerts.
- the later method may be prefe ⁇ ed if, for example, a few target computers are selectively singled out for scanning.
- the present invention simultaneously uses a set of 640 packet slots.
- a pocket slot is an advantageously allocated space in memory that keeps track of a sent packet while waiting for a response or for the packet sent to time-out.
- ICMP request packets can be handled simultaneously, but it will be appreciated that a different number of slots, more or less than 640, may be allocated and used simultaneously.
- the slot allocated for the packet is then reallocated to send a new packet and monitor any response or time-out.
- packets can be kept moving at a rapid rate since there is a small average delay between sending of one packet and receipt of a response and/or time out for another packet.
- a response to one of the sent packets will have been received, thereby freeing the associated slot for handling of another packet.
- a similar methodology applies to the handling of TCP SYN packets, UDP host discovery, and service discovery in general.
- operating system identification and tracerouting can use similar batched parallel port monitoring.
- the number of slots used is not limited to 640 slots, and can be varied for programming or scanning efficiency.
- one embodiment of the present invention uses a batch size of one hundred target computers for simultaneous scanning. For host discovery, the ICMP scanning process sends 100 ICMP echo requests and monitors responses and time-outs.
- the above-described service discovery phase is illustrated by the process flowchart in Figure 7.
- the process starts with a live list 710, which advantageously co ⁇ esponds to the live list 632 generated by the host discovery process illustrated in Figure 6.
- the process may also include the potentially live list 634 generated in Figure 6; however, for ease of explanation, the potentially live list is not shown in Figure 7.
- the IP addresses in the live list 710 are advantageously parsed into batches of IP addresses 712.
- the process of Figure 7 operates on a target computer vulnerability database 714 and a known vulnerability database 716.
- a first decision step 720 in Figure 7 the process determines whether TCP SYN scanning or TCP "full connect" scanning is being performed. As discussed above, the TCP full connect scanning process requires the process to wait for an operating system message indicating that a three-way handshake between the target computer and the scanning system has been established. In the TCP SYN scanning process, the process, waits for a SYN ACK response from each target port, in which case, the target computers can be processed in parallel, as discussed above, hi both cases, the process proceeds to a step 722 to obtain a first batch of IP addresses representing a first batch of live (or potentially live) target computers. If TCP full connect scanning is being performed, the process operates on a smaller number of ports on the target computers at one time. The process then proceeds to a decision step 730.
- the process determines whether all the live target computers have been processed in TCP full connect scanning or whether all the batches of live target computers have been processed in TCP SYN scanning. If all the target computers or all the batches of target computers have been processed, the process ends. Otherwise, the process proceeds to a TCP service scan routine 740 wherein the process uses a TCP service discovery list 742 to identify the TCP service ports to be examined for each target computer.
- TCP packets are sent to the identified TCP service ports of each target computer, and the target computer vulnerability database 714 is updated for each target computer in accordance with whether a response is received or is not received from each target computer for each TCP service port scanned and using the known vulnerability database to obtain the vulnerability information for the particular TCP service ports that are determined to be open.
- the process proceeds to an optional UDP latency test 750 wherein the latency of each target computer is determined and stored in a latency database 752.
- the process proceeds from the latency test 750 or directly from the TCP service scan routine 740 to a UDP service scan 760 wherein the process uses a UDP service discovery list 762 to identify the UDP service ports to be examined for each target computer.
- UDP packets are sent to the identified UDP service ports of each target computer, and the target computer vulnerability database 714 is updated for each target computer in accordance with whether a response is received or is not received from each target computer for each UDP service port scanned and using the known vulnerability database to obtain the vulnerability information for the particular UDP service ports that are determined to be open.
- the process proceeds to a decision step 770 wherein the process determines whether a response has been received from all the scanned service ports. If not, the process determines whether the scanning of the cu ⁇ ent target computer or batch of target computers has been performed a predetermined number of times. If all the scanned service ports have responded or if the scanning has been performed a predetermined number of times, the process returns to the step 720. Otherwise, the process returns to the TCP service scan routine 740 to scan the service ports that have not responded.
- "Banner grabbing” is a method of stripping relevant information from packets received from a target computer, h one embodiment, for each target computer in the live list, an attempt is made to perform banner grabbing against each open TCP port and each open UDP port discovered during the service scan phase. If information is successfully obtained from a responsive TCP or UDP packet, this information is stored in a database in association with the target computer from which the information is obtained. The stored information is subsequently used to collect vulnerability information on the target computer, and the vulnerability information is also stored in a database. [0138] For each open TCP port located during the service discovery phase, a TCP data probe is sent to that port if the port is known to be typically associated with a particular service.
- TCP port 80 when sending a TCP data probe to a target TCP port 80 on a target computer, where TCP port 80 is well known as the common service port for HTTP, the system sends an HTTP-compliant GET request, and strips useful information from any TCP response packet sent back from the target computer.
- TCP port 80 is well known as the common service port for HTTP
- the system sends an HTTP-compliant GET request, and strips useful information from any TCP response packet sent back from the target computer.
- similar commands can be used for other ports with well known services running thereon.
- the useful information obtained may advantageously be transformed or translated into a readable or processable form (e.g., text) and stored for later reporting.
- UDP port 137 is known to be associated with a NetBIOS service.
- the system sends a NetBIOS Node Status Command, for example, and strips and stores useful information from any response packet sent by the target computer.
- the information obtained in this manner may advantageously be transformed or translated into a readable or processable form (e.g., text) and stored for later reporting.
- an attempt is made to perform an ICMP traceroute between the system and the target computer. If the ICMP traceroute is incomplete, an attempt is made to perform a TCP traceroute between the system and the target computer. Based on the traceroute results for each target computer, a map of the target network topology is created and stored in a database. [0141] Initially, traditional ICMP tracerouting is performed. A number of packets are sent to the target computer with varying TTL (time to live) values in the TCP TP header, starting with a TTL of 1.
- the ICMP echo request packet fails to reach the destination target computer, it will return an ICMP destination unreachable packet containing the IP address of the router/host that the packet was returned from. Packets that arrive at the target computer itself return an ICMP echo reply packet. Based on the known TTL value, the number of "hops" between the system and the target computer, and the router/host at each "hop" can be mapped out. When all packets have arrived or timed out, if there is a router/host and IP address associated with each "hop" between the system and the target computer, the traceroute step is completed for that target computer. The ICMP traceroute is continued for a number of pre-determined passes until a complete trace is received or the maximum number of passes is completed. If, after the pre-determined number of passes the tracerouting of the target computer is incomplete, then a TCP traceroute is attempted.
- TCP tracerouting works similarly to ICMP tracerouting, except TCP SYN packets are used, hi some instances, TCP packets are more reliable at completing otherwise incomplete traces, because, for example, ICMP packets are sometimes blocked by firewalls or routers.
- the TCP port chosen is taken from the list of open ports discovered for the target computer that is the subject of the traceroute.
- the TTL value in each SYN packet is incrementally increased, and the return of ICMP unreachable packets and SYN ACK packets is monitored for all "hops" between the scanning system and the target host.
- the network maps are an attempt to represent in the most concise way possible the topology of the network as discovered by tracerouting methods. Basically, packets are sent to each discovered host in the scanned network with the Time-To-Live field set to the hopcount at which a packet indicating failure to transmit due to that hopcount will be sent by the machine that is that many hops away from the scanning machine. By increasing the TTL and storing the IPs of the machines that respond until getting a response from the host in question, a string of IPs is built up that represents the machines that led up to that host.
- a machine at a given hop may not respond within the time expected by the tracerouting algorithm, or it may not respond at all if it is a firewall that blocks the traceroute packets. Any approach that can exist must deal with this uncertainty in some way. In one embodiment, any unknowns are assumed to be firewalls.
- the algorithm typically employed is presented with a set of discovered hosts and each host includes a IP address that represent what the tracerouting algorithm initially determines are the machines leading up to them. This string may include unknowns which are denoted by OxFFFFFF or 255.255.255.255.255. The algorithm operates as follows:
- CONDENSE UNKNOWNS Condense consecutive unknowns into a single hop with unknown IP address (OxFFFFFF). If a traceroute is performed to a given hop and an unknown is received, it is probable that every hop after that will also be unknown because the first unknown hop is a firewall blocking the packets.
- Each ROUTENODE struct has a list of
- ROUTENODE pointers in it which represent the machines that ROUTENODE is directly connected to.
- the algorithm next fills this in to guarantee that the IP addresses are unique in each list of connections. Note that these pointers point to other ROUTENODE structs in the list (i.e., the list is typically a self contained bunch of data.)
- ⁇ COMPUTE DISTANCE FROM INTERNET The traceroute information is once again traversed for each host and for each IP address.
- the co ⁇ esponding ROUTENODE struct is looked up in the list and the struct' s m_nDistFromInternet is set according to the hopcount in the route. This is typically done to represent a maximum hopcount.
- the m_nDistFromInteraet fields are initialized to 0, and then, if the hopcount in a traceroute IP string is greater, the m_nDistFromInternet is set to that hopcount.
- an IP address (let it be called “d,” for example) may appear in one route as a-b-d and in some other route as a-b-c-d, where "a,” "b,” and “c” are other IP addresses on the route to the IP address c.
- a ROUTER struct contains a pointer to a ROUTENODE believed to be a ROUTER and a list of ROUTENODE pointers that are leaf (end of route) machines it is connected to.
- a leaf is any ROUTENODE that is directly connected to only one machine (besides itself.)
- a ROUTER is that machine.
- This stage of the algorithm builds up a list of ROUTER structs, and, within each ROUTER, builds a list of leaf ROUTENODEs connected to that ROUTER.
- the algorithm also marks a Boolean field within the ROUTENODEs that are being designated ROUTERs as it will become necessary to know which machines in the ROUTENODE list are routers without wanting to consult the ROUTER list.
- the algorithm would then look for other ROUTERs whose m_nDistFromInternet fields are less than this ROUTERs m_nDistFromInternet (i.e., look for a ROUTER that is directly connected to this ROUTER and precedes it.)
- the algorithm takes the greatest m_nDistFromInternet router that it finds and connects this ROUTER to it visually. If it finds no preceding ROUTERs, it connects this ROUTER to the internet cloud in the center of the map.
- the refined algorithm still does all that is described above, but typically not before doing a bit more processing.
- ROUTER PROMOTION There are circumstances when the algorithm as it has been detailed thus far would produce a map in which a ROUTER has leaf nodes su ⁇ ounding it all of which have the same subnet, for example they might all be 149.17.Lxxx. The first 1, 2, or 3 digits (8 bits each) will be the same. That ROUTER has a ROUTER of less mj DistFromlnternet directly connected to it that has exactly 1 leaf node and that leaf node has the same IP address digits in common as all the ones in the first ROUTER's leaf list, hi this case, although the traceroute data suggests that the first ROUTER and that single leaf are different machines, they are likely two NICs (Network Interface Cards) on the same machine.
- NICs Network Interface Cards
- the algorithm "promotes" that ROUTENODE by adding its IP address to the m_lnOtherNics member of the first ROUTER's ROUTENODE and then removing it from the other ROUTER's list of leaves and marking that ROUTER's ROUTENODE to be no longer a ROUTER. That ROUTER is also removed from the ROUTER list.
- the ROUTERs primary IP address is represented as usual but now there is a grey bar and the other IP address underneath it.
- the algorithm supports doing multi-homed ROUTERs and will represent all the IPs that get promoted. The multi-homed case is easily imagined by extending the dual-homed example discussed here.
- the prefe ⁇ ed algorithm performs another type of router promotion as well. If exactly one leaf around some ROUTER fulfills a heuristic, it will be promoted to another NIC on the ROUTER. In order to test for the heuristic, the machine needs to be a host discovered during the scanning process because that is where the information comes from. It is noteworthy that most leaves will be discovered hosts. Although the algorithm does not demand this, and traceroute information may produce non-discovered- host hops that only have one thing connected to them and thereby make leaves out of them, since tracerouting is being done to the discovered hosts, the leaves will tend to be discovered hosts.
- the heuristic is, in one embodiment, as follows: if TCP 2001, 4001, 6001, or 9001 is discovered, or if UDP 520, or both UDP 23 and 79 are discovered, or if the discovered operating system is Cisco, that ROUTENODE is assumed to be a router-IP address and it is promoted (IP address added to the ROUTER's m nOtherNics and ROUTENODE pointer removed from its leaves).
- FIREWALL PROMOTION Firewall promotion is similar to the router promotion heuristic detailed above.
- the heuristic in one embodiment, if exactly one leaf around a firewall satisfies the heuristic then it gets promoted into the firewall's other-NIC list resulting in the map printing "Firewall," but now the known IP address is underneath it separated by the gray bar.
- the heuristic in one embodiment, is if TCP 256, 257, 264, 265 is found on a machine then it is assumed to be a firewall.
- NUMBER FIREWALLS This is the last step of the algorithm.
- the firewalls are sorted in order of the IP address that precedes them and are then numbered so that the map can print "Firewall-1, Firewall-2, ..., etc.” on the report.
- the known vulnerabilities for that configuration are stored in a vulnerability database based on vulnerability identification codes.
- a methodology for testing the vulnerability can be written into an automatic script, which will assess the actual weakness of the target system to the suspected vulnerability.
- these scripts are prepared in a assessment security scripting language, and are preferably prepared in FASL.
- FASL is a scripting language based on C++ and Java implementation, in one embodiment.
- FASL provides an adjustable, automated language for security testing various vulnerabilities.
- Multiple FASL scripts advantageously may be run in parallel. For example, in one embodiment up to eight simultaneous scripts may be run.
- Each FASL script for example, will respond with a success or failure result noting whether the target computer was vulnerable or not to the given vulnerability identification code.
- the information collected by the FASL script from the target computer, and the success or failure of the attempt, are stored in a database, related to the target computer for later reporting, for use in additional vulnerability testing, or for repeating additional testing.
- FASL includes member functions in structure objects, constructors and destructors in structure objects, inheritance in structure objects, arrays of scalar types, new scalar type "binary" and associated functions, string constants that support embedded hex codes including embedded zero bytes, RPCCheckO and SMBCheck() functions for RFC and Netbios checks, debugMessage() on all scalar types that produces hex output on binary type, recursion, function overloading, reference parameters, and support for Active- Assessment.
- all variables are stack variables. In addition to permitting recursion, this also allows a parse tree to be built once and then used to execute the same script by multiple threads.
- the execution architecture in FASL treats the parse tree as a read-only data structure. Hence, other than considerations such as two instances of the same script attempting to instantiate a Socket on the same target computer IP and port (which should not happen in practice), FASL is completely thread- safe.
- Scalar data types are those native types in the language that take up one slot on the execution stack. Basically, any variable that can be declared is a scalar type, an a ⁇ ay of a scalar type, or an instance of a structure.
- the scalar types are as follows:
- a string is NULL terminated. This means that internally the string is represented as a string of characters with a zero marking the end. This zero's existence is always implicit, however. In other words, there is no string function that will return you the zero.
- the length of the string is computed by counting the number of characters up to but not including the zero. This also makes it so that if a constant is assigned to a string of, for example, "this is a string ⁇ x0 with stuff beyond the zero.” the value of that string will be "this is a string” and its length will be 16.
- Type binary typically does not use a zero or any other delimiting character in its internal representation. The string constant example with the embedded zero would have everything after the zero also in the binary.
- string s "1234"; // length - 4.
- Keywords that indicate a constant value of a given type are as follows:
- Constant Keyword Value null 0 (int, char, boolean) true 1 (boolean) false 0 (boolean)
- Type Constants attack ATTACK UNKNOWN, ATTACK NTRUSIVE, ATTACK DOS, ATTACK NON ⁇ NTRUS ⁇ VE operatingsystem OSJJNTX, OSJVIAC, OS_WINDOWS, OS_UNKNOWN, OS ROUTER protocol TCP, UDP, ICMP, IGMP returnvalue RETURN_SUCCESS, RETURN_FA ⁇ LURE, RETURN TIMEOUT ipservice LOWDELAY, THROUGHPUT, RELIABILITY, MINCOST, CONEXP, ECTCAP ipoptions EOL, NOP, RR, TS, SECURITY, LSRR, SATID, SSRR, RA ipoffset RESERVED, PONT, MORE
- a FASL script is typically a list of statements. These statements are generally separated by semicolons. The exception to this rule is that statements that involve blocks (other statement lists enclosed by ⁇ and ⁇ ) do not typically require semicolons to separate them. A semicolon constitutes a valid (empty) statement so it does not hurt anything to put semicolons after statements involving blocks but it accomplishes nothing. A new block represents a new scope. Any variables declared in that scope will be accessible only in that scope, and if they have destructors, those destructors will be called at the end of the scope. Variables can be declared with the same name as variables in scopes that enclose the scope in which they are declared. They will override the variables in the outer scopes which are otherwise accessible to the enclosed scope. Variables of the same name as other variables in the same scope will generate an e ⁇ or however. A statement can be one of the following, each of which will be detailed further below:
- Function declaration A named list of statements with parameters that appear to the list of statements as declared variables in their scope but whose values are copied from expressions or else refer to variables supplied by a function-call which is a type of expression. Function declarations may only occur in the topmost scope of the script.
- Structure declaration A declaration of an entity which can have both data members and member functions.
- the member functions all have an implicit first parameter which is a reference to the object instance upon which the function is being called.
- Variable declaration A declaration of a variable which then exists in the scope in which it was declared. Variables can be simply declared or as part of their declaration they can be initialized by assigning them to an expression or constructed by supplying constructor parameters in parenthesis after the variable. Note that scalar types have no constructors. On types that do have constructors, the parameter list must match a constructor that exists for that type.
- While loop This is a control structure that has a block/statementlist/scope that is executed for as long as a given condition (expression) resolves to true.
- Repeat loop This is a control structure that executes its block a given integer amount of times that an expression resolves to.
- This control structure has 3 lists of expressions separated by semicolons enclosed in parentheses. Within the lists (which can be empty, have one expression, or more than one) if there are more than one expression, they are separated by commas. The first list is executed initially. The next is a condition that must be true for the block to execute (in a list of expressions all must be true), and the last is the iterator list of expressions that gets executed each time through the loop.
- Block Note that many statements own blocks. A block may also exist on its own without being owned by a control statement or function declaration. An unowned block may be coded in circumstances when construction and destruction of something needs to happen at a given point that cannot be accomplished in any of the "normal" scopes.
- the (possibly empty) ⁇ body> consists of a list of statements. If a statement which is "return ⁇ expression>" is encountered anywhere in this body, the execution of the function ceases at that point and control is returned to the caller of the function with the value returned being the value that function presents to the expression in which it participates. Functions can be called without using the value they return as well. [0160] For example,
- ⁇ typename> ⁇ var>[, ⁇ var>...]; [0162]
- ⁇ typename> is typically expressed as "structure ⁇ structurename>” or, alternatively, a structure variable of type "OBJECT" can be declared as "OBJECT o; ⁇
- a ⁇ var> is one of the following:
- ⁇ params> is a comma separated list of expressions.
- the constructor matching that signature in ⁇ typename> is called. Note that ⁇ typename> needs to be a structure.
- ⁇ identifier> ⁇ a ⁇ av-dimension-expression>l ⁇ typename> must indicate a scalar (non-structure) type. The expression must resolve to a constant integer (i.e., no variables or function calls in it). This declares ⁇ identifier> to be an a ⁇ ay variable of given dimension of ⁇ typename>.
- Structures are declared using the "structure" keyword. They are declared as follows: structure ⁇ structurename> [extends ⁇ parentstructurename>]
- the parameter ⁇ member-list> is a possibly empty list of ⁇ member>s.
- a ⁇ member> is typically either a function declaration or a variable declaration. The only syntactic difference between these things when used in structure declarations versus not is that member variables cannot have initializer expressions or constructor parameters. Member variables can be a ⁇ ays however.
- this structure When “extends” is used, this structure "inherits" all the members of the parent. Any member functions in this structure that are the same name and signature as one that is in the parent structure will override that parent structure's function. [0167] A “constructor” is a member function that gets called when a structure variable is declared and a “destructor” is a member function that gets called when a variable goes out of scope.
- any member function whose name is ⁇ structurename> is a constructor and can have any or no parameters. There can be zero or one member function whose name is ⁇ structurename> and has no parameters, and this is the destructor.
- Some subtleties that are not immediately apparent are as follows: If this structure extends an object that has constructors and/or a destructor or has member variables that are structures that have constructors and/or a destructor, then each constructor in this object will implicitly contain a call to the default constructor in the parent and or owned object(s) and similarly the destructor for this object will have call(s) to destructors of parent/owned object(s).
- Expressions are variables, function calls, constants, member-selections, and combinations of these things with operators serving as the connectors.
- expressions may be defined recursively, such that, for example, ⁇ expression> + ⁇ expression> is an expression.
- operators assignment, arithmetic, logical, etc., it is customary to refer to the expression on the left as the "lvalue” and the expression on the right as the "rvalue.”
- the lvalue and rvalue in any expression must return compatible types (usually the types must be the same but sometimes, as with int and char in FASL, different types can be compatible). Additionally, some operators only work on some types.
- function calls ⁇ function-name>([ ⁇ argument-list>]); ⁇ argument-list> is a possibly empty, comma-separated list of expressions. There must be a function somewhere in the script which takes parameters that match the return types of these expressions in the order in which they occur. In the case of functions that take references, the co ⁇ esponding expression in the ⁇ argument-list> of the function call must resolve to a variable (not a constant or arithmetic/logical/relational expression of multiple variables).
- the type of a function call expression is the return type of its co ⁇ esponding function declaration.
- string constants "sample string ⁇ x3f ' ; these are string values enclosed in quotes which mostly represent the literal characters that comprise the string. The exceptions to this are the escape characters: " ⁇ t” is tab, “ ⁇ n” is newline, “ ⁇ r” is carriage return, and " ⁇ x[0-9a-fA-F][0-9a-fA-F]*" are embedded hex codes that resolve down to one character. Note the regular expression simply means for example “ ⁇ x3F-sample” will resolve down to a 47 (0x3F) followed by a '-' followed by a 's,' etc. Any embedded zeros (“ ⁇ x0”) will terminate the string when the constant is used in string expressions, but when used in binary expressions, the total string will get processed to resolve the escape sequences and then converted to type binary. String constants typically have the same precedence as functions.
- the ⁇ expression-list> can be nothing, it can be a single ⁇ expression>, or it can be a comma-separated list of expressions.
- the first ⁇ expression-list> gets called initially and can be any mix of expressions as the return values are ignored.
- the middle ⁇ expression-list> is the condition that determines whether the block will be executed and whether the loop will continue to be iterated. All expressions in this list must return boolean and they all must return true in order for the block to be executed.
- the last ⁇ expression-list> can be any mix of expressions and it gets executed after each time the block has been executed.
- faultline refers to the overall network security system.
- m_nFaultlineID nFaultlinelD
- m_eOSMajor eMajor
- m_eOSMinor eMinor
- FASL.memberfunctionO When a script is successfully compiled, all statements of the form "FASL.memberfunctionO" that are in the main scope are executed (and no other statements in the script are executed at this point). The information that these member functions set goes into the script object's data which allows the system to make some intelligent decisions on when and how to run the script.
- FASL.addValidPort(nPort) can be called any number of times and will result in a list of unique ports being built up. When the system is run, it will either find that FASL.addValidPort(nPort) was not called in the script's main scope in which case the script will be run once per host and FASL.getScriptPortO will return 0 within that script.
- FASL.addValidPort(nPort) does occur in the main scope of the script, the system will execute the script once for each unique port on a given host, and FASL.getScriptPortO will return whatever port the system passes in for that execution.
- FASL.setScriptOS() operates along a similar principle (i.e., by calling it you are requesting that the script be executed only on hosts whose OS has been specifically determined whereas not calling it implies that the script is to be called regardless of OS). Note that calling this multiple times does not make a list of OSes like the addValidPort makes a list of ports. The last call to setScriptOS is the one that gets used.
- the m_nTP Address member of the FASL variable has been set to the IP address of the target machine upon which the FASL script is to run. All network activity that takes place in a FASL script uses this IP address as its destination, hence in the functions and objects about to be specified, the IP address is never a parameter.
- Calling FASL.setScriptReturn(string, RETURNVALUE) sets the m_szReturnString member which is then printed by the script executor command line application "fasl.exe" upon completion of executing the script.
- the system will execute only the "FASL.xxx()" statements in the script, then the system examines the memberdata and decides whether or not to run the whole script on that IP address.
- the constructor of FASL_OBJECT is actually not called on the FASL variable.
- any variable other than m_nTP Address is sometimes not be initially set to anything.
- Structures may be derived from FASL OBJECT and variables of type FASL_OBJECT may be initialized, in which case that constructor will be called.
- the member variables of FASL are not directly accessible by script code (declared as private).
- the structure is as follows (the data members are omitted as it is not necessary to know them):
- eProtocol is either TCP or UDP and the port is the IP port.
- This object is used for active assessment, and its custom behavior — atypical of general FASL script — is that it knows how to copy itself, and all the data it needs to find itself later, into a global data area where other scripts can access the data, and use the information to attempt to compromise another machine.
- the object is as follows:
- the m nFaultlinelD is the vulnerability id of the vulnerability discovered.
- the m_nTP Address is the machine it was discovered on.
- the m_nExploitIP Address is the machine on which the data was discovered that proved instrumental in finding this vulnerability.
- the m_szDescription is what you want to appear in the Active-Assessment report.
- the m_nExploitIP Address should typically be set to -1 when no other vulnerability was used to find this vulnerability.
- debugMessage( ⁇ scalar> e) overloaded for all the scalar types. Usually it prints what is expected from a debugging system, h t and char print as numbers, boolean prints as "true” or “false”, strings print their contents. Binary produces a hex dump output, through debugMessage(binary b), which closely resembles what the MS-DOS DEBUG.EXE "d” option produces.
- nStart is 0-based... return binary which is the nLength bytes starting
- FASL scripting language permits one to perform active assessment of potential vulnerabilities on a known target computer with known open ports.
- a FASL script to test a Unicode vulnerability has the form:
- information collected from a successful vulnerability test in one embodiment, is used to advantageously further test the vulnerability of the target network and individual target computers.
- additional ports or levels of account access are typically available on the target computer.
- Figure 8 illustrates one embodiment of active assessment of a vulnerability of a target computer on a target network.
- the network is shown as having a target 1 computer 800 and a target 2 computer 802.
- a single vulnerability is assumed to apply to all TCP and UDP ports of the two computers.
- a single vulnerability "TEST" is tested on various TCP and UDP ports on both target computers.
- Prior host discovery and port discovery have provided target 1 data 804 and target 2 data 806 that includes an identification of open ports found on each target computer. Specifically, in the example illustrated in Figure 8, TCP port 80 and UDP ports 5000 and 53 were found open on the target 1 computer 800, and TCP ports 23 and 80 and UDP ports 500, 53, and 1721 were found open on the target 2 computer 802.
- the active assessment process starts in a step 806 and begins by executing a TEST routine 808 that applies the TEST vulnerability to each port on the target 1 computer 800.
- a TEST routine 808 that applies the TEST vulnerability to each port on the target 1 computer 800.
- the testing of ports 80, 5000 and 53 result in no successful applications of the vulnerability.
- the system then moves in to a first round 812 of testing the target 2 computer, where testing of ports 80 and 53 are unsuccessful, but testing of ports 23, 5000 and 1721 are successful.
- an attempt is made to strip useful information from the target computer, and any information retrieved is stored in the target 2 data 806. Based on the new information retrieved, a second round 814 of testing the target 1 computer is attempted.
- testing of port 80 is still unsuccessful, but testing of ports 5000 and 53 is now successful with the inclusion of the additional information gathered from the target 2 data 806. In this manner, a second round 816 of testing the target 2 computer is attempted. The rounds of testing are repeated until vulnerability assessments can be actively completed for the entire target network.
- Vulns are typically stored in a database for inclusion in vulnerability assessment testing, active assessment and reporting.
- the "Vulns" table called “static data,” which only changes when deploying new patches inco ⁇ orating new vulnerabilities. This would happen, for example, as new vulnerabilities are discovered and existing in-the-field system installations need to be made aware of them.
- the present system uses, in one example, the VulnsFound table below to indicate which vulnerabilities it has found on a particular scan. VulnsFound is simply an index into the Vulns table which keeps us from otherwise repeating the same data a multitude of times and wasting space.
- COLUMN CyberID
- TYPE int (10)
- COLUMN Description
- TYPE text (2147483647)
- COLUMN ExploitDataType
- TYPE varchar (64) //Name of the FASL type, where applicable, that contains extra data for this vulnerability.
- COLUMN ExploitDate
- TYPE smalldatetime (16)
- COLUMN ExploitLink
- TYPE varchar (255)
- COLUMN Impact
- TYPE tinyint(3)
- COLUMN ISSID
- TYPE int (10)
- COLUMN LHF
- TYPE bit (1)
- COLUMN NID, TYPE: int (10) COLUMN: Observation, TYPE: text (2147483647) COLUMN: Person, TYPE varchar (50) COLUMN: Popularity, TYPE: tinyint(3) COLUMN: Recommendation, TYPE: text (2147483647) COLUMN: Risk, TYPE: tinyint(3) COLUMN: RiskText, TYPE: text (2147483647) COLUMN: Simplicity, TYPE: tinyint(3) COLUMN: Type, TYPE: varchar (50)
- the present system provides objective, quantitative indicia of the overall security of the target network.
- this quantitative indicia can be any quantitative scale of sufficient granularity to provide meaningful distinctions due to changes in network vulnerabilities over time, with a range of between 1-10, 1-100, and the like.
- this objective indicia applies a standard formula to the various vulnerabilities discovered on the target network and network configuration, such that a valid comparison can be made between the security of otherwise heterogeneous network configurations, operating systems, and computers.
- the objective indicia is a risk measurement algorithm, such as a FoundS core F.
- the FoundScore F is defined as:
- the vulnerability loss V is defined as the sum of values assigned to each vulnerability found on the target network. For each of the n vulnerabilities found on the target network, that vulnerability is assigned a weight.
- V w , x is defined as: where:
- PEA ) floor ( ⁇ P(V X ) + E(V X ) + A(V X ) ⁇ / 3) (Eq. 3) and: fioor(x) is the standard floor function, P(V X ) is the popularity of the vulnerability on a 1-3 scale, E(V X ) is the ease of exploitation of the vulnerability on a 1-3 scale, A(V X ) is the level of access/privileges granted by the vulnerability on a 1-3 scale, where the higher the score on the scale the greater the risk. [0199] Alternatively, the vulnerability can be simply defined as the risk level associated with the vulnerability, such as where:
- R(V X ) is the risk associated with the vulnerability on a 1-3 scale.
- the factors used to determine the PEA(V) for a particular vulnerability are provided from the vulnerability database discussed previously.
- the vulnerability base function e.g., PEA(V)
- the total vulnerability score V is, in one embodiment, equal to:
- the total exposure score E is, in one embodiment, defined as:
- E min ( 50 , ⁇ i ⁇ ⁇ 10xU y + 5xl y + N y + 2xM y ⁇ ) (Eq. 5)
- q the number of live target computers found on the target network
- U y the open UDP ports found on the yth target computer, except DNS
- I y the open ICMP ports found on the yth target computer
- N y the non-essential services found on the yth target computer
- M y a penalty for target computers with no essential services
- ⁇ the summation symbol
- min (x,y) is the standard minimum function.
- the number of live target computers q is typically deduced from the host discovery process described above.
- the number of open UDP ports TJ y found on the yth target computer is typically deduced from the service discovery and active assessment process described above.
- the number of non-essential services N y found on the yth target computer is typically deduced from the service discovery of TCP and UDP ports, and in one prefe ⁇ ed embodiment, counts all open ports found on each target computer, except for certain predetermined services.
- Table 11 lists examples of predetermined services that are not included in the count of nonessential services N y in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.
- Figure 9 illustrates one embodiment of a methodology for determining the security score for a target network.
- the method determines whether all vulnerabilities found in the target network have been counted. If not, the method calculates PEA(V X ) (Eq. 3) above, or a variation thereof, in a step 902 for vulnerability number x based on predetermined values stored in a vulnerability database 904. The value of PEA(V X ) is used to calculate the weighted vulnerability V W)X (Eq. 2) for a vulnerability x in a step 906. Typically, the vulnerability counter is then incremented in a step 908 if necessary for a particular embodiment. Thereafter, the method returns to the decision step 900 and again determines if all the vulnerabilities have been counted.
- the total vulnerability V is calculated in a step 910. As discussed above, the total vulnerability V is the lesser of either 50 or the sum of all weighted vulnerability scores V W)X in this embodiment. Alternatively, other scores are possible, or the tabulation of the total score V can be combined with the prior loop.
- the method determines whether all target computers found in the target network have been counted. If not, the exposure values are determined in a step 914.
- the exposure values include U y (the open UDP ports found on the yth target computer, except DNS on port 53), I y (the open ICMP ports found on the yth target computer), and N y (the non-essential services found on the yth target computer), are determined.
- the exposure values are determined dynamically based on the network security test, and are, in one embodiment, stored in the target computer vulnerability database 904 or in another database.
- a penalty M y is determined for target computers with no essential services present.
- the exposure counter is then incremented in a step 918, and the method returns to the decision step 912 to determine whether all the target computers have been counted.
- the total exposure E is calculated in a step 920 as the lesser of either 50 or the sum of a weighted sum of the exposure values found.
- the score F is calculated in a step 992 as 100 minus the total vulnerability and exposure scores to generate a representation of a network security score.
- a greater value of F implies greater network security on an objective scale.
- a conventional network security system provides reporting information in a text dump format.
- the collected data records regarding network topology, target computers, vulnerabilities, and the like are dumped into an ASCII file that requires substantial effort to inte ⁇ ret.
- Such data dumps are used conventionally because, other than alerting the network security user to the presence of high danger vulnerabilities, existing systems do not provide an interactive, hierarchical, and graphical representation of the data representing the network, target computers, and vulnerabilities found to assist the user in identifying and co ⁇ ecting the specific vulnerabilities.
- the present system compiles the data discovered during security testing into a graphical, informationally hierarchical, and interactive set of documents for review at various levels of detail and documentation.
- the reports engine produces (1) a dynamic graphical display representing the network topology, the target computers found, and the vulnerabilities found throughout the target network; (2) a comprehensive list of target computers, vulnerabilities found, and vulnerability explanations; (3) an objective scoring report describing the approximate security rating of the target network; (4) an exposure report describing the ports, services, and (5) detailed information that sets forth testing results on a per-machine, per-port, or per-vulnerability basis. Certain individuals within an organization may want different levels of detail.
- upper management may only want the objective scoring report (3) that describes the approximate security rating of the target network.
- the network administrator wants to receive all reports, particularly, the detailed information report (5) that enables the administrator to identify the machines and ports on the machines that need to be co ⁇ ected.
- a functional representation of a report generated by the report engine typically includes a quantitative score representation including (1) the actual score, (2) a color representation of the score exposure, and (3) a graphical representation of the quantitative score.
- the actual score is the F score or an alternative embodiment, such as, for example, a 1 to 100 numerical rating as described previously.
- the color representation represents the overall vulnerability range of the score. Thus, in one embodiment, a score between 1 and 33 will have a red color signifying high vulnerability, a score between 34 and 66 will have a yellow color signifying medium vulnerability, and a score above 66 will have a green color signifying low vulnerability. Other colors, ranges, and representations, such as, for example, using icons or pictures to represent the vulnerability level, are foreseen.
- Figure 10 illustrates an embodiment of a hierarchical security report 1000 presented on a display for viewing by a user.
- the hierarchical security report includes a representation 1010 of the Foundstone score, showing a value of 15 co ⁇ esponding to a relatively high risk.
- the security report further includes a graphical representation 1020 of the mapped network topology, including the live target computers and the services located on the target computers.
- the security report further includes a list 1030 of discovered hosts, and a list 1040 of discovered services.
- the user may select any of the reports shown in Figure 10 (or other reports that are not shown) and request additional details.
- Figure 11 illustrates an embodiment of a hierarchical security report 1100 that provides greater detail regarding the vulnerabilities of two target computers.
- an upper portion of the display identifies a first target computer ("localhost.local.net” at IP address 255.255.255.255) having a first open port represented by a window 1110 and a second open port represented by a window 1120.
- Each of the open ports of the first target computer has a respective vulnerability and may identify a vulnerability patch to install on the target computer to reduce the vulnerability.
- a lower portion of the security report 1100 identifies a second target computer (“localhost2.local.net” at IP address 254.255.255.255) having a single open port represented by a window 1130.
- the information in the window 1130 indicates that the service on the port is out of date, suggesting that it should be removed, and advantageously identifies a vulnerability patch to install if the service is to be retained.
- object layer implemented in C++ which represents the hierarchy of data objects that the system deals with, as described above with respect to the FASL scripting language. All objects follow the model of 1) containing the data directly relevant to that object as data members (these are 1-1 co ⁇ espondent with a row in the database) and 2) possibly containing lists of other objects that also follow this convention.
- Each object has a LoadO and Save() member that deals with the data for which that object is directly responsible by loading or saving it from the database.
- UpdateToDatabase() and UpdateFromDatabase() member functions are used. These call the object's Save() or LoadO members respectively.
- the gifs and jpgs are simply background graphics that do not change from report to report so they are written as is without the report mechanism having to know the details of gif and jpg encoding.
- the png graphics format is used. This is a public (non-licensed) format for which there exists a public library which we are linking into the system executable.
- the images are drawn onto a Windows HDC (windows software object that represents a display device) and then converted into png by a custom class which wraps the object in the proper format.
- FoundScore is a numerical representation of your security exposure. For a detailed explanation of FoundScore, click here.
- the network map below is a graphical representation of the scanned environment. FoundScan created it by issuing a series of ICMP and TCP traceroute commands, analyzing the results, then mapping devices based on their subnet membership and distance from one another. The map provides a high-level overview of your environment so that you can easily identify all discovered subnets and devices. A detailed report of discovered hosts is also available.
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- Computer And Data Communications (AREA)
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Abstract
Description
Claims
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Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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JP2005515541A (en) | 2005-05-26 |
EP1466248A1 (en) | 2004-10-13 |
CA2473444A1 (en) | 2003-07-24 |
CA2473444C (en) | 2009-09-08 |
CN1623140A (en) | 2005-06-01 |
AU2002245262B2 (en) | 2007-03-15 |
AU2002245262A1 (en) | 2003-07-30 |
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