WO2001099373A2 - Systeme et procede permettant de mettre en oeuvre une politique de securite - Google Patents

Systeme et procede permettant de mettre en oeuvre une politique de securite Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2001099373A2
WO2001099373A2 PCT/US2001/019333 US0119333W WO0199373A2 WO 2001099373 A2 WO2001099373 A2 WO 2001099373A2 US 0119333 W US0119333 W US 0119333W WO 0199373 A2 WO0199373 A2 WO 0199373A2
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
policy
network
file
monitor
protocol
Prior art date
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PCT/US2001/019333
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English (en)
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WO2001099373A3 (fr
Inventor
Kieran Gerard Sherlock
Geoffrey Cooper
Luis Filipe Pereira Valente
Jose Amador
Paul Wang
Robert Allen Shaw
Kevin Cornwall
Original Assignee
Securify, Inc.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from US09/826,602 external-priority patent/US20020093527A1/en
Priority claimed from US09/881,147 external-priority patent/US20030061506A1/en
Application filed by Securify, Inc. filed Critical Securify, Inc.
Priority to AU2001269870A priority Critical patent/AU2001269870A1/en
Publication of WO2001099373A2 publication Critical patent/WO2001099373A2/fr
Publication of WO2001099373A3 publication Critical patent/WO2001099373A3/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
    • H04L41/06—Management of faults, events, alarms or notifications
    • H04L41/0686—Additional information in the notification, e.g. enhancement of specific meta-data
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
    • H04L41/06—Management of faults, events, alarms or notifications
    • H04L41/069—Management of faults, events, alarms or notifications using logs of notifications; Post-processing of notifications
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L43/00—Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
    • H04L63/0227—Filtering policies
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
    • H04L63/0227—Filtering policies
    • H04L63/0263—Rule management
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1408—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1408—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
    • H04L63/1425—Traffic logging, e.g. anomaly detection
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1433—Vulnerability analysis
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
    • H04L63/166—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer at the transport layer
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L43/00—Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks
    • H04L43/06—Generation of reports
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L69/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services independent of the application payload and not provided for in the other groups of this subclass
    • H04L69/22—Parsing or analysis of headers

Definitions

  • the invention relates to security and network services. More particularly, the invention relates to a system and methods for implementing a system-wide security policy for an entire computer network, and for providing monitoring and enforcing of computer network security.
  • Networked information systems are an essential part of many organizations. Critical systems, services, and information resources all require protection that depends on effective orchestration of a variety of factors: network architecture, security products, site security, administrative procedures, end user responsibility, and more.
  • a network security policy is an explicit plan of how to accomplish this multi-faceted protection, what objectives the plans should meet, and what assets are being protected.
  • Security administrators need tools to help them formulate site security policy and to translate the policy into monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. They need to be sure that the computer enforced policy - often cobbled together from a plethora of disjoint access control mechanisms - matches their enterprise policy, all too often specified in a loose natural language or a set of unwritten principles. This leads to confusion as to why access is being granted or denied to particular resources and may lead to unintentional breaches of security.
  • a conventional network assessment visit determines the customer network using the following information:
  • Network security scanning technology e.g. port or vulnerability scans
  • the information is typically derived from the first three of these items. Customer log files and network traffic is of a volume so great that it is impractical to examine it in a short assessment visit.
  • Network vulnerability scanners only detect certain types of known vulnerabilities. Such vulnerabilities are generally not detected directly, but are inferred based on host responses to a series of network packets sent to hosts by the scanner. This process does not directly ensure that data traffic on the subject network matches expectations, either explicit or implicit.
  • Network vulnerability scanners cannot see a host if it does not respond to packets.
  • a host that is only a source of network packets such as, for example, a rogue router, is not visible to a scanner.
  • Hosts which are turned off or otherwise temporarily disconnected such as, for example, workstations and laptops, are often missed by vulnerability scanners. This problem is compounded by the fact that scans are often scheduled for non-work hours in order to alleviate customer fears that the scans will somehow impact production systems and organizational mission.
  • Network scanners typically return a large volume of vulnerability information, based on all possible configured elements in a network. The scanner tools cannot currently interpret those vulnerabilities in light of business requirements which the subject systems are intended to support, or even for the specific network architecture of which those systems are a part. The scan results must be reviewed manually by a security analyst, who applies his or her knowledge of the business requirements and network architecture to an interpretation of those results. Such manual process is error-prone because the volume is so great that problems may be overlooked.
  • Another problem is that the scan derives only vulnerabilities, not network usage patterns. Therefore, the scan cannot detect security problems that are attributable to human behavior, but only those scans that result from misconfigured systems and/or systems which have documented design problems.
  • Network scanners cannot diagnose incorrect client usage of software. For example, network scanners cannot detect whether web servers are being used with invalid ciphersuites, whether 40-bit browsers are in use, and whether a given telnet port is accessed only by a management station.
  • Network scanners must be targeted to particular subnets. If a customer has forgotten to mention a subnet, the scanner will not notice it.
  • Host Inspection Inspecting host configuration files is a time consuming, manual process that is subject to human error. In the assessment of any large network, it is impractical to include an inspection of the configurations for more than a few critical systems.
  • Log file inspection can provide great insight into the workings of network components. Machine-based aggregation and filtering systems can speed this process. However, logs provide only a components' own view of its status. If a component is misconfigured, the log data from the component cannot be trusted. Log data may also be subject to modification by an attacker who has penetrated the machine and is seeking to mask his presence.
  • log aggregation systems work in cooperation with the components that generate the information, they require configuration changes to every component that they examine. Also, they are unable to detect when a component is added to the system.
  • Such techniques of performing network assessments generally are limited in their ability to determine actual security threats to information systems. Generally, they represent the state of the art and are indicative of best practices within the security community today.
  • a way to reduce or eliminate the confusion described above is by providing a user-friendly and, yet, rigorous way of specifying security policy, as well as providing tools for monitoring and enforcing the security policy.
  • a network policy it would be advantageous for a network policy to provide the definition of normal traffic on the network. It would be advantageous to provide a monitoring mechanism that lets an end user determine and understand traffic and/or activity on a network.
  • the invention is a network security policy monitoring system and method that comprises supportive features, algorithms, and tools. It is ideally suited for network and security assessments or long-term monitoring where real network traffic is analyzed to identify abnormal traffic patterns, system vulnerabilities, and incorrect configuration of computer systems on the network.
  • the invention listens on a network, logs events, and takes action, all in accordance with a rule based system-wide policy.
  • the invention is able to incorporate external sources of event information, such as are generated in log files of other network components.
  • the invention gets protocol information, which can make it more meaningful to a network administrator.
  • the invention sends data upstream to an event log and interprets the data. It listens to secure protocols and can identify encryption quality of service parameters. It extracts basic security parameters, such as, for example, network events, and passes them to a policy manager component.
  • the policy manager component implements system-wide policies, based on monitored system or enterprise traffic.
  • the policy manager component provides a trust manager that takes as its input a security policy defined as a set of policy rules and a set of credentials, and that is capable of processing requests for trust decisions, i.e. evaluating compliance with the policy.
  • the invention is designed to be a passive monitor of network traffic. As such, it need not be installed on target hosts or integrated into existing applications.
  • the policy manager component Two key aspects of the policy manager component are provided.
  • One aspect is a unified view of the interaction between two principals across a stack of protocol areas, each area covered by discrete policy rules. The final trust decision applied is based on policy rules that better fit the entire interaction.
  • the second aspect comprises the policy manager's policy definition language that supports the monitoring and auditing of a network's activity in addition to traditional access/denial authorization decisions.
  • the policy definition language is the subject of U.S. patent application serial number 09/479,781 , filed 01/07/00, entitled, "A Declarative Language for Specifying A Security".
  • the policy definition language is discussed herein to the extent necessary to explain such language to those skilled in the art in connection with the invention disclosed herein.
  • the declarative language system comprises a language as a tool for expressing network security policy in a formalized way. It allows the specification of security policy across a wide variety of networking layers and protocols.
  • a security administrator assigns a disposition to each and every network event that can occur in a data communications network. The event's disposition determines whether the event is allowed, i.e.
  • the invention herein is focused on defining allowed traffic patterns and how to handle events that deviate from those patterns.
  • the invention comprises, but is not limited to, six major features and tools.
  • the first feature discussed is auto-conversion of policy language, whereby policy language is converted to an English language representation.
  • an algorithm for efficient rule evaluation is provided.
  • a credential/assertion optimization technique is provided.
  • a policy generator tool is provided.
  • An embodiment in which the invention is used as an assessment tool is provided.
  • a technique for secure sensitive event extraction from protocol monitoring is provided.
  • Fig. 1 a is a schematic diagram of components of the system according to the invention.
  • Fig. 1 b is a schematic diagram of components of the system according to the invention.
  • Fig. 2 is a high level workflow flow diagram according to the invention.
  • Fig. 3 is an example of a policy wizard dialog box according to the invention.
  • Fig. 4a is an example of a policy wizard dialog box according to the invention.
  • Fig. 4b is an example of a policy wizard dialog box according to the invention.
  • Fig. 5 is an example of a policy monitor dialog box according to the invention
  • Fig. 6 is an example of a query tool dialog box according to the invention
  • Fig. 7 is an example of a query tool dialog box according to the invention.
  • Fig. 8 is an example of a query tool dialog box according to the invention.
  • Fig. 9 is an example of a query tool dialog box according to the invention.
  • Fig. 10a is an example of a policy wizard dialog box according to the invention.
  • Fig. 10b is an example of a policy wizard dialog box according to the invention.
  • Fig. 10c is an example of a policy wizard dialog box according to the invention.
  • Fig. 11 shows a high-level view of an example network according to the invention.
  • Fig. 12 shows an algorithm according to the invention
  • Fig. 13 shows a flow diagram according to the invention
  • Fig. 14 shows an algorithm according to the invention
  • Fig. 15 shows a high level schematic diagram according to the invention
  • Fig. 16 shows a schematic diagram of process flow according to the invention
  • Fig. 17 is a block schematic diagram according to the invention.
  • Fig. 18 is a high level flow diagram of the preferred output section according to the invention.
  • Fig. 19 shows a schematic diagram according to the invention.
  • Fig. 20 is an example of a dashboard according to the invention.
  • Fig. 21 shows an example of a tear off console according to the invention
  • Fig. 22 shows an example of an events summary view according to the invention
  • Fig. 23 shows an example of a conformance event details page according to the invention
  • Fig. 24 shows an example of a protocol event details page according to the invention
  • Fig. 25 shows an example of an events summary page containing a pop up description according to the invention
  • Fig. 26 shows an example of an events summary page containing a pop up description according to the invention
  • Fig. 27 shows an example of a conformance event details page containing a pop up description according to the invention
  • Fig. 28 shows an example of an alert details page according to the invention
  • Fig. 29 shows an example of a violators chart and table page according to the invention.
  • Fig. 30 shows an example of a targets chart and table page according to the invention
  • Fig. 31 shows an example of an advanced search dialog box according to the invention.
  • Fig. 32 shows an example of a link to the advanced search dialog box according to the invention.
  • the invention is a security policy monitoring system and its supportive features, algorithms, and tools. It is ideally suited for network and security assessments where real network traffic is analyzed in order to identify abnormal traffic patterns, system vulnerabilities and incorrect configuration of computer systems on the network.
  • the system listens on a network, logs events, and takes action, all in accordance with a rule based system-wide policy.
  • the system is able to incorporate external sources of event information, such as are generated in log files of other network components.
  • the system gets protocol information, which can make it more meaningful to a network administrator.
  • the invention sends data upstream to an event log and interprets the data.
  • the system listens to secure protocols and can decrypt a session if a key escrow facility is available.
  • the system extracts basic security parameters, such as, for example, network events, and passes them to a policy manager component.
  • Network Event One complete transaction on the network, such as a FTP connection or a HTTPS transaction. Each network event has several component protocol events. Protocol Event: A transaction at one protocol level. For example, a network event that represents an FTP connection has protocol events representing an IP association, a TCP connection, an FTP control connection, and several FTP control commands.
  • Target The endpoints of a network event or protocol event.
  • Credential An identification of the initiator or target of a protocol event at a particular protocol level.
  • credentials are, for example, IP addresses or UDP port numbers.
  • credentials are, for example, user names, file names, or public key certificates.
  • Association A placeholder for a transaction run over a datagram-based protocol such as IP, ICMP or UDP.
  • IP datagram-based protocol
  • ICMP Integrated Multimedia Subsystem
  • UDP User Datagram Protocol
  • the invention herein constructs an association to collect a conversation between two hosts, or processes in the case of UDP. It is noted that when the invention misses any data packets between the two communicating computers, it might not be able to determine the initiator and the target of the association.
  • Associative array A list of value pairs where each associative array entry is indexed by the first element of its value pair, which is called the key. Keys are stored in a hash table to make lookups efficient irrespective of the size of the associative array.
  • a policy rule governs a specific interaction, or set of interactions, between two communicating entities.
  • the invention evaluates policy rules against protocol events to determine if the latter conform to the active security policy.
  • Policy Domain A top level segmentation of a network, roughly akin to a cloud-like object in a network diagram, which hides internal detail.
  • communities of hosts provide or access services.
  • One community of hosts defines the limits of the domain.
  • Monitoring Point A point within a policy domain where it will be possible to plug a machine into the network in order to collect packet data.
  • Perimeter Element A hardware device that allows access to and from communities of hosts outside a policy domain. Examples of perimeter elements are firewalls and routers.
  • a policy language is used to create a formal specification of a network security policy.
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention incorporates the policy definition language of U.S. patent application number 09/479,781 , filed 01/07/00, entitled, "A Declarative Language for Specifying A Security Policy.” It defines first class objects such as rules, credentials and dispositions. It is based on s-expressions, which are LISP-like parenthesized expressions.
  • Rogue server A machine introduced to a network that is not authorized to be on that network.
  • Rogue router An unauthorized router that is added to a network, providing an alternate path into the network. Typically occurs through misconfiguration of switches or dialup connections.
  • Real-time monitoring Reading packet data off a network and processing it to events in a stream, so that an event appearing in the network causes a corresponding event in the stream a short time later.
  • DLL Any kind of a dynamically linked library
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention functions by translating traffic on the network into protocol events that are themselves combined into network events. As protocol events are detected, they are compared against a policy. The policy specifies a disposition of the network event, as defined by the observed series of protocol events. Information about the protocol events, the network event and its disposition is stored in a database. This database of network traffic information can be mined for policy violations.
  • Fig. 1a is a schematic diagram of components of the system according to the invention.
  • the system comprises a policy monitoring component 100 that takes as input a policy file 105 that has been generated using a policy generator wizard 110 or other means, and a file containing network packet dump data 115 that has been collected off of an observed network 125 by a packet capture 126, or that has been processed by a protocol monitor processor 127.
  • the system can also process packet event data from the observed network 125 in a continuous real-time mode, without first storing packet data to a file.
  • the policy monitoring component 100 comprises a policy manager component 106 that itself comprises a parser 101 for parsing the policy file 105, a policy engine for 102 for assigning policy dispositions to network events, and a logger 103 for determining how to log the information processed by the policy engine 102, according to an input logging policy 130. It also comprises a database 104 for storing synthesized information of the packet dump's 115 conformance to the specified policy 105 performed by the policy engine 102, where it can be mined with a query tool 135. It also comprises a report script component 160 for querying the database 104 and creating reports 161 , and an alarm script component 155, for generating alarms based on the severity of the disposition assigned to network events.
  • An equally preferred embodiment of the invention also comprises a parser tool 150 that takes the policy specification file 105 as input and automatically generates an English description of the policy 151 for the end user.
  • the parser tool 150 is optional.
  • An equally preferred embodiment of the invention also provides a secure Web server feature 162 for the end user to review reports from the end user's host computer 163.
  • the secure Web server feature 162 comprises the Web server 164 and a report database 165 that hosts the reports 161 generated using the report script 160.
  • the Web server feature 162 is optional.
  • An equally preferred embodiment of the invention provides secure management connections (141 , 142) and a secure management host 140 for managing the policy monitoring component 100 and the combination of the network monitoring components 128, respectively.
  • Fig. 1 b shows a simpler embodiment of the invention, wherein the parser tool 150 and the secure Web server feature 162 are omitted.
  • the default action of the policy engine 102 is that it denies all traffic.
  • the policy 105 opens holes in this denial to allow permitted traffic to flow.
  • the policy engine 102 assigns a single disposition to an entire network event, the protocol events are significant.
  • the policy engine 102 interprets protocols and generates updates of protocol event information.
  • the policy 105 is consulted as each new piece of information arrives, so that the earliest determination of disposition is reached. For example, if the policy 105 states that a given IP address may not communicate with another IP address, the policy 105 can generate a disposition immediately upon receiving the first packet 115 of the network event.
  • the policy language divides dispositions into immediate and final.
  • An immediate disposition fires immediately, i.e. its value becomes associated with the network event right away.
  • a final disposition sets a bookmark to itself as the latest and best disposition. When all protocol events are processed without an immediate disposition, the last bookmark set is the disposition that is applied to that network event.
  • Immediate dispositions are designed to generate early results and to allow policy writers to issue a definitive disposition for the network event based on the information received up to that point.
  • Final dispositions allow for the possibility that a better disposition might be determined later on, in other words, allow the policy engine 102 to make a more informed decision based on additional protocol events that might be received as the network event progresses.
  • the preferred embodiment of the policy generator component 110 is a program that makes an end user readily able to generate a first-pass policy for a new site. Policy information is input into a set of dialog boxes and a policy is generated. The wizard enables the end user to generate policy based on what can be considered gross characteristics of a network at the IP level, such as, for example, policy domains, communities of hosts, servers, subnets and firewalls, as well as at the UDP/TCP service level (for example, communities of hosts that can access certain services on server hosts).
  • a policy Once a policy has been generated with the wizard, it is output in the policy specification language 105 so that it may be directly processed by the policy monitor component 100.
  • the policy wizard 110 is also able to save files at the wizard level, i.e. such that the policy may be refined in the wizard and regenerated.
  • the policy monitoring component 100 comprises a suitable user interface such as an MFC-based front end or a command line interface, and the policy manager 106.
  • the policy manager 106 performs the actual examination of a sequence of event updates stored in a file or transmitted in a continuous stream 115 in the context of a policy specification 105 and signals the adherence to the policy via records written to the database 104.
  • the network monitor component 127 provides the following capabilities:
  • the network monitor 127 can perform serialization of event data. That is, the network monitor 106 can process a packet capture file 126 into a series of event updates that contain only the salient security details for processing by the policy monitor 100. The resulting file is significantly smaller than the original, for example, approximately 1/20 th to 1/100 th the size of the original. It is also possible for sensitive data, such as passwords and documents, to be removed from the file. However, it should be appreciated that the original packet capture file is needed to perform full analysis.
  • the network monitor 127 can read packet data directly from observed network 125, generating a continuous stream of event updates for the policy monitor 100. This stream operates in real-time so that the policy monitor 100 processes events shortly after they happen on observed network 125.
  • network monitor 127 can be used as a standalone tool, but typically is invoked from within the policy monitor component 100 and the query tool 135 in normal operation of the invention.
  • network monitor and the policy monitor may run on the same machine.
  • the query tool 135 allows the end user to view the data that has been stored in the database 104 by the policy manager 106.
  • the policy compiler performs syntactic and semantic checking of a policy specification. Upon successful compilation the compiler as controlled by runtime arguments, may: • generate a DLL containing a compilation of credential and condition verification code; and
  • the policy generator 110 runs on a Windows NT or Unix machine while the policy monitor 100 and the network monitor 127 run on Linux machine(s). It should be appreciated that these components can run equally well on other suitable operating systems. In addition to policy and network monitoring software, the following software components are also installed on the appropriate machines:
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention incorporates a high level workflow method for developing policy, as follows:
  • an initial policy is generated (201). Often the initial policy is created from corporate network policy, in whatever form that may take, and a network topology diagram. For the sake of this example, it is assumed that the policy wizard 110 was used to generate an initial, simple policy 105. Next, compliance of current network traffic to this initial policy is monitored (202). Such monitoring is achieved by collecting packet information off the network and running such data 115 against the initial policy 105 using the policy monitor 100.
  • the query tool 135 is used to data-mine output network event data from the database 104, using the mined data to check for traffic that is not consistent with the policy 105, and reporting the results (203).
  • the problem could be network equipment is misconfigured and needs to be corrected (203); otherwise acceptable behavior is not covered currently by the policy specification file the file needs to be corrected (204); or, otherwise acceptable behavior is not covered currently by the corporate policy and the corporate policy needs to be corrected (205).
  • the policy specification 105 is incomplete and an end user needs to add a new rule to permit the observed traffic pattern.
  • a Policy Specification File From a Wizard Policy
  • the end user starts the policy generator tool, or wizard 110, by double clicking on a policy wizard shortcut on the end user's desktop.
  • a window such as depicted in Fig. 3 opens.
  • the end user has opened a file, c: ⁇ spm ⁇ quickstart ⁇ null.spw, through the File->Open menu item 301.
  • This file contains a very simple policy that defines a single policy domain defined by a 10.0.0.0/8 subnet mask. Rules within this policy deny essentially all traffic.
  • the end user chooses to compile the policy, whereby the dialog box in Fig. 4 opens.
  • the end user presses the "Process Policy” button 401 and a file named null.spm in the output file exntry field 402 is generated and saved.
  • Fig. 4b shows the dialog box in Fig. 4a with printed results from the compile process in a text window 403.
  • the end user starts the policy monitor 100 by double clicking on a policy monitor shortcut on the desktop.
  • a window such as depicted in Fig. 5 opens.
  • the end user ensures that the "Input Dump File” entry field 501 points to a data dump file, here qs.dmp, and that the "Policy” entry field 502 points to the null.spm (monitor) file that the end user generated above.
  • the "Monitoring Point” entry field 503 is derived from a policy domain name "Intranet” that is present in the null.spw (wizard) file.
  • the end user ensures database connectivity information is set correctly.
  • the ODBC entry field 504 with entry “sybase” points to a Sybase database running on a local machine.
  • the username "policy” 505 with some password, shown as "******” 506 have been preinstalled.
  • the end user presses the Run button 507 and the .dmp file is processed through the policy specification file 105 placing the output data into the database 104.
  • the end user starts the query tool 135 by double clicking on a query tool shortcut on the desktop.
  • a window such as depicted in Fig. 6 opens.
  • Fig. 7 is a dialog box that allows the end user to enter login information for the database 104.
  • Fig. 8 is a dialog box that allows the user to select which processed network data to view from database 104.
  • the topmost entry in the "Execution Run" pull-down contains most recent data was added to the database 104. In this case it is current processing of the qs.dmp file.
  • the end user presses the "Query” button and network event information for this run is retrieved from the database 104 and shown in as in Fig. 9.
  • Fig. 9 shows a queried rule view dialog box according to the preferred embodiment of the invention. Fig. 9 shows that the null.spw policy has denied all traffic.
  • the network events having disposition Udp_Access_Denied represent DNS lookups from an internal host (10.5.63.143) to another internal host (10.5.63.6). It is assumed for this example that this is traffic conforming to policy, and therefore the end user adds a rule to the policy to permit this event.
  • Fig. 10a shows a dialog box for generating a new rule according to the invention.
  • the end user selects the "Intranet” domain from the "Policy Domain” pull-down to add a rule for our Intranet domain.
  • the end user types a rule name, such as lnternal_Dns into the "Rule Name” field and presses the "New” button.
  • the end user selects the communities and services to which this rule applies.
  • the end user wants to allow DNS from any internal nodes to any other internal nodes and therefore selects an Initiator community of hosts lnside_Nodes, a service of DNS, and a Target community of hosts lnside_Nodes.
  • the end user then presses the "Add Selected" button for each in turn to create a rule as shown in Fig. 10b, where Fig. 10b shows a dialog box for generating a new rule according to the preferred embodiment of the invention.
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention provides a policy generator tool, or simply policy generator, equally referred to as policy wizard, that provides a level of abstraction on top of the policy language, and which simplifies the process of creating an initial policy based on gross characteristics of a network at the IP level, such as policy domains, communities of hosts, servers, subnets, firewalls.
  • the policy generator provides a novel mechanism for translating desired network security policy, such as corporate network security policy, into a policy specification file that can be interpreted and implemented by a policy monitor mechanism.
  • Building a policy with the policy wizard involves: deciding on logical divisions within the network, i.e. policy domains, grouping network nodes into logical communities, and expressing rules about which communities of hosts can provide what services to which communities of hosts.
  • the first step in building a basic policy is to define a high-level topology for the network. Not much detail is necessary.
  • the network needs to be divided into bounded units called policy domains.
  • policy domains In practice, the choice of a policy domain boundary is fairly obvious. Usually natural logical and physical boundaries in a network help define policy domain boundaries. For example, firewalls and routers with packet filters commonly denote the important boundaries. When defining a simple policy, it is reasonable to ignore switches, bridges, hubs, and routers that connect interior subnets.
  • policy domains be as small as required by traffic monitoring limitations and as large as specification of rules allow.
  • Rules are written about traffic visible in a policy domain. Traffic in a policy domain is logically considered to be visible anywhere within the policy domain even though networking elements, such as, for example, switches prevent such visibility in most networks. By writing rules about traffic as though it is visible anywhere within the policy domain, the same set of rules can be applied to network traffic anywhere within the policy domain.
  • Fig. 11 shows a high-level view of an example network.
  • An Intranet 1101 is connected to a DMZ 1102 through a firewall 1103.
  • the DMZ 1102 connects through a router 1104 to the Internet 1105 and through a second router 1106 to an external corporate network 1107.
  • an end user is only expected to be able to monitor traffic in the Intranet and DMZ, so these two entities are declared to be policy domains. Rules in the policy will only apply to allowed traffic in the DMZ and Intranet.
  • the corporate network and Internet are viewed only as communities of hosts visible from within the policy domains.
  • the point of connection of a policy domain to the outside world is known as a perimeter element.
  • the set of nodes visible through it needs to be known and, for generating rules to detect IP spoofing and rogue routers, the MAC address of the perimeter element itself needs to be known.
  • Network address translation can change the IP addresses seen though the boundary. For example, a proxying firewall may not let the end user see anything directly beyond a single IP address at the boundary. Filters may limit the view to only a few hosts when thousands are actually present.
  • communities consist of sets of IP addresses. They can be expressed as, for example, individual IP addresses, ranges of addresses, or subnet masks. Additionally, communities can be composed of other communities. It is often the case that a community of nodes involves all nodes in some existing set except for a node or two. Communities are defined in terms of included elements and excluded elements.
  • rules defined for a policy domain describe allowed transactions. For example, if no rules are written, the policy specifies that everything at the IP level or above is denied, although this specification is not strictly true because typically auto-generated rules that apply to IP broadcast traffic and ICMP traffic within the policy domain exist. Rules create holes in this base layer that declares all traffic illegal. Rules are defined in terms of initiator communities, target communities, and the services allowed. Services consist of a set of port numbers and indicators of whether TCP or UDP protocols are used.
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention provides a front end for the policy generator. It provides a user interface for entering and editing a simple policy.
  • the front end reads and writes the current state of a policy from or to an intermediate file.
  • the currently preferred extension for the intermediate file is .spw.
  • the front end allows the end user to edit policy domains, communities, services, and rules, to read and write the current policy from or to an intermediate file, and to process the intermediate policy file into the formal policy specification file.
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention allows several instances of each editing process to be open simultaneously. The interaction is intended to feel very live. Data changed in one editing process should be reflected in the contents shown in other editing processes. For example, if a community is added in one community editing process, then it is immediately available for use in all editing processes.
  • entities are first created, then filled in. From the time of creation they can be used throughout the policy. Consequently, a community or policy domain does not need to be fully specified in order to be used. However, to prevent errors in backend processing, all entities should be complete before the intermediate policy file is submitted to the backend for policy specification file generation.
  • only one policy is under development at any time.
  • the front end starts up containing a default policy that is empty except for some predefined default services.
  • This policy can be used as a starting point or an existing policy can be read from a saved intermediate policy file.
  • the preferred embodiment of the packet gathering component 128 is a program referred to as the harvester. It reads packets off the observed network 125 and writes them to either a packet capture file 126 or to a TCP socket that is connected to the policy monitor 100. As an example, the harvester reads packets off the network when invoked as follows:
  • 1000 packets are read from a network interface labeled 'ethO' and stored in file 'qs.dmp.'
  • the harvester can also be configured to read packet data and convert it to event data suitable for policy monitor 100.
  • the harvester may be invoked as follows:
  • 1000 packets are read off the network interface labeled 'ethO', converted to event data suitable for policy monitor 100, and stored in the file 'qs.dme'.
  • the harvester can also be configured to read packet data, convert it to event data suitable for policy monitor 100, and stream such data directly to the policy monitor in real time.
  • the harvester may be invoked as follows:
  • 1000 packets are read off the network interface labeled 'ethO', converted to event data suitable for policy monitor 100, and transmitted in a TCP network stream to port 333 on the machine with IP address 10.5.63.6.
  • This machine and TCP port may be configured so that the policy monitor 100 reads the data and processes it.
  • the events are transmitted as they are processed, so that the policy monitor 100 is able to see events shortly after they occur on the observed network 125.
  • the policy monitor 100 is also able to pass information about policy dispositions back to the harvester. The harvester can use this information to make processing of packets more efficient. For example, if the policy monitor 100 has determined that a given network event is acceptable according to the policy, the monitor can sometimes expedite its protocol processing by skipping packets until the network event terminates.
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention provides a policy monitor component that provides a user interface, either graphical or command line, that allows the configuration of various options of the monitor, policy engine and logger.
  • Monitor Configuration Monitor configuration allows the end user to configure the location of the input packet dump, policy to be used, and the specification of the monitoring point.
  • the Input dump file specifies the input file, in tcpdump format that is to be used.
  • the Policy input specifies the .spm file that contains the policy specification to be used.
  • the Monitoring Point is a specification of where the Input dump file was collected. This name is derived from policy domain names that are specified in the policy wizard. For example, if a packet dump was collected in a policy domain named "Intranet” then the Monitoring Point name INTRANET_MONITOR should be used.
  • Monitor Logging Options allow the end user control of the location and the amount of data that gets written to the backend database.
  • the Execution Run Comment field allows the entry of freeform text that is added to the logs in the database to help identify this particular run of policy monitor.
  • ODBC Name provides the name of the ODBC source to which output data will be written.
  • the DB Username and DB password are the end user's database login information.
  • the Save Password allows the program to save the password in the clear so that it will not need to be entered the next time the program is run.
  • Output options allow the end user to specify whether the trace output from the monitor should be displayed in a console window (Output to console) or sent to a file (Output to file:).
  • Advanced options allow more options to be set. In day to day operation, it is rare that such options need to be changed.
  • An Assert DLL parameter allows specification of the name of the DLL to be used to verify condition and credential assertions. Note that if this DLL does not match the version of the policy specified then this DLL will be regenerated, overwriting the provided DLL.
  • a Trace Options parameter allows the end user to provide configuration of runtime trace options. This option affects the amount of output generated by the monitor. For a more efficient operation, this field should be left blank.
  • Certificate Dir argument points to a directory that contains trusted CA root certificates in DER encoded form.
  • the packet logging options section allows the configuration of the trace options to be provided by the low level packet monitor.
  • the various logging options may be specified at a global level (by setting them for layer "-All-") or individually on a per-layer basis. Again it is to be noted that specifying logging options will adversely affect the performance of the monitor.
  • the Site Handle parameter specifies a name that is associated with the particular company or site that is being monitored. It is used to segment a table that is used for ip-address name resolution within the output database.
  • the Disable Logging checkbox disables the writing of all logging data to the database. If logging is enabled then the remaining checkboxes provide for the enabling or disabling of the logging of network events with the given final disposition code. For example, if Disable Logging is not selected and only Policy Error selected then the only network events that are logged to the database are those that resulted in a final disposition code of POLICY_ERROR.
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention provides a query tool to examine the data that was placed in the database.
  • the preferred query tool allows the following functions to be performed:
  • the compiler needs just a single argument that is the input policy specification file. This form is often all that is needed while doing initial development of a policy. It should be appreciated that the compiler is rarely used in standalone form since its function, with the exception of the -r flag, is subsumed into the policy monitor component.
  • the end user is ready to generate pieces that are used to run the policy monitor.
  • the end user can use the command line:
  • db-name Store information about the compiled policy in the named database, db-name is the name of a user data source that has been configured within Control Panels->ODBC. This argument is rarely used. The alternative is to allow the runtime Policy Monitor to write the policy to the database if needed.
  • C preprocessor macros such as #define and #include may be included within a policy file. This option specifies that the pre-compiler should not be run prior to actually compiling. This option will be rarely used.
  • the preferred embodiment provides a streams-based network monitor that can be run in a standalone mode independent of the policy monitor. In this way it can be used to provide a detailed, streams-based view of the network traffic, or a subset thereof. For example, run in standalone mode is desirable when a particular protocol is not supported natively by the policy monitor and an end user desires to see raw data to gain an understanding of what is going on.
  • Table E provides a list of network monitor options according to the invention.
  • eventid Only process the data through eventid. Note that in order to find the end of eventid, events with ids greater than eventid may be processed.
  • dump_file The dump file, in tcpdump/windump format, that contains the input data.
  • a user specifies a network security policy in terms of the network services provided by certain hosts to other hosts in the network.
  • the wizard When such policy is processed, the wizard generates a formal and more detailed description of the network security policy using the policy language.
  • the policy language specification may then be used to analyze network traffic using the policy monitor tool. The results of this analysis can be studied using the query tool.
  • An exemplary policy language is taught in A Declarative Language for Specifying a Security Policy, patent application number 09/479,781 filed on 1/7/2000. Understanding the output of the preferred query tool requires understanding how the preferred wizard translates the high-level view of security policy it presents to its users into a set of policy language objects such as rules, credentials and dispositions.
  • Every policy generated by the wizard includes a set of predefined default rules for handling protocol events that do not conform to the user-defined policy i.e. rules that deny access, as well as rules for handling common network events not covered by the user policy. These rules and their dispositions are shown in Table F and Table G, and further discussed below.
  • Table G shows the default rules for all the protocols supported by the policy monitor. The policy engine selects these rules when no other rule can be found that is satisfied by the protocol event.
  • Tcp_Missed_Connections TCP - MISSED_CONNECT Warn_Missed_Tcp_Connect
  • Table H shows rules that cover protocol events not addressed by the wizard's user interface. These are well understood events that can be separated from those handled by the default rules.
  • lp_Deny_Pure_lp is assigned to IP associations whose payload is not one of the three well-known IP-based protocols (ICMP, UDP and TCP).
  • Tcp_Missed_Connections ⁇ s assigned to network events where the establishment of the TCP connection was not witnessed by the policy monitor.
  • Ftp_lgnore_Data__Connections is assigned to all FTP data connections which, from a security policy monitoring perspective, can be safely ignored. It is noted that the preferred policy wizard generates other rules to deal with common protocol events as discussed below.
  • Table H shows the predefined dispositions used by all the rules in the generated policy. Associated with each disposition are its disposition code and severity, which may be used in the query tool to filter network events.
  • the wizard includes a set of predefined credentials that are combined with dynamically generated credentials and used in implicitly generated rules:
  • Multicast_Addresses - a set of commonly used IP multicast addresses
  • Local_Broadcast_Address the IP address used for non-directed local broadcasts (255.255.255.255).
  • Zero_lp_Address - a zero-valued IP address (0.0.0.0), commonly used by BOOTP clients;
  • Service names are also global in scope. Because services and communities share the same name space, every service defined in the policy results in a credential whose name is constructed by prefixing the user-supplied service name with the underscore character. Thus, for example, the Smb service is represented by a credential named _Smb.
  • Rule names are only unique within the scope of a policy domain. Furthermore, if a user-defined rule addresses a service that is both a UDP and a TCP service, the wizard generates two rules, one for the UDP protocol and another for the TCP protocol. Thus, a rule name is constructed by prefixing the user-supplied name with the protocol name (Udp_ or TcpX) and the policy domain name.
  • the wizard will generate two rules, Udp_lntranet_Smb_Services and Tcp__lntranet_Smb_Services, for the UDP and TCP protocols respectively.
  • User-defined rules may also result in the generation of additional credentials.
  • the user provides the following information:
  • the wizard generates a credential that combines these communities into a union.
  • the credential name is constructed by appending the word _lnitiator to the user-supplied rule name, prefixed by the policy domain name. Using the example above, the wizard would create a credential named lntranet_Smb_Services_lnitiator.
  • the wizard creates a credential representing their union and names it by appending the word _ Ta rg e t to the policy domain and rule names e . g . lntranet_Smb_Services_ Target).
  • the wizard would generate the following additional credentials: Udp_lntranet_Smb_Services__Target a n d
  • Tcp_lntranet_Smb_Services_ Target These credentials combine lntranet_Smb_Services_Target (or a single target community) with the _Smb credential and constitute the actual target credentials used in Udp_lntranet_Smb_Services and Tcp_lntranet_Smb_Services respectively. It should be noted that, in many cases, the set of UDP and TCP services referenced in a rule will have little, if any overlap. Of course, if the end user does not specify any services the wizard uses the lntranet_Smb_Services_Target credential (or a single target community credential) to identify the target principal.
  • the wizard automatically generates a set of rules and credentials that define the valid IP- level traffic seen at the monitoring point within the domain.
  • an ICMP rule is generated that handles all intradomain ICMP traffic, as well as a credential for the monitoring point in that domain.
  • the monitoring point credential is based on an agent descriptor string manufactured by the wizard.
  • the agent descriptor is constructed by converting the policy domain name to uppercase and appending to it the word _MONITOR.
  • a policy domain named Intranet is assigned the agent descriptor:
  • the monitoring point credential itself is named by appending the word _Monitors to the policy domain's name.
  • the credential would be named Intranet Monitors.
  • the wizard segregates all intradomain ICMP traffic (common on an enterprise network) by means of a rule that assigns it the disposition Monitor_lcmp.
  • the rule is named by combining the protocol name with the domain name using the word _Within. For example, in the Intranet policy domain the rule would be named lcmp_Within_lntranet.
  • IP traffic is described by a set of rules that systematically enumerate all valid IP-level traffic within the policy domain, between hosts in the policy domain and external hosts, and between external hosts through the policy domain (when more than one perimeter element is present). Most of these rules provisionally allow IP traffic, letting the subsequent protocol layers (ICMP, UDP, TCP, etc.) determine if the traffic is indeed allowed either by a user- defined (explicit) rule or by a predefined rule.
  • ICMP ICMP, UDP, TCP, etc.
  • the first IP rule provisionally allows all intradomain IP traffic. It is named by combining the protocol name with the domain name using the word _Within (e.g., lp_Within_lntranef). In the absence of a higher-level protocol within an intradomain IP association, the rule assigns the network event a disposition of Deny__Pure_lp (i.e., its final outcome).
  • _Within e.g., lp_Within_lntranef
  • the intradomain IP rule uses the policy domain's defining community as its target principal. However, it generates another credential to be used as the initiator. This credential combines the defining community with the predefined credential for zero-valued IP addresses ( Zero Ip Address).
  • the generated credential is named by appending the word _lnitiator ⁇ o the generated rule name (e.g., lp__WithinJntranetJnitiator).
  • Another intradomain IP rule is used to segregate typical broadcast and multicast traffic within an enterprise network. It is named by combining the protocol name with the domain name using the words _Broadcasts_Within (e.g., lp_Broadcasts_Within_lntranet).
  • Its initiator principal is the same as that used for the general intradomain traffic e.g. lp_Within_lntranet_lnitiator).
  • Its target is a new credential constructed by combining the predefined credentials Multicast_Addresses and Local_Broadcast__Address with the directed broadcast addresses for all the subnets within the policy domain's defining community.
  • the new credential is named by appending the word XTargetXo the rule name e.g. lp__Broadcasts_Within_lntranet_Target).
  • the intradomain broadcast and multicast traffic is assigned the disposition Monitor_Broadcasts.
  • Traffic between hosts in the policy domain and external hosts is described by a set of rules whose complexity depends on how much information the user supplied about the topology of the network. Specifically, it depends on how many perimeter elements were specified and on whether or not the interface addresses, i.e. MAC addresses, of the perimeter elements are included in the policy specification.
  • the wizard If there are external communities associated with at least one perimeter element for which the interface address is not known, the wizard generates a credential combining all such communities in a single union unless there is only one such community, in which case its credential already exists.
  • This credential is named by combining the policy domain name with the string _External__Communities (e.g. , lntranet_External_Communities) .
  • the wizard then generates two rules defining the traffic between hosts internal to the policy domain and these external communities.
  • the wizard names these rules by combining the protocol name with the domain name and the string _To_External_Communities or _External_Communities_To, depending on the direction of the IP traffic (e.g., lp_lntranet_To_External_Communities for outbound traffic and lp_External_Communities__To_lntranet tor inbound traffic).
  • the credentials used alternately as the initiator and target principals for these rules are the policy domain's defining community and the aforementioned credential for the external communities.
  • the rules provisionally allow the IP traffic to flow, subject to other rules for higher level protocols. In the absence of a higher-level protocol within the network event, the rule assigns it a disposition of Deny_Pure_lp, i.e. its final outcome.
  • External communities visible through one or more perimeter elements whose interface addresses are known, are handled by a separate set of rules, two per perimeter element.
  • the wizard starts by creating a credential that combines the credential(s) for the external community(ies) visible through it with the perimeter element's interface address.
  • credential is named by combining the domain name with the perimeter element name and the string _Communities.
  • Firewall would be described by a credential named lntranet_Firewall__Communities.
  • the wizard then generates two rules defining the traffic between hosts internal to the policy domain and the external communities visible through this perimeter element.
  • the wizard names these rules by combining the protocol name, the domain name, the perimeter element name and the word __To (e.g., lp_lntranet_ToJntranet_Firewall fo r outbo u n d traff i c an d lp_lntranet_Firewall_To_lntranet for inbound traffic).
  • the credentials used alternately as the initiator and target principals for these rules are the policy domain's defining community and the aforementioned credential for the external communities.
  • the rules provisionally allow the IP traffic to flow, subject to other rules for higher level protocols. In the absence of a higher-level protocol within the network event, the rule assigns it a disposition of Deny_Pure_lp, i.e., its final outcome.
  • the wizard generates rule-pairs that describe the traffic between external communities visible through specific perimeter elements as well as external communities visible through any perimeter element, i.e. those without associated interface addresses.
  • the rules are named by combining the names of each pair of perimeter elements with the protocol name, the policy domain name and with the word _To, in the case of addressable perimeter elements, or with the string _External_Communities, for all other external communities.
  • An additional rule is generated to cover traffic between external communities not associated with an addressable perimeter element and is named by combining the protocol name with the domain name and the string _Between_External_Communities.
  • the wizard would generate the following rules to cover all traffic amongst their respective external communities:
  • the policy domain includes two perimeter elements with a specified interface address (Firewall and Route ⁇ and a third non-addressable perimeter element.
  • lntranet_Monitors Uses agent descriptor INTRANET_MONITOR lp_Within___lntranet___lnitiator Defining community plus zero-valued IP address lp_Broadcasts_ Within ntranet Combines standard multicast addresses with local __Target broadcast and directed broadcast addresses lntranet___External_Communities Combines all external communities not associated with addressable perimeter elements lntranet_Firewall_Communities Combines all external communities visible through the
  • Intranet Router Communities Combines all external communities visible through the
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention provides logging and reporting modules, as described herein with reference to Fig. 1a.
  • the policy engine module 102 reaches dispositions on network events, it passes the network event object to the logging module 103.
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention also provides an alarm script 155.
  • the alarm script is invoked to provide expedited alerting of the disposition.
  • the following algorithm is used to enter the data into the database 104.
  • the database 104 is tested to see if it contains a policy that matches the MD5 hash of the policy 105 currently being used by the policy engine 102. If no such policy is found then the policy details are added to the database 104;
  • report statistics 161 are sent across a secure channel to a secure, customer accessible server 162.
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention uses the following algorithm.
  • a report script 160 described is used to generate a report 161 for the configured or predetermined time period.
  • An example of a list of preferred acquired or calculated statistics or intermediate steps is contained in Table K below;
  • the report 161 is then packaged using the tar command and PGP to encrypt the resulting file using the public key of a recipient email account;
  • the client Upon accessing the reporting website 164 the client is able to peruse the reports that have been generated, access the protocol event data stored in the database 165 via a cgi script.
  • Table K Generate network events in subsidiary web files, based on execution run
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention uses a formal specification of network security policy that is to be enforced on a network.
  • This specification provides a precise, compact description of network security policy.
  • the parser module (Fig. 1 150) is used to generate an English language description of the policy. This description is simple enough to be understood, yet captures the salient details of the policy.
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention provides the following algorithm for generating the English language representation.
  • the algorithm comprises the following: • Loading the policy into the parser from its text representation; and
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention provides the following rule algorithm to generate an English language representation of a single policy language rule.
  • the algorithm is described with reference to Fig. 12.
  • the algorithm outputs the name of the rule at hand (2001). It then proceeds to output the agent's name (2002), where the agent is the subject network monitor(s) to which the policy applies.
  • the algorithm then loops through all protocol and action combinations (2003). If the action is to be ignored (2004), then the rule applies to the whole protocol (2005). Otherwise, the rule applies to certain actions only (2014).
  • the algorithm looks at the immediate outcome for the rule (2006).
  • the algorithm then outputs the corresponding directive for the outcome (2007). If any conditions exist on the disposition, then the algorithm outputs the conditions (2008).
  • the algorithm looks at the final outcome (2011), then outputs the corresponding final outcome of the rule (2012).
  • the algorithm outputs the conditions (2013). If the rule applies to a particular initiator or target, then the algorithm outputs the initiator or target name (2009). Otherwise, the algorithm outputs a general inclusive name, such as, for example, "anyone.” The algorithm then checks for prerequisites (2010). If any are discovered, the algorithm then outputs such prerequisites.
  • Table L below shows code to the example implementation.
  • Table M shows the example of the output in table format.
  • Table R For an example of a policy specification file that can be used as input into the main algorithm discussed above, refer to Table R below.
  • Http_Blocked_Service_Violation All Deny HTTP from anyone to anyone, Monitors provided that Tcp Blocked Services is true.
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention comprises a technique for a policy engine internally to organize policy rules in order to effect an efficient evaluation of protocol events at runtime. Evaluation of a protocol event entails selecting one or more applicable policy rules using an evaluation algorithm.
  • the preferred evaluation algorithm is described on pages 75 through 77 in A Declarative Language for Specifying a Security Policy, patent application number 09/479,781 filed on 1/7/2000. An excerpt describing the preferred evaluation algorithm is provided below in Table S.
  • policy rules are organized in a manner that minimizes the number of rules that need to be considered when determining the set of rules applicable to a given protocol event. The algorithm is described with reference to Fig. 13 as follows:
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention provides an assessment tool that allows the discussed technique for continuously assessing the security of a system to be applicable to both long-term and short-term network assessment.
  • the tool provides an additional dimension to network assessment. That is, it provides the ability to capture and classify large volumes of network traffic efficiently, based on a formal policy which describes permitted traffic.
  • the tool adds network usage to the known list of features discussed in an assessment framework.
  • the invention provides specific and tangible data points for discussion that facilitates the interview process and educates the customer on problems in an immediate feedback loop;
  • a consultant arrives at a customer office with one or more workstations with the monitoring invention discussed herein loaded.
  • the workstation, or station for short may be a laptop computer, or other suitably portable platform.
  • the monitoring station is attached to the customer network at a critical network bottleneck, e.g. just inside an Internet firewall, and monitors all traffic at that point in the network. From a security point of view, the monitoring station is entirely passive and invisible to the network. The monitoring station only receives packets and does not respond to any protocol actions. Due to the monitoring station's passive nature, no operational impact is imposed on the subject network. Hence, assessments may be performed during peak production times, as well as when a network is in a quiescent state.
  • the monitoring station is left attached to the network for a long period of time, depending on conditions, such as, for example, the practical demands of the visit, storage space on the station, and the amount of traffic on the customer's network. If appropriate, the station can be left at the customer site to gather data over a short-term period, such as, for example, days and weeks.
  • the policy specification is used to remove from consideration as much mundane network traffic as possible, allowing the analyst to concentrate on more interesting traffic. Due to the opinion of the analyst being part of the assessment process, there is no fixed goal for the level of detail needed in the policy specification. In the simplest case, the analyst generates no policy at all, and examines the network events one by one (perhaps using the query tool to filter them). In practice, it can be suggested that the analyst undergoes a short policy development phase, as the short policy development phase can serve the analyst well to reduce thousands of network events into a page or two, which may then be examined by inspection.
  • the invention allows data to be stored in full packet form for most detailed analysis, or in compressed form storing only security-sensitive events.
  • the latter form also removes customer-confidential information, such as, for example, embedded passwords, so that it is more appropriate for removal from the customer site.
  • a typical usage scenario is capturing full-packet data in a short burst, such as, for example, five minutes. After a brief analysis, a longer data collection is run using the compressed form.
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention provides the following algorithm for an operator, such as an analyst, to perform the data analysis on a data packet or on a compressed file of data.
  • the algorithm is described referring to Fig. 14, as follows: 1) Create a null policy, which denies all actions, for a customer site (copying a file). Set null policy to the current policy (4002);
  • step 2 (4009) until only a small, manageable number of events remains (4007). Then end the algorithm (4008).
  • the same packet or compressed file is run by the policy engine multiple times. It should be appreciated that in an assessment situation a policy can be edited by using the policy generator discussed herein.
  • the invention provides for using the policy generator for rapid policy development based on transport-level parameters. Enhanced policy development, using more complex tools, typically is not necessary in an assessment situation.
  • An equally preferred embodiment comprises the analysts first determining the customer requirements and the customer network credentials. Using this information, the analyst programs an initial policy. The analyst can derive and use additional information from the scanning process as described in the algorithm above.
  • the customer or analysts designs an initial best policy as a set of credentials and rules, set all dispositions to DENY, and monitors the network to determine what the dispositions should be.
  • the policy language describes a policy decision involving two principals, an initiator and a target principal. These principals are identified by a set of one or more credentials. For each policy decision the policy engine ascertains which credential in the policy best describes the information about the principals involved in an interaction. Similarly, the policy language herein describes conditions that in turn describe tests performed on the state of an associated protocol event.
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention provides a credential / condition assertion verification optimization algorithm to ensure that the choice of credentials and conditions are made as efficiently as possible.
  • the policy engine To accomplish credential / condition assertion verification optimization, the policy engine:
  • ⁇ calls comparing functions as appropriate.
  • the preferred embodiment provides a more rigorous algorithm, an example of which is described in Table O below.
  • a predetermined function for example named dllValidateFunc(), contained in the loaded DLL is called. If the return value of the function call is the same as a MD5 hash of the previously loaded policy file, then loading is complete. Otherwise execution initialization continues below; because the DLL does not exist or because the MD5 hash does not match, a code generation function of the parser module is invoked, which:
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention provides a network monitor internals mechanism discussed below that serves to translate packet data into multiple concurrent streams of network event data. It accomplishes this by interpreting both sides of each protocol transaction.
  • Fig. 15 shows a high level schematic diagram of the network monitor 127 accepting packet data from either a live network interface 125 or a file containing packet data 126.
  • the network monitor extracts security-sensitive details from the input packet stream 125, 126, and generates output in a serialized stream of encoded network event information 115.
  • the preferred encoded format is DME encoded format, discussed below in section, Network Event Encoding Format.
  • the output network event information can be stored for logging or debugging purposes, or can be passed directly to the policy engine.
  • the discussed network monitor provides an efficient process of exporting data from a customer's site, such process comprising extracting security-sensitive information.
  • Fig. 16 shows a schematic diagram of process flow according to the invention.
  • the network monitor 127 is a single-threaded program that processes packets (125 or 126) as they are read. Each packet is passed to a monitor protocol engine 6100 for processing. When security-sensitive protocol events are encountered in the packet data, the monitor calls into its output section 6200 to transmit network or protocol events to the rest of the policy monitoring system 100 via a network pipe, direct procedure call. Output section 6200 can also store protocol events in a file for later processing. Protocol Engine
  • Fig. 17 is a block schematic diagram of features of the protocol engine according to the invention.
  • Input packet data 115 is read into a known object-oriented structure type 6101 , such as, for example, a C structure here named pkt_t structure.
  • the pkt_t structure 6101 represents a packet on the network. It provides a stack-based structuring mechanism 6102 that allows protocol headers and trailers 6103 to be marked in the packet so that software may focus easily on the correct protocol layer.
  • the pkt_t structure 6101 also includes generic src 6104 and dst 6105 address locations, and flags 6106 to pass useful information up and down a connection stack, for example, if such packet is transiting from server to client or vice versa.
  • the protocol engine 6100 provides one module 6107 for each protocol implemented 6108.
  • the modules implement a generic series of operations, a preferred example of such series is provided below in Table P.
  • a common connection structure 6109 allows connection data to be arranged in a stack allocation for each access across layer boundaries.
  • each protocol is a superclass of connection.
  • the layering permits protocols to assume one or more roles as the layer responsible for each corresponding boundary, such as, for example: Network, Transport, Session, Application, or Transactions.
  • Bind(packet, connection) given the first packet of a connection, attempt to bind this packet into a new instance of this protocol within connection. Establish the instance in its proper role(s) within the connection.
  • Input(packet, connection) given a packet, which has been associated with a connection (in some cases, connection is NULL, indicating that no such relationship exists, or exists yet), process the packet as input to the connection.
  • StopCollecting(connection) given a connection, adjust the protocol stack so that no further data will be processed on this connection. Depending on the protocol in question, this may involve discarding data or adjusting filters. A connection which is not "collecting" attempts to process packets in the most efficient manner.
  • the full generality of the call is needed only for a transport connection like TCP.
  • the process discussed above for the stopCollecting generic operation can be appropriate for a hardware filter to stop packets from arriving.
  • the concept of the current time in the monitor flows from the packet level upwards. That is, time is associated with the packet and is maintained throughout the packet.
  • current time reduces to the time a packet was received, which may be earlier than the time when the packet is processed.
  • current time in the monitor has no relation to actual current time. The packet is processed relative to the time it was received and whereby time intervals remain the same. Also, results can be lined up in the database reflecting the point of reference of the time the packet was received.
  • the network monitor provides support for setting alarms on connections.
  • An alarm is set by registering a connection to receive a signal when the network monitor transitions to a predetermined value of current time.
  • the signal consists of a call to a generic alarm operation in every protocol layer registered with such connection.
  • Alarm handlers are called in order from lowest protocol layer to highest protocol layer.
  • the network monitor Because network monitor functionality is based on network events that can map to network connections, the network monitor provides a connectionless association feature. By using the feature, the network monitor registers the fact that it noticed two IP hosts communicating. Typically, an association is long lived, whether or not the network monitor knows its intention. Examples of associations are a series of ICMP PING / PING REPLY packets and a stream of IPSEC packets. The network monitor treats associations as connections. Indeed, often associations are connections at a higher level of protocol.
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention provides an output section in the protocol engine.
  • Fig. 18 is a high level flow diagram of the preferred output section according to the invention.
  • the output section 6200 of the network monitor receives network event data from the protocol engine and generates outbound calls 6203 to transmit such data to the policy engine or to a file.
  • the output section 6200 works by allowing the network monitor to establish a transaction which forms an association between a monitor connection and a network event in the policy engine.
  • Fig. 19 shows a schematic diagram of a transaction 6204, comprising an association 6205 between a subject monitor connection 6206 and a network event 6207.
  • the lifetime of the connection 6206, the transaction 6204, and the network event 6207 is similar.
  • the output section's interface comprises a set of calls to establish communication with the policy engine, and to start and finish transactions, and a set of protocol-specific calls.
  • the calls progress as follows:
  • the output section internally translates such calls into a generic set of calls, an example of which is listed below.
  • the output section is configured with a chain of output generic modules, each of which is used as filter on the output data.
  • An example of the implemented modules follows:
  • NULL acts as an endpoint, but discards input data without doing anything
  • the network monitor also includes an input section that decodes an encoded version of events.
  • the monitor 127 processes network traffic 125 in real time and uses ENC to generate encoded output.
  • the encoded output is transmitted in real-time over a TCP connection where it is decoded and connected using SM to the Policy Engine 102.
  • the output section is used for testing purposes.
  • the output section is configured using command line arguments.
  • An example of an algorithm for such testing follows:
  • the preferred embodiment of the invention provides a technique for network event encoding to be used by the network monitor.
  • the encoding technique is designed for both archival and transmission purposes.
  • the basic format of the encoding is:
  • the agent descriptor section is used to store a possibly null list of agent descriptors that are configured into the network monitor at encoding time.
  • the agent descriptors are strings that plug into a particular policy language policy. They indicate the location of the subject monitor in the subject network wiring structure, enabling rules that apply to such location in the network and disable rules that do not apply.
  • a preferred agent descriptor section comprises an array, where each element of the array is an ASCII string, preceded by a single byte giving its length. The size of the array is given in the header cited above.
  • the preferred type map section is used to improve maintainability of the full policy monitoring system. Provided by the type map section is a mapping between update types used in an encoded record and the update types' string names. The decoding module uses this information to detect new update types that are not supported by mapping known updates to the correct values. That is, because new update types typically are not interpretable by old software, they are therefore successfully skipped.
  • a preferred type map section comprises an array, where each element of the array contains a 4-byte type value, a single byte of string length, and the ASCII name of the type.
  • the size of the array is given in the header cited above.
  • the preferred encoded transactions comprise an array of individual update encodings.
  • the size of the array is either derivable from the header file size information, or is unbounded, such as, for real-time monitoring.
  • a preferred header for an individual update has the following format:
  • SM_IP_ASSOCIATION provides IP src and dst addresses and establishes a peer relationship. Subsequent events assume that this information is known and builds on it. For example, an update named ICMP_ECHO has no body at all.
  • the monitor can glean no more useful information about this network event.
  • the policy engine should process policy and give additional input to the monitor.
  • SM_FTP_NOAUTH Body 4-byte, number of authentication failures
  • Body String, user name String, password, if user was anonymous
  • Body String, file name 1 -byte, FTP error code
  • SM_FTP_XFERDONE Body String, unused 1 -byte, FTP error code String, FTP error message Meaning: status from continuing FILEPUT or FILEGET command
  • Body 1-byte, method code (one value for each HTTP method) 1 -byte, HTTP version (major)
  • Body 1 -byte, always true.
  • Body 1-byte, nonzero if this is the last group of header info 4-byte, number of header lines String[number of header lines]
  • Body 4-byte, response code 1 -byte, HTTP version (major)
  • SM_ICMP_DU_FRAG destination unreachable: fragmentation needed and DF set
  • SM_ICMP_DU_HOST destination unreachable
  • SM_ICMP_DU_NET destination unreachable: net unreachable
  • SM_lCMP_DU_PORT destination unreachable: port unreachable
  • SM_ICMP_DU_PROT destination unreachable: protocol unreachable
  • SM_ICMP_DU_SRCRT destination unreachable: source route failed
  • SM_ICMP_DU_FILTER destination unreachable: packet filtered
  • SM_ICMP_PARAM parameter problem
  • SM_ICMP_SRCQ source quench
  • SM_ICMP_TE_EXCD time to live exceeded in transit
  • SM_ICMP_TE_FRAG fragment reassembly time exceeded
  • Body 4-byte, IP src address 2-byte, UDP/TCP src port
  • IP dst address 2-byte a connection contains a particular ICMP error.
  • the body gives information from the nested packet within the ICMP packet.
  • SM_ICMP_ECHO SM_ICMP_ECHOR Body none Meaning: ICMP echo / echo reply seen (echo is commonly called "ping").
  • SMJCMPJREQ SMJCMPJREQR Body none
  • SM_ICMP_RD_HOSTTOS Redirect datagrams for the Type of Service and Host
  • SM_ICMP_RD_NET Redirect datagrams for the Network
  • SM_ICMP_RD_NETTOS Redirect datagrams for the Type of Service and Network
  • IP src address 2-byte 4-byte
  • UDP/TCP src port 4-byte IP dst address 2-byte
  • UDP/TCP src port 4-byte IP protocol
  • the body gives gateway information and information from the nested packet within the ICMP packet.
  • SM_IPINFO_IP_ASSOCIATION Body 6-byte, src MAC address 6-byte, dst MAC address
  • IP src address 2-byte
  • UDP/TCP src port 4-byte, IP dst address 2-byte, UDP/TCP src port >
  • IP protocol 1-byte IP protocol 1-byte
  • IP version IP version
  • Body 4-byte, client version (major) 4-byte, client version (minor)
  • SM_SSL_ABORT fatal alert
  • SM_SSL_WARNING non-fatal alert
  • Body 1-byte, version (major) 1 -byte, version (minor)
  • ge target-auth-keysize 1024 ge target-auth-keysize 1024
  • ge ke-keysize 768 ge target-auth-keysize 768
  • rule Ftp_Anonymous_Authentication protocol FTP
  • action CONTROL_AUTHENTICATE action CONTROL_AUTHENTICATE
  • rule Tcp_Blocked_Services protocol TCP
  • action CONNECT initiator ignore
  • target ignore target ignore
  • rule Ftp_Blocked_Service_Violation protocol FTP
  • action ignore prerequisite Tcp_Blocked_Services
  • initiator ignore ( initiator ignore ) ( target ignore ) ( outcome ( immediate ( default Ftp_Access_Violation )
  • rule Ftp_lgnore_Data_Connections protocol FTP
  • action DATAJDPEN action DATAJDPEN
  • target ignore target ignore
  • rule Ftp_Validate_Password protocol FTP
  • action CONTROL_AUTHENTICATE action CONTROL_AUTHENTICATE
  • rule lcmp_Deny protocol ICMP
  • action ignore initiator ignore
  • target ignore target ignore
  • rule lp_Within_X protocol IP
  • action ASSOCIATION agent X_Monitors
  • protocol ICMP action ASSOCIATION
  • protocol IP protocol IP
  • action ASSOCIATION agent X_Monitors
  • agent X_Monitors initiator I p_Within_X_l n itiator
  • target lp_Directed_Broadcasts_Within_X_Target target lp_Directed_Broadcasts_Within_X_Target
  • agent X_Monitors initiator X_Extemal_Communities
  • target X_Coloc_Subnet target X_Coloc_Subnet
  • protocol IP protocol IP
  • action ASSOCIATION agent X_Monitors
  • initiator lp_Within_X_lnitiator target Generic_Multicast_And_Broadcast_Addresses

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Abstract

L'invention se rapporte à un système et à un procédé de contrôle de la politique de sécurité d'un réseau, qui permettent d'effectuer des vérifications de réseau et de sécurité sur la base d'une politique à l'échelle du système. Le trafic réseau réel est analysé aux fins de l'identification de modèles de trafic anormaux, de vulnérabilités du système et de la configuration incorrecte de systèmes informatiques dans un réseau, au moyen d'une écoute du réseau, de l'enregistrement chronologique des événements et de la mise en oeuvre d'actions adaptées.
PCT/US2001/019333 2000-06-16 2001-06-15 Systeme et procede permettant de mettre en oeuvre une politique de securite WO2001099373A2 (fr)

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US60/212,126 2000-06-16
US09/826,602 US20020093527A1 (en) 2000-06-16 2001-04-05 User interface for a security policy system and method
US09/826,602 2001-04-05
US09/881,147 US20030061506A1 (en) 2001-04-05 2001-06-14 System and method for security policy
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