WO2001001361A1 - Systeme de transactions securise - Google Patents

Systeme de transactions securise Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2001001361A1
WO2001001361A1 PCT/GB1999/002017 GB9902017W WO0101361A1 WO 2001001361 A1 WO2001001361 A1 WO 2001001361A1 GB 9902017 W GB9902017 W GB 9902017W WO 0101361 A1 WO0101361 A1 WO 0101361A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
party
transaction
authenticator
buyer
intermediary
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/GB1999/002017
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Roger Keith Alexander
Original Assignee
Barclays Bank Plc
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Barclays Bank Plc filed Critical Barclays Bank Plc
Priority to PCT/GB1999/002017 priority Critical patent/WO2001001361A1/fr
Priority to AU45228/99A priority patent/AU4522899A/en
Publication of WO2001001361A1 publication Critical patent/WO2001001361A1/fr

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q30/00—Commerce
    • G06Q30/06—Buying, selling or leasing transactions
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/02—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols involving a neutral party, e.g. certification authority, notary or trusted third party [TTP]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/04—Payment circuits
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/08—Payment architectures
    • G06Q20/12—Payment architectures specially adapted for electronic shopping systems

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a secure transaction system, particularly for use over a public network, and particularly but not exclusively for processing payment transactions.
  • the standards aim to provide: privacy of information - such that the content of a transaction cannot be read by a third party; data integrity - to ensure that the content cannot be changed during transmission across the Internet; authentication of the parties to the transaction - to avoid fraudulent activity by the buyer and/or seller; and non-repudiation of the transaction - to provide evidence of the transaction should it subsequently be disputed by one of the parties.
  • the current e-commerce model replicates that used for card purchases in a physical environment in which a buyer is physically present at the seller's premises, or conducts a transaction with the seller over the telephone.
  • the buyer B sends a purchase request PR to the seller S. for example by selecting a particular item from a web page hosted on behalf of the seller S. and receives purchase information PI from the seller, confirming the price and identity of the item selected and prompting the buyer for payment details.
  • the buyer B submits the payment details PD. such as card and buyer details, to the seller S.
  • the seller S then submits an Authorization Request AR to an Acquirer A, such as the seller's bank, who passes the Authorization Request AR to the Issuer I of the card used by the buyer B in the transaction.
  • the Issuer checks that the card and buyer details contained in the Authorization Request
  • AR are correct and that the payment is within the buyer ' s authorized limit. If the payment is authorized, the Issuer sends an acceptance message ACC to the Acquirer A, who passes the acceptance message ACC to the seller S. The seller S then fulfils F the transaction, by delivering the item ordered and/or issuing confirmation that the order has been accepted and the payment will be debited from the buyer's account. The seller S then sends a transaction confirmation message TCF to the Acquirer A.
  • EP-A-0 779 587 discloses a payment settlement system for on-line shopping in which the user selects an item from an on-line shop over the Internet, but sends credit card data via a separate settlement network to a "service centre' which sends the payment details to an 'approval centre'
  • a further problem associated with Internet shopping is that of import taxes, such as duty and value added tax (VAT).
  • VAT duty and value added tax
  • An on-line shop may not have a warehouse within the same country or economic area as the buyer and therefore the ordered goods have to be imported by the buyer, usually by mail or courier.
  • the buyer is therefore liable to pay import taxes, which vary according to the country as well as the type of goods, so that the buyer does not usually know the tax due and cannot readily judge the total cost of the purchase.
  • the cost advantage of shopping over the Internet is cancelled by import taxes, so ideally the buyer would like to know the total cost before proceeding with the transaction.
  • the goods may be impounded or delayed by customs. If the goods are not detected by customs, the import taxes are often not paid at all by the buyer.
  • a system for conducting a payment transaction between a paying party and a receiving party in which transaction identification information is transmitted from one of the parties to the other.
  • the paying party transmits an instruction to pay to an intermediary, and the transaction identification information is transmitted from the party which receives it to the intermediary, which then transmits the transaction identification information to the party which originally transmitted the transaction identification information.
  • the payment is not allowed to proceed unless the transaction identification information as received from the intermediary matches that originally transmitted.
  • the intermediary To allow the intermediary to transmit the transaction identification information to the originating party, the intermediary is provided with information identifying the originating party in the current transaction. Therefore, the intermediary is able to check the identity of the originating party and only to transmit the transaction identification information to the originating party if that party is authorised to use the system. This aspect also prevents bogus on-line shops from obtaining account information or payment by passing themselves off as trusted shops.
  • the bogus shop identifies itself as a trusted shop and sends this information to the buyer, this identification information will be transmitted by the buyer to the intermediary, which then contacts the trusted shop.
  • the trusted shop has no record of the current transaction and therefore prevents the payment being made.
  • a payment transaction system for conducting a payment transaction between a buyer and a seller, in which a buyer authenticator, in communication with the buyer, verifies the authenticity of the buyer, a seller authenticator, in communication with the seller, verifies the authenticity of the seller, and payment instructions for the transaction are transmitted from the buyer authenticator to the seller authenticator.
  • This system greatly simplifies the establishment of a trust relationship between the buyer and the seller, by reducing the problem to that of establishing trust between the buyer authenticator and the seller authenticator.
  • the authenticators may each serve a large number of buyers and sellers, so that the number of possible connections between buyer authenticators and seller authenticators over which trust must be established is greatly reduced.
  • the buyer and seller authenticators can be interconnected by a more secure network, such as a circuit-switched network.
  • the trust relationship between buyer and buyer authenticator. and between seller and seller authenticator can be easily established by pre-registration, whereas direct pre-registration between buyers and sellers is not feasible.
  • this four-party model breaks the trust problem of the huge number of potential connections between buyers and sellers into the much more manageable number of connections between each buyer authenticator and its registered buyers, between each buyer authenticator and each seller authenticator, and between each seller authenticator and its registered sellers.
  • the certification hierarchy of SET can be replaced by, for example, different secret keys for each connection, the secret keys being set during preregistration or by separate communications between authenticators.
  • a system for conducting a purchase transaction between a buying party and a selling party in which information identifying the goods to be purchased is transmitted to an intermediary, which calculates an additional amount due to a party other than the selling party dependent on the identity of the goods to be purchased and preferably the destination to which the goods are to be delivered.
  • the additional amount is indicated to the buying party and the purchase transaction is only allowed to proceed if the buying party confirms that the additional amount should be paid.
  • the intermediary automatically triggers the payment of the additional amount if the purchase transaction is allowed to proceed.
  • the additional amount such as an import tax
  • Another advantage is that the buyer knows the total payment due before entering into the purchase transaction.
  • Figure 1 is a diagram of the stages in a conventional payment transaction
  • Figure 2 is a diagram of the stages in a payment transaction system in an embodiment of the present invention
  • Figure 3 is a diagram showing the technical means by which the transaction of Figure 2 may be conducted;
  • Figure 4 is a diagram of the relationships of trust between the parties in the system of Figure 2;
  • Figure 5 is a diagram showing a virtual trust relationship between buyer and seller as a result of the relationships shown in Figure 4.
  • Figure 6 is a diagram showing a protocol for calculating and paying import taxes, which can be applied to the protocol shown in Figure 2.
  • the buyer B operates a buyer terminal BT, which may be a general purpose computer or dedicated Internet terminal running TCP/IP and Internet browser software, and browses a website hosted on a seller ' s server SS, via the Internet.
  • the Internet browser software may include a 'plug-in ' , or a discrete application may be run, which implements the transaction protocol of this embodiment, as performed on the buyer's terminal BT.
  • the buyer B indicates a desire to purchase one or more items, such as goods or services, by selecting an item displayed within the web browser, which sends a Purchase Request message PR via the Internet to the seller S.
  • the seller S In response to the Purchase Request Message PR, the seller S then sends to the buyer B, over the Internet I, an Offer to Sell message OS, including details of the intended purchase and the seller's identity, preferably in a form which can be verified later by the seller but is difficult to reproduce by another party.
  • the Offer to Sell message includes a seller agreement reference identifying a previously concluded agreement between the seller S and the seller authenticator SA.
  • the software on the buyer's terminal BT enters an authentication process with the buyer B.
  • This process may comprise reading a smartcard carrying account details and identification information of the holder of the card, and inputting a PIN and/or biometric information from the buyer B.
  • This information may be digitally signed, for example by generating and encrypting a hash of the information, using a key stored on the smart card and not known to the buyer.
  • the buyer B may also digitally sign the Offer to Sell information.
  • the signed information and Offer to Sell information are sent as payment details PD over the Internet I to a buyer authenticator BA, which may be a server BAS operated by the buyer ' s bank.
  • the buyer authenticator BA checks the details of the buyer B contained within the payment details PD. for example by validating the signature of the Offer to sell information using a key previously assigned to the buyer B when issuing the smartcard, and checking that the PIN and/or biometric information are correct.
  • the PIN and/or biometric information may be validated at the buyer ' s terminal BT against a PIN or biometric information stored on the smart card. If the PIN and/or biometric information do not match after a predetermined number of attempts, the software on the buyer's terminal BT may terminate the transaction and optionally send a message to the buyer authenticator BA indicating a failed attempt to use the smartcard.
  • the buyer authenticator BA sends a buyer authentication message BAM via a secure channel to a seller authenticator SA.
  • a seller authenticator SA which may be a server SAS operated by the seller ' s bank.
  • the secure channel may be a circuit switched connection via a private network PN. or via a public network such as a PSTN or ISDN.
  • the buyer authentication message BAM includes the Offer to Sell information, payment information, and a flag indicating whether the buyer has been authenticated.
  • the seller authenticator SA checks the seller agreement reference in the Offer to Sell information and, if this reference corresponds to seller agreement recognised by the seller authenticator SA, sets up a communications channel to the seller identified by the seller agreement reference using pre-stored connection details.
  • the seller authenticator routes all messages intended for the seller through that leased line.
  • the connection is a dial-up connection
  • the seller authenticator SA dials a number pre-stored in the seller agreement record indicated by the seller agreement reference.
  • the seller authenticator forwards the Offer to Sell Information to the seller, for example via a leased line connection LL, or the Internet I.
  • the Offer to Sell information is digitally signed by the seller authenticator. This signature may be generated by a secret key known only to the seller S to which the Offer to Sell information is to be sent, and established during pre- registration of the seller with the seller authenticator.
  • the seller verifies the seller authenticator' s signature and checks whether the Offer to Sell Information was indeed originated by itself in a current transaction.
  • the seller may include a unique transaction number in the Offer to Sell information, generated in a sequence which is difficult to predict by another party.
  • the unique transaction number and other information unique to the current transaction and included in the Offer to Sell information may be encrypted using a secret key stored in the seller's server SS. If the seller verifies the seller authenticator' s signature and that the transaction is current, it sends an Offer to Sell Confirmation message OSC via the Internet I back to the seller authenticator SA.
  • the Offer to Sell Confirmation message is forwarded to the buyer authenticator via the secure channel and thence to the buyer B via the Internet I.
  • the recipient party verifies the identity of the sender of the Offer to Sell Confirmation Message, for example by verifying a digital signature by the sending party of the Offer to Sell Confirmation message.
  • the Offer to Sell Confirmation Message includes information derived from the Offer to Sell Information, which is unique to the current transaction, so that replays of
  • Offer to Sell Confirmation Messages can be detected.
  • the seller S then performs a fulfilment operation F with the buyer, by initiating the delivery of the purchased item or items to the buyer B or by delivering the item over the Internet in the case where the item purchased is software, data, or some interactive service such as advice or support.
  • the seller also sends a transaction confirmation TCF to the seller authenticator SA, which triggers the clearing and settlement of the payment in the transaction through conventional channels, as currently used by issuers such as Mastercard (RTM) and Visa (RTM).
  • One of the bases of the SET protocol is the creation of a trust hierarchy based on public key certificates. This requires the signatory of a public key certificate to be trusted by the authenticating party, or for the authenticity of the signatory to be established from one or more higher levels of public key certificate, the highest level of which is signed by a trusted party.
  • the SET trust hierarchy is necessary because the payment transaction is conducted between parties having no pre-existing trust relationship.
  • the protocol of the embodiment described above controls security through a chain of trust comprising trust domain dl between the buyer B and the buyer authenticator BA, trust domain d2 between the buyer authenticator BA and the seller authenticator SA, and domain d3 between the seller authenticator SA and the seller S, as represented by Figure 4.
  • the buyer B has a pre-existing relationship with the buyer authenticator BA, for example through a registration procedure.
  • the buyer authenticator's server may maintain an electronic wallet or personal electronic data store (PEDS) for the buyer, so that the account details of the buyer are stored at the buyer authenticator Server BAS and are not transmitted over the Internet from the buyer to the buyer authenticator BA. Instead, the buyer authenticator BA transmits the account details of the buyer B to the seller authenticator only when authorized to do so by the buyer.
  • PDS personal electronic data store
  • the buyer may be issued with a smart card storing encryption keys and/or algorithms by means of which an on-line authentication protocol is conducted with the buyer authenticator BA.
  • the buyer authenticator BA is required to underwrite the transaction sent to the seller against fraud by the buyer, and therefore it is the responsibility of the buyer authenticator to verify the identity of the buyer.
  • the trusted domain d2 between the buyer authenticator BA and the seller authenticator SA operates through an international payment system such as that used between banks under the Visa or Mastercard systems, or the Global Trust system as announced on 21 October 1998 in New York by ABN AMRO, Bank of America, Bankers Trust, Barclays Bank, Chase Manhattan, Citibank, Deutsche Bank and Hypotenbank, and CertCo, now known as "Identrus " TM and joined by two further members, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and Sanwa Bank.
  • This type of trusted domain operates through an intermediary which certifies all buyer and seller authenticators using a standard certified identity.
  • the seller authenticator SA has a pre-existing relationship with the seller S, for example by pre-registration.
  • the seller authenticator SA guarantees the authenticity of the seller S and accepts at least some liability for transactions with that seller.
  • the amount of account information transmitted from the buyer B to the buyer authenticator BA across the open network may be further limited by the use of electronic wallets at the buyer authenticator's server - the seller S only gains access to account information of the buyer once both the buyer B and the seller S have been authenticated, in the Offer to Sell information
  • the above transaction system also allows buyer authenticators BA and seller authenticators SA flexibility in their respective relationships with buyers B and sellers S.
  • Seller authenticators can provide financial incentives to sellers S to encourage them to trade through the system, and buyer authenticators can create whatever transaction protocols and business processes are necessary to alleviate the buyers' concerns about security.
  • the transaction system is based around the position of trust that financial institutions, as buyer authenticators and seller authenticators, enjoy with their customers as buyers and sellers, and among themselves, by the use of existing or planned trust systems.
  • the seller S transmits to the buyer B Classification of Goods information CG and Country of Export information CE.
  • the Classification of Goods information CG identifies the goods to be sold in the transaction according to a standard classification, such as the Harmonized System (HS) classification used by customs authorities. If multiple different types of goods are being purchased, falling under different classifications, the Classification of Goods message lists the value of goods to be purchased under each classification.
  • the Country of Export information CE identifies the country or tax jurisdiction from which the goods will be exported.
  • the buyer B includes the Classification of Goods and Country of Export information in the Payment Details message PD.
  • the buyer authenticator BA stores, for example on its server BAS, a database of import tax rates due on different classifications of goods, as a function of the country of export and the country of import.
  • the buyer authenticator also has available the address to which the goods will be delivered; this may be the address of the buyer B as registered against the account from which the payment will be made, and may be provided in the payment details PD or be pre-stored at the buyer authenticator Server BAS. Alternatively, if the goods are ordered as a gift for delivery to another address, that address is supplied by the buyer B. From this, the buyer authenticator BA derives the country or jurisdiction to which the goods are to be delivered.
  • the buyer authenticator BA calculates the import tax payable by the buyer according to the applicable tax rate retrieved from the database, using the identifications of the country of import, the country of export, and the value and classification of the goods.
  • the import tax information TI is transmitted from the buyer authenticator BA to the buyer B.
  • the software running on the buyer's terminal BT displays the import tax information and asks the buyer B whether to proceed with the transaction. If the buyer confirms this, a tax confirmation message TC is sent from the buyer to the buyer authenticator.
  • the buyer authenticator BA in response to receipt of the Offer to Sell Confirmation OSC. initiates a payment TP of the import tax due from the buyer's account to the account of the customs authority responsible for collecting import taxes for the country of delivery of the ordered goods.
  • the payment of import taxes is automated and the delivery of goods should not be delayed by customs authorities.
  • the taxes are only paid with the consent of the buyer, and once the transaction has been confirmed by both the buyer B and the seller S.
  • the buyer B may provide sufficient information to the buyer authenticator BA to allow the tax information TI to be sent back to the buyer B, before the rest of the Payment Details PD are sent to the buyer authenticator. This provides greater comfort to the buyer that the payment for the transaction and for any taxes due cannot be made until the buyer B has confirmed that the taxes are acceptable.
  • the buyer B only transmits the Classification of Goods information CG and the Country of Export information CE to the buyer authenticator BA once the buyer B has received the Offer to Sell
  • the protocol then proceeds, with the Tax Information TI being sent to the buyer B and the buyer replying with the Tax Confirmation TC, in response to which the buyer authenticator BA initiates payment of the taxes.
  • This alternative allows the buyer B to proceed with the transaction without paying the taxes automatically, and may therefore be more attractive to the buyer B.
  • the protocol may proceed without requiring a tax confirmation TC from the Buyer B, and optionally without sending the tax information TI to the Buyer.
  • the Buyer Authenticator may initiate a claim from the relevant tax authority for a tax refund to be paid to the buyer's account.
  • the payment details are submitted for payment processing by the seller authenticator, once the transaction confirmation is received.
  • the payment details may be submitted for processing by other parties.
  • the seller S may submit the payment details for processing directly, rather than through the seller authenticator SA.
  • the payment may be pre-authorised before fulfilment F takes place.
  • the buyer authenticator BA may be the issuer of the smart card used by the buyer. In that case, the buyer authenticator BA confirms that the use of the card is authorised, in the buyer authentication message BAM. Payment processing is then triggered by the offer to sell confirmation OSC being received by the buyer authenticator BA.
  • the transaction confirmation TCF may be forwarded from the seller authenticator to the buyer authenticator BA, whereby the payment processing is triggered.
  • the seller authenticator may request authorisation for the payment from the card issuer and terminate the transaction protocol if authorisation is denied. For example, on receipt of the offer to sell message, the seller authenticator may submit the payment details to the card issuer, and only forward the offer to sell message to the seller if the payment amount is authorized by the issuer.
  • the Offer to Sell message OS is generated by the seller S and returned to the seller for confirmation via the buyer authenticator BA and the seller authenticator SA.
  • the seller S may send the information content of the purchase request PR to the seller authenticator SA. which information is passed to the buyer authenticator and then returned to the buyer B, the transaction not being allowed to proceed to payment and delivery until the buyer has confirmed that the Purchase Request PR is current.
  • the buyer must still send the payment details PD to the buyer authenticator BA and thence to the seller authenticator SA, so that the protocol requires a greater number of separate information transfers to take place.
  • the functions of the buyer authenticator BA and the seller authenticator SA may be combined into a single party, so that the buyer Authentication Message BAM is an internal message which is not transmitted over external communications links. This eventuality is possible in the above described embodiments, if coincidentally the buyer B and the seller S are using the services of the same bank as their respective authenticators.
  • the protocol may be designed so that the buyer authenticator BA and the seller authenticator SA must be the same party.
  • the centralised authenticator would then need to establish trust relationships with a very much larger number of users, both as buyers and sellers, than would the separate buyer authenticators BA and seller authenticators SA.
  • the buyers and sellers could not rely on their existing relationships with their banks, but would have to register with the centralized authenticator as a new organisation.
  • the above protocol is advantageously applied to a payment transaction, but could be applied to a transaction in which certain other types of agreement are concluded between two parties.
  • the buyer may instead be entering into a contract to buy a property, such as a house, from the seller.
  • the buyer authenticator on request by the buyer, provides details of the financial position of the buyer to the seller authenticator together with details of the cost of the property.
  • the seller authenticator checks from these details as to whether the buyer is likely to be able to pay for the property, and sends a simple confirmation or denial message, together with identification of the current transaction, to the seller.
  • the seller can check that the buyer's financial status is sufficient without the buyer having to supply detailed financial status information directly to the seller, which would put the seller in an advantageous position in negotiating the price. Moreover, fraudulent attempts to obtain financial information about the buyer can be prevented, in the same way as access to account information.

Abstract

L'invention concerne un système de transactions électroniques dans lequel un acheteur B lance une transaction d'achat auprès d'un vendeur S qui envoie une offre de vente OS à l'acheteur B par Internet. L'acheteur B envoie, par Internet, ses coordonées de paiement PD à une unité d'authentification de l'acheteur BA qui authentifie l'identité de l'acheteur B et envoie un message d'authentifcation de l'acheteur BAM, par l'intermédiaire d'un réseau sécurisé, à une unité d'authentification du vendeur. A partir du contenu du message d'authentification de l'acheteur BAM, l'unité d'authentification du vendeur SA identifie le vendeur S et envoie le message d'offre de vente OS au vendeur S. Ce dernier vérifie que le message d'offre de vente correspond à l'offre de vente initialement envoyée à l'acheteur, et, le cas échéant, envoie une confirmation d'offre de vente OSC à l'unité d'authentification du vendeur SA, d'où le message est transmis à l'unité d'authentification de l'acheteur BA et de là, à l'acheteur B. L'exécution F de la commande est lancée et le vendeur envoie une confirmation de transaction à l'unité d'authentification du vendeur SA. Le système utilise les unités d'authentification comme intermédiaires afin d'établir un domaine de confiance virtuel entre l'acheteur et le vendeur. Une plus grande sécurité est mise en oeuvre, l'acheteur aussi bien que le vendeur devant confirmer l'existence de la transaction à d'autres parties. L'invention concerne également une modification du système selon laquelle l'unité d'authentification du vendeur calcule les éventuels frais qu'entraîne la livraison de la commande, et obtient l'accord de l'acheteur de payer ces frais avant que ne se poursuive la transaction.
PCT/GB1999/002017 1999-06-28 1999-06-28 Systeme de transactions securise WO2001001361A1 (fr)

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Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/GB1999/002017 WO2001001361A1 (fr) 1999-06-28 1999-06-28 Systeme de transactions securise
AU45228/99A AU4522899A (en) 1999-06-28 1999-06-28 Secure transaction system

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PCT/GB1999/002017 WO2001001361A1 (fr) 1999-06-28 1999-06-28 Systeme de transactions securise

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Cited By (15)

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WO2002073476A1 (fr) * 2001-03-14 2002-09-19 Dna Enabled Pty Ltd Procede et appareil pour applications de verification electronique de contrats et d'identites
WO2002073556A1 (fr) * 2001-03-13 2002-09-19 Servicios Para Medios De Pago, S.A. Procede permettant d'effectuer des achats sur internet garantissant la protection de la confidentialite des donnees fournies par l'utilisateur
EP1329859A1 (fr) * 2002-01-17 2003-07-23 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Procédé de réalisation de paiements dans des réseaux de communication
EP1388797A2 (fr) * 2002-08-08 2004-02-11 Fujitsu Limited Procédé, appareil et cadre pour l'achat de biens et de services
EP1461743A2 (fr) * 2001-11-27 2004-09-29 Pitney Bowes Inc. Procede et systeme d'autorisation d'utilisation d'une carte de transaction
DE10336070A1 (de) * 2003-08-06 2005-01-20 Siemens Ag Verfahren zur sicheren Abwicklung von Zahlungen über ein Datennetz
EP1825432A2 (fr) * 2004-11-04 2007-08-29 Telcordia Technologies, Inc. Systeme et procede de gestion de confiance
US7353382B2 (en) 2002-08-08 2008-04-01 Fujitsu Limited Security framework and protocol for universal pervasive transactions
US7447662B2 (en) 2000-07-10 2008-11-04 Vett (Uk) Limited Transaction processing system
AT504634B1 (de) * 2006-12-04 2008-11-15 Hofstaedter Gernot Dr Verfahren zum transferieren von verschlüsselten nachrichten
US8712918B2 (en) 1999-08-26 2014-04-29 Moneycat Ltd. Electronic currency, electronic wallet therefor and electronic payment systems employing them
US8930694B2 (en) 2012-08-02 2015-01-06 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. Method for the generation of a code, and method and system for the authorization of an operation
CN109559212A (zh) * 2018-11-22 2019-04-02 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司 一种退税处理方法、装置、设备及系统
CN109829722A (zh) * 2019-02-22 2019-05-31 兴唐通信科技有限公司 一种电子支付系统的用户身份实名认证方法

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CN109559212B (zh) * 2018-11-22 2024-01-05 创新先进技术有限公司 一种退税处理方法、装置、设备及系统
CN109829722A (zh) * 2019-02-22 2019-05-31 兴唐通信科技有限公司 一种电子支付系统的用户身份实名认证方法

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