Classifications

• • G—PHYSICS
  • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
  • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
  • G06F7/00—Methods or arrangements for processing data by operating upon the order or content of the data handled
  • G06F7/60—Methods or arrangements for performing computations using a digital non-denominational number representation, i.e. number representation without radix; Computing devices using combinations of denominational and non-denominational quantity representations, e.g. using difunction pulse trains, STEELE computers, phase computers
  • G06F7/72—Methods or arrangements for performing computations using a digital non-denominational number representation, i.e. number representation without radix; Computing devices using combinations of denominational and non-denominational quantity representations, e.g. using difunction pulse trains, STEELE computers, phase computers using residue arithmetic
  • G06F7/723—Modular exponentiation
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/002—Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms
  • H04L9/003—Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms for power analysis, e.g. differential power analysis [DPA] or simple power analysis [SPA]
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
  • H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
  • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
  • G06F2207/00—Indexing scheme relating to methods or arrangements for processing data by operating upon the order or content of the data handled
  • G06F2207/72—Indexing scheme relating to groups G06F7/72 - G06F7/729
  • G06F2207/7219—Countermeasures against side channel or fault attacks
  • G06F2207/7223—Randomisation as countermeasure against side channel attacks
  • G06F2207/7233—Masking, e.g. (A**e)+r mod n
  • G06F2207/7238—Operand masking, i.e. message blinding, e.g. (A+r)**e mod n; k.(P+R)
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
  • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
  • G06F2207/00—Indexing scheme relating to methods or arrangements for processing data by operating upon the order or content of the data handled
  • G06F2207/72—Indexing scheme relating to groups G06F7/72 - G06F7/729
  • G06F2207/7219—Countermeasures against side channel or fault attacks
  • G06F2207/7266—Hardware adaptation, e.g. dual rail logic; calculate add and double simultaneously
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
  • H04L2209/12—Details relating to cryptographic hardware or logic circuitry
  • H04L2209/127—Trusted platform modules [TPM]
• • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
  • Y04—INFORMATION OR COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES HAVING AN IMPACT ON OTHER TECHNOLOGY AREAS
  • Y04S—SYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS
  • Y04S40/00—Systems for electrical power generation, transmission, distribution or end-user application management characterised by the use of communication or information technologies, or communication or information technology specific aspects supporting them
  • Y04S40/20—Information technology specific aspects, e.g. CAD, simulation, modelling, system security

Definitions

• the present invention relates to a method for securing an electronic assembly implementing a cryptographic algorithm which uses a secret key. More specifically, the method aims to achieve a version of the algorithm that is not vulnerable to a certain type of physical attack - called Differential Power Analysis or High -Order Differential Power Analysis - who seek to obtain information on the key secret from the study of the electrical consumption of the electronic assembly during the execution of the calculation.
• the cryptographic algorithms considered here use a secret key to calculate output information as a function of input information; it can be an encryption, decryption or signature or signature verification, authentication or non-repudiation operation. They are constructed in such a way that an attacker, knowing the inputs and the outputs, cannot in practice deduce any information on the secret key itself. We are therefore interested in a broader class than that traditionally designated by the expression secret key algorithms or symmetrical algorithms. In particular, everything described in this patent application also applies to algorithms known as public key or asymmetric algorithms, which in fact have two keys: one public, and the other, private, undisclosed. , the latter being that targeted by the attacks described below.
• DPA Differential Power Analyzes in Anglo-Saxon language
• the DES algorithm takes place in 16 stages called turns, confer figure la.
• an F transformation is performed on 32 bits.
• This transformation F uses eight non-linear transformations of 6 bits on 4 bits, which are each coded in a table called -box-S, confer figure lb, where the boxes S are denoted Si, S 2 , ..., S 9 .
• the DPA attack on the DES can be implemented as follows:
• the object of the present invention is to eliminate the risks of DPA or HO-DPA attacks on electronic or secret or private key cryptography systems.
• Another object of the present invention is therefore a modification of the cryptographic calculation process implemented by the protected electronic cryptography systems so that the aforementioned fundamental hypothesis is no longer verified, namely that no intermediate variable depends on the consumption of an easily accessible subset of the secret or private key, attacks of the DPA or HO-DPA type being thus rendered inoperative.
• the method of securing an electronic assembly implementing a conventional cryptographic calculation process which uses a secret key, object of the present invention is remarkable in that we divide the cryptographic calculation process into several separate calculation parts carried out in parallel and implementing intermediate partial results distinct from those of conventional cryptographic calculation and that we reconstruct the final value, obtained by classical calculation in the absence of division, from separate intermediate partial results.
• conventional cryptographic calculation process is meant any sequential or successive calculation process making it possible to obtain encrypted, deciphered values, signature values, signature verification, authentication and non-repudiation.
• Such a method makes it possible to inhibit attacks of the DPA or HO-DPA type against on-board assemblies or systems provided with cryptographic calculation functions such as microcomputer cards dedicated to electronic money functions, bank card, control card. access or the like.
• FIGS. 1a and 1b relating to the prior art with reference to the DES encryption / decryption process for "Da ta Encryption System”"in Anglo-Saxon language:
• FIG. 3a represents, by way of illustration, a non-limiting mode of implementation of the method which is the subject of the present invention
• FIG. 3b represents, by way of illustrative example, a flow diagram of a particular implementation of the method which is the subject of the invention applied to a nonlinear transformation used in a classical cryptographic calculation process such as DES;
• FIG. 3d represents, by way of illustrative example, a flowchart of another particular implementation of the method which is the subject of the invention, from a secret bijective transformation, applied to a nonlinear transformation used in a process of conventional cryptographic calculation such as DES
• FIG. 3e represents, by way of illustrative example, a flowchart of another particular implementation of the method which is the subject of the invention, from polynomial functions, applied to a nonlinear transformation used in a conventional cryptographic calculation process such as the DES.
• the method which is the subject of the present invention consists, for a conventional cryptographic calculation process which uses a secret Ks, or private key, in modifying the cryptographic calculation process so that the aforementioned fundamental assumption is no longer verified, no intermediate variable calculated no longer depending, in accordance with the method which is the subject of the present invention, on the knowledge of an easily accessible subset of the secret key.
• a conventional cryptographic calculation process which uses a secret Ks, or private key
• v with values in the multiplicative group of Z / nZ, i.e. the set of integers modulo n which have an inverse, also modulo n
• f (v lf . ., v k ) v_ • v 2 • ... • v k mod n
• the new variables v ⁇ f v 2 r . . . , v k are also with values in the multiplicative group of Z / nZ.
• the condition n ° 1 is also manifestly fulfilled, because, for any index i between 1 and k, the considered set of values v x contains all the possible values, and therefore does not depend on v.
• a “translation” of the algorithm is then carried out by replacing each intermediate variable v depending on the input (or output) data by the k variables vv 2 , .. ., v k .
• the following additional condition is imposed on the function f:
• the function f is such that the transformations to be performed on v ⁇ , v 2 , ..., or v k during the calculation, instead of the transformations usually performed on v, can be performed without having to recalculate v.
• the DES the DES
• the first two categories correspond to linear transformations on the bits of the variable v.
• condition n ° 2 is also very easy to satisfy: it suffices to replace the calculation of v ⁇ c by v ⁇ ⁇ c, or v 2 ⁇ c, which ensures condition n ° 2.
• (new) box-S corresponds to the transformation table (v lf v 2 ) -> S (v t ⁇ v 2 ) ⁇ A (v x , v 2 ) which with (v x , v 2 ) associates S ( v x v 2 ) ⁇ A (v lf v 2 ).
• the presence of the random function A guarantees condition n ° l.
• the use of tables also makes it possible to avoid to have to calculate Vi v 2 and, thereby, allows to satisfy condition n ° 2.
• the transformation or conversion tables can be stored in a ROM memory of the microcomputer card when the electronic assembly consists of a microcomputer card.
• a non-linear transformation type calculation step implemented by a conventional cryptographic calculation process such as DES
• the division as shown in FIG. 3b, can be carried out in k parts.
• the first (new) box-S corresponds to the transformation table v 0 -> A (v 0 ) which to v 0 associates A (v 0 ) and the second (new) box-S corresponds to the transformation table v 0 - »S ( ⁇ '1 (v 0 )) ⁇ A (v 0 ) which at v 0 associates S ( ⁇ ' 1 (v 0 )) ⁇ A (v 0 ).
• f (v ' lf v' 2 ) v '.
• the presence of the random function A guarantees condition n ° l.
• FIG. 3d a corresponding calculation step has been shown, of the non-linear transformation type implemented within the framework of the conventional cryptographic calculation process such as DES, as modified in accordance with the method which is the subject of the invention according to the Variant. # 2.
• the non-linear transformations of m bits onto n bits described by conversion tables in which the n output bits are read at an address which is a function of the m bits d 'input
• This partial nonlinear transformation is described and performed by k conversion tables, each of the entries in the conversion tables receiving a value obtained by applying a secret bijective function ⁇ j to the function f (v X / ..., v k ) partial intermediate variables according to the relation ⁇ jof (v ⁇ , ..., v k ), with js [l, k].
• the above-mentioned application ⁇ j of (v ⁇ , ..., v k ) is carried out by direct evaluation of a resulting value, which, applied to the input of the corresponding conversion table 1 to k, makes it possible to read n output bits of the transformation v'i or v ' 2 or ... v' k at an address which is a function of these m input bits .
• the bijective functions ⁇ x to ⁇ k are identical.
• Example 1 A linear jection bijection
• ⁇ (u ⁇ , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 , u 3 , U ⁇ ) (U ⁇ u 2 ⁇ u 4 , u x ⁇ u 2 ⁇ u 4 ⁇ U S , U 2 ⁇ U 3 ⁇ U 5 , U ⁇ u 2 ⁇ u 3 ⁇ u 5 , u 2 ⁇ u 3 ⁇ u 4 ⁇ u 5 , u 3 ⁇ u 4 ⁇ u 6 )
• V 2 , 5 r V 2 , 3 ⁇ V 2 , 4 ⁇ V 2 , 6 V 2 , 5 r V 2 , 3 ⁇ V 2 , 4 ⁇ V 2 , 6 ).
• ⁇ a secret and bijective quadratic function of 6 bits on 6 bits.
• the term "guadratigue" means here that each bit of output value of the function ⁇ is given by a polynomial function of degree two of the 6 input bits, which are identified with 6 elements of the finite field F 2 .
• you can choose the function ⁇ defined by the formula ⁇ (x) t (s (x) 5 ), where s is a secret and bijective linear map of (F 2 ) 6 on L, t is a secret and bijective linear map of L on (F 2 ) 6 , and where L denotes an algebraic extension of degree 6 of the finite field F 2 .
• ⁇ (V ⁇ v 2 ) ⁇ (V ⁇ , VJ ⁇ ⁇ (V, v 2 ) ⁇ ⁇ (v 2 , Vx) ⁇ ⁇ (v 2 , v 2 )
• Variant No. 1 and Variant No. 2 Variant 2 is used, with the same secret bijection ⁇ (from 6 bits to 6 bits) and the same secret random function A (from 6 bits to 6 bits) in the new implementation of each non-linear transformation given in the form of an S-box.
• each non-linear transformation applied to an intermediate variable of the conventional cryptographic calculation process is replaced, in the absence of division, by a partial nonlinear transformation of km bits on kn bits applied to the set of partial intermediate variables v x to v k .
• (kl) n output bits of this transformation are calculated as a polynomial function of the km input bits of the variables v x , v 2 . .. v k according to the relations:
• v ' k _ ⁇ P k - ⁇ (Vi, v 2 , ... v k ), relations in which P-, to P k - ⁇ denote polynomial functions of m bits over n bits.
• n bits v ' k of the output variable are then obtained, for example, by reading a table of non-linear conversion in which these n bits are read at an address which is a function of the km input bits.
• Triple-DES consists of sequentially performing encryption / decryption operations using two secret keys.
• the principle consists in using DES three times in succession to encrypt a message: we start by performing a DES in encryption mode with key n ° l, then a DES in decryption mode with key n ° 2, and finally a DES in encryption mode again with key no.
• the DPA attack is possible in the same way as for the DES: thanks to the consumption measurements carried out on the first round of the first DES, there are 48 bits of the key n ° l, then considering the second round, we finds the remaining 8 bits of key # 1. Knowing the key n ° l, we then know the entries of the second DES, and we can apply the same attack to find the key n ° 2.
• Securing the algorithm can operate exactly as in the case of the simple DES described in the first example above: we use the same function f to perform the "di visi on" of the intermediate variables, and the same transformations of the algorithm.
• RSA is the most famous of the asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. It was developed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1978. For a more detailed description of this algorithm, one can usefully refer to the following documents:
• the RSA algorithm uses an integer n which is the product of two large prime numbers p and g, and an integer e, prime with ppcm (p-1, ql), and such that e ⁇ ⁇ 1 mod ppcm (p-1, ql).
• the integers n and e constitute the public key.
• DPA or HO-DPA attacks also pose a threat to conventional implementations of the RSA algorithm. Indeed, these very often use the principle din of sguare and mul tiply in Anglo-Saxon language to carry out the computation of x d mod n.
• the method which is the subject of the present invention also applies to securing the RSA algorithm.
• k 2
• This function f makes it possible to satisfy condition n ° l.

Landscapes

• Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
• Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
• Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
• General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
• Mathematical Optimization (AREA)
• Computational Mathematics (AREA)
• Signal Processing (AREA)
• Mathematical Analysis (AREA)
• Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
• Pure & Applied Mathematics (AREA)
• Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
• Computing Systems (AREA)
• Mathematical Physics (AREA)
• General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
• Storage Device Security (AREA)
• Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Priority Applications (4)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Publications (1)

Family

ID=35004509

Family Applications (1)

Country Status (9)

Cited By (3)

Families Citing this family (37)

Citations (1)

Family Cites Families (10)

• 1999
  • 1999-02-04 FR FR9901289A patent/FR2789535B1/fr not_active Expired - Fee Related
  • 1999-06-17 US US09/334,687 patent/US6658569B1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
• 2000
  • 2000-02-03 ES ES00902703T patent/ES2344399T3/es not_active Expired - Lifetime
  • 2000-02-03 WO PCT/FR2000/000258 patent/WO2000046953A1/fr not_active Ceased
  • 2000-02-03 AT AT00902703T patent/ATE464714T1/de not_active IP Right Cessation
  • 2000-02-03 JP JP2000597921A patent/JP2002536911A/ja active Pending
  • 2000-02-03 EP EP00902703A patent/EP1068695B1/fr not_active Expired - Lifetime
  • 2000-02-03 DE DE60044168T patent/DE60044168D1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
  • 2000-02-03 PT PT00902703T patent/PT1068695E/pt unknown
• 2009
  • 2009-12-28 JP JP2009297838A patent/JP2010072664A/ja active Pending

Patent Citations (1)

Non-Patent Citations (4)

Also Published As

Similar Documents

Legal Events