WO1999029064A1 - Systeme de communication de securite fonctionnant avec des numeros aleatoires - Google Patents

Systeme de communication de securite fonctionnant avec des numeros aleatoires Download PDF

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Publication number
WO1999029064A1
WO1999029064A1 PCT/US1998/024881 US9824881W WO9929064A1 WO 1999029064 A1 WO1999029064 A1 WO 1999029064A1 US 9824881 W US9824881 W US 9824881W WO 9929064 A1 WO9929064 A1 WO 9929064A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
key
message
encrypted
party
sequence
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US1998/024881
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Hong J. Kim
Original Assignee
Kim Hong J
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Kim Hong J filed Critical Kim Hong J
Priority to AU23056/99A priority Critical patent/AU2305699A/en
Publication of WO1999029064A1 publication Critical patent/WO1999029064A1/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
    • H04L9/0833—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/065—Encryption by serially and continuously modifying data stream elements, e.g. stream cipher systems, RC4, SEAL or A5/3
    • H04L9/0656—Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher
    • H04L9/0662—Pseudorandom key sequence combined element-for-element with data sequence, e.g. one-time-pad [OTP] or Vernam's cipher with particular pseudorandom sequence generator
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash

Definitions

  • the invention relates to encrypting and decrypting data in order to provide a highly secured method of communications .
  • the field of cryptography has advanced from the field of military intelligence into everyday commercial interactions. There is a need for secure transmission of electronic transactions, such as credit card purchases, and for a method of securely transmitting information over publicly accessible electronic channels.
  • the Vernam cipher was developed by Gilbert S. Vernam of American Telephone and Telephone Company and Major Joseph O. Mauborgne of the U.S. Army Signal Corps.
  • the Vernam encryption scheme (also known as the "one-time pad" scheme) requires a key that is at least as long as the message and which is never used to send another message .
  • the Vernam cipher relies on a sequence of random numbers of length at least as large as the length of the message to be sent.
  • the sequence of random numbers which can be a random sequence of "0"s and "l"s to be used with a message coded similarly, is subtracted from or added to the message before it is sent .
  • the receiver decodes the message by adding or subtracting the same random sequence.
  • Vernam cipher Variations of the Vernam cipher have reused long keys or have used systems where the sender and receiver have identical pseudo-random number generators.
  • a pseudo-random number generator generates a series of numbers which statistically appear random but which are actually completely deterministic. Both the receiver and the sender can generate the same key by starting the pseudo-random number generator using the same "seed" value. None of these schemes, however, are completely secure because the keys can be predicted by an eavesdropper.
  • a more prevalent system of exchanging secured information is with the use of public-key cryptosystems .
  • An advantage of public-key encryption systems is that they allow two parties who have not previously communicated to send secured messages.
  • the receiver, A chooses randomly a pair of mutually inverse transformations to be used for encryption and decryption of the message.
  • A then publishes instructions for encryption but does not publish the transformation used for decryption.
  • the transformations are chosen so that it is at least extremely difficult to deduce the transformation used for decryption from that used for encryption.
  • a sender, B would then be able to send a secured message to A by encrypting the message as per the publicly known algorithm and sending it to A. A would then use the unpublished decryption algorithm to retrieve the message .
  • public-key encryption may be applicable for certain uses, especially when the parties have not foreseen a need to communicate, these system have not been shown to be secure .
  • a method of encryption which expands on the Vernam cipher system but which dispenses with the need for the parties to continuously communicate a key by alternative channels.
  • one of the users generates a key, preferably including a series of random numbers, the random numbers preferably being generated using a quantum random number generator as described in Applicant's previous application (serial number 08/876,994), hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety.
  • the key is communicated to all of the other users.
  • the communication channels used to distribute the key may include personal communication, postal mail, or electronic means. Personal communication is the most secure method of communicating the key while electronic transmissions suffer a high degree of risk because the key may be intercepted.
  • a message may be sent between the parties using the sequence of random numbers as an encryption key.
  • a new key is generated.
  • the new key is encrypted using the previous key, or alternatively the previously sent message or a preset encryption sequence, and is communicated to the users .
  • the new encrypted key may be sent along the same transmission channel as was the encrypted message.
  • Each of the users then decrypts the new key using the previous key and stores the new key in place of the previous key so that the new key is used for the next communication. Therefore, any given key is used in sending and/or receiving only one message and is abandoned in favor of a new key without any further need of communication between the parties through alternative channels.
  • users who have not previously interacted to initialize an encryption key may send and receive secured messages through a mediator with whom each of the parties have initialized a communication channel.
  • the invention is applicable to use with the Internet, the world wide web, credit card or debit card transactions, or Pay TV systems, among other uses .
  • the encryption key may be used to encode a passkey.
  • the message itself is a random sequence which, when decrypted by the receiver, is used to access coded information such as debit card balances.
  • the passkey may also allow physical access, i.e. unlocking or opening a door.
  • the key may be used to certify the source of the message.
  • the sender transmits the key to the receiver and the receiver compares the key with a stored key to certify the sender's identity. After the sender is certified by the receiver, further communications without encryption may be undertaken. Additional communications may include passkeys or, alternatively, the certified key may itself act as a passkey, allowing access to information or to allow physical access such as opening doors.
  • An additional feature of the invention is that, because the encryption key is updated after every communication, if a user's key has been intercepted and used by an eavesdropper (such as would be the case with fraudulent credit card transactions) then that user will no longer have access to the system and can promptly notify the mediator or other users of a breach in security.
  • Figure 1 shows schematically communication between several parties.
  • Figure 2 shows schematically communication between several parties using a mediator as a central communications node.
  • Figure 3 shows an apparatus for communicating between two parties.
  • Figure 4A shows a smart card used as a communicator .
  • Figure 4B shows a memory card/magnetic strip card used as a communicator.
  • Figure 1 shows schematically communication between several parties using a distributed network system. Although only parties A, B, C and D are shown, any number of parties greater than two may be linked in accordance with the technique shown in Figure 1.
  • a message sender may selectively choose to whom a particular message is to be sent.
  • Figure 1 also shows a possible eavesdropper E.
  • the message may be represented as a numerical sequence (M lf . . ., M ir . . . M L ) where M A is a number which represents the ith character of the message and L is the length of the message.
  • a particularly useful form for computerized communication is the binary form, a series of "0"s and "l”s.
  • Some applications which use the binary format include the Internet, the world wide web, credit card purchases, debit card purchases, and pay TV, although other applications may use it as well.
  • a message may also include verification or routing information.
  • the verification information may be used to verify the identity of the sender to the receiver. Routing information may be used to determine who the sender chooses to receive the message .
  • the communications channels are initialized by first generating and distributing to all of the parties an encryption key.
  • Figure 1 shows the scenario where party C has the capability of generating a key G while parties A, B and D do not. Therefore, Party C would generate the key and distribute the key to parties A, B and D. Any of the parties, or all of the parties, may have the capability of generating a key G, but at least one of them must have the capability of generating a key G.
  • the communication channel is initialized by any party generating and distributing the key to all of the other parties.
  • Each party stores the encryption key for future use .
  • the key includes a sequence of random numbers, (R l f . . . R N ) .
  • the key may also include further information such as, for example, a choice of encryption/decryption methods.
  • the key generator G is preferably a random number generator.
  • the random number generator may be one of any of the well known types, the preferred random number generator used with this invention is a true random number generator such as the quantum mechanical random number generator of Applicant's previous application (Ser. No. 08/876,994) .
  • the preferred random number generator employs the laws of quantum mechanics in order to generate a true random number sequence which does not repeat . These generators are fast enough to produce a sequence of random numbers of adequate length in an amount of time consistent with the needs of this communication scheme and are relatively independent of external influences.
  • random number generators employ arithmetic methods for generating random numbers which inherently are deterministic and which may, with enough persistence, be shown not to be truly random. At some point in the sequence generated they repeat, thereby compromising the desired nonpredictability of the key sequence .
  • the length of the sequence, N is arbitrary but it is preferred that the length N be chosen to be equal to or greater than the length of the numerical sequence representing the message, L.
  • a sequence length N that is less than the length of the message L will result in a less secure transmission because it is necessary that part of the key be repeated in the encryption process. The part of the encryption key which is repeated potentially compromises the portions of the message encrypted with the repeated key.
  • the sequence of random numbers is also preferably a sequence of "0"s and "l”s.
  • the initial encryption key is preferably communicated to each of the other parties in person.
  • Alternative forms of communicating the initial encryption key include mail or by electronic transmission. In-person communication of the initial key has the advantage of more securely ensuring that the parties receive the key and that potential eavesdroppers do not gain access to the key. Other forms of communication increase the risk that the initial key is intercepted by a potential eavesdropper.
  • any of them may send a secured message to any or all of the others.
  • the message after translation into its corresponding numerical sequence, may be encrypted using the key in a number of ways, but whichever way is chosen must be agreed upon by the parties in advance.
  • the method of encryption may also be communicated between the parties along with the key itself where a code in the key signals a selection from a predetermined set of encryption/decryption methods.
  • One common method of encryption is to add or subtract the random number sequence of the key to the message. This is the well known Vernam cipher.
  • Any operation which convolutes the message with the key can be used to encrypt the message so long as all parties know and agree upon the operation so that the decryption of the message can be accomplished by deconvoluting the message from the key.
  • Possible convolution operations include any mathematical function of the message sequence and the encryption sequence, or any shifting and rearranging of sequence strings in the message and the key such that the resulting encrypted message is a single sequence.
  • the message and the key are both in binary form and the convolution of the message with the key results in an encrypted sequence having the same length as the message.
  • the encrypted message may be of any length sufficient to contain the entire message.
  • the sender of the message encrypts the message and transmits the encrypted message to each of the receiving parties. Not all of the parties may receive the message.
  • one of the parties who is capable of generating a key (C in Figure 1) generates a new key.
  • that party encrypts the new key using the old key and transmits the encrypted new key to all of the parties, the old key being the key previously used to send the message.
  • the new key may be encrypted using the previously transmitted message or a preset encryption sequence previously shared by the parties.
  • Each of the parties then, decrypts the new key using the old key and stores the new key in place of the old key.
  • the new key is then used in future communications and the old key can be abandoned. Alternatively, the old key can be stored as proof of the message.
  • Both the message and the new key are securely transmitted between the parties even though transmission of the encrypted new key requires a repeated use of the old key.
  • an outside party Eavesdropper E in Figure 1
  • Eavesdropper E would not be able to break the code based on the encrypted new key because the new key itself is a sequence of random numbers.
  • Eavesdropper E could break the code, however, if the old key was reused to send a new message or repeated in the transmission of the old message.
  • a new party may be included in the communication scheme of Figure 1 by sharing the current encryption key to the new party and by connecting the new party to the other parties so that the new party can send and receive encrypted messages.
  • Figure 2 shows schematically a communication technique between several parties (A, B, C, and D) where each of the parties has previously initialized a communication channel with a mediator.
  • the parties do not necessarily have an initialized communication channel with each other.
  • the parties may not have previously contemplated the need for communications between them.
  • each party (A, B, C, or D) individually initializes a communication channel with a mediator.
  • the mediator may initialize communications channels with any number of separate parties.
  • the mediator has the capability of generating a key G and communicates a separate key to each of the parties.
  • the mediator does not have the capability of generating a key, each of the parties should have that capability G and then each party communicates a key to the mediator. The latter scenario may be useful if the mediator is a shared member of separate communications networks which utilize this methodology.
  • the mediator If the mediator is not capable of generating a key and not all of the parties have the capability of generating a key G, then the mediator must receive keys from a capable party to distribute to those not capable of generating a key.
  • the mediator stores the encryption key for each party individually in such a way that the key associated with an individual party is easily identifiable to the mediator.
  • the key preferably includes a random number sequence generated from a random number generator.
  • Party A encrypts the message using the key and an encryption method that is shared between party A and the mediator.
  • Party A transmits the encrypted message to the mediator.
  • the mediator decrypts the message and determines from routing information that is transmitted as part of the message which party or parties are to receive the message .
  • the mediator then encrypts the message using the key which is shared with the receiving party, B in this example, and transmits the message to the receiving party.
  • the receiving party retrieves the message by decrypting the message using the key that the receiving party shares with the mediator.
  • the key which is shared with the sending party, A, and the keys that are shared with the receiving parties, B, are then replaced.
  • a new key is generated.
  • the new key is encrypted using the key that is shared between that party and the mediator M.
  • the new key could be encrypted using the message which was previously sent between the party and the mediator.
  • the new key could be encrypted using a preset encryption sequence previously shared between the party and the mediator.
  • the encrypted new key is then transmitted so that both the party and the mediator M share the new key.
  • the encrypted new key is then decrypted and is used to replace the previous key.
  • different parties such as A and B, may securely communicate through a mediator while never themselves sharing a common key.
  • the configuration of Figure 2 is employable to send messages between parties, such as Party A and Party B, even if the parties are members of a network such as Figure 1 if the communications link between them is faulty or non existent.
  • parties A and B in Figure 1 may communicate using party C or D as a mediator.
  • parties A, B, C and D in Figure 1 may themselves each be networks as shown in Figure 1, each of these networks having the mediator as a member.
  • the configuration illustrated in Figure 2 may be particularly employable for secured credit card or debit card purchases over the Internet, world wide web or via telephone lines where the purchaser and vendor have not previously interacted but both use a central credit card service such as mastercard or visa.
  • a transfer of funds from user A to user B may result from A transmitting a different message to the mediator than the mediator finally sends to B.
  • A' s message may include a passkey and account information.
  • the mediator records A' s message, and after approval of the transfer of funds, sends B a confirmation that funds have been credited to B's account from A' s account .
  • the mediator may hold the account information or, alternatively, another user may hold the account information and the mediator must communicate with the third user for approval before sending a confirmation to B.
  • the mediator may communicate with the third party user using the techniques of this invention.
  • Another useful application of the invention is to obtain access to information or initiate an action from another communicating party.
  • the message includes a passkey which may be randomly generated.
  • Other non-encrypted messages may be sent between the sender and receiver in addition to the message which includes the passkey.
  • the use of the system to send passkeys may be particularly useful for debit card account access or simply to unlock or operate doors (e.g., garage doors).
  • the party seeking access encrypts the message including the passkey using the key and transmits the encrypted passkey to the party responsible for granting access.
  • the key is replaced after each use.
  • the granting party decrypts the encrypted passkey and, by comparing the passkey with a stored passkey, either grants or disallows access to the party seeking access.
  • the granting party may grant access to information (such as in a debit card transaction) , transfer funds in response to the remainder of the messages (such as in a credit card transaction or debit card transaction) , or open a door (such as in a garage door opener) .
  • the key may be used to certify the validity of a communication. In the certification embodiment, the key is sent to the receiver and replaced after every transmission.
  • the receiver compares the key with a stored key to certify that communication with that sender is valid.
  • the key itself may act as a passkey such as discussed above or is used to certify that a message originates from a particular sender.
  • a message which may or may not be encrypted, may be sent in the communication.
  • One method of sending the message with the key is to appending the message sequence onto the end of the random number sequence of the key.
  • the message may be sent in a transmission separate from the transmission which includes the key. In either case, the key is used to certify that the message originates from a particular sender .
  • FIG. 3 An apparatus for use with either of the communication configurations shown in Figures 1 and 2 is shown in Figure 3.
  • the apparatus includes at least two communicators and at least one key generator, a communicator being a device for communications.
  • Figure 3 shows Communicator A 100, Communicator B 200 and Key Generator 300.
  • Communicator A 100 includes Data I/O port 110, processor 120, encryption key storage memory 130, message storage memory 140, and system memory 150.
  • Communicator B 200 includes data I/O port 210, processor 220, encryption key storage memory 230, message storage memory 140 and system memory 250.
  • Communicator B 200 also communicates with key generator 300 so that Communicator B 200 has the capability of generating a key (G on Figures 1 and 2) .
  • Each communicator must at least have the ability to store the key, encrypt and decrypt messages, and communicate with other communication devices.
  • Communicator A 100 has a processor 120 which receives and sends messages through data I/O port 110.
  • Data I/O port 110 may include a modem to facilitate communications with other communicators.
  • Processor 120 stores the message in message storage memory 140, reads the key from encryption key storage memory 130, and encrypts or decrypts the message in response to programming instructions stored in the system memory 150.
  • Communicator B 200 reads and writes encryption keys to encryption key storage memory 230, receives and sends messages through data I/O port 210, and reads and writes messages from message storage memory 240 in response to programming instructions stored in system memory 240.
  • Data I/O port 110 and data I/O port 210 must be compatible so that communicator A 100 and communicator B 200 can exchange data through transmission path 400.
  • Transmission path 400 may be telephone lines, Ethernet lines, or other communications path by which different communicators may communicate.
  • Communicator B 200 receives new keys from key generator 300.
  • Key generator 300 generates a key and could be one of the random number generators previously discussed, preferably the quantum mechanical random number generator.
  • Figure 3 shows only two communicators, but the apparatus for carrying out this invention could include any number of separate communicators configured as in Figure 1 or Figure 2.
  • the communicators communicate with all other communicators and in Figure 2 each communicator communicates with a mediator.
  • a communicator which is functioning as a mediator in Figure 2 must additionally be capable of storing a separate key in relation to each of the users of the mediator configuration.
  • a network of communicators as in Figures 1 or 2 may include any number of different communications devices, each device having the capability of storing a key, encrypting and decrypting data, and of communicating with the other communicators or with the mediator through transmission paths 400.
  • the preferred apparatus for use with this invention includes at least one smart card, a communicator acting as a mediator, and a key generator communicating with the mediator.
  • Figure 4A shows a smart card for use with this invention.
  • the smart card 500 is physically convenient to transport, i.e. about credit card size.
  • the smart card 500 includes a processor 520, a data I/O port 510, an encryption key storage memory 530, a system storage memory 550, and a message storage memory 540.
  • Processor 520 is capable of encrypting and decrypting messages, of reading and writing to the encryption key storage memory 530 and the message storage memory 540, and of communicating through data I/O port 510 with another communicator, such as a mediator.
  • the smart card 500 communicates through data I/O port 510 to an intermediate I/O device 560 which communicates with the other communicators of network 700, although smart card 500 may itself be capable of communicating with network 700.
  • smart card 500 also stores account information and account balances. This information is useful if the smart card is used as a debit card.
  • smart card 500 or intermediate I/O device 560 may have external displays and controls so that an outside user may query smart card 500 regarding account information and balances.
  • the intermediate I/O device 560 need have no further features except to facilitate communications with other communicators in network 700.
  • an intermediate I/O device 560 may connect smart card 500 to a phone modem wherein the intermediate I/O device 560 communicates with the smart card 500 through the data I/O port 510 and transmitting to network 700 through a phone modem.
  • Other intermediate I/O devices include computer systems capable of networking with other communicators .
  • At least one communicator in network 700 with smart card 500 must be capable of generating encryption keys .
  • the key generator used in the preferred embodiment is the quantum mechanical random number generator.
  • FIG. 4B shows a storage card communicator 600 having a storage card 630 in communication with card reader 660.
  • Storage card 630 may be a memory card, a card with a magnetic strip, or any other device capable of storing data.
  • Card reader 660 includes a processor 620, a system memory 650, a message memory 640 and a data I/O port 610.
  • the processor 620 read the encryption key from the memory card 630 and encrypts or decrypts messages in response to program instructions stored in the system memory 650.
  • the data I/O port 610 is capable of communicating with other communicators on network 700.
  • Storage card 630 may also store account information and account balances. This information is useful if the storage card is used as a debit card.
  • card reader 660 may have external displays and controls so that an outside user may query account balances stored in the card.
  • Yet another embodiment of the communicator includes a computer, the computer being capable of communicating with all of the other communicators in the network or with a mediator computer. Each computer must be able to store the encryption key and encrypt and decrypt data which it receives. This communicator is useful for Internet communications or for networking communications.
  • each of the computers may be capable of communicating with a device external to the computer, the device being one which stores the key and possibly is also one which encrypts and decrypts the data (such as a smart card or a storage card) .
  • the external device could make the key and possibly the encryption/decryption algorithms inaccessible to the computer.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Electromagnetism (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

Un premier dispositif (100) de communication comprend une mémoire de clés de cryptage (130), une mémoire de messages (140), une mémoire système pour le stockage de programmes (150), un processeur (120) et un dispositif (110) d'entrée/sortie de données. Le premier dispositif de communication communique avec un second dispositif de communications (200) par une voie de transmission (400). Le second dispositif de communication est constitué par une mémoire de clés de cryptage (230), une mémoire de messages (240), une mémoire système pour le stockage de programmes (250), un processeur (220) et un dispositif d'entrée/sortie de données (210). Le processeur (220) du second dispositif de communication (200) reçoit une clé d'un générateur de clés (300) situé hors de ce second dispositif (200) de communication.
PCT/US1998/024881 1997-12-01 1998-11-20 Systeme de communication de securite fonctionnant avec des numeros aleatoires WO1999029064A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
AU23056/99A AU2305699A (en) 1997-12-01 1998-11-20 Secured communications scheme using random numbers

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

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US98057397A 1997-12-01 1997-12-01
US08/980,573 1997-12-01

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Cited By (1)

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EP1152567A2 (fr) * 2000-05-05 2001-11-07 Kryptografics GmbH Procédé de sécurisation de la confidentialité et de garantie contre une écoute illicite lors de la communication entre des réseaux d'ordinateurs

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Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
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EP1152567A2 (fr) * 2000-05-05 2001-11-07 Kryptografics GmbH Procédé de sécurisation de la confidentialité et de garantie contre une écoute illicite lors de la communication entre des réseaux d'ordinateurs
EP1152567A3 (fr) * 2000-05-05 2002-10-02 Kryptografics GmbH Procédé de sécurisation de la confidentialité et de garantie contre une écoute illicite lors de la communication entre des réseaux d'ordinateurs

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