WO1998038407A1 - Dispositif de securite perfectionne pour cartes - Google Patents

Dispositif de securite perfectionne pour cartes Download PDF

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Publication number
WO1998038407A1
WO1998038407A1 PCT/CA1997/000124 CA9700124W WO9838407A1 WO 1998038407 A1 WO1998038407 A1 WO 1998038407A1 CA 9700124 W CA9700124 W CA 9700124W WO 9838407 A1 WO9838407 A1 WO 9838407A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
card
vault
case
disarming
entry
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CA1997/000124
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Brad Fettis
Walter Ii Shawlee
Richard Weisbeck
Scott Ronald Fazackerley
Original Assignee
2001 Concepts International Ltd.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 2001 Concepts International Ltd. filed Critical 2001 Concepts International Ltd.
Priority to PCT/CA1997/000124 priority Critical patent/WO1998038407A1/fr
Priority to AU17621/97A priority patent/AU1762197A/en
Publication of WO1998038407A1 publication Critical patent/WO1998038407A1/fr

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Classifications

    • E—FIXED CONSTRUCTIONS
    • E05—LOCKS; KEYS; WINDOW OR DOOR FITTINGS; SAFES
    • E05G—SAFES OR STRONG-ROOMS FOR VALUABLES; BANK PROTECTION DEVICES; SAFETY TRANSACTION PARTITIONS
    • E05G1/00—Safes or strong-rooms for valuables
    • E05G1/14—Safes or strong-rooms for valuables with means for masking or destroying the valuables, e.g. in case of theft
    • A—HUMAN NECESSITIES
    • A45—HAND OR TRAVELLING ARTICLES
    • A45C—PURSES; LUGGAGE; HAND CARRIED BAGS
    • A45C11/00—Receptacles for purposes not provided for in groups A45C1/00-A45C9/00
    • A45C11/18—Ticket-holders or the like
    • A45C11/182—Credit card holders

Definitions

  • This invention relates to the field of portable vaults or portable lockable security containers, and in particular to portable security containers for cards such as credit cards.
  • Cards which includes cards which may have dimensions typically in the order of 3 3/8 inch x 2 1/8 inch planar rectangular dimensions, and where typically the card may be 1/32 inch thick, are in common use by a large percentage of the population. Commonly, such cards are somewhat flexible and made of plastic so as to be conveniently carried. Such cards are prevalently used to carry information about the user, sometimes on a magnetic stripe along the length of the card, such information including type and quantity of financial credit available to user, coding information to access a user's bank account so as to debit that account, and coded information identifying the bearer of the card as being entitled to access through a controlled access entry.
  • Such cards if stolen, can be used by unscrupulous third parties to the detriment of the owner of the card. Consequently, it is desirable that such cards be contained in a conveniently portable vault where, advantageously, the vault will deter unauthorized access to the cards held within the vault, will render the cards unusable if the vault is forced open, and, further advantageously, where the vault will remind the user to replace the cards into the vault after a timely delay so as to prevent inadvertent loss of the cards, for example, following use in a restaurant.
  • Patent No. 4,480,250 which issued October 30, 1984 to McNeely for a credit card carrier with alarm
  • Patent No.4,652,865 which issued March 24, 1987 to Maharshak for a card holder
  • Patent No. 4,692,745 which issued September 8, 1987 to Simanowitz for a credit card alarm
  • Patent No. 4,717,908 which issued January 5, 1988 to Phillips et al for a credit card case with alarm system
  • Patent No. 4,719,453 which issued January 12, 1988 to Beck et al for a card carrier having an alarm
  • Patent No. 4,721,948 which issued January 26, 1988 to Lin for a wallet with missing-card reminder
  • Patent No. 4,870,405 which issued September 26, 1989 to Fletcher for an object monitoring and alarm device
  • Patent No. 4,890,094 which issued December 26, 1989 to Kopel for a wallet incorporating credit card alarm system
  • Patent No. 4,916,434 which issued April 10, 1990 to McNeely for a credit card carrier with alarm
  • Patent No. 5,053,749 which issued October 1, 1991 to Weiss for a retainer for documents with alarm.
  • the Maharshak and Weiss patents also disclose use of a timer cooperating with the alarm so that the triggering of the alarm may be delayed by a timed interval to allow for a credit card transaction to take place and the card to be reinserted into the receptacle thereby preventing unnecessary triggering of the alarm.
  • a timer cooperating with the alarm so that the triggering of the alarm may be delayed by a timed interval to allow for a credit card transaction to take place and the card to be reinserted into the receptacle thereby preventing unnecessary triggering of the alarm.
  • a personal identification number otherwise known as a PIN code
  • the invention may be described generally as a mechanically closeable and releasably lockable card vault for releasable locking enclosure of cards within the card vault where the cards have information coded on the cards or within the cards and where the information is confidential coded information which is the subject of protection by the present invention.
  • the cards may be credit cards, debit cards, smart cards, security access cards or any other security information carrying card or the like which carry confidential information on or within the card by information carrying means such as magnetic stripes, logic semi-conductor chips or the like.
  • the card vault may have releasable locking means releasable by activation of a code entry and recognition means whereby a vault door on the card vault may be opened upon entry of a predetermined code and recognition of the code by the code entry and recognition means.
  • a destruction means whereby the confidential information on the information carrying means is rendered useless and unrecoverable by being disfigured or destroyed by the destruction means.
  • the destruction means may include electrical burning or fusing by a heated wire or flash means, resistor or like element, or permanent disfigurement by ink or corrosive fluid or by permanent liquid adhesive or the like.
  • mechanical destruction means may be employed to mechanically disfigure or destroy the information carrying means on a card if, once the vault door has been forced open, a card held within the card vault is forcibly removed from the vault.
  • Such mechanical destruction means may include toothed card engagement means releasably engagable onto a card held in the vault by a traction or friction device having means for cutting, embedding or ripping into the card in the manner of a ratchet gear or a barbed device if the card is forcibly removed from the card vault without the toothed engagement means being released from the traction or friction engagement against the card prior to the card being removed.
  • One such means may be a toothed traction wheel selectively biased against a magnetic stripe on a card held within the card vault whereby if the card is forcibly pulled free of the card vault without proper entry and recognition of a code, the teeth on a toothed traction wheel permanently disfigure the magnetic stripe coating thereby rendering the confidential information irretrievably unusable and unrecoverable.
  • the mechanical destruction means may be a "scrape gate" such as a sharp blade selectively releasably biased as by spring-loaded pressure against the information carrying means.
  • the card vault case is adapted to form a Faraday
  • Shield by means of grounding of the enveloping metal vault case.
  • This may include a static drain layer built into the keyboard layer to provide continuous and contiguous grounded shielding around the entire card vault thereby providing the card vault with a defence against electronic assault.
  • the keypad is adapted so that disruption of the keypad to gain forced access to the card vault door will not be successful.
  • the hinge and closing mechanism for the card vault door forms a continuous closed seal around the perimeter of the door to inhibit access between the door and the card vault case with a prying tool.
  • the code entry and recognition means include a code entry keypad cooperating with a programmable controller having an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) to facilitate reprogramming of the code entry and recognition means, for example, up and until the time the card vault of the present invention is sealed for product shipment.
  • EEPROM electrically erasable programmable read-only memory
  • the code entry and recognition means thereby facilitates adjusting predeterminable adjustable variables within the preprogrammed software routines in the EEPROM to allow adjustable tailoring of the active defence of the confidential information on the cards within the card vault, for example, adjusting the time period during which the code entry and recognition means would cause the card vault to go inactive, "sleep" or "lock-down" upon attempted entry of an unrecognized entry code.
  • the destruction means which operates by means of electrical burning or fusing of the information carrying means on the card may include a fuser assembly which may take many different forms as, for example, electro-chemical, electrical or merely a burn-in template for burning in words such as "void" onto the information carrying means on the card.
  • the fuser assembly may be in the form of camera flash bulbs or flash filaments, and may be adapted for fusing predetermined spots on the information carrying means depending on the type of the information carrying means employed by the card intended to be inserted into the card vault. Using the example of the magnetic stripe information carrying means, then selective spots may be fused on the magnetic stripe to selectively disfigure selected information on the magnetic stripe.
  • the destruction means may also include means to electrically damage the information carrying means on logically controlled "smart" cards carried within the card vault or may include magnetic destruction means to destroy, disfigure or otherwise render useless and unreadable a magnetic stripe bearing code information.
  • the card security device of the present invention provides a card case for holding a credit card sized card, where the case has built-in ink, or like permanent marking solution reservoirs and built-in electrical magnetic strip demagnetizing means so that unauthorized removal of a card from the card case will cause the card to be permanently marked by the fluid in the reservoirs and will also cause the magnetic strip on the rear surface of the card to be permanently damaged.
  • Access that is, removal of the card from the case, is governed by entry of a coded password onto an external keypad. Entry of the correct password disarms the circuitry controlling the permanent marking means and magnetic strip demagnetizing means in the card case so as to allow the removal of the card from the case without damaging the card.
  • the permanent marking fluid reservoirs rupture to permanently mark the card.
  • the permanent marking fluid in the reservoirs is released onto the card and the magnetic strip demagnetizing means is activated so as to damage or erase the magnetic strip on the card rendering the card both sufficiently marked so as to alert a teller or clerk manipulating the card during a card transaction, and electrically damaged so that a teller or clerk would be forced to look at the card to ascertain the account number for manual entry into the computerized system maintained by the card issuing institution.
  • the card case is also provided with an alarm which is timed so that after a preset time from authorized removal of the card from the card case, if the card has not been returned to the card case, the alarm is triggered.
  • a card security device has a case for snugly receiving therein a card, sensing means in the case for sensing when the card has been inserted into the case and for sensing when the card is being removed from the case, and for sending a trigger signal as the card is removed from the case via communication means to a marking means for marking the card as the card is removed from the case or a card damaging means for damaging the card as the card is removed from the case.
  • Disarming signal means is provided for receipt of a disarming input from a user and communication of a disarming signal to a disarming means. The disarming means prevents communication of the trigger signal to the marking means for marking the card or the card damaging means for damaging the card upon receipt of the disarming signal as the card is removed from the case.
  • Figure 1 is, in perspective view, the card security device of the present invention.
  • Figure 2 is, in exploded front elevation view, the card security device of Figure 1.
  • Figure 3 a is, in plan view, the interior surface of the upper casing of the card security device of Figure 1.
  • Figure 3b is, in front elevation view, the upper casing of Figure 3a.
  • Figure 3c is, in side elevation view, the upper casing of Figure 3a.
  • Figure 3d is the keypad plate of the card security device of Figure 1.
  • Figure 3e is, in plan view, the card security device of Figure 1.
  • Figure 4a is, in plan view, the interior surface of the lower casing of the card security device of Figure 1.
  • Figure 4b is, in front elevation view, the lower casing of Figure 4a.
  • Figure 4c is, in side elevation view, the lower casing of Figure 4a.
  • Figure 5a is, in front elevation view, the latch mechanism of the card security device of Figure 1.
  • Figure 5b is, in side elevation view, the latch of Figure 5a.
  • Figure 5c is, in plan view, the latch of Figure 5a.
  • Figure 6a is, in front elevation view, the access door of the card security device of Figure 1.
  • Figure 6b is, in side elevation view, the access door of Figure 6a.
  • Figure 6c is, in plan view, the access door of Figure 6a.
  • Figure 7a is, in plan view, an upper card receiving cavity member of the card security device of Figure 1.
  • Figure 7b is, in front elevation view, the upper card receiving cavity member of Figure 7a.
  • Figure 7c is, in side elevation view, the upper card receiving cavity member of Figure 7a.
  • Figure 8a is, in plan view, the lower card receiving cavity member of the card security device of Figure 1.
  • Figure 8b is, in front elevation view, the lower card receiving cavity member of
  • Figure 8c is, in side elevation view, the lower card receiving cavity member of Figure 8a.
  • Figure 9 is, in plan view, the card destruction printed circuit mounting board of the card security device of Figure 1.
  • Figure 10a is, in front elevation view, the card entry bezel of the card security device of Figure 1.
  • Figure 10b is, in plan view, the card entry bezel of Figure 10a.
  • Figure 10c is, in side elevation view, the card entry bezel of Figure 10a.
  • Figure 11 is a front elevation view of an alternative embodiment of the credit card security device of the present invention with a credit card inserted.
  • Figure 12 is a side elevation view of the credit card security device of Figure 11.
  • Figure 13 is a sectional view along line 3-3 in Figure 12.
  • Figure 14 is a schematic diagram of the operation of the credit card security device of the present invention.
  • card security device 10 includes vault casing 12 for rigidly mounting therein the componentry as hereinafter described so as to releasably store cards 14 within vault casing 12.
  • cards 14 are standard credit card sized cards such as described above and vault casing 12 is sufficiently large so as to define therein a cavity 16 into which may be mounted, as better seen in exploded view in Figure 2, between upper vault casing 12a and lower vault casing 12b, a controller printed circuit board 18, a card destruction printed circuit board 20 sandwiched between adjacently mounted upper and lower card receiving cavity members 22 and 24 respectively, where controller printed circuit board 18 and card destruction printed circuit board 20 are each generally planar and mounted in generally parallel spaced apart array sandwiched between upper case 12a and lower case 12b.
  • upper casing 12a may define an aperture on an uppermost generally planar surface 26 into which, or behind which, may be mounted a keypad plate 28 for protrusion therethrough of keypad buttons 30.
  • Keypad buttons 30 are mounted onto controller printed circuit board 18 so as to cooperate therewith.
  • Keypad buttons 30, in one embodiment, are touch sensitive membranes labelled and arranged according to the configuration depicted in Figure 3e.
  • Flanges 22 extend from upper vault casing 12a so as to lockingly mate with corresponding mating apertures 34 in lower vault casing 12b, seen in Figures 4a - 4c.
  • Lower vault casing 12b has flanges 36 for locking mating with upper vault casing 12a.
  • Solenoid 40 when mounted within flanges 38 cooperates with door latch 42, where door latch 42 is better seen in Figures 5a - 5c.
  • Door latch 42 is pivotally mounted within vault casing 12 so that when solenoid 40 is energized, push rod 44 engages push rod engaging member 46 on door latch 42. When push rod 44 pushes against push rod engaging member 46, door latch 42 is rotated in direction A so as to release latch bar 48 from latching engagement with latch bar receiving groove 50 in access door 52.
  • Access door 52 is pivotally mounted in lower vault casing 12b so that when unlatched by rotation of latch 42 in direction A access door 52 may be pivoted in direction B so as to expose card entry bezel 54.
  • Access door 52 is best seen in Figures 6a - 6c.
  • Pivot pins 56 or the like may be mounted in channel 58 so as to protrude from a lower edge of access door 52 so as to pivotally mount in pin receiving apertures
  • Card entry bezel 54 has parallel spaced apart card receiving slots 66 which correspond to generally planar parallel spaced apart card slots 68 formed by the mounting of upper and lower card receiving cavity members 22 and 24 on opposed sides of card destruction printed circuit board 20 as may better be seen in Figures 7a - 7c, which illustrate upper card receiving cavity member 22, and Figures 8a - 8c, which illustrates lower card receiving cavity member 24.
  • card slots 68 are defined by the generally plate-like card receiving cavity members 22 and 24 mounted by mounting flanges 70 to card destruction printed circuit board 20 so as to space apart interior surfaces 72 and 74 respectively of upper and lower card receiving cavity members 22 and 24 from the opposed corresponding surfaces of card destruction printed circuit board 20.
  • receiving slots 66 and card slots 68 are closely aligned and sized to exacting tolerances so that standard credit-card sized cards fit very snugly into cards slots 68 through receiving slots 66.
  • receiving slots 66 and card slots 68 are notched and channelled respectively to allow passage of the raised lettering.
  • notches 66a are depicted (in Figure 10a) on receiving slots 66, it being understood that corresponding longitudinal channels would be formed in upper and lower card receiving cavity members 22 and 24.
  • notches 66a and their corresponding channels would, as depicted, be formed so as not to be adjacent card destruction printed circuit board 20.
  • notches 66a require that card 14 be inserted in only one orientation. Consequently the location of magnetic strip 84 will be known, or at least it will be known that magnetic strip 84 will be adjacent card destruction printed circuit board 20, so that the destruction means 82, 86 or 88 need only be mounted on circuit board 20.
  • card destruction printed circuit board 20 and controller printed control board 18 are mounted in corresponding grooves in the laterally opposed sides of vault casing 12.
  • Upper card receiving cavity member 22 may be adapted to support a battery (not shown) thereon by means of battery enclosure 78.
  • Opposed generally vertical flange members 80 mounted to the upper surface of upper receiving cavity member 22 stabilize controller printed circuit board 18 in spaced apart relation above card destruction printed circuit board 20.
  • card destruction printed circuit board 20 will have mounted therein various defence mechanisms which, when triggered by a coordinating signal from controller printed circuit board 18, will activate so as to render useless one or both of cards 14 held within card slots 68.
  • electrical or magnetic demagnetizing means may be provided on opposed sides of card destruction printed circuit board 20 (although one side is depicted in
  • An electrical destruction means may operate by means of heating as by fusing or heating element 86 which, when heated, will act to render card 14 useless or at least disfigure card 14.
  • friction or traction card destruction means 88 which may take the form of a toothed pr barbed surface which, when actuated or released by a triggering signal from controller printed circuit board 18, will engage the magnetic strip 84 or like information carrying medium on card 14 by selective spring biasing or the like so as to render card 14 useless or at least disfigured.
  • corresponding demagnetizing means 82, fusing or heating element 86, and friction or traction destruction means 88 may also be cooperatively mounted in opposed facing relation on interior surfaces 72 and 74 of card receiving cavity members 22 and 24.
  • status indicators 90 which may be light emitting diodes (LEDs), are mounted so as to visibly disposed adjacent keypad buttons 30.
  • status indicators 90 would operate independently as controlled by controller printed circuit board 18 so as to indicate when vault 12 was in a "locked” mode, indicating that access door 52 was locked shut by latch 42, in an "open” mode indicating that access door 52 was unlatched, "warning" mode indicating that incorrect PIN codes have been entered and that the user is risking activation of one or all of the various card destruction means as controlled by controller printed circuit board 18 so as to trigger card destruction printed circuit board 20, and a “dead” or “killed” mode indicating that the operation of card destruction printed circuit board 20 has been triggered by controller printed circuit board 18 so that any card 14 stored in card slot 68 has been rendered useless or disfigured.
  • a preferred method of operation for activating the defence mechanisms pursuant to the programming of the code entry and recognition means according to the present invention is set out in Table 1, although it will be understood that other warning and destruction protocols may be programmed into the controller printed circuit board microprocessors or EEPROM and still fall within the scope of the present invention.
  • the status indicated by the colour of the various status indicators 90 in the preferred embodiment are set out in Table 2.
  • the "start" button 30a which, when pressed, initiates the various routines governed by controller printed circuit board 18, may also act as a "status” button triggering illumination of status indicators 90 corresponding to the current mode of the device.
  • the enter code button 30b in the preferred embodiment is used to trigger the routine governed by controller printer circuit board 18 which allows for entry of the PIN code.
  • credit card security device 0 112 has outer casing 114 which may be made of plastic, and which may be formed of two halves such as illustrated in Figure 12 as casing components 114a and 1 14b. Casing components 114a and 114b define a planar cavity therebetween for snugly receiving therein conventional credit card 116.
  • Credit card 116 better seen in Figure 13, has a conventional longitudinal magnetic stripe 118, illustrated in dotted outline as extending longitudinally along the back surface of credit card 5 116.
  • Casing 114 has magnetic stripe erasing coils 110 (also shown in dotted outline) incorporated into casing components 114a and 114b, placed so as to place at least one magnetic stripe erasing coil 110 adjacent magnetic stripe 118 on credit card 116 when credit card 116 is inserted into casing 114, no matter in what orientation credit card 116 is inserted.
  • Casing elements 114a and 114b also define therebetween permanent marking fluid reservoirs 122 so that when casing elements 114a and 114b are assembled to form casing 114, reservoirs 122 may contain permanent marking fluid such as ink or marking fluid detectable under infra-red light or other radiation not visible to the human eye (hereinafter collectively referred to as "ink") held within the reservoirs.
  • permanent marking fluid such as ink or marking fluid detectable under infra-red light or other radiation not visible to the human eye
  • ink marking fluid detectable under infra-red light or other radiation not visible to the human eye
  • credit card 116 is permanently marked by the ink so as to visually indicate on credit card 116 that credit card 116 has been obtained by unauthorized access to casing 114.
  • electronically triggered permanent marking fluid reservoir 122a also contains ink or like permanent marking fluid so as to visually mark credit card 116 when 5 reservoir 122a is ruptured upon an electronic trigger.
  • Tamper sensing switch 214 senses unauthorized tampering with casing 114, such as the above described physical deformation, and electronically triggers the rupturing of electronic triggered permanent marking fluid reservoir 122a so as to visually mark credit card 116, and o energizes magnetic stripe erasing coils 110 so as to damage or erase magnetic stripe 118 on credit card 116.
  • a credit card 116 inserted into casing 114 is physically restrained therein by means of nipples 216 and interlock switches 218.
  • Interlock switches 218 are interrogated, or otherwise 5 transmit a signal to electronic control module 220 to indicate to electronic control module 220 when credit card 116 has been inserted into casing 114 and whether credit card 116 has been fully inserted.
  • Interlock switch 218a senses when credit card 116 has been fully inserted into casing 114.
  • Interlock switch 218b also assists in retaining credit card 116 within casing 114.
  • Interlock switch 218c is spaced longitudinally from interlock switch 218b away from credit card 116 when 0 fully inserted into casing 114, and closer to the opening, ie. the credit card removal aperture, in casing 114.
  • Electronic control module 220 magnetic stripe erasing coils 110, and an electronic fuse (not shown) used to rupture electronically triggered permanent marking fluid reservoir 122a, 5 and sensor circuits communicating between electronic control module 220 and interlock switches
  • Batteries 222 may be 1.5 volt DC lithium batteries, permanently installed in casing 114. Batteries 222 are a back-up power source to solar power cell 224.
  • Digital display 226, password entry button 228, conventional calculator function buttons 230, and power button 232 are provided on the front face of casing 114 for interaction between a user and electronic control module 220 as hereinafter described.
  • electronic control module 220 is pre-programmed to recognize a digital password which is known only to the user of credit card security device 112.
  • the first insertion of credit card 116 into casing 114 by a user activates interlock switches 218, so that with credit card 116 fully inserted into casing 114 as indicated by activation of interlock switch 218a, credit card security device 112 is armed and credit card 116 can only be removed without damage by keying in of the correct pre-programmed password.
  • calculator function buttons 230 are used to enter the correct pre-programmed password by the user to gain authorized access to credit card 116 (see Figure 14).
  • power button 230 is depressed so as to power electronic control module 220.
  • Calculator function buttons 230 may be then used in the usual manner.
  • power button 232 is first depressed and then password button 228 is depressed.
  • the pre-programmed password may then be entered by depressing the numeric keys of calculator function buttons 230.
  • the sequence of numerals depressed are displayed on digital display 226.
  • Piezo electric buzzer 234 sounds a single beep to indicate to the user that the password may be entered.
  • password entry button 228 is again depressed and, if the correct pre-programmed password has been entered, Piezo electric buzzer 234 will sound again as three rapid beeps to indicate correct password entry.
  • Electronic control module 220 then disarms credit card security device 112 for period of 15 seconds within which time credit card 116 may be safely removed from casing 114.
  • Piezo electric buzzer 234 sounds again as a beep of 1 second duration to indicate that the password has to be re-entered. Similarly, if the password entered was incorrect, Piezo electric buzzer 234 sounds as a 1 second beep to indicate that the password has to be reentered.
  • Piezo electric buzzer 234 sounds as 3 beeps to indicate to the user to reinsert credit card 116 into casing 114.
  • Piezo electric buzzer 234 again sounds as a further reminder to the user to reinsert credit card 116 into casing 114.
  • credit card security device 112 is deactivated and will not reactivate until reinsertion of credit card 116 into casing 114 so as to activate interlock switches 218. If credit card 116 is reinserted into casing 114 within the pre-programmed sequence governed by electronic control module 220, then credit card security device 112 is once again armed.
  • electronic control module 112 operates to:

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Abstract

L'invention concerne un dispositif de sécurité pour cartes, destiné à des cartes portant ou contenant des informations codées. Ledit dispositif comporte un boîtier de sécurité (12) pour cartes, à fermeture mécanique et à verrouillage libérable, permettant le verrouillage libérable de cartes (14) à l'intérieur du boîtier de sécurité (12) pour cartes, ledit boîtier (12) pouvant être verrouillé libérable au moyen d'un verrou libérable (42), lui-même déblocable par un processeur d'entrée et de reconnaissance de code, de façon à ce que le volet (52) du boîtier de sécurité pour cartes ne s'ouvre que sur entrée d'un code prédéterminé et reconnaissance de clui-ci par le processeur précité. Selon le dispositif de l'invention, si un utilisateur entre, à plusieurs reprises, un code incorrect dans le processeur d'entrée et de reconnaissance de code ou s'il essaie de forcer l'entrée du boîtier de sécurité soit en forçant l'ouverture du volet, soit en cassant l'enveloppe du boîtier, il déclenche, au moyen d'un dispositif de contrôle et de déclenchement monté à l'intérieur de l'enveloppe du boîtier de sécurité, un dispositif de destruction destiné à rendre inutilisables et irrécupérables les informations codées sur le support d'informations, par dégradation ou destruction desdites informations.
PCT/CA1997/000124 1997-02-26 1997-02-26 Dispositif de securite perfectionne pour cartes WO1998038407A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/CA1997/000124 WO1998038407A1 (fr) 1997-02-26 1997-02-26 Dispositif de securite perfectionne pour cartes
AU17621/97A AU1762197A (en) 1997-02-26 1997-02-26 Improved card security device

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/CA1997/000124 WO1998038407A1 (fr) 1997-02-26 1997-02-26 Dispositif de securite perfectionne pour cartes

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WO1998038407A1 true WO1998038407A1 (fr) 1998-09-03

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Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2001020559A1 (fr) * 1999-09-14 2001-03-22 Neopost Inc. Procede et appareil permettant a l'utilisateur de verrouiller un equipement d'impression d'affranchissements securise
WO2001039101A1 (fr) * 1999-11-23 2001-05-31 Nagracard Sa Ensemble mecanique a insertion irreversible
US7150669B2 (en) 2002-03-05 2006-12-19 Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd. Electroluminescent panel and a manufacturing method therefor
US9305190B2 (en) 2010-07-18 2016-04-05 Graeme J. Freedman Anti-tamper device for integrated circuits

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WO1987003400A1 (fr) * 1985-11-20 1987-06-04 Krister Hertzen Dispositif empechant l'usage non autorise de cartes de credit et autres supports de donnees analogues
EP0259534A1 (fr) * 1986-09-05 1988-03-16 Mareels, Marc Etui protecteur de poche
EP0284351A1 (fr) * 1987-03-27 1988-09-28 Cardgard Ltd. Dispositif de sécurité
FR2645318A1 (fr) * 1989-03-28 1990-10-05 Sofirec Ouest Sarl Etui de protection pour supports a piste magnetique
GB2240586A (en) * 1989-12-19 1991-08-07 John Stuart Ashworth Security wallet
GB2241017A (en) * 1990-01-25 1991-08-21 Robin Tucker Card holder
WO1992006611A1 (fr) * 1990-10-23 1992-04-30 Colloc International Ab Boitier de securite
FR2723609A1 (fr) * 1994-08-11 1996-02-16 Philippe Escal Dispositif de protection de documents contenant des informations stockees sous forme de memoire notamment magnetique.

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WO1987003400A1 (fr) * 1985-11-20 1987-06-04 Krister Hertzen Dispositif empechant l'usage non autorise de cartes de credit et autres supports de donnees analogues
EP0259534A1 (fr) * 1986-09-05 1988-03-16 Mareels, Marc Etui protecteur de poche
EP0284351A1 (fr) * 1987-03-27 1988-09-28 Cardgard Ltd. Dispositif de sécurité
FR2645318A1 (fr) * 1989-03-28 1990-10-05 Sofirec Ouest Sarl Etui de protection pour supports a piste magnetique
GB2240586A (en) * 1989-12-19 1991-08-07 John Stuart Ashworth Security wallet
GB2241017A (en) * 1990-01-25 1991-08-21 Robin Tucker Card holder
WO1992006611A1 (fr) * 1990-10-23 1992-04-30 Colloc International Ab Boitier de securite
FR2723609A1 (fr) * 1994-08-11 1996-02-16 Philippe Escal Dispositif de protection de documents contenant des informations stockees sous forme de memoire notamment magnetique.

Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2001020559A1 (fr) * 1999-09-14 2001-03-22 Neopost Inc. Procede et appareil permettant a l'utilisateur de verrouiller un equipement d'impression d'affranchissements securise
WO2001039101A1 (fr) * 1999-11-23 2001-05-31 Nagracard Sa Ensemble mecanique a insertion irreversible
US7150669B2 (en) 2002-03-05 2006-12-19 Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd. Electroluminescent panel and a manufacturing method therefor
US9305190B2 (en) 2010-07-18 2016-04-05 Graeme J. Freedman Anti-tamper device for integrated circuits

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