GB2240586A - Security wallet - Google Patents

Abstract

A security wallet has three power sources incorporated to protect cards, with information contained on magnetic material, which are kept in the wallet and to corrupt that information by electrical charge if access, other than access with a pre-coded personal identification number, is achieved. When either legitimate or trespassory access using the opening of the wallet has taken place, the circuitry within the wallet is returned to its original state upon closure of the wallet.

Description

SECURITY WALLET This invention relates to a security wallet.

The dishonest use of credit cards, debit cards and other cards, which have encoded details held on magnetic material, is rife throughout the world. Such cards are currently unprotected when stolen, other than by the added protection of the use of a personal identification number (P.I.N.J when utilising cash dispensing machines. The security wallet is designed to prevent misuse of lost or stolen cards by corrupting the encoded details by passing an electrical current over the magnetic strips.

Aocoriing to the present invention there is provided a security wallet comprising a folding shallow box, protected from attack by a metal blade by a network open electrid1 circuit drawing power when 'shorted from an internal battery source. The cards to be protected are held in a series of hinged folders, across which a metallic electrical circuit passes internally thus being in close contact with the magnetic material on the enclosed cards. The corruption circuit is switched to a closed state thus corrupting the encoded cards when the protective circuit is completed, the concealed catch is opened, or the wallet is opened after the wrong personal identification number (P.I.N.) has been entered into the trigger mechanism.

The corruption circuit is isolated prior to opening the wallet by the predetermined P.I.N. being entered into the system, thus allowing legitimate access to the cards. The catch, upon closing the wallet, operates one of two circuits to trigger the return of the necessary switches to their original state thereby returning the wallet to its secure mode.

A specific embodiment of the invention will now be described by way of example with reference to the accompanying drawing in which: Figure 1 shows the external features of the wallet.

Figure 2 shows the internal features of the wallet.

Figure 3 indicates the method and extent of the protective circuitry and power source.

Figure 4 shows the corruption circuitry and power source; only one folder being illustrated in the figure.

Figure 5 shows the folders in profile.

Figure 6 shows the internal catch with its trigger mechanism and the protective circuitry.

Figure 7 shows the firing and resetting circuits.

Figure 8 shows the firing circuitry.

Figure 9 shows the resetting circuitry after ligitimate access.

Figure 10 shows the resetting circuitry after corruption by access; other than as a result of shorting of the protective circuit.

Referring to the drawing, the security wallet comprises a solar powered 1 calculator 10 with battery back-up 2 with display panel 5, which converts by use of the mode switch 11 to an electronic entry system, operating as shown in Figures 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, upon entry of a P.I.N., the firing of the entry switch 12 and the opening of the internal catch 9. The wallet has additional security features externally, viz: a safety catch 21 to prevent accidentil opening, an amber LED 7 to indicate low power in battery 2, two red LEDs 6(1) anS 6(2) to indicate low power in batteries 3 & 4 respectively, and a green LED 8 to indicate that the calculator function has been changed to the entry mode.

The protective circuit as shown at Figure 3 comprises a normally open (N/o) circuit which protects the internal areas from attack with blades and protects particularly catch 9. An attack 'shorts' the circuit sending an electrical charge via switch B (Normally Closed N/C) to switch E (N/o) causing switch E to close thereby operating the corruption circuit shown in Figure 4. The electrical charge of the corruption circuit passes through a network of conductive material which crosses internally the folders, Figure 5 refers, held in the wallet by the hinge 20. The charge passes over the magnetic strips on the cards held in the folders causing a corruption of the information retained on the strips. The protective circuit cannot be reset.

The sequence of events, upon opening the wallet, varies as follows: Firstly, when the wallet is opened either without changing to the entry mode or without.entering any P.I.N. after changing to the entry mode 11.

The catch 9 on opening completes an electrical circuit via contact Z, this charge passing through switch B (N/C) and causing switch E (N/o) to close, thus implementing the corruption circuit. It also changes the switch G to the G2 position and on closing the wallet the catch 9 causes the circuit contact Y to be activated via the G2 circuit. This in turn resets switch E to N/O, switch D to N/O or to remain N/o, and switch G to CI from G2.

Secondly, when the wallet is opened following the activation of the mode switch 11, an incorrect P.I.N. entered and the firing of the circuit using the button 12, which cancels the display 5 ofr.the P.I.N. but does not close switches F and C. The opening of catch 9 completes an electrical circuit operating in the same way as outlined in the first sequence and resets upon closing as outlined above.

Thirdly, when legitimate access is obtained, the operator engages switch D (N/O) upon selecting the entry mode 11, the entry of the pre-coded P.I.N. closes switch F (N/O) and thereby arms the firing button 12.

Upon firing, switch (N/o) is closed causing the impulse to open switch B (N/C). Simultaneously the display of the FIN is cancelled.

When the wallet is then opened and the catch 9 makes contact with contact Z the circuit is broken by the open switch B,and the corruption circuit and the link to switch G remain unaffected. When the wallet is again closed aha catch 9 completes a circuit via contact Y and an impulse is passed via switch G in the G1 mode resetting switches B (N/C), C (N/o), F(N/o), and D (N/o).

The in all three instances, upon closing the wallet, the mode select button 11 is cancelled and the calculator returns to its normal function, and all the security circuitry is returned to its original state.

Figure 1 illustrates the outward appearance of the wallet and Figure 2 the internal appearance showing the card holders 17, the cards in situ 18 and the control switch 16 operated by the catch 9 on opening or closing the wallet.

Claims (7)

1. A Security Wallet to corrupt by electrical charge the information held on the magnetic material on credit, debit and other cards held in the wallet, upon trespassory access.

2. A Security Wallet as claimed in Claim 1 wherein circuitry ia provided to protect the wallet from physical attack with metal blades.

A Security Wallet as claimed in Claim 1 or Claim 2, wherein circuitry is provided to allow legitimate access by isolating the corruption circuit upon entry of a correct pre-coded personal identiirication number.

4. A Security Wallet as claimed in any preceding claim, wherein the internal catch resets all the switches to their initial mode during the act of closing the wallet, with the exception of the protection circuit's switch.

5. A Security Wallet as claimed in any preceding claim, wherein the internal catch causes the corruption circuit to operate during the act of opening the wallet unless the correct personal identification number has caused a break between the circuits thus isolating the corruption circuit.

6. A Security Wallet as claimed in any preceding claim, wherein the power for the circuits is provided by three batteries and a solar panel.

7. A Security Wallet as described herein with reference to Figures 1 - 10 of the accompanying drawing.