US9698992B2 - Method for signing electronic documents with an analog-digital signature with additional verification - Google Patents

Method for signing electronic documents with an analog-digital signature with additional verification Download PDF

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US9698992B2
US9698992B2 US14/686,374 US201514686374A US9698992B2 US 9698992 B2 US9698992 B2 US 9698992B2 US 201514686374 A US201514686374 A US 201514686374A US 9698992 B2 US9698992 B2 US 9698992B2
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user
signature
electronic
confirmation
file
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US20150222437A1 (en
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Dmitry Aleksandrovich GERTNER
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OBSHESTVO S OGRANICHENNOJ OTVETSTVENNOSTYU "LABORATORIYA ELANDIS"
Obshestvo S Ogranichennoj Otvetstvennostyu Laboratoriya Elandis
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Obshestvo S Ogranichennoj Otvetstvennostyu Laboratoriya Elandis
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G06F21/36—User authentication by graphic or iconic representation
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity

Definitions

  • the invention pertains to electronic industry, namely paper-free document management technologies and can be used for conversion of primary documentation of companies into electronic form.
  • EDS Electronic Digital Signature algorithms
  • the disadvantages of the electronic digital signature are the requirement of use some media to reliably store the private key (as it is almost impossible to remember an individual private key due to its large size) as well as safekeeping of the media itself and the need to remember the password for the private key.
  • Another problem is the lack of compatibility between different EDS algorithms, software and hardware, which is a significant constraint for a broader application of digital signatures.
  • Another serious problem is a psychological bather for transition to paper-free document management technologies based on EDS.
  • the disadvantage of this method is low reliability.
  • an electronic document is delivered to EDS device from a computing apparatus with pre-installed malicious software (generally known as hacker software)
  • the malicious software can be configured to cause one document to be displayed to the user for signature and a different document actually to be signed.
  • hacker software generally known as hacker software
  • the user can inadvertently sign an electronic document other than the one which is displayed on the screen and which the user believes she or he is actually signing.
  • this prior art method contemplates, rather than inputting the documents for signing from a computer, but rather from auxiliary devices, such as a bar-coder, a scanning device or a digital camera, which is not a user-friendly practice because it requires the electronic document to be printed prior to EDS.
  • a method of signing an electronic document using an Analog-to-Digital (AD) signature is executable at a server.
  • the method comprises: receiving, from an electronic device, via an encrypted connection of a communication network a signature generation request file, the signature generation request file having been generated by the electronic device by executing: generating a private key; receiving the electronic document to be signed; receiving an Analog-to-Digital (AD) information associated with a user of the electronic device; generating a first control sum based on the electronic document and a second control sum based the AD information associated with the user; generating a single numeric sequence based on the first control sum and the second control sum; encrypting the single numeric sequence using the private key to generate a digital signature; generating the signature confirmation file, the signature generation request file containing at least: an electronic address associated with the user, the electronic document to be signed, the AD information associated with the user, and the digital signature; generating a final signature confirmation file; the final signature confirmation file
  • the method further comprises deleting the digital signature.
  • the deleting the digital signature is executed without transmitting, to the electronic address associated with the user, the file containing the digital signature.
  • At least one of: transmitting the final signature confirmation file; receiving, from the user, a confirmation response; and transmitting, to the electronic address associated with the user, the file containing the digital signature, is executed via the encrypted connection.
  • the AD information comprises a dynamic autographic signature of the user.
  • the method further comprises, prior to the receiving the signature generation request file, storing a public key of the electronic device, the electronic device being one of a plurality of trusted electronic devices, and the method further comprising using the public key to verify that the signature generation request file is received from the trusted electronic device.
  • the generating the final signature confirmation file is executed only in response to a positive verification of the trusted electronic device.
  • the electronic device comprises a computer and an ADS device coupled thereto, and wherein the public key is associated with the ADS device.
  • the method further comprises, prior to the receiving the signature generation request file, storing a sample AD information associated with the user, the user being a trusted user, the method further comprising comparing the received AD information with the sample ID information to verify that the signature generation request file is received from the trusted user and wherein the generating the final signature confirmation file is executed only in response to a positive verification of the AD information.
  • the method further comprises, prior to the receiving the signature generation request file, storing a list of electronic addresses of authorized users, the method further comprising checking whether the signature generation request file contains the electronic address that matches an entry in the list of electronic addresses, and wherein the generating the final signature confirmation file is executed only in response to a positive verification of the electronic address.
  • the generating the final signature confirmation request file further comprises generating a random confirmation code, the method further comprising:
  • an electronic device comprising: a processor; a memory coupled to the processor; an input-output module coupled to the processor; a biometry entry module coupled to the processor; the memory storing computer executable instructions, which computer executable instructions when executed, cause the processor to execute: generate a private key; acquire an electronic document to be signed; acquire an electronic address associated with a user of the electronic device; acquire, via the biometry entry module, an AD information associated with the user of the electronic device; generate an Digital signature using the AD information associated with the user; generate a signature generation request file, the signature generation request file containing at least: the electronic address associated with the user, the electronic document to be signed, the AD information associated with the user, and the Digital signature; establish an encrypted connection with a server; transmit, via the encrypted connection, the signature generation request file, the signature generation request file for confirming the Digital signature via the server.
  • the processor is configured to: generate a first control sum based on the electronic document and a second control sum based the AD information associated with the user; generate a single numeric sequence based on the first control sum and the second control sum; encrypt the single numeric sequence using the private key do generate the Digital signature.
  • the electronic device further comprises a protective cover enclosing the processor, the memory, the input-output module and the biometry entry module, the protective cover comprising a sensor coupled to the processor and the memory, the sensor being configure to: detect an un-authorized tempering with the protective cover; transmit a deletion command to the processor, the deletion command for erasing data stored on the memory.
  • the AD information comprises a dynamic autographic signature of the user and wherein the biometry entry module comprises a hand-written information input device.
  • the biometry entry module is coupled to the processor via a wireless connection.
  • the processor is further configured to execute private-public key cryptography.
  • the processor is further configured to: receive from the server a final signature confirmation file; the final signature confirmation file including a hyperlink to the electronic document to be signed and to the AD information associated with the user, both the electronic document to be signed and the AD information associated with the user accessible via the server; in response to the user activating the hyperlink, display on the input-output module at least one of the electronic document and the AD information; acquire, from the user, a confirmation response; transmit the confirmation response to the server; receive a file containing the Digital signature; store, in the memory, the Digital signature.
  • the processor and the biometry entry module are parts of separate physical entities.
  • FIG. 1 depicts a system implemented in accordance with non-limiting embodiments of the present technology.
  • FIG. 2 depicts an example of a print version of a document generated by the system of FIG. 1 .
  • This invention is aimed at providing a new method of e-documents signing using a signature with an additional verification, which will eliminate the above mentioned vulnerability and will allow direct entry of the electronic documents from a computing apparatus to an Analog-to-Digital Signature (ADS) device.
  • ADS Analog-to-Digital Signature
  • the ADS device 1 comprises: a protective housing 2 that contains: a memory data storage 3 , a microprocessor 4 , at least one input and output port 5 , and a device for entering biometric data 6 .
  • Memory data storage 3 contains a private key and computer executable instructions for implementing the algorithms of CRC computation and electronic digital signature.
  • the protective housing 2 contains an anti-tamper switch 7 which is communicatively coupled to the microprocessor 4 and the memory data storage 3 . If the protective housing 2 is damaged, data stores in the memory storage 3 is erased.
  • Microprocessor 4 is linked with the memory data storage 3 by means of a data input and output port 5 (hereinafter referred to as “the port” or “I/O port”) and a biometry data input device 6 that is configured to process data and to output the processed data via the port 5 to a computer 8 .
  • a server 9 which is used as for implementing the method as will be described herein below.
  • the server 9 is configured to execute verification and is connected to a communication network.
  • the computer 8 is linked with server 9 via a communication network.
  • ADS device 1 is connected via port 5 to the computer 8 .
  • the user's email can be entered into the ADS device 1 .
  • the signature confirmation request file is generated by the ADS device 1 .
  • This request includes such information as the user's email, the electronic document, the analogue-digital information about the user and the obtained digital signature.
  • the encrypted connection is established between the ADS device 1 and a server 9 .
  • the server 9 is designed to ensure verification and the signature confirmation file is transmitted to the server 9 .
  • the above mentioned server 9 generates and sends via the communication network to the user's email, a final confirmation file containing a request for confirmation of the signature, the final confirmation file includes the electronic document file and a file with the AD information about user.
  • user can again check documents that was signed and confirm or cancel the signing of the electronic document.
  • the server 9 receives a positive response and the server 9 sends back the file containing the mentioned digital signature to the user's email.
  • the digital signatures will not be sent from the server 9 and will eventually be deleted.
  • Digital signature is also deleted before the set time if the user, during the signature verification process, selects a proposed option “cancel signature”. If the confirmation is received after the set time limit, the confirmation will be ignored.
  • no party will receive the digital signature linking AD information associated with the user with the electronic document being signed and it will be permanently deleted form memory data storage of the server 9 .
  • Biometry data input device 6 is designed for entering AD information about user signing the document.
  • the AD information is actually a biometric data which is unique for each user. Information about dynamic and trajectory of a personal user signature can be used as such biometric data.
  • Hand-written information input device such as a laser marker (Patent Application No. 3013103309/09(004133)) can be used as the biometric data input device 6 for appropriate type of biometry information. Its distinctive feature is that the laser marker as user biometry information input device is linked with the ADS device 1 by a wireless optical communication channel.
  • Port 5 is connected to the computer 8 that is used to generate and/or to save electronic documents for signing. Additionally, part of complex computing operations with of the microprocessor 4 can be performed by microprocessor of the computer 8 .
  • Computer 8 is used to establish a link with communication network, namely with the Internet, to which server 9 is connected, which server 9 is designed for verification of signed electronic documents. Users can access the server 9 via the communication network, namely the Internet, using their terminal devices such as a personal computer (PC), smartphones for signature verification. Users are identified using their unique electronic addresses such as emails. Thus, the user can sign electronic document using one PC to which the ADS device is connected and the signature can be confirmed by any other terminal device such as another PC, smart phone, etc. The ADS device 1 is not needed for confirmation of the signature.
  • PC personal computer
  • Verification in this description means a check, a method of confirmation, a check using additional actions of the user.
  • a user account means an account that contains information required for user identification in case of logging in into the system, information for authorization and accounting. This is a user name and password (or other similar means of authentication, for example, biometry characteristics). Password or its equivalent is saved in the encoded or hashed form (to ensure its security). User account can also record different user statistics in the system: the date of last system logging in, duration of work in the system last time, address of computer used to log in, system usage intensity, total and (or) specific number of certain operations performed in the system and so on.
  • Hyperlink is a part of an electronic document including email that is linked to other element (command, text, header, note, image) in the document, other object (file, catalogue, annex) stored in the local drive or in a computer network, linked to the element of this object. Hyperlink can be added to any element of the electronic document and is usually graphically identified.
  • Identification means procedure of recognition of the subject at its address, namely, using the user's email or a mobile phone number.
  • Server means a computer dedicated and/or specializing for performance of certain service functions.
  • AD signature with additional verification for signing electronic documents can be implemented as follows. User can see an electronic document on the screen of the computer 8 . User ensures that ADS device 1 is connected to the computer 8 and the latter is connected to the communication network such as the Internet to which server 9 is connected. Then the user enters his or her AD information using the biometry data input device 6 . Laser pen can be used as such biometry data input device 6 . User puts his or her personal signature using the laser pen in the selected field on the screen of the computer 8 (in this case dynamic autographic signature contains AD information about the user). This field is generated by the software and can be located on top of the e-document image. A second field can be located near the autographic signature field for the user's email which is unique for each user.
  • Dynamic autographic signature is entered via the biometry data input device 6 as AD information associated with the user. It is digitized using the microprocessor 4 and is stored in the memory data storage 3 . Simultaneously a digitized dynamic autographic signature is delivered via the port 5 to computer 8 and using software it is displayed on the screen of the monitor in the form of trajectory of the electronic signature.
  • the computer 8 software allows for displaying the trajectory on the screen synchronously with the movement of the biometry data input device 6 such as the above-mentioned laser marker. This creates an illusion of drawing on the screen.
  • Email address can be entered separately from the electronic document. Email address can also be retrieved by the software of the computer 8 directly from the electronic document if the email address is located at the end of the text part of the electronic document or the email address is highlighted by special predefined tagging elements—tags. Email address, mobile phone number or any other unique address can be used as an electronic address. If mobile phone number is used as an electronic address, the request file is sent to the mobile phone in the form of SMS.
  • the microprocessor 4 and the software stored in the memory data storage 3 generate a first control sum based on the AD information associated with the user and a second control sum based on the electronic document and the two control sums are used to generate a single numeric sequence and using a private key and the software stored in the memory data storage 3 , the single numeric sequence of the electronic digital signature is generated.
  • a request file is generated for confirmation of the signature, which request file includes the user electronic address, the electronic document, the digitized AD information associated with the user and the generated electronic digital signature.
  • an encrypted connection is established with the server 9 .
  • a conventional cryptographic protocol is used which is based on the exchange of public keys of the ADS device 1 and the server 9 .
  • the public key of the ADS device 1 is stored in the memory data storage of the server 9 for enabling the server 9 to identify the ADS device 1 and to establish the encrypted connection with the authenticated ADS device 1 . Therefore, the public key of the server 9 is also stored in the ADS device 1 .
  • a main private key and a main public key is generated.
  • Main public key is saved on the server 9 and on the ADS devices 1 .
  • Digital certificates of public keys of the ADS device 1 and the server 9 are created using the main private key.
  • the ADS device 1 is identified by the server 9 using these digital certificates.
  • Server 9 is identified by the ADS device 1 using digital certificate of the server 9 . It should be noted that it is necessary to preinstall server software supporting known cryptographic protocols for verification of digital certificates and for establishing encrypted links with the identified ADS device 1 .
  • the ADS device 1 After establishing the encrypted link between the ADS device 1 and the server 9 , the ADS device 1 sends the request file for confirmation of the signature.
  • This confirmation file contains the user electronic address, the obtained electronic document, the digitized AD information associated with the user and the received digital signature.
  • the server 9 retrieves the electronic address of the user, the digital signature from signature confirmation request file.
  • the signature is saved in the memory data storage of the server 9 and the final file requesting confirmation of the signature is generated.
  • This file includes the file of electronic document and file with AD information about user.
  • the final signature confirmation request file is sent via the communication network to the user electronic address.
  • the confirmation waiting time is set. Time range is set in advance.
  • the user's electronic address is an email address
  • the user receives an email containing a hyperlink to the signed electronic document and to the AD information about the user who signed the document. Then, the user opens an html page of the server 9 using the hyperlink where he/she can review the electronic document. If the user confirms the signature by sending a confirmation reply—which can be provided by clicking an html confirmation button—the file containing the digital signature is sent to the electronic address of the user. If, within the predefined time, the user does not send the confirmation or if the user clicks a signature rejection html button, the file containing the digital signature is deleted in the server 9 .
  • At least two private keys of digital signature are generated and saved on the ADS device 1 .
  • the first private key is used for creation of digital signatures for legal electronic documents such as contracts, invoices, certificates, orders, resolutions, etc.
  • the second private key is used for generation of digital signatures of other electronic documents such as receipts, small fines, applications, etc.
  • the private key for generation of the digital signature will be selected in the ADS device 1 using the following procedure: when electronic user address is received via the port 5 for verification, the first private key of digital signature is used for signing and in case of the absence of the electronic user address the second private key of digital signature is used. Therefore, if the electronic document is signed by the second private key the verification via sever 9 can be omitted.
  • the software installed on the computer 8 to which the ADS device 1 is connected can be used for authentication of trusted users by comparison of the AD information associated with the user entered via the biometry data input device 6 with pre-saved samples of AD information of trusted users such as samples of dynamic autographic signatures. Samples of AD information of trusted users can be stored in the databases in the mentioned computer 8 or the server 9 .
  • the ADS device 1 Prior to generating the electronic signature, the ADS device 1 connects to the software and transmits thereto the user electronic address and the AD information just created by the user and entered via the biometry data input device 6 .
  • Software connects to he database with samples of AD information of trusted users and transmits the electronic address of the user.
  • the database contains such electronic address and the sample of the AD information of the user in question
  • the AD information received from the ADS device 1 and the one stored in the database are compared.
  • the authentication is considered to be successful and the first private key of the digital signature is used in the ADS device 1 for signing.
  • the stored database data is encrypted using known data security methods.
  • a list of electronic addresses of trusted users associated with the certain ADS devices 1 is saved on the server 9 .
  • signature confirmation request file is received from the ADS device 1
  • the signature confirmation request file is checked using the public key for any potential restrictions set for accessing this ADS device 1 . If a restriction has been put in place, it is checked whether the received request contains the electronic address of the user included in the mentioned list—if it is so the verification is continued.
  • final signature confirmation request file When final signature confirmation request file is created on the server 9 , a random confirmation code is generated. It is included in the final signature confirmation request file as a hyperlink. Confirmation code is saved in the memory data storage of the server 9 . When the confirmation response is received from the user, the confirmation code is checked and compared with the code saved in the memory data storage of the server 9 . Verification is continued only if the code matches.
  • Final confirmation of the signature is performed by the user using the html page of the server 9 . Hyperlink contained in the final signature confirmation request file is linked with this html page. Html page contains additional elements of the interface such as: a link for downloading the electronic document, a link to the AD information associated with the user signing the document, html buttons for confirmation and rejection of the signature.
  • the server 9 is further configured to execute registration of users.
  • the account and the electronic address of the user are saved on the server 9 .
  • the user is identified using the user electronic address, i.e. the electronic address used as login for identification of the account of the user that is saved in the database of the server 9 .
  • the access to the account can be protected by a password and when the server 9 receives confirmation from the user, an additional authorization of user is performed for final verification of the signature using password and data from user account.
  • servers 9 can be connected to the communication network. This implementation can be useful when a given organization needs, for security reasons or otherwise, their own sever 9 to store samples of the AD information of employees of that given organization. If several servers 9 are used, the user account and electronic address are stored on one of these servers 9 . Routers connected to the communication network are used to determine which server 9 should be used. Software routers installed on each server 9 and hardware routers can be used. Lists of electronic addresses of users are copied on each router with indication of server 9 where the data of indicated user is stored. Additionally, the unique private key of each user is stored on each server 9 . Digital certificates of the servers 9 for their public keys are created using mentioned main private key. These public keys are pairs of respective private keys. Main public key which is a pair of main private key is saved on all ADS devices 1 and software is installed for verification of digital certificates of servers 9 . Only after successful validation of digital certificate of the server 9 , the encrypted connection is established therewith.
  • the account of the given user can contain a sample of the AD information associated with the given user.
  • the sample is transmitted from the ADS devices 1 and saved on the server 9 together with data of the registered user to which the sample of the AD information belongs, namely the sample of the dynamic autographic signature.
  • the sample is additionally signed by the digital signature of the device whose public key or digital certificate is stored in the server 9 in the list of trusted devices.
  • trusted ADS devices 1 can include devices that officially belong to such organizations as notaries, passport offices, certification centres, etc. Signing of the sample of the AD information associated with the user in this case is performed via one of trusted ADS devices 1 and then it is transmitted to the server 9 .
  • samples of the AD information associated with users is stored in server 9 in an encrypted form.
  • Electronic address of the user whose sample is encrypted is used as an encryption key.
  • the electronic addresses in the open form are not saved in the server database, only control sums of the electronic addresses are saved. Control sums are calculated using hash functions and appropriate software.
  • this process is coordinated via the server 9 for users to sign the same electronic document or to enable access to the electronic document signed by different users via the same hyperlink
  • Signed electronic document is saved on the server 9 and a hyperlink to the html page of the server 9 is created.
  • This html page contains a link to the electronic document, files containing data and analogue-digital information associated with the users who sign this electronic document and links to accessible digital signature files, i.e. digital signatures which are confirmed by users.
  • the links to the samples of their AD information namely samples of dynamic autographic signature for other users who sign this electronic document to be able to visually identify the similarity or difference.
  • access rights to this html-page, for example, full access for users for users participating in the signing of this electronic document. These user rights are determined automatically using electronic addresses of users indicated in electronic document. If the hyperlink is used by an external user he/she will see limited amount of information in the html-page, e.g. only the electronic document or electronic document and data of signatories who confirmed their signatures. User who was the first to upload the electronic document to server 9 can manage access rights.
  • a print version of the document is generated that includes the text of this electronic document 10 ( FIG. 2 ) and a 2D code 11 is generated such as QR code that contains information about the hyperlink to the html page on the server 9 and it is included in the print version of the document.
  • QR code a 2D code 11
  • the software can be used for inserting into the print version of the document, a mask 12 of the AD information associated with the user, namely, the image of the user's dynamic autographic signature.
  • a visual element 13 can be inserted in proximity to the 2D code 11 , namely QR code.
  • the visual element 13 can include text, such name and type of ownership of organization that owns the ADS device 1 used to sign this electronic document.

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US14/686,374 2012-10-15 2015-04-14 Method for signing electronic documents with an analog-digital signature with additional verification Expired - Fee Related US9698992B2 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

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RU2012143920 2012-10-15
RU2012143920/08A RU2522024C2 (ru) 2012-10-15 2012-10-15 Способ подписания электронных документов аналого-цифровой подписью с дополнительной верификацией
PCT/RU2013/000901 WO2014062093A1 (fr) 2012-10-15 2013-10-11 Procédé de signature de documents électroniques au moyen d'une signature analogique et numérique, avec vérification supplémentaire

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US20160292804A1 (en) * 2015-03-31 2016-10-06 Konica Minolta, Inc. Computer-readable recording medium, contract creation system, contract verification system, and final cipher creation system
US20200228541A1 (en) * 2019-01-14 2020-07-16 Qatar Foundation For Education, Science And Community Development Methods and systems for verifying the authenticity of a remote service
US20210028944A1 (en) * 2019-07-23 2021-01-28 Christopher Lee Runyan Signature Token System

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