US9419623B2 - Semiconductor component and an operating method for a protective circuit against light attacks - Google Patents

Semiconductor component and an operating method for a protective circuit against light attacks Download PDF

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US9419623B2
US9419623B2 US14/512,686 US201414512686A US9419623B2 US 9419623 B2 US9419623 B2 US 9419623B2 US 201414512686 A US201414512686 A US 201414512686A US 9419623 B2 US9419623 B2 US 9419623B2
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semiconductor component
resistor
component according
semiconductor
well
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US20150028917A1 (en
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Thomas Kuenemund
Dennis Tischendorf
Uwe Weder
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Infineon Technologies AG
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Infineon Technologies AG
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H03—ELECTRONIC CIRCUITRY
    • H03K—PULSE TECHNIQUE
    • H03K19/00—Logic circuits, i.e. having at least two inputs acting on one output; Inverting circuits
    • H03K19/02—Logic circuits, i.e. having at least two inputs acting on one output; Inverting circuits using specified components
    • H03K19/173—Logic circuits, i.e. having at least two inputs acting on one output; Inverting circuits using specified components using elementary logic circuits as components
    • H03K19/177—Logic circuits, i.e. having at least two inputs acting on one output; Inverting circuits using specified components using elementary logic circuits as components arranged in matrix form
    • H03K19/17748—Structural details of configuration resources
    • H03K19/17768—Structural details of configuration resources for security
    • G06F21/558—
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
    • G06F21/75—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information by inhibiting the analysis of circuitry or operation
    • G06F21/755—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information by inhibiting the analysis of circuitry or operation with measures against power attack
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L23/00—Details of semiconductor or other solid state devices
    • H01L23/544—Marks applied to semiconductor devices or parts, e.g. registration marks, alignment structures, wafer maps
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L23/00—Details of semiconductor or other solid state devices
    • H01L23/552—Protection against radiation, e.g. light or electromagnetic waves
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L23/00—Details of semiconductor or other solid state devices
    • H01L23/57—Protection from inspection, reverse engineering or tampering
    • H01L23/573—Protection from inspection, reverse engineering or tampering using passive means
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L27/00—Devices consisting of a plurality of semiconductor or other solid-state components formed in or on a common substrate
    • H01L27/02—Devices consisting of a plurality of semiconductor or other solid-state components formed in or on a common substrate including semiconductor components specially adapted for rectifying, oscillating, amplifying or switching and having potential barriers; including integrated passive circuit elements having potential barriers
    • H01L27/04—Devices consisting of a plurality of semiconductor or other solid-state components formed in or on a common substrate including semiconductor components specially adapted for rectifying, oscillating, amplifying or switching and having potential barriers; including integrated passive circuit elements having potential barriers the substrate being a semiconductor body
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L27/00—Devices consisting of a plurality of semiconductor or other solid-state components formed in or on a common substrate
    • H01L27/14—Devices consisting of a plurality of semiconductor or other solid-state components formed in or on a common substrate including semiconductor components sensitive to infrared radiation, light, electromagnetic radiation of shorter wavelength or corpuscular radiation and specially adapted either for the conversion of the energy of such radiation into electrical energy or for the control of electrical energy by such radiation
    • H01L27/144—Devices controlled by radiation
    • H01L27/1443—Devices controlled by radiation with at least one potential jump or surface barrier
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H02—GENERATION; CONVERSION OR DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRIC POWER
    • H02H—EMERGENCY PROTECTIVE CIRCUIT ARRANGEMENTS
    • H02H1/00—Details of emergency protective circuit arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L21/00—Processes or apparatus adapted for the manufacture or treatment of semiconductor or solid state devices or of parts thereof
    • H01L21/70—Manufacture or treatment of devices consisting of a plurality of solid state components formed in or on a common substrate or of parts thereof; Manufacture of integrated circuit devices or of parts thereof
    • H01L21/71—Manufacture of specific parts of devices defined in group H01L21/70
    • H01L21/76—Making of isolation regions between components
    • H01L21/761—PN junctions
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L2924/00—Indexing scheme for arrangements or methods for connecting or disconnecting semiconductor or solid-state bodies as covered by H01L24/00
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
    • H01L—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES NOT COVERED BY CLASS H10
    • H01L2924/00—Indexing scheme for arrangements or methods for connecting or disconnecting semiconductor or solid-state bodies as covered by H01L24/00
    • H01L2924/0001—Technical content checked by a classifier
    • H01L2924/0002—Not covered by any one of groups H01L24/00, H01L24/00 and H01L2224/00

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a semiconductor component and an operating method for a protective circuit against light attacks.
  • CMOS complementary metal oxide semiconductor
  • CMOS gates contain p-channel transistors arranged in an n-conductively doped well.
  • the n-type wells are fixedly connected to the highest electrical potential provided (supply voltage V DD ).
  • V DD supply voltage
  • the pn junction between the n-conductively doped well and the source-drain regions becomes non-conducting. Defined transistor properties are obtained as a result.
  • this arrangement prevents the well potential from falling below a value at which a so-called latch-up occurs that is to say a transition of the semiconductor component to a low-impedance state that can lead to an electrical short circuit and thus to thermal destruction of the component.
  • Local light attacks are locally highly delimited attacks on a semiconductor component and can be carried out by means of a laser, for example. By means of local light attacks, it is possible to change individual bits in sensitive regions. They generally require the chip housing to be opened and the circuit structure to be exposed. Local light attacks can be detected by means of a dual CPU (central processing unit) arrangement, for example.
  • CPU central processing unit
  • US 2011/0043245 A1 discloses a semiconductor component including a parasitic activation structure for protection against light attacks, wherein the energy limit value for activating the parasitic structure is lower than the energy limit value for changing the status of a storage flip-flop of the semiconductor component.
  • a current limiting circuit limits the current flowing in the semiconductor component.
  • the semiconductor component according to the invention comprises a semiconductor substrate, wherein a doped well having a well terminal and a transistor structure having at least one potential terminal are formed in the semiconductor substrate.
  • a supply potential for example V DD
  • the transistor structure has a parasitic thyristor, which is partly arranged in the doped well, wherein the potential terminal and the well terminal are connected via a resistor.
  • the well is not fixedly connected to the highest electrical potential, rather a resistor is arranged between the well terminal and the potential terminal.
  • the highest electrical potential for example the positive supply voltage V DD
  • V DD the positive supply voltage
  • V DD a negative supply voltage V SS can also be present at the potential terminal.
  • the sensitivity of the parasitic thyristor towards a light attack can be adjusted by means of the value of the resistor.
  • the parasitic thyristor can be adjusted such that it triggers under specific conditions and thus initiates a latch-up or a latch-up preliminary stage.
  • data stored on the semiconductor component can be destroyed or erased.
  • the function of the semiconductor component can be destroyed or the semiconductor component can be thermally damaged or destroyed.
  • the resistor can be embodied in such a way that a light attack triggers the parasitic thyristor before a functional disturbance for external analysis of the circuit construction or for reading out data stored on the semiconductor component is possible.
  • the resistor advantageously has a value of between 50 and 500 ohms.
  • the resistor can be an adjustable resistor, wherein the resistor can be adjusted after the end of the manufacturing process.
  • the sensitivity of the parasitic thyristor to light attacks can be changed by the adjustment of the resistor.
  • the resistor can be a polysilicon resistor or a metal resistor, which can be arranged outside the semiconductor substrate.
  • the resistor is formed in the semiconductor substrate, for example in a doped well and/or in a diffusion region.
  • the resistor can also be a regulable resistor, wherein the semiconductor component is embodied such that the resistor can be regulated in a manner dependent on a physical variable measured in the semiconductor component.
  • a physical variable measured in the semiconductor component By way of example, temperature and/or other ambient conditions and/or an ageing-dictated change of the semiconductor component can be taken into account by means of a regulable resistor.
  • the semiconductor component can furthermore comprise a temperature sensor, wherein the semiconductor component is embodied such that it can regulate the resistor in a manner dependent on a temperature measured by the temperature sensor.
  • the semiconductor component can be a semiconductor component constructed using CMOS technology.
  • the semiconductor component can also comprise a plurality of transistor structures each having a parasitic thyristor.
  • the resistor can be connected to the potential terminals of a plurality of transistor structures.
  • the transistor structures can be a part or the totality of a logic circuit constructed generally with CMOS transistors.
  • the doped well is an n-type well and the electrical potential present at the potential terminal is a positive supply voltage V DD , wherein the potential terminal and the well terminal are connected via the resistor, which can be arranged outside the doped well.
  • the doped well can also be a p-type well and the electrical potential present at the potential terminal can be a negative supply voltage V SS .
  • the semiconductor component can comprise a current limiting circuit, wherein the current limiting circuit can be designed such that the semiconductor component is not damaged when the parasitic thyristor is triggered. Even though the semiconductor component is not damaged by the current limiting, the function of the semiconductor component can be disturbed in such a way that it is no longer possible to read out data stored on the semiconductor component and/or to conduct an external analysis of the circuit construction.
  • the semiconductor component can comprise an alarm circuit, wherein the alarm circuit is designed such that a function of the semiconductor component is blocked at least temporarily when the parasitic thyristor is triggered.
  • the semiconductor component can be blocked such that an undesirable external analysis of the semiconductor component or the data content thereof is prevented.
  • Such function can be enabled by a reset, for example.
  • the semiconductor component according to the invention achieves area-covering protection against light attacks both from the front side and from the rear side (substrate) of the semiconductor component. No further measures are required within the circuit to be protected.
  • the entire circuit integrated into the chip, in particular a complete logic circuit, can be protected.
  • the sensitivity can be preset by the choice of the resistor or by the layer construction of the semiconductor component.
  • the arrangement of the resistor between the potential terminal and the well terminal and utilization of the latch-up effect make it possible to effectively protect the semiconductor component against light and radiation attacks, virtually without increasing the overall area requirement.
  • the arrangement of the resistor between the well terminal and the potential terminal in contrast to other, known solutions against light attacks, consumes no additional current. Even the subsequent implementation of such a resistor into existing logic circuits, designs and IP blocks is possible without high outlay.
  • the semiconductor component comprises a semiconductor substrate having a doped well having a well terminal and a transistor structure arranged at least partly in the well and having at least one potential terminal and having a parasitic thyristor, wherein the potential terminal and the well terminal are connected by a resistor.
  • the parasitic thyristor turns on, as a result of which it is no longer possible to read out data stored on the semiconductor component, or the semiconductor component is functionally disturbed or damaged or destroyed.
  • FIG. 1 shows an exemplary embodiment of a semiconductor component in cross section.
  • FIG. 2 shows an exemplary embodiment of a logic circuit.
  • FIG. 1 shows an exemplary embodiment of a semiconductor component 100 using CMOS technology in cross section.
  • the semiconductor component 100 comprises an n-channel field effect transistor 34 and a p-channel field effect transistor 32 .
  • the two field effect transistors 32 , 34 together form a transistor structure 30 .
  • the n-channel field effect transistor 34 is arranged in a p-doped semiconductor substrate 20 of the semiconductor component 100
  • the p-channel field effect transistor 32 is arranged in an n-doped well 10 formed in the semiconductor substrate 20 .
  • the n-doped well 10 has a well terminal 5 with an n + -doped diffusion region.
  • the p-channel field effect transistor 32 has a potential terminal 35 .
  • a supply voltage V DD is present at the potential terminal 35 .
  • the supply voltage V DD of a semiconductor component 100 can be approximately 1.5 V.
  • the layer construction of the individual dopings of the transistor structure 30 results in a parasitic npn bipolar transistor 44 and a parasitic pnp bipolar transistor 42 .
  • the npn bipolar transistor 44 and the pnp bipolar transistor 42 correspond to a parasitic thyristor 40 in terms of their mutual interconnection.
  • the parasitic thyristor 40 has a lateral npn bipolar transistor 44 and a vertical pnp bipolar transistor 42 .
  • the source-drain regions of the p-channel field effect transistor 32 are the emitter and the n-doped well 10 is the base of the resultant pnp bipolar transistor 42 , while the p-doped semiconductor substrate 20 constitutes the collector.
  • the source-drain regions of the n-channel field effect transistor 34 , the p-doped semiconductor substrate 20 and the n-doped well 10 form the emitter, base and collector of the npn bipolar transistor 44 .
  • the potential terminal 35 and the well terminal 5 are connected to one another via a resistor R.
  • the resistor R as illustrated schematically in this exemplary embodiment is arranged outside the semiconductor substrate 20 or outside the doped well 10 .
  • the sensitivity of the parasitic thyristor 40 towards a light attack can be adjusted by the value of the resistor R.
  • the parasitic thyristor 40 can be adjusted such that it triggers under specific conditions and thus initiates a latch-up or a latch-up preliminary stage.
  • npn bipolar transistor 44 and the pnp bipolar transistor 42 are turned off under normal operating conditions. If, on account of external conditions, for example as a result of a light attack, a voltage drop occurs at one of the two base-emitter diodes of one of the two parasitic bipolar transistors 42 , 44 , then a collector current flows through this bipolar transistor. This collector current produces a voltage drop across the complementary bipolar transistor. If, in the latter as well, the base-emitter voltage is exceeded, both bipolar transistors 42 , 44 are now in the on-state. The consequence is a positive feedback between the two bipolar transistors 42 , 44 , thus giving rise to a permanent low-impedance connection between the supply voltage V DD and ground V SS . This low-impedance connection can then be disconnected only by removal of the supply voltage V DD .
  • latch-up leads to a malfunction of the semiconductor component 100 since the outputs of the field effect transistors 32 , 34 are at a fixed potential and no longer react to changes at the gate terminal.
  • data stored on the semiconductor component 100 can be erased or altered.
  • thermal destruction or melting of the feeding metal tracks or underlying structures of the semiconductor component 100 can occur. Even if the semiconductor component 100 is not damaged by the latch-up or its preliminary stage, the function of the semiconductor component 100 can be lastingly disturbed.
  • FIG. 2 shows a plurality of semiconductor components 100 arranged in the form of a logic circuit 200 .
  • the resistor R is an adjustable or regulable resistor.
  • the resistor R is arranged between the potential terminals 35 of a plurality of transistor structures 30 - 1 , 30 - 2 , . . . 30 - n and the well terminals 5 of the transistor structures 30 - 1 , 30 - 2 , . . . 30 - n .
  • each transistor structure 30 - 1 , 30 - 2 , . . . 30 - n has a parasitic thyristor.
  • the transistor structures 30 - 1 , 30 - 2 , . . . 30 - n are part of a synthesized logic/logic circuit.
  • a positive supply voltage V DD is present at the potential terminals 35 and a voltage V WELL is present at the well terminals 5 .
  • the voltage V WELL at the well terminals 5 is equal to the positive supply voltage V DD .
  • the supply voltage V DD remains constant, while the voltage V WELL decreases by the voltage drop across the resistor R.
  • the sensitivity of the parasitic thyristors of the transistor structures 30 - 1 , 30 - 2 , . . . 30 - n towards a light attack can be adjusted by the value of the resistor R.
  • the parasitic thyristors can be adjusted such that they trigger under specific conditions and thus initiate a latch-up or a latch-up preliminary stage.
  • data stored on the semiconductor components 100 can be destroyed or erased.
  • the function of the semiconductor components 100 can be disturbed or the semiconductor components 100 can be thermally damaged or destroyed.
  • the construction of the logic circuit 200 with the semiconductor components 100 according to the invention makes it possible to effectively protect the entire logic circuit 200 against light or radiation attacks, without additional design measures, sensors or area expenditure.
  • the resistor R is an adjustable resistor
  • the resistor R can be adjusted after the end of the manufacturing process.
  • the sensitivity of the parasitic thyristors to light attacks can be adjusted by the adjustment of the resistor R.
  • the resistor R is a regulable resistor
  • the resistor R can be embodied such that the resistor R can be regulated in a manner dependent on a physical variable measured in the semiconductor component 100 .
  • temperature and/or other ambient conditions and/or an ageing dictated change of the semiconductor component 100 can be taken into account by a regulable resistor R.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Power Engineering (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Condensed Matter Physics & Semiconductors (AREA)
  • Microelectronics & Electronic Packaging (AREA)
  • Mathematical Physics (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
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Abstract

A semiconductor component includes a semiconductor substrate, and a doped well having a well terminal and a transistor structure having at least one potential terminal formed in the semiconductor substrate. The transistor structure has a parasitic thyristor, and is at least partly arranged in the doped well. The potential terminal and the well terminal are connected via a resistor.

Description

PRIORITY CLAIM
This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/450,907 filed on 19 Apr. 2012, which in turn claims priority to German Patent Application No. 10 2011 018 450.3 filed on 21 Apr. 2011, the content of both of said applications incorporated herein by reference in their entirety.
TECHNICAL FIELD
The present invention relates to a semiconductor component and an operating method for a protective circuit against light attacks.
BACKGROUND
Semiconductor components comprising a logic circuit, such as are used in a CPU, for example, are often constructed with CMOS (complementary metal oxide semiconductor) gates. CMOS gates contain p-channel transistors arranged in an n-conductively doped well. The n-type wells are fixedly connected to the highest electrical potential provided (supply voltage VDD). The pn junction between the n-conductively doped well and the source-drain regions becomes non-conducting. Defined transistor properties are obtained as a result. Moreover, this arrangement prevents the well potential from falling below a value at which a so-called latch-up occurs that is to say a transition of the semiconductor component to a low-impedance state that can lead to an electrical short circuit and thus to thermal destruction of the component.
One problem in the case of semiconductor components for security-critical applications is also required safeguarding against light attacks by which functional disturbances of the component can be brought about or an undesirable external analysis of the circuit construction is intended to be made possible. There are already a number of proposals as to how a semiconductor component can be protected against light attacks.
In the case of light attacks, a distinction is made between global light attacks and local light attacks. In the case of global light attacks, the chip is exposed to light or ionizing radiation over a large area. This attack is not restricted to delimited regions. It is known that global light attacks can be detected by light sensors arranged in a scattered manner on the chip.
Local light attacks are locally highly delimited attacks on a semiconductor component and can be carried out by means of a laser, for example. By means of local light attacks, it is possible to change individual bits in sensitive regions. They generally require the chip housing to be opened and the circuit structure to be exposed. Local light attacks can be detected by means of a dual CPU (central processing unit) arrangement, for example.
US 2011/0043245 A1 discloses a semiconductor component including a parasitic activation structure for protection against light attacks, wherein the energy limit value for activating the parasitic structure is lower than the energy limit value for changing the status of a storage flip-flop of the semiconductor component. In this case, a current limiting circuit limits the current flowing in the semiconductor component.
The known measures are not only very complex and make the component considerably more expensive, but, as in the case of the dual CPU arrangement, may also result in an increase in the current consumption/demand and the area requirement. The additional area requirement of the components of a protective circuit readily exceeds the area available for the entire integrated circuit.
SUMMARY
Therefore, it is an object of the present invention to provide a semiconductor component having a cost-effective construction and improved protective properties against local light attacks.
The semiconductor component according to the invention comprises a semiconductor substrate, wherein a doped well having a well terminal and a transistor structure having at least one potential terminal are formed in the semiconductor substrate. A supply potential, for example VDD, can be present at the potential terminal. The transistor structure has a parasitic thyristor, which is partly arranged in the doped well, wherein the potential terminal and the well terminal are connected via a resistor.
According to the invention, unlike what is customary in the prior art, the well is not fixedly connected to the highest electrical potential, rather a resistor is arranged between the well terminal and the potential terminal. As a result of this arrangement, the highest electrical potential, for example the positive supply voltage VDD, can be present at the potential terminal, while, in the case of a light attack, a lower potential, reduced by the voltage drop across the resistor, is present at the well terminal.
Instead of the positive supply voltage VDD a negative supply voltage VSS can also be present at the potential terminal.
The sensitivity of the parasitic thyristor towards a light attack can be adjusted by means of the value of the resistor. The parasitic thyristor can be adjusted such that it triggers under specific conditions and thus initiates a latch-up or a latch-up preliminary stage. As a result of the high currents which flow in the case of a latch-up or a latch-up preliminary stage, data stored on the semiconductor component can be destroyed or erased. Furthermore, the function of the semiconductor component can be destroyed or the semiconductor component can be thermally damaged or destroyed.
The resistor can be embodied in such a way that a light attack triggers the parasitic thyristor before a functional disturbance for external analysis of the circuit construction or for reading out data stored on the semiconductor component is possible. The resistor advantageously has a value of between 50 and 500 ohms.
The resistor can be an adjustable resistor, wherein the resistor can be adjusted after the end of the manufacturing process. The sensitivity of the parasitic thyristor to light attacks can be changed by the adjustment of the resistor.
The resistor can be a polysilicon resistor or a metal resistor, which can be arranged outside the semiconductor substrate.
In a further exemplary embodiment, the resistor is formed in the semiconductor substrate, for example in a doped well and/or in a diffusion region.
The resistor can also be a regulable resistor, wherein the semiconductor component is embodied such that the resistor can be regulated in a manner dependent on a physical variable measured in the semiconductor component. By way of example, temperature and/or other ambient conditions and/or an ageing-dictated change of the semiconductor component can be taken into account by means of a regulable resistor.
The semiconductor component can furthermore comprise a temperature sensor, wherein the semiconductor component is embodied such that it can regulate the resistor in a manner dependent on a temperature measured by the temperature sensor.
The semiconductor component can be a semiconductor component constructed using CMOS technology. The semiconductor component can also comprise a plurality of transistor structures each having a parasitic thyristor.
In a further exemplary embodiment, the resistor can be connected to the potential terminals of a plurality of transistor structures. In this case, the transistor structures can be a part or the totality of a logic circuit constructed generally with CMOS transistors.
In one exemplary embodiment, the doped well is an n-type well and the electrical potential present at the potential terminal is a positive supply voltage VDD, wherein the potential terminal and the well terminal are connected via the resistor, which can be arranged outside the doped well. However, the doped well can also be a p-type well and the electrical potential present at the potential terminal can be a negative supply voltage VSS.
Furthermore, the semiconductor component can comprise a current limiting circuit, wherein the current limiting circuit can be designed such that the semiconductor component is not damaged when the parasitic thyristor is triggered. Even though the semiconductor component is not damaged by the current limiting, the function of the semiconductor component can be disturbed in such a way that it is no longer possible to read out data stored on the semiconductor component and/or to conduct an external analysis of the circuit construction.
Furthermore, the semiconductor component can comprise an alarm circuit, wherein the alarm circuit is designed such that a function of the semiconductor component is blocked at least temporarily when the parasitic thyristor is triggered. The semiconductor component can be blocked such that an undesirable external analysis of the semiconductor component or the data content thereof is prevented. Such function can be enabled by a reset, for example.
The semiconductor component according to the invention achieves area-covering protection against light attacks both from the front side and from the rear side (substrate) of the semiconductor component. No further measures are required within the circuit to be protected. The entire circuit integrated into the chip, in particular a complete logic circuit, can be protected. The sensitivity can be preset by the choice of the resistor or by the layer construction of the semiconductor component.
The arrangement of the resistor between the potential terminal and the well terminal and utilization of the latch-up effect make it possible to effectively protect the semiconductor component against light and radiation attacks, virtually without increasing the overall area requirement. Moreover, the arrangement of the resistor between the well terminal and the potential terminal, in contrast to other, known solutions against light attacks, consumes no additional current. Even the subsequent implementation of such a resistor into existing logic circuits, designs and IP blocks is possible without high outlay.
An operating method for a protective circuit and a semiconductor component enables the semiconductor component to be effectively protected against light attacks. In this case, the semiconductor component comprises a semiconductor substrate having a doped well having a well terminal and a transistor structure arranged at least partly in the well and having at least one potential terminal and having a parasitic thyristor, wherein the potential terminal and the well terminal are connected by a resistor. Upon exposure to light or radiation, the parasitic thyristor turns on, as a result of which it is no longer possible to read out data stored on the semiconductor component, or the semiconductor component is functionally disturbed or damaged or destroyed.
Those skilled in the art will recognize additional features and advantages upon reading the following detailed description, and upon viewing the accompanying drawings.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
Exemplary embodiments of the semiconductor component are described in more detail below with reference to the accompanying Figures. The drawings serve to illustrate the basic principle, so that only aspects necessary for understanding the basic principle are illustrated. The drawings are not to scale. In the drawings the same reference characters denote like features.
FIG. 1 shows an exemplary embodiment of a semiconductor component in cross section.
FIG. 2 shows an exemplary embodiment of a logic circuit.
 DETAILED DESCRIPTION
FIG. 1 shows an exemplary embodiment of a semiconductor component 100 using CMOS technology in cross section. The semiconductor component 100 comprises an n-channel field effect transistor 34 and a p-channel field effect transistor 32. The two field effect transistors 32, 34 together form a transistor structure 30. While the n-channel field effect transistor 34 is arranged in a p-doped semiconductor substrate 20 of the semiconductor component 100, the p-channel field effect transistor 32 is arranged in an n-doped well 10 formed in the semiconductor substrate 20. The n-doped well 10 has a well terminal 5 with an n+-doped diffusion region. The p-channel field effect transistor 32 has a potential terminal 35. A supply voltage VDD is present at the potential terminal 35. The supply voltage VDD of a semiconductor component 100 can be approximately 1.5 V.
The layer construction of the individual dopings of the transistor structure 30 results in a parasitic npn bipolar transistor 44 and a parasitic pnp bipolar transistor 42. The npn bipolar transistor 44 and the pnp bipolar transistor 42 correspond to a parasitic thyristor 40 in terms of their mutual interconnection.
The parasitic thyristor 40 has a lateral npn bipolar transistor 44 and a vertical pnp bipolar transistor 42. The source-drain regions of the p-channel field effect transistor 32 are the emitter and the n-doped well 10 is the base of the resultant pnp bipolar transistor 42, while the p-doped semiconductor substrate 20 constitutes the collector. Correspondingly, the source-drain regions of the n-channel field effect transistor 34, the p-doped semiconductor substrate 20 and the n-doped well 10 form the emitter, base and collector of the npn bipolar transistor 44. The potential terminal 35 and the well terminal 5 are connected to one another via a resistor R. The resistor R, as illustrated schematically in this exemplary embodiment is arranged outside the semiconductor substrate 20 or outside the doped well 10. The sensitivity of the parasitic thyristor 40 towards a light attack can be adjusted by the value of the resistor R. The parasitic thyristor 40 can be adjusted such that it triggers under specific conditions and thus initiates a latch-up or a latch-up preliminary stage.
The npn bipolar transistor 44 and the pnp bipolar transistor 42 are turned off under normal operating conditions. If, on account of external conditions, for example as a result of a light attack, a voltage drop occurs at one of the two base-emitter diodes of one of the two parasitic bipolar transistors 42, 44, then a collector current flows through this bipolar transistor. This collector current produces a voltage drop across the complementary bipolar transistor. If, in the latter as well, the base-emitter voltage is exceeded, both bipolar transistors 42, 44 are now in the on-state. The consequence is a positive feedback between the two bipolar transistors 42, 44, thus giving rise to a permanent low-impedance connection between the supply voltage VDD and ground VSS. This low-impedance connection can then be disconnected only by removal of the supply voltage VDD.
If the current supply of one of the two parasitic bipolar transistors 42, 44 is high enough, then the arrangement remains in an active state even after the disappearance of the currents injected, for example by a light attack. This state is called latch-up or latching state. The latch-up leads to a malfunction of the semiconductor component 100 since the outputs of the field effect transistors 32, 34 are at a fixed potential and no longer react to changes at the gate terminal. As a result of the high currents flowing during a latch-up or a latch-up preliminary stage, data stored on the semiconductor component 100 can be erased or altered. In the case of very high currents, thermal destruction or melting of the feeding metal tracks or underlying structures of the semiconductor component 100 can occur. Even if the semiconductor component 100 is not damaged by the latch-up or its preliminary stage, the function of the semiconductor component 100 can be lastingly disturbed.
FIG. 2 shows a plurality of semiconductor components 100 arranged in the form of a logic circuit 200. In this exemplary embodiment, the resistor R is an adjustable or regulable resistor. The resistor R is arranged between the potential terminals 35 of a plurality of transistor structures 30-1, 30-2, . . . 30-n and the well terminals 5 of the transistor structures 30-1, 30-2, . . . 30-n. In this case, each transistor structure 30-1, 30-2, . . . 30-n has a parasitic thyristor. In this case, the transistor structures 30-1, 30-2, . . . 30-n are part of a synthesized logic/logic circuit.
A positive supply voltage VDD is present at the potential terminals 35 and a voltage VWELL is present at the well terminals 5. In the normal operating state, the voltage VWELL at the well terminals 5 is equal to the positive supply voltage VDD. In the case of a light attack, the supply voltage VDD remains constant, while the voltage VWELL decreases by the voltage drop across the resistor R.
The sensitivity of the parasitic thyristors of the transistor structures 30-1, 30-2, . . . 30-n towards a light attack can be adjusted by the value of the resistor R. The parasitic thyristors can be adjusted such that they trigger under specific conditions and thus initiate a latch-up or a latch-up preliminary stage. As a result of the high currents which flow during a latch-up or a latch-up preliminary stage, data stored on the semiconductor components 100 can be destroyed or erased. Furthermore, the function of the semiconductor components 100 can be disturbed or the semiconductor components 100 can be thermally damaged or destroyed.
The construction of the logic circuit 200 with the semiconductor components 100 according to the invention makes it possible to effectively protect the entire logic circuit 200 against light or radiation attacks, without additional design measures, sensors or area expenditure.
If the resistor R is an adjustable resistor, the resistor R can be adjusted after the end of the manufacturing process. By way of example, the sensitivity of the parasitic thyristors to light attacks can be adjusted by the adjustment of the resistor R.
If the resistor R is a regulable resistor, then the resistor R can be embodied such that the resistor R can be regulated in a manner dependent on a physical variable measured in the semiconductor component 100. By way of example, temperature and/or other ambient conditions and/or an ageing dictated change of the semiconductor component 100 can be taken into account by a regulable resistor R.
Spatially relative terms such as “under”, “below”, “lower”, “over”, “upper” and the like, are used for ease of description to explain the positioning of one element relative to a second element. These terms are intended to encompass different orientations of the device in addition to different orientations than those depicted in the figures. Further, terms such as “first”, “second”, and the like, are also used to describe various elements, regions, sections, etc. and are also not intended to be limiting. Like terms refer to like elements throughout the description.
As used herein, the terms “having”, “containing”, “including”, “comprising” and the like are open ended terms that indicate the presence of stated elements or features, but do not preclude additional elements or features. The articles “a”, “an” and “the” are intended to include the plural as well as the singular, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.
With the above range of variations and applications in mind, it should be understood that the present invention is not limited by the foregoing description, nor is it limited by the accompanying drawings. Instead, the present invention is limited only by the following claims and their legal equivalents.

Claims (17)

What is claimed is:
1. A semiconductor component, comprising:
a semiconductor substrate;
a doped well formed in the semiconductor substrate, the doped well having a well terminal;
a transistor structure formed in the semiconductor substrate, the transistor structure having a potential terminal and a parasitic thyristor partly arranged in the doped well; and
a resistor connecting the potential terminal and the well terminal,
wherein the parasitic thyristor is configured to initiate a latch-up or latch-up preliminary stage responsive to a light attack on the semiconductor component,
wherein data stored on the semiconductor component and/or a function of the semiconductor component is disturbed or destroyed in the latch-up or latch-up preliminary stage.
2. A semiconductor component according to claim 1, wherein the resistor is operable such that that a light attack turns on the parasitic thyristor.
3. A semiconductor component according to claim 1, wherein the resistor is arranged outside the doped well.
4. A semiconductor component according to claim 3, wherein the resistor is a polysilicon resistor or a metal resistor.
5. A semiconductor component according to claim 1, wherein the resistor is arranged outside the semiconductor substrate.
6. A semiconductor component according to claim 5, wherein the resistor is a polysilicon resistor or a metal resistor.
7. A semiconductor component according to claim 1, wherein the resistor is formed in the semiconductor substrate, in a doped well and/or in a diffusion region.
8. A semiconductor component according to claim 1, wherein the resistor is an adjustable resistor and the semiconductor component is operable such that the sensitivity of the parasitic thyristor to light attacks is adjustable by an adjustment of the resistor.
9. A semiconductor component according to claim 1, wherein the resistor is a regulable resistor and the semiconductor component is operable to regulate the resistor based on a physical variable measured in the semiconductor component.
10. A semiconductor component according to claim 1, wherein the semiconductor component is a CMOS semiconductor component.
11. A semiconductor component according to claim 1, wherein the semiconductor component comprises a plurality of transistor structures each having a parasitic thyristor.
12. A semiconductor component according to claim 11, wherein the resistor is connected to the potential terminals of the plurality of transistor structures.
13. A semiconductor component according to claim 1, wherein the doped well is an n-type well and the electrical potential present at the potential terminal is a positive supply voltage.
14. A semiconductor component according to claim 1, wherein the semiconductor component comprises a logic circuit and the transistor structure is a part of the logic circuit.
15. A semiconductor component according to claim 1, further comprising a current limiting circuit operable to protect the semiconductor component against damage when the parasitic thyristor is triggered.
16. A semiconductor component according to claim 1, wherein the sensitivity of the parasitic thyristor to light attacks is a function of the resistance of the resistor.
17. A semiconductor component according to claim 1, wherein the sensitivity of the parasitic thyristor to light attacks is a function of a layer construction of the semiconductor component.
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