US8930710B2 - Using a manifest to record presence of valid software and calibration - Google Patents
Using a manifest to record presence of valid software and calibration Download PDFInfo
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- US8930710B2 US8930710B2 US13/557,060 US201213557060A US8930710B2 US 8930710 B2 US8930710 B2 US 8930710B2 US 201213557060 A US201213557060 A US 201213557060A US 8930710 B2 US8930710 B2 US 8930710B2
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- 230000015654 memory Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 158
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 41
- 229910003460 diamond Inorganic materials 0.000 description 7
- 239000010432 diamond Substances 0.000 description 7
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 7
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 5
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 4
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000008672 reprogramming Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000013459 approach Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000006399 behavior Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000000638 solvent extraction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000010200 validation analysis Methods 0.000 description 1
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/22—Detection or location of defective computer hardware by testing during standby operation or during idle time, e.g. start-up testing
- G06F11/26—Functional testing
- G06F11/261—Functional testing by simulating additional hardware, e.g. fault simulation
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
- G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
- G05B19/00—Programme-control systems
- G05B19/02—Programme-control systems electric
- G05B19/04—Programme control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers
- G05B19/042—Programme control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers using digital processors
- G05B19/0426—Programming the control sequence
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
- G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
- G05B19/00—Programme-control systems
- G05B19/02—Programme-control systems electric
- G05B19/04—Programme control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers
- G05B19/042—Programme control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers using digital processors
- G05B19/0428—Safety, monitoring
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/22—Detection or location of defective computer hardware by testing during standby operation or during idle time, e.g. start-up testing
- G06F11/26—Functional testing
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/51—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems at application loading time, e.g. accepting, rejecting, starting or inhibiting executable software based on integrity or source reliability
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
- G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
- G05B2219/00—Program-control systems
- G05B2219/20—Pc systems
- G05B2219/24—Pc safety
- G05B2219/24034—Model checker, to verify and debug control software
Definitions
- This invention relates generally to a system and method for determining that operating software and/or calibration files are present and valid after a bootloader flashes the files into the memory of a controller before allowing the operating software to execute in the controller and, more particularly, to a system and method for determining that operating software and/or calibration files are present and valid after a bootloader flashes the files into the memory of a vehicle electronic control unit (ECU) before allowing the operating software to execute in the ECU, where the method includes creating a programming manifest at the beginning of a memory segment for both the operating software and the calibration files that identifies that all of the programmable parts in the software and calibration memory segments are valid.
- ECU vehicle electronic control unit
- ECUs electronice control units
- controllers that control the operation of vehicle systems, such as the powertrain, climate control system, infotainment system, body systems, chassis systems, and others.
- vehicle systems such as the powertrain, climate control system, infotainment system, body systems, chassis systems, and others.
- Such controllers require special purpose-designed software in order to perform the control functions.
- software that is not properly validated, or worse, maliciously-designed, in a vehicle controller include unintended behavior of the vehicle or its systems, loss of anti-theft features on the vehicle, potential tampering with components such as the odometer, and loss of other vehicle features and functions.
- asymmetric key cryptography uses digital signatures for authenticating files that are programmed into controllers.
- asymmetric key cryptography uses a pair of mathematically-related keys, known as a private key and a public key, to encrypt and decrypt a message.
- a signer uses his private key, which is known only to himself, to encrypt a message.
- the digital signature can later be decrypted by another party using the public key, which is paired to the signer's private key.
- Flashing is a well known process for uploading software, calibration files and other applications into the memory of a vehicle ECU or other programmable device.
- a bootloader is an embedded software program loaded in the memory of the ECU that provides an interface between the ECU and a programming device that is flashing the software.
- the bootloader flashes the operating software and calibration files into the ECU memory, where the operating software provides the software that causes the various vehicle functions to operate in conjunction with each other and the calibration files are the various vehicle configuration and tuning parameters, such as binary switches, thresholds, etc., for the particular vehicle systems.
- the bootloader typically employs asymmetric key cryptography and stores a public key that must be used to decode a digital signature transferred by the programming device before uploading to or reflashing of the ECU is allowed to prevent malicious software or calibration files from being uploaded into the ECU.
- the bootloader can determine that the operating software and/or calibration files are present and valid by checking for the occurrence of specific digital patterns, known as a “presence pattern” within software and/or calibration file memory blocks.
- a prefix pattern a digital pattern within software and/or calibration file memory blocks.
- the bootloader has to “know” where the presence patterns are located, even if the patterns can be moved in fixed memory increments.
- software and calibration re-partitioning may render the bootloader incompatible with the software and calibration files stored in the memory.
- the presence patterns are included in the software and calibration files, the patterns exist before the integrity check is performed.
- a system and method for verifying that operating software and/or calibration files are present and valid after a bootloader flashes the files into the memory on a vehicle ECU before allowing the operating software to execute.
- the ECU memory defines a memory segment for each of the operating software and the calibration files.
- a software manifest is provided in a memory slot before the operating software segment in the ECU memory.
- a calibration manifest is provided in a memory slot before the calibration segment in the ECU memory.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a system showing the operation of digital signature verification process
- FIG. 2 is a flow chart diagram showing a process for identifying if operating software and calibration parts are present and valid in an ECU memory to allow a bootloader to execute the operating software;
- FIG. 3 is a representation of a memory in the ECU showing programming manifests including flags that identify that the software and calibration files are present and valid;
- FIG. 4 is another representation of a memory in the ECU showing programming manifests including flags that identify that the software and calibration files are present and valid.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram 10 of a known method for using asymmetric key digital signatures for authenticating files that are programmed into controllers.
- asymmetric key cryptography uses a pair of mathematically-related keys known as a private key and a public key to encrypt and decrypt a message.
- a signer uses his private key, which is known only to himself, to encrypt a file or message.
- the digital signature can later be decrypted by another party using the public key, which is paired to the signer's private key to authenticate a file or message.
- a content file 14 is provided, where the content file 14 could be a piece of software, a calibration file, or other “soft-part” content to be used in a controller.
- a hash calculation is performed on the content file 14 to produce a hash value 16 .
- the hash value 16 is then encrypted with the signer's private key to produce a digital signature 18 , where the digital signature 18 is only good for that particular content file 14 .
- the digital signature 18 and the content file 14 are then used in a verifying step 20 , which would be performed by the bootloader in the ECU in the application being discussed herein.
- the digital signature 18 is decrypted using the signer's public key to produce a hash value 22 .
- a hash calculation is performed on the content file 14 by the verifier to produce a calculated hash value 24 .
- the decrypted hash value 22 is compared to the calculated hash value 24 . If the decrypted hash value 22 matches the calculated hash value 24 , then a valid determination at oval 28 is issued, and the content file 14 is used. If the decrypted hash value 22 does not match the calculated hash value 24 , then an invalid determination at oval 30 is issued, and the content file 14 is not used.
- the present invention proposes a technique for validating that an operating software has been properly flashed into the memory of a vehicle ECU using a bootloader.
- the technique allocates a predetermined memory space at a first software flash section in a memory segment for the software, where the software code immediately follows the memory space.
- the memory space is defined as a software programming manifest that identifies that the operating software has properly been flashed, for example, by setting a flag in the software manifest.
- the first memory segment is used as the software manifest because it is erased first during software reprogramming to record the software programming results.
- the memory space for the manifest is an increment of the smallest write size permitted by the bootloader flash. The software being flashed does not overwrite this memory space.
- the results of an integrity check such as digital signature verification described above, are recorded in the manifest.
- the present invention also proposes a technique for validating that calibration files have been properly flashed into the memory of a vehicle ECU using a bootloader.
- the technique allocates a predetermined memory space at a first calibration file flash section in a memory segment for the calibration files, where the calibration file code immediately follows the memory space.
- the memory space is defined as a calibration file programming manifest that identifies that the calibration files have properly been flashed, for example, by setting a flag in the calibration file manifest.
- the first memory segment is used as the calibration file manifest because it is erased first during calibration file reprogramming to record the calibration file results.
- the memory space for the manifest is an increment of the smallest write size permitted by the bootloader flash.
- the calibration files being flashed do not overwrite this memory space. After the bootloader programs each calibration file, the results of the integrity check are recorded in the manifest space.
- the bootloader Upon an ECU reset, the bootloader will check all software and calibration flags in the software and calibration file manifests. If all of the flags are valid, then a transfer to the operating software is permitted. Otherwise, the bootloader stays in the boot mode.
- FIG. 2 is a flow chart diagram 40 showing a process for using programming manifests to record the presence of valid software and/or calibration files when flashing the operating software and/or calibration files to the memory on a vehicle ECU by a bootloader flashing process.
- a bootloader programming executive at box 42 controls the bootloader programming function, and this function may be entered via request by a service tool at a servicing facility.
- the bootloader programming executive detects a request to program software or calibration and enters box 44 to perform some operation, such as uploading or flashing the operating software and/or calibration files for the particular vehicle ECU.
- the bootloader flashes an operating software or calibration file, it first erases the appropriate memory segment(s), which sets the flag(s) in a programming manifest memory space indicating that the software or particular calibration file has not been properly flashed.
- the bootloader determines whether a valid flash has occurred each time a separate piece of software or calibration file is flashed by determining that the flag has been properly set in the manifest.
- the bootloader performs an integrity check and updates the programming manifest at box 48 .
- the bootloader determines whether all of the operating software and calibration files have been properly flashed at decision diamond 50 , and if not, returns to the bootloader programming executive at the box 42 to flash the next piece of software or calibration file. If all of the software and/or calibration files are properly flashed at the decision diamond 50 , then the bootloader determines whether all of the operating software and calibration file flags in the programming manifest have been properly set and are valid at decision diamond 52 , and if so, allows execution of the operating software at box 54 .
- the bootloader sends a negative response message to the requester, such as the programming tool, at box 56 indicating that the flashing has not properly occurred.
- FIG. 3 is a representation of a portion of an ECU memory 60 including a flash memory segment 62 that stores operating software and calibration files that are flashed by the bootloader.
- the bootloader stores one operating software file and four calibration files for the particular application, which is by way of a non-limiting embodiment.
- the operating software is flashed into a memory section 64 and the calibration files are flashed into memory sections 66 .
- a programming manifest is defined in the memory segment 62 for both the operating software and the calibration files, and that manifest is at the beginning of the memory segment for the operating software or the calibration files.
- the software manifest is stored at memory slot 68 before the software memory section 64 and only includes a single software flag 70 because the operating software only includes a single part, namely, the operating software stored in the segment 64 .
- the calibration manifest is located at memory slot 72 before the calibration files in the memory sections 66 , where the calibration manifest stores a calibration flag 74 for each of the separate calibration files, which would be four calibration flags in this example.
- the manifest memory space is provided at the beginning of the memory segment for the operating software and calibration files because this space would be the first part of the memory to be erased if the operating software or the particular calibration file were reprogrammed with new files, where a new flag would need to be set in the manifest for those new files. Note since the calibration files all reside in the same memory segment, all calibration files must be programmed during any calibration flashing event and the segment is erased once before writing the first calibration file.
- FIG. 4 is another representation of a portion of an ECU memory 80 where like elements to the ECU memory 60 are identified by the same reference numeral.
- a calibration manifest including a calibration flag is provided immediately preceding each of the calibration files.
- a calibration manifest is provided at memory slot 82 for a calibration file stored in memory section 84 and includes a single calibration flag
- a calibration manifest is provided at memory slot 86 for a calibration file stored in memory section 88 and also includes a single calibration flag
- a calibration manifest is provided in memory slot 90 for a calibration file stored in memory section 92 and also includes a single calibration flag
- a calibration manifest is provided at memory slot 94 for a calibration file stored in memory section 96 and also includes a single calibration file.
- the configuration of the ECU memory 80 may have benefits over the configuration of the ECU memory 60 because the calibration files may be flashed to different calibration segments that are not contiguous with each other where a calibration manifest would be provided at the beginning of the separate calibration segments that may be overwritten when the new calibration file is downloaded.
- the knowledge of what segments in the ECU memory are flashed for one or more calibration files may determine how many flags are in the calibration manifest, where one flash segment may include a single calibration file and other flash segments may include multiple calibration files.
- the bootloader would ensure that all of the calibration files are programmed before that flag is set by enforcing a programming sequence of the calibration files. For example, each calibration file would be given a specific sequence ID, and flashing of the calibration files would be performed in the order of those IDs. For example, a calibration file with a sequence ID of 3 would not be flashed before a calibration file with a sequence ID of 2.
- programming of the calibration file being flashed must be successful, i.e., the signature must be valid, before the next calibration file is flashed.
- the bootloader sets the flag to indicate successful programming for all of the calibration files in that segment.
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- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
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Priority Applications (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US13/557,060 US8930710B2 (en) | 2011-10-28 | 2012-07-24 | Using a manifest to record presence of valid software and calibration |
DE102012109615.5A DE102012109615B4 (de) | 2011-10-28 | 2012-10-10 | Verwendung eines Manifests zur Präsenzaufzeichnung von gültiger Software und Kalibrierung |
CN201210415290.7A CN103198270B (zh) | 2011-10-28 | 2012-10-26 | 使用清单来记录有效软件和校准文件的存在 |
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US201161552968P | 2011-10-28 | 2011-10-28 | |
US13/557,060 US8930710B2 (en) | 2011-10-28 | 2012-07-24 | Using a manifest to record presence of valid software and calibration |
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US20130111271A1 US20130111271A1 (en) | 2013-05-02 |
US8930710B2 true US8930710B2 (en) | 2015-01-06 |
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US13/557,060 Active 2033-07-12 US8930710B2 (en) | 2011-10-28 | 2012-07-24 | Using a manifest to record presence of valid software and calibration |
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US (1) | US8930710B2 (de) |
CN (1) | CN103198270B (de) |
DE (1) | DE102012109615B4 (de) |
Cited By (2)
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US9928890B2 (en) | 2016-08-29 | 2018-03-27 | Apple Inc. | System and method for calibrating memory using credit-based segmentation control |
US10430178B2 (en) | 2018-02-19 | 2019-10-01 | GM Global Technology Operations LLC | Automated delivery and installation of over the air updates in vehicles |
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US9600662B2 (en) * | 2014-06-06 | 2017-03-21 | T-Mobile Usa, Inc. | User configurable profiles for security permissions |
US9430220B2 (en) * | 2014-07-22 | 2016-08-30 | GM Global Technology Operations LLC | Method, medium, and apparatus for re-programming flash memory of a computing device |
CA2988947C (en) | 2015-06-08 | 2023-10-03 | Cosmetic Technologies, Llc | Automated delivery system of a cosmetic sample |
JP2017167916A (ja) * | 2016-03-17 | 2017-09-21 | 株式会社デンソー | 情報処理システム |
DE102016007498A1 (de) | 2016-06-18 | 2017-12-21 | Audi Ag | Manipulationssichere Bereitstellung einer Funktionalität eines Assistenzsystems eines Kraftfahrzeugs |
DE102016221108A1 (de) * | 2016-10-26 | 2018-04-26 | Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft | Verfahren zum Aktualisieren einer Software eines Steuergeräts eines Fahrzeugs |
CN106789672B (zh) * | 2017-01-18 | 2020-08-04 | 北京经纬恒润科技有限公司 | 一种报文路由处理方法及装置 |
US11822955B2 (en) * | 2020-01-17 | 2023-11-21 | Steering Solutions Ip Holding Corporation | System and method for decentralized vehicle software management |
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2012
- 2012-07-24 US US13/557,060 patent/US8930710B2/en active Active
- 2012-10-10 DE DE102012109615.5A patent/DE102012109615B4/de active Active
- 2012-10-26 CN CN201210415290.7A patent/CN103198270B/zh active Active
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Cited By (2)
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US9928890B2 (en) | 2016-08-29 | 2018-03-27 | Apple Inc. | System and method for calibrating memory using credit-based segmentation control |
US10430178B2 (en) | 2018-02-19 | 2019-10-01 | GM Global Technology Operations LLC | Automated delivery and installation of over the air updates in vehicles |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
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CN103198270B (zh) | 2015-11-25 |
CN103198270A (zh) | 2013-07-10 |
US20130111271A1 (en) | 2013-05-02 |
DE102012109615B4 (de) | 2022-05-12 |
DE102012109615A1 (de) | 2013-05-02 |
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