US8762721B2 - Method for generating authorization key and method for negotiating authorization in communication system based on frequency overlay - Google Patents

Method for generating authorization key and method for negotiating authorization in communication system based on frequency overlay Download PDF

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US8762721B2
US8762721B2 US12/670,519 US67051908A US8762721B2 US 8762721 B2 US8762721 B2 US 8762721B2 US 67051908 A US67051908 A US 67051908A US 8762721 B2 US8762721 B2 US 8762721B2
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key
generating
base station
authorization
authentication
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US20100211786A1 (en
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Sun-Hwa Lim
Sang Ho Lee
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Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute ETRI
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd
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Samsung Electronics Co Ltd
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
    • H04L9/0844—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/02—Details
    • H04L12/06—Answer-back mechanisms or circuits
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0892—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities by using authentication-authorization-accounting [AAA] servers or protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to authorization of a communication system.
  • a communication system for example the wireless broadband Internet system defined by the IEEE 802.16e, acquires uplink/downlink channels between a terminal and a base station and negotiates parameters. Also, the wireless broadband Internet system transmits and receives values including power between a terminal and a base station, time, frequency offset, basic connection identifier (CID), and primary CID through a ranging process. Since a physical (PHY) layer and a media access control (MAC) layer are provided to the terminal and the base station in the above-noted communication system, a network entry process for user authentication is performed once.
  • PHY physical
  • MAC media access control
  • a terminal can have two predetermined frequency bandwidths (e.g., 10 MHz frequency bandwidth) based on the frequency overlay having an independent base station identifier (BSID).
  • BSID base station identifier
  • the communication system needs the network entry process twice since the terminal and the base station respectively have two PHY layers and MAC layers.
  • key management for handover and authorization can be problematic.
  • the present invention has been made in an effort to provide a method for efficiently generating an authorization key when performing a network entry for frequency overlay.
  • a method for a terminal including a first media access control (MAC) layer and a second MAC layer to generate an authorization key includes: performing a first network entry process to a base station through the first MAC layer; and performing a second network entry process for a frequency overlay to the base station through the second MAC layer, wherein the performing the first network entry process includes acquiring a key for generating an authorization key through an authentication process according to an authentication method negotiated with the base station and generating a first authorization key through the key for generating the authorization key, and the performing the second network entry process includes generating a second authorization key by using the key for generating the authorization key.
  • MAC media access control
  • a method for an access control router to generate an authorization key includes: generating a first authorization key for a terminal when the terminal performs a first network entry process through the first MAC layer of the base station; and generating a second authorization key of the terminal when the terminal performs a second network entry process for a frequency overlay through the second MAC layer of the base station, wherein the generating the first authorization key includes acquiring a key for generating an authorization key when the authentication process according to the authentication method between the terminal and the base station is successful and generating the first authorization key by using the key for generating the authorization key, and the generating the second authorization key includes generating the second authorization key by using the key for generating the authorization key.
  • MAC media access control
  • a method for a terminal to negotiate with a base station on an authorization method includes: transmitting a subscriber station basic capability request (SBC-REQ) message including an authorization policy support field to the base station so as to negotiate the authentication; and receiving a subscriber station basic capability response (SBC-RSP) message from the base station in response to the (SBC-REQ) message, and the authorization policy support field includes an authentication omission bit for omitting the authentication process according to the authentication method when performing a network entry for a frequency overlay.
  • SBC-REQ subscriber station basic capability request
  • SBC-RSP subscriber station basic capability response
  • the authorization process of the second network entry can be omitted by using a master key that is generated when performing a first network entry. Accordingly, the time for processing the second network entry is reduced, and a waste of radio resource is prevented by reducing a signaling overhead. Also, the terminal and the AAA server manage a pair of master keys (MSK and EMSK) to provide convenience of key sharing for handover and MIP signal authentication.
  • MSK and EMSK master keys
  • FIG. 1 is a configuration diagram of a communication system according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a table for an authorization policy support field structure of a message according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 shows a hierarchical structure of an authorization key generated by a terminal according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 shows a hierarchical structure of an authorization key generated by an AAA server, an access control router, and a base station according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 shows a network entry process in a first physical/MAC layer 1 between a terminal and a base station according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 6 shows a network entry process in a second physical/MAC layer 2 between a terminal and a base station according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • a terminal can be a portable subscriber station (PSS), a mobile terminal (MT), a subscriber station (SS), a mobile station (MS), user equipment (UE), and an access terminal (AT), and can include whole or partial functions of the mobile terminal, the subscriber station, the portable subscriber station, and the user equipment.
  • PSS portable subscriber station
  • MT mobile terminal
  • SS subscriber station
  • MS mobile station
  • UE user equipment
  • AT access terminal
  • a base station can represent an access point (AP), a radio access station (RAS), a nodeB (Node B), a base transceiver station (BTS), and a mobile multihop relay (MMR)-BS, and can include whole or partial functions of the access point, the radio access station, the nodeB, the base transceiver station, and the MMR-BS.
  • AP access point
  • RAS radio access station
  • Node B nodeB
  • BTS base transceiver station
  • MMR mobile multihop relay
  • FIG. 1 is a configuration diagram of a communication system according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • the communication system includes a terminal 10 , a base station 20 , and an access control router 30 , and is connected to a wired Internet network.
  • the wired Internet network includes an authentication, authorization, accounting (AAA) server 40 , a home agent (HA) 50 , and a call state control function (CSCF) 60 .
  • AAA authentication, authorization, accounting
  • HA home agent
  • CSCF call state control function
  • the terminal 10 and the base station 20 start communication to negotiate an authentication method for authenticating the terminal 10 through a subscriber station basic capability request (SBC-REQ) message and a subscriber station basic capability response (SBC-RSP) message, and then perform an authentication process.
  • the authentication method according to the exemplary embodiment of the present invention is performed based on the EAP-based authentication process for performing equipment authentication or user authentication on the terminal 10 and the base station 20 by using a higher extensible authentication protocol (EAP) authentication protocol, and it supports the authentication function by using the cipher-based message authentication code (CMAC) method so as to perform a message authentication function, but the present invention is not limited thereto.
  • EAP extensible authentication protocol
  • CMAC cipher-based message authentication code
  • the terminal 10 generates a message for authentication and transmits the message to the base station 20 , and the base station 20 authenticates the terminal 10 through an interaction with the AAA server 40 that is a corresponding authentication server.
  • the terminal 10 is connected to the base station 20 by performing a radio channel transmitting/receiving function and a MAC process function according to the radio access standard, and transmits/receives high-speed packet data to/from the connected base station 20 .
  • the base station 20 receives a radio signal from the terminal 10 and transmits it to the access control router 30 , and converts information transmitted by the access control router 30 into a radio signal and transmits it to the terminal 10 .
  • the access control router 30 is connected to the base station 20 and the portable Internet core network to perform an authentication function and a mobile IP (MIP) and quality of service (QoS) control function.
  • MIP mobile IP
  • QoS quality of service
  • the AAA server 40 authenticates the subscriber station 10 , authenticates the user, and verifies the service rights, and the home agent (HA) 50 performs a mobile IP (MIP) service function.
  • MIP mobile IP
  • the CSCF 60 performs an IP multimedia subsystem (IMS) registration function and a call setting function so as to support the IP multimedia service.
  • IMS IP multimedia subsystem
  • FIG. 2 is a table for an authorization policy support field structure of a message according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • an authorization policy support field included in the subscriber station basic capability request (SBC-REQ) message is used for supporting authentication negotiation for a frequency overlay between a terminal and a base station, and its type is determined to be 25.2.
  • the length of the authorization policy support field according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention is controlled to be 2 bytes which is greater than 1 byte that is defined by the IEEE 802.16e standard.
  • the bits from the 0 th bit (Bit # 0 ) to the 2 nd bit (Bit # 2 ) in the 2 bytes of the authorization policy support field are valid bits when the terminal's first network entry is performed. That is, the terminal performing the first network entry sets the supportable authorization policies to be 1 and the unsupportable authorization policies to be 0 in the authentication process of the initial access process through the lower 3 bits (Bit # 0 to Bit # 2 ) of the authorization policy support field.
  • the 0 th bit (Bit # 0 ) can be allocated to the Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA)-based authentication, the 1 st bit (Bit # 1 ) to the EAP-based authentication, and the 2 nd bit (Bit # 2 ) to the authenticated EAP-based authentication.
  • RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
  • the bits from the 4 th bit (Bit # 4 ) to the 6 th bit (Bit # 6 ) are bits that are valid for the terminal's system re-access process or handover process while performing the first network entry. That is, the terminal in the re-access process when performing a first network entry or in the authentication process when performing a handover process sets the authorization policies to be 1 that are supportable in the authentication process of the handover process while performing the re-access process through the upper 3 bits (Bit # 4 to Bit # 6 ) of the authorization policy support field, and sets the unsupportable authorization policies to be 0.
  • the 4 th bit (Bit # 4 ) can be allocated to the RAS-based authentication during the re-access process or the handover process, the 5 th bit (Bit # 5 ) to the EAP-based authentication during the re-access process or the handover process, and the 6 th bit (Bit # 6 ) to the authenticated EAP-based authentication during the re-access process or the handover process.
  • the 8 th bit (Bit # 8 ) is a bit that is used for omitting authentication between the terminal and the AAA server when performing a second network entry for a frequency overlay.
  • the 3 rd bit (Bit # 3 ), the 7 th bit (Bit # 7 ) and the 9 th bit (Bit # 9 ) to the 15 th bit (Bit # 15 ) are not used and are set to be 0.
  • An authorization key hierarchical structure generated by a terminal, a base station, an access control router, and an AAA server will now be described with reference to FIG. 3 and FIG. 4 .
  • FIG. 3 and FIG. 4 show hierarchical structures of an authorization key (AK) used for the radio section, and an authorization key used for the MIP signal.
  • An algorithm for generating an authorization key used for the radio section will be described based on the IEEE 802.16e standard, and an algorithm for generating an authorization key used for the MIPv6 signal will be described based on the world interoperability for microwave access (WiMAX) standard.
  • WiMAX world interoperability for microwave access
  • the terminal and the base station according to the exemplary embodiment of the present invention have two MAC layers, and hence the network entry process for user authentication is performed twice.
  • FIG. 3 shows a hierarchical structure of an authorization key generated by a terminal according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • the EAP-based authentication process is successfully performed after the first network entry by the terminal 10 , and the terminal 10 generates a pair of a master session key (MSK) and an extended master session key (EMSK) that are master keys for generating the authorization key (AK) ( 100 and 160 ).
  • MSK master session key
  • EMSK extended master session key
  • AK authorization key
  • the MSK is used to generate an authorization key to be used for the radio section between the terminal 10 and the base station 20
  • the EMSK is used for authenticating the MIPv6 signal message.
  • the terminal 10 generates a pairwise master key (PMK) that is a basic key so as to generate an authorization key used for the radio section from the MSK ( 110 ), and generates an authorization key (AK) by using the “Dot16KDF (Dot16 Key Derivation Function)” that is a key generation algorithm defined by the IEEE 802.16e ( 120 ).
  • the terminal 10 generates an upward message authorization key (CMAC_KEY_U), a downward message authorization key (CMAC_KEY_D), and a key encryption key from the generated authorization key (AK) ( 130 , 140 , and 150 ).
  • the CMAC_KEY_U is a key used for authenticating the signaling message to be transmitted to the base station 20 by the terminal 10
  • the CMAC_KEY_D is a key used for authenticating the signaling message to be transmitted to the terminal 10 by the base station 20
  • the key encryption key (KEK) is a key used for encrypting a traffic encryption key (TEK) when the base station 20 transmits the TEK to the terminal 10
  • the traffic encryption key (TEK) is used for encrypting the data traffic between the terminal 10 and the base station 20 .
  • the terminal 10 After the second network entry by the terminal 10 , the terminal 10 generates a new AK by using the PMK that is a basic key generated when performing the first network entry ( 200 ). The terminal 10 generates a CMAC_KEY_U, a CMAC_KEY_D, and a KEK from the new AK ( 210 , 220 , and 230 ).
  • the terminal 10 generates a mobile IP-root key (MIP-RK) from the EMSK so as to authenticate the MIPv6 signal ( 160 and 170 ), and generates a mobile node-home agent (MN-HA) from the generated MIP_RK ( 180 ).
  • MIP-RK mobile IP-root key
  • MN-HA mobile node-home agent
  • FIG. 4 shows a hierarchical structure of an authorization key generated by an AAA server, an access control router, and a base station according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • the AAA server 40 when the terminal 10 successfully performs the EAP-based authentication process while performing the first network entry, the AAA server 40 generates a master session key (MSK) and an extended master session key (EMSK) that are a pair of master keys for generating the AK ( 300 and 360 ).
  • the master key can be a pre-primary authorization key (pre-PAK).
  • the AAA server 40 distributes the MSK to the access control router so as to generate an authorization key to be used for the radio section.
  • the access control router 30 generates a PMK that is a basic key from the MSK ( 310 ), and generates an AK by using the Dot16KDF 320 defined in the IEEE 802.16e.
  • the basic key can be a primary authorization key (PAK).
  • the base station 20 generates a CMAC_KEY_U, a CMAC_KEY_D, and a KEK from the generated AK ( 330 , 340 , and 350 ).
  • the access control router 30 After the second network entry by the terminal 10 , the access control router 30 generates a new authorization key (AK) by using the PMK that is generated when performing the first network entry ( 400 ).
  • the base station 20 generates a CMAC_KEY_U, a CMAC_KEY_D, and a KEK by using the AK acquired from the access control router 30 ( 410 , 420 , and 430 ).
  • the AAA server 40 generates a mobile IP-root key (MIP-RK) from the EMSK so as to authenticate the MIPv6 signal ( 370 ), and generates a MN-HA from the generated MIP_RK ( 380 ).
  • MIP-RK mobile IP-root key
  • a network entry process between a terminal and a base station according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention will now be described with reference to FIG. 5 and FIG. 6 .
  • the terminal 10 and the base station 20 in FIG. 5 and FIG. 6 transmit/receive the EAP-based authentication protocol message by using a privacy key management version 2 (PKMv2) that is one of media access control (MAC) layer messages defined in the IEEE 802.16e.
  • PLMv2 privacy key management version 2
  • the base station 20 and the access control router 30 transmit/receive the EAP-based authentication protocol message by using the R6 protocol defined by the WiMAX standard.
  • the access control router 30 and the AAA server 40 transmit/receive the EAP-based authentication protocol message by using the diameter or radius protocol.
  • the terminal 10 and the base station 20 have two of a physical layer and MAC layer, and the network entry process is performed for each physical/MAC layer.
  • FIG. 5 shows a network entry process in a first physical/MAC layer 1 between a terminal and a base station according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • an uplink/downlink channel acquiring and ranging-request/response (RNG-REQ/RSP) process between the terminal 10 and the base station 20 is performed ( 501 ).
  • a subscriber station basic capability negotiation (SBC) process including an authentication mode negotiation process for authenticating the terminal 10 is performed. That is, when the terminal 10 transmits a SBC-REQ message to the base station 20 so as to negotiate the parameters including authorization policy, PKM protocol, and message authorization code mode, the base station 20 negotiates the parameters and transmits an SBC-RSP message to the terminal 10 ( 502 ).
  • the SBC-REQ/RSP message includes parameters of supportable authorization modes so as to select the authorization mode.
  • the base station 20 transmits a mobile station (MS) pre-attachment REQ message to the access control router 30 so as to transmit authorization policy information thereto.
  • the access control router 30 generates an AK context for the terminal 10 , and transmits an MS pre-attachment RSP message to the base station.
  • the access control router 30 receives an MS pre-attachment acknowledgment (ACK) message from the base station 20 ( 503 ).
  • the terminal 10 and the access control router 30 checks the executable authorization mode through the authorization mode negotiation parameter included in the SBC message, and select an authorization mode. For example, as described in FIG. 2 , one of the RSA-based authentication mode, the EAP-based authentication mode, and the authenticated EAP-based authentication mode can be selected.
  • the exemplary embodiment of the present invention will be described with the assumption that the EAP-based authentication mode is selected.
  • the terminal 10 and the AAA server 40 transmit/receive an EAP authentication message through the base station 20 and the access control router 30 ( 504 ).
  • the access control router 30 receives a user authentication success and an MSK from the AAA server 40 ( 505 ), includes an EAP success to the EAP relay message therein, and transmits the message to the base station 20 ( 506 ).
  • the base station 20 includes the EAP success in the PKMv2-RSP/EAP-transfer message, and transmits the message to the terminal 10 ( 507 ).
  • the terminal 10 generates an AK, a CMAC_KEY_U, a CMAC_KEY_D, and a KEK by using the MSK ( 508 ).
  • the access control router 30 generates a PMK and an AK by using the MSK received from the AAA server 40 ( 509 ).
  • the access control router 30 includes the AK context in a NetEntry MS state change directive message and transmits the message to the base station 20 , and the base station 20 transmits a NetEntry MS state change acknowledgement (ACK) message to the access control router 30 ( 510 ).
  • the base station 20 generates a CMAC_KEY_U, a CMAC_KEY_D, and a KEK by using the AK ( 511 ).
  • the base station 20 transmits a PKMv2 SA-TEK challenge message to the terminal 10 so as to negotiate security association (SA) and transmit the TEK.
  • the terminal 10 transmits a PKMv2 SA-TEK REQ message to the base station 20 in response to the PKMv2 SA-TEK challenge message.
  • the base station 20 successfully performing the PKMv2 SA-TEK REQ message transmits a PKMv2 SA-TEK RSP message to the terminal 10 ( 512 ).
  • the terminal 10 transmits a register request (REG-REQ) message to the base station 20 so as to perform a registration process.
  • the base station 20 transmits a register response (REG-RSP) message to the terminal 10 when successfully performing registration on the terminal 10 ( 513 ).
  • the base station 20 transmits an MS attachment REQ message to the access control router 30 so as to perform a process for registering the terminal 10 to the access control router 30 .
  • the access control router 30 transmits an MS attachment RSP message to the base station 20 , and receives an MS attachment ACK message from the base station 20 ( 514 ).
  • the terminal 10 transmits a dynamic service addition (DSA) REQ message to the base station 20 so as to set a channel for a service connection including IP address allocation and user traffic transmission between the terminal 10 and the base station 20 .
  • the base station 20 transmits a DSA RSP message to the terminal 10
  • the terminal 10 transmits a DSA ACK message to the base station 20 ( 515 ).
  • the base station 20 and the access control router 30 perform a data path establishment message process ( 516 ). Then, data traffic is transmitted through the terminal 10 , the base station 20 , and the access control router 30 ( 517 ).
  • FIG. 6 shows a network entry process in a second physical/MAC layer 2 between a terminal and a base station according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • the authentication process between the terminal 10 and the AAA server 40 is omitted. That is, an authorization key to be used in the second network entry process is generated by using the PMK generated in the first network entry process.
  • the uplink/downlink channel acquiring and RNG-REQ/RSP process is performed between the terminal 10 and the base station 20 ( 518 ) in a like manner of the first network entry process.
  • the SBC process is performed. That is, the terminal 10 transmits the SBC-REQ message to the base station 20 so as to negotiate the parameters including an authorization policy, a PKM protocol, and a message authorization code mode, and the base station 20 transmits the SBC-RSP message to the terminal 10 after negotiating the parameters.
  • the SBC-REQ/RSP message used in the second network entry for a frequency overlay includes an authentication omission bit for omitting the authentication process between the terminal 10 and the AAA server 40 ( 519 ).
  • the base station 20 transmits an MS pre-attachment REQ message to the access control router 30 so as to transmit authorization policy information thereto.
  • the access control router 30 generates an AK context for the terminal 10 , and transmits an MS pre-attachment RSP message to the base station.
  • the access control router 30 receives an MS pre-attachment ACK message from the base station 20 ( 520 ).
  • the terminal 10 generates an AK, a CMAC_KEY_U, a CMAC_KEY_D, and a KEK by using the PMK generated in the first network entry process ( 521 ).
  • the base station 20 transmits a NetEntry MS state change REQ message to the access control router 30 so as to receive the AK context ( 522 ).
  • the access control router 30 when receiving the NetEntry MS state change REQ message, the access control router 30 generates an AK and an AK context by using the PMK generated in the first network entry process ( 523 ).
  • the access control router 30 includes the AK context in the NetEntry MS state change directive message and transmits the message to the base station 20 , and the base station 20 transmits a NetEntry MS state change ACK message to the access control router 30 ( 524 ).
  • the base station 20 generates a CMAC_KEY_U, a CMAC_KEY_D, and a KEK by using the AK ( 525 ).
  • the base station 20 transmits a PKMv2 SA-TEK challenge message to the terminal 10 so as to perform security association (SA) and transmit the TEK.
  • the terminal 10 transmits a PKMv2 SA-TEK REQ message to the base station 20 in response to the PKMv2 SA-TEK challenge message.
  • the base station 20 having successfully performed the PKMv2 SA-TEK REQ message transmits a PKMv2 SA-TEK RSP message to the terminal 10 ( 526 ).
  • the terminal 10 transmits a REG-REQ message to the base station 20 so as to perform a registration process.
  • the base station 20 transmits a REG-RSP message to the terminal 10 ( 527 ).
  • the base station 20 transmits an MS attachment REQ message to the access control router 30 so as to perform a process for registering the terminal 10 to the access control router 30 .
  • the access control router 30 transmits an MS attachment RSP message to the base station 20 , and receives an MS attachment ACK message from the base station 20 ( 528 ).
  • the terminal 10 transmits a dynamic service addition (DSA) REQ message to the base station 20 so as to set the channel for service connection including IP address allocation and user traffic transmission between the terminal 10 and the base station 20 .
  • the base station 20 transmits a DSA RSP message to the terminal 10
  • the terminal 10 transmits a DSA ACK message to the base station 20 ( 529 ).
  • the base station 20 and the access control router 30 perform a data path establishment message process 530 . Then, data traffic is transmitted through the terminal 10 , the base station 20 , and the access control router 30 ( 531 ).
  • the PMK is used as a key for generating an authorization key when performing a network entry process for a frequency overlay. That is, when performing the network entry process, the terminal and the access control router generate a PMK from the MSK that is generated when performing the first network entry process, and then generates an authorization key by using the PMK.
  • the above-described embodiments can be realized through a program for realizing functions corresponding to the configuration of the embodiments or a recording medium for recording the program in addition to through the above-described device and/or method, which is easily realized by a person skilled in the art.

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US12/670,519 2007-08-07 2008-06-12 Method for generating authorization key and method for negotiating authorization in communication system based on frequency overlay Expired - Fee Related US8762721B2 (en)

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PCT/KR2008/003297 WO2009020281A1 (fr) 2007-08-07 2008-06-12 Procédé de génération de clé d'autorisation et procédé de négociation d'autorisation dans un système de communication en fonction d'un chevauchement de fréquences

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