US20210256530A1 - Transmitter for transmitting a secure access signal - Google Patents
Transmitter for transmitting a secure access signal Download PDFInfo
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- US20210256530A1 US20210256530A1 US17/167,996 US202117167996A US2021256530A1 US 20210256530 A1 US20210256530 A1 US 20210256530A1 US 202117167996 A US202117167996 A US 202117167996A US 2021256530 A1 US2021256530 A1 US 2021256530A1
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- cellular telephone
- biometric
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- proximity
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
- G06Q20/327—Short range or proximity payments by means of M-devices
- G06Q20/3278—RFID or NFC payments by means of M-devices
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- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
- G06Q20/4014—Identity check for transactions
- G06Q20/40145—Biometric identity checks
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- G06K9/00885—
-
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- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/352—Contactless payments by cards
-
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- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
- G06Q20/34—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using cards, e.g. integrated circuit [IC] cards or magnetic cards
- G06Q20/354—Card activation or deactivation
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- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
- G07C9/22—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder
- G07C9/25—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition
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- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
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- G07F7/0893—Details of the card reader the card reader reading the card in a contactless manner
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- H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
- H04L9/0625—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation with splitting of the data block into left and right halves, e.g. Feistel based algorithms, DES, FEAL, IDEA or KASUMI
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- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
- H04L9/0631—Substitution permutation network [SPN], i.e. cipher composed of a number of stages or rounds each involving linear and nonlinear transformations, e.g. AES algorithms
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- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L9/3006—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters
- H04L9/302—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters involving the integer factorization problem, e.g. RSA or quadratic sieve [QS] schemes
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- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
- H04L9/3231—Biological data, e.g. fingerprint, voice or retina
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- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00182—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys operated with unidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
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- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
- G07C9/00563—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys using personal physical data of the operator, e.g. finger prints, retinal images, voicepatterns
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- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
- G07C9/22—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder
- G07C9/25—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition
- G07C9/26—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition using a biometric sensor integrated in the pass
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- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
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- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
- H04L2209/805—Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
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- H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
- H04L2463/102—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying security measure for e-commerce
Definitions
- the present disclosure relates to secure access systems and, in particular, to systems for remote entry access.
- FIG. 1 shows a conventional arrangement 400 for providing secure access.
- a user 401 makes a request 402 , as depicted by an arrow, directed to a code entry module 403 .
- the code entry module 403 is typically mounted on the external jamb of a secure door.
- the request 402 is typically a secure code of some type that is compatible with the code entry module 403 .
- the request 402 can be a card number stored within a conventional proximity card used to direct the request 402 to a code entry module 403 , e.g., a card reader.
- the request 402 can be a sequence of secret numbers directed to a code entry module 403 , i.e., a keypad.
- the request 402 can also be a biometric signal from the user 401 directed to a code entry module 403 , e.g., a corresponding biometric sensor.
- a biometric signal is a fingerprint.
- Other physical attributes that can be used to provide biometric signals include voice, retinal or iris pattern, face pattern, palm configuration and so on.
- the code entry module 403 conveys the request 402 by sending a corresponding signal 404 , as depicted by an arrow, to a controller 405 , which is typically situated in a remote or inaccessible place.
- the controller 405 authenticates the security information provided by the user 401 by interrogating a database 407 with signal 406 , as depicted by an arrow. If the user 401 is authenticated, and has the appropriate access privileges, then the controller 405 sends an access signal 408 , as depicted by an arrow, to a device 409 in order to provide the desired access.
- the device 409 can, for example, be the locking mechanism of a secure door, or can be an electronic lock on a personal computer (PC) that the user 401 desires to access.
- PC personal computer
- the Wiegand protocol is a simple one-way data protocol that can be modified by increasing or decreasing the bit count to ensure uniqueness of the protocol among different security companies, The Wiegand protocol does not secure the information being sent between the code entry module 403 and the controller 405 .
- RS 485 is a duplex protocol offering encryption capabilities at both the transmitting and receiving ends, i.e., the code entry module 403 and the controller 405 , respectively, in the present case.
- the length of the path of the signal 404 nonetheless provides an attack point for the unauthorized person.
- proximity cards have become a popular means for emitting the request 402 , since proximity cards are cheap, easy to use and convenient to carry for the user 401 .
- proximity cards comprise an inductive circuit including an integrated circuit (IC), a capacitor, and a coil, which are connected in series within the card.
- IC integrated circuit
- the code entry module 403 presents a field that excites the coil and charges the capacitor, which in turn energizes the IC on the proximity card 410 .
- the IC transmits a card number stored within the IC, via the coil as transmit antenna, to the code entry module 403 .
- the field emitted by the code entry module 403 for older proximity cards is typically around 125 kHz.
- the field emitted by the code entry module 403 for newer proximity cards is typically around 13.56 MHz.
- These newer proximity cards are typically in the form of contactless RFID cards, which are also known as “contactless smartcards.”
- Proximity cards have a communication range of 0-80 mm in most instances, allowing the user to place the proximity card 410 within 80 mm of the code entry module 403 in order for the card to be read by the code entry module 403 .
- the term “communication range” refers, in the described example, to the distance to within which the proximity module 126 and the code entry module 130 must be brought in order for their respective transmit/receive antennas to be able to achieve satisfactory communications.
- a method of transmitting a secure access signal to a system for providing secure access to a controlled item, the access being dependent on information contained in the secure access signal comprising:
- a computer program product having a computer readable medium having a computer program recorded therein for transmitting a secure access signal to a system for providing secure access to a controlled item, the access being dependent on information contained in the secure access signal, the program comprising:
- a system for providing secure access to a controlled item comprising:
- a transmitter sub-system for operating in a system for providing secure access to a controlled item, the system comprising a database of biometric signatures, a receiver sub-system comprising means for emitting a radio frequency field, means for receiving a secure access signal transmitted by the transmitter sub-system, and means for providing conditional access to the controlled item dependent upon information conveyed in the secure access signal; wherein the transmitter sub-system comprises:
- a receiver sub-system for operating in a system for providing secure access to a controlled item, the system comprising a database of biometric signatures, a transmitter sub-system comprising a biometric sensor for receiving a biometric signal, means for matching the biometric signal against members of the database of biometric signatures, and means for enabling an inductive circuit, based on the matching of the biometric signal, to transmit a secure access signal conveying information; wherein the receiver sub-system comprises:
- a system for providing secure access to one of a plurality of controlled items comprising:
- a receiver sub-system in a system for providing secure access to one of a plurality of controlled items comprising a database of biometric signatures, a transmitter sub-system comprising a biometric sensor for receiving a biometric signal, means for determining if the received biometric signal matches a member of the database of biometric signatures, a plurality of proximity modules associated with the plurality of controlled items, means for selecting one of the plurality of proximity modules, and means for enabling, if the received biometric signal matches a member of the database of biometric signatures, the selected proximity module, which can consequently transmit a secure access signal conveying information stored in the selected proximity module upon the proximity module being placed within range of a radio-frequency field adapted to activate the selected proximity module;
- the receiver sub-system comprising:
- a system for performing a secure transaction comprising:
- a first sub-system for operating in a system for performing a secure transaction comprising a database of biometric signatures, a second sub-system comprising means for receiving a password, and means for performing the secure transaction based on available funds dependent upon the password, the first subsystem comprising:
- a system for performing a secure transaction over a network using a card comprising:
- a method of transmitting a secure access signal to a system for providing secure access to one of a plurality of controlled items, the access being dependent on information contained in the secure access signal comprising the steps of:
- a method for performing a secure transaction over a network using a card comprising:
- a computer program product having a computer readable medium having a computer program recorded therein for transmitting a secure access signal to a system for providing secure access to a controlled item, the access being dependent on information contained in the secure access signal, the program comprising:
- a computer program product having a computer readable medium having a computer program recorded therein for performing a secure transaction over a network using a card, the program comprising:
- FIG. 1 shows a conventional arrangement for providing secure access
- FIG. 2 is a functional block diagram of a system for providing secure access according to an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure
- FIG. 3 shows an example of a method of operation of a transmitter sub-system of the system of FIG. 2 ;
- FIG. 4 shows an example of a method of operation of a receiver sub-system of the system of FIG. 2 ;
- FIG. 5A shows an example of a method of operation of the transmitter sub-system of FIG. 2 where the IC is a smart card chip;
- FIG. 5B shows an example of a method of operation of the receiver sub-system of FIG. 2 where the IC is a smart card chip;
- FIG. 6 is a schematic block diagram of the system in FIG. 2 ;
- FIGS. 7A and 7B show an alternate arrangement for enabling the proximity module in FIG. 2 ;
- FIG. 8 shows how the secure access system of FIG. 2 can support multiple selectable proximity modules
- FIG. 9 shows an example of a method of operation of the arrangement of FIG. 8 ;
- FIG. 10 shows an example of a method of making an online payment using the arrangement of FIG. 8 ;
- FIG. 11 is a functional block diagram of a general purpose computer system upon which the method of FIG. 10 may be implemented;
- FIG. 12 shows an example of a method of debiting an amount of funds from an account stored within the transmitter sub-system of FIGS. 2 and 8 ;
- FIG. 13 shows how the secure access system of FIG. 2 can support one or more conventional proximity modules according to another embodiment
- FIG. 14 shows an example of a method of performing a secure transaction using the arrangement of FIG. 13 .
- FIG. 2 is a functional block diagram of a system 100 for providing secure access according to the exemplary embodiment.
- a user 101 makes a request 102 , as depicted by an arrow, to a biometric module 103 .
- the biometric module 103 includes a biometric sensor 121 and the request 102 takes the form of a biometric signal that corresponds to the nature of the sensor 121 in the module 103 .
- the biometric sensor 121 in the module 103 is a fingerprint sensor and the request 102 typically takes the form of a thumb press on a sensor panel (not shown) on the module 103 .
- the biometric sensor 121 may be responsive to one or more of voice, retinal pattern, iris pattern, face pattern and palm configuration.
- the module 103 interrogates a user ID database 105 as communication 104 , depicted by an arrow.
- the user database 105 contains one or more members in the form of biometric signatures for authorized users against which the request 102 can be authenticated.
- the biometric module 103 sends a signal 106 to a controller 107 .
- the controller 107 Upon receiving the signal 106 , the controller 107 sends a signal 112 , as depicted by an arrow, to a switch module 113 comprising a “normally open” switch 127 . Any suitable mechanical or electronic (e.g., semiconductor) switch may be used to implement the switch 127 .
- the switch module 113 is connected to a proximity module 126 .
- the proximity module 126 comprises an inductive circuit formed from an IC 128 , a coil 129 and a capacitor 131 , which are connected in series.
- the IC 128 has information in the form of a unique card number stored within a memory of the IC 128 .
- the switch 127 of the switch module 113 is connected in series with the IC 128 , the coil 129 and the capacitor 131 of the proximity module 126 .
- the proximity module 126 is similar to that used in conventional proximity cards such as those provided by financial institutions such as VISA®, MASTERCARD®, AMERICAN EXPRESS® and so on.
- the switch module 113 is configured to close and open the circuit formed by the IC 128 , the coil 129 and the capacitor 131 , thereby enabling and disabling the proximity module 126 , respectively.
- the switch module 113 Upon receiving the signal 112 from the controller 107 , the switch module 113 closes the normally open switch 127 for a predetermined period of time (e.g., four to five seconds). Within this period the inductive circuit in the proximity card module 126 is enabled and may be placed by the user 101 within range of a radio frequency field being emitted by a code entry module 130 . The field emitted by the code entry module 130 excites the coil 129 and charges the capacitor 131 , which in turn energizes the IC 128 and thus activates the proximity module 126 . The IC 128 then transmits a secure access signal 132 , as depicted by an arrow, via the coil as transmit antenna, to the code entry module 130 . Accordingly, the secure access signal 132 is transmitted via the inductive circuit. The secure access signal 132 is configured for conveying information including the card number stored within the memory of the IC 128 .
- a predetermined period of time e.g., four to five seconds.
- the switch 127 is preferably implemented in the form of a flip/flop arrangement where upon receiving the signal 112 the switch 127 will close but will automatically return to the normally open position at the end of the predetermined period. Accordingly, if the proximity card module 126 is not placed within the range of the code entry module 130 within the predetermined period, then the field emitted by the code entry module 130 will not charge the capacitor 131 as the switch 127 has opened the circuit formed by the IC 128 , coil 129 and capacitor 131 . In this instance, the user 101 again makes the request 102 in order to enable the proximity module 126 .
- the code entry module 130 Upon receiving the secure access signal 132 including the card number from the proximity card module 126 , the code entry module 130 sends a signal 108 , as depicted by an arrow, including the card number to a controller 109 .
- the controller 109 tests the card number received from the code entry module 130 against a database 115 of card numbers by sending test 114 , this test 114 being depicted by an arrow. If the incoming card number received from the code entry module 130 is found to be legitimate, then the controller 109 sends a command signal 110 , as depicted by an arrow, to a controlled item 111 .
- the controlled item 111 can be a door locking mechanism on a secure door, or an electronic lock (or key circuit) on a personal computer (PC) that is to be accessed by the user 101 . Accordingly, access to the controlled item 111 is dependent on the information (e.g., the card number) contained in the secure access signal 132 .
- the system 100 provides conditional access to the controlled item 111 dependent upon the information contained in the secure access signal 132 .
- controller 109 contains a receiver 118 that receives the signal 108 including the card number and converts the signal 108 into a form 120 , as depicted by an arrow, which the controller 109 can use.
- the biometric module 103 also incorporates at least one mechanism for providing feedback to the user 101 .
- This mechanism can, for example, take the form of one or more light emitting diode (LED) indicators 122 , which can provide visual feedback 123 , depicted by an arrow to the user 101 .
- the mechanism can take the form of an audio signal provided by an audio transducer 124 providing audio feedback 125 .
- the code entry module 130 may also incorporate one or more mechanisms for providing feedback to the user 101 .
- the transmitter sub-system (or transmitter) 116 in FIG. 2 falling to the left hand side, as depicted by an arrow, of a dashed line 119 may be implemented in a number of different forms.
- the transmitter sub-system 116 (or transmitter), including the biometric module 103 , the switch module 113 , the user ID database 105 , the controller 107 and the proximity module 126 may, for example, be incorporated within a remote fob (which is a small portable device carried by the user 101 ) or even a mobile (cell) telephone.
- the biometric module 103 may be powered by an internal battery of the fob or telephone.
- the code entry module 130 , the controller 109 , database 115 and the controlled item 111 form a receiver sub-system 117 as seen in FIG. 2 .
- the code entry module 130 may be mounted in a protected enclosure on the outside jamb of a secured door.
- the channel used by the signal 108 typically uses a wired medium.
- the code entry module 130 may communicate with the controller 109 via a wireless communication channel used by the signal 108 .
- the controller 109 , database 115 and controlled item 111 are typically located in an inaccessible area such as a hidden roof space or alternately in a suitable protected area such as an armored cupboard. In the case that a wireless communication channel is used by the signal 108 , the location of the controller 109 is of course consistent with reliable reception of the wireless signal 108 .
- the signal 108 may be based upon rolling code.
- this is merely one arrangement, and other secure codes can equally be used.
- either of the BLUETOOTHTM protocols, or the WI-FITM protocols may be used.
- Rolling codes provide a substantially non-replayable, non-repeatable and encrypted radio frequency data communications scheme for secure messaging. These codes use inherently secure protocols and serial number ciphering techniques, which may be used to hide clear text values required for authentication.
- Rolling codes may use a different code variant each time the transmission of the signal 108 occurs. This is achieved by encrypting the data from the code entry module 130 with a mathematical algorithm, and ensuring that successive transmissions of the signal 108 are modified using a code and/or a look-up table known to both the code entry module 130 and the receiver sub-system 117 . Using this approach, successive transmissions are modified, resulting in a non-repeatable data transfer, even if the information from the code entry module 130 remains the same. The modification of the code in the signal 108 for each transmission significantly reduces the likelihood that an intruder can access the information and replay the information to thereby gain entry at some later time.
- the biometric signature user ID database 105 is shown in FIG. 2 to be part of the transmitter sub-system 116 .
- the sub-system 116 may comprise a memory 1006 (see FIG. 6 ) containing the database 105 of biometric signatures.
- the transmitter sub-system 116 including the database 105 may be implemented as a remote fob, where the fob incorporates the biometric (e.g., fingerprint) authentication arrangement.
- the biometric signature user ID database 105 can be located in the receiver sub-system 117 together with the controller 109 , in which case the communication 104 between the biometric module 103 and the signature user ID database 105 can also be performed over a secure wireless communication channel.
- the secure access system 100 is being applied to providing secure access to a PC, then the secured PC can store the biometric signature of the authorized user in internal memory, and the PC can be integrated into the receiver sub-system 117 of FIG. 1 .
- the combination of the biometric verification and proximity module 126 in a remote fob provides a particularly significant advantage over current proximity card systems. If the remote fob is lost by the user 101 , the lost remote fob may not be used by an unauthorized person to gain the desired access. Further, the security of conventional proximity card systems may be improved without the need to upgrade existing infrastructure.
- FIG. 3 shows the method 200 of operation of the transmitter sub-system 116 of FIG. 2 .
- the method 200 commences with a testing step 201 in which the biometric sensor 121 in the code entry module 130 checks whether a biometric signal 102 is being received. If this is not the case, then the method 200 is directed in accordance with a NO arrow back to the step 201 in a loop. If, on the other hand, the biometric signal 102 has been received, then the method 200 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to a step 202 .
- the step 202 compares the received biometric signal 102 with information in the biometric signature user ID database 105 in order to ensure that the received biometric signal 102 is that of the rightful user 101 of the transmitter sub-system 116 .
- a subsequent testing step 203 checks whether the comparison in the step 202 yields the desired authentication. If the biometric signature matching is authenticated, then the method 200 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to a step 204 .
- the controller 107 sends the signal 112 to the switch module 113 to close the normally open switch 127 to allow the coil 129 to be excited when the proximity card module 126 is placed within range of the code entry module 130 .
- the coil 129 is excited and charges the capacitor 131 , which in turn energizes the IC 128 .
- the IC 128 then transmits secure access signal 132 , i.e., the card number stored within the IC 128 , as depicted by an arrow, via the coil, to the code entry module 130 .
- secure access signal 132 i.e., the card number stored within the IC 128 , as depicted by an arrow, via the coil.
- the method 200 is then directed in accordance with an arrow 206 back to the step 201 .
- the method 200 is directed in accordance with a NO arrow back to the step 201 .
- the NO arrow from the step 203 could lead to a disabling step that would disable further operation of the transmitter sub-system 116 , either immediately upon receipt of the incorrect biometric signal 102 , or after a number of attempts to provide the correct biometric signal 102 .
- FIG. 4 shows the method of operation of the receiver sub-system 117 of FIG. 2 .
- the method 300 commences with a testing step 301 that continuously checks whether the signal 108 including the card number has been received from code entry module 130 .
- the step 301 is performed by the controller 109 .
- the controller 109 compares the card number received by means of the signal 108 with one or more card numbers stored in the database 115 .
- a subsequent testing step 303 is performed by the controller 109 .
- the method 300 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to a step 304 .
- step 304 the controller 109 sends the control signal 110 to the controlled item 111 (for example, opening the secured door).
- the method 300 is then directed from the step 304 as depicted by an arrow 305 back to the step 301 .
- the method 300 is directed from the step 303 in accordance with a NO arrow back to the step 301 .
- the method 300 could be directed, if the card number match is negative, from the step 303 to a disabling step that would disable the receiver sub-system 117 if the incorrect card number where received once or a number of times.
- the IC 128 merely stores information in the form of a unique card number.
- the IC 128 may be a smart card chip that may be used to store one or more other values as well as the unique card number.
- the IC 128 may further comprise a memory (not shown) containing a “stored value” representing an amount of money where the transmitter sub-system 116 is being used for paying the fare on a bus or other form of public transport.
- FIG. 5A shows a method 500 of operation of the transmitter sub-system 116 of FIG. 2 where the IC 128 is a smart card chip containing a stored value representing an amount of money, in accordance with the alternative embodiment.
- the method 500 commences with a testing step 501 in which the biometric sensor 121 in the code entry module 130 checks whether a biometric signal 102 is being received. If this is not the case, then the method 500 is directed in accordance with a NO arrow back to the step 501 in a loop. If, on the other hand, the biometric signal 102 has been received, then the method 500 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to a step 502 .
- the step 502 compares the received biometric signal 102 with information in the biometric signature user ID database 105 in order to ensure that the received biometric signal 102 is that of the rightful user 101 of the transmitter sub-system 116 .
- a subsequent testing step 503 checks whether the comparison in the step 502 yields the desired authentication. If the biometric signature matching is authenticated, then the method 500 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to a step 504 .
- the controller 107 sends the signal 112 to the switch module 113 to close the normally open switch 127 to allow the coil 129 to be excited when the proximity module 126 is placed within range of the code entry module 130 .
- the coil 129 upon the proximity module 126 being placed within the field of the code entry module 130 , the coil 129 is excited and charges the capacitor 131 , which in turn energizes the IC 128 .
- the IC 128 transmits secure access signal 132 , i.e., the card number stored within the IC 128 , as depicted by an arrow, via the coil, to the code entry module 130 .
- the proximity module 126 receives a signal 133 , as depicted by an arrow, from the code entry module 130 .
- the signal 133 is received via the coil 129 acting as a receive antenna.
- the IC 128 decrements the stored value by a predetermined amount. This predetermined amount may represent the fare for a trip on a bus, for example.
- the signal 133 received from the code entry module 130 may include a value indicating an amount that needs to be decremented from the stored value in step 507 . In this instance, the IC 128 decrements the stored value by the amount represented by the value received from the code entry module 130 .
- the stored value is decremented by an amount (i.e., either predetermined or variable) depending on the information (such as the card number) contained in the secure access signal 132 and the proximity module 126 never has to leave the user's hand.
- the method 500 is then directed in accordance with an arrow 508 back to the step 501 .
- FIG. 5B shows a method 510 of operation of the receiver sub-system 117 of FIG. 2 where the IC 128 is the smart card chip containing the stored value of FIG. 5A .
- the method 510 commences with a testing step 511 that continuously checks whether the signal 108 including the card number has been received from code entry module 130 .
- the step 511 is performed by the controller 109 . As long as the signal 108 is not received the process 510 is directed in accordance with a NO arrow in a looping manner back to the step 511 .
- the method 510 is directed from the step 511 by means of a YES arrow to a step 512 .
- the controller 109 compares the card number received by means of the signal 108 with the card numbers stored in the database 115 .
- a subsequent testing step 513 is performed by the controller 109 .
- the controller 109 sends a signal 134 , as represented by an arrow in FIG. 2 , to the code entry module 130 indicating that the card number was successfully matched.
- the amount by which the stored value should be decremented (i.e., the amount of the fare) is predetermined.
- the amount by which the stored value should be decremented may be variable (e.g., where the fare is variable).
- the signal 134 may include a value representing the value of the fare.
- the method 510 is directed by a YES arrow to a step 516 .
- the code entry module 130 may read a particular memory address in the IC 128 to determine if the stored value is more than the fare.
- the code entry module 130 sends the signal 133 to the proximity module 126 to indicate that the stored value should be decremented by the predetermined amount.
- the signal 133 may include a value indicating an amount that needs to be decremented from the stored value.
- the code entry module 130 may also send a further signal to the controller 109 , which in turn sends a signal 110 to the controlled item 111 .
- the controlled item may merely produce an audible tone indicating that the fare has been paid.
- the controlled item 111 may open a gate or enable a turnstile.
- the method 510 is then directed from the step 516 as depicted by an arrow 517 back to the step 511 .
- the method 510 is directed from the step 513 in accordance with a NO arrow back to the step 511 .
- the controller 109 may send a signal 110 to the controlled item 111 , which then sounds an audible alert to indicate that the fare has not been paid.
- the process 510 is directed from the step 515 in accordance with a NO arrow back to the step 511 .
- the controller 109 may send a signal 110 to the controlled item 111 , which then sounds an audible alert to indicate that the fare has not been paid.
- the code entry module 130 may include a liquid crystal display (LCD) screen (not shown) for providing feedback to the user 101 .
- the code entry module 130 may display the amount of the fare as well as the amount of the stored value representing the remaining amount of money on the proximity module 126 .
- the transmitter sub-system 116 as described with reference to FIGS. 5A and 5B may also be configured to enable value to be added to the stored value.
- a cash station similar to a train ticket vending machine may be configured with a card reader similar to the code entry module 130 .
- the proximity module 126 may be placed within the field of the card reader module 130 of the vending machine.
- the card reader module 130 may then send a signal to proximity module 126 indicating the value of the money entered into the vending machine and the corresponding amount by which the stored value is to be incremented.
- the transmitter sub-system 116 may also include an LCD screen (not shown) for providing feedback to the user 101 .
- the LCD screen may be used for displaying information, such as the stored value, stored on the transmitter sub-system 116 .
- the LCD of the transmitter sub-system 116 may display the amount of the fare as well as the amount of the stored value representing the remaining amount of money stored in the IC of the proximity module 126 .
- the LCD and the IC 128 included in the transmitter sub-system 116 may be powered by a battery (e.g., a battery incorporated within the remote fob).
- the user 101 may determine the amount of money remaining on the transmitter sub-system 116 by presenting a biometric request. After the biometric has been authenticated in the manner described above, the amount of the stored value may be displayed on the LCD.
- the IC 128 may also be used to store personal details, health records, account balances, personal identification numbers (PIN) and/or other pertinent data. Again, after a biometric has been authenticated in the manner described above, the personal details, medical records, account balances and/or PIN may be displayed on the LCD.
- PIN personal identification numbers
- the IC 128 may also be used to store audit trail information so that a record is kept of the date and time that the user 101 attempted to gain access to the controlled item 111 .
- the ICs such as the IC 128 may also be used to generate a one-time dynamic password for use in online banking applications or the like. If the identity of the user 101 is authenticated successfully upon the user presenting a particular biometric (e.g., an index finger), as described above, then the biometric module 103 sends the signal 106 to the controller 107 . The controller 107 may then access a key stored in a key database (not shown) and generate a one-time password using the key and the current time, which the controller 107 determines from a clock (not shown). The password may be displayed on the LCD. The password may be generated using the RSA encryption algorithm.
- a particular biometric e.g., an index finger
- any suitable encryption algorithm may be used (e.g., Data Encryption Standard (DES), Blowfish, International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA)).
- DES Data Encryption Standard
- Blowfish Blowfish
- IDEA International Data Encryption Algorithm
- the user may then provide the generated password read from the LCD to an authentication server via a personal computer and communications network (see FIG. 11 ) in order to make an online banking transaction, for example.
- the transmitter sub-system 116 of any of the described embodiments may be used in automotive applications where the controlled item 111 is the central locking of a car.
- the controlled item 111 may also activate or deactivate an engine immobilizer.
- the transmitter sub-system 116 of any of the embodiments described may also be used in resort areas, hotels, theme parks or the like.
- the internal operators of the resort areas, hotels and theme parks may issue the transmitter sub-system 116 incorporated within a remote fob, for example, to the user 101 .
- the user 101 may then operate the transmitter sub-system 116 within the confines of the resort, hotel or theme park to enter their room or to go on a ride, where the code entry module 130 is mounted on a door jamb or near a gate, respectively.
- Biometric signatures may be added to the user ID database 105 or deleted from the user ID database 105 .
- the received biometric may be treated as an “administrator.” This would be the case, for example, if the biometric module 103 is new and has never been used, or if the user 101 has erased all the information in the database 105 .
- the administrator may have the ability to amend data stored, for example, in the database 105 .
- Another type of user may be termed an “ordinary user” and may not have the capability to amend the data stored in the user ID database 105 .
- the first user of the biometric module 103 may be automatically categorized as an administrator. This first administrator may direct the system 100 to either accept further administrators, or alternately to only accept further ordinary users.
- FIG. 6 is a schematic block diagram of the system 100 ′ in FIG. 2 .
- the disclosed secure access methods are preferably practiced using a computer system arrangement 100 ′, such as that shown in FIG. 6 wherein the processes of FIGS. 3-5B and FIGS. 9, 12 and 14 may be implemented as software, such as application program modules executing within the computer system 100 ′.
- the method steps for providing secure access are effected by instructions in the software that are carried out under direction of the respective processor modules 107 and 109 in the sub-systems 116 and 117 .
- the instructions may be formed as one or more code modules, each for performing one or more particular tasks.
- the software may also be divided into two separate parts, in which a first part performs the provision of secure access methods and a second part manages a user interface between the first part and the user.
- the software may be stored in a computer readable medium, including the storage devices described below, for example.
- the software is loaded into the sub-systems 116 and 117 from the computer readable medium, and is then executed under direction of the respective processor modules 107 and 109 .
- a computer readable medium having such software or computer program recorded on it is a computer program product.
- the use of the computer program product in the computer preferably effects an advantageous apparatus for provision of secure access.
- the computer system 100 ′ is formed, having regard to the transmitter sub-system 116 , by the controller 107 , input devices such as the biometric sensor 121 , output devices including the LED indicators 122 , the audio transducer 124 and the switch module 113 .
- the controller module 107 typically includes at least one processor unit 1005 , and a memory unit 1006 , for example, formed from semiconductor random access memory (RAM) and read only memory (ROM).
- the controller module 107 also includes a number of input/output (I/O) interfaces including an audio-video interface 1007 that couples to the LED display 122 and audio speaker 124 , an I/O interface 1003 for the biometric sensor 121 and the switch module 113 .
- the switch module 113 is connected to the proximity module 126 .
- the components 1005 , 1007 , 1003 and 1006 of the controller 107 typically communicate via an interconnected bus 1004 and in a manner that results in a conventional mode of operation of the controller 107 known to those in the relevant art.
- the application program modules for the transmitter sub-system 116 are resident in the memory 1006 iROM, and are read and controlled in their execution by the processor 1005 . Intermediate storage of the program and any data fetched from the biometric sensor 121 and a network, for example, may be accomplished using the RAM in the memory 1006 . In some instances, the application program modules may be supplied to the user encoded into the ROM in the memory 1006 . Still further, the software modules can also be loaded into the transmitter sub-system 116 from other computer readable media (e.g., over a communications network).
- the term “computer readable medium” as used herein refers to any storage or transmission medium that participates in providing instructions and/or data to the transmitter sub-system 116 for execution and/or processing.
- Examples of storage media include floppy disks, magnetic tape, CD-ROM, a hard disk drive, a ROM or integrated circuit, a magneto-optical disk, or a computer readable card such as a PCMCIA card and the like, whether or not such devices are internal or external of the transmitter sub-system 116 .
- Examples of transmission media include radio or infra-red transmission channels as well as a network connection to another computer or networked device, and the Internet or Intranets including e-mail transmissions and information recorded on Websites and the like.
- FIGS. 7A and 7B show an alternate arrangement for enabling the proximity module in FIG. 2 .
- FIG. 7A shows the proximity arrangement of FIG. 2 , in which the control signal 112 from the controller 107 of the transmitter sub-system 116 is used to control the switch module 113 .
- the switch 127 When the switch 127 is open, the series circuit comprising the IC 128 , the coil 129 and the capacitor 131 is open, and thus the proximity module 126 is disabled and cannot operate when it is brought into the field emitted by the code entry module 130 .
- the control signal 112 can be a simple is binary signal, in which, for example, one voltage level can cause the switch 127 to be in an open state, and another voltage level can cause the switch 127 to be in an open state.
- FIG. 7B shows an alternate arrangement 702 in which a proximity module 704 has a series circuit comprising an IC 705 , a coil 707 and a capacitor 706 that is permanently closed, and in this arrangement, a control signal 703 controls the operation of the IC 705 directly.
- the control signal can in one example comprise a secure encrypted communication session, using multiple layers of security if desired, between the controller 107 (see FIG. 2 ) and the IC 705 .
- the control signal 703 can be a simple binary signal that merely enables or disables the operation of the IC 705 .
- the IC 705 Upon receiving the signal 112 from the controller 107 , the IC 705 remains enabled for a predetermined period of time (e.g., four to five seconds). Within this period the proximity module 704 is enabled and may be placed by the user 101 within range of a radio frequency field being emitted by a code entry module 130 . Although the arrangement of FIG. 7B shows one series circuit for each IC 705 , other arrangements may be used that share some of the components such as the coils and/or the capacitors.
- the communication between the controller 107 and the IC 705 can be implemented using data and/or address bus communications, via a direct bus connection between the controller 107 and the IC 705 .
- the communication between the controller 107 and the IC 705 can be implemented using a contactless communication interface comprising the series circuit of the IC 705 , the coil 707 and the capacitor 706 .
- the contactless communication interface between the controller 107 and the IC 705 is a software interface. Any suitable contactless communication interface may be used.
- the controller 107 may communicate with the IC 705 according to the Sliding Window Protocol (SWP).
- SWP Sliding Window Protocol
- FIG. 8 shows how the secure access system of FIG. 2 can, using the proximity module arrangement of FIG. 7B , support multiple selectable proximity modules (e.g., 806 A and 806 B).
- FIG. 8 shows the biometric module 103 of FIG. 2 together with the audio transducer 124 , the LED indicators 122 and the biometric sensor 121 .
- the biometric module 103 also has a set of control selectors 801 designated selectors 1-4 in the present example for selecting one or more control functions. A greater or smaller number of selectors can be incorporated as desired.
- the module 103 has an LCD display 802 .
- the user may select one of the set of the control selectors 801 such as the selector designated “1.”
- the biometric module 103 sends a signal 803 to the controller 107 .
- the controller 107 Upon receiving the signal 803 , the controller 107 sends a control signal on a control line 807 A to a corresponding proximity module 806 A.
- the proximity module 806 A Upon receiving the control signal from control line 807 A from the controller 107 , the proximity module 806 A remains enabled for a predetermined period of time (e.g., four to five seconds).
- the proximity module 806 A is enabled and may be placed by the user 101 within range of a radio frequency field being emitted by a code entry module 130 .
- the biometric module 103 , the controller 107 and the plurality of the proximity modules may, for example, be incorporated within a remote fob or mobile telephone, together with the switch module 113 and the user ID database 105 .
- each IC and associated proximity module being associated with a different service provider (such as VISA®, MASTERCARD®, AMERICAN EXPRESS® and so on).
- This arrangement would enable the user 101 , after biometric authentication, to select the appropriate service provider by pressing the appropriate selector in the set of control selectors 801 , and to then bring the corresponding proximity module 806 A into the field emitted by the code entry module 130 .
- all of the proximity modules incorporated into the transmitter sub-system 116 are being brought into the field emitted by the code entry module 130 however only the desired proximity module 806 A is enabled by the signal 803 .
- the LCD display 802 can show the user 101 which service provider has been selected, thereby confirming to the user that the desired service provider has been selected.
- the LCD display 802 can be provided before the user places the proximity module (e.g., 806 A) into the field emitted by the corresponding code entry module 130 .
- the various selectable proximity modules can be associated with service providers from diverse fields, namely financial, security, automotive, individual identification and so on, and can have different interfaces with the respective code entry modules such as 130 . Therefore, the ICs 705 A, 705 B configured within the proximity modules 806 A, 806 B may include a combination of ICs such as the known HIDTM proximity IC, iCLASS IC, and MIFARETM IC, each for a distinct application and using a different interface.
- the user 101 may select the desired application using the set of control selectors 801 , and optionally can receive feedback on the selection via the LCD display 802 .
- the proximity module 806 A and corresponding IC 705 A may contain a stored unique number for use in secure access and the proximity module 806 B and corresponding IC 705 B may contain a stored value for use in making cashless payments as described above.
- the controller 107 may also be configured to generate a one-time dynamic “time-dependent” or “event-synchronous” password.
- the controller 107 may access a key stored in a database (e.g., the database 115 ).
- the controller 107 may then generate a one-time time-dependent password using the key and the current time (as a dynamic input value), for example.
- the current time may be determined from a computer clock (not shown) configured within the arrangement 800 of FIG. 8 .
- the password may be generated using the RSA encryption algorithm or any other suitable encryption algorithm (e.g., Data Encryption Standard (DES), Blowfish, International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA)).
- DES Data Encryption Standard
- IDDA International Data Encryption Algorithm
- a password may be generated using the current time as the input value to the encryption process. It is noted that this is merely one arrangement, and other input values such as a simple counter value or a random number may be used as with event-synchronous tokens and asynchronous challenge/response tokens. Further, other mathematical algorithms or codes can equally be used to generate the one-time password.
- the password may be generated using a rolling code to generate a different code variant each time the password is generated.
- successive passwords may be generated using a code and/or a look-up table known to both the code entry module 130 and receiver sub-system 117 . Using this approach successive numbers are modified, resulting in a non-repeatable number.
- the user 101 may make a payment (e.g., a VISA® payment) at a conventional (i.e., not using the proximity module) payment terminal or online by selecting the appropriate control selector 801 from the set, then pressing a suitable combination of the control selectors 801 as guided by a display on the LCD display 802 and waiting for a one-time password to be generated and shown on the LCD display 802 .
- the password may then be manually entered into the keyboard of the payment terminal or personal computer.
- This approach supports applications including business-to-business on line payments through to standard contactless payments at existing payment terminals.
- FIG. 9 shows a method 900 of operation of the arrangement 800 of FIG. 8 according to one example.
- the user 101 generates a dynamic password using the arrangement 800 of FIG. 8 .
- the dynamic password may then be used for making an online payment to a business web site.
- the online payment is being made using a VISA® account.
- the example provides a secure scenario as a reference to a typical transaction.
- variations of the steps of the methods described below including input from the user 101 , biometric reads, generation of dynamic passwords, display of current account balances, can be used to conduct various transactions.
- the method 900 of FIG. 9 may be implemented as software, such as application program modules being controlled in their execution by the controller 107 and being resident in the memory 1006 of the controller 107 .
- the method 900 commences with a testing step 901 in which the biometric sensor 121 in the code entry module 130 checks whether a biometric signal 102 is being received. If this is not the case, then the method 900 is directed in accordance with a NO arrow back to the step 901 in a loop. If, on the other hand, the biometric signal 102 has been received, then the method 900 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to a step 902 .
- the step 902 compares the received biometric signal 102 with information in the biometric user ID database 105 in order to ensure that the received biometric signal 102 is that of the rightful user 101 .
- a subsequent testing step 903 checks whether the comparison in the step 902 yields the desired authentication. If the biometric signature matching is authenticated, then the method 900 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to a step 904 .
- the controller 107 detects selection of one of the control selectors 801 of the set. In the present example, the control selector 801 “1” of the set is selected.
- the controller 107 displays the value, stored on one of the ICs, representing available funds.
- the IC 705 A is a VISA® IC for making VISA® card payments and comprises the stored value. The value is displayed on the LCD display 802 . In the present example, the controller 107 displays $156.56, which represents the balance of the user's VISA® account.
- the controller 107 again detects selection of the same control selector 801 (i.e., selector “1”) of the set, then the method 900 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to a step 907 . Otherwise, the method 900 is directed in accordance with a NO arrow to the step 901 .
- the controller 107 generates a dynamic password (i.e., a first dynamic password), using the RSA encryption algorithm, as described above.
- the dynamic password is displayed on the LCD display 802 .
- the dynamic password generated at step 907 is “2 3 4 9 8 7 8 9.”
- the dynamic password will be different each time it is generated.
- the dynamic password may be a time-dependent password where the current time is used as the input value to the encryption process.
- the available funds and the unique token serial number are also preferably encrypted with the generated password.
- the dynamic password may be an event-synchronous password.
- the first dynamic password generated and displayed by the controller 107 at step 907 is entered into a computer module 1101 of a computer system 1100 as shown in FIG. 11 , in order to make the online payment to the business website.
- the online payment is made in accordance with a method 1000 of making an online payment, which will be described in detail below with reference to FIG. 10 .
- the method 1000 may be may be implemented using the computer system 1100 , wherein the process of FIG. 10 may be implemented as software, such as one or more application programs executable within the computer system 1100 .
- the steps of method 1000 may be effected by instructions in the software that are carried out within the computer system 1100 .
- the instructions may be formed as one or more code modules, each for performing one or more particular tasks.
- the software may also be divided into two separate parts, in which a first part and the corresponding code modules performs the method 1000 and a second part and the corresponding code modules manage a user interface between the first part and the user.
- the software may be stored in a computer readable medium, including the storage devices described below, for example.
- One or more portions of the software may be stored within the computer module 1101 and also on a remote server 1150 , as will be described below.
- the software is loaded into the computer system 1100 from the computer readable medium, and then executed by the computer system 1100 .
- a computer readable medium having such software or computer program recorded on it is a computer program product as described above.
- the use of the computer program product in the computer system 1100 preferably effects an advantageous apparatus for implementing the method 1000 .
- the computer system 1100 is formed by a computer module 1101 , input devices such as a keyboard 1102 and a mouse pointer device 1103 , and output devices including a printer 1115 , a display device 1114 and loudspeakers 1117 .
- An external Modulator-Demodulator (Modem) transceiver device 1116 may be used by the computer module 1101 for communicating to and from a communications network 1120 via a connection 1121 .
- the network 1120 may be a wide-area network (WAN), such as the Internet or a private WAN.
- the modem 1116 may be a traditional “dial-up” modem.
- the modem 1116 may be a broadband modem.
- a wireless modem may also be used for wireless connection to the network 1120 .
- a server 1150 hosting a payments website (e.g., a utility website such as the phone company or bank website) is connected to the network 1120 .
- a payments website e.g., a utility website such as the phone company or bank website
- the computer module 1101 typically includes at least one processor unit 1105 , and a memory unit 1106 , for example, formed from semiconductor random access memory (RAM) and read only memory (ROM).
- the computer module 1101 also includes an number of input/output (I/O) interfaces including an audio-video interface 1107 that couples to the video display 1114 and loudspeakers 1117 , an I/O interface 1113 for the keyboard 1102 and mouse 1103 and optionally a joystick (not illustrated), and an I/O interface 1108 for the external modem 1116 and printer 1115 .
- the modem 1116 may be incorporated within the computer module 1101 , for example, within the I/O interface 1108 .
- the computer module 1101 also has a local network interface 1111 that, via a connection 1123 , permits coupling of the computer system 1100 to a local computer network 1122 , known as a Local Area Network (LAN).
- LAN Local Area Network
- the local computer network 1122 may also couple to the wide network 1120 via a connection 1124 , which would typically include a so-called “firewall” device or similar functionality.
- the interface 1111 may be formed by an ETHERNETTM circuit card, a wireless BLUETOOTHTM or an IEEE 802.11 wireless arrangement.
- the interfaces 1108 and 1113 may afford both serial and parallel connectivity, the former typically being implemented according to the Universal Serial Bus (USB) standards and having corresponding USB connectors (not illustrated).
- Storage devices 1109 are provided and typically include a hard disk drive (HDD) 1110 .
- HDD hard disk drive
- Other devices such as a floppy disk drive and a magnetic tape drive (not illustrated) may also be used.
- An optical disk drive 1112 is typically provided to act as a non-volatile source of data.
- Portable memory devices such optical disks (e.g., CD-ROM, DVD), USB-RAM, and floppy disks, for example, may then be used as appropriate sources of data to the computer system 1100 .
- the components 1105 to 1113 of the computer module 1101 typically communicate via an interconnected bus 1104 and in a manner which results in a conventional mode of operation of the computer system 1100 known to those in the relevant art.
- Examples of computers on which the described arrangements can be practiced include IBM-PC's and compatibles, Sun Sparcstations, APPLE MACTM or alike computer systems evolved therefrom.
- the application program(s) implementing the method 1000 are resident on the hard disk drive 1110 and read and controlled in execution by the processor 1105 . Intermediate storage of such programs and any data fetched from the networks 1120 and 1122 may be accomplished using the semiconductor memory 1106 , possibly in concert with the hard disk drive 1110 . In some instances, the application programs may be supplied to the user encoded on one or more CD-ROM and read via the corresponding drive 1112 , or alternatively may be read by the user from the networks 1120 or 1122 . Still further, the software can also be loaded into the computer system 1100 from other computer readable media. Computer readable media refers to any storage medium that participates in providing instructions and/or data to the computer system 1100 for execution and/or processing.
- Examples of such media include floppy disks, magnetic tape, CD-ROM, a hard disk drive, a ROM or integrated circuit, a magneto-optical disk, or a computer readable card such as a PCMCIA card and the like, whether or not such devices are internal or external of the computer module 1101 .
- Examples of computer readable transmission media that may also participate in the provision of instructions and/or data include radio or infra-red transmission channels as well as a network connection to another computer or networked device, and the Internet or Intranets including e-mail transmissions and information recorded on Websites and the like.
- GUIs graphical user interfaces
- a user of the computer system 1100 and the application may manipulate the interface to provide controlling commands and/or input to the applications associated with the GUI(s).
- the method 1000 may alternatively be implemented in dedicated hardware such as one or more integrated circuits performing the functions or sub functions of FIG. 10 .
- dedicated hardware may include graphic processors, digital signal processors, or one or more microprocessors and associated memories.
- the method 1000 begins at step 1010 , where after receiving the first password entered by the user 101 , the method 1000 proceeds to step 1011 .
- the password is transmitted by the processor 1105 to the server 1150 hosting the payments website.
- the server 1150 verifies the password entered by the user 101 by generating another dynamic password and comparing the passwords.
- the server 1150 accesses a key (associated with the user 101 of the code module 130 ) stored in a key database 1151 and determines the current time from a system clock 1152 .
- the key database 1151 may be configured within a hard disk drive (not shown) of the server 1150 .
- the server 1150 generates the password using the key and the current time determined by encrypting a value representing the current time, using the RSA encryption algorithm, which is the same encryption algorithm used by the controller 107 . Also at step 1012 , the server 1150 determines available funds (i.e., $156.56) by determining the amount from the password entered by the user 101 .
- FIG. 12 shows a method 1200 of debiting an amount of funds from an account.
- the method 1200 commences at step 1201 , where the controller 107 detects selection of another one of the control selectors 801 of the set.
- the control selector 801 “2” of the set is selected.
- the controller 107 prompts the user 101 to enter the amount that they wish to pay that also represents the amount to be debited from their account (i.e., their VISA® account).
- the controller 107 determines the amount wished to be payed based on an amount entered by the user 101 and displays this amount on the LCD display 802 .
- the user may enter the amount using the set of control selectors 801 .
- the controller 107 may display a generic amount and the user may select control selector 801 “3” of the set to increase a displayed amount and “4” to decrease the displayed amount.
- the next step 1204 is a testing step in which the biometric sensor 121 in the code entry module 130 checks whether a biometric signal 102 is being received. If this is not the case, then the method 1200 is directed in accordance with a NO arrow back to the step 1206 in a loop. If, on the other hand, the biometric signal 102 has been received, then the method 1200 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to a step 1205 . The step 1205 compares the received biometric signal 102 with information in the biometric signature user ID database 105 in order to ensure that the biometric signal received is that of the rightful user 101 .
- a subsequent testing step 1206 checks whether the comparison in the step 1205 yields the desired authentication. If the biometric signature matching is authenticated, then the method 1200 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to a step 1207 .
- the controller 107 generates a second dynamic password, using the RSA encryption algorithm with the current time being used as the input value to the encryption process, as described above.
- the dynamic password is displayed on the LCD display 802 .
- the dynamic password generated at step is “5 6 8 8 8 1 8 9.”
- the second dynamic password is a time-dependent password.
- the second password may also be an event-synchronous password.
- the amount determined at step 1203 representing the amount of funds to be payed is also encrypted within the dynamic password.
- the method 1200 concludes at the next step 1208 , where the amount of funds entered by the user at step 1203 is deducted from the value stored on the IC 705 A.
- the second dynamic password generated and displayed by the controller 107 at step 1207 is entered into the computer module 1101 to complete the online payment to the business website.
- the method 1000 proceeds to step 1014 .
- the second password is transmitted by the processor 1105 to the server 1150 hosting the payments website.
- the server 1150 verifies the password entered by the user 101 by generating still another dynamic password and comparing the passwords as described above.
- the server 1150 accesses the key (associated with the user 101 of the code entry module 130 ) stored in the key database 1151 and determines the current time from the system clock 1152 , as described above. Also at step 1015 , the server 1150 determines the amount to be paid by decrypting the amount from the second password entered by the user 101 .
- the method 1000 concludes at the next step 1016 , where the payment is processed by the server 1150 .
- the payment transaction can be reconciled to the customer in a monthly statement.
- the dynamic password generated at step 907 may be entered into a keypad located on a door jamb and being connected to a building security system.
- the stored value encrypted within the dynamic password can be a personal identification number (PIN) stored with the transmitter sub-system 116 .
- PIN personal identification number
- the building security system then verifies the password entered by the user 101 by generating another dynamic password and comparing the passwords.
- the PIN used for secure access is enhanced through the need of a biometric signature.
- the dynamic passwords generated at step 907 may have other user information encrypted within the dynamic password including a serial number related to the transmitter sub-system (configured within a telephone or fob), time of access, type of account and validated finger (e.g., middle finger).
- the arrangement of FIG. 8 comprises multiple selectable proximity modules (e.g., 806 A, 806 B) each configured in accordance with the arrangement of FIG. 7B .
- one antenna e.g., 707
- multiple ICs e.g., all connected in parallel with the antenna.
- each of the ICs may be separately selectable using separate control lines (e.g., 807 A, 807 B).
- FIG. 13 shows how the secure access system of FIG. 2 can, using one or more conventional proximity modules, be used to perform a secure transaction.
- FIG. 13 shows the biometric module 103 of FIG. 2 together with the audio transducer 124 , the LED indicators 122 and the biometric sensor 121 , and a set of control selectors 1301 designated selectors 1-4 in the present example for selecting one or more control functions.
- the biometric module 103 also has an LCD display 802 .
- the arrangement 1300 also has a proximity module 1306 .
- the proximity module 1306 comprises the coil 129 , the capacitor 131 and an IC 1307 .
- the proximity module 1306 is configured to be constantly available to be activated, upon being placed within the field of the code entry module 130 in a conventional manner, without the need for a control signal such as the signal 803 . That is, no biometric verification is required in the arrangement 1300 in order to activate the proximity module 1306 .
- the arrangement 1300 may also be used to perform secure transactions or the like, including an online transaction. Rather than the biometric verification being needed in order to activate the proximity module 1306 , the generation of a dynamic password, as described above, may be utilized to provide an additional security layer, as will be described below.
- the method 1400 begins with a testing step 1401 in which the biometric sensor 121 in the code entry module 130 checks whether a biometric signal 102 is being received. If this is not the case, then the method 1400 is directed in accordance with a NO arrow back to the step 1401 in a loop. If, on the other hand, the biometric signal 102 has been received, then the method 1400 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to a step 1402 . The step 1402 compares the received biometric signal 102 with information in the user ID database 105 in order to ensure that the received biometric signal 102 is that of the rightful user 101 .
- a subsequent testing step 1403 checks whether the comparison in the step 1402 yields the desired authentication. If the biometric signature matching is authenticated, then the method 1400 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to a step 1404 where the match is indicated to the user 101 on the LCD display 802 . Also at step 1404 , the controller 107 detects selection of one of the control selectors 801 of the set. In the present example, the control selector 801 “1” of the set is selected by the user 101 . In response to selection of the selector “1,” at the next step 1405 , the controller 107 generates a dynamic password, using the RSA encryption algorithm, as described above, and displays the dynamic password on the LCD display 802 .
- the dynamic password is generated based on a card number (associated with the user) stored on the IC 1307 .
- the dynamic password generated at 1405 is entered into a keypad or the like (not shown) associated with the code entry module 130 .
- the card number may be encrypted within the dynamic password.
- the coil 129 is excited and charges the capacitor 131 , which in turn energizes the IC 1307 .
- the IC 1307 then transmits signal 1332 , as depicted by an arrow, the card number stored within the IC 1307 , via the proximity module 1306 , to the code entry module 130 .
- a controller e.g., 109
- the controller of the code entry module 130 uses the card number to verify the dynamic password as described above.
- the controller of the code entry module 130 generates a dynamic password, using the RSA encryption algorithm, using the card number, and compares the generated password to the password entered by the user 101 .
- the passwords generated at step 1405 and by the controller may be time-dependent or event-synchronous.
- the proximity module 1306 receives a signal 1333 , as depicted by the arrow, from the code entry module 130 . Then at the next step 1407 , the IC 1307 decrements the stored value by a predetermined amount. This predetermined amount may represent a payment for a trip on a bus, for example.
- the signal 1333 received from the code entry module 130 may include a value indicating an amount that needs to be decremented from the stored value in step 1407 . In this instance, the IC 1307 decrements the stored value by the amount represented by the value received from the code entry module 130 .
- the stored value is decremented by an amount (i.e., either predetermined or variable) depending on the information (such as the card number) contained in the secure access signal 132 and the proximity module 126 never has to leave the user's hand.
- the method 1400 is then directed in accordance with an arrow 1408 back to the step 1401 .
- the dynamic password generated on the basis of a valid biometric reading is used to verify the user of the arrangement 1300 .
- the dynamic password was generated first, in alternative arrangements the dynamic password may follow or accompany a payment.
- the arrangements described above, including the arrangement 1300 of FIG. 13 may also be used with automatic teller machines (ATMs) or point of sale (POS) devices where a personal identification number (PIN) has conventionally been used to verify the validity of a card (i.e., magnetic stripe card or smart card) owner.
- ATMs automatic teller machines
- POS point of sale
- the dynamic password generated on the basis of a valid biometric reading may be used to replace such a FIN, without affecting a conventional transaction.
- a user inserts their magnetic stripe card (or smart card) into the ATM or swipes the card using an EFTPOS terminal.
- a card number corresponding to the magnetic stripe card is stored on the IC 1307 .
- the user may use the arrangement 1300 described above to generate a time-dependent or event-synchronous dynamic password based on a valid biometric reading.
- the card number corresponding to the magnetic stripe card may be encrypted within the generated password.
- the user then enters the generated dynamic password into the ATM or EFTPOS terminal.
- the dynamic password is then verified by a back-end host server (e.g., associated with a bank) in the manner described above based on the card number.
- the arrangements described above, including the arrangement 1300 of FIG. 13 may also be used for making an online payment.
- the dynamic password may be used to replace the user's password that has conventionally been used.
- the user may use the arrangement 1300 described above to generate a time-dependent or event-synchronous dynamic password based on a valid biometric reading.
- a user identification number corresponding to the user may be encrypted within the generated password.
- the user then enters the generated dynamic password into a personal computer.
- the dynamic password is then verified by a back-end host server (e.g., associated with a bank) connected to the personal computer in the manner described above based on the user's identification number encrypted with the entered password.
- a back-end host server e.g., associated with a bank
- the arrangements described above, including the arrangement 1300 of FIG. 13 may stop intruders from stealing credit and debit cards for later fraudulent use in ATM and POS devices.
- the owner or user of a magnetic stripe card would also require the fob or mobile telephone with the card number corresponding to the magnetic stripe card stored thereon.
- a new dynamic password could then be generated for each ATM or EFTPOS transaction.
- the dynamic password overcomes the inherent weaknesses in PIN type inputs, due to the dynamic nature of the password and requirement to validate the owner or user biometrics prior to generating that password. If an intruder views a dynamic password input, they cannot replicate it a next time as the password is constantly changing.
- the arrangement 1300 of FIG. 13 has been described as including the proximity module 1306 , the arrangement 1300 may not necessarily include such proximity module 1306 .
- An arrangement without a proximity module may also be used to perform the transactions described above including ATM, EFTPOS and online transactions merely by generating a dynamic password as described above.
- the arrangements described above allow biometric security to be easily integrated with existing infrastructure for payment or access systems.
- the arrangements are simple and effective for secure proof of identity. The user does not need to remember a code, number, name or combination.
- the arrangements may be used online or offline.
- the described arrangements may also be used in wireless systems, alarm panel activation, garage control, door access, boom-gate access and anywhere long distance secure transmissions are required.
- the system 100 can also be used to provide authorized access to lighting systems, building control devices, exterior or remote devices such as air compressors and so on.
- the system 100 may also be used to gain access to online applications.
- the transmitter sub-system 116 may be used to generate a one-time dynamic password for use in online banking applications or the like.
- the concept of “secure access” is thus extendible beyond mere access to restricted physical areas.
- the arrangements described above may comprise a “duress” or “alarm” feature.
- This feature may be activated using a different predetermined biometrics. For example, typically the user may present a particular finger (e.g., their thumb) for verification prior to enabling the proximity module (e.g., 126 ) or generating a dynamic password. If the valid user is under duress by an intruder, the valid user can use an alternate finger (e.g., their index finger) to enable the proximity module and/or generate a dynamic password, for example. Use of the alternate finger may automatically activate an alarm, thereby bringing emergency services to the situation. Alternatively, the dynamic password generated based on the alternate finger may include an encrypted alarm notification. In this instance, when the generated password is entered into a keypad, keyboard or the like, an alarm will be automatically activated by a backend controller or server, again bringing the emergency services to the location.
- Generating different dynamic passwords based on the verification of different biometrics may also be used where multiple access areas are selectable from a single point.
- the arrangements described above e.g., the arrangement 1300
- the arrangements described above may be configured so that a user's thumb may be read and verified, as described above, in order to generate a first dynamic password.
- the first password may be entered into a keypad, for example, to allow the user to enter a first door “1.”
- the user may then present a different finger (e.g., the person's index finger), which, once verified, may result in the generation of a second dynamic password.
- the second password may be entered into a keypad, for example, to allow the user to enter a second door “2.”
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Abstract
A transmitter for transmitting a secure access signal to a system for providing secure access to a controlled item is disclosed. The access is dependent on information contained in the secure access signal. The transmitter comprises a biometric sensor for receiving a biometric signal and a processor for matching the biometric signal against members of a database of biometric signatures. The transmitter comprises enabling means for enabling an inductive circuit, based on the matching of the biometric signal, to transmit the secure access signal conveying the information to the system upon the inductive circuit being placed within range of a radio frequency field emitted by the system.
Description
- This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 16/717,270, filed Dec. 17, 2019, which is a continuation application of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 15/213,661, filed Jul. 19, 2016, now U.S. Pat. No. 10,685,353, issued Jun. 16, 2020, which is a continuation application of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14/308,091, filed Jun. 18, 2014, abandoned, which is a continuation application of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/738,663, filed Apr. 22, 2010, abandoned, which is a national stage entry of PCT/AU2008/001490, filed Oct. 8, 2008, which claims priority to AU2007905760, filed Oct. 22, 2007, and also claims priority to AU2008900672, filed Feb. 13, 2008, the disclosure of each of which is hereby incorporated herein in its entirety by this reference.
- The present disclosure relates to secure access systems and, in particular, to systems for remote entry access.
-
FIG. 1 shows aconventional arrangement 400 for providing secure access. Auser 401 makes arequest 402, as depicted by an arrow, directed to a code entry module 403. The code entry module 403 is typically mounted on the external jamb of a secure door. Therequest 402 is typically a secure code of some type that is compatible with the code entry module 403. Thus, for example, therequest 402 can be a card number stored within a conventional proximity card used to direct therequest 402 to a code entry module 403, e.g., a card reader. Alternatively, therequest 402 can be a sequence of secret numbers directed to a code entry module 403, i.e., a keypad. Therequest 402 can also be a biometric signal from theuser 401 directed to a code entry module 403, e.g., a corresponding biometric sensor. One example of a biometric signal is a fingerprint. Other physical attributes that can be used to provide biometric signals include voice, retinal or iris pattern, face pattern, palm configuration and so on. - The code entry module 403 conveys the
request 402 by sending acorresponding signal 404, as depicted by an arrow, to acontroller 405, which is typically situated in a remote or inaccessible place. Thecontroller 405 authenticates the security information provided by theuser 401 by interrogating adatabase 407 withsignal 406, as depicted by an arrow. If theuser 401 is authenticated, and has the appropriate access privileges, then thecontroller 405 sends anaccess signal 408, as depicted by an arrow, to adevice 409 in order to provide the desired access. Thedevice 409 can, for example, be the locking mechanism of a secure door, or can be an electronic lock on a personal computer (PC) that theuser 401 desires to access. - Current systems as depicted in
FIG. 1 utilize a communication protocol called “Wiegand” for communication between the code entry module 403 and thecontroller 405. The Wiegand protocol is a simple one-way data protocol that can be modified by increasing or decreasing the bit count to ensure uniqueness of the protocol among different security companies, The Wiegand protocol does not secure the information being sent between the code entry module 403 and thecontroller 405. - More advanced protocols such as RS 485 have been used in order to overcome the vulnerability of the Wiegand protocol over long distance routes. RS 485 is a duplex protocol offering encryption capabilities at both the transmitting and receiving ends, i.e., the code entry module 403 and the
controller 405, respectively, in the present case. The length of the path of thesignal 404 nonetheless provides an attack point for the unauthorized person. - Proximity cards have become a popular means for emitting the
request 402, since proximity cards are cheap, easy to use and convenient to carry for theuser 401. Typically, proximity cards comprise an inductive circuit including an integrated circuit (IC), a capacitor, and a coil, which are connected in series within the card. When aproximity card 410 is placed within range of the code entry module 403 (or “card reader”), the code entry module 403 presents a field that excites the coil and charges the capacitor, which in turn energizes the IC on theproximity card 410. The IC then transmits a card number stored within the IC, via the coil as transmit antenna, to the code entry module 403. The field emitted by the code entry module 403 for older proximity cards is typically around 125 kHz. The field emitted by the code entry module 403 for newer proximity cards is typically around 13.56 MHz. These newer proximity cards are typically in the form of contactless RFID cards, which are also known as “contactless smartcards.” Proximity cards have a communication range of 0-80 mm in most instances, allowing the user to place theproximity card 410 within 80 mm of the code entry module 403 in order for the card to be read by the code entry module 403. The term “communication range” refers, in the described example, to the distance to within which theproximity module 126 and thecode entry module 130 must be brought in order for their respective transmit/receive antennas to be able to achieve satisfactory communications. - Conventional proximity cards (e.g., 410) used for emitting the
request 402 may be lost by theuser 401, and the lostproximity card 410 may be used by an unauthorized person to gain the desired access. In fact, there has been a high incidence of such fraudulent activity with conventional proximity cards where unauthorized persons steal the cards. As a result many users have looked to upgrade their proximity card secure access systems with other more secure systems. However, the cost of such up-grades is high due to the necessity to re-wire buildings and facilities to implement the upgrades. - It is an object of the present disclosure to substantially overcome, or at least ameliorate, one or more disadvantages of existing arrangements.
- According to a first aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a transmitter for transmitting a secure access signal to a system for providing secure access to a controlled item, the access being dependent on information contained in the secure access signal, the transmitter comprising:
-
- a biometric sensor for receiving a biometric signal;
- a processor for matching the biometric signal against members of a database of biometric signatures; and
- enabling means for enabling an inductive circuit, based on the matching of the biometric signal, to transmit the secure access signal conveying the information to the system upon the inductive circuit being placed within range of a radio frequency field emitted by the system.
- According to another aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a method of transmitting a secure access signal to a system for providing secure access to a controlled item, the access being dependent on information contained in the secure access signal, the method comprising:
-
- receiving a biometric signal;
- matching the biometric signal against members of a database of biometric signatures; and
- enabling an inductive circuit, based on the matching of the biometric signal, to transmit the secure access signal conveying the information to the system upon the inductive circuit being placed within range of a radio frequency field emitted by the system.
- According to still another aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a computer program product having a computer readable medium having a computer program recorded therein for transmitting a secure access signal to a system for providing secure access to a controlled item, the access being dependent on information contained in the secure access signal, the program comprising:
-
- code for receiving a biometric signal;
- code for matching the biometric signal against members of a database of biometric signatures; and
- code for enabling an inductive circuit, based on the matching of the biometric signal, to transmit the secure access signal conveying the information to the system upon the inductive circuit being placed within range of a radio frequency field emitted by the system.
- According to still another aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a system for providing secure access to a controlled item, the system comprising:
-
- a database of biometric signatures;
- a transmitter sub-system comprising:
- a biometric sensor for receiving a biometric signal;
- means for matching the biometric signal against members of the database of biometric signatures; and
- means for enabling an inductive circuit, based on the matching of the biometric signal, to transmit a secure access signal conveying information upon the inductive circuit being placed within range of a radio frequency field; and
- a receiver sub-system comprising;
- means for emitting the radio frequency field;
- means for receiving the transmitted secure access signal upon the radio frequency field being emitted; and
- means for providing conditional access to the controlled item dependent upon the information.
- According to still another aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a transmitter sub-system for operating in a system for providing secure access to a controlled item, the system comprising a database of biometric signatures, a receiver sub-system comprising means for emitting a radio frequency field, means for receiving a secure access signal transmitted by the transmitter sub-system, and means for providing conditional access to the controlled item dependent upon information conveyed in the secure access signal; wherein the transmitter sub-system comprises:
-
- a biometric sensor for receiving a biometric signal;
- means for matching the biometric signal against members of the database of biometric signatures; and
- means for enabling an inductive circuit, based on the matching of the biometric signal, to transmit a secure access signal conveying the information upon the inductive circuit being placed within range of the radio frequency field.
- According to still another aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a receiver sub-system for operating in a system for providing secure access to a controlled item, the system comprising a database of biometric signatures, a transmitter sub-system comprising a biometric sensor for receiving a biometric signal, means for matching the biometric signal against members of the database of biometric signatures, and means for enabling an inductive circuit, based on the matching of the biometric signal, to transmit a secure access signal conveying information; wherein the receiver sub-system comprises:
-
- means for emitting a radio frequency field;
- means for receiving the transmitted secure access signal from the transmitter sub-system upon the inductive circuit being placed within range of a radio frequency field; and
- means for providing conditional access to the controlled item dependent upon the information.
- According to still another aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a system for providing secure access to one of a plurality of controlled items, the system comprising:
-
- a database of biometric signatures;
- a transmitter sub-system comprising:
- a biometric sensor for receiving a biometric signal;
- means for determining if the received biometric signal matches a member of the database of biometric signatures;
- a plurality of proximity modules associated with the plurality of controlled items;
- means for selecting one of the plurality of proximity modules; and
- means for enabling, if the received biometric signal matches a member of the database of biometric signatures, the selected proximity module, which can consequently transmit a secure access signal conveying information stored in the selected proximity module upon the proximity module being placed within range of a radio-frequency field adapted to activate the selected proximity module; and
- a receiver sub-system comprising;
- means for emitting the radio frequency field adapted to activate the selected proximity module;
- means for receiving the transmitted secure access signal upon the radio frequency field being emitted; and
- means for providing conditional access to the selected controlled item dependent upon the information.
- According to still another aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a transmitter for transmitting a secure access signal to a system for providing secure access to one of a plurality of controlled items, the access being dependent on information contained in the secure access signal, the transmitter comprising:
-
- a biometric sensor for receiving a biometric signal;
- means for determining if the received biometric signal matches a member of a database of biometric signatures;
- a plurality of proximity modules associated with the plurality of controlled items;
- means for selecting one of the plurality of proximity modules; and
- means for enabling, if the received biometric signal matches a member of the database of biometric signatures, the selected proximity module, which can consequently transmit a secure access signal conveying information stored in the selected proximity module upon the proximity module being placed within range of a radio-frequency field adapted to activate the selected proximity module.
- According to still another aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a receiver sub-system in a system for providing secure access to one of a plurality of controlled items, the system comprising a database of biometric signatures, a transmitter sub-system comprising a biometric sensor for receiving a biometric signal, means for determining if the received biometric signal matches a member of the database of biometric signatures, a plurality of proximity modules associated with the plurality of controlled items, means for selecting one of the plurality of proximity modules, and means for enabling, if the received biometric signal matches a member of the database of biometric signatures, the selected proximity module, which can consequently transmit a secure access signal conveying information stored in the selected proximity module upon the proximity module being placed within range of a radio-frequency field adapted to activate the selected proximity module; the receiver sub-system comprising:
-
- means for emitting the radio frequency field adapted to activate the selected proximity module;
- means for receiving the transmitted secure access signal upon the radio frequency field being emitted; and
- means for providing conditional access to the selected controlled item dependent upon the information.
- According to still another aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a system for performing a secure transaction, the system comprising:
-
- a database of one or more biometric signatures;
- a first subsystem comprising:
- a biometric sensor for receiving a biometric signal;
- means for matching the biometric signal against members of the database of biometric signatures to thereby determine an authentication signal; and
- means for generating a first password dependent upon the authentication signal, the password being generated according to an encryption process based on a dynamic input value, the first password comprising an encrypted value representing funds available; and
- a second sub-system comprising;
- means for receiving the first password;
- means for determining the funds available based on the received password; and
- means for performing the transaction based on the available funds.
- According to still another aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a first sub-system for operating in a system for performing a secure transaction, the system comprising a database of biometric signatures, a second sub-system comprising means for receiving a password, and means for performing the secure transaction based on available funds dependent upon the password, the first subsystem comprising:
-
- a biometric sensor for receiving a biometric signal;
- means for matching the biometric signal against members of the database of biometric signatures to thereby determine an authentication signal; and
- means for generating the password dependent upon the authentication signal, wherein the password is generated according to an encryption process based on a dynamic input value, the first password comprising an encrypted value representing the funds available.
- According to still another aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a system for performing a secure transaction over a network using a card, the system comprising:
-
- a database of one or more biometric signatures;
- a first subsystem comprising:
- a biometric sensor for receiving a biometric signal;
- means for matching the biometric signal against members of the database of biometric signatures to thereby determine an authentication signal; and
- means for generating a password dependent upon the authentication signal, the password being generated according to an encryption process based on a dynamic input value, the first password comprising an encrypted value representing the magnetic stripe card; and
- a second sub-system comprising;
- means for reading the card;
- means for receiving the password;
- means for authenticating the received password based on the card number encrypted within password; and
- means for performing the transaction based on the authentication.
- According to still another aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a method of transmitting a secure access signal to a system for providing secure access to one of a plurality of controlled items, the access being dependent on information contained in the secure access signal, the method comprising the steps of:
-
- receiving a biometric signal;
- matching the biometric signal to a member of a database of biometric signatures;
- selecting one of a plurality of proximity modules, the selected proximity module being associated with at least one of the plurality of controlled items; and
- enabling the selected proximity module, if the received biometric signal matches a member of the database of biometric signatures, the enabled selected proximity module being configured for transmitting a secure access signal conveying information stored in to the selected proximity module upon the proximity module being placed within range of a radio-frequency field adapted to activate the selected proximity module.
- According to still another aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a method for performing a secure transaction over a network using a card, the method comprising:
-
- matching a biometric signal against members of a database of biometric signatures to thereby determine an authentication signal; and
- generating a password dependent upon the authentication signal, the password being generated according to an encryption process based on a dynamic input value, the password comprising an encrypted number representing the card;
- reading the card to determine the card number from the card;
- authenticating a received password based on the card number, encrypted within password; and
- performing the transaction based on the authentication.
- According to still another aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a computer program product having a computer readable medium having a computer program recorded therein for transmitting a secure access signal to a system for providing secure access to a controlled item, the access being dependent on information contained in the secure access signal, the program comprising:
-
- code for receiving a biometric signal;
- code for matching the biometric signal to a member of a database of biometric signatures;
- code for selecting one of a plurality of proximity modules, the selected proximity module being associated with at least one of the plurality of controlled items; and
- code for enabling the selected proximity module, if the received biometric signal matches a member of the database of biometric signatures, the enabled selected proximity module being configured for transmitting a secure access signal conveying information stored in the selected proximity module upon the proximity module being placed within range of a radio-frequency field adapted to activate the selected proximity module.
- According to still another aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided a computer program product having a computer readable medium having a computer program recorded therein for performing a secure transaction over a network using a card, the program comprising:
-
- code for matching a biometric signal against members of a database of biometric signatures to thereby determine an authentication signal; and
- code for generating a password dependent upon the authentication signal, the password being generated according to an encryption process based on a dynamic input value, the password comprising an encrypted number representing the card;
- code for reading the card to determine the card number from the card;
- code authenticating a received password based on the card number encrypted within password; and
- code for performing the transaction based on the authentication.
- Other aspects of the present disclosure are also disclosed.
- Some aspects of the prior art and one or more embodiments of the present disclosure are described with reference to the drawings, in which:
-
FIG. 1 shows a conventional arrangement for providing secure access; -
FIG. 2 is a functional block diagram of a system for providing secure access according to an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure; -
FIG. 3 shows an example of a method of operation of a transmitter sub-system of the system ofFIG. 2 ; -
FIG. 4 shows an example of a method of operation of a receiver sub-system of the system ofFIG. 2 ; -
FIG. 5A shows an example of a method of operation of the transmitter sub-system ofFIG. 2 where the IC is a smart card chip; -
FIG. 5B shows an example of a method of operation of the receiver sub-system ofFIG. 2 where the IC is a smart card chip; -
FIG. 6 is a schematic block diagram of the system inFIG. 2 ; -
FIGS. 7A and 7B show an alternate arrangement for enabling the proximity module inFIG. 2 ; -
FIG. 8 shows how the secure access system ofFIG. 2 can support multiple selectable proximity modules; -
FIG. 9 shows an example of a method of operation of the arrangement ofFIG. 8 ; -
FIG. 10 shows an example of a method of making an online payment using the arrangement ofFIG. 8 ; -
FIG. 11 is a functional block diagram of a general purpose computer system upon which the method ofFIG. 10 may be implemented; -
FIG. 12 shows an example of a method of debiting an amount of funds from an account stored within the transmitter sub-system ofFIGS. 2 and 8 ; -
FIG. 13 shows how the secure access system ofFIG. 2 can support one or more conventional proximity modules according to another embodiment; and -
FIG. 14 shows an example of a method of performing a secure transaction using the arrangement ofFIG. 13 . - It is to be noted that the discussions contained in the “Background” section relating to prior art arrangements relate to discussions of documents or devices that form public knowledge through their respective publication and/or use. Such should not be interpreted as a representation by the present inventor(s) or patent applicant that such documents or devices in any way form part of the common general knowledge in the art.
- Where reference is made in any one or more of the accompanying drawings to steps and/or features that have the same reference numerals, those steps and/or features have for the purposes of this description the same function(s) or operation(s), unless the contrary intention appears.
-
FIG. 2 is a functional block diagram of asystem 100 for providing secure access according to the exemplary embodiment. Auser 101 makes arequest 102, as depicted by an arrow, to abiometric module 103. Thebiometric module 103 includes abiometric sensor 121 and therequest 102 takes the form of a biometric signal that corresponds to the nature of thesensor 121 in themodule 103. In the embodiments described herein, thebiometric sensor 121 in themodule 103 is a fingerprint sensor and therequest 102 typically takes the form of a thumb press on a sensor panel (not shown) on themodule 103. Alternatively, thebiometric sensor 121 may be responsive to one or more of voice, retinal pattern, iris pattern, face pattern and palm configuration. - The
module 103 interrogates auser ID database 105 ascommunication 104, depicted by an arrow. Thus, for example, if therequest 102 is the thumb press on thebiometric sensor panel 121 then theuser database 105 contains one or more members in the form of biometric signatures for authorized users against which therequest 102 can be authenticated. If the identity of theuser 101 is authenticated successfully, then thebiometric module 103 sends asignal 106 to acontroller 107. Upon receiving thesignal 106, thecontroller 107 sends asignal 112, as depicted by an arrow, to aswitch module 113 comprising a “normally open”switch 127. Any suitable mechanical or electronic (e.g., semiconductor) switch may be used to implement theswitch 127. - As seen in
FIG. 2 , theswitch module 113 is connected to aproximity module 126. Theproximity module 126 comprises an inductive circuit formed from anIC 128, acoil 129 and acapacitor 131, which are connected in series. TheIC 128 has information in the form of a unique card number stored within a memory of theIC 128. Theswitch 127 of theswitch module 113 is connected in series with theIC 128, thecoil 129 and thecapacitor 131 of theproximity module 126. Accordingly, theproximity module 126 is similar to that used in conventional proximity cards such as those provided by financial institutions such as VISA®, MASTERCARD®, AMERICAN EXPRESS® and so on. However, theswitch module 113 is configured to close and open the circuit formed by theIC 128, thecoil 129 and thecapacitor 131, thereby enabling and disabling theproximity module 126, respectively. - Upon receiving the
signal 112 from thecontroller 107, theswitch module 113 closes the normallyopen switch 127 for a predetermined period of time (e.g., four to five seconds). Within this period the inductive circuit in theproximity card module 126 is enabled and may be placed by theuser 101 within range of a radio frequency field being emitted by acode entry module 130. The field emitted by thecode entry module 130 excites thecoil 129 and charges thecapacitor 131, which in turn energizes theIC 128 and thus activates theproximity module 126. TheIC 128 then transmits asecure access signal 132, as depicted by an arrow, via the coil as transmit antenna, to thecode entry module 130. Accordingly, thesecure access signal 132 is transmitted via the inductive circuit. Thesecure access signal 132 is configured for conveying information including the card number stored within the memory of theIC 128. - The
switch 127 is preferably implemented in the form of a flip/flop arrangement where upon receiving thesignal 112 theswitch 127 will close but will automatically return to the normally open position at the end of the predetermined period. Accordingly, if theproximity card module 126 is not placed within the range of thecode entry module 130 within the predetermined period, then the field emitted by thecode entry module 130 will not charge thecapacitor 131 as theswitch 127 has opened the circuit formed by theIC 128,coil 129 andcapacitor 131. In this instance, theuser 101 again makes therequest 102 in order to enable theproximity module 126. - Upon receiving the secure access signal 132 including the card number from the
proximity card module 126, thecode entry module 130 sends asignal 108, as depicted by an arrow, including the card number to acontroller 109. Thecontroller 109 tests the card number received from thecode entry module 130 against adatabase 115 of card numbers by sendingtest 114, thistest 114 being depicted by an arrow. If the incoming card number received from thecode entry module 130 is found to be legitimate, then thecontroller 109 sends acommand signal 110, as depicted by an arrow, to a controlleditem 111. The controlleditem 111 can be a door locking mechanism on a secure door, or an electronic lock (or key circuit) on a personal computer (PC) that is to be accessed by theuser 101. Accordingly, access to the controlleditem 111 is dependent on the information (e.g., the card number) contained in thesecure access signal 132. Thesystem 100 provides conditional access to the controlleditem 111 dependent upon the information contained in thesecure access signal 132. - It is noted that the
controller 109 contains areceiver 118 that receives thesignal 108 including the card number and converts thesignal 108 into aform 120, as depicted by an arrow, which thecontroller 109 can use. - The
biometric module 103 also incorporates at least one mechanism for providing feedback to theuser 101. This mechanism can, for example, take the form of one or more light emitting diode (LED)indicators 122, which can providevisual feedback 123, depicted by an arrow to theuser 101. Alternately, or in addition, the mechanism can take the form of an audio signal provided by anaudio transducer 124 providingaudio feedback 125. Similarly, thecode entry module 130 may also incorporate one or more mechanisms for providing feedback to theuser 101. - The transmitter sub-system (or transmitter) 116 in
FIG. 2 falling to the left hand side, as depicted by an arrow, of a dashedline 119 may be implemented in a number of different forms. The transmitter sub-system 116 (or transmitter), including thebiometric module 103, theswitch module 113, theuser ID database 105, thecontroller 107 and theproximity module 126, may, for example, be incorporated within a remote fob (which is a small portable device carried by the user 101) or even a mobile (cell) telephone. Thebiometric module 103 may be powered by an internal battery of the fob or telephone. - Similar to the
transmitter sub-system 116, thecode entry module 130, thecontroller 109,database 115 and the controlleditem 111 form areceiver sub-system 117 as seen inFIG. 2 . - The
code entry module 130 may be mounted in a protected enclosure on the outside jamb of a secured door. In this instance, the channel used by thesignal 108 typically uses a wired medium. However, thecode entry module 130 may communicate with thecontroller 109 via a wireless communication channel used by thesignal 108. - The
controller 109,database 115 and controlleditem 111 are typically located in an inaccessible area such as a hidden roof space or alternately in a suitable protected area such as an armored cupboard. In the case that a wireless communication channel is used by thesignal 108, the location of thecontroller 109 is of course consistent with reliable reception of thewireless signal 108. - In the case that the
code entry module 130 communicates with thecontroller 109 via a wireless communication channel, thesignal 108 may be based upon rolling code. However, it is noted that this is merely one arrangement, and other secure codes can equally be used. Thus, for example, either of the BLUETOOTH™ protocols, or the WI-FI™ protocols may be used. - Rolling codes provide a substantially non-replayable, non-repeatable and encrypted radio frequency data communications scheme for secure messaging. These codes use inherently secure protocols and serial number ciphering techniques, which may be used to hide clear text values required for authentication.
- Rolling codes may use a different code variant each time the transmission of the
signal 108 occurs. This is achieved by encrypting the data from thecode entry module 130 with a mathematical algorithm, and ensuring that successive transmissions of thesignal 108 are modified using a code and/or a look-up table known to both thecode entry module 130 and thereceiver sub-system 117. Using this approach, successive transmissions are modified, resulting in a non-repeatable data transfer, even if the information from thecode entry module 130 remains the same. The modification of the code in thesignal 108 for each transmission significantly reduces the likelihood that an intruder can access the information and replay the information to thereby gain entry at some later time. - The biometric signature
user ID database 105 is shown inFIG. 2 to be part of thetransmitter sub-system 116. Thesub-system 116 may comprise a memory 1006 (seeFIG. 6 ) containing thedatabase 105 of biometric signatures. As described above, thetransmitter sub-system 116 including thedatabase 105 may be implemented as a remote fob, where the fob incorporates the biometric (e.g., fingerprint) authentication arrangement. However, in an alternate arrangement, the biometric signatureuser ID database 105 can be located in thereceiver sub-system 117 together with thecontroller 109, in which case thecommunication 104 between thebiometric module 103 and the signatureuser ID database 105 can also be performed over a secure wireless communication channel. In the event that thesecure access system 100 is being applied to providing secure access to a PC, then the secured PC can store the biometric signature of the authorized user in internal memory, and the PC can be integrated into thereceiver sub-system 117 ofFIG. 1 . - The combination of the biometric verification and
proximity module 126 in a remote fob provides a particularly significant advantage over current proximity card systems. If the remote fob is lost by theuser 101, the lost remote fob may not be used by an unauthorized person to gain the desired access. Further, the security of conventional proximity card systems may be improved without the need to upgrade existing infrastructure. -
FIG. 3 shows themethod 200 of operation of thetransmitter sub-system 116 ofFIG. 2 . Themethod 200 commences with atesting step 201 in which thebiometric sensor 121 in thecode entry module 130 checks whether abiometric signal 102 is being received. If this is not the case, then themethod 200 is directed in accordance with a NO arrow back to thestep 201 in a loop. If, on the other hand, thebiometric signal 102 has been received, then themethod 200 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to astep 202. Thestep 202 compares the receivedbiometric signal 102 with information in the biometric signatureuser ID database 105 in order to ensure that the receivedbiometric signal 102 is that of therightful user 101 of thetransmitter sub-system 116. - A
subsequent testing step 203 checks whether the comparison in thestep 202 yields the desired authentication. If the biometric signature matching is authenticated, then themethod 200 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to astep 204. In thestep 204 thecontroller 107 sends thesignal 112 to theswitch module 113 to close the normallyopen switch 127 to allow thecoil 129 to be excited when theproximity card module 126 is placed within range of thecode entry module 130. Then at thenext step 205, upon theproximity card module 126 being placed within the field of thecode entry module 130, thecoil 129 is excited and charges thecapacitor 131, which in turn energizes theIC 128. TheIC 128 then transmitssecure access signal 132, i.e., the card number stored within theIC 128, as depicted by an arrow, via the coil, to thecode entry module 130. Themethod 200 is then directed in accordance with anarrow 206 back to thestep 201. - Returning to the
testing step 203, if the signature comparison indicates that thebiometric signal 102 is not authentic, and has thus not been received from the proper user, then themethod 200 is directed in accordance with a NO arrow back to thestep 201. In an alternate arrangement, the NO arrow from thestep 203 could lead to a disabling step that would disable further operation of thetransmitter sub-system 116, either immediately upon receipt of the incorrectbiometric signal 102, or after a number of attempts to provide the correctbiometric signal 102. -
FIG. 4 shows the method of operation of thereceiver sub-system 117 ofFIG. 2 . Themethod 300 commences with atesting step 301 that continuously checks whether thesignal 108 including the card number has been received fromcode entry module 130. Thestep 301 is performed by thecontroller 109. As long as thesignal 108 is not received themethod 300 is directed in accordance with a NO arrow in a looping manner back to thestep 301. When thesignal 108 is received, themethod 300 is directed from thestep 301 by means of a YES arrow to astep 302. In thestep 302, thecontroller 109 compares the card number received by means of thesignal 108 with one or more card numbers stored in thedatabase 115. Asubsequent testing step 303 is performed by thecontroller 109. In thestep 303 if the card number received on thesignal 108 is successfully matched against a card number stored in thedatabase 115 then themethod 300 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to astep 304. - In the
step 304 thecontroller 109 sends thecontrol signal 110 to the controlled item 111 (for example, opening the secured door). Themethod 300 is then directed from thestep 304 as depicted by anarrow 305 back to thestep 301. - Returning to the
testing step 303 if the card number received on thesignal 108 is not successfully matched against card number stored in thedatabase 115 by thecontroller 109 then themethod 300 is directed from thestep 303 in accordance with a NO arrow back to thestep 301. As was described in regard toFIG. 3 , in an alternate arrangement, themethod 300 could be directed, if the card number match is negative, from thestep 303 to a disabling step that would disable thereceiver sub-system 117 if the incorrect card number where received once or a number of times. - In the exemplary embodiment described above, the
IC 128 merely stores information in the form of a unique card number. In an alternative embodiment, theIC 128 may be a smart card chip that may be used to store one or more other values as well as the unique card number. Such an embodiment provides particular advantages where thetransmitter sub-system 116 is being used to pay for a service. For example, theIC 128 may further comprise a memory (not shown) containing a “stored value” representing an amount of money where thetransmitter sub-system 116 is being used for paying the fare on a bus or other form of public transport. -
FIG. 5A shows amethod 500 of operation of thetransmitter sub-system 116 ofFIG. 2 where theIC 128 is a smart card chip containing a stored value representing an amount of money, in accordance with the alternative embodiment. Themethod 500 commences with atesting step 501 in which thebiometric sensor 121 in thecode entry module 130 checks whether abiometric signal 102 is being received. If this is not the case, then themethod 500 is directed in accordance with a NO arrow back to thestep 501 in a loop. If, on the other hand, thebiometric signal 102 has been received, then themethod 500 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to a step 502. The step 502 compares the receivedbiometric signal 102 with information in the biometric signatureuser ID database 105 in order to ensure that the receivedbiometric signal 102 is that of therightful user 101 of thetransmitter sub-system 116. - A
subsequent testing step 503 checks whether the comparison in the step 502 yields the desired authentication. If the biometric signature matching is authenticated, then themethod 500 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to astep 504. In thesubsequent step 504 thecontroller 107 sends thesignal 112 to theswitch module 113 to close the normallyopen switch 127 to allow thecoil 129 to be excited when theproximity module 126 is placed within range of thecode entry module 130. Then at thenext step 505, upon theproximity module 126 being placed within the field of thecode entry module 130, thecoil 129 is excited and charges thecapacitor 131, which in turn energizes theIC 128. TheIC 128 then transmitssecure access signal 132, i.e., the card number stored within theIC 128, as depicted by an arrow, via the coil, to thecode entry module 130. - At the
next step 506, theproximity module 126 receives asignal 133, as depicted by an arrow, from thecode entry module 130. In the described arrangement, thesignal 133 is received via thecoil 129 acting as a receive antenna. Then at thenext step 507, theIC 128 decrements the stored value by a predetermined amount. This predetermined amount may represent the fare for a trip on a bus, for example. In another alternative embodiment, thesignal 133 received from thecode entry module 130 may include a value indicating an amount that needs to be decremented from the stored value instep 507. In this instance, theIC 128 decrements the stored value by the amount represented by the value received from thecode entry module 130. Accordingly, the stored value is decremented by an amount (i.e., either predetermined or variable) depending on the information (such as the card number) contained in thesecure access signal 132 and theproximity module 126 never has to leave the user's hand. Followingstep 507, themethod 500 is then directed in accordance with anarrow 508 back to thestep 501. -
FIG. 5B shows amethod 510 of operation of thereceiver sub-system 117 ofFIG. 2 where theIC 128 is the smart card chip containing the stored value ofFIG. 5A . Themethod 510 commences with atesting step 511 that continuously checks whether thesignal 108 including the card number has been received fromcode entry module 130. Thestep 511 is performed by thecontroller 109. As long as thesignal 108 is not received theprocess 510 is directed in accordance with a NO arrow in a looping manner back to thestep 511. When thesignal 108 is received, themethod 510 is directed from thestep 511 by means of a YES arrow to astep 512. In thestep 512, thecontroller 109 compares the card number received by means of thesignal 108 with the card numbers stored in thedatabase 115. Asubsequent testing step 513 is performed by thecontroller 109. In thestep 513 if the card number received on thesignal 108 is successfully matched against a card number stored in thedatabase 115 then themethod 510 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to astep 514. In thestep 514, thecontroller 109 sends asignal 134, as represented by an arrow inFIG. 2 , to thecode entry module 130 indicating that the card number was successfully matched. - In the alternative embodiment of
FIG. 5A , the amount by which the stored value should be decremented (i.e., the amount of the fare) is predetermined. However, in one arrangement, the amount by which the stored value should be decremented may be variable (e.g., where the fare is variable). In this instance, thesignal 134 may include a value representing the value of the fare. - At step 515, if the
code entry module 130 determines that the stored value is more than the fare, then themethod 510 is directed by a YES arrow to astep 516. Thecode entry module 130 may read a particular memory address in theIC 128 to determine if the stored value is more than the fare. - At
step 516, thecode entry module 130 sends thesignal 133 to theproximity module 126 to indicate that the stored value should be decremented by the predetermined amount. As described above, thesignal 133 may include a value indicating an amount that needs to be decremented from the stored value. Atstep 516, thecode entry module 130 may also send a further signal to thecontroller 109, which in turn sends asignal 110 to the controlleditem 111. In this instance, the controlled item may merely produce an audible tone indicating that the fare has been paid. Alternatively, the controlleditem 111 may open a gate or enable a turnstile. Themethod 510 is then directed from thestep 516 as depicted by anarrow 517 back to thestep 511. - Returning to the
testing step 513 if the card number received on thesignal 108 is not successfully matched against card number stored in thedatabase 115 by thecontroller 109 then themethod 510 is directed from thestep 513 in accordance with a NO arrow back to thestep 511. In this instance, thecontroller 109 may send asignal 110 to the controlleditem 111, which then sounds an audible alert to indicate that the fare has not been paid. - Returning to the testing step 515, if the
code entry module 130 determines that the stored value is less than the fare, then theprocess 510 is directed from the step 515 in accordance with a NO arrow back to thestep 511. Again, in this instance, thecontroller 109 may send asignal 110 to the controlleditem 111, which then sounds an audible alert to indicate that the fare has not been paid. - In the embodiment of
FIGS. 5A and 5B , thecode entry module 130 may include a liquid crystal display (LCD) screen (not shown) for providing feedback to theuser 101. In this instance, at step 515, thecode entry module 130 may display the amount of the fare as well as the amount of the stored value representing the remaining amount of money on theproximity module 126. - The
transmitter sub-system 116 as described with reference toFIGS. 5A and 5B may also be configured to enable value to be added to the stored value. For example, a cash station similar to a train ticket vending machine may be configured with a card reader similar to thecode entry module 130. In this instance, upon entering an amount of money into the vending machine (e.g., via a note collector) and providing a biometric request to thebiometric sensor 121, theproximity module 126 may be placed within the field of thecard reader module 130 of the vending machine. Thecard reader module 130 may then send a signal toproximity module 126 indicating the value of the money entered into the vending machine and the corresponding amount by which the stored value is to be incremented. - The
transmitter sub-system 116, including theswitch module 113 and theproximity module 126, may also include an LCD screen (not shown) for providing feedback to theuser 101. The LCD screen may be used for displaying information, such as the stored value, stored on thetransmitter sub-system 116. In this instance, atstep 507 of themethod 500, the LCD of thetransmitter sub-system 116 may display the amount of the fare as well as the amount of the stored value representing the remaining amount of money stored in the IC of theproximity module 126. In this instance, the LCD and theIC 128 included in thetransmitter sub-system 116 may be powered by a battery (e.g., a battery incorporated within the remote fob). In this instance, theuser 101 may determine the amount of money remaining on thetransmitter sub-system 116 by presenting a biometric request. After the biometric has been authenticated in the manner described above, the amount of the stored value may be displayed on the LCD. - The
IC 128 may also be used to store personal details, health records, account balances, personal identification numbers (PIN) and/or other pertinent data. Again, after a biometric has been authenticated in the manner described above, the personal details, medical records, account balances and/or PIN may be displayed on the LCD. - The
IC 128 may also be used to store audit trail information so that a record is kept of the date and time that theuser 101 attempted to gain access to the controlleditem 111. - As will be described in detail below, the ICs such as the
IC 128 may also be used to generate a one-time dynamic password for use in online banking applications or the like. If the identity of theuser 101 is authenticated successfully upon the user presenting a particular biometric (e.g., an index finger), as described above, then thebiometric module 103 sends thesignal 106 to thecontroller 107. Thecontroller 107 may then access a key stored in a key database (not shown) and generate a one-time password using the key and the current time, which thecontroller 107 determines from a clock (not shown). The password may be displayed on the LCD. The password may be generated using the RSA encryption algorithm. However, any suitable encryption algorithm may be used (e.g., Data Encryption Standard (DES), Blowfish, International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA)). The user may then provide the generated password read from the LCD to an authentication server via a personal computer and communications network (seeFIG. 11 ) in order to make an online banking transaction, for example. - The
transmitter sub-system 116 of any of the described embodiments may be used in automotive applications where the controlleditem 111 is the central locking of a car. The controlleditem 111 may also activate or deactivate an engine immobilizer. - The
transmitter sub-system 116 of any of the embodiments described may also be used in resort areas, hotels, theme parks or the like. In this instance, the internal operators of the resort areas, hotels and theme parks may issue thetransmitter sub-system 116 incorporated within a remote fob, for example, to theuser 101. Theuser 101 may then operate thetransmitter sub-system 116 within the confines of the resort, hotel or theme park to enter their room or to go on a ride, where thecode entry module 130 is mounted on a door jamb or near a gate, respectively. - Any suitable and secure method may be used for populating the
user ID database 105 with biometric signatures. Biometric signatures may be added to theuser ID database 105 or deleted from theuser ID database 105. For example, if a biometric signal has been received by thebiometric module 103 and theuser ID database 105 inFIG. 2 is empty, then the received biometric may be treated as an “administrator.” This would be the case, for example, if thebiometric module 103 is new and has never been used, or if theuser 101 has erased all the information in thedatabase 105. The administrator may have the ability to amend data stored, for example, in thedatabase 105. Another type of user may be termed an “ordinary user” and may not have the capability to amend the data stored in theuser ID database 105. - The first user of the
biometric module 103, whether this is the user who purchases the module, or the user who programs themodule 103 after all data has been erased from thedatabase 105, may be automatically categorized as an administrator. This first administrator may direct thesystem 100 to either accept further administrators, or alternately to only accept further ordinary users. -
FIG. 6 is a schematic block diagram of thesystem 100′ inFIG. 2 . The disclosed secure access methods are preferably practiced using acomputer system arrangement 100′, such as that shown inFIG. 6 wherein the processes ofFIGS. 3-5B andFIGS. 9, 12 and 14 may be implemented as software, such as application program modules executing within thecomputer system 100′. In particular, the method steps for providing secure access are effected by instructions in the software that are carried out under direction of therespective processor modules sub-systems sub-systems respective processor modules - The following description is directed primarily to the
transmitter sub-system 116, however the description applies in general to the operation of thereceiver sub-system 117. Thecomputer system 100′ is formed, having regard to thetransmitter sub-system 116, by thecontroller 107, input devices such as thebiometric sensor 121, output devices including theLED indicators 122, theaudio transducer 124 and theswitch module 113. - The
controller module 107 typically includes at least oneprocessor unit 1005, and amemory unit 1006, for example, formed from semiconductor random access memory (RAM) and read only memory (ROM). Thecontroller module 107 also includes a number of input/output (I/O) interfaces including an audio-video interface 1007 that couples to theLED display 122 andaudio speaker 124, an I/O interface 1003 for thebiometric sensor 121 and theswitch module 113. Theswitch module 113 is connected to theproximity module 126. - The
components controller 107 typically communicate via aninterconnected bus 1004 and in a manner that results in a conventional mode of operation of thecontroller 107 known to those in the relevant art. - Typically, the application program modules for the
transmitter sub-system 116 are resident in thememory 1006 iROM, and are read and controlled in their execution by theprocessor 1005. Intermediate storage of the program and any data fetched from thebiometric sensor 121 and a network, for example, may be accomplished using the RAM in thememory 1006. In some instances, the application program modules may be supplied to the user encoded into the ROM in thememory 1006. Still further, the software modules can also be loaded into thetransmitter sub-system 116 from other computer readable media (e.g., over a communications network). The term “computer readable medium” as used herein refers to any storage or transmission medium that participates in providing instructions and/or data to thetransmitter sub-system 116 for execution and/or processing. Examples of storage media include floppy disks, magnetic tape, CD-ROM, a hard disk drive, a ROM or integrated circuit, a magneto-optical disk, or a computer readable card such as a PCMCIA card and the like, whether or not such devices are internal or external of thetransmitter sub-system 116. Examples of transmission media include radio or infra-red transmission channels as well as a network connection to another computer or networked device, and the Internet or Intranets including e-mail transmissions and information recorded on Websites and the like. -
FIGS. 7A and 7B show an alternate arrangement for enabling the proximity module inFIG. 2 .FIG. 7A shows the proximity arrangement ofFIG. 2 , in which the control signal 112 from thecontroller 107 of thetransmitter sub-system 116 is used to control theswitch module 113. When theswitch 127 is open, the series circuit comprising theIC 128, thecoil 129 and thecapacitor 131 is open, and thus theproximity module 126 is disabled and cannot operate when it is brought into the field emitted by thecode entry module 130. When theswitch 127 is closed, the series circuit comprising theIC 128, thecoil 129 and thecapacitor 131 is closed, and thus theproximity module 126 is enabled and can perform its designated functions when brought into the field emitted by thecode entry module 130. In this arrangement, thecontrol signal 112 can be a simple is binary signal, in which, for example, one voltage level can cause theswitch 127 to be in an open state, and another voltage level can cause theswitch 127 to be in an open state. -
FIG. 7B shows analternate arrangement 702 in which aproximity module 704 has a series circuit comprising anIC 705, acoil 707 and acapacitor 706 that is permanently closed, and in this arrangement, acontrol signal 703 controls the operation of theIC 705 directly. In this arrangement, the control signal can in one example comprise a secure encrypted communication session, using multiple layers of security if desired, between the controller 107 (seeFIG. 2 ) and theIC 705. In another simpler arrangement, thecontrol signal 703 can be a simple binary signal that merely enables or disables the operation of theIC 705. Upon receiving thesignal 112 from thecontroller 107, theIC 705 remains enabled for a predetermined period of time (e.g., four to five seconds). Within this period theproximity module 704 is enabled and may be placed by theuser 101 within range of a radio frequency field being emitted by acode entry module 130. Although the arrangement ofFIG. 7B shows one series circuit for eachIC 705, other arrangements may be used that share some of the components such as the coils and/or the capacitors. - The communication between the
controller 107 and theIC 705 can be implemented using data and/or address bus communications, via a direct bus connection between thecontroller 107 and theIC 705. Alternatively, the communication between thecontroller 107 and theIC 705 can be implemented using a contactless communication interface comprising the series circuit of theIC 705, thecoil 707 and thecapacitor 706. The contactless communication interface between thecontroller 107 and theIC 705 is a software interface. Any suitable contactless communication interface may be used. In one example, thecontroller 107 may communicate with theIC 705 according to the Sliding Window Protocol (SWP). -
FIG. 8 shows how the secure access system ofFIG. 2 can, using the proximity module arrangement ofFIG. 7B , support multiple selectable proximity modules (e.g., 806A and 806B).FIG. 8 shows thebiometric module 103 ofFIG. 2 together with theaudio transducer 124, theLED indicators 122 and thebiometric sensor 121. In thisarrangement 800, however, thebiometric module 103 also has a set ofcontrol selectors 801 designated selectors 1-4 in the present example for selecting one or more control functions. A greater or smaller number of selectors can be incorporated as desired. Furthermore, themodule 103 has anLCD display 802. - According to this arrangement, once the identity of the
user 101 is authenticated successfully, the user may select one of the set of thecontrol selectors 801 such as the selector designated “1.” In response to such a selection, thebiometric module 103 sends asignal 803 to thecontroller 107. Upon receiving thesignal 803, thecontroller 107 sends a control signal on acontrol line 807A to acorresponding proximity module 806A. Upon receiving the control signal fromcontrol line 807A from thecontroller 107, theproximity module 806A remains enabled for a predetermined period of time (e.g., four to five seconds). Within this period theproximity module 806A is enabled and may be placed by theuser 101 within range of a radio frequency field being emitted by acode entry module 130. Again, thebiometric module 103, thecontroller 107 and the plurality of the proximity modules (e.g., 806A, 806B) may, for example, be incorporated within a remote fob or mobile telephone, together with theswitch module 113 and theuser ID database 105. Thearrangement 805 ofFIG. 8 can be used to incorporate a number of different ICs (e.g., 705A, 705B) (being the service provider specific elements in the corresponding proximity modules) in asingle transmitter sub-system 116, each IC and associated proximity module being associated with a different service provider (such as VISA®, MASTERCARD®, AMERICAN EXPRESS® and so on). This arrangement would enable theuser 101, after biometric authentication, to select the appropriate service provider by pressing the appropriate selector in the set ofcontrol selectors 801, and to then bring thecorresponding proximity module 806A into the field emitted by thecode entry module 130. In fact, all of the proximity modules incorporated into thetransmitter sub-system 116 are being brought into the field emitted by thecode entry module 130 however only the desiredproximity module 806A is enabled by thesignal 803. - The
LCD display 802 can show theuser 101 which service provider has been selected, thereby confirming to the user that the desired service provider has been selected. TheLCD display 802 can be provided before the user places the proximity module (e.g., 806A) into the field emitted by the correspondingcode entry module 130. - In a more general case, the various selectable proximity modules (e.g., 806A, 806B) can be associated with service providers from diverse fields, namely financial, security, automotive, individual identification and so on, and can have different interfaces with the respective code entry modules such as 130. Therefore, the ICs 705A, 705B configured within the
proximity modules user 101 may select the desired application using the set ofcontrol selectors 801, and optionally can receive feedback on the selection via theLCD display 802. - Security and payment functionality may be combined using one or more iterations of authentication and selection, thus facilitating operation with existing infrastructure. For example, the
proximity module 806A and corresponding IC 705A may contain a stored unique number for use in secure access and theproximity module 806B and corresponding IC 705B may contain a stored value for use in making cashless payments as described above. - The
controller 107 may also be configured to generate a one-time dynamic “time-dependent” or “event-synchronous” password. Upon authentication of a user's biometric as described above with reference toFIG. 3 , thecontroller 107 may access a key stored in a database (e.g., the database 115). Thecontroller 107 may then generate a one-time time-dependent password using the key and the current time (as a dynamic input value), for example. The current time may be determined from a computer clock (not shown) configured within thearrangement 800 ofFIG. 8 . The password may be generated using the RSA encryption algorithm or any other suitable encryption algorithm (e.g., Data Encryption Standard (DES), Blowfish, International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA)). - Accordingly, a password may be generated using the current time as the input value to the encryption process. It is noted that this is merely one arrangement, and other input values such as a simple counter value or a random number may be used as with event-synchronous tokens and asynchronous challenge/response tokens. Further, other mathematical algorithms or codes can equally be used to generate the one-time password. For example, the password may be generated using a rolling code to generate a different code variant each time the password is generated. In this instance, successive passwords may be generated using a code and/or a look-up table known to both the
code entry module 130 andreceiver sub-system 117. Using this approach successive numbers are modified, resulting in a non-repeatable number. - The
user 101 may make a payment (e.g., a VISA® payment) at a conventional (i.e., not using the proximity module) payment terminal or online by selecting theappropriate control selector 801 from the set, then pressing a suitable combination of thecontrol selectors 801 as guided by a display on theLCD display 802 and waiting for a one-time password to be generated and shown on theLCD display 802. The password may then be manually entered into the keyboard of the payment terminal or personal computer. This approach supports applications including business-to-business on line payments through to standard contactless payments at existing payment terminals. -
FIG. 9 shows amethod 900 of operation of thearrangement 800 ofFIG. 8 according to one example. In the example ofFIG. 9 , theuser 101 generates a dynamic password using thearrangement 800 ofFIG. 8 . The dynamic password may then be used for making an online payment to a business web site. In the present example, the online payment is being made using a VISA® account. The example provides a secure scenario as a reference to a typical transaction. However, variations of the steps of the methods described below including input from theuser 101, biometric reads, generation of dynamic passwords, display of current account balances, can be used to conduct various transactions. - The
method 900 ofFIG. 9 may be implemented as software, such as application program modules being controlled in their execution by thecontroller 107 and being resident in thememory 1006 of thecontroller 107. Themethod 900 commences with atesting step 901 in which thebiometric sensor 121 in thecode entry module 130 checks whether abiometric signal 102 is being received. If this is not the case, then themethod 900 is directed in accordance with a NO arrow back to thestep 901 in a loop. If, on the other hand, thebiometric signal 102 has been received, then themethod 900 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to astep 902. Thestep 902 compares the receivedbiometric signal 102 with information in the biometricuser ID database 105 in order to ensure that the receivedbiometric signal 102 is that of therightful user 101. - A
subsequent testing step 903 checks whether the comparison in thestep 902 yields the desired authentication. If the biometric signature matching is authenticated, then themethod 900 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to astep 904. Atstep 904, thecontroller 107 detects selection of one of thecontrol selectors 801 of the set. In the present example, thecontrol selector 801 “1” of the set is selected. In response to selection of the selector “1,” at thenext step 905, thecontroller 107 displays the value, stored on one of the ICs, representing available funds. In the present example, the IC 705A is a VISA® IC for making VISA® card payments and comprises the stored value. The value is displayed on theLCD display 802. In the present example, thecontroller 107 displays $156.56, which represents the balance of the user's VISA® account. - At the
next step 906, if within a predetermined period of time (e.g., 30 seconds) thecontroller 107 again detects selection of the same control selector 801 (i.e., selector “1”) of the set, then themethod 900 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to astep 907. Otherwise, themethod 900 is directed in accordance with a NO arrow to thestep 901. Atstep 907, thecontroller 107 generates a dynamic password (i.e., a first dynamic password), using the RSA encryption algorithm, as described above. The dynamic password is displayed on theLCD display 802. - In the present example, the dynamic password generated at
step 907 is “2 3 4 9 8 7 8 9.” The dynamic password will be different each time it is generated. The dynamic password may be a time-dependent password where the current time is used as the input value to the encryption process. The available funds and the unique token serial number are also preferably encrypted with the generated password. Alternatively, the dynamic password may be an event-synchronous password. - In accordance with the present example, the first dynamic password generated and displayed by the
controller 107 atstep 907 is entered into acomputer module 1101 of acomputer system 1100 as shown inFIG. 11 , in order to make the online payment to the business website. The online payment is made in accordance with amethod 1000 of making an online payment, which will be described in detail below with reference toFIG. 10 . Themethod 1000 may be may be implemented using thecomputer system 1100, wherein the process ofFIG. 10 may be implemented as software, such as one or more application programs executable within thecomputer system 1100. In particular, the steps ofmethod 1000 may be effected by instructions in the software that are carried out within thecomputer system 1100. The instructions may be formed as one or more code modules, each for performing one or more particular tasks. The software may also be divided into two separate parts, in which a first part and the corresponding code modules performs themethod 1000 and a second part and the corresponding code modules manage a user interface between the first part and the user. The software may be stored in a computer readable medium, including the storage devices described below, for example. One or more portions of the software may be stored within thecomputer module 1101 and also on aremote server 1150, as will be described below. The software is loaded into thecomputer system 1100 from the computer readable medium, and then executed by thecomputer system 1100. A computer readable medium having such software or computer program recorded on it is a computer program product as described above. The use of the computer program product in thecomputer system 1100 preferably effects an advantageous apparatus for implementing themethod 1000. - As seen in
FIG. 11 , thecomputer system 1100 is formed by acomputer module 1101, input devices such as akeyboard 1102 and amouse pointer device 1103, and output devices including a printer 1115, adisplay device 1114 andloudspeakers 1117. An external Modulator-Demodulator (Modem)transceiver device 1116 may be used by thecomputer module 1101 for communicating to and from acommunications network 1120 via aconnection 1121. Thenetwork 1120 may be a wide-area network (WAN), such as the Internet or a private WAN. Where theconnection 1121 is a telephone line, themodem 1116 may be a traditional “dial-up” modem. Alternatively, where theconnection 1121 is a high capacity (e.g., cable) connection, themodem 1116 may be a broadband modem. A wireless modem may also be used for wireless connection to thenetwork 1120. - In accordance with the present example, a
server 1150 hosting a payments website (e.g., a utility website such as the phone company or bank website) is connected to thenetwork 1120. - The
computer module 1101 typically includes at least oneprocessor unit 1105, and amemory unit 1106, for example, formed from semiconductor random access memory (RAM) and read only memory (ROM). Thecomputer module 1101 also includes an number of input/output (I/O) interfaces including an audio-video interface 1107 that couples to thevideo display 1114 andloudspeakers 1117, an I/O interface 1113 for thekeyboard 1102 andmouse 1103 and optionally a joystick (not illustrated), and an I/O interface 1108 for theexternal modem 1116 and printer 1115. In some implementations, themodem 1116 may be incorporated within thecomputer module 1101, for example, within the I/O interface 1108. Thecomputer module 1101 also has alocal network interface 1111 that, via a connection 1123, permits coupling of thecomputer system 1100 to a local computer network 1122, known as a Local Area Network (LAN). As also illustrated, the local computer network 1122 may also couple to thewide network 1120 via a connection 1124, which would typically include a so-called “firewall” device or similar functionality. Theinterface 1111 may be formed by an ETHERNET™ circuit card, a wireless BLUETOOTH™ or an IEEE 802.11 wireless arrangement. - The
interfaces Storage devices 1109 are provided and typically include a hard disk drive (HDD) 1110. Other devices such as a floppy disk drive and a magnetic tape drive (not illustrated) may also be used. Anoptical disk drive 1112 is typically provided to act as a non-volatile source of data. Portable memory devices, such optical disks (e.g., CD-ROM, DVD), USB-RAM, and floppy disks, for example, may then be used as appropriate sources of data to thecomputer system 1100. - The
components 1105 to 1113 of thecomputer module 1101 typically communicate via aninterconnected bus 1104 and in a manner which results in a conventional mode of operation of thecomputer system 1100 known to those in the relevant art. Examples of computers on which the described arrangements can be practiced include IBM-PC's and compatibles, Sun Sparcstations, APPLE MAC™ or alike computer systems evolved therefrom. - Typically, the application program(s) implementing the
method 1000 are resident on thehard disk drive 1110 and read and controlled in execution by theprocessor 1105. Intermediate storage of such programs and any data fetched from thenetworks 1120 and 1122 may be accomplished using thesemiconductor memory 1106, possibly in concert with thehard disk drive 1110. In some instances, the application programs may be supplied to the user encoded on one or more CD-ROM and read via the correspondingdrive 1112, or alternatively may be read by the user from thenetworks 1120 or 1122. Still further, the software can also be loaded into thecomputer system 1100 from other computer readable media. Computer readable media refers to any storage medium that participates in providing instructions and/or data to thecomputer system 1100 for execution and/or processing. Examples of such media include floppy disks, magnetic tape, CD-ROM, a hard disk drive, a ROM or integrated circuit, a magneto-optical disk, or a computer readable card such as a PCMCIA card and the like, whether or not such devices are internal or external of thecomputer module 1101. Examples of computer readable transmission media that may also participate in the provision of instructions and/or data include radio or infra-red transmission channels as well as a network connection to another computer or networked device, and the Internet or Intranets including e-mail transmissions and information recorded on Websites and the like. - The second part of the application programs and the corresponding code modules mentioned above may be executed to implement one or more graphical user interfaces (GUIs) to be rendered or otherwise represented upon the
display 1114. Through manipulation of thekeyboard 1102 and themouse 1103, a user of thecomputer system 1100 and the application may manipulate the interface to provide controlling commands and/or input to the applications associated with the GUI(s). - The
method 1000 may alternatively be implemented in dedicated hardware such as one or more integrated circuits performing the functions or sub functions ofFIG. 10 . Such dedicated hardware may include graphic processors, digital signal processors, or one or more microprocessors and associated memories. - The
method 1000 begins atstep 1010, where after receiving the first password entered by theuser 101, themethod 1000 proceeds to step 1011. Atstep 1011, the password is transmitted by theprocessor 1105 to theserver 1150 hosting the payments website. Then at thenext step 1012, theserver 1150 verifies the password entered by theuser 101 by generating another dynamic password and comparing the passwords. In order to generate the password, theserver 1150 accesses a key (associated with theuser 101 of the code module 130) stored in akey database 1151 and determines the current time from asystem clock 1152. In the present example, thekey database 1151 may be configured within a hard disk drive (not shown) of theserver 1150. Theserver 1150 generates the password using the key and the current time determined by encrypting a value representing the current time, using the RSA encryption algorithm, which is the same encryption algorithm used by thecontroller 107. Also atstep 1012, theserver 1150 determines available funds (i.e., $156.56) by determining the amount from the password entered by theuser 101. - Once the dynamic password is entered into the
computer module 1101 and verified by theserver 1150, theuser 101 makes another request using the arrangement ofFIG. 8 in order to select the amount of funds wishing to be debited from their account. The amount of funds selected by theuser 101 is then debited from the value stored on the IC (e.g., 705A) corresponding to their account.FIG. 12 shows amethod 1200 of debiting an amount of funds from an account. - The
method 1200 commences atstep 1201, where thecontroller 107 detects selection of another one of thecontrol selectors 801 of the set. In the present example, thecontrol selector 801 “2” of the set is selected. In response to selection of the selector “2,” at thenext step 1202, thecontroller 107 prompts theuser 101 to enter the amount that they wish to pay that also represents the amount to be debited from their account (i.e., their VISA® account). - At the
next step 1203, thecontroller 107 determines the amount wished to be payed based on an amount entered by theuser 101 and displays this amount on theLCD display 802. The user may enter the amount using the set ofcontrol selectors 801. For example, thecontroller 107 may display a generic amount and the user may selectcontrol selector 801 “3” of the set to increase a displayed amount and “4” to decrease the displayed amount. - The
next step 1204 is a testing step in which thebiometric sensor 121 in thecode entry module 130 checks whether abiometric signal 102 is being received. If this is not the case, then themethod 1200 is directed in accordance with a NO arrow back to thestep 1206 in a loop. If, on the other hand, thebiometric signal 102 has been received, then themethod 1200 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to astep 1205. Thestep 1205 compares the receivedbiometric signal 102 with information in the biometric signatureuser ID database 105 in order to ensure that the biometric signal received is that of therightful user 101. - A
subsequent testing step 1206 checks whether the comparison in thestep 1205 yields the desired authentication. If the biometric signature matching is authenticated, then themethod 1200 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to astep 1207. Atstep 1207, thecontroller 107 generates a second dynamic password, using the RSA encryption algorithm with the current time being used as the input value to the encryption process, as described above. The dynamic password is displayed on theLCD display 802. In the present example, the dynamic password generated at step is “5 6 8 8 8 1 8 9.” Again, the second dynamic password is a time-dependent password. However, the second password may also be an event-synchronous password. The amount determined atstep 1203 representing the amount of funds to be payed is also encrypted within the dynamic password. Themethod 1200 concludes at thenext step 1208, where the amount of funds entered by the user atstep 1203 is deducted from the value stored on the IC 705A. - In accordance with the present example, the second dynamic password generated and displayed by the
controller 107 atstep 1207 is entered into thecomputer module 1101 to complete the online payment to the business website. - Returning to
FIG. 10 , at thenext step 1013, after receiving the second dynamic password entered by theuser 101, themethod 1000 proceeds to step 1014. Atstep 1014, the second password is transmitted by theprocessor 1105 to theserver 1150 hosting the payments website. Then at thenext step 1015, theserver 1150 verifies the password entered by theuser 101 by generating still another dynamic password and comparing the passwords as described above. In order to generate this still further password, theserver 1150 accesses the key (associated with theuser 101 of the code entry module 130) stored in thekey database 1151 and determines the current time from thesystem clock 1152, as described above. Also atstep 1015, theserver 1150 determines the amount to be paid by decrypting the amount from the second password entered by theuser 101. - The
method 1000 concludes at thenext step 1016, where the payment is processed by theserver 1150. The payment transaction can be reconciled to the customer in a monthly statement. - Variations on the methods described above can also be used for secure access, for example, to gain entry to a building. For example, the dynamic password generated at
step 907 may be entered into a keypad located on a door jamb and being connected to a building security system. In this instance, rather than representing an account balance, the stored value encrypted within the dynamic password can be a personal identification number (PIN) stored with thetransmitter sub-system 116. The building security system then verifies the password entered by theuser 101 by generating another dynamic password and comparing the passwords. Thus, the PIN used for secure access is enhanced through the need of a biometric signature. - The dynamic passwords generated at
step 907 may have other user information encrypted within the dynamic password including a serial number related to the transmitter sub-system (configured within a telephone or fob), time of access, type of account and validated finger (e.g., middle finger). - The arrangement of
FIG. 8 comprises multiple selectable proximity modules (e.g., 806A, 806B) each configured in accordance with the arrangement ofFIG. 7B . In an alternative arrangement, one antenna (e.g., 707) may be associated with multiple ICs (e.g., all connected in parallel with the antenna). Again, in this instance, each of the ICs may be separately selectable using separate control lines (e.g., 807A, 807B). -
FIG. 13 shows how the secure access system ofFIG. 2 can, using one or more conventional proximity modules, be used to perform a secure transaction.FIG. 13 shows thebiometric module 103 ofFIG. 2 together with theaudio transducer 124, theLED indicators 122 and thebiometric sensor 121, and a set of control selectors 1301 designated selectors 1-4 in the present example for selecting one or more control functions. Thebiometric module 103 also has anLCD display 802. Thearrangement 1300 also has aproximity module 1306. Theproximity module 1306 comprises thecoil 129, thecapacitor 131 and anIC 1307. - In the
arrangement 1300 ofFIG. 13 , theproximity module 1306 is configured to be constantly available to be activated, upon being placed within the field of thecode entry module 130 in a conventional manner, without the need for a control signal such as thesignal 803. That is, no biometric verification is required in thearrangement 1300 in order to activate theproximity module 1306. - The
arrangement 1300 may also be used to perform secure transactions or the like, including an online transaction. Rather than the biometric verification being needed in order to activate theproximity module 1306, the generation of a dynamic password, as described above, may be utilized to provide an additional security layer, as will be described below. - A
method 1400 of performing a transaction using thearrangement 1300 ofFIG. 13 will now be described with reference toFIG. 14 . Themethod 1400 begins with atesting step 1401 in which thebiometric sensor 121 in thecode entry module 130 checks whether abiometric signal 102 is being received. If this is not the case, then themethod 1400 is directed in accordance with a NO arrow back to thestep 1401 in a loop. If, on the other hand, thebiometric signal 102 has been received, then themethod 1400 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to astep 1402. Thestep 1402 compares the receivedbiometric signal 102 with information in theuser ID database 105 in order to ensure that the receivedbiometric signal 102 is that of therightful user 101. - A
subsequent testing step 1403 checks whether the comparison in thestep 1402 yields the desired authentication. If the biometric signature matching is authenticated, then themethod 1400 is directed in accordance with a YES arrow to astep 1404 where the match is indicated to theuser 101 on theLCD display 802. Also atstep 1404, thecontroller 107 detects selection of one of thecontrol selectors 801 of the set. In the present example, thecontrol selector 801 “1” of the set is selected by theuser 101. In response to selection of the selector “1,” at thenext step 1405, thecontroller 107 generates a dynamic password, using the RSA encryption algorithm, as described above, and displays the dynamic password on theLCD display 802. The dynamic password is generated based on a card number (associated with the user) stored on theIC 1307. In the present example, the dynamic password generated at 1405, is entered into a keypad or the like (not shown) associated with thecode entry module 130. The card number may be encrypted within the dynamic password. - Then at the
next step 1406, upon theproximity module 1306 being placed within the field of thecode entry module 130, thecoil 129 is excited and charges thecapacitor 131, which in turn energizes theIC 1307. TheIC 1307 then transmitssignal 1332, as depicted by an arrow, the card number stored within theIC 1307, via theproximity module 1306, to thecode entry module 130. A controller (e.g., 109) associated with thecode entry module 130 then uses the card number to verify the dynamic password as described above. In particular, the controller of thecode entry module 130 generates a dynamic password, using the RSA encryption algorithm, using the card number, and compares the generated password to the password entered by theuser 101. Again, the passwords generated atstep 1405 and by the controller may be time-dependent or event-synchronous. - At the
next step 1406, theproximity module 1306 receives asignal 1333, as depicted by the arrow, from thecode entry module 130. Then at thenext step 1407, theIC 1307 decrements the stored value by a predetermined amount. This predetermined amount may represent a payment for a trip on a bus, for example. In another alternative embodiment, thesignal 1333 received from thecode entry module 130 may include a value indicating an amount that needs to be decremented from the stored value instep 1407. In this instance, theIC 1307 decrements the stored value by the amount represented by the value received from thecode entry module 130. Accordingly, the stored value is decremented by an amount (i.e., either predetermined or variable) depending on the information (such as the card number) contained in thesecure access signal 132 and theproximity module 126 never has to leave the user's hand. Followingstep 1407, themethod 1400 is then directed in accordance with anarrow 1408 back to thestep 1401. - Accordingly, in the example of
FIGS. 13 and 14 , the dynamic password generated on the basis of a valid biometric reading, is used to verify the user of thearrangement 1300. Although in the example ofFIGS. 13 and 14 , the dynamic password was generated first, in alternative arrangements the dynamic password may follow or accompany a payment. - The arrangements described above, including the
arrangement 1300 ofFIG. 13 , may also be used with automatic teller machines (ATMs) or point of sale (POS) devices where a personal identification number (PIN) has conventionally been used to verify the validity of a card (i.e., magnetic stripe card or smart card) owner. The dynamic password generated on the basis of a valid biometric reading may be used to replace such a FIN, without affecting a conventional transaction. For example, in the case of an ATM transaction or electronic funds transfer point of sale (EFTPOS) transaction, a user inserts their magnetic stripe card (or smart card) into the ATM or swipes the card using an EFTPOS terminal. A card number corresponding to the magnetic stripe card is stored on theIC 1307. At the same time as inserting or swiping their card, the user may use thearrangement 1300 described above to generate a time-dependent or event-synchronous dynamic password based on a valid biometric reading. Again, the card number corresponding to the magnetic stripe card may be encrypted within the generated password. The user then enters the generated dynamic password into the ATM or EFTPOS terminal. The dynamic password is then verified by a back-end host server (e.g., associated with a bank) in the manner described above based on the card number. - The arrangements described above, including the
arrangement 1300 ofFIG. 13 , may also be used for making an online payment. Again, the dynamic password may be used to replace the user's password that has conventionally been used. At the same time as logging into a banking website, for example, the user may use thearrangement 1300 described above to generate a time-dependent or event-synchronous dynamic password based on a valid biometric reading. Again, a user identification number corresponding to the user may be encrypted within the generated password. The user then enters the generated dynamic password into a personal computer. The dynamic password is then verified by a back-end host server (e.g., associated with a bank) connected to the personal computer in the manner described above based on the user's identification number encrypted with the entered password. - The arrangements described above, including the
arrangement 1300 ofFIG. 13 may stop intruders from stealing credit and debit cards for later fraudulent use in ATM and POS devices. The owner or user of a magnetic stripe card would also require the fob or mobile telephone with the card number corresponding to the magnetic stripe card stored thereon. A new dynamic password could then be generated for each ATM or EFTPOS transaction. The dynamic password overcomes the inherent weaknesses in PIN type inputs, due to the dynamic nature of the password and requirement to validate the owner or user biometrics prior to generating that password. If an intruder views a dynamic password input, they cannot replicate it a next time as the password is constantly changing. - Although the
arrangement 1300 ofFIG. 13 has been described as including theproximity module 1306, thearrangement 1300 may not necessarily includesuch proximity module 1306. An arrangement without a proximity module may also be used to perform the transactions described above including ATM, EFTPOS and online transactions merely by generating a dynamic password as described above. - The arrangements described above allow biometric security to be easily integrated with existing infrastructure for payment or access systems. The arrangements are simple and effective for secure proof of identity. The user does not need to remember a code, number, name or combination. The arrangements may be used online or offline. The described arrangements may also be used in wireless systems, alarm panel activation, garage control, door access, boom-gate access and anywhere long distance secure transmissions are required.
- It is apparent from the above that the arrangements described are applicable to the security industry.
- The foregoing describes only some embodiments of the present disclosure, and modifications and/or changes can be made thereto without departing from the scope and spirit of the present disclosure, the embodiments being illustrative and not restrictive.
- The
system 100 can also be used to provide authorized access to lighting systems, building control devices, exterior or remote devices such as air compressors and so on. Thesystem 100 may also be used to gain access to online applications. For example, as described above, thetransmitter sub-system 116 may be used to generate a one-time dynamic password for use in online banking applications or the like. The concept of “secure access” is thus extendible beyond mere access to restricted physical areas. - Although the present specification has described communication between the
transmitter sub-system 116 and the receiver sub-system being performed using RF, other communication modes such as capacitive coupling or infra-red could also be used. - The arrangements described above may comprise a “duress” or “alarm” feature. This feature may be activated using a different predetermined biometrics. For example, typically the user may present a particular finger (e.g., their thumb) for verification prior to enabling the proximity module (e.g., 126) or generating a dynamic password. If the valid user is under duress by an intruder, the valid user can use an alternate finger (e.g., their index finger) to enable the proximity module and/or generate a dynamic password, for example. Use of the alternate finger may automatically activate an alarm, thereby bringing emergency services to the situation. Alternatively, the dynamic password generated based on the alternate finger may include an encrypted alarm notification. In this instance, when the generated password is entered into a keypad, keyboard or the like, an alarm will be automatically activated by a backend controller or server, again bringing the emergency services to the location.
- Generating different dynamic passwords based on the verification of different biometrics may also be used where multiple access areas are selectable from a single point. For example, the arrangements described above (e.g., the arrangement 1300) may be configured so that a user's thumb may be read and verified, as described above, in order to generate a first dynamic password. The first password may be entered into a keypad, for example, to allow the user to enter a first door “1.” The user may then present a different finger (e.g., the person's index finger), which, once verified, may result in the generation of a second dynamic password. The second password may be entered into a keypad, for example, to allow the user to enter a second door “2.”
Claims (30)
1. A cellular telephone configured to transmit a secure signal to a system for performing a secure transaction, the cellular telephone comprising:
a biometric sensor;
a display;
a selector through which a user input is received;
a switch;
at least one proximity circuit coupled to the switch;
a controller configured to:
present data representative of a plurality of financial accounts on the display;
receive, via the selector, user input indicative of a selected financial account selected from the plurality of financial accounts presented;
present, via the display, feedback indicating the selected financial account;
prompt input of a biometric signal via the biometric sensor;
receive, via the biometric sensor, the biometric signal;
perform a matching process, thereby to seek matching of the received biometric signal with a biometric signature contained in memory of the cellular telephone;
in the case that the matching is successful, configure the proximity circuit to transmit a secure signal conveying information to the system when the proximity circuit is placed within range of a radio frequency field emitted by the system;
wherein the secure transaction is performed based on the information conveyed within the transmitted secure signal in order to adjust a financial account associated with the matched signature by an amount provided by the system;
wherein the database of biometric signatures is maintained using the cellular telephone by a user corresponding to the biometric signature contained in memory of the cellular telephone; and
wherein the biometric sensor of the cellular telephone was used to biometric signature contained in memory of the cellular telephone.
2. The cellular telephone according to claim 1 , wherein the biometric sensor is configured to receive a biometric signal in one of the following forms: retinal pattern, iris pattern, face pattern, and palm configuration.
3. The cellular telephone of claim 1 , wherein the proximity circuit is further configured to unlock an automobile.
4. The cellular telephone of claim 1 , further comprising at least one light emitting diode (LED).
5. The cellular telephone of claim 1 , further comprising a second proximity circuit including at least one coil.
6. The cellular telephone of claim 5 , wherein said second proximity circuit further comprises an inductor and a capacitor.
7. The cellular telephone of claim 1 , wherein said first proximity circuit is configured to activate an automobile engine.
8. The cellular telephone of claim 1 , wherein said biometric sensor is further configured to allow the user to gain access to an application.
9. The cellular telephone of claim 1 , further comprising a processor configured to generate passwords for use by the user.
10. The cellular telephone of claim 1 , wherein said encrypted information identifying the financial account associated with the user comprises the number of the financial account associated with the user.
11. The cellular telephone of claim 1 , wherein said encrypted information identifying the financial account associated with the user comprises a token generated by the cellular telephone.
12. The cellular telephone of claim 1 , wherein said second proximity circuit is configured to communicate with a magnetic stripe card reader.
13. The cellular telephone of claim 1 , further comprising at least infrared emitter.
14. The cellular telephone of claim 1 , wherein the at least one proximity circuit is configured to provide functionality of a plurality of distinct proximity circuits corresponding to respective financial accounts.
15. A method for operating a cellular telephone to transmit a secure signal to a system for performing a secure transaction, the method including:
presenting on a display unit of the cellular telephone data representative of a plurality of financial accounts;
receiving, via a selector of the cellular telephone through which used input is received, user input indicative of a selected financial account selected from the plurality of financial accounts presented;
presenting, via the display, feedback indicating the selected financial account;
prompt input of a biometric signal via a biometric sensor provided via hardware of the cellular telephone;
receiving, via the biometric sensor, the biometric signal;
performing a matching process, thereby to seek matching of the received biometric signal with a biometric signature contained in physical memory of the cellular telephone; and
in the case that the matching is successful, configuring a proximity circuit provided by the cellular telephone to transmit a secure signal conveying information to the system when the proximity circuit is placed within range of a radio frequency field emitted by the system;
wherein the secure transaction is performed based on the information conveyed within the transmitted secure signal in order to adjust a financial account associated with the matched signature by an amount provided by the system;
wherein the database of biometric signatures is maintained using the cellular telephone by a user corresponding to the biometric signature contained in memory of the cellular telephone; and
wherein the biometric sensor of the cellular telephone was used to biometric signature contained in memory of the cellular telephone.
16. The method of claim 15 , wherein the biometric sensor is configured to receive a biometric signal in one of the following forms: retinal pattern, iris pattern, face pattern, and palm configuration.
17. The method of claim 15 , wherein the proximity circuit is further configured to unlock an automobile.
18. The method of claim 15 , wherein the proximity circuit is further configured to activate an automobile engine.
19. The method of claim 15 , wherein said biometric sensor is further configured to allow the user to gain access to an application.
20. The method of claim 15 , wherein said encrypted information identifying the financial account associated with the user comprises the number of the financial account associated with the user.
21. The method of claim 15 , wherein said encrypted information identifying the financial account associated with the user comprises a token generated by the cellular telephone.
22. A cellular telephone comprising:
a display configured to display information concerning at least one financial account associated with a user;
a transmitter subsystem comprising a biometric sensor configured to authenticate the user in a database based upon information received from the biometric sensor;
a proximity circuit including at least one coil, wherein said first proximity circuit is configured, upon authentication of the user by the biometric sensor, to generate a radio frequency field including encrypted information identifying the financial account associated with the user when the proximity circuit is placed within range of a point-of-sale device.
23. The cellular telephone of claim 22 , wherein said first proximity circuit is further configured to unlock an automobile.
24. The cellular telephone of claim 22 , further comprising at least one light emitting diode (LED).
25. The cellular telephone of claim 22 , further comprising a second proximity circuit including at least one coil.
26. The cellular telephone of claim 25 , wherein said second proximity circuit further comprises an inductor and a capacitor.
27. The cellular telephone of claim 22 , wherein said first proximity circuit is configured to activate an automobile engine.
28. The cellular telephone of claim 22 , wherein said transmitter subsystem is further configured to allow a user to gain access to an application stored on the cellular telephone based on information from the biometric sensor.
29. The cellular telephone of claim 22 , further comprising a processor configured to generate passwords for use by the user.
30. The cellular telephone of claim 22 , further comprising at least infrared emitter.
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2008
- 2008-10-08 CN CN2008801224248A patent/CN101911584A/en active Pending
- 2008-10-08 WO PCT/AU2008/001490 patent/WO2009052548A1/en active Application Filing
- 2008-10-08 SG SG201101591-4A patent/SG170074A1/en unknown
- 2008-10-08 AU AU2008316289A patent/AU2008316289B2/en active Active
- 2008-10-08 EP EP17189130.2A patent/EP3270540A1/en active Pending
- 2008-10-08 EP EP08800125A patent/EP2206277A4/en not_active Ceased
- 2008-10-08 US US12/738,663 patent/US20100253470A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2008-10-08 SG SG2012014312A patent/SG179419A1/en unknown
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2014
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2016
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US20210256531A1 (en) | 2021-08-19 |
SG179419A1 (en) | 2012-04-27 |
AU2008316289B2 (en) | 2012-03-22 |
AU2008316289A1 (en) | 2009-04-30 |
US20100253470A1 (en) | 2010-10-07 |
EP3270540A1 (en) | 2018-01-17 |
US20230099358A1 (en) | 2023-03-30 |
SG170074A1 (en) | 2011-04-29 |
EP2206277A4 (en) | 2013-02-13 |
CN101911584A (en) | 2010-12-08 |
US10949849B2 (en) | 2021-03-16 |
EP2206277A1 (en) | 2010-07-14 |
US10685353B2 (en) | 2020-06-16 |
US20150106621A1 (en) | 2015-04-16 |
US20170046713A1 (en) | 2017-02-16 |
US20200372512A1 (en) | 2020-11-26 |
US20240273534A1 (en) | 2024-08-15 |
WO2009052548A1 (en) | 2009-04-30 |
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