US20200088503A1 - Rfd with history log, security fence, and seismic detection - Google Patents
Rfd with history log, security fence, and seismic detection Download PDFInfo
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- US20200088503A1 US20200088503A1 US16/694,872 US201916694872A US2020088503A1 US 20200088503 A1 US20200088503 A1 US 20200088503A1 US 201916694872 A US201916694872 A US 201916694872A US 2020088503 A1 US2020088503 A1 US 2020088503A1
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- Prior art keywords
- remote
- hardware
- controller
- terminal
- security fence
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- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F42—AMMUNITION; BLASTING
- F42D—BLASTING
- F42D1/00—Blasting methods or apparatus, e.g. loading or tamping
- F42D1/04—Arrangements for ignition
- F42D1/045—Arrangements for electric ignition
- F42D1/05—Electric circuits for blasting
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F42—AMMUNITION; BLASTING
- F42C—AMMUNITION FUZES; ARMING OR SAFETY MEANS THEREFOR
- F42C13/00—Proximity fuzes; Fuzes for remote detonation
- F42C13/04—Proximity fuzes; Fuzes for remote detonation operated by radio waves
-
- F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
- F42—AMMUNITION; BLASTING
- F42D—BLASTING
- F42D5/00—Safety arrangements
Definitions
- the present subject matter is generally related to remote firing devices, and more particularly, it relates to technical solutions for better remote firing devices including history log, security fence, seismic detection, countdown timers, and sequential firing.
- Explosive devices have differing triggering mechanisms including wire, radio, cellular phone, or infrared.
- command-wire uses an electrical firing cable that affords the user complete control over the device right up until the moment of initiation.
- the trigger is radio-controlled by a radio link.
- the system is constructed so that a receiver is connected to an electrical firing circuit and the transmitter operated by the operator at a distance. A signal from the transmitter causes the receiver to trigger a firing pulse that operates a switch. Usually the switch fires an initiator; however, the output may also be used to remotely arm an explosive circuit. In conventional systems, it is impossible to tell what has transpired in connection with an explosion. Additionally, there is a desire to delimit the operations of the system to improve safety.
- One aspect of the present subject matter is in a system form which recites a system comprising a controller, the hardware of which is suitable for being communicatively coupled with a piece of controller event hardware which is capable of logging events; and a piece of controller security fence hardware having a capacity to enforce a first security fence within which operations of the controller are allowed.
- the system also comprises a remote, the hardware of which is suitable for being communicatively coupled with a piece of remote event hardware which is capable of logging events; a piece of remote security fence hardware having a capacity to enforce a second security fence within which operations of the remote are allowed; and a piece of seismic detection hardware which is suitable for detecting seismic vibration.
- Another aspect of the present subject matter is in an apparatus form which recites a controller comprising a piece of controller event hardware which is capable of logging events; a piece of controller security fence hardware having a capacity to enforce a first security fence within which operations of the controller are allowed; a controller GPS module; and a controller countdown timer.
- An additional aspect of the present subject matter is in an apparatus form which recites a remote comprising a piece of remote event hardware which is capable of logging events; a piece of remote security fence hardware having a capacity to enforce a second security fence within which operations of the remote are allowed; a piece of seismic detection hardware which is suitable for detecting seismic vibration; a remote GPS module; a remote countdown timer; and a piece of sequential firing hardware which is capable of causing the remote to fire after another remote has fired.
- a further aspect of the present subject matter is in a method form which recites a method comprising allowing operations of a controller if the operations are within a first security fence; allowing operations of a remote if the operations are within a second security fence; detecting seismic vibration after a blast has occurred; storing retrievable events of a controller in a first non-volatile memory; and storing retrievable events of a remote in a second non-volatile memory.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating archetypical pieces of hardware of a system
- FIG. 2 is a pictorial diagram illustrating a use case using pieces of hardware of the system.
- FIGS. 3A-3T are process diagrams implementing an archetypical method.
- FIG. 1 illustrates a system 100 in which a controller 102 is in wireless communication with one or more remotes 112 .
- the system 100 uses multiple microprocessors to effectuate discrete two-way radio-controlled remote blast initiation.
- the system 100 's signals are digitally encoded (addressed).
- the system 100 is executed by software running on these multiple microprocessors located in the controller 102 and in the remotes 112 .
- the system 100 's message encoding/validation technical solutions have been combined to safely fire multiple dual-output remotes, electric or non-electric, in one or more defined groups. Both the controller 102 and a remote 112 can run on standby power mode for many hours before recharging is required.
- Both the controller 102 and the remote 112 have each a retractable and guarded antenna, which can be raised vertically during operation and retracted into an antenna guard for protection during transport and storage.
- the system 100 has increased firing capacity in which a minimum 350 volts are available.
- LCD displays are installed in both the controller 102 and the remote 112 to display information pertaining to the operation of the system 100 .
- the controller 102 is communicatively coupled to a piece of controller event hardware 104 .
- the controller event hardware 104 is engineered to log events using GPS information when available.
- the controller event hardware 104 keeps a record of information such as controller's state, post-blast motion detect value, firing voltage level, battery level, and the date and time the event was logged.
- each event includes the longitude and latitude of where the controller 102 was when the event was recorded.
- the controller event hardware 104 stores the last number of events in non-volatile memory. These events form a history which can be used to obtain information on the operation and performance of the controller 102 .
- Each event is logged with the current date and time and some events also include the GPS coordinates (if GPS is enabled and a signal available when logged). These events can be uploaded to a personal computer through a USB cable to invoke a program. The program reads the data and then converts it to a readable format, such as a spreadsheet format.
- the controller 102 also is communicatively coupled to a piece of controller security fence hardware 108 .
- the controller security fence hardware 108 inhibits operations of the controller to arm or to fire outside of the security fence. Other actions such as status request and disarm are not inhibited.
- the GPS fence can be set up to cover a different area for operations of the controller 102 and a different area of operations for each remote 112 .
- a user may choose to enable this feature in the controller 102 and allow the remotes 112 to be placed freely.
- the controller security fence hardware 108 is engineered to provide the following technical solution: the controller 102 can only be fired from an established zone. This can be used to ensure that the operator/blast crew can only fire from a safe position. In the event the controller 102 was lost or stolen, it could not be used outside of the authorized security fence which discourages theft or terrorist use.
- Both the controller event hardware 104 and the controller security fence hardware 108 are communicatively coupled to a controller GPS module 106 .
- the controller GPS module 106 stores the date and time for use in the history log regardless of whether a GPS signal is available as long as sufficient battery power is present.
- the controller GPS module 106 is powered by the controller's main battery when the controller is switched on. When the controller GPS module 106 is switched off, the controller GPS module 106 is powered by a three-volt rechargeable lithium battery and is placed in a low current draw mode which keeps its clock running in order to maintain the correct date and time.
- the controller's three-volt rechargeable lithium battery keeps the clock running for 7-10 days.
- the controller GPS module 106 is facilitated to re-acquire a GPS signal.
- the controller GPS module 106 supports 66 channels with an update rate of up to 10 Hertz. It is capable of SBAS (WAAS, EGNOS, and MSAS).
- the controller GPS module 106 has fast TTFF at a low signal level.
- the built-in battery reserve system in addition to keeping the clock running, is also used for rapid satellite acquisition.
- the controller GPS module 106 is set to update a processor with fresh GPS data every 500 ms.
- the processor extracts the date, time, GPS information, and HDOP (horizontal dilution of precision) as provided by the GPS.
- the controller 102 is communicatively coupled to a controller countdown timer 110 .
- the controller countdown timer 110 automatically disarms the controller 102 after expiry of a period of time.
- the automatic-disarming technical function ensures that the controller 102 returns to a safe state in the event of a loss of communications, after a time out period.
- the remote 112 is communicatively coupled to a piece of remote event hardware 114 .
- the remote event hardware 114 is engineered to log events using GPS information when available.
- the remote event hardware 114 keeps a record of information such as remote's state, post-blast motion detect value, firing voltage level, battery level, and the date and time the event was logged.
- each event includes the longitude and latitude of where the remote 112 was when the event was recorded.
- the remote event hardware 114 stores the last number of events in non-volatile memory. These events form a history which can be used to obtain information on the operation and performance of the remote 112 .
- Each event is logged with the current date and time and some events also include the GPS coordinates (if GPS is enabled and a signal available when logged). These events can be uploaded to a personal computer through a USB cable to invoke a program. The program reads the data and then converts it to a readable format, such as a spreadsheet format.
- the remote 112 is also communicatively coupled to a piece of remote security fence hardware 118 .
- the remote security fence hardware 118 inhibits operations of the remote to arm or to fire outside of the security fence. Other actions such as status request and disarm are not inhibited.
- the GPS fence can be set up to cover a different area for operations of the remote 112 and a different area of operations for the controller 102 .
- the remote security fence hardware 118 is engineered to provide the following technical solutions: the remote 112 can only be fired from an established zone. This can be used to ensure that the remote 112 is not placed too close to the blast area where it might be damaged and to help keep the blasting crew a safe distance from the blast area during hookup of the firing line. In the event the remote 112 is lost or stolen, it cannot be used outside the authorized security fence which discourages theft or terrorist use.
- the security fence is not a physical fence but a virtual one.
- Both the remote event hardware 114 and the remote security fence hardware 118 are communicatively coupled to a remote GPS module 116 .
- the remote GPS module 116 stores the date and time for use in the history log regardless of whether a GPS signal is available as long as sufficient battery power is present.
- the remote GPS module 116 is powered by the remote's main battery when the controller is switched on. When the remote GPS module 116 is switched off, the remote GPS module 116 is powered by a three-volt rechargeable lithium battery and is placed in a low current draw mode which keeps its clock running in order to maintain the correct date and time.
- the remote's three-volt rechargeable lithium battery keeps the clock running for 7-10 days.
- the remote GPS module 116 is facilitated to re-acquire a GPS signal.
- the remote GPS module 116 supports 66 channels with an update rate of up to 10 Hertz. It is capable of SBAS (WAAS, EGNOS, and MSAS).
- the remote GPS module 116 has fast TTFF at a low signal level.
- the built-in battery reserve system in addition to keeping the clock running, is also used for rapid satellite acquisition.
- the remote GPS module 116 is set to update a processor with fresh GPS data every 500 ms. The processor extracts the date, time, GPS information, and HDOP as provided by the GPS.
- the remote 112 is wired to detonation charges 126 .
- the remote 112 is communicatively coupled to a piece of seismic detection hardware 122 .
- the seismic detection hardware 122 is suitably used to detect post-blast vibration.
- Each remote 112 has a hardware sensor, namely, the seismic detection hardware 122 that measures the seismic motion that is expected when a successful blast detonation has occurred.
- the controller 102 after being notified by the remote 112 , reports that a post-fire vibration was detected, which is useful in subsurface operations when the successful initiation of a blast cannot be easily determined.
- the seismic detection hardware 122 is a sensor that measures the seismic vibration that may be expected when a successful blast detonation has occurred. The measured vibration is integrated over a period of time following an attempt at initiation. The vibration value is subsequently returned to the controller 102 through the radio communications link during the post-blast automatic status check. If the motion value is sufficient, the controller 102 reports to the operator that a post-fire motion was detected via a liquid crystal display.
- the seismic detection hardware 122 is useful in operations where the successful initiation of a blast cannot be easily determined.
- the seismic detection hardware 122 also helps inform the user of a successful detonation when other methods (sight, sound, and perceived or measured vibration) are not directly available to the user.
- the seismic detection hardware 122 facilitates knowledge that a blast attempt was not successful to inform the user that re-entry may be dangerous and that he may wish to choose extra precautions, protective gear, and/or extra wait times.
- the seismic detection hardware 122 may affect measurements: the distance from the blast (higher frequencies tend to attenuate more quickly); the type and quantity of the explosive energy; the blast-hole pattern and inter-hole timing; the geological features of the earth materials; whether the body wave consists of the P (or primary) or S (or secondary) wave; and so on.
- Background noise in the measurement might contribute to a false post-blast indication, so the seismic detection hardware 122 suitably characterizes such background noise. Background noise may be a result of motion or vibration from neighboring equipment such as high power fans, generators, or waves from other nearby blasts.
- the remote 112 is communicatively coupled to a piece of sequential firing hardware 124 .
- the sequential firing hardware 124 upon activation allows the user to space the firings of each remote 112 so that they do not fire at the same time (suitably 0-2 seconds between the firing of each remote 112 ). This feature is particularly useful when firing multiple blocks where a delay is needed between each block to verify successes of operations.
- the remote 112 is communicatively coupled to a remote countdown timer 120 .
- the remote countdown timer 120 automatically disarms the controller 112 after expiry of a period of time.
- the automatic-disarming technical function ensures that the remote 112 returns to a safe state in the event of a loss of communications, after a time out period.
- FIG. 2 illustrates a use case scenario 200 in which a controller 202 is in wireless communication with a remote 204 as well as another remote 210 .
- the remote 204 is wire coupled to detonation charges 206 .
- the controller 202 arms and issues a firing command to the remote 204
- the remote 204 detonates the detonation charges 206 generating seismic vibration 208 .
- the controller 202 arms and issues a firing command to the remote 210 .
- the remote 210 detonates detonation charges 212 generating seismic vibration 214 as well as seismic vibration 216 .
- Firing multiple blasts at the same time may produce false seismic vibration detections.
- the remotes 204 , 210 are fired at the same time. However, the remote 204 's blast pattern failed to detonate or had a seismic vibration 208 that was not sufficiently strong when reaching the remote 204 . If the proximity of the blast from the remote 210 is sufficiently close, the remote 204 may inadvertently pick up the seismic vibration 214 and report to the user that a successful blast initiation occurred. This gives the user false information that the detonation charges 206 were successfully initiated, which may not have been the case. This false reporting to the user significantly decreases the usefulness of post-blast seismic vibration sensing when using multiple remotes.
- the user can employ the sequential firing hardware 124 .
- This hardware allows the user to set a delay between the firing of each remote, such as from 0 to 2 seconds. With a delay between the firing of each remote, the vibration detection sampling can be completed for each remote before the next remote initiates its charge. Thus each remote can sample the vibration from its connected blast pattern without interference from neighboring blast patterns.
- the sequence delay is user programmable in 1 ⁇ 8th second increments and is stored in the non-volatile memory of the controller 102 . This delay value is sent to the remotes within the broadcast firing command Each remote calculates its delay based on the number of lower remotes (lower remote means a remote with an identification number lower than another remote) and waits accordingly.
- the sequence delay spaces the firing of each remote an equal amount, with the lowest remote firing first, and a subsequent highest remote firing next, until the last remote fires. If a remote within the middle of a group is not selected for firing, its delay is skipped. To prevent false motion detections from adjacent blasts, the delay should be set to be greater than the vibration detection sample period.
- FIGS. 3A-3T are process diagrams implementing an exemplary method 3000 .
- the method 3000 proceeds to a set of method steps defined between a continuation terminal (“terminal A”) and another continuation terminal (“terminal B”).
- the set of method steps 3002 sets a security fence for a controller, a remote, or both, within which operations are allowed.
- terminal A FIG. 3C
- the method proceeds to decision block 3014 .
- a test is performed at decision block 3014 to determine whether a security fence should be set up for the controller. If the answer to the test at decision block 3014 is No, the method continues to another continuation termination (“terminal A 3 ”).
- the method proceeds to block 3016 where the method prepares to set an area of operation for the controller.
- the method then continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal A 1 ”).
- terminal A 1 FIG. 3C
- the method proceeds to decision block 3018 where a test is performed to determine whether the controller is located at a desired firing point. If the answer to the test at decision block 3018 is No, the method continues to terminal A 1 and loops back to decision block 3018 where processing is repeated. Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block 3018 is Yes, the method proceeds to another continuation terminal (“terminal A 2 ”).
- the method 3000 proceeds to block 3020 where the method receives security authentication, such as a PIN code, to set the security fence for the controller.
- security authentication such as a PIN code
- the method continues to decision block 3022 where a test is performed to determine whether the security authentication was authenticated. If the answer to the test at decision block 3022 is No, the method proceeds to terminal A 2 and skips back to block 3020 where the above-identified processing steps are repeated. If the answer to the test at decision block 3022 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3024 where the method receives instructions to lock the current position of the controller into non-volatile memory.
- the method receives a radius of operation (such as in meters and so on) of which the center is located at the current position of the controller.
- the method enables the security fence for the controller. The method then continues to terminal A 3 .
- the method proceeds to decision block 3030 where a test is performed to determine whether a security fence should be set for a remote. If the answer to the test at decision block 3030 is No, the method continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal A 6 ”). Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block 3030 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3032 where the method prepares to set an area of operation for the remote. The method then continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal A 4 ”). From terminal A 4 ( FIG. 3E ), the method proceeds to decision block 3034 where a test is performed to determine whether the remote is located at a desired firing point.
- terminal A 4 If the answer to the test at decision block 3034 is No, the method proceeds to terminal A 4 and skips back to decision block 3034 where its processing is repeated. Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block 3034 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3036 where the method receives security authentication, such as a PIN code, to set the security fence for the remote. The method then continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal A 5 ”).
- security authentication such as a PIN code
- the method proceeds to decision block 3038 where a test is performed to determine whether the security authentication was authenticated. If the answer to the test at decision block 3038 is No, the method proceeds to terminal A 2 and skips back to block 3020 where the above-identified processing steps are repeated. Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block 3038 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3040 where the method receives instructions to lock the current position of the remote into non-volatile memory. The method then proceeds to block 3042 where the method receives a radius of operation (such as in meters and so on) of which the center is located at the current position of the remote. At block 3044 , the method enables the security fence for the remote.
- a radius of operation such as in meters and so on
- decision block 3046 Another test is performed to determine whether there is another remote to set the security fence. If the answer to the test at decision block 3046 is No, the method proceeds to another continuation terminal (“terminal A 6 ”). Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block 3046 is Yes, the method proceeds to terminal A 3 and skips back to decision block 3030 where the above-identified processing steps are repeated.
- the method proceeds to decision block 3048 where a test is performed to determine whether the security fence is enabled. If the answer to the test at decision block 3048 is No, the method proceeds to terminal B. Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block 3048 is Yes, the method proceeds to decision block 3050 where another test is performed to determine whether GPS is enabled. If the answer to the test at decision block 3050 is No, the method proceeds to terminal B. Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block 3050 is Yes, the method proceeds to decision block 3052 where another test is performed to determine whether the GPS signal is present. If the answer to the test at decision block 3052 is No, the method proceeds to terminal B. Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block 3052 is Yes, the method proceeds to another continuation terminal (“terminal A 7 ”).
- the method proceeds to yet another decision block 3054 where a test is performed to determine whether the GPS HDOP value has a rating high enough to ensure confidence of accuracy (i.e., an excellent rating). If the answer to the test at decision block 3054 is No, the method proceeds to terminal B. Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block 3054 is Yes, the method proceeds to another decision block 3056 where a test is performed to determine whether the operation is within the security fence (i.e., within the set radius). If the answer to the test at decision block 3056 is No, the method proceeds to block 3058 where the method prevents operations of arming and/or firing to proceed. The method then continues to terminal B. Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block 3056 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3060 where the method permits operations of arming and/or firing to proceed. The method then continues to terminal B.
- the method 3000 proceeds to a set of method steps 3004 defined between a continuation terminal (“terminal C”) and another continuation terminal (“terminal D”).
- the set of method steps 3004 actuate a countdown timer.
- the method proceeds to a set of method steps defined between a continuation terminal (“terminal E”) and another continuation terminal (“terminal F”).
- the set of method steps 3006 actuate sequential firing hardware.
- the method proceeds to a set of method steps 3008 defined between a continuation terminal (“terminal G”) and another continuation terminal (“terminal H”).
- the set of method steps 3008 actuate seismic detection hardware.
- the method 3000 proceeds to block 3062 where the method prepares to extract wanted vibration measurement from background noise. The method then proceeds to decision block 3064 where a test is performed to determine whether the vibration detection threshold should be changed. If the answer to the test at decision block 3064 is No, the method proceeds to another continuation terminal (“terminal G 1 ”). Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block 3064 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3066 where the method receives a value which is programmable in the controller setting the vibration detection threshold. The method then continues to terminal G 1 . From terminal G 1 ( FIG. 3I ), the method proceeds to decision block 3068 where a test is performed to determine whether the vibration detection sensitivity should be changed. If the answer to the test at decision block 3068 is No, the method proceeds to another continuation terminal (“terminal G 3 ”). Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block 3068 is Yes, the method proceeds to another continuation terminal (“terminal G 2 ”).
- the method 3000 proceeds to block 3070 where the method receives a value which is programmable in the non-volatile memory of a remote, setting the vibration detection sensitivity. The method then continues to terminal G 3 and further proceeds to decision block 3072 where a test is performed to determine whether the vibration detection period should be changed. If the answer to the test at decision block 3072 is No, the method continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal G 4 ”). Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block 3072 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3074 where the method receives a value which is programmable in the non-volatile memory of a remote, setting the vibration detection period. At block 3076 , the method prepares to detect seismic vibration. The method then continues to terminal G 4 .
- the method proceeds to decision block 3078 where a test is performed to determine whether the method detects an arming sequence. If the answer to the test at decision block 3078 is No, the method proceeds to terminal G 4 and skips back to decision block 3078 where its processing is repeated. Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block 3078 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3080 where the method accesses a piece of hardware, namely, a dual-axis accelerometer suitable for detecting vertical and horizontal movement. At block 3082 , the method prepares to take a measurement of the dual-axis accelerometer to establish its current orientation. At block 3084 , the method extracts the vibration detection period from the hardware.
- the method causes a processor of the remote to sample the X-axis and the Y-axis of the dual-axis accelerometer using two different channels of a 10-bit successive approximation analog-to-digital converter.
- the method samples at a rate of one sample every millisecond. The method then continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal G 5 ”).
- the method proceeds to block 3088 where the method integrates the samples for the duration of the vibration detection period.
- the method sums the samples together.
- the method divides the sum by the number of samples taken for each axis.
- the quotient is used by the method as a reference sample.
- the method then continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal G 6 ”).
- the method proceeds to decision block 3096 where a test is performed to determine whether the firing circuit has initiated detonation of the charges. If the answer to the test at decision block 3096 is No, the method continues to terminal G 6 and skips back to decision block 3096 and its processing is repeated. If the answer to the test at decision block 3096 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3098 where the method makes a second sampling using steps discussed above. The method then continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal G 7 ”).
- the method proceeds to block 3100 where the method causes the processor to calculate the absolute value of the difference of the two samples, namely, the quotient and the second sampling, for both the X-axis and Y-axis.
- the method averages the values for the X-axis and the Y-axis together forming an amplitude of a measured vibration acceleration.
- the method extracts from hardware the vibration detection sensitivity, which is used electrically as a gain value.
- the amplitude of the measured vibration acceleration is multiplied by the vibration detection sensitivity to adjust the sensitivity, of which the product forms a vibration detection value.
- the method 3000 continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal G 8 ”). From terminal G 8 ( FIG. 3M ), the method proceeds to decision block 3108 where a test is performed to determine whether the blast has occurred. If the answer to the test at decision block 3108 is No, the method proceeds to terminal G 8 and skips back to decision block 3108 where its processing is repeated. Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block 3108 is Yes, the method proceeds to another continuation terminal (“terminal G 9 ”).
- the method 3000 proceeds to block 3110 where the method extracts, from the controller's hardware, the vibration detection threshold.
- the method compares the vibration detection value (vibration) with the vibration detection threshold (threshold). The method then continues to decision block 3114 where a test is performed to determine whether the vibration is equal to or greater than the threshold. If the answer to the test at decision block 3114 is No, the method proceeds to terminal H. Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block 3114 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3116 where the method transforms the post-blast seismic vibration to display. At block 3118 , the method saves the vibration to the event hardware of both the controller and the remote(s). The method then continues to terminal H.
- the method 3000 proceeds to a set of method steps 3010 defined between a continuation terminal (“terminal I”) and another continuation terminal (“terminal J”).
- the set of method steps 3010 captures events of a controller with GPS information.
- the method proceeds to decision block 3120 where a test is performed to determine whether the controller's events should be extracted. If the answer to the test at decision block 3120 is No, the method proceeds to terminal J. Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block 3120 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3122 where the method extracts from hardware the date of the event in month, day, and year; and the time of the event in hours, minutes, and seconds.
- the GPS coordinates namely the latitude and longitude, in decimal format are extracted for the event (if available).
- the horizontal dilution of precision is extracted to show the quality of the GPS coordinates.
- the data connected with remotes that are selected, armed, and/or ready (safe) is extracted.
- the method extracts the battery voltage of the controller, internal temperature, the fire mode selected and other user settings. The method then continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal I 1 ”).
- the method proceeds to block 3132 where the method extracts information regarding when the controller is switched on.
- the method extracts information showing whether the correct electronic key for the controller is installed.
- the method extracts information regarding the user's request for a status of one or more remote units, which reveals selected remotes, whether they are armed, and whether they are ready.
- the method extracts information regarding whether the controller made an automatic status request for one or more remotes.
- the method extracts information regarding the controller's request for the status of one or more remotes automatically before sending the arm command
- the method extracts information regarding the controller's request for the status of one or more remotes automatically after being disarmed (caused by various options including a disarm command or expiry of an internal arm timer).
- the method extracts information regarding whether the controller sent the arm command to the selected and responding remotes. The method then continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal I 2 ”).
- the method proceeds to block 3146 where the method extracts information regarding whether the controller reports receipt of the status message from the remote showing it is armed.
- the method extracts information regarding whether the user fired and whether the fire command was sent to the remotes.
- the method extracts information regarding whether the post-fire status from a responding remote unit is available, including the firing voltage and the seismic vibration detection value (detected by one or more sensors).
- the method extracts information regarding whether the user disarmed some or all of the remotes.
- the method extracts information regarding whether the user changed the fire circuit selection to electric detonator.
- the method extracts information regarding whether the user changed the fire circuit selection to shock tube.
- the method extracts information regarding whether the user performed an emergency disarm of all remotes by removing the controller's electronic key.
- the method extracts information regarding whether the controller's internal arm timer expired and the controller disarmed itself. The method then continues to terminal J.
- the method proceeds to a set of method steps 3012 defined between a continuation terminal (“terminal K”) and another continuation terminal (“terminal L”).
- the set of method steps 3012 captures events of a remote with GPS information.
- the set of method steps 3000 proceeds to decision block 3162 where a test is performed to determine whether a remote's events should be extracted. If the answer to the test at decision block 3162 is No, the method proceeds to terminal L and terminates execution. Otherwise, if the answer to the test at decision block 3162 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3164 , where the method extracts from hardware the date of the event in month, day, and year; and the time of the event in hours, minutes, and seconds.
- the GPS coordinates namely the latitude and longitude, in decimal format are extracted for the events if available.
- the horizontal dilution of precision is extracted to show the quality of the GPS coordinates.
- the data connected with whether the remote is selected, armed, and/or ready (safe) is extracted.
- the method extracts the battery voltage of the remote, internal temperature, the fire mode selected, and other user settings. The method then continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal K 1 ”).
- the method proceeds to block 3174 , where the method extracts information regarding when the remote is switched on.
- the method extracts information showing whether the correct electronic key for the remote is installed.
- the method extracts information regarding the controller's request for status, which reveals the remote unit number, fire state, and fire voltage as well as vibration detection value.
- the method extracts information regarding whether status messages received by the controller may be confirmed by the remote with an acknowledge signal.
- the method extracts information regarding whether the remote received the arm command from the controller.
- the method extracts information regarding whether the remote's internal electric circuit was armed.
- the method extracts information regarding whether the remote's internal shock tube circuit was armed. The method then continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal K 2 ”).
- the method proceeds to block 3188 where the method extracts information regarding whether the remote received the arm command from the controller.
- the method extracts information regarding whether the electric detonator circuit was fired and the firing voltage as well as the vibration detection value from the seismic sensor.
- the method extracts information regarding whether the shock tube circuit was fired, including the firing voltage and the vibration detection value from the seismic sensor.
- the method extracts information regarding whether the remote was disarmed (ready or safe) by the controller.
- the method extracts information regarding whether the remote's internal arm timer counted down to zero and disarmed itself.
- the method extracts information regarding whether the user performed an emergency disarm of the remote by removing its key.
- the method extracts information regarding whether following key removal, the remote shows its new status as disarmed (ready or safe). The method then continues to terminal L and terminates execution.
Abstract
Technical solutions are engineered for remote firing devices to include pieces of hardware to implement a history log, security fence, seismic detection, countdown timers, and sequential firing.
Description
- This application is a division of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 15/370972, filed Dec. 6, 2016, which is a division of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 14/589788, filed Jan. 5, 2015, now U.S. Pat. No. 9,791,253, issued Oct. 17, 2017, which claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/924163, filed Jan. 6, 2014. Each application is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.
- The present subject matter is generally related to remote firing devices, and more particularly, it relates to technical solutions for better remote firing devices including history log, security fence, seismic detection, countdown timers, and sequential firing.
- Explosive devices have differing triggering mechanisms including wire, radio, cellular phone, or infrared. Historically, command-wire uses an electrical firing cable that affords the user complete control over the device right up until the moment of initiation. In modern times, the trigger is radio-controlled by a radio link. The system is constructed so that a receiver is connected to an electrical firing circuit and the transmitter operated by the operator at a distance. A signal from the transmitter causes the receiver to trigger a firing pulse that operates a switch. Usually the switch fires an initiator; however, the output may also be used to remotely arm an explosive circuit. In conventional systems, it is impossible to tell what has transpired in connection with an explosion. Additionally, there is a desire to delimit the operations of the system to improve safety.
- This summary is provided to introduce a selection of concepts in a simplified form that are further described below in the Detailed Description. This summary is not intended to identify key features of the claimed subject matter, nor is it intended to be used as an aid in determining the scope of the claimed subject matter.
- One aspect of the present subject matter is in a system form which recites a system comprising a controller, the hardware of which is suitable for being communicatively coupled with a piece of controller event hardware which is capable of logging events; and a piece of controller security fence hardware having a capacity to enforce a first security fence within which operations of the controller are allowed. The system also comprises a remote, the hardware of which is suitable for being communicatively coupled with a piece of remote event hardware which is capable of logging events; a piece of remote security fence hardware having a capacity to enforce a second security fence within which operations of the remote are allowed; and a piece of seismic detection hardware which is suitable for detecting seismic vibration.
- Another aspect of the present subject matter is in an apparatus form which recites a controller comprising a piece of controller event hardware which is capable of logging events; a piece of controller security fence hardware having a capacity to enforce a first security fence within which operations of the controller are allowed; a controller GPS module; and a controller countdown timer.
- An additional aspect of the present subject matter is in an apparatus form which recites a remote comprising a piece of remote event hardware which is capable of logging events; a piece of remote security fence hardware having a capacity to enforce a second security fence within which operations of the remote are allowed; a piece of seismic detection hardware which is suitable for detecting seismic vibration; a remote GPS module; a remote countdown timer; and a piece of sequential firing hardware which is capable of causing the remote to fire after another remote has fired.
- A further aspect of the present subject matter is in a method form which recites a method comprising allowing operations of a controller if the operations are within a first security fence; allowing operations of a remote if the operations are within a second security fence; detecting seismic vibration after a blast has occurred; storing retrievable events of a controller in a first non-volatile memory; and storing retrievable events of a remote in a second non-volatile memory.
- The foregoing aspects and many of the attendant advantages of this invention will become more readily appreciated as the same become better understood by reference to the following detailed description, when taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein:
-
FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating archetypical pieces of hardware of a system; -
FIG. 2 is a pictorial diagram illustrating a use case using pieces of hardware of the system; and -
FIGS. 3A-3T are process diagrams implementing an archetypical method. -
FIG. 1 illustrates asystem 100 in which acontroller 102 is in wireless communication with one ormore remotes 112. Thesystem 100 uses multiple microprocessors to effectuate discrete two-way radio-controlled remote blast initiation. Thesystem 100's signals are digitally encoded (addressed). Thesystem 100 is executed by software running on these multiple microprocessors located in thecontroller 102 and in theremotes 112. Thesystem 100's message encoding/validation technical solutions have been combined to safely fire multiple dual-output remotes, electric or non-electric, in one or more defined groups. Both thecontroller 102 and a remote 112 can run on standby power mode for many hours before recharging is required. Both thecontroller 102 and the remote 112 have each a retractable and guarded antenna, which can be raised vertically during operation and retracted into an antenna guard for protection during transport and storage. Thesystem 100 has increased firing capacity in which a minimum 350 volts are available. LCD displays are installed in both thecontroller 102 and the remote 112 to display information pertaining to the operation of thesystem 100. - The
controller 102 is communicatively coupled to a piece ofcontroller event hardware 104. Thecontroller event hardware 104 is engineered to log events using GPS information when available. Thecontroller event hardware 104 keeps a record of information such as controller's state, post-blast motion detect value, firing voltage level, battery level, and the date and time the event was logged. With the GPS included, each event includes the longitude and latitude of where thecontroller 102 was when the event was recorded. Thecontroller event hardware 104 stores the last number of events in non-volatile memory. These events form a history which can be used to obtain information on the operation and performance of thecontroller 102. Each event is logged with the current date and time and some events also include the GPS coordinates (if GPS is enabled and a signal available when logged). These events can be uploaded to a personal computer through a USB cable to invoke a program. The program reads the data and then converts it to a readable format, such as a spreadsheet format. - The
controller 102 also is communicatively coupled to a piece of controllersecurity fence hardware 108. The controllersecurity fence hardware 108 inhibits operations of the controller to arm or to fire outside of the security fence. Other actions such as status request and disarm are not inhibited. The GPS fence can be set up to cover a different area for operations of thecontroller 102 and a different area of operations for each remote 112. Here is a use case: A user may choose to enable this feature in thecontroller 102 and allow theremotes 112 to be placed freely. The controllersecurity fence hardware 108 is engineered to provide the following technical solution: thecontroller 102 can only be fired from an established zone. This can be used to ensure that the operator/blast crew can only fire from a safe position. In the event thecontroller 102 was lost or stolen, it could not be used outside of the authorized security fence which discourages theft or terrorist use. - Both the
controller event hardware 104 and the controllersecurity fence hardware 108 are communicatively coupled to acontroller GPS module 106. Thecontroller GPS module 106 stores the date and time for use in the history log regardless of whether a GPS signal is available as long as sufficient battery power is present. Thecontroller GPS module 106 is powered by the controller's main battery when the controller is switched on. When thecontroller GPS module 106 is switched off, thecontroller GPS module 106 is powered by a three-volt rechargeable lithium battery and is placed in a low current draw mode which keeps its clock running in order to maintain the correct date and time. The controller's three-volt rechargeable lithium battery keeps the clock running for 7-10 days. To reset the clock or to correct accumulated date and time drift error, thecontroller GPS module 106 is facilitated to re-acquire a GPS signal. Thecontroller GPS module 106 supports 66 channels with an update rate of up to 10 Hertz. It is capable of SBAS (WAAS, EGNOS, and MSAS). Thecontroller GPS module 106 has fast TTFF at a low signal level. The built-in battery reserve system, in addition to keeping the clock running, is also used for rapid satellite acquisition. Thecontroller GPS module 106 is set to update a processor with fresh GPS data every 500 ms. The processor extracts the date, time, GPS information, and HDOP (horizontal dilution of precision) as provided by the GPS. - The
controller 102 is communicatively coupled to acontroller countdown timer 110. Thecontroller countdown timer 110 automatically disarms thecontroller 102 after expiry of a period of time. The automatic-disarming technical function ensures that thecontroller 102 returns to a safe state in the event of a loss of communications, after a time out period. - The remote 112 is communicatively coupled to a piece of
remote event hardware 114. Theremote event hardware 114 is engineered to log events using GPS information when available. Theremote event hardware 114 keeps a record of information such as remote's state, post-blast motion detect value, firing voltage level, battery level, and the date and time the event was logged. With the GPS included, each event includes the longitude and latitude of where the remote 112 was when the event was recorded. Theremote event hardware 114 stores the last number of events in non-volatile memory. These events form a history which can be used to obtain information on the operation and performance of the remote 112. Each event is logged with the current date and time and some events also include the GPS coordinates (if GPS is enabled and a signal available when logged). These events can be uploaded to a personal computer through a USB cable to invoke a program. The program reads the data and then converts it to a readable format, such as a spreadsheet format. - The remote 112 is also communicatively coupled to a piece of remote
security fence hardware 118. The remotesecurity fence hardware 118 inhibits operations of the remote to arm or to fire outside of the security fence. Other actions such as status request and disarm are not inhibited. The GPS fence can be set up to cover a different area for operations of the remote 112 and a different area of operations for thecontroller 102. The remotesecurity fence hardware 118 is engineered to provide the following technical solutions: the remote 112 can only be fired from an established zone. This can be used to ensure that the remote 112 is not placed too close to the blast area where it might be damaged and to help keep the blasting crew a safe distance from the blast area during hookup of the firing line. In the event the remote 112 is lost or stolen, it cannot be used outside the authorized security fence which discourages theft or terrorist use. The security fence is not a physical fence but a virtual one. - Both the
remote event hardware 114 and the remotesecurity fence hardware 118 are communicatively coupled to aremote GPS module 116. Theremote GPS module 116 stores the date and time for use in the history log regardless of whether a GPS signal is available as long as sufficient battery power is present. Theremote GPS module 116 is powered by the remote's main battery when the controller is switched on. When theremote GPS module 116 is switched off, theremote GPS module 116 is powered by a three-volt rechargeable lithium battery and is placed in a low current draw mode which keeps its clock running in order to maintain the correct date and time. The remote's three-volt rechargeable lithium battery keeps the clock running for 7-10 days. To reset the clock or to correct accumulated date and time drift error, theremote GPS module 116 is facilitated to re-acquire a GPS signal. Theremote GPS module 116 supports 66 channels with an update rate of up to 10 Hertz. It is capable of SBAS (WAAS, EGNOS, and MSAS). Theremote GPS module 116 has fast TTFF at a low signal level. The built-in battery reserve system, in addition to keeping the clock running, is also used for rapid satellite acquisition. Theremote GPS module 116 is set to update a processor with fresh GPS data every 500 ms. The processor extracts the date, time, GPS information, and HDOP as provided by the GPS. - The remote 112 is wired to detonation charges 126. The remote 112 is communicatively coupled to a piece of
seismic detection hardware 122. Theseismic detection hardware 122 is suitably used to detect post-blast vibration. Each remote 112 has a hardware sensor, namely, theseismic detection hardware 122 that measures the seismic motion that is expected when a successful blast detonation has occurred. Thecontroller 102, after being notified by the remote 112, reports that a post-fire vibration was detected, which is useful in subsurface operations when the successful initiation of a blast cannot be easily determined. - The
seismic detection hardware 122 is a sensor that measures the seismic vibration that may be expected when a successful blast detonation has occurred. The measured vibration is integrated over a period of time following an attempt at initiation. The vibration value is subsequently returned to thecontroller 102 through the radio communications link during the post-blast automatic status check. If the motion value is sufficient, thecontroller 102 reports to the operator that a post-fire motion was detected via a liquid crystal display. Theseismic detection hardware 122 is useful in operations where the successful initiation of a blast cannot be easily determined. Theseismic detection hardware 122 also helps inform the user of a successful detonation when other methods (sight, sound, and perceived or measured vibration) are not directly available to the user. Theseismic detection hardware 122 facilitates knowledge that a blast attempt was not successful to inform the user that re-entry may be dangerous and that he may wish to choose extra precautions, protective gear, and/or extra wait times. - Because the magnitude and frequency of a blast wave is complex, it is characterized by the
seismic detection hardware 122 and may affect measurements: the distance from the blast (higher frequencies tend to attenuate more quickly); the type and quantity of the explosive energy; the blast-hole pattern and inter-hole timing; the geological features of the earth materials; whether the body wave consists of the P (or primary) or S (or secondary) wave; and so on. Background noise in the measurement might contribute to a false post-blast indication, so theseismic detection hardware 122 suitably characterizes such background noise. Background noise may be a result of motion or vibration from neighboring equipment such as high power fans, generators, or waves from other nearby blasts. - The remote 112 is communicatively coupled to a piece of
sequential firing hardware 124. Thesequential firing hardware 124 upon activation allows the user to space the firings of each remote 112 so that they do not fire at the same time (suitably 0-2 seconds between the firing of each remote 112). This feature is particularly useful when firing multiple blocks where a delay is needed between each block to verify successes of operations. The remote 112 is communicatively coupled to aremote countdown timer 120. Theremote countdown timer 120 automatically disarms thecontroller 112 after expiry of a period of time. The automatic-disarming technical function ensures that the remote 112 returns to a safe state in the event of a loss of communications, after a time out period. -
FIG. 2 illustrates ause case scenario 200 in which acontroller 202 is in wireless communication with a remote 204 as well as another remote 210. The remote 204 is wire coupled to detonation charges 206. When thecontroller 202 arms and issues a firing command to the remote 204, the remote 204 detonates the detonation charges 206 generatingseismic vibration 208. Thecontroller 202 arms and issues a firing command to the remote 210. The remote 210, in turn, detonatesdetonation charges 212 generatingseismic vibration 214 as well asseismic vibration 216. - Firing multiple blasts at the same time may produce false seismic vibration detections. For example, in
FIG. 2 , theremotes seismic vibration 208 that was not sufficiently strong when reaching the remote 204. If the proximity of the blast from the remote 210 is sufficiently close, the remote 204 may inadvertently pick up theseismic vibration 214 and report to the user that a successful blast initiation occurred. This gives the user false information that the detonation charges 206 were successfully initiated, which may not have been the case. This false reporting to the user significantly decreases the usefulness of post-blast seismic vibration sensing when using multiple remotes. To reduce this undesired interaction, the user can employ thesequential firing hardware 124. This hardware allows the user to set a delay between the firing of each remote, such as from 0 to 2 seconds. With a delay between the firing of each remote, the vibration detection sampling can be completed for each remote before the next remote initiates its charge. Thus each remote can sample the vibration from its connected blast pattern without interference from neighboring blast patterns. The sequence delay is user programmable in ⅛th second increments and is stored in the non-volatile memory of thecontroller 102. This delay value is sent to the remotes within the broadcast firing command Each remote calculates its delay based on the number of lower remotes (lower remote means a remote with an identification number lower than another remote) and waits accordingly. The sequence delay spaces the firing of each remote an equal amount, with the lowest remote firing first, and a subsequent highest remote firing next, until the last remote fires. If a remote within the middle of a group is not selected for firing, its delay is skipped. To prevent false motion detections from adjacent blasts, the delay should be set to be greater than the vibration detection sample period. -
FIGS. 3A-3T are process diagrams implementing anexemplary method 3000. From a start block, themethod 3000 proceeds to a set of method steps defined between a continuation terminal (“terminal A”) and another continuation terminal (“terminal B”). The set ofmethod steps 3002 sets a security fence for a controller, a remote, or both, within which operations are allowed. From terminal A (FIG. 3C ), the method proceeds todecision block 3014. A test is performed atdecision block 3014 to determine whether a security fence should be set up for the controller. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3014 is No, the method continues to another continuation termination (“terminal A3”). Otherwise, if the answer to the test atdecision block 3014 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3016 where the method prepares to set an area of operation for the controller. The method then continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal A1”). From terminal A1 (FIG. 3C ), the method proceeds todecision block 3018 where a test is performed to determine whether the controller is located at a desired firing point. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3018 is No, the method continues to terminal A1 and loops back todecision block 3018 where processing is repeated. Otherwise, if the answer to the test atdecision block 3018 is Yes, the method proceeds to another continuation terminal (“terminal A2”). - From terminal A2 (
FIG. 3D ), themethod 3000 proceeds to block 3020 where the method receives security authentication, such as a PIN code, to set the security fence for the controller. The method continues todecision block 3022 where a test is performed to determine whether the security authentication was authenticated. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3022 is No, the method proceeds to terminal A2 and skips back to block 3020 where the above-identified processing steps are repeated. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3022 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3024 where the method receives instructions to lock the current position of the controller into non-volatile memory. Atblock 3026, the method receives a radius of operation (such as in meters and so on) of which the center is located at the current position of the controller. Atblock 3028, the method enables the security fence for the controller. The method then continues to terminal A3. - From terminal A3 (
FIG. 3E ), the method proceeds todecision block 3030 where a test is performed to determine whether a security fence should be set for a remote. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3030 is No, the method continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal A6”). Otherwise, if the answer to the test atdecision block 3030 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3032 where the method prepares to set an area of operation for the remote. The method then continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal A4”). From terminal A4 (FIG. 3E ), the method proceeds todecision block 3034 where a test is performed to determine whether the remote is located at a desired firing point. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3034 is No, the method proceeds to terminal A4 and skips back todecision block 3034 where its processing is repeated. Otherwise, if the answer to the test atdecision block 3034 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3036 where the method receives security authentication, such as a PIN code, to set the security fence for the remote. The method then continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal A5”). - From terminal A5 (
FIG. 3F ), the method proceeds todecision block 3038 where a test is performed to determine whether the security authentication was authenticated. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3038 is No, the method proceeds to terminal A2 and skips back to block 3020 where the above-identified processing steps are repeated. Otherwise, if the answer to the test atdecision block 3038 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3040 where the method receives instructions to lock the current position of the remote into non-volatile memory. The method then proceeds to block 3042 where the method receives a radius of operation (such as in meters and so on) of which the center is located at the current position of the remote. Atblock 3044, the method enables the security fence for the remote. The method then proceeds todecision block 3046 where another test is performed to determine whether there is another remote to set the security fence. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3046 is No, the method proceeds to another continuation terminal (“terminal A6”). Otherwise, if the answer to the test atdecision block 3046 is Yes, the method proceeds to terminal A3 and skips back todecision block 3030 where the above-identified processing steps are repeated. - From terminal A6 (
FIG. 3G ), the method proceeds todecision block 3048 where a test is performed to determine whether the security fence is enabled. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3048 is No, the method proceeds to terminal B. Otherwise, if the answer to the test atdecision block 3048 is Yes, the method proceeds todecision block 3050 where another test is performed to determine whether GPS is enabled. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3050 is No, the method proceeds to terminal B. Otherwise, if the answer to the test atdecision block 3050 is Yes, the method proceeds todecision block 3052 where another test is performed to determine whether the GPS signal is present. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3052 is No, the method proceeds to terminal B. Otherwise, if the answer to the test atdecision block 3052 is Yes, the method proceeds to another continuation terminal (“terminal A7”). - From terminal A7 (
FIG. 3H ), the method proceeds to yet anotherdecision block 3054 where a test is performed to determine whether the GPS HDOP value has a rating high enough to ensure confidence of accuracy (i.e., an excellent rating). If the answer to the test atdecision block 3054 is No, the method proceeds to terminal B. Otherwise, if the answer to the test atdecision block 3054 is Yes, the method proceeds to anotherdecision block 3056 where a test is performed to determine whether the operation is within the security fence (i.e., within the set radius). If the answer to the test atdecision block 3056 is No, the method proceeds to block 3058 where the method prevents operations of arming and/or firing to proceed. The method then continues to terminal B. Otherwise, if the answer to the test atdecision block 3056 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3060 where the method permits operations of arming and/or firing to proceed. The method then continues to terminal B. - From terminal B (
FIG. 3A ), themethod 3000 proceeds to a set ofmethod steps 3004 defined between a continuation terminal (“terminal C”) and another continuation terminal (“terminal D”). The set ofmethod steps 3004 actuate a countdown timer. From terminal D (FIG. 3A ), the method proceeds to a set of method steps defined between a continuation terminal (“terminal E”) and another continuation terminal (“terminal F”). The set of method steps 3006 actuate sequential firing hardware. From terminal F (FIG. 3B ), the method proceeds to a set ofmethod steps 3008 defined between a continuation terminal (“terminal G”) and another continuation terminal (“terminal H”). The set ofmethod steps 3008 actuate seismic detection hardware. - From terminal G (
FIG. 3I ), themethod 3000 proceeds to block 3062 where the method prepares to extract wanted vibration measurement from background noise. The method then proceeds todecision block 3064 where a test is performed to determine whether the vibration detection threshold should be changed. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3064 is No, the method proceeds to another continuation terminal (“terminal G1”). Otherwise, if the answer to the test atdecision block 3064 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3066 where the method receives a value which is programmable in the controller setting the vibration detection threshold. The method then continues to terminal G1. From terminal G1 (FIG. 3I ), the method proceeds todecision block 3068 where a test is performed to determine whether the vibration detection sensitivity should be changed. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3068 is No, the method proceeds to another continuation terminal (“terminal G3”). Otherwise, if the answer to the test atdecision block 3068 is Yes, the method proceeds to another continuation terminal (“terminal G2”). - From terminal G2 (
FIG. 3J ), themethod 3000 proceeds to block 3070 where the method receives a value which is programmable in the non-volatile memory of a remote, setting the vibration detection sensitivity. The method then continues to terminal G3 and further proceeds todecision block 3072 where a test is performed to determine whether the vibration detection period should be changed. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3072 is No, the method continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal G4”). Otherwise, if the answer to the test atdecision block 3072 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3074 where the method receives a value which is programmable in the non-volatile memory of a remote, setting the vibration detection period. Atblock 3076, the method prepares to detect seismic vibration. The method then continues to terminal G4. - From terminal G4 (
FIG. 3K ), the method proceeds todecision block 3078 where a test is performed to determine whether the method detects an arming sequence. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3078 is No, the method proceeds to terminal G4 and skips back todecision block 3078 where its processing is repeated. Otherwise, if the answer to the test atdecision block 3078 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3080 where the method accesses a piece of hardware, namely, a dual-axis accelerometer suitable for detecting vertical and horizontal movement. Atblock 3082, the method prepares to take a measurement of the dual-axis accelerometer to establish its current orientation. Atblock 3084, the method extracts the vibration detection period from the hardware. Atblock 3086, the method causes a processor of the remote to sample the X-axis and the Y-axis of the dual-axis accelerometer using two different channels of a 10-bit successive approximation analog-to-digital converter. Atblock 3088, the method samples at a rate of one sample every millisecond. The method then continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal G5”). - From terminal G5 (
FIG. 3L ), the method proceeds to block 3088 where the method integrates the samples for the duration of the vibration detection period. Atblock 3090, the method sums the samples together. Atblock 3092, the method divides the sum by the number of samples taken for each axis. Atblock 3094, the quotient is used by the method as a reference sample. The method then continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal G6”). From terminal G6 (FIG. 3L ), the method proceeds todecision block 3096 where a test is performed to determine whether the firing circuit has initiated detonation of the charges. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3096 is No, the method continues to terminal G6 and skips back todecision block 3096 and its processing is repeated. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3096 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3098 where the method makes a second sampling using steps discussed above. The method then continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal G7”). - At terminal G7 (
FIG. 3M ), the method proceeds to block 3100 where the method causes the processor to calculate the absolute value of the difference of the two samples, namely, the quotient and the second sampling, for both the X-axis and Y-axis. Atblock 3102, the method averages the values for the X-axis and the Y-axis together forming an amplitude of a measured vibration acceleration. Atblock 3104, the method extracts from hardware the vibration detection sensitivity, which is used electrically as a gain value. Atblock 3106, the amplitude of the measured vibration acceleration is multiplied by the vibration detection sensitivity to adjust the sensitivity, of which the product forms a vibration detection value. - The
method 3000 continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal G8”). From terminal G8 (FIG. 3M ), the method proceeds todecision block 3108 where a test is performed to determine whether the blast has occurred. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3108 is No, the method proceeds to terminal G8 and skips back todecision block 3108 where its processing is repeated. Otherwise, if the answer to the test atdecision block 3108 is Yes, the method proceeds to another continuation terminal (“terminal G9”). - From terminal G9 (
FIG. 3N ), themethod 3000 proceeds to block 3110 where the method extracts, from the controller's hardware, the vibration detection threshold. Atblock 3112, the method compares the vibration detection value (vibration) with the vibration detection threshold (threshold). The method then continues todecision block 3114 where a test is performed to determine whether the vibration is equal to or greater than the threshold. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3114 is No, the method proceeds to terminal H. Otherwise, if the answer to the test atdecision block 3114 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3116 where the method transforms the post-blast seismic vibration to display. Atblock 3118, the method saves the vibration to the event hardware of both the controller and the remote(s). The method then continues to terminal H. - From terminal H, the
method 3000 proceeds to a set of method steps 3010 defined between a continuation terminal (“terminal I”) and another continuation terminal (“terminal J”). The set of method steps 3010 captures events of a controller with GPS information. From terminal I (FIG. 3O ), the method proceeds todecision block 3120 where a test is performed to determine whether the controller's events should be extracted. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3120 is No, the method proceeds to terminal J. Otherwise, if the answer to the test atdecision block 3120 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3122 where the method extracts from hardware the date of the event in month, day, and year; and the time of the event in hours, minutes, and seconds. Atblock 3124, the GPS coordinates, namely the latitude and longitude, in decimal format are extracted for the event (if available). Atblock 3126, the horizontal dilution of precision is extracted to show the quality of the GPS coordinates. Atblock 3128, the data connected with remotes that are selected, armed, and/or ready (safe) is extracted. Atblock 3130, the method extracts the battery voltage of the controller, internal temperature, the fire mode selected and other user settings. The method then continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal I1”). - From terminal I1 (
FIG. 3P ), the method proceeds to block 3132 where the method extracts information regarding when the controller is switched on. Atblock 3134, the method extracts information showing whether the correct electronic key for the controller is installed. Atblock 3136, the method extracts information regarding the user's request for a status of one or more remote units, which reveals selected remotes, whether they are armed, and whether they are ready. Atblock 3138, the method extracts information regarding whether the controller made an automatic status request for one or more remotes. Atblock 3140, the method extracts information regarding the controller's request for the status of one or more remotes automatically before sending the arm command Atblock 3142, the method extracts information regarding the controller's request for the status of one or more remotes automatically after being disarmed (caused by various options including a disarm command or expiry of an internal arm timer). Atblock 3144, the method extracts information regarding whether the controller sent the arm command to the selected and responding remotes. The method then continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal I2”). - From terminal I2 (
FIG. 3Q ), the method proceeds to block 3146 where the method extracts information regarding whether the controller reports receipt of the status message from the remote showing it is armed. Atblock 3148, the method extracts information regarding whether the user fired and whether the fire command was sent to the remotes. Atblock 3150, the method extracts information regarding whether the post-fire status from a responding remote unit is available, including the firing voltage and the seismic vibration detection value (detected by one or more sensors). Atblock 3152, the method extracts information regarding whether the user disarmed some or all of the remotes. Atblock 3154, the method extracts information regarding whether the user changed the fire circuit selection to electric detonator. Atblock 3156, the method extracts information regarding whether the user changed the fire circuit selection to shock tube. Atblock 3158, the method extracts information regarding whether the user performed an emergency disarm of all remotes by removing the controller's electronic key. Atblock 3160, the method extracts information regarding whether the controller's internal arm timer expired and the controller disarmed itself. The method then continues to terminal J. - From terminal J (
FIG. 3B ), the method proceeds to a set ofmethod steps 3012 defined between a continuation terminal (“terminal K”) and another continuation terminal (“terminal L”). The set of method steps 3012 captures events of a remote with GPS information. From terminal K (FIG. 3R ), the set ofmethod steps 3000 proceeds todecision block 3162 where a test is performed to determine whether a remote's events should be extracted. If the answer to the test atdecision block 3162 is No, the method proceeds to terminal L and terminates execution. Otherwise, if the answer to the test atdecision block 3162 is Yes, the method proceeds to block 3164, where the method extracts from hardware the date of the event in month, day, and year; and the time of the event in hours, minutes, and seconds. Atblock 3166, the GPS coordinates, namely the latitude and longitude, in decimal format are extracted for the events if available. Atblock 3168, the horizontal dilution of precision is extracted to show the quality of the GPS coordinates. Atblock 3170, the data connected with whether the remote is selected, armed, and/or ready (safe) is extracted. Atblock 3172, the method extracts the battery voltage of the remote, internal temperature, the fire mode selected, and other user settings. The method then continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal K1”). - From terminal K1 (
FIG. 3S ), the method proceeds to block 3174, where the method extracts information regarding when the remote is switched on. Atblock 3176, the method extracts information showing whether the correct electronic key for the remote is installed. Atblock 3178, the method extracts information regarding the controller's request for status, which reveals the remote unit number, fire state, and fire voltage as well as vibration detection value. Atblock 3180, the method extracts information regarding whether status messages received by the controller may be confirmed by the remote with an acknowledge signal. Atblock 3182, the method extracts information regarding whether the remote received the arm command from the controller. Atblock 3184, the method extracts information regarding whether the remote's internal electric circuit was armed. Atblock 3186, the method extracts information regarding whether the remote's internal shock tube circuit was armed. The method then continues to another continuation terminal (“terminal K2”). - From terminal K2 (
FIG. 3T ), the method proceeds to block 3188 where the method extracts information regarding whether the remote received the arm command from the controller. Atblock 3190, the method extracts information regarding whether the electric detonator circuit was fired and the firing voltage as well as the vibration detection value from the seismic sensor. Atblock 3192, the method extracts information regarding whether the shock tube circuit was fired, including the firing voltage and the vibration detection value from the seismic sensor. Atblock 3194, the method extracts information regarding whether the remote was disarmed (ready or safe) by the controller. Atblock 3196, the method extracts information regarding whether the remote's internal arm timer counted down to zero and disarmed itself. Atblock 3200, the method extracts information regarding whether the user performed an emergency disarm of the remote by removing its key. Atblock 3202, the method extracts information regarding whether following key removal, the remote shows its new status as disarmed (ready or safe). The method then continues to terminal L and terminates execution. - While illustrative embodiments have been illustrated and described, it will be appreciated that various changes can be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention.
Claims (13)
1. A remote blast initiation system comprising:
a controller, the hardware of which is suitable for being communicatively coupled with one or more remotes;
a remote; and
security fence hardware configured to enforce a first security fence within which operations of the remote blast initiation system are allowed, wherein the security fence hardware comprises a global positioning system (GPS) module.
2. The system of claim 1 , wherein the GPS module is included in the controller.
3. The system of claim 1 , further comprising a controller countdown timer.
4. The system of claim 1 , wherein a second GPS module is included in the remote.
5. The system of claim 1 , further comprising a remote countdown timer.
6. The system of claim 1 , further comprising sequential firing hardware comprising a programmable microprocessor which is capable of causing the remote to fire after another remote has fired.
7. The system of claim 1 , wherein the security fence hardware is further configured to enforce a second security fence within which operations of the remote are allowed.
8. The system of claim 1 further comprising event hardware capable of logging events.
9. The system of claim 1 further comprising seismic detection hardware having one or more sensors suitable for detecting post-blast seismic vibration.
10. A remote blast initiation system comprising:
a GPS module;
a controller comprising:
controller event hardware including memory configured to log events; and
security fence hardware including a processor in communication with the GPS module, wherein the security fence hardware is configured to enforce a first security fence within which operations of the controller are allowed; and
a remote configured to be wired to detonation charges, the remote including seismic detection hardware having one or more sensors suitable for detecting post-blast seismic vibration.
11. The system of claim 10 , wherein the GPS module is included in the controller.
12. The system of claim 10 , further comprising sequential firing hardware comprising a programmable microprocessor which is capable of causing the remote to fire after another remote has fired.
13. A remote blast initiation system comprising:
a GPS module;
a controller comprising:
controller event hardware including memory configured to log events; and
security fence hardware including a processor in communication with the GPS module, wherein the security fence hardware is configured to enforce a first security fence within which remote firing operations are allowed;
a plurality of remotes configured to be wired to detonation charges, each of the remotes including seismic detection hardware having one or more sensors suitable for detecting post-blast seismic vibration; and
sequential firing hardware including a programmable microprocessor which is capable of causing the remotes to fire in a predetermined sequence.
Priority Applications (1)
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US16/694,872 US20200088503A1 (en) | 2014-01-06 | 2019-11-25 | Rfd with history log, security fence, and seismic detection |
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US201461924163P | 2014-01-06 | 2014-01-06 | |
US14/589,788 US9791253B2 (en) | 2014-01-06 | 2015-01-05 | RFD with history log, security fence, and seismic detection |
US15/370,972 US20170082412A1 (en) | 2014-01-06 | 2016-12-06 | Rfd with history log, security fence, and seismic detection |
US16/694,872 US20200088503A1 (en) | 2014-01-06 | 2019-11-25 | Rfd with history log, security fence, and seismic detection |
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US15/370,972 Division US20170082412A1 (en) | 2014-01-06 | 2016-12-06 | Rfd with history log, security fence, and seismic detection |
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US15/370,972 Abandoned US20170082412A1 (en) | 2014-01-06 | 2016-12-06 | Rfd with history log, security fence, and seismic detection |
US16/694,872 Abandoned US20200088503A1 (en) | 2014-01-06 | 2019-11-25 | Rfd with history log, security fence, and seismic detection |
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US15/370,972 Abandoned US20170082412A1 (en) | 2014-01-06 | 2016-12-06 | Rfd with history log, security fence, and seismic detection |
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PE20171741A1 (en) * | 2015-05-12 | 2017-12-05 | Detnet South Africa (Pty) Ltd | DETONATOR CONTROL SYSTEM |
USD849166S1 (en) | 2017-12-07 | 2019-05-21 | Ssg International, Llc | Golf putter grip |
US10099101B1 (en) | 2017-12-07 | 2018-10-16 | Ssg International, Llc | Golf club grip with sensor housing |
BR112022022832A2 (en) * | 2020-04-29 | 2022-12-20 | Detnet South Africa Pty Ltd | A SAFE ARRANGEMENT FOR A WIRELESS DETONATION SYSTEM |
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US3914732A (en) * | 1973-07-23 | 1975-10-21 | Us Energy | System for remote control of underground device |
US4576093A (en) * | 1984-04-12 | 1986-03-18 | Snyder Richard N | Remote radio blasting |
US5870029A (en) | 1996-07-08 | 1999-02-09 | Harris Corporation | Remote mobile monitoring and communication system |
US6079333A (en) * | 1998-06-12 | 2000-06-27 | Trimble Navigation Limited | GPS controlled blaster |
US7383882B2 (en) * | 1998-10-27 | 2008-06-10 | Schlumberger Technology Corporation | Interactive and/or secure activation of a tool |
DE10084519B3 (en) * | 1999-04-20 | 2013-08-08 | Orica Explosives Technology Pty Ltd | Method and system for controlling a blasting network |
CA2381651A1 (en) | 2002-04-15 | 2003-10-15 | Clinton Smith | Method and facility for safe, pollution-free destruction of pfm-type landmines and other chemical and bacteriological ordnance |
US6941870B2 (en) | 2003-11-04 | 2005-09-13 | Advanced Initiation Systems, Inc. | Positional blasting system |
US8474379B2 (en) * | 2004-01-16 | 2013-07-02 | Rothenbuhler Engineering Co. | Remote firing device with diverse initiators |
US7594471B2 (en) * | 2004-07-21 | 2009-09-29 | Detnet South Africa (Pty) Ltd. | Blasting system and method of controlling a blasting operation |
US6990335B1 (en) | 2004-11-18 | 2006-01-24 | Charles G. Shamoon | Ubiquitous connectivity and control system for remote locations |
DE102006025696A1 (en) | 2006-06-01 | 2007-12-06 | Trw Automotive Gmbh | Piston cylinder unit, has piston movable in cylinder, pressure chamber with pressure connector, and pressure limiting pipe attached to valve element in piston |
US20070277403A1 (en) | 2006-06-05 | 2007-12-06 | Stephen David Summer | Automated snow removal tracking system |
US20080282925A1 (en) | 2007-05-15 | 2008-11-20 | Orica Explosives Technology Pty Ltd | Electronic blasting with high accuracy |
WO2009105243A2 (en) | 2008-02-22 | 2009-08-27 | Boyd Palsgrove | Position monitoring system |
US8504061B2 (en) | 2010-04-07 | 2013-08-06 | Apple Inc. | Multi-tier geofence detection |
JP6612769B2 (en) * | 2014-03-27 | 2019-11-27 | オリカ インターナショナル プライベート リミティド | Ignition device for blasting, wireless electronic blasting system having the same, and blasting method |
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2015
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AU2021221646A1 (en) | 2021-09-23 |
US20170082412A1 (en) | 2017-03-23 |
AU2015203918A1 (en) | 2016-06-09 |
WO2015103607A1 (en) | 2015-07-09 |
US20150192396A1 (en) | 2015-07-09 |
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