US20160127420A1 - Lawful Interception for Proximity Service - Google Patents

Lawful Interception for Proximity Service Download PDF

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Publication number
US20160127420A1
US20160127420A1 US14/897,800 US201314897800A US2016127420A1 US 20160127420 A1 US20160127420 A1 US 20160127420A1 US 201314897800 A US201314897800 A US 201314897800A US 2016127420 A1 US2016127420 A1 US 2016127420A1
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Prior art keywords
connection
proximity service
radio access
access network
devices
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US14/897,800
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English (en)
Inventor
Ling Yu
Yixue Lei
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Nokia Solutions and Networks Oy
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Nokia Solutions and Networks Oy
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Assigned to NOKIA SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS OY reassignment NOKIA SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS OY ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: Lei, Yixue, YU, LING
Publication of US20160127420A1 publication Critical patent/US20160127420A1/en
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/30—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting lawful interception, monitoring or retaining of communications or communication related information
    • H04L63/304—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting lawful interception, monitoring or retaining of communications or communication related information intercepting circuit switched data communications
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/30—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting lawful interception, monitoring or retaining of communications or communication related information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B7/00—Radio transmission systems, i.e. using radiation field
    • H04B7/14—Relay systems
    • H04B7/15—Active relay systems
    • H04B7/155—Ground-based stations
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
    • H04L41/04—Network management architectures or arrangements
    • H04L41/046—Network management architectures or arrangements comprising network management agents or mobile agents therefor
    • H04L41/048—Network management architectures or arrangements comprising network management agents or mobile agents therefor mobile agents
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
    • H04L63/0281—Proxies
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04M—TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04M3/00—Automatic or semi-automatic exchanges
    • H04M3/22—Arrangements for supervision, monitoring or testing
    • H04M3/2281—Call monitoring, e.g. for law enforcement purposes; Call tracing; Detection or prevention of malicious calls
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/02—Services making use of location information
    • H04W4/023—Services making use of location information using mutual or relative location information between multiple location based services [LBS] targets or of distance thresholds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/80—Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W40/00—Communication routing or communication path finding
    • H04W40/34—Modification of an existing route
    • H04W76/043—
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00—Connection management
    • H04W76/20—Manipulation of established connections
    • H04W76/23—Manipulation of direct-mode connections
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W8/00—Network data management
    • H04W8/005—Discovery of network devices, e.g. terminals
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04M—TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04M2207/00—Type of exchange or network, i.e. telephonic medium, in which the telephonic communication takes place
    • H04M2207/18—Type of exchange or network, i.e. telephonic medium, in which the telephonic communication takes place wireless networks

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to an apparatus, a method and a computer program product for enabling law interception for proximity service.
  • Embodiments of the present invention relate to proximity services and lawful interception (LI) for 3GPP Rel-12 and beyond.
  • L lawful interception
  • one of ProSe requirements is to support regional or national regulatory requirements (e.g. lawful interception, PWS).
  • the LI functionality is located in the core network.
  • ProSe is promoting the network controlled discovery and communication between UEs that are in proximity to be able to use a “direct mode” or “locally-routed” path, which may not involve the core network (CN).
  • the direct mode path is a direct connection between the two UEs without involving further network elements such as an eNB.
  • the locally-routed path is an indirect connection between the two UEs via an eNB without involving CN.
  • the connection of UEs by proximity service does note involve the core network. Therefore, the intercepted information may not be available to the core network LI entities.
  • Embodiments of the present invention address this situation and to enable lawful interception also for devices using a direct connection such a proximity service connection.
  • an apparatus comprising a processor and a memory for storing instructions to be executed by the processor, wherein the processor is configured to provide control in a radio access network, to perform control in relation to a connection for proximity service between at least two devices, to receive configuration information for performing lawful interception in relation to the proximity service with respect to at least one device to be intercepted of the at least two devices, and to report interception information with respect to the at least one device to be intercepted.
  • a method comprising providing control in a radio access network, performing control in relation to a connection for proximity service between at least two devices, receiving configuration information for performing lawful interception in relation to the proximity service with respect to at least one device to be intercepted of the at least two devices, and reporting interception information with respect to the at least one device to be intercepted.
  • an apparatus comprising a processor and a memory for storing instructions to be executed by the processor, wherein the processor is configured to provide a connection to a radio access network, to receive interception information intercepted by lawful interception with respect to at least one device to be intercepted, wherein the at least one device is one of at least two devices connected by a connection for proximity service in the radio access network.
  • a method comprising providing a connection to a radio access network, and receiving interception information intercepted by lawful interception with respect to at least one device to be intercepted, wherein the at least one device is one of at least two devices connected by a connection for proximity service in the radio access network.
  • a system comprising a device-to-device registration server function and at least one radio access network control element, wherein the device-to-device registration server function is configured to perform control in relation to a connection for proximity service between at least two devices, to perform lawful interception in relation to the proximity service with respect to at least one device to be intercepted of the at least two devices, and to configure the at least one radio access network control element to perform the lawful interception in relation to the proximity service; and the at least one radio access network control element is configured to perform control in relation to a connection for proximity service between the at least two devices, to receive configuration information from the device-to-device registration server function, and to report interception information with respect to the at least one device to be intercepted.
  • a computer program product for a computer comprising software code portions for performing the above defined methods, when said product is run on the computer.
  • the computer program product may comprise a computer-readable medium on which said software code portions are stored.
  • the computer program product may be directly loadable into the internal memory of the computer and/or transmittable via a network by means of at least one of upload, download and push procedures.
  • FIG. 1 shows an example of simplified structures of network elements involved according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIGS. 2, 3 and 4 show examples of reference configurations for a ProSe lawful interception according to embodiments of the present invention.
  • UMTS universal mobile telecommunications system
  • UTRAN long term evolution
  • LTE long term evolution
  • WLAN wireless local area network
  • WiFi worldwide interoperability for microwave access
  • Bluetooth® personal communications services
  • PCS personal communications services
  • WCDMA wideband code division multiple access
  • UWB ultra-wideband
  • sensor networks sensor networks
  • MANETs mobile ad-hoc networks
  • IMS Internet Protocol multimedia subsystems
  • B4G 4 th generation
  • a network element may be a computing equivalent device that gathers programmable resources based on virtualization technologies.
  • FIG. 1 shows several elements involved in the procedures according to embodiments of the present invention.
  • Examples are for an apparatuses in which procedures according to embodiments of the invention can be applied are a DRSF 1 and an eNB 2 .
  • the DRSF 1 is responsible for registration, authentication and identifying of D2D users and management of D2D sessions including the mobility management and radio resource management, which may be a standalone element (unit, module) or may be implemented in another network element (unit, module) such as a MME or eNB, for example.
  • the apparatuses may also only be parts of the corresponding network elements (e.g., DRSF and eNB).
  • the DRSF may be located in a server, host or corresponding unit or element.
  • the DRSF is located in the MME.
  • an S-GW/PDN-GW 5 as an example for an apparatus providing a gateway function for the radio access network is connected to the eNB 2 and the DRSF 1 .
  • the DRSF 1 comprises a processor 11 and a memory 12 for storing instructions to be executed by the processor, and may also comprise a connection unit 13 , which is configured to provide connection to a network.
  • the eNB 2 or the corresponding apparatus, comprises a processor 21 and a memory 22 for storing instructions to be executed by the processor, and may also comprise a connection unit 23 , which is configured to provide connection to a network, for example to a radio access network (RAN), via which devices such as UEs 3 and 4 may be connected.
  • the S-GW/PDN-GW 5 comprises a processor 51 and a memory 52 for storing instructions to be executed by the processor, and may also comprise a connection unit 53 , which is configured to provide connection to other network elements.
  • the memories as described above may be internal or external or it may be provided as a service via network. Further, the memory may include volatile and/or non-volatile memory.
  • the memory may store computer program code and/or operating systems, information, data, content or the like for the processor to perform operations according to embodiments.
  • the memory may comprise one or more memory units, each of them may be a random access memory, hard drive, etc.
  • the memory (units) may be at least partly removable and/or detachably operationally coupled to the apparatus.
  • the memory may be of any type suitable for the current technical environment and it may be implemented using any suitable data storage technology, such as semiconductor-based technology, flash memory, magnetic and/or optical memory devices.
  • connection for proximity service which may either be an indirect connection via the eNB 2 without involving the core network or a direct connection without involving the eNB 2 .
  • the processor (one or more units, modules, entities, microprocessors, such as single-chip computer element(s), or chipset(s)) 11 of the DRSF 1 is configured to perform control in relation to a connection for proximity service between at least two devices (e.g., the UEs 3 and 4 ), to perform lawful interception in relation to the proximity service with respect to at least one device to be intercepted (e.g., the UE 3 or 4 ) of the at least two devices, and to configure at least one radio access network control element (e.g., eNB 2 ) to perform the lawful interception in relation to the proximity service.
  • a radio access network control element e.g., eNB 2
  • the processor (one or more units, modules, entities, microprocessors, such as single-chip computer element(s), or chipset(s)) 21 of the eNB 2 is configured to provide control in a radio access network, perform control in relation to a connection for proximity service between at least two devices (e.g., the UEs 3 and 4 ), to receive configuration information for performing lawful interception in relation to the proximity service with respect to at least one device to be intercepted of the at least two devices, and to report interception information with respect to the at least one device to be intercepted.
  • the processor (one or more units, modules, entities, microprocessors, such as single-chip computer element(s), or chipset(s)) 51 of the S-GW/PDN-GW 5 is configured to provide a connection to a radio access network, to receive interception information intercepted by lawful interception with respect to at least one device (e.g., UE 3 or UE 4 ) to be intercepted, wherein the at least one device is one of at least two devices connected by a connection for proximity service in the radio access network.
  • the processor 11 of the DRSF 1 may instruct the eNB 2 to carry out lawful interception with respect to one or both of the UEs 3 and 4 , and the DRSF may report the interception information to a corresponding entity such as a LEMF.
  • the DRSF may only be involved in configuring eNB for LI, so that the report from the eNB 2 goes to MME (for IRI) and S/PDN-GW 5 (for CC) directly without involving of DRSF.
  • the eNB 2 may change the direct connection between the two UEs 3 and 4 to an indirect connection, so that the connection extends via the eNB 2 .
  • lawful interception is enabled also in the RAN, and therefore also possible for proximity service connections.
  • LI functionalities are extended from CN to RAN so that proximity services (including D2D discovery and D2D communication either directly between at least two devices or locally routed through eNB) can be kept for LI targeted UE.
  • LI functional architecture is extended to cover ProSe related key EPS nodes (i.e. DRSF and eNB) in order to allow the intercept related information (IRI)/events and as well the content of communication (CC) for ProSe to be available.
  • IRI intercept related information
  • CC content of communication
  • the DRSF Upon LI configuration (e.g. activation, deactivation and interrogation of LI) received by MME or S-/PDN-GW, the DRSF is informed for the LI configuration of the targeted UE in which the information of target identifier and LI related information (e.g. whether CC should be provided) is included.
  • the target identifier may be indicated explicitly in the form e.g. S-TMSI or D2D_ID or implicitly by the signalling transport bearer identifier.
  • ProSe related events may be introduced: UE requested proximity services including D2D discovery and D2D communication, D2D bearer activation/modification/deactivation, successful D2D discovery etc. They may be introduced by the new events which may be applicable to DRSF/eNB or be extended from current available events. For instance, for UEs in connected state, D2D bearer activation/modification/deactivation events may be provided by enhancing the current bearer activation/modification/deactivation events with additional D2D bearer related information. To achieve successful D2D discovery information, DRSF/eNB may be an applicable LI entity if D2D discovery procedure requires the network involvement for e.g. identifying the UE. However, if D2D discovery is fully based on pre-configured parameters without network involvement, UE may be configured to report such event in background manner so that each discovery behaviour of the targeted UE can be intercepted.
  • the activation of LI CC may trigger the mode switching from direct D2D mode to the locally routed data path mode so that the eNB may be able to duplicate the data packets transmitted between D2D UEs. That is, in this case the eNB is configured to change the direct connection of the DSD UEs to an indirect connection via the eNB.
  • the activation of LI CC may also trigger the change of user plane security keys which are adopted in direct D2D mode (i.e., the direct connection between the D2D UEs) and locally routed data path mode (i.e., the indirect connection between the D2D UEs via the eNB) respectively in case security keys for direct mode and locally routed optimized path mode are different.
  • direct D2D mode i.e., the direct connection between the D2D UEs
  • locally routed data path mode i.e., the indirect connection between the D2D UEs via the eNB
  • the activation/deactivation of LI CC may also trigger the establishment/release of the user plane transport bearer from eNB to S-/PDN-GW for provision of CC, which can be regarded as a new trigger for user plane transport bearer management over S1-U interface.
  • the establishment/release of the user plane transport bearer from eNB to S-/PDN-GW may be triggered when ProSe communication starts/ends.
  • the established transport bearer may be used by the eNB to transmit the duplicated data packets to S-/PDN-GW for providing the intercepted CC.
  • FIGS. 2 and 3 One possible reference configuration for ProSe interception is shown in FIGS. 2 and 3 , in which DRSF is assumed to be located in MME.
  • a LEMF which receives intercepted information, such as IRI and CC, and which instruct network elements to perform Lawful Interception.
  • a ADMF is connected, by means of a mediation function, via an interface HI 1 to the LEMF.
  • a delivery function 2 is connected, by means of a mediation function, via an interface HI2 to the LEMF.
  • the delivery function 2 may be connected with the ADMF via an interface X1_2.
  • the MME which includes the DRSF (e.g., DRSF 1 shown in FIG. 1 ) is connected to the ADMF and the delivery function 2 via interfaces X1_1 and X2, respectively. Since the DRSF is assumed to be located in the MME, the interface between DRSF and eNB (e.g., eNB 2 shown in FIG. 1 ) is S1 control plane (S1-C) interface.
  • S1-C S1 control plane
  • FIG. 2 shows the case in which Lawful Interception is only performed by providing IRI, so that the eNB is involved for reporting IRI, which in this case may include the ProSe related events described above.
  • reporting is performed in this case via the S1-C interface to the MME which also accommodate the DRSF functions.
  • a further delivery function namely delivery function 3 is connected by means of a mediation function, via interface HI3 to the LEMF.
  • the delivery function 3 may be connected to the ADMF via interface X1_3.
  • the S-GW/PDN-GW (e.g., S-GW/PDN-GW 5 shown in FIG. 1 ) is connected to the ADMF, the delivery function 2 and the delivery function via interfaces X1_1, X2 and X3, respectively.
  • the S-GW/PDN-GW is connected to the DRSF (which is included in the MME) via interface S11, and with an eNB (e.g. eNB 2 shown in FIG. 2 ) via interface S1-U.
  • FIG. 3 shows an example of the case in which Lawful Interception is also carried out by reporting CC.
  • the eNB reports IRI to the MME with DRSF co-located via the S1-C interface similar as shown in FIG. 2 , but also via the S1-U interface to the core network, i.e., to the S-GW/PDN-GW.
  • the proposed enhancement according to embodiments of the present invention may be implemented by introducing new procedures or information elements over S1 and S11 interfaces.
  • An advantage of the solution according to embodiments of the present invention is that LI can be supported for both discovery and communication, without switching back to infrastructure path mode which may lose the benefits of ProSe communication. Meanwhile, with such proposal, it is possible to make the user unaware of the LI happening for the ProSe.
  • the DRSF is located in the MME.
  • the DRSF may be a standalone network element and the proposed enhancement may be an implementation over the interface between MME and DRSF and the interface between DRSF and eNB.
  • FIG. 4 is similar to FIG. 2 except that the DRSF is a standalone network element (or is located in another suitable network element other than the MME or eNB).
  • the DRSF configures the eNB to report IRI, for example, and the eNB reports IRI via the interface S1-C directly to the MME, without involving the DRSF.
  • a general example for the MME may be an apparatus which may have a similar structure as the DRSF 1 or the S-GW/PDN-GW 5 shown in in FIG. 1 . That is, such an apparatus comprises a processor and a memory for storing instructions to be executed by the processor.
  • the processor is configured to provide a connection to a radio access network, to perform a mobility management function, to receive interception information intercepted by lawful interception with respect to at least one device to be intercepted, wherein the at least one device is one of at least two devices connected by a connection for proximity service in the radio access network.
  • the processor may further be configured to receive interception information (e.g., IRI) from a device-to-device registration server function (e.g., the DRSF 1 shown in FIG. 1 ), wherein the interception information may comprise events related to the connection for proximity service.
  • interception information e.g., IRI
  • a device-to-device registration server function e.g., the DRSF 1 shown in FIG. 1
  • the interception information may comprise events related to the connection for proximity service.
  • the eNB reports IRI via the DRSF, i.e., not directly to the MME.
  • DRSF co-located with MME and IRI reported to MME&DRSF by eNB ii) DRSF is standalone element, IRI reported to MME via DRSF iii) DRSF is standalone element, IRI reported to MME without involving of DRSF.
  • a further alternative is that the DRSF is co-located in eNB. In this case, reporting of IRI to MME via eNB or DRSF is possible.
  • D2D device-to-device
  • M2M machine-to-machine
  • T2T terminal-to-terminal
  • P2P peer-to-peer
  • an apparatus which comprises
  • an apparatus which comprises
  • an apparatus which comprises

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Technology Law (AREA)
  • Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
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WO2014198349A1 (en) 2014-12-18
WO2014198063A1 (en) 2014-12-18
US20160182571A1 (en) 2016-06-23
US20160134662A1 (en) 2016-05-12
WO2014198350A1 (en) 2014-12-18
US10182079B2 (en) 2019-01-15
EP3008934A1 (de) 2016-04-20
EP3008883A1 (de) 2016-04-20
EP3008934A4 (de) 2017-02-22

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