US20150200942A1 - Update of security for group based feature in m2m - Google Patents

Update of security for group based feature in m2m Download PDF

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Publication number
US20150200942A1
US20150200942A1 US14/409,646 US201314409646A US2015200942A1 US 20150200942 A1 US20150200942 A1 US 20150200942A1 US 201314409646 A US201314409646 A US 201314409646A US 2015200942 A1 US2015200942 A1 US 2015200942A1
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message
group
mtc
core network
transmission source
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US14/409,646
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English (en)
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Xiaowei Zhang
Anand Raghawa Prasad
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NEC Corp
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NEC Corp
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Publication of US20150200942A1 publication Critical patent/US20150200942A1/en
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08—Access security
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08—Access security
    • H04W12/086—Access security using security domains
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/06—Selective distribution of broadcast services, e.g. multimedia broadcast multicast service [MBMS]; Services to user groups; One-way selective calling services
    • H04W4/08—User group management
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/70—Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
    • H04W88/16—Gateway arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
    • H04W88/18—Service support devices; Network management devices
    • H04W88/184—Messaging devices, e.g. message centre
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H04L63/104—Grouping of entities

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a security solution for group based Machine-Type Communication (MTC) with the architecture newly provided in NPL 1.
  • the solution can support MTC-IWF (MTC-Interworking Function) to perform proper authorization to SCS (Services Capability Server) when a group message is sent from it.
  • MTC-IWF MTC-Interworking Function
  • SCS Services Capability Server
  • the present invention also relates to a mechanism to deliver and broadcast the group message securely.
  • SCS sends group message to network node of MTC-IWF and MTC-IWF will forward the group message to the target group of MTC devices.
  • the message is targeted to more than one MTC devices and may trigger these devices to communicate with network.
  • MTC-IWF should perform SCS authorization to see if it can send a group message, especially when the message contains trigger.
  • a network node is placed within a core network.
  • This network node includes a reception means for receiving a message from a transmission source placed outside the core network, the message including an indicator indicating whether or not the message is addressed to a group of one or more MTC devices attached to the core network; and a determination means for determining to authorize the transmission source, when the indicator indicates that the message is addressed to the group.
  • a method provides a method of controlling a network node that is placed within a core network. This method includes receiving a message from a transmission source placed outside the core network, the message including an indicator indicating whether or not the message is addressed to a group of one or more MTC devices attached to the core network; and determining to authorize the transmission source, when the indicator indicates that the message is addressed to the group.
  • a MTC device includes a reception means for receiving a message from the core network, the message including an ID (identifier) for identifying whether or not the message is addressed to a group of one or more MTC devices; and a determination means for determining to discard the message, when the ID does not coincide with an ID allocated for the MTC device itself.
  • ID identifier
  • determination means for determining to discard the message, when the ID does not coincide with an ID allocated for the MTC device itself.
  • a method according to fourth exemplary aspect of the present invention provides a method of controlling a MTC device attached to a core network. This method includes receiving a message from the core network, the message including an ID for identifying whether or not the message is addressed to a group of one or more MTC devices; and determining to discard the message, when the ID does not coincide with an ID allocated for the MTC device itself.
  • a gateway relays a message from a transmission source of the message placed outside a core network to a group of one or more MTC devices attached to the core network.
  • This gateway includes an acquisition means for acquiring a pair of group keys for the group of MTC devices to securely conduct communication with the transmission source; and a relaying means for relaying the message by use of the group keys.
  • a MTC device includes an acquisition means for acquire a pair of group keys for securely conducting communication with a transmission source that is placed outside the core network and transmits a message addressed to a group of one or more MTC devices; and a communication means for communicate with the transmission source by use of the group keys.
  • a method according to seventh exemplary aspect of the present invention provides a method of controlling gateway that relays a message from a transmission source of the message placed outside a core network to a group of one or more MTC devices attached to the core network.
  • This method includes acquiring a pair of group keys for the group of MTC devices to securely conduct communication with the transmission source; and relaying the message by use of the group keys.
  • a method according to eighth exemplary aspect of the present invention provides a method of controlling a MTC (Machine-Type-Communication) device attached to a core network.
  • This method includes acquiring a pair of group keys for securely conducting communication with a transmission source that is placed outside the core network and transmits a message addressed to a group of one or more MTC devices; and communicating with the transmission source by use of the group keys.
  • MTC Machine-Type-Communication
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing an example of system architecture according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a sequence diagram showing an example of group message terminated at MTC device in a system according to the exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing a configuration example of a network node placed according to the exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing a configuration example of a MTC device according to the exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a block diagram showing a configuration example of a gateway according to the exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • SA2 has started study on group based feature in TR 23.8xy v0.1.0 “Machine-Type and other Mobile Data Applications Communications Enhancements (Release 12)”.
  • SA3 should study security issue for release 12 according to the architectural requirements that SA2 provided.
  • the network shall provide a mechanism to distribute a group message from an SCS to those members of an MTC group located in a particular geographic area.
  • the group based messaging feature shall not require additional new functionality for UEs that do not use this feature.
  • the system shall support a mechanism where a UE that uses the group based messaging feature can efficiently recognize distributed group messages addressed to the UE.
  • the system shall provide an interface for the SCS to send a group message.
  • This interface shall be able to carry the following information:
  • the system shall be protected against overload resulting from devices responding to the distributed group message.
  • Group based messaging shall be supported in GERAN, UTRAN, and E-UTRAN access.
  • MTC-IWF receives a group message from SCS and forwards it to the target group of MTC devices.
  • MTC-IWF receives a group message from SCS and forwards it to the target group of MTC devices.
  • FIGS. 1 to 5 An exemplary embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to FIGS. 1 to 5 .
  • a system includes a core network (3GPP network), a plurality of MTC devices 10 which connect to the core network through a RAN (Radio Access Network), and an SCS 30 and an SME (Short Message Entity) 40 which serve as group message or group trigger sources placed outside the core network.
  • the RAN is formed by a plurality of base stations (i.e., eNBs (evolved Node Bs)).
  • each MTC device 10 is a UE for MTC connecting to the core network via the Um/Uu/LTE-Uu interface.
  • the UE can host one or multiple MTC Applications.
  • the corresponding MTC Applications in the external network are hosted on one or multiple ASs (Application Servers).
  • the SCS 30 and the SME 40 connect to the core network to communicate with the MTC devices 10 .
  • the core network includes an MTC-IWF 21 and an HSS (Home Subscriber Server) 22 in the HPLMN (Home Public Land Mobile Network).
  • the MTC-IWF 21 serves as a network node which receives a group message or group trigger from its transmission source.
  • the MTC-IWF 21 receives a group message which can be also be a group trigger from the SCS 30 via Tsp interface or from the SME 40 via T4 and Tsms interfaces, and forwards the group message to the MME (Mobility Management Entity), SGSN (Serving GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) Support Node) or MSC (Mobile Switching Centre), which serves as a network element forwarding the group message to the MTC device 10 , via T5b/T5a/T5c interface, so that the group message or group trigger can be routed to the MTC device 10 .
  • MME Mobility Management Entity
  • SGSN Serving GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) Support Node)
  • MSC Mobile Switching Centre
  • the HSS 22 or the MTC-IWF 21 can create and stores a mapping of an internal and external group IDs, and the HSS 22 generates a pair of group keys (which will be described later). One of the group keys is generated for encryption and decryption, another one is generated for integrity protection.
  • FIG. 2 shows the message sequence of group message sending to a group of MTC devices. There are more than one device in the MTC device group.
  • a gateway was proposed in a separate invention of PTL 1 which is responsible of receiving group message and send it to MTC devices, and send concatenated messages for MTC device communicating with network or SCS.
  • This exemplary embodiment proposes some new functions for the gateway and it can be either deployed in a network node or be an independent node.
  • (A) SCS 30 sends a group message over Tsp interface to MTC-IWF 21 (Step S 8 ).
  • the group message contains group ID and geography area information (this is described in NPL 2).
  • the message includes an indicator indicating whether the message is a group message or a non-group message. Therefore, the MTC-IWF 21 can distinguish the group message from the non-group message, thereby being able to perform a proper authorization to the SCS 30 as described at the following (B). Further, the indicator may indicate whether or not the group message contains trigger. In this case, the MTC-IWF 21 can also distinguish the group trigger from the group message or the non-group message.
  • MTC-IWF 21 performs authorization to SCS 30 , to see if it can send group message to the target group (Step S 9 ). This should be the same authorization procedure when MTC-IWF 21 sends a non-group message.
  • the authorization is based on the group information of group ID, geography area information received from SCS 30 and authorization data retrieved by MTC-IWF 21 from HSS 22 .
  • the group GW 50 can own more than one group. It can be a virtual function that deployed on any network node like eNB/MME/MTC-IWF, or an independent node.
  • the group GW 50 broadcasts the group message to the target group of MTC devices (Step S 12 ).
  • the group message is broadcast only between the eNB and the MTC devices. Therefore, it is possible to avoid congestion of the core network.
  • the group GW 50 is deployed on the MME which serves as one of network elements connected to one or more base stations, it is possible to broadcast the group message over a plurality of areas while partly reducing the congestion of the core network.
  • HSS 22 generates a unique group ID for the group of MTC devices (Steps S 1 and S 3 ).
  • the HSS 22 can generate the group keys.
  • the group ID should not be exposed to SCS 30 thus HSS 22 will have a mapping of the group IDs and external use group IDs.
  • Internal use Group ID can be sent to MTC devices 10 , group GW 50 within the existing NAS or AS messages (Step S 4 ).
  • HSS 22 There can be two ways of generating an external group ID. It can be created by HSS 22 and provided to SCS 30 . Alternatively it can be created by SCS 30 and provided to HSS 22 (Step S 2 ). Either way, HSS will create the mapping of both group IDs.
  • the MTC-IWF 21 downloads the mapping from the HSS 22 (Step S 5 ), and stores it locally (Step S 6 ). Further, upon forwarding the group message to the group GW 50 at the above-mentioned Step S 10 , the MTC-IWF 21 refers to the mapping, thereby mapping the external group ID to the corresponding internal group ID in the group message.
  • the internal group ID shall be hidden from outside the core network. Therefore, it is possible to prevent a fraud group message from causing attack to the core network. Further, the external group ID is made effective only after the source authorization. Therefore, even if the external group ID is revealed to attackers, it is possible to prevent attack.
  • This exemplary embodiment proposes to use a pair of group keys for the group message confidentiality and integrity protection.
  • the group key is for all the MTC devices in a MTC group to have group key. This group key is the same for all the MTC devices in the group, and it is shared by them with group GW 50 and optionally with the other end where the group message is sent.
  • the group message transferring between group GW 50 and SCS 30 can be protected by IPsec or other existing network security solution.
  • Group GW 50 uses the group key to protect the group message and broadcasts it to the target group MTC devices.
  • the MTC devices and the group GW 50 acquire the group keys from the HSS 22 , so that the group keys are shared between the MTC devices and the group GW 50 .
  • group GW 50 will forward the group message and broadcast it as it is.
  • the MTC devices acquire the group keys as with the above-mentioned (A).
  • the SCS 30 acquire the group keys from the HSS 22 through the MTC-IWF 21 , so that the group keys are shared between the MTC devices and the SCS 30 . Therefore, it is possible to provide end-to-end security between MTC devices and SCS 30 .
  • MTC device can perform authorization to SCS 30 .
  • group GW 50 can perform authorization to SCS 30 with the group key and MTC device do not need to perform authorization.
  • group keys are shared between the MTC devices, the group GW 50 and the SCS 30 . Further, the group GW verifies the group message (decryption and integrity check) with the shared group key, thereby discarding the group message upon failing the verification. In this case, it is possible to avoid the broadcasting itself.
  • MTC device listens to the message but will only receive the message which contains the same group ID it has, then the MTC device will perform integrity check and decrypt the message with the shared group key (Steps S 13 and S 14 ).
  • the MTC device discards the group message. In this case, the MTC device does not need to verify the group message. Therefore, it is possible to reduce processing load on the MTC device.
  • the MTC device will listen to all the broadcasts and perform integrity check and decryption and only respond to the ones it can verify.
  • the MTC-IWF 21 includes at least a reception unit 211 and a determination unit 212 .
  • the reception unit 211 receives from the SCS 30 or the SME 40 the group message or group trigger including the above-mentioned indicator.
  • the determination unit 211 determines to authorize the SCS 30 or the SME 40 , when the indicator indicates the group message or group trigger.
  • the MTC-IWF 21 can include a storage unit 213 , a mapping unit 214 , and a forwarding unit 215 .
  • the storage unit 213 stores the above-mentioned mapping.
  • the mapping unit 214 maps the external group ID to the corresponding internal group ID in the group message or group trigger, by use of the mapping.
  • the forwarding unit 215 forwards the group message or group trigger to one of the MME/SGSN/MSC, so that the group message or group trigger is broadcast to the MTC devices. Note that these units 211 to 215 are mutually connected with each other thorough a bus or the like.
  • These units 211 to 215 can be configured by, for example, transceivers which respectively conduct communication with the HSS 22 , the MME/SGSN/MSC, the SCS 30 and the SME 40 , and a controller which controls these transceivers to execute the processes shown at Steps S 5 , S 6 and S 8 to S 10 in FIG. 2 or processes equivalent thereto.
  • each of the MTC devices 10 includes at least a reception unit 101 and a determination unit 102 .
  • the reception unit 101 receives from the core network the group message or group trigger including the above-mentioned group ID.
  • the determination unit 102 determines to discard the group message or group trigger, when the group ID does not coincides with a group ID for each of the MTC devices 10 itself.
  • each of the MTC devices 10 can include an acquisition unit 103 and a communication unit 104 .
  • the acquisition unit 103 acquires the group keys from e.g. the HSS 20 .
  • the communication unit 104 communicates with the SCS 30 or the SME 40 by use of the group keys. Note that these units 101 to 104 are mutually connected with each other thorough a bus or the like.
  • These units 101 to 104 can be configured by, for example, a transceiver which wirelessly conducts communication with the core network through the RAN, and a controller which controls this transceiver to execute the processes shown at Steps S 4 and S 12 to S 14 in FIG. 2 or processes equivalent thereto.
  • the group GW 50 includes at least an acquisition unit 501 and a relaying unit 502 .
  • the acquisition unit 501 acquires the group keys from e.g. the HSS 20 .
  • the relaying unit 502 relays the group message or group trigger by use of the group keys. Note that these units 501 and 502 are mutually connected with each other thorough a bus or the like.
  • These units 501 and 502 can be configured by, for example, transceivers which respectively conduct communication with the MTC-IWF 21 , the HSS 22 and the MME/SGSN/MSC/RAN, and a controller which controls these transceivers to execute the processes shown at Steps S 4 and S 10 to S 12 in FIG. 2 or processes equivalent thereto.
  • each of the SCS 30 and the SME 40 includes, in addition to functions mounted on each of typical SCS and SME, at least one of a function of including the above-mentioned indicator in the group message or group trigger, a function of including the above-mentioned group ID in the group message or group trigger, and a function of communicating with the group of MTC devices by use of the above-mentioned group keys.
  • Network node such as HSS creates a unique internal use group ID for each group.
  • the HSS sends the group ID to all the group member of MTC devices and the group GW.
  • the group GW can be a function deployed in a network node or be an independent node.
  • HSS keeps a mapping of the external group ID and unique group ID which is only used in the network.
  • the external group ID can be either allocated by HSS or by SCS to which the group subscribes to.
  • MTC-IWF downloads the group ID mapping via interface S6m and stores it locally. Novelty is modification of the interface.
  • a pair of group keys for encryption and integrity protection is generated.
  • the pair of group keys is the same for all the MTC devices within the group.
  • Group GW and/or SCS can have the same group key.
  • Indicator in a group message such that network entities e.g. MTC-IWF can distinguish it from other non-group messages.
  • the group GW broadcasts the group message to the group of MTC devices, it is protected by a pair of group keys, such that only the proper MTC devices can receive and read the group message.
  • the group message can be broadcasted in one of the two ways shown below:
  • (A) Contains the group ID: MTC device will check the group ID in the broadcast, if it is the same with the group ID it holds, it will perform integrity check and decrypt the message with using the (group ID related) group key.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Multimedia (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
US14/409,646 2012-06-29 2013-04-19 Update of security for group based feature in m2m Abandoned US20150200942A1 (en)

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JP2012147983 2012-06-29
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US16/560,348 Active US11070955B2 (en) 2012-06-29 2019-09-04 Update of security for group based feature in M2M
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BR112014032353A2 (pt) 2017-06-27
IN2014DN10696A (enrdf_load_stackoverflow) 2015-08-28
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US20210076168A1 (en) 2021-03-11
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CN107786966A (zh) 2018-03-09
US11070955B2 (en) 2021-07-20
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US20190394201A1 (en) 2019-12-26
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