US20120268241A1 - Biometric chain of provenance - Google Patents

Biometric chain of provenance Download PDF

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Publication number
US20120268241A1
US20120268241A1 US13/450,151 US201213450151A US2012268241A1 US 20120268241 A1 US20120268241 A1 US 20120268241A1 US 201213450151 A US201213450151 A US 201213450151A US 2012268241 A1 US2012268241 A1 US 2012268241A1
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United States
Prior art keywords
biometric
transaction
acquired
individual
biometric information
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Abandoned
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US13/450,151
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English (en)
Inventor
Keith J. Hanna
Hector T. Hoyos
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EyeLock LLC
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EyeLock Inc
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Priority to US13/450,151 priority Critical patent/US20120268241A1/en
Assigned to EYELOCK, INC. reassignment EYELOCK, INC. ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: HANNA, KEITH J., HOYOS, HECTOR T.
Publication of US20120268241A1 publication Critical patent/US20120268241A1/en
Assigned to EYELOCK LLC reassignment EYELOCK LLC ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: EYELOCK, INC.
Assigned to VOXX INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION reassignment VOXX INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION SECURITY INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: EYELOCK LLC
Priority to US14/919,323 priority patent/US10055733B2/en
Abandoned legal-status Critical Current

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
    • G06Q20/4014—Identity check for transactions
    • G06Q20/40145—Biometric identity checks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G06F21/32—User authentication using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voiceprints
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/30—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks
    • G06Q20/32—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols characterised by the use of specific devices or networks using wireless devices
    • G06Q20/322—Aspects of commerce using mobile devices [M-devices]
    • G06Q20/3224—Transactions dependent on location of M-devices
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
    • G06Q20/4016—Transaction verification involving fraud or risk level assessment in transaction processing
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0861—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using biometrical features, e.g. fingerprint, retina-scan
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/30—Security of mobile devices; Security of mobile applications
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2111—Location-sensitive, e.g. geographical location, GPS
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H04L63/107—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources wherein the security policies are location-dependent, e.g. entities privileges depend on current location or allowing specific operations only from locally connected terminals
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H04L63/108—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources when the policy decisions are valid for a limited amount of time
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/61—Time-dependent
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/63—Location-dependent; Proximity-dependent

Definitions

  • the present disclosure relates to identity verification technologies, and more specifically to systems and methods directed to providing or ensuring a biometric chain of provenance.
  • biometrics acquired by a biometrics device are really those of an individual at the biometrics device.
  • biometrics acquired by a biometrics device it may be necessary or more acceptable to acquire biometric of a moving individual without constraining the individual's advance or movements.
  • conventional systems are typically not very robust against fraud and/or mistake when biometric acquisition is decoupled from traditional access control systems, or when individuals whose biometrics are being acquired are not rigidly constrained for the biometric acquisition process. Some ability to track an individual across one or more transactions may be a way to reduce fraudulent activity.
  • the present disclosure describes methods and systems for tracking the provenance of an individual between disparate transactions that they perform, be they logical and/or physical access transactions.
  • the present methods and systems may use acquisition and optional matching of potentially disparate biometrics at each point of transaction, and may provide means to ensure the provenance of each step within each transaction and/or between each transaction.
  • Biometric Chain of Provenance can then be audited and verified, for example, not just between two transactions, but between many transactions that the individual performs. Every transaction, be it buying a coffee or buying a house or setting up a bank account, is therefore an opportunity for the integrity of the biometric chain of provenance to be validated.
  • Biometrics is the field of measurement of human characteristics, and the acquisition and optional matching of biometric data can be a component in such a process.
  • POS point of sale
  • iris biometric in particular can be a powerful biometric for tracking transactions due to its standardization and its accuracy. If there is a need to search through millions of records to associate transactions just based on a biometric, then the iris biometric may be best-placed to do so compared to face and voice and many other biometrics. This can be most significant at the beginning of the BCP when a customer presents themselves to open up a new account, for example.
  • a verification step in the BCP may check whether the customer should be linked to prior BCP activity (e.g., is the customer attempting to assume multiple identities). This can be performed reliably and quickly with the iris biometric. However, as discussed earlier, the platforms on which transactions are performed are becoming more disparate and non-iris biometrics may be used. The present disclosure describes in detail embodiments of methods for maintaining the Biometric Chain of Provenance even when disparate biometrics are used.
  • the present disclosure is directed to a method for ensuring integrity of biometric data linked to one or more transactions.
  • a mobile biometric device may acquire biometric information of an individual.
  • a ranging device may determine that a distance between the mobile biometric device and a physical location of a transaction with the individual is within a predefined value.
  • the ranging device or a transaction device may link, responsive to the determination, the acquired biometric information to the transaction if the biometric information is acquired within a specific time limit from the distance determination.
  • the ranging device or transaction device may compute the specific time limit based on an amount or rate of change in the location of the mobile biometric device.
  • the ranging device may determine the distance between the mobile biometric device and the physical location via a global positioning system.
  • the ranging device may determine the distance between the mobile biometric device and the physical location using a short-range location system, using one or more of a: radio-frequency, laser, infra-red and audio ranging process.
  • the biometric device may transmit the acquired biometric information to a biometric matching device located at or connected to the physical location.
  • the biometric device may transmit the acquired biometric information to a transaction device located at or connected to the physical location if the distance is determined to be within the predefined value.
  • the ranging device or transaction device may link the acquired biometric information to the transaction if the acquired biometric information is received by a transaction device associated with the physical location within a predetermined time period of initiating the transaction.
  • the ranging device or transaction device may link the acquired biometric information to the transaction if the distance between the physical location and the biometric device at the time the transaction is initiated is within a specified value.
  • the transaction device at the physical location may allow or deny the transaction at the physical location based on biometric verification using the acquired biometric information.
  • the transaction device may allow or deny the transaction based on biometric verification using the acquired biometric information, the transaction comprising one of: a point-of-sale transaction, a point-of-service transaction, and an access control transaction.
  • the ranging device determines the distance between the mobile biometric device and a physical location based on strength of a signal received at one of: the physical location and the mobile biometric device, and transmitted by the other.
  • the biometric device and/or the transaction device may identify the individual based on the acquired biometrics, and linking the transaction at the physical location with the individual.
  • the biometric device and/or the transaction device may retrieve an identifier of the individual based on the acquired biometrics, and linking the transaction at the physical location with the identifier.
  • the transaction device may link the transaction with another transaction linked to the individual, and comparing information of both transactions for inconsistency or fraud.
  • the transaction device may link the transaction to a universal biometric record of the individual.
  • the universal biometric record may include biometric information of a first type that matches the acquired biometric information.
  • a biometric device may acquire biometric information of an individual.
  • a transaction device may link the acquired biometric information to a first transaction of the individual and a universal biometric record of the individual.
  • the universal biometric record may include biometric information of a first type that matches the acquired biometric information, and may include biometric information of a second type.
  • the transaction device or a biometric integrity engine may identify, via the universal biometric record, a second transaction.
  • the second transaction may be linked to acquired biometric information that matches the biometric information of the second type.
  • the transaction device or biometric integrity engine may compare information from the first transaction and the second transaction for inconsistency or fraud.
  • a biometric device may acquire biometric information of an individual.
  • a transaction device may link the acquired biometric information to a first transaction of the individual.
  • the universal biometric record may include an identifier of the individual and/or biometric information of a first type that matches the acquired biometric information.
  • the transaction device or a biometric integrity engine may identify a second transaction linked with the identifier of the individual.
  • the transaction device or biometric integrity engine may compare information from the first transaction and the second transaction for inconsistency or fraud.
  • the disclosure is directed to a system for ensuring integrity of biometric data linked to one or more transactions.
  • the system may include a mobile biometric device acquiring biometric information of an individual.
  • a ranging device may determine that a distance between the mobile biometric device and a physical location of a transaction with the individual is within a predefined value.
  • the ranging device or a transaction device of the physical location may link, responsive to the determination, the acquired biometric information to the transaction if the biometric information is acquired within a specific time limit from the distance determination.
  • the system includes a database comprising a universal biometric record of the individual, for linking to the transaction.
  • the universal biometric record may include biometric information of a first type that matches the acquired biometric information, and biometric information of a second type.
  • the ranging device may compute the specific time limit based on an amount or rate of change in the location of the mobile biometric device.
  • the system includes a mirror module at the physical location. The mirror module may be oriented to allow the acquisition of the biometric data using a rear-facing camera on the biometric device.
  • the system includes a second biometric device for acquiring imagery of the individual at substantially the same time as the acquisition of the biometric data.
  • FIG. 1A is a block diagram illustrative of an embodiment of a networked environment with a client machine that communicates with a server;
  • FIGS. 1B and 1C are block diagrams illustrative of embodiments of computing machines for practicing the methods and systems described herein;
  • FIG. 2A depicts one embodiment of a system for determining or ensuring a biometric chain of provenance
  • FIG. 2B depicts one embodiment of a universal biometric record used in the present systems and methods.
  • FIG. 2C depicts one embodiment of a method for determining or ensuring a biometric chain of provenance
  • FIGS. 2D and 2E depict examples of a chain or network of biometric provenance established using embodiments of the present systems and methods
  • FIG. 3A depicts an embodiment of the present system providing access control to one or more users
  • FIG. 3B depicts one embodiment of the present system providing access control to each user
  • FIG. 3C depicts one embodiment of the present system comprising a mobile access control device
  • FIG. 4 depicts one embodiment of a mobile access control device of one embodiment of the present system
  • FIG. 5 depicts another embodiment of a mobile access control device comprising features that may be incorporated with a mobile phone or other personal device;
  • FIG. 6 depicts yet another embodiment of a mobile access control device
  • FIG. 7 depicts embodiments of a system for determining or ensuring a biometric chain of provenance in different form factors
  • FIG. 8 depicts one embodiment of a system, from a top view, for determining or ensuring a biometric chain of provenance
  • FIG. 9 depicts one embodiment of a method for determining or ensuring a biometric chain of provenance
  • FIG. 10 depicts one embodiment of certain steps of a method for determining or ensuring a biometric chain of provenance
  • FIG. 11 depicts an embodiment of a mobile access control device acquiring imagery of at least a portion of a face
  • FIG. 12 depicts an embodiment of the present system incorporating image stabilization
  • FIG. 13 depicts an embodiment of the present system incorporating residual motion detection
  • FIGS. 14-19 depicts some embodiments of certain steps of a method for determining or ensuring a biometric chain of provenance
  • FIG. 20 depicts one embodiment of the present system configured for multiple users
  • FIGS. 21 and 22 depict embodiments of access nodes with multiple transceiver modules
  • FIG. 23 depicts another embodiment of the present system involving multiple users
  • FIG. 24 depicts another embodiment of a system for acquisition of face imagery and iris imagery using a single sensor
  • FIGS. 25-27 depict certain embodiments of certain steps of a method for determining or ensuring a biometric chain of provenance
  • FIG. 28 depicts one embodiment of a system for determining or ensuring a biometric chain of provenance
  • FIG. 29 depicts one scenario in which a chain of biometric providence is confirmed by one embodiment of the present system
  • FIG. 30 depicts one scenario in which a chain of biometric providence is denied by one embodiment of the present system
  • FIG. 31 depicts another scenario in which a chain of biometric providence is confirmed by one embodiment of the present system
  • FIGS. 32 and 33 depict certain scenarios in which a chain of biometric providence is denied by an embodiment of the present system.
  • FIG. 34 depicts one embodiment of a method for ensuring integrity of biometric data linked to one or more transactions.
  • FIG. 1A illustrates one embodiment of a computing environment 101 that includes one or more client machines 102 A- 102 N (generally referred to herein as “client machine(s) 102 ”) in communication with one or more servers 106 A- 106 N (generally referred to herein as “server(s) 106 ”). Installed in between the client machine(s) 102 and server(s) 106 is a network.
  • the computing environment 101 can include an appliance installed between the server(s) 106 and client machine(s) 102 .
  • This appliance can mange client/server connections, and in some cases can load balance client connections amongst a plurality of backend servers.
  • the client machine(s) 102 can in some embodiment be referred to as a single client machine 102 or a single group of client machines 102
  • server(s) 106 may be referred to as a single server 106 or a single group of servers 106 .
  • a single client machine 102 communicates with more than one server 106
  • a single server 106 communicates with more than one client machine 102
  • a single client machine 102 communicates with a single server 106 .
  • a client machine 102 can, in some embodiments, be referenced by any one of the following terms: client machine(s) 102 ; client(s); client computer(s); client device(s); client computing device(s); local machine; remote machine; client node(s); endpoint(s); endpoint node(s); or a second machine.
  • the server 106 in some embodiments, may be referenced by any one of the following terms: server(s), local machine; remote machine; server farm(s), host computing device(s), or a first machine(s).
  • the client machine 102 can in some embodiments execute, operate or otherwise provide an application that can be any one of the following: software; a program; executable instructions; a virtual machine; a hypervisor; a web browser; a web-based client; a client-server application; a thin-client computing client; an ActiveX control; a Java applet; software related to voice over internet protocol (VoIP) communications like a soft IP telephone; an application for streaming video and/or audio; an application for facilitating real-time-data communications; a HTTP client; a FTP client; an Oscar client; a Telnet client; or any other set of executable instructions.
  • Still other embodiments include a client device 102 that displays application output generated by an application remotely executing on a server 106 or other remotely located machine. In these embodiments, the client device 102 can display the application output in an application window, a browser, or other output window.
  • the application is a desktop, while in other embodiments the application is an application that generates a desktop.
  • the computing environment 101 can include more than one server 106 A- 106 N such that the servers 106 A- 106 N are logically grouped together into a server farm 106 .
  • the server farm 106 can include servers 106 that are geographically dispersed and logically grouped together in a server farm 106 , or servers 106 that are located proximate to each other and logically grouped together in a server farm 106 .
  • Geographically dispersed servers 106 A- 106 N within a server farm 106 can, in some embodiments, communicate using a WAN, MAN, or LAN, where different geographic regions can be characterized as: different continents; different regions of a continent; different countries; different states; different cities; different campuses; different rooms; or any combination of the preceding geographical locations.
  • the server farm 106 may be administered as a single entity, while in other embodiments the server farm 106 can include multiple server farms 106 .
  • a server farm 106 can include servers 106 that execute a substantially similar type of operating system platform (e.g., WINDOWS NT, manufactured by Microsoft Corp. of Redmond, Wash., UNIX, LINUX, or SNOW LEOPARD.)
  • the server farm 106 can include a first group of servers 106 that execute a first type of operating system platform, and a second group of servers 106 that execute a second type of operating system platform.
  • the server farm 106 in other embodiments, can include servers 106 that execute different types of operating system platforms.
  • the server 106 can be any server type.
  • the server 106 can be any of the following server types: a file server; an application server; a web server; a proxy server; an appliance; a network appliance; a gateway; an application gateway; a gateway server; a virtualization server; a deployment server; a SSL VPN server; a firewall; a web server; an application server or as a master application server; a server 106 executing an active directory; or a server 106 executing an application acceleration program that provides firewall functionality, application functionality, or load balancing functionality.
  • a server 106 may be a RADIUS server that includes a remote authentication dial-in user service.
  • Some embodiments include a first server 106 A that receives requests from a client machine 102 , forwards the request to a second server 106 B, and responds to the request generated by the client machine 102 with a response from the second server 106 B.
  • the first server 106 A can acquire an enumeration of applications available to the client machine 102 and well as address information associated with an application server 106 hosting an application identified within the enumeration of applications.
  • the first server 106 A can then present a response to the client's request using a web interface, and communicate directly with the client 102 to provide the client 102 with access to an identified application.
  • Client machines 102 can, in some embodiments, be a client node that seeks access to resources provided by a server 106 .
  • the server 106 may provide clients 102 or client nodes with access to hosted resources.
  • the server 106 functions as a master node such that it communicates with one or more clients 102 or servers 106 .
  • the master node can identify and provide address information associated with a server 106 hosting a requested application, to one or more clients 102 or servers 106 .
  • the master node can be a server farm 106 , a client 102 , a cluster of client nodes 102 , or an appliance.
  • One or more clients 102 and/or one or more servers 106 can transmit data over a network 104 installed between machines and appliances within the computing environment 101 .
  • the network 104 can comprise one or more sub-networks, and can be installed between any combination of the clients 102 , servers 106 , computing machines and appliances included within the computing environment 101 .
  • the network 104 can be: a local-area network (LAN); a metropolitan area network (MAN); a wide area network (WAN); a primary network 104 comprised of multiple sub-networks 104 located between the client machines 102 and the servers 106 ; a primary public network 104 with a private sub-network 104 ; a primary private network 104 with a public sub-network 104 ; or a primary private network 104 with a private sub-network 104 .
  • LAN local-area network
  • MAN metropolitan area network
  • WAN wide area network
  • a primary network 104 comprised of multiple sub-networks 104 located between the client machines 102 and the servers 106 ; a primary public network 104 with a private sub-network 104 ; a primary private network 104 with a public sub-network 104 ; or a primary private network 104 with a private sub-network 104 .
  • Still further embodiments include a network 104 that can be any of the following network types: a point to point network; a broadcast network; a telecommunications network; a data communication network; a computer network; an ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode) network; a SONET (Synchronous Optical Network) network; a SDH (Synchronous Digital Hierarchy) network; a wireless network; a wireline network; or a network 104 that includes a wireless link where the wireless link can be an infrared channel or satellite band.
  • a network 104 can be any of the following network types: a point to point network; a broadcast network; a telecommunications network; a data communication network; a computer network; an ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode) network; a SONET (Synchronous Optical Network) network; a SDH (Synchronous Digital Hierarchy) network; a wireless network; a wireline network; or a network 104 that includes a wireless link where the wireless link can be
  • the network topology of the network 104 can differ within different embodiments, possible network topologies include: a bus network topology; a star network topology; a ring network topology; a repeater-based network topology; or a tiered-star network topology. Additional embodiments may include a network 104 of mobile telephone networks that use a protocol to communicate among mobile devices, where the protocol can be any one of the following: AMPS; TDMA; CDMA; GSM; GPRS UMTS; 3 G; 4 G; or any other protocol able to transmit data among mobile devices.
  • FIG. 1B Illustrated in FIG. 1B is an embodiment of a computing device 100 , where the client machine 102 and server 106 illustrated in FIG. 1A can be deployed as and/or executed on any embodiment of the computing device 100 illustrated and described herein.
  • a system bus 150 that communicates with the following components: a central processing unit 121 ; a main memory 122 ; storage memory 128 ; an input/output (I/O) controller 123 ; display devices 124 A- 124 N; an installation device 116 ; and a network interface 118 .
  • the storage memory 128 includes: an operating system, software routines, and a client agent 120 .
  • the I/O controller 123 in some embodiments, is further connected to a key board 126 , and a pointing device 127 .
  • Other embodiments may include an I/O controller 123 connected to more than one input/output device 130 A- 130 N.
  • FIG. 1C illustrates one embodiment of a computing device 100 , where the client machine 102 and server 106 illustrated in FIG. 1A can be deployed as and/or executed on any embodiment of the computing device 100 illustrated and described herein.
  • a system bus 150 that communicates with the following components: a bridge 170 , and a first I/O device 130 A.
  • the bridge 170 is in further communication with the main central processing unit 121 , where the central processing unit 121 can further communicate with a second I/O device 130 B, a main memory 122 , and a cache memory 140 .
  • I/O ports I/O ports
  • a memory port 103 a main processor.
  • Embodiments of the computing machine 100 can include a central processing unit 121 characterized by any one of the following component configurations: logic circuits that respond to and process instructions fetched from the main memory unit 122 ; a microprocessor unit, such as: those manufactured by Intel Corporation; those manufactured by Motorola Corporation; those manufactured by Transmeta Corporation of Santa Clara, Calif.; the RS/6000 processor such as those manufactured by International Business Machines; a processor such as those manufactured by Advanced Micro Devices; or any other combination of logic circuits.
  • a central processing unit 121 characterized by any one of the following component configurations: logic circuits that respond to and process instructions fetched from the main memory unit 122 ; a microprocessor unit, such as: those manufactured by Intel Corporation; those manufactured by Motorola Corporation; those manufactured by Transmeta Corporation of Santa Clara, Calif.; the RS/6000 processor such as those manufactured by International Business Machines; a processor such as those manufactured by Advanced Micro Devices; or any other combination of logic circuits.
  • central processing unit 122 may include any combination of the following: a microprocessor, a microcontroller, a central processing unit with a single processing core, a central processing unit with two processing cores, or a central processing unit with more than one processing core.
  • FIG. 1C illustrates a computing device 100 that includes a single central processing unit 121
  • the computing device 100 can include one or more processing units 121 .
  • the computing device 100 may store and execute firmware or other executable instructions that, when executed, direct the one or more processing units 121 to simultaneously execute instructions or to simultaneously execute instructions on a single piece of data.
  • the computing device 100 may store and execute firmware or other executable instructions that, when executed, direct the one or more processing units to each execute a section of a group of instructions. For example, each processing unit 121 may be instructed to execute a portion of a program or a particular module within a program.
  • the processing unit 121 can include one or more processing cores.
  • the processing unit 121 may have two cores, four cores, eight cores, etc.
  • the processing unit 121 may comprise one or more parallel processing cores.
  • the processing cores of the processing unit 121 may in some embodiments access available memory as a global address space, or in other embodiments, memory within the computing device 100 can be segmented and assigned to a particular core within the processing unit 121 .
  • the one or more processing cores or processors in the computing device 100 can each access local memory.
  • memory within the computing device 100 can be shared amongst one or more processors or processing cores, while other memory can be accessed by particular processors or subsets of processors.
  • the multiple processing units can be included in a single integrated circuit (IC).
  • IC integrated circuit
  • the processors can execute a single instruction simultaneously on multiple pieces of data (SIMD), or in other embodiments can execute multiple instructions simultaneously on multiple pieces of data (MIMD).
  • SIMD single instruction simultaneously on multiple pieces of data
  • MIMD multiple instructions simultaneously on multiple pieces of data
  • the computing device 100 can include any number of SIMD and MIMD processors.
  • the computing device 100 can include an image processor, a graphics processor or a graphics processing unit.
  • the graphics processing unit can include any combination of software and hardware, and can further input graphics data and graphics instructions, render a graphic from the inputted data and instructions, and output the rendered graphic.
  • the graphics processing unit can be included within the processing unit 121 .
  • the computing device 100 can include one or more processing units 121 , where at least one processing unit 121 is dedicated to processing and rendering graphics.
  • One embodiment of the computing machine 100 includes a central processing unit 121 that communicates with cache memory 140 via a secondary bus also known as a backside bus, while another embodiment of the computing machine 100 includes a central processing unit 121 that communicates with cache memory via the system bus 150 .
  • the local system bus 150 can, in some embodiments, also be used by the central processing unit to communicate with more than one type of I/O device 130 A- 130 N.
  • the local system bus 150 can be any one of the following types of buses: a VESA VL bus; an ISA bus; an EISA bus; a MicroChannel Architecture (MCA) bus; a PCI bus; a PCI-X bus; a PCI-Express bus; or a NuBus.
  • MCA MicroChannel Architecture
  • computing machine 100 examples include an I/O device 130 A- 130 N that is a video display 124 that communicates with the central processing unit 121 . Still other versions of the computing machine 100 include a processor 121 connected to an I/O device 130 A- 130 N via any one of the following connections: HyperTransport, Rapid I/O, or InfiniBand. Further embodiments of the computing machine 100 include a processor 121 that communicates with one I/O device 130 A using a local interconnect bus and a second I/O device 130 B using a direct connection.
  • the computing device 100 includes a main memory unit 122 and cache memory 140 .
  • the cache memory 140 can be any memory type, and in some embodiments can be any one of the following types of memory: SRAM; BSRAM; or EDRAM.
  • Other embodiments include cache memory 140 and a main memory unit 122 that can be any one of the following types of memory: Static random access memory (SRAM), Burst SRAM or SynchBurst SRAM (BSRAM); Dynamic random access memory (DRAM); Fast Page Mode DRAM (FPM DRAM); Enhanced DRAM (EDRAM), Extended Data Output RAM (EDO RAM); Extended Data Output DRAM (EDO DRAM); Burst Extended Data Output DRAM (BEDO DRAM); Enhanced DRAM (EDRAM); synchronous DRAM (SDRAM); JEDEC SRAM; PC100 SDRAM; Double Data Rate SDRAM (DDR SDRAM); Enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM); SyncLink DRAM (SLDRAM); Direct Rambus DRAM (DRDRAM); Ferroelectric RAM (FRAM), Ferr
  • One embodiment of the computing device 100 provides support for any one of the following installation devices 116 : a CD-ROM drive, a CD-R/RW drive, a DVD-ROM drive, tape drives of various formats, USB device, a bootable medium, a bootable CD, a bootable CD for GNU/Linux distribution such as KNOPPIX®, a hard-drive or any other device suitable for installing applications or software.
  • Applications can in some embodiments include a client agent 120 , or any portion of a client agent 120 .
  • the computing device 100 may further include a storage device 128 that can be either one or more hard disk drives, or one or more redundant arrays of independent disks; where the storage device is configured to store an operating system, software, programs applications, or at least a portion of the client agent 120 .
  • a further embodiment of the computing device 100 includes an installation device 116 that is used as the storage device 128 .
  • the computing device 100 may further include a network interface 118 to interface to a Local Area Network (LAN), Wide Area Network (WAN) or the Internet through a variety of connections including, but not limited to, standard telephone lines, LAN or WAN links (e.g., 802.11, T1, T3, 56 kb, X.25, SNA, DECNET), broadband connections (e.g., ISDN, Frame Relay, ATM, Gigabit Ethernet, Ethernet-over-SONET), wireless connections, or some combination of any or all of the above.
  • LAN Local Area Network
  • WAN Wide Area Network
  • the Internet may further include a network interface 118 to interface to a Local Area Network (LAN), Wide Area Network (WAN) or the Internet through a variety of connections including, but not limited to, standard telephone lines, LAN or WAN links (e.g., 802.11, T1, T3, 56 kb, X.25, SNA, DECNET), broadband connections (e.g., ISDN, Frame Relay, ATM, Gigabit Ethernet, Ethernet
  • Connections can also be established using a variety of communication protocols (e.g., TCP/IP, IPX, SPX, NetBIOS, Ethernet, ARCNET, SONET, SDH, Fiber Distributed Data Interface (FDDI), RS232, RS485, IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.11a, IEEE 802.11b, IEEE 802.11g, CDMA, GSM, WiMax and direct asynchronous connections).
  • One version of the computing device 100 includes a network interface 118 able to communicate with additional computing devices 100 ′ via any type and/or form of gateway or tunneling protocol such as Secure Socket Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TLS), or the Citrix Gateway Protocol manufactured by Citrix Systems, Inc.
  • SSL Secure Socket Layer
  • TLS Transport Layer Security
  • Versions of the network interface 118 can comprise any one of: a built-in network adapter; a network interface card; a PCMCIA network card; a card bus network adapter; a wireless network adapter; a USB network adapter; a modem; or any other device suitable for interfacing the computing device 100 to a network capable of communicating and performing the methods and systems described herein.
  • Embodiments of the computing device 100 include any one of the following I/O devices 130 A- 130 N: a keyboard 126 ; a pointing device 127 ; mice; trackpads; an optical pen; trackballs; microphones; drawing tablets; video displays; speakers; inkjet printers; laser printers; and dye-sublimation printers; or any other input/output device able to perform the methods and systems described herein.
  • An I/O controller 123 may in some embodiments connect to multiple I/O devices 103 A- 130 N to control the one or more I/O devices.
  • I/O devices 130 A- 130 N may be configured to provide storage or an installation medium 116 , while others may provide a universal serial bus (USB) interface for receiving USB storage devices such as the USB Flash Drive line of devices manufactured by Twintech Industry, Inc.
  • USB universal serial bus
  • an I/O device 130 may be a bridge between the system bus 150 and an external communication bus, such as: a USB bus; an Apple Desktop Bus; an RS-232 serial connection; a SCSI bus; a FireWire bus; a FireWire 800 bus; an Ethernet bus; an AppleTalk bus; a Gigabit Ethernet bus; an Asynchronous Transfer Mode bus; a HIPPI bus; a Super HIPPI bus; a SerialPlus bus; a SCl/LAMP bus; a FibreChannel bus; or a Serial Attached small computer system interface bus.
  • an external communication bus such as: a USB bus; an Apple Desktop Bus; an RS-232 serial connection; a SCSI bus; a FireWire bus; a FireWire 800 bus; an Ethernet bus; an AppleTalk bus; a Gigabit Ethernet bus; an Asynchronous Transfer Mode bus; a HIPPI bus; a Super HIPPI bus; a SerialPlus bus; a SCl/LAMP bus; a FibreChannel bus; or
  • the computing machine 100 can execute any operating system, while in other embodiments the computing machine 100 can execute any of the following operating systems: versions of the MICROSOFT WINDOWS operating systems; the different releases of the Unix and Linux operating systems; any version of the MAC OS manufactured by Apple Computer; OS/2, manufactured by International Business Machines; Android by Google; any embedded operating system; any real-time operating system; any open source operating system; any proprietary operating system; any operating systems for mobile computing devices; or any other operating system.
  • the computing machine 100 can execute multiple operating systems.
  • the computing machine 100 can execute PARALLELS or another virtualization platform that can execute or manage a virtual machine executing a first operating system, while the computing machine 100 executes a second operating system different from the first operating system.
  • the computing machine 100 can be embodied in any one of the following computing devices: a computing workstation; a desktop computer; a laptop or notebook computer; a server; a handheld computer; a mobile telephone; a portable telecommunication device; a media playing device; a gaming system; a mobile computing device; a netbook, a tablet; a device of the IPOD or IPAD family of devices manufactured by Apple Computer; any one of the PLAYSTATION family of devices manufactured by the Sony Corporation; any one of the Nintendo family of devices manufactured by Nintendo Co; any one of the XBOX family of devices manufactured by the Microsoft Corporation; or any other type and/or form of computing, telecommunications or media device that is capable of communication and that has sufficient processor power and memory capacity to perform the methods and systems described herein.
  • the computing machine 100 can be a mobile device such as any one of the following mobile devices: a JAVA-enabled cellular telephone or personal digital assistant (PDA); any computing device that has different processors, operating systems, and input devices consistent with the device; or any other mobile computing device capable of performing the methods and systems described herein.
  • the computing device 100 can be any one of the following mobile computing devices: any one series of Blackberry, or other handheld device manufactured by Research In Motion Limited; the iPhone manufactured by Apple Computer; Palm Pre; a Pocket PC; a Pocket PC Phone; an Android phone; or any other handheld mobile device. Having described certain system components and features that may be suitable for use in the present systems and methods, further aspects are addressed below.
  • Embodiments of the present systems and methods may use acquisition and/or matching of potentially disparate biometrics at each point of transaction.
  • the present systems and methods may provide means to ensure the provenance of each step within each transaction and/or between each transaction.
  • FIG. 2A depicts one embodiment of a method for ensuring integrity of acquired biometrics for linking to one or more transactions.
  • An individual shown on the left of the figure performs a Transaction A.
  • On the right of the figure either the same or a different individual may attempt to perform a Transaction B.
  • Integrity may be ensured via a biometric chain of provenance (BCP) between transactions A and B, which may provide transaction-related information after-the-fact or in real-time, and may depend on whether the individuals are in fact the same or different.
  • BCP biometric chain of provenance
  • the customer may use a mobile device to acquire biometric data.
  • the customer may use his/her mobile device to communicate to a static device such as Point of Sale (POS) terminal.
  • POS Point of Sale
  • the first link in Transaction B for the BCP is associating the acquisition of the biometric of the user to the mobile device. This may involve a specific physical location and/or a particular time (Link 1 B). For example, provenance of the biometric acquisition may be less assured if the biometric was acquired far (e.g., 100 m) from the point of sale terminal rather than in front of checkout staff. Various methods for performing this as well as other provenance checks are described later.
  • the second link in Transaction B for the BCP may involve associating the mobile device to the POS terminal at a specific location and time (Link 2 B). This may be governed by the physics of the communication method between the mobile device and the POS terminal and/or other methods. Embodiments of such methods are described later.
  • the third link in Transaction B for the BCP may involve association of the biometric information acquired during the transaction with a Universal Biometric record (UBR).
  • UBR Universal Biometric record
  • the UBR may be stored locally at the site of the transaction or at a back-end server, for example.
  • the UBR record may include multiple biometrics acquired at a time of customer enrollment or registration into the system.
  • This attempted association can be done using a combination of one or more of: i) using a unique ID number of the mobile device to index into a Unique Universal Identifier (UUID) number that may be part of the UBR, ii) using the biometric data that has been acquired and to perform biometric matching on a database containing a plurality of UBR records or with a single UBR record if used in combination with the indexing method, and iii) acquisition of the biometric data without real-time matching for later forensic and provenance analysis, either by automatic processing or human analysis.
  • UUID Unique Universal Identifier
  • an automatic biometric search can yield many matches (e.g., face biometric), can yield a unique match result (e.g., the iris), or can yield no matches.
  • the face data may be acquired (e.g., not matched) and the unique ID of the mobile phone may be used to index into a UUID number and the associated UBR record, thereby creating provenance link 3 B.
  • links 1 B, 2 B, 3 B in the BCP We next consider the other end of the BCP—links 1 A, 2 A, 3 A which relate to Transaction A. These links may be performed by a similar approach as in links 1 B, 2 B, 3 B, although another embodiment of the methods and systems is illustrated for Transaction A.
  • the biometric device can be a static device and not a mobile device. The device may capture iris imagery and not face imagery, for example.
  • link 3 A may link the acquired iris biometric to the iris biometric component of the UBR.
  • a step in confirming or rejecting the BCP comprises associating the candidate UBR records that have been located in Transaction A and B by search or by indexing, and checking the integrity of the provenance, either in real-time or after-the-fact for reasons of detection, deterrence, and prosecution.
  • the attempted association can be done in one or more ways: i) comparing the UUID numbers of Transaction A and B and checking for a match, and/or ii) using the biometric data recovered or acquired during Transaction A and B and performing a match.
  • the first method may be performed by first associating Transaction A to the UUID of the indexed record identified for Transaction A (Link 4 A′), and similarly for Transaction B (Link 4 B′).
  • the second biometric match method can be simple if the biometric used for Transaction A and B are the same. In such cases, those biometrics can be compared directly with each other, or with the reference biometric acquired at a time of registration/enrollment. However, the approach may be more complicated if Transaction A was performed with one biometric while Transaction B was performed with another biometric. In some embodiments, we may address this by choosing to match a biometric that is contained in both UUID records since not all biometric fields/structures in the USB may be populated.
  • the biometric matching may select at least one biometric that was acquired at the time of either Transaction A or B, since this comprises very recent biometric information rather than just biometric information captured at the time of registration.
  • This method of choosing overlapping biometrics may be represented by links 4 A and 4 B respectively for each of Transaction A and B.
  • it may be determined that the iris is the biometric in common with the two UBR records, and in the case of Transaction A, iris data was in fact acquired.
  • the chosen overlapping biometrics for Transaction A and B may be compared in Link 5 . In this way, one biometric used in Transaction A can be biometrically associated to another biometric used in Transaction B using the UBR. This allows multiple biometrics to co-exist in the biometric chain of provenance.
  • a (e.g., small) mirror module at the point of transaction such that when the camera of the mobile device is placed near it, images of the user may be reflected and captured. This can be achieved, for example, by using a first mirror in the module that is oriented at a 45 degree angle to the camera's optical axis and a second mirror that is oriented at 90 degrees to the first mirror.
  • the first facial biometric may be acquired from the mobile device while the second facial biometric may be acquired from an existing security camera located in the ceiling for example, near the point of transaction, or from a webcam on the user's laptop.
  • the second facial biometric can be configured to have a wider field of view of coverage than the first facial biometric and can capture context of any fraudulent activity.
  • images and/or video of the transaction can be acquired from both the first and second facial biometric cameras simultaneously.
  • imagery can be acquired from the second facial biometric camera from a (e.g., small) cut-out region covering the region near the transaction (e.g., point of sale).
  • a cut-out region covering the region near the transaction (e.g., point of sale).
  • the approach of capturing the same biometric from a different geometric perspective makes it harder to spoof the biometric capture. This is because a potential fraudster will likely need to plan the spoof from two perspectives simultaneously.
  • such an approach can add an extra layer of security, and biometric data from the different geometric perspectives can be checked to ensure the integrity of acquired biometrics linked to a transaction.
  • FIG. 2B shows a more detailed view of the UBR.
  • the UBR may comprise multiple biometric records acquired at a time of registration/enrollment for a particular customer, for example, face, iris, voice, palm and fingerprint biometrics.
  • the UUID may be a Universal Unique Identifier that is a number or identifier created to be unique over a population of customers or individuals.
  • the UBR can contain an index to traditional personal information such as name, address and account number information.
  • FIG. 2C shows one embodiment of a summary of a BCP process.
  • the column on the left shows certain steps in the provenance chain, as described above.
  • the column in the middle gives a description of the link, and what associations are tested.
  • the column on the right shows the result of the provenance check for that particular link. If all rules for all links pass successfully, then as shown at the bottom of the middle column, the concatenation of all the inferences from each link can lead to the conclusion that, in this case, the person performing Transaction A is the same as the person performing Transaction B.
  • the BCP can be performed not just between two transactions, but between multiple serial transactions or across a network of transactions where cross-validation of transactions may be performed in real-time or forensically.
  • FIG. 2D shows how the BCP maybe extended to validate transactions over a chain of multiple (e.g., four) transactions.
  • FIG. 2E shows how the BCP may be extended to incorporate a network of transactions. Additional confirmation may be provided by validating against additional transactions. Such validation may take longer, but can provide added confirmation for higher value transactions. For example, if the transaction involves buying a coffee, then it may be appropriate to check the BCP for one or two transactions, for example appropriate to such a low-value transaction. However, if the transaction involves a significant purchase such as a car or house, then all or a substantial number of available BCP checks can be performed for both low and high value transactions previously performed, to check for consistency of the BCP.
  • Biometric Chain of Provenance may be that biometric chains of provenance should not overlap unless the same person is involved in the transaction(s).
  • a further test of the BCP is the lack of matching to other BCPs. While it may be processor-intensive to test all possible combinations of matches of BCPs, such a process can be performed (e.g., by a biometric validation or integrity engine) as a background computing process and not on a transaction-by-transaction basis. Anomalies may be reported as they are detected.
  • biometric systems give evidence of who the person is, rather than evidence of what they carry (e.g., an identification token).
  • biometric authentication needs to be associated to a particular location or access point or point of sale location or even another mobile location. This is more easily achieved if the biometric device is fixed to the wall, for example, since then the biometric read is inherently linked to the physical location.
  • biometric devices may be cost-prohibitive in many cases to deploy biometric systems in such a large number of locations.
  • Some embodiments of the present methods allow mobile biometric devices to be linked to other mobile or static devices, while maintaining a level of security similar to or attained by fixed biometric devices.
  • a mobile biometric device may be suitable.
  • the iris biometric is known to be highly accurate and can be acquired quickly and easily by a user.
  • a set of unique issues are posed.
  • successful matching of the user's biometric using a mobile biometric device may provide no evidence that the person who used the biometric device is also the person who actually executes the physical transaction or access control function.
  • a user with a biometric device could stand by a point of sale or access control gate, use the biometric device, and a person without any such device could execute the access control or point of sale function.
  • two users with two mobile biometric devices could be standing next to each other at an access control point and the access control point is unaware of which device physically is relevant for the desired function or transaction.
  • the present method addresses at least some of these issues using for example two components.
  • a first component leverages on the spatial geometric relationship between a network of one or more mobile authentication devices and/or static nodes. This helps determine where the mobile devices and/or nodes are with respect to each other at any particular moment in time.
  • the method may employ ways to link the physical action of reading the biometric to the geometrical relationship discussed in the first component.
  • a GPS module located on the mobile device or static node can be used to provide an approximate location of the device or node for example.
  • a wireless link between the mobile device and one or more other mobile devices or nodes may allow the GPS location of the device to be transmitted to the other.
  • Geometrical relationships between each device or node can then be computed. For example, the Euclidean distance between the device and node can be computed as follows:
  • D is the distance between device or node 1 , and device or node 2 , and the location of device 1 is given by (X1,Y1,Z1) and the location of device 2 is given by (X2,Y2,Z2). More generally, D can represent a vector difference that represents just Euclidean distance, or can include other attributes such as signal strength for example.
  • One method for disambiguating which mobile biometric device is relevant to a particular fixed node or other biometric device may include performing rules upon the computed vector distance D. For example, in some embodiments, if the biometric device is being used for a function such as access control, then the following steps may be employed:
  • this distance metric can almost be binary, such that it is a contactless reader whereby the user has to place device N_o against N_i for the signal strength to be sufficiently large such that the devices can communicate.
  • the algorithm described above may automatically take into account the condition when devices are too far away for a contactless reader to communicate.
  • another approach is to use time-of-flight using radio frequency signals between device N_i and N_o.
  • a signal may be sent from one device to the other and then back again using a standard radio link method such as Bluetooth.
  • the signal itself may carry the device ID D_i so that it may be known which signals are sent from which devices.
  • the time it takes for the signal to be received can allow a distance to be computed. For example,
  • D_io is the distance between devices N_i and N_o
  • C is the speed of light
  • T_io is the time computed from sending the signal and receiving it
  • T_p is the processing time it takes to send a return signal back.
  • the factor of 0.5 is used since a signal is being sent both ways between the device and this accounts for that.
  • the factor T_p is subtracted from T_io so that processing time does not interfere with the distance measurement.
  • Processing time may be independent of distance between devices, and can be computed by setting devices N_i and N_o at a known distance apart, by measuring T_io, and then by rearranging the variables in the equation above to compute T_p.
  • the RF time-of-flight approach can work reliably at long and short distances. However, in some embodiments, it may require that very precisely-tuned electronics be used, since T_io may be measured in nanoseconds and not milliseconds.
  • an audio-based approach may be used rather than radio frequency signals. Audio can travel through air many orders of magnitude slower compared to radio frequency (approximately 3 ⁇ 10 ⁇ 2 m/sec compared to 3 ⁇ 10 ⁇ 8 m/sec) and this can mean that corresponding electronics need only work at millisecond precision. There are several ways that audio can be implemented. One method is similar or identical to the method described above for RF, except that audio is used. For example, a loudspeaker on one device may send a signal, and a microphone on the other device may receive the signal. A loudspeaker on that device may send another signal, after which the first device receives the other signal using a microphone for example.
  • Several microphones can be used in a phased-array so that sounds from the expected direction of use are amplified while those from other directions are minimized or rejected. This can improve noise rejection capabilities.
  • ultrasound above 20 KHz is used so that the audio signal is inaudible to humans.
  • the speed of sound can vary quite widely with temperature, however this may not matter in the process of selecting which device N_i is closest to N_o, since all devices in the vicinity of N_o are subject to the same temperature. Once a device has been selected, then there is typically enough tolerance in the specifications for D_allowed to accommodate such variations in C_sound due to temperature variations.
  • an approach is to use both audio and radio signals to perform ranging.
  • This has an advantage that an audio signal may be sent in one direction, which can reduce the processing complexity.
  • a radio signal may be sent wirelessly between device N_o and N_i.
  • an audio signal may be sent.
  • the time difference between arrival of the radio signal and the audio can be used to compute the distance.
  • This distance in some embodiments, may be expressed as:
  • T_RF is the time when an RF signal from a device was received
  • T_audio is the time when the audio signal was received.
  • embodiments of the present methods may link the physical action of reading a biometric to the geometrical relationship recovered above. More specifically, the issue we are addressing here is that while the above-mentioned methods may associate one device to another, they do not specifically associate the act of acquiring the biometric to the desired transaction or function. For example, a mobile device may acquire the user's biometric at one instant in time as they are physically far from another device or node, and then at a later time (measured in seconds for example) distance is computed as discussed above. The time difference between these two events may allow one or more users to move nearer or farther away from each other, thereby resulting in an incorrect estimation of the geometrical relationship between devices at the time that it matters most.
  • a ranging module or device may perform distance calculation within a time difference T_diff of a biometric read.
  • T_diff may be determined such that any movement of a person or device in that time instant will be sufficiently small that it does not affect the outcome of the geometrical calculations described herein.
  • T_diff may be determined as a function of human factors such as human walking speed. In some embodiments, T_diff ⁇ 1 second is a preferred value.
  • the methods and systems may optionally require that the user hold on to the device between the time that a biometric is read and the geometrical calculation is performed. This can ensure that locating the device also locates the user, for example within the accuracy of the length of the arm of the user. This can be achieved in many ways. For example, a user can press and hold a button on the device between the time that a biometric capture is performed and the ranging calculation is completed.
  • embodiments of the present systems and methods may incorporate one or more of the following to counter fraudulent activity: 1) the ability to track a particular individual to a transaction, and 2) the ability to track one transaction to a second transaction.
  • biometric access control devices such as that disclosed in “A System for Non-intrusive Human Iris Acquisition and Identification”, K. Hanna, R. Mandelbaum, L. Wixson, D. Mishra, and V. Paragano, International Association for Pattern Recognition Workshop on Machine Vision Applications, pp 200-203, Tokyo, Japan, 1996.
  • biometric access control devices include fingerprint recognition systems, and face recognition systems.
  • biometric access control devices can be expensive, can require complex installation depending on the system, and can require costly maintenance.
  • biometric access control device for example, their record is not located in the device or they are unfamiliar with how to use the device
  • FIG. 3B shows how this problem may be addressed in a particular embodiment of the present methods and systems.
  • each user may have their own personal access control device (sometimes referred to as a biometric device or mobile biometric device).
  • Each personal access control device may include a biometric capture or match module.
  • a personal access control device may communicate with at least one transceiver module remote from the personal access control device, which may in turn communicate with an access node that is at the point of logical or physical access which may be at the same or different location to that of the transceiver module(s).
  • processing and/or mechanisms on the personal access control device and on the transceiver module may be processing and/or mechanisms on the personal access control device and on the transceiver module, as described herein, to establish that the user holding the personal access control device desires logical or physical access to one or more specific access node(s) (to avoid confusion at an installation with adjacent turnstiles or devices for example).
  • biometric access control device there may be several advantages of each user having their own personal access control device.
  • biometric access control devices have particular use cases and requirements for operation that are carefully controlled. Combining these human factor constraints with the human factor constraints of access point (e.g., turnstile) people-flow can be complex, and may require significant planning and cost for installation.
  • the biometric access control device also typically requires maintenance by specialized staff.
  • a personal access control device carried by the user on the other hand can be maintained remotely, by the user themselves for example.
  • the human-factors constraints imposed by the device usage and the turnstile entry are separated. Since the personal access control device is in the hands of the user, the user is more likely to be familiar with its usage.
  • an access point e.g., turnstiles. If any user in line is having a problem using their device, he/she can simply step aside from the access point until he/she resolves the problem. In this way, the throughput of people through the access point may be maximized.
  • FIG. 3C shows an example of the personal access control device usage.
  • Users ahead of the line can use their own personal access control device before they reach their turnstile, as shown by the first and third person from the left in the line.
  • the fourth person from the left has already used the personal access control device and is now at the front of the line by the turnstile.
  • the person at the front of the line can swipe his personal access control device next or near to the transceiver module on the access node, as will be discussed later.
  • the user since the user does not use their personal access control device at the turnstile, there may be potential ambiguities in who actually is being allowed to enter the portal.
  • a user could use his/her personal access control device at a significant physical distance from the turnstile, thereby opening it, but an unauthorized user can step in and gain access.
  • either turnstile could be actuated by the remote user, causing confusion and potential access by unauthorized individuals.
  • FIG. 4 shows an example of a personal access control device used in the disclosure. Not all features may be required in all configurations in the disclosure.
  • FIG. 4 shows an Access Node illuminator which may include a semi-directional infra-red light source, for example, much like that on a television remote control unit for communicating with the transceiver module, a loudspeaker and a microphone for communicating with the transceiver module, a camera for acquiring biometric information from the user such as face and iris imagery, an eye/face illuminator which may be in the visible or infra-red range, a wireless transmitter for communicating with the transceiver module, an near field communications (NFC) chip for communicating with the transceiver module, and in this example, a fingerprint sensor.
  • NFC near field communications
  • FIG. 5 shows another example of a personal access control device configured to be on a mobile phone.
  • a camera on the back of the device there may be a camera, an illuminator to acquire biometric data such as facial and iris imagery, and/or also a fingerprint sensor.
  • FIG. 6 shows one embodiment of the front of the personal access control device, showing a screen with a 2D bar code on it (as will be discussed later), a loudspeaker, a microphone and an NFC chip. Not all features may be required in certain embodiments as will be discussed below. There may also be a processor to perform certain steps described herein.
  • FIG. 7 depicts, on the left, one embodiment of an Access Node with a Transceiver module mounted on top with various sensor and transmitter components. Access nodes and transceiver modules can be mounted remotely from each other. Transceiver modules can include one or more of a photo-detector that is tuned to receive the signal of the semi-directional light source in the personal access control device as the user points the device towards the transceiver module, one or more microphones and loudspeakers to communicate via audio with the personal access control device, a camera, a wireless transceiver to communicate with the personal access control device, and an NFC receiver.
  • a photo-detector that is tuned to receive the signal of the semi-directional light source in the personal access control device as the user points the device towards the transceiver module
  • one or more microphones and loudspeakers to communicate via audio with the personal access control device
  • a camera a wireless transceiver to communicate with the personal access control device
  • an NFC receiver an NFC receiver
  • the access node 7 depicts, on the right, a USB version of the access node and transceiver module, comprising one or more of a microphone, loudspeaker and a photo-detector. In both configurations, there may be a processor that performs certain steps described herein. It is possible that the access node can contain similar or identical functions as the personal access control device, and in some embodiments, the access node may be a mobile device or device phone.
  • FIG. 8 shows one configuration where a personal access control device B is at a distance a from a transceiver module A on an Access Module N1 mounted on a turnstile.
  • FIG. 9 shows a flow diagram of one embodiment of the methods disclosed herein.
  • the first step may be biometric capture or matching.
  • biometric capture can include the capture of information that indicates that a live person is in front of the personal access control device, and/or more traditional biometric matching whereby biometric data (a face, iris or fingerprint) is acquired and compared to reference data.
  • this step may be omitted and a device ID used in place of, or in addition to, the biometric data capture or matching.
  • Such applications may be less secure but the user does not need to perform the step of having their biometric data acquired or matched.
  • biometric matching for example iris matching as disclosed by Daugman, “Biometric Personal Identification system based on iris analysis”, U.S. Pat. No. 5,291,560.
  • biometric capture module can ensure that the face of a live person is acquired and this data can be sent to the Access Node and stored so that in case of unauthorized access the biometric data of the unauthorized user can be available to help identify them.
  • the camera at the Access Node can be used to capture imagery of users as they transit through the turnstile.
  • step 2 If the biometric capture or matching is not successful (for example as shown in step 2 ) then the user can try again. By virtue of the particular embodiment of the disclosure, this step can be attempted repeatedly before the user reaches the access point so that other users are not delayed, which would have been the case if the user had to perform the step at the turnstile itself. If the biometric capture or match is successful, processing may be performed (step 3 ).
  • the processing on the personal access control device (step 3 ) and on the transceiver module (step 8 ) may establish: (i) that the user holding the personal access control device desires logical or physical access to one or more specific access node(s) (to avoid confusion at an installation with adjacent turnstiles or devices for example), and (ii) establishes that the person who has successfully used the biometric capture or match module is the same person within the vicinity of said access node(s) at the moment of logical and physical access. More details of the processing are discussed later.
  • the results of the processing may be encrypted (step 4 ) and may be displayed or sent from the Personal access control device (step 5 ) and received by one or more Transceiver Modules (step 6 ). Encryption may be desirable or necessary since otherwise the communication from the Personal access control device to the Transceiver Modules can be intercepted, monitored and/or replayed.
  • the message may be decrypted (step 7 ) and then further processing (step 8 ) may be performed as discussed above.
  • the results of the processing may then be checked to determine if authorization is allowed (step 9 ). If authorization is allowed, the turnstile may be opened and/or a message may be sent to an access control system which in turn opens the turnstile.
  • FIG. 10 shows an example breakdown of the “Biometric Capture module” in FIG. 9 .
  • imagery may be acquired using a camera on the personal access control device and optionally an illuminator as shown in FIG. 11 , and faces are detected.
  • Methods for detecting faces are described, for example, in M. Turk, A. Pentland, Eigenfaces for Recognition, Journal of Cognitive Neurosicence, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1991, pp. 71-86.
  • the face region may be stabilized as shown in FIG. 12 to remove motion due to instability of the user holding the camera.
  • Methods for stabilization may be adapted from, for example, “Efficient Image Stabilization and Automatic Target Detection in Aerial FLIR Sequences”, Enrique Estalayo et.
  • the biometric capture may be deemed successful. If the measured residual motion does not fit the model, then the user may try the acquisition again. It may be desirable to include a unique device ID in the “biometric capture” step since this is additional evidence of who the user of the device may be.
  • FIG. 14 shows a breakdown of an example of steps 3 , 4 , 5 (on the left) and steps 6 , 7 , 8 (on the right) and some of the modules described in FIG. 9 .
  • the NFC (near-field-communication) module on the personal access control device and the transceiver module may be used.
  • the NFC communication may be enabled but only for a time interval. This means that a user cannot simply verify themselves 1 hour earlier, for example, and then use the personal access control device to gain access. This time interval may be as short as 60 or even 5 seconds, for example.
  • the NFC module may send out an RF (Radio Frequency) signal that may be received on the Transceiver module which then enables the rest of the process shown in FIG. 9 to occur.
  • RF Radio Frequency
  • FIG. 10 shows another example where instead of NFC, a bar code (1D or 2D) may be displayed on the screen of the personal access control device.
  • the bar code may be displayed for a time interval.
  • the bar code may be encrypted with a variable code using standard public/private key encryption methods so that the bar code is different each time the system is used. This can prevent the screen from being copied and used for unauthorized access.
  • the time of the biometric acquisition can optionally be encoded in the bar code.
  • the bar code is read in the “receive message” module, not only can the authenticity of the “access allowed” message be detected, but a second check can be performed on the time interval between the acquisition of the biometric data and the current time.
  • FIG. 16 shows a similar method to FIG. 15 except separate counters on the personal access control device and on the transceiver modules may be compared for consistency.
  • Another method is to enable the semi-directional infra-red light source in the personal access control device so that a modulated signal may be sent that encodes the encrypted signal, rather than the image bar code.
  • the user may point the device towards the transceiver module, much like a remote control, and the signal may be received by the transceiver module if the user is sufficiently close to the transceiver, and is pointing at the particular desired transceiver module as oppose to an adjacent transceiver module.
  • steps above may require or assume that the user scans or points the personal access control device at the transceiver module which may usually be placed on or near the turnstile. While this may be acceptable in many cases, it can be desirable to remove this step so there are fewer actions for the user to perform.
  • FIG. 17 shows an example of this. Again, steps 3 , 4 , 5 and steps 6 , 7 , 8 are broken down from FIG. 9 .
  • a message may be sent over wireless. However to prevent a person from authorizing at this distance away, the signal strength of the wireless signal can be monitored at the transceiver module and if above a threshold the personal access control device may be designated to be close to the transceiver module.
  • the roundtrip time-of-flight of the wireless signal (e.g., personal device to transceiver to personal device, or transceiver to personal device to transceiver) can also be used to measure the distance.
  • FIG. 18 Another embodiment of the method is shown in FIG. 18 .
  • an ultrasonic audio signal may be used rather than a wireless signal. This can allows standard hardware in a cell phone to be used for communication.
  • FIG. 19 shows another embodiment of the method that uses both wireless and audio. Messages may be sent simultaneously over wireless and audio. The time difference between the receipt of the wireless signal and the audio signal can be measured. With the speed of sound being 330 m/sec, and a temporal accuracy of only lusec, for example, the distance measurement from the personal access control device to the transceiver module can be determined to be 0.33 mm.
  • FIG. 20 shows a potential issue with these methods that allow remote access to a particular turnstile or access point, that are adjacent to each other; when at a distance, a particular transceiver node may not be able to tell whether the signal is coming from its lane or an adjacent lane.
  • FIG. 20 shows for example that personal access control device B 1 is in fact closer to the turnstile in the adjacent lane compared to personal access control device B 2 which actually is in the adjacent lane. A user in one lane could therefore potentially open up the wrong turnstile. This problem may be mitigated if the thresholds in the approaches above are made small enough so that effectively the ambiguity cannot occur. This may mean that the users have to hold the devices fairly close to the relevant transceiver module.
  • FIG. 21 shows one solution to this problem.
  • there are two transceiver modules each receiving signals and computing distance measurements as described earlier. Since there are two transceiver modules, two distances can be calculated and the position of the personal access control device triangulated from that, using the known geometry of the transceiver nodes.
  • FIG. 22 shows another configuration with three transceiver nodes arranged in a triangle. As will be shown later, such arrangements can provide more accurate and stable estimates of position.
  • FIG. 23 shows another configuration where the personal access control device communicates with transceiver nodes in the adjacent lane (or elsewhere) in order to increase the separation between transceiver nodes and increase the accuracy and stability of the position estimate as shown below.
  • the distance estimates can be transferred from one transceiver node to the next over a standard network connection.
  • FIG. 24 shows embodiments of the three configurations in FIGS. 21 , 22 , 23 .
  • the table shows the result of computing the distance with all four combinations of + ⁇ 0.33 mm accuracy, which corresponds to 1 usec temporal measurement error.
  • the transceiver nodes in the left and middle are 0.1 m apart, and on the right the nodes are 1 m apart, and the user is at a point (4, 0.5)m from the first (or left depending on the configuration) transceiver node.
  • the table on the left shows that with the transceiver modules arranged along the length of the lane as shown, the estimated X coordinate (along the lane direction) may vary very little but the estimated Y position may vary by almost up to 1 ⁇ 2 m.
  • the middle table shows the same table when the transceiver nodes are mounted orthogonal to the axis of the lane.
  • the estimated Y position may vary by only 0.06 m. This is because the positioning of the transceiver modules in this orthogonal configuration may provide more accuracy in the Y direction.
  • the triangular configuration in FIG. 22 can give more accuracy approximately isotropically around the transceiver module cluster.
  • FIG. 24 on the right shows the estimated Y position when transceiver nodes are used between adjacent lanes. Note that the estimated Y position may vary only by 0.006 m. This is because of the much wider baseline of the transceiver modules resulting in more accurate position estimates.
  • FIG. 25 shows how this method is implemented using two transceiver modules using both wireless and audio signals.
  • FIG. 26 shows how the method can be used just using three transceiver modules and three audio signals.
  • FIG. 27 shows how in all of these approaches above, the transceiver modules can be used as the transmitting devices rather than just the receiver devices. While FIG. 27 shows how audio signals are used exclusively, then the approaches described above can be interchanged. For example, audio signals can be sent from the transceiver modules and a bar code can be displayed on the personal access control device and used as a means to communicate back to the transceiver module.
  • the transceiver nodes need not necessarily be positioned at the location of the access node where physical or logical access occurs. If the position of the personal access control device is known with respect to the transceiver nodes, and since the geometry of the transceiver nodes is known a priori with respect to the access nodes, then the position of the personal access control device to the access nodes can be computed by geometry.
  • biometric capture or match module another method for establishing when the personal access control device is within the vicinity of an access node that the user holding the personal access control device is the same person who successfully used the biometric capture or match module, is to detect whether the user has parted with the device between the time of biometric capture and detection of the device at the point of access. This would occur if the user passed the device to another user, for example.
  • one approach is to have a button on the device that must be held during and after authentication before a message is sent from the personal access control device to the transceiver module, to ensure that the device is not passed from one person to the next.
  • the biometric capture or matching modules can be omitted in some instantiations of the disclosure and replaced with the device ID.
  • a user is in the vicinity of a turnstile or point-of-sale location, holding a personal access control device such as a mobile phone.
  • a personal access control device such as a mobile phone.
  • an access node On the turnstile or point-of-sale location is an access node, which may be a second mobile phone.
  • FIG. 28 four distinct positions and time elements as disclosed are shown. Biometric data “Bio_XYZT” may be acquired and collected onto the mobile device at geometric position and time “Mobile_XYZT — 1”.
  • the user may move the device to a new geometric position and time “Mobile_XYZT — 2” at which the proximity between the mobile device and the access node “Node_XYZT” may be measured either explicitly using the distance-measurement methods described previously, for example an audio ranging method, or implicitly for example using a camera on the access node that captures imagery of a bar code on a screen on the mobile phone, which can be done successfully if the mobile phone is within a certain zoom range of the access node.
  • These are elements in the Biometric Chain of Provenance described herein.
  • the disclosure provides a means to ensure that the chain of biometric provenance is not broken. As discussed earlier, we define the meaning of breaking the chain of biometric provenance.
  • the four discrete position and time elements are Bio_XYZT, Mobile_XYZT — 1, Mobile_XYZT — 2 and Node_XYZT.
  • Bio_XYZT can be immediately associated to Node_XYZT at the identical values of space and time XYZT, so that the biometric may be unambiguously associated to the node.
  • an application may be a point of sale transaction where a check-out attendant is present.
  • Two roles of the checkout attendant may be i) to be present and observe the user presenting the biometric to the mobile device, and ii) be present and observe the user presenting the mobile device to the node.
  • the four discrete position and time elements are Bio_XYZT, Mobile_XYZT — 1, Mobile_XYZT — 2 and Node_XYZT.
  • the more critical metrics for ensuring the chain of biometric provenance may include the spatial and time difference between Mobile_XYZT — 1 and Mobile_XYZT — 2, and between Mobile_XYZT — 2 and Node_XYZT.
  • a face detector algorithm can be performed on the mobile device, and the spacing between the eyes of a detected face may be calibrated to the average human eye-spacing or particular eye spacing of the user can be used to determine that the user is in fact only a particular distance away from the device.
  • the spatial difference between Mobile_XYZT — 1 and Mobile_XYZT — 2 can be measured instead by integrating accelerometer information on the mobile device. This distance may be measured to be 0.75 m, but the user may take 20 seconds, for example, until they present the mobile device to the access node. Since the measured spatial difference is still within the acceptable range at 0.75 m, then such a long time interval may be allowable by the chain of provenance rule set depending on the use case.
  • the temporal difference between Mobile_XYZT — 2 and Node_XYZT may be typically small since the data is transferred in a short time instant.
  • the difference in distance may be explicitly measured and checked to be below a threshold, for example 0.75 m, or the distance may be implicitly verified to be below a threshold due to the inability of the particular communication method to communicate information further than a particular distance.
  • FIGS. 29-33 on the top gives different examples of the spatial and temporal values of each of Bio_XYZT, Mobile_XYZT — 1, Mobile_XYZT — 2 and Node_XYZT, and shows how a chain of biometric provenance can be confirmed or denied using combinations of spatial and temporal constraints with the different sets of rules shown for each figure at the bottom.
  • FIG. 29 the user acquires their biometric and may present his/her device within a sufficiently short time period (T_c ⁇ T_b) such that provenance may be confirmed.
  • the rules may be configured such that (T_c ⁇ T_b) is measured to be too long and provenance may be denied.
  • FIG. 31 shows a case where the user may acquire his/her biometric and may present his/her device such that the device has not moved more than distance D 2 between the time of biometric acquisition and presentation of the device to the node, and such that the distance of the device from the node at the time of presentation of the device to the node is less than distance D 3 , and provenance may therefore be confirmed.
  • FIG. 31 shows a case where the user may acquire his/her biometric and may present his/her device such that the device has not moved more than distance D 2 between the time of biometric acquisition and presentation of the device to the node, and such that the distance of the device from the node at the time of presentation of the device to the node is less than distance D 3 ,
  • FIG. 32 shows a similar situation to case 4 , except the mobile device may be presented at a distance greater than D 3 from the node, and therefore provenance may be denied.
  • the method includes acquiring, by a mobile biometric device, biometric information of an individual ( 3402 ).
  • a ranging module of a transaction device may determine that a distance between the mobile biometric device and a physical location of a first transaction with the individual is within a predefined value ( 3404 ).
  • the transaction device may link, responsive to the determination, the acquired biometric information to the first transaction if the biometric information is acquired within a specific time limit from the distance determination ( 3406 ).
  • the transaction device may link the acquired biometric information to a universal biometric record of the individual ( 3408 ).
  • the universal biometric record may include biometric information of a first type that matches the acquired biometric information, and biometric information of a second type.
  • a biometric integrity engine may identify, via the universal biometric record, a second transaction ( 3410 ).
  • the second transaction may be linked to acquired biometric information that matches the biometric information of the second type.
  • the biometric integrity engine may compare information from the first transaction and the second transaction for inconsistency or fraud ( 3412 ).
  • a mobile biometric device may acquire biometric information of an individual.
  • a biometric device mobile or otherwise, may acquire biometric information of an individual.
  • the biometric device may acquire, capture, record or otherwise process one or more sets of biometric information from the individual.
  • the individual may carry and/or operate the biometric device.
  • the mobile biometric device may be a personal or portable device of the individual, and/or assigned to the individual for use (e.g., for biometric acquisition and/or verification).
  • the biometric device may acquire biometric information while the individual is moving, stationary, or substantially still.
  • the biometric device may acquire biometric information when the individual is approaching and/or near to a physical location, such as an access point, a point-of-sale terminal, or a secured area or device.
  • the individual may initiate biometric acquisition when the individual is approaching and/or near to the physical location. For example, the individual may raise the device close to the individual's face or eye, to acquire biometric data, including but not limited to iris, voice and/or facial data.
  • the biometric information is stored or processed further if a distance or separation between the individual (e.g., the individual's head, face, eye or iris) and the biometric device during biometric acquisition is within a certain threshold value or range.
  • the biometric device may include a ranging module to measure its distance from the individual, or the biometric device may include software to check that the size, quality and/or orientation of the biometrics acquired are acceptable or optimal.
  • a ranging module of a transaction device may determine that a distance between the mobile biometric device and a physical location of a first transaction with the individual is within a predefined value.
  • a ranging device or module determines the distance between the mobile biometric device and a physical location of a first transaction with the individual.
  • the ranging device or module may be part of the biometric device, or part of a transaction device located at or connected to the physical location.
  • the ranging device or module may be connected (e.g., wirelessly or via a network) to the biometric device and/or the transaction device.
  • the ranging device or module may collect location information of the biometric device and/or the transaction device from the biometric device and/or the transaction device. In some embodiments, the ranging device or module may determine the distance before a transaction occurs at the physical location. The ranging device or module may determine the distance during or after a transaction with the individual at the physical location has been initiated or completed. The ranging device or module may determine the distance before, during, and/or after the biometric acquisition. The ranging device or module may determine the distance while the biometric device and/or the individual is stationary or in motion.
  • the distance or location determination is triggered or initiated by the biometric acquisition.
  • the biometric acquisition is triggered or initiated by the location determination.
  • the distance or location determination is triggered or initiated responsive to the (e.g., successful) acquisition of biometric data from the individual.
  • the distance or location determination and the biometric acquisition are triggered or initiated at substantially the same time, and/or by the same event.
  • the individual may push a button on the biometric device to start the distance or location determination and/or the biometric acquisition.
  • a sensor of the biometric device may alert the user to commence biometric acquisition and/or location determination, for example when the biometric device is close to the physical location (e.g., access point).
  • the biometric device may communication with the ranging device to perform the distance determination, for example, at around the same time as the biometric acquisition.
  • a transaction device at the physical location may communicate with or instruct the biometric device and/or ranging device to start the distance/location determination and/or the biometric acquisition, e.g., when the individual is proximate to the physical location.
  • the distance determination may include a comparison of the distance between the biometric device and the physical location, and a predefined distance value or threshold.
  • the transaction device, ranging device and/or the biometric device may accept (e.g., receive, store and/or process) the acquired biometric data if the distance is at and/or within the predefined value. New, replacement or additional biometric data may be acquired if the distance is at and/or beyond the predefined value.
  • the ranging module or device may employ any one or a combination of techniques discussed earlier to locate the position of the biometric device, and/or the biometric device's separation from the physical location. For example, the ranging module or device may determine the distance between the mobile biometric device and the physical location via a global positioning system.
  • the ranging module or device may determine the distance between the mobile biometric device and the physical location using a short-range location system.
  • the short-range location system may use one or more of a: radio-frequency, laser, infra-red and audio ranging process as discussed earlier.
  • the ranging module or device estimates or determines the distance between the mobile biometric device and a physical location based on strength of a signal received at one of: the physical location and the mobile biometric device, and transmitted by the other.
  • the ranging module or device may use signal strength as a threshold determination of whether to store or further process the acquired biometrics, or to acquire new, replacement or additional biometric data.
  • the ranging module or device may use or specify a particular signal strength to represent or indicate the predefined distance value or threshold. For example, if the mobile biometric device or the transaction device receives a signal of strength greater than S, the separation between the biometric device and the physical location is determined to be within the predefined distance value.
  • the transaction device may link, responsive to the determination, the acquired biometric information to the first transaction if the biometric information is acquired within a specific time limit from the distance determination.
  • the transaction device may link the acquired biometric information to the location of the biometric device or the physical location if the biometric information is acquired within a specific time or time limit from the distance determination.
  • the time of the biometric acquisition may be determined as the time the biometric acquisition is initiated/commenced, or the time the biometric acquisition is completed.
  • the time of the distance determination may be determined as the time the distance determination is initiated/commenced, or the time the distance determination is completed.
  • the transaction device may link or apply the identity of the individual, once established, to the transaction, the location of the biometric device and/or the physical location if the biometric information is acquired within a specific time limit from the distance determination.
  • the specific time limit may be defined as a limit within which the biometric acquisition, the transaction and/or the distance measurement is considered contemporaneous or occurring substantially at the same time.
  • the specific time limit may be defined as a limit within which there is a high certainty that integrity of the acquired biometric data can be maintained, presumed or is assured, e.g., the acquired biometric data is correctly attributed to the individual/transaction and/or is not fraudulent introduced.
  • there is a potential that biometric data may be fraudulently introduced for a transaction if the specific time limit is exceeded. For example, a person may obtain the biometric device to initiate/complete a transaction after biometric data has already been acquired from another person.
  • the transaction device and/or the biometric device may compute, calculate, determine or otherwise define the specific time limit based on an amount or rate of change in the location of the mobile biometric device. For example, if the biometric device moves significantly within a short period of time (e.g., relative to the physical location), the determined distance between the biometric device and the physical location may have become inaccurate or invalid over the short period of time.
  • the specific time limit may be defined to be more conservative (e.g., shorter) or longer depending on the mobility and/or movement characteristics of the biometric device.
  • the specific time limit may be defined based in part on the predefined distance value. In some embodiments, the specific time limit and the predefined distance value are determined in connection with each other, as well as other factors (e.g., an amount or rate of change in the location of the mobile biometric device).
  • the transaction device may link the acquired biometric information to the transaction if the acquired biometric information is received by a transaction device associated with the physical location within a predetermined time period of initiating the transaction.
  • the transaction device may link the acquired biometric information to the transaction if the distance between the physical location and the biometric device at the time the transaction is initiated is within a specified value.
  • the transaction device may link the acquired biometric information to the transaction if the acquired biometric information is transferred from the biometric device when the biometric device is within a predefined distance of the transaction device or the physical location.
  • the transaction device may link the acquired biometric information to a universal biometric record of the individual.
  • the universal biometric record may include biometric fields and/or information of one of more types, for example, iris data, voice data, imagery of the individual's face, palm print, finger print, etc.
  • the universal biometric record may include biometric information of a first type.
  • the universal biometric record may include biometric information of a different or second type.
  • the universal biometric record may include or be associated with information related to the corresponding individual, for example, a social security number, a driving license number, a telephone number, an email address, a device identifier (e.g., of the biometric device), a credit card or other financial account number, a unique user identifier (e.g. UUID), an index number for the universal biometric record, or any other identifying or user information.
  • a social security number e.g., a driving license number, a telephone number, an email address, a device identifier (e.g., of the biometric device), a credit card or other financial account number, a unique user identifier (e.g. UUID), an index number for the universal biometric record, or any other identifying or user information.
  • the universal biometric record may include biometric information of a first type that matches the acquired biometric information, e.g., iris information. Matching may comprise matching a biometric type (e.g., iris, voice or fingerprint type), regardless of whether the acquired biometric data matches biometric data held in the universal biometric record. Matching may comprise matching the acquired biometric data with biometric data (e.g., of the same type) included in the universal biometric record.
  • the transaction device may link the acquired biometric information to a transaction of the individual and/or a universal biometric record of the individual.
  • the universal biometric record may include an identifier of the individual, such as a UUID as described above, and/or biometric information of a type that matches the acquired biometric information
  • the biometric device transmits the acquired biometric information to a biometric matching device or a transaction device located at or connected to the physical location.
  • the biometric device may transmit the acquired biometric information to a biometric matching device or a transaction device located at or connected to the physical location if the distance is determined to be within the predefined value.
  • the biometric device may transmit the acquired biometric information if the distance from the biometric matching device or a transaction device is less than the predefined value.
  • the biometric device may transmit the acquired biometric information if the biometric information is acquired within a specific time from the initiation of the transaction.
  • the biometric matching device or transaction device may receive, store and/or process the acquired biometric information if the biometric information is acquired within a specific time from the initiation of the transaction.
  • the biometric matching device or transaction device may assume the integrity of the acquired biometric information if the biometric information is acquired within a specific time from the initiation of the transaction.
  • the acquired biometric data may include raw biometric information (e.g., voice sample, iris and face imagery) acquired from the user, and/or data extracted or processed from raw biometric information.
  • the biometric device may transmit a result of matching, verifying and/or identifying the individual based on the acquired biometric data.
  • the transaction device may identify or locate a universal biometric record based on the acquired biometric information and/or any information about the individual in association with the transaction.
  • the transaction device may identify or locate a universal biometric record from a database or plurality of universal biometric records.
  • the transaction device may identify or locate a universal biometric record based on the purported identity of the individual and/or any user/transaction data.
  • the transaction device may match the acquired biometric data with biometric data included in the identified universal biometric record.
  • the universal biometric record may be created or generated from an enrollment stage or process, e.g., during which an individual's biometrics and other information are securely and/or accurately collected.
  • the universal biometric record may be built and/or assembled over a period of time, for example, different pieces of biometric and/or user data may be generated, collected and/or consolidated during enrollment/registration, during the course of one or more transactions, and/or from existing records or databases.
  • the transaction device may allow or deny the transaction at the physical location based on biometric matching, identification or verification using the acquired biometric information and/or other user information.
  • the transaction device may allow or deny the transaction based on a result of biometric matching, identification or verification, received from the biometric device.
  • the transaction may comprise one of: a point-of-sale transaction, a point-of-service transaction, and an access control transaction.
  • the transaction device may allow or deny the transaction responsive to identifying an universal biometric record and/or matching the acquired biometric information with an universal biometric record of the individual.
  • the transaction device or a biometric matching device may identify the individual based on the acquired biometrics, and may link the transaction at the physical location with the individual.
  • the transaction device or biometric matching device may identify the individual via a universal biometric record and/or identifier (e.g., UUID) of the individual.
  • the transaction device may identify the individual via any user information, such a credit card number and/or an identifier of the individual's mobile biometric device.
  • the transaction device or biometric matching device may identify the individual via any combination of acquired biometric data and user information used in the transaction.
  • the transaction device retrieves an identifier (e.g., UUIC) of the individual based on the acquired biometrics and/or transaction data, and links the transaction at the physical location with the identifier.
  • the transaction device links the transaction to a universal biometric record of the individual.
  • the universal biometric record may include biometric information of a first type that matches the acquired biometric information (e.g., by type and/or by data).
  • a biometric integrity engine may identify, via the universal biometric record, another transaction (e.g., a second transaction).
  • the second transaction may be linked to acquired biometric information that matches the biometric information of the second type.
  • the biometric integrity engine identifies a second transaction linked with the identifier of the individual.
  • the second transaction may be linked with the identifier of the individual via the universal biometric record, or some other record/profile of the individual.
  • the second transaction may be linked with the identifier of the individual via matching of one or more types of biometric data.
  • the biometric integrity engine may link the transaction with another transaction linked to the individual and/or acquired biometric data.
  • the biometric integrity engine may establish a biometric chain of provenance between one or more sets of acquired biometric data and one or more transactions.
  • the second transaction may occur before, during and/or after the first transaction, and may occur during a portion of the first transaction.
  • the second transaction may acquire biometric data of the same or a different type.
  • the first or the second transaction may not involve any biometrics.
  • the biometric integrity engine may compare information from the first transaction and the second transaction for inconsistency or fraud.
  • the biometric integrity engine may compare biometric information acquired from the two transactions against data included in the universal biometric record of the individual.
  • the biometric integrity engine may compare user or transaction data (e.g., biometric or mobile device identifier, credit card number, UUID) between the two transactions.
  • the biometric integrity engine may compare information from a plurality of transactions that are each linked to one or more other transactions from within the plurality of transactions.
  • the biometric integrity engine may compare information from the transactions for inconsistencies, for example, differences in a certain type of data (e.g., credit card number, biometric data or biometric device identifier), which may be expected or expected to be the same between two transactions.
  • the biometric integrity engine may detect that two transactions occurred at the same time (which may be improbable), and perhaps at different locations.
  • the biometric integrity engine may detect that two universal biometric records exist, and that the two records may show differences or inconsistencies between them.
  • the biometric integrity engine may detect that a set of biometric data acquired during one transaction does not match those of another transaction.
  • the biometric integrity engine may detect possible or attempted fraud in one or both transactions. For example, the biometric integrity engine may detect that biometrics acquired from each transaction of the same purported individual do not match with each other.
  • the biometric integrity engine may incorporate or add data into the universal biometric record if the data from the two transactions are verified to be consistent and/or non-fraudulent.
  • the incorporated data may be compared against data from another transaction, for any inconsistency and/or possible fraud. If any inconsistency or possible fraud is detected, the corresponding universal biometric record may be modified or adjusted. If any inconsistency or possible fraud is detected, the biometric integrity engine may flag such an issue to the user. If any inconsistency or possible fraud is detected, the biometric integrity engine may terminate the link or association between the transactions.
  • the biometric integrity engine may exclude from universal biometric record the information showing the inconsistency or possible fraud. If any inconsistency or possible fraud is detected, the biometric integrity engine may trigger an update, re-evaluation, and/or creation of a universal biometric record. In certain embodiments, the comparison between transactions ensures integrity of acquired biometric data linked to one or more transactions.
  • systems described above may provide multiple ones of any or each of those components and these components may be provided on either a standalone machine or, in some embodiments, on multiple machines in a distributed system.
  • the systems and methods described above may be implemented as a method, apparatus or article of manufacture using programming and/or engineering techniques to produce software, firmware, hardware, or any combination thereof.
  • the systems and methods described above may be provided as one or more computer-readable programs embodied on or in one or more articles of manufacture.
  • article of manufacture is intended to encompass code or logic accessible from and embedded in one or more computer-readable devices, firmware, programmable logic, memory devices (e.g., EEPROMs, ROMs, PROMs, RAMs, SRAMs, etc.), hardware (e.g., integrated circuit chip, Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), etc.), electronic devices, a computer readable non-volatile storage unit (e.g., CD-ROM, floppy disk, hard disk drive, etc.).
  • the article of manufacture may be accessible from a file server providing access to the computer-readable programs via a network transmission line, wireless transmission media, signals propagating through space, radio waves, infrared signals, etc.
  • the article of manufacture may be a flash memory card or a magnetic tape.
  • the article of manufacture includes hardware logic as well as software or programmable code embedded in a computer readable medium that is executed by a processor.
  • the computer-readable programs may be implemented in any programming language, such as LISP, PERL, C, C++, C#, PROLOG, or in any byte code language such as JAVA.
  • the software programs may be stored on or in one or more articles of manufacture as object code.

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US10055733B2 (en) 2018-08-21
US20160104165A1 (en) 2016-04-14
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BR112013027076A2 (pt) 2019-09-24

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