US20070289011A1 - Method for Secure Operation a Computing Device - Google Patents

Method for Secure Operation a Computing Device Download PDF

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Publication number
US20070289011A1
US20070289011A1 US10/596,774 US59677404A US2007289011A1 US 20070289011 A1 US20070289011 A1 US 20070289011A1 US 59677404 A US59677404 A US 59677404A US 2007289011 A1 US2007289011 A1 US 2007289011A1
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United States
Prior art keywords
user
pass phrase
time period
computing device
requested
Prior art date
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Abandoned
Application number
US10/596,774
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English (en)
Inventor
Craig Heath
Leon Clarke
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Conversant Wireless Licensing SARL
2011 Intellectual Property Asset Trust
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Symbian Software Ltd
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Publication date
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Application filed by Symbian Software Ltd filed Critical Symbian Software Ltd
Assigned to SYMBIAN SOFTWARE LTD. reassignment SYMBIAN SOFTWARE LTD. ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: CLARKE, LEON, HEATH, CRAIG
Publication of US20070289011A1 publication Critical patent/US20070289011A1/en
Assigned to NOKIA CORPORATION reassignment NOKIA CORPORATION ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: SYMBIAN LIMITED, SYMBIAN SOFTWARE LIMITED
Assigned to MICROSOFT CORPORATION, NOKIA CORPORATION reassignment MICROSOFT CORPORATION SHORT FORM PATENT SECURITY AGREEMENT Assignors: CORE WIRELESS LICENSING S.A.R.L.
Assigned to NOKIA 2011 PATENT TRUST reassignment NOKIA 2011 PATENT TRUST ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: NOKIA CORPORATION
Assigned to 2011 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSET TRUST reassignment 2011 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSET TRUST CHANGE OF NAME (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: NOKIA 2011 PATENT TRUST
Assigned to CORE WIRELESS LICENSING S.A.R.L reassignment CORE WIRELESS LICENSING S.A.R.L ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: 2011 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSET TRUST
Assigned to MICROSOFT CORPORATION reassignment MICROSOFT CORPORATION UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT - DELETION OF SECURED PARTY Assignors: NOKIA CORPORATION
Priority to US15/292,493 priority Critical patent/US10095852B2/en
Abandoned legal-status Critical Current

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G06F21/32—User authentication using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voiceprints
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2137—Time limited access, e.g. to a computer or data
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2151—Time stamp

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a method of operating a computing device, and in particular, to a method for secure operation of a computing device where a user needs to be authenticated, such as by entering a pass phrase, before the user is able to carry out a requested operation on the device.
  • the present invention also relates to a computing device arranged to operate according to the above method and also to computer software for causing a computing device to operate in accordance with the above method.
  • computing device as used herein is to be expansively construed to cover any form of electrical device and includes, data recording devices, such as digital still and movie cameras of any form factor, computers of any type or form, including hand held and personal computers, and communication devices of any form factor, including mobile phones, smart phones, communicators which combine communications, image recording and/or playback, and computing functionality within a single device, and other forms of wireless and wired information devices.
  • data recording devices such as digital still and movie cameras of any form factor
  • computers of any type or form including hand held and personal computers
  • communication devices of any form factor including mobile phones, smart phones, communicators which combine communications, image recording and/or playback, and computing functionality within a single device, and other forms of wireless and wired information devices.
  • Pretty Good Privacy is a computer program used to encrypt and decrypt communications over large networks such as the internet. It can also be used to send an encrypted digital signature that enables a receiver of a communication to verify the identity of a sender and know that the message was not changed en route.
  • PGP is the one of the most widely used privacy-ensuring programs.
  • PGP uses a variation of the public key system. In such systems, each user has a publicly known encryption key and a private key known only to that user. A message sent to a third party is encrypted using the public key for that party. When the encrypted message is received by the third party, it is decrypted using the private key for that party.
  • PGP uses a faster encryption algorithm to encrypt the message and then uses the public key to encrypt the shorter key that was used to encrypt the entire message. Both the encrypted message and the short key are sent to the receiver who first uses the private key of the receiver to decrypt the short key and then uses that key to decrypt the message.
  • encryption/decryption techniques are considered to be especially important in wireless communications because wireless circuits are often easier to “tap” than their hard-wired counterparts.
  • Authentication is the process of determining whether someone or something is, in fact, who or what it is declared to be.
  • authentication is commonly done through the use of logon passwords. Knowledge of the password is assumed to guarantee that the user is authentic.
  • Each user may register initially using an assigned or self-declared password. On each subsequent use, the user must know and use the previously declared password.
  • the weakness in this system for transactions that are significant, such as the exchange of money, is that passwords can often be stolen, accidentally revealed, or forgotten.
  • a pass phrase is used, in essence, as a digital signature to authenticate a person.
  • the pass phrase does, in fact, perform two purposes—it allows the key manager software to determine that the authorised user of the software is actually present (as only that user knows the PIN or pass phrase) and it confirms that the user wishes the key to be used.
  • the pass phrase is used to prove that the person claiming to have sent a message, or trying to gain access to an encrypted message, or trying to carry out a secure transaction such as a commercial purchase, is in fact that person. Because an improved level of security is required in comparison to that provided by a normal access password, the pass phrase is typically about 16 characters in length, and frequently these may be up to about 100 characters in length.
  • the pass phrase is usually a relatively lengthy sequence of alpha numeric characters and the repeated entry of the pass phrase each time user authentication is required is not considered to be convenient. If the pass phrase is a relatively lengthy alphanumeric sequence, or if pass phrase re-entry is requested too often, repeated authentication too frequently may even discourage the use of the encryption process by a user on occasions where its use would otherwise be considered particularly beneficial. Hence, to improve the user experience of the use of such systems, it is known not to require the user to authenticate again if the key is used a short time after a previous use of the key. This is referred as “pass phrase caching”. Pass phrase caching is one way of implementing the user experience in a way such that the key is “unlocked” for a predetermined period of time. It is only after the expiry of this period of time that further use of the key will require the authentication process to be repeated.
  • the pass phrase is cached for a predetermined time period; for example 30 minutes.
  • the following sequence of events may, as an example, be required of a user in order to carry a number of secure Operations
  • a method of operating a computing device comprising, in response to a request from a user to carry out an operation using the device, determining the time period since the identity of the user was authenticated, and enabling the requested operation in dependence upon the determined time period and the purpose of the requested operation.
  • a computing device arranged to operate in accordance with a method according to the first aspect.
  • a third aspect of the present invention there is provided computer software for causing a computing device in accordance with the second aspect to operate in accordance with a method according to the first aspect.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates a flow chart of a method for authenticating a user in accordance with the present invention.
  • a computing device receives a request to carry out a secure operation, which can only be completed if the user is currently authenticated, such as by entry of a pass phrase.
  • the computing device determines the type of operation which the user has requested. For example, the user may be requesting to carry out approval of a purchase contract with significant financial obligations, in which case it is imperative to correctly identify the user and thus ensure that the user has the authority to commit to the financial obligations. This can be regarded as an operation requiring a high security level. Alternatively, the user may be requesting to carry out a relatively low security level operation, such as reading of an email.
  • the type of operation being requested may be determined in a number of ways, such as by determining the type of application used to carry out the operation, the type of file required, or even by analysing the content of the request itself. Many ways of determining the type of operation will be apparent to persons familiar to this art, and it is considered that the present invention can be applied to and therefore encompasses any method which can be used to categorise requested operations.
  • the computing device determines the time which has elapsed since the user was last authenticated by entering his/her pass phrase. With the present invention, the computing device then determines whether the time elapsed since authentication is acceptable for the operation being requested. This is shown as step 8 in FIG. 1 .
  • the reading of the email is a relatively low level secure operation and hence the ‘standard’ caching period, say one hour, is considered to be acceptable.
  • the time period elapsed since the last authentication is determined to be less than one hour and the pass phrase, and thus the identity of the user, is considered to be authentic. Therefore, the operation is enabled and this is shown as step 10 in FIG. 1 .
  • the system has been arranged such that for this type of operation the caching period expires upon the completion of the previous operation of the same type.
  • the computing device determines at step 8 that the time elapsed since the last authentication is not valid for the requested operation and requests, at step 12 of FIG. 1 , for the user to re-enter his/her pass phrase in order to authenticate the user for the particular contract approval operation. If the pass phrase is entered correctly, the user is authenticated and the time period is determined to be acceptable at step 8 and this high level secure operation is then enabled. After enabling the requested operation, the process ends at step 14 . It can be seen that the above process provides a more secure environment, but still enables one pass phrase to control the use of all keys.
  • Operation A is “decrypt and view my calendar entries for today”
  • Operation B is “sign a transaction to purchase a book”.
  • Operation A is in all probability going to be requested by the user many times during each working day and hence would be very annoying if the user has to type in his/her pass phrase every time the user wishes to consult the calendar entries for the day concerned. In essence, the user should only be required to enter his/her pass phrase once or possibly twice a day to carry out this operation.
  • Operation B is costing money, so the user will want to make ensure that a third party who may gain access to the computing device, which may be in the form of a mobile phone, cannot carry out any financial transaction, such as the purchase of books, so a relatively short caching time is set for this type of operation.
  • a third party who may gain access to the computing device, which may be in the form of a mobile phone, cannot carry out any financial transaction, such as the purchase of books, so a relatively short caching time is set for this type of operation.
  • the user does not want to have to enter his/her pass phrase for each transaction, but nevertheless requires to have a higher level of security than that provided by the caching time set for his/her calendar.
  • the user may want his/her pass phrase to permit use of Operation B for a relatively short time, say 3 minutes. So, in the present invention, the above operations may be conducted as follows:
  • the user is asked for his/her pass phrase only when it considered necessary according to the security of the operation that is about to be carried out and the time that has elapsed since the pass phrase was last entered, and not mechanically upon a time period fixed for a caching period which does not relate to the operations which may be carried out during the caching period. It is envisaged that the user will select the categories of operations, and the associated elapsed time periods so that the user may arrange never to have to re-enter the pass phrase in rapid succession.
  • the elapsed time is determined from the last or immediately preceding entry of the pass phrase.
  • this elapsed time may also be determined from a previous entry of the pass phrase which is not necessarily the last entry.
  • the invention has been described with reference to the use of pass phrases.
  • other methods for authenticating the user may also be employed, such as the use of pass words or PINs (Personal Identification Numbers), and/or biometric data, such as fingerprint or iris recognition.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
  • Operation Control Of Excavators (AREA)
  • Vehicle Body Suspensions (AREA)
  • Monitoring And Testing Of Nuclear Reactors (AREA)
  • Facsimiles In General (AREA)
  • Input From Keyboards Or The Like (AREA)
US10/596,774 2003-12-23 2004-12-16 Method for Secure Operation a Computing Device Abandoned US20070289011A1 (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US15/292,493 US10095852B2 (en) 2003-12-23 2016-10-13 Method for secure operation of a computing device

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
GB0329835A GB2409557C (en) 2003-12-23 2003-12-23 A method for secure operation of a computing device
GB0329835.3 2003-12-23
PCT/GB2004/005275 WO2005062153A1 (en) 2003-12-23 2004-12-16 A method for secure operation of a computing device

Related Parent Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/GB2004/005275 A-371-Of-International WO2005062153A1 (en) 2003-12-23 2004-12-16 A method for secure operation of a computing device

Related Child Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US15/292,493 Continuation US10095852B2 (en) 2003-12-23 2016-10-13 Method for secure operation of a computing device

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US20070289011A1 true US20070289011A1 (en) 2007-12-13

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US10/596,774 Abandoned US20070289011A1 (en) 2003-12-23 2004-12-16 Method for Secure Operation a Computing Device
US15/292,493 Expired - Lifetime US10095852B2 (en) 2003-12-23 2016-10-13 Method for secure operation of a computing device
US16/154,257 Expired - Lifetime US10496806B2 (en) 2003-12-23 2018-10-08 Method for secure operation of a computing device

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US15/292,493 Expired - Lifetime US10095852B2 (en) 2003-12-23 2016-10-13 Method for secure operation of a computing device
US16/154,257 Expired - Lifetime US10496806B2 (en) 2003-12-23 2018-10-08 Method for secure operation of a computing device

Country Status (8)

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US (3) US20070289011A1 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
EP (3) EP1700183B1 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
JP (4) JP4903581B2 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
AT (1) ATE550707T1 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
ES (2) ES2820434T3 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
GB (1) GB2409557C (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
PL (1) PL2615570T3 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)
WO (1) WO2005062153A1 (enrdf_load_stackoverflow)

Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20060225129A1 (en) * 2005-03-31 2006-10-05 Nec Infrontia Corporation Authentication system for authenticating communication terminal
US10095852B2 (en) 2003-12-23 2018-10-09 Nokia Technologies Oy Method for secure operation of a computing device
US20230418918A1 (en) * 2015-12-29 2023-12-28 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. User information gathering and distribution system
US12143816B2 (en) 2019-10-10 2024-11-12 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Self-sovereign identification via digital credentials for identity attributes

Families Citing this family (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP5216486B2 (ja) * 2008-08-28 2013-06-19 株式会社日立製作所 半導体素子、携帯端末、および情報端末
EP2590101B1 (en) * 2008-12-01 2017-09-27 BlackBerry Limited Authentication using stored biometric data
FR2982397B1 (fr) * 2011-11-07 2013-12-27 Xiring Procede de signature electronique d'un ensemble de documents au sein d'un systeme informatique et systeme correspondant
JP2015033038A (ja) * 2013-08-05 2015-02-16 ソニー株式会社 情報処理装置、情報処理方法及びコンピュータプログラム
US11863549B2 (en) 2021-02-08 2024-01-02 Cisco Technology, Inc. Adjusting security policies based on endpoint locations
US11805112B2 (en) * 2021-02-08 2023-10-31 Cisco Technology, Inc. Enhanced multi-factor authentication based on physical and logical proximity to trusted devices and users

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US5913025A (en) * 1996-11-14 1999-06-15 Novell, Inc. Method and apparatus for proxy authentication
US20020178359A1 (en) * 2001-04-26 2002-11-28 Markus Baumeister Just-in-time authentication of users of a digital home network
US20030074552A1 (en) * 2000-04-25 2003-04-17 Secure Data In Motion Security server system
US6567915B1 (en) * 1998-10-23 2003-05-20 Microsoft Corporation Integrated circuit card with identity authentication table and authorization tables defining access rights based on Boolean expressions of authenticated identities
US20030191594A1 (en) * 2001-08-13 2003-10-09 Tetsujiro Kondo Individual authentication apparatus, individual authentication method, and computer program
US20040205176A1 (en) * 2003-03-21 2004-10-14 Ting David M.T. System and method for automated login

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US5235642A (en) * 1992-07-21 1993-08-10 Digital Equipment Corporation Access control subsystem and method for distributed computer system using locally cached authentication credentials
US6892307B1 (en) * 1999-08-05 2005-05-10 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Single sign-on framework with trust-level mapping to authentication requirements
JP4712989B2 (ja) * 2001-03-09 2011-06-29 大日本印刷株式会社 情報配信サーバー装置
CN1554176B (zh) * 2001-07-10 2012-12-05 捷讯研究有限公司 在无线移动通信设备上处理加密消息的方法和处理对加密内容的多次访问的装置
GB2409557C (en) 2003-12-23 2009-12-15 Symbian Ltd A method for secure operation of a computing device
JP5728629B2 (ja) * 2013-03-29 2015-06-03 楽天株式会社 情報処理装置、情報処理装置の制御方法、プログラム、及び情報記憶媒体

Patent Citations (6)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5913025A (en) * 1996-11-14 1999-06-15 Novell, Inc. Method and apparatus for proxy authentication
US6567915B1 (en) * 1998-10-23 2003-05-20 Microsoft Corporation Integrated circuit card with identity authentication table and authorization tables defining access rights based on Boolean expressions of authenticated identities
US20030074552A1 (en) * 2000-04-25 2003-04-17 Secure Data In Motion Security server system
US20020178359A1 (en) * 2001-04-26 2002-11-28 Markus Baumeister Just-in-time authentication of users of a digital home network
US20030191594A1 (en) * 2001-08-13 2003-10-09 Tetsujiro Kondo Individual authentication apparatus, individual authentication method, and computer program
US20040205176A1 (en) * 2003-03-21 2004-10-14 Ting David M.T. System and method for automated login

Cited By (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US10095852B2 (en) 2003-12-23 2018-10-09 Nokia Technologies Oy Method for secure operation of a computing device
US10496806B2 (en) 2003-12-23 2019-12-03 Nokia Technologies Oy Method for secure operation of a computing device
US20060225129A1 (en) * 2005-03-31 2006-10-05 Nec Infrontia Corporation Authentication system for authenticating communication terminal
US8201222B2 (en) * 2005-03-31 2012-06-12 Nec Infrontia Corporation Authentication system for authenticating communication terminal
US20230418918A1 (en) * 2015-12-29 2023-12-28 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. User information gathering and distribution system
US12143816B2 (en) 2019-10-10 2024-11-12 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Self-sovereign identification via digital credentials for identity attributes

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
US10496806B2 (en) 2019-12-03
GB2409557A (en) 2005-06-29
ES2820434T3 (es) 2021-04-21
US20170140139A1 (en) 2017-05-18
JP2012053901A (ja) 2012-03-15
JP2007515730A (ja) 2007-06-14
PL2615570T3 (pl) 2020-12-28
EP1700183B1 (en) 2012-03-21
EP2615570B1 (en) 2020-06-03
ES2390155T3 (es) 2012-11-07
US20190073463A1 (en) 2019-03-07
GB2409557B (en) 2008-03-26
GB2409557C (en) 2009-12-15
JP2012248198A (ja) 2012-12-13
JP4903581B2 (ja) 2012-03-28
EP2420912A1 (en) 2012-02-22
ATE550707T1 (de) 2012-04-15
EP2615570A1 (en) 2013-07-17
WO2005062153A1 (en) 2005-07-07
EP1700183A1 (en) 2006-09-13
JP2014059884A (ja) 2014-04-03
US10095852B2 (en) 2018-10-09
GB0329835D0 (en) 2004-01-28
JP5135509B2 (ja) 2013-02-06

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