US20030235305A1 - Key generation in a communication system - Google Patents

Key generation in a communication system Download PDF

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Publication number
US20030235305A1
US20030235305A1 US10/177,017 US17701702A US2003235305A1 US 20030235305 A1 US20030235305 A1 US 20030235305A1 US 17701702 A US17701702 A US 17701702A US 2003235305 A1 US2003235305 A1 US 2003235305A1
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Prior art keywords
access
msk
authentication
key
communication system
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US10/177,017
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English (en)
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Raymond Hsu
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Qualcomm Inc
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Qualcomm Inc
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First worldwide family litigation filed litigation Critical https://patents.darts-ip.com/?family=29734262&utm_source=google_patent&utm_medium=platform_link&utm_campaign=public_patent_search&patent=US20030235305(A1) "Global patent litigation dataset” by Darts-ip is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Application filed by Qualcomm Inc filed Critical Qualcomm Inc
Priority to US10/177,017 priority Critical patent/US20030235305A1/en
Assigned to QUALCOMM INCORPORATED A DELAWARE reassignment QUALCOMM INCORPORATED A DELAWARE ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST (SEE DOCUMENT FOR DETAILS). Assignors: HSU, RAYMOND T.
Priority to EP03761176A priority patent/EP1525706A4/en
Priority to CA2792490A priority patent/CA2792490C/en
Priority to BRPI0311994-7A priority patent/BR0311994A/pt
Priority to PCT/US2003/019465 priority patent/WO2004002056A1/en
Priority to CN201310460165.2A priority patent/CN103532939B/zh
Priority to TW092116837A priority patent/TWI360975B/zh
Priority to TW101126108A priority patent/TWI388180B/zh
Priority to JP2004516007A priority patent/JP4897215B2/ja
Priority to CN201410439953.8A priority patent/CN104243145A/zh
Priority to KR1020047020774A priority patent/KR101062781B1/ko
Priority to CA2490131A priority patent/CA2490131C/en
Priority to CNA038192977A priority patent/CN1720688A/zh
Priority to CA2862069A priority patent/CA2862069C/en
Priority to AU2003243680A priority patent/AU2003243680B2/en
Priority to RU2005101217/09A priority patent/RU2333607C2/ru
Publication of US20030235305A1 publication Critical patent/US20030235305A1/en
Priority to US10/912,898 priority patent/US7190793B2/en
Priority to HK15103526.0A priority patent/HK1203706A1/zh
Priority to JP2010092578A priority patent/JP5313200B2/ja
Priority to TW099142508A priority patent/TWI376905B/zh
Priority to JP2012012031A priority patent/JP5512709B2/ja
Abandoned legal-status Critical Current

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
    • H04L9/0844—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/062—Pre-authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H04L2209/805—Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/061—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying further key derivation, e.g. deriving traffic keys from a pair-wise master key
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0892—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities by using authentication-authorization-accounting [AAA] servers or protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W48/00—Access restriction; Network selection; Access point selection
    • H04W48/08—Access restriction or access information delivery, e.g. discovery data delivery
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W74/00—Wireless channel access
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W84/00—Network topologies
    • H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
    • H04W84/10—Small scale networks; Flat hierarchical networks
    • H04W84/12—WLAN [Wireless Local Area Networks]

Definitions

  • the present relates to an inter-working function for a communication system, and more specifically to mechanisms for common authentication and key exchange through an inter-working function for use in a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN).
  • WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
  • a Wireless Local Area Network allows users virtually unrestricted access to Internet Protocol (IP) services and data networks.
  • IP Internet Protocol
  • the use of a WLAN is not limited to laptop computers and other computing devices, but is rapidly expanding to include cellular telephones, Personal Digital Assistants (PDA)s, and other small wireless devices supported by an external network or carrier.
  • PDA Personal Digital Assistants
  • a wireless device communicating via a cellular carrier may roam into a WLAN in a cyber-cafe or workspace. In this situation, the wireless device has access to the cellular system, but desires access to the WLAN.
  • the WLAN access requires authentication. As the wireless device has already gained access to the cellular system, the need for further authentication is redundant. There is a need therefore, for a mechanism that allows a common authentication for access to a cellular system and to a WLAN. Further, there is a need for a common mechanism for generating encryption keys used during communications.
  • FIG. 1 is a communication system including an High Data Rate or HDR type network and a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN).
  • WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
  • FIG. 2 is a timing diagram of authentication procedure in a communication system.
  • FIG. 3 is a timing diagram of an authentication procedure in a communication system.
  • FIGS. 4 and 5 are access request message formats.
  • FIG. 6 is a wireless apparatus including functionality to generate a Master Session Key (MSK).
  • MSK Master Session Key
  • An HDR subscriber station referred to herein as an access terminal (AT) may be mobile or stationary, and may communicate with one or more HDR base stations, referred to herein as modem pool transceivers (MPTs).
  • An access terminal transmits and receives data packets through one or more modem pool transceivers to an HDR base station controller, referred to herein as a modem pool controller (MPC).
  • Modem pool transceivers and modem pool controllers are parts of a network called an access network.
  • An access network transports data packets between multiple access terminals.
  • the access network may be further connected to additional networks outside the access network, such as a corporate intranet or the Internet, and may transport data packets between each access terminal and such outside networks.
  • An access terminal that has established an active traffic channel connection with one or more modem pool transceivers is called an active access terminal, and is said to be in a traffic state.
  • An access terminal that is in the process of establishing an active traffic channel connection with one or more modem pool transceivers is said to be in a connection setup state.
  • An access terminal may be any data device that communicates through a wireless channel or through a wired channel, for example using fiber optic or coaxial cables.
  • An access terminal may further be any of a number of types of devices including but not limited to PC card, compact flash, external or internal modem, or wireless or wireline phone.
  • the communication link through which the access terminal sends signals to the modem pool transceiver is called a reverse link.
  • the communication link through which a modem pool transceiver sends signals to an access terminal is called a forward link.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates a communication system having a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) 104 with multiple Access Points (APs).
  • WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
  • AP Access Points
  • An AP is a hub or bridge that provides a star topology control of the wireless side of the WLAN 104 , as well as access to a wired network.
  • Each AP 110 supports a connection to a data service, such as the Internet.
  • a MS 102 such as a laptop computer, or other digital computing device, communicates with an AP via the air interface, thus the term Wireless LAN.
  • the AP then communicates with an Authentication Server (AS) or Authentication Center (AC).
  • the AC is a component for performing authentication services for devices requesting admittance to a network. Implementations include Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS), which is an Internet user authentication described in RFC 2138, “Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)” by C. Rigney et al., published April 1997, and other Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) servers.
  • RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
  • Wireless networking is emerging as a significant aspect of internetworking. It presents a set of unique issues based on the fact that the only boundary of a wireless network is the radio signal strength. There is no wiring to define membership in a network. There is no physical method to restrict a system within radio range to be a member of a wireless network. Wireless networking, more than any other networking technology, needs an authentication and access control mechanism. Various groups are currently working on developing a standard authentication mechanism. Currently the accepted standard is the IEEE 802.11.
  • Authentication is the process of proving the identity of an individual or application in a communication. Such identification allows the service provider to verify the entity as a valid user and also to verify the user for the specific services requested. Authentication and authorization actually have very specific meanings, though the two names are often used interchangeably, and in practice are often not clearly distinguished.
  • Authentication is the process where a user establishes a right to an identity—in essence, the right to use a name.
  • a name or identity has attributes associated with it. Attributes may be bound closely to a name (for example, in a certificate payload) or they may be stored in a directory or other database under a key corresponding to the name. Attributes may change over time.
  • Authorization is the process of determining whether an identity (plus a set of attributes associated with that identity) is permitted to perform some action, such as accessing a resource. Note that permission to perform an action does not guarantee that the action can be performed. Note that authentication and authorization decisions can be made at different points, by different entities.
  • the authentication feature is a network capability that allows cellular networks to validate the identity of wireless device, thereby reducing unauthorized use of cellular networks.
  • the process is transparent to subscribers. Customers are not required to do anything to authenticate the identity of their phones when they make a call.
  • Authentication typically involves a cryptographic scheme, wherein the service provider and the user have some shared information and some private information.
  • the shared information is typically referred to as a “shared secret.”
  • the authentication key is a secret value that is unique to each individual cellular phone. It is registered with the cellular service provider and stored in the phone and Authentication Center (AC).
  • the A-key is programmed into the phone by the manufacturer. It can also be entered manually by the user, from the wireless device menu, or by a special terminal at the point of sale.
  • the wireless device and the AC must have the same A-key to produce the same calculations.
  • the primary function of the A-key is to be used as a parameter to calculate the shared secret data (SSD).
  • the SSD is used as an input for authentication calculations in the wireless device and the AC, and is stored in both places. Unlike the A-key, the SSD may be modified over the network.
  • the AC and the wireless device share three elements that go into the calculation of the SSD: 1) the Electronic Serial Number (ESN); 2) the Authentication Key (A-Key); and 3) a RANDom number for Shared Secret Data calculation (RANDSSD).
  • ESN Electronic Serial Number
  • A-Key Authentication Key
  • RANDSSD RANDom number for Shared Secret Data calculation
  • the ESN and RANDSSD are transmitted over the network and over the air interface.
  • the SSD is updated when a device makes its first system access, and periodically thereafter.
  • the result is two separate values, SSD-A and SSD-B.
  • SSD-A is used for authentication.
  • SSD-B is used for encryption and voice privacy.
  • SSD may be shared or not shared between the AC and serving Mobile Switching Center (MSC). If secret data is shared, it means the AC will send it to the serving MSC and the serving MSC must be capable of executing CAVE. If it is not shared, the AC will keep the data and perform authentication.
  • MSC Mobile Switching Center
  • the type of sharing affects how an authentication challenge is conducted.
  • An authentication challenge is a message sent to challenge the identify of the wireless device. Basically, the authentication challenge sends some information, typically random number data, for the user to process. The user then processes the information and sends a response. The response is analyzed for verification of the user.
  • shared secret data a challenge is handled at the serving MSC.
  • non-shared secret data a challenge is handled by the AC.
  • sharing secret data the system may minimize the amount of traffic sent and allow challenges to happen more quickly at the serving switch.
  • a Home Location Register controls the authentication process by acting as intermediary between the MSC and AC.
  • the serving MSC is set up to support authentication with the mobile's HLR and vice versa.
  • the device initiates the process by notifying the serving MSC if it is capable of authentication, by setting an authorization field in the overhead message train.
  • the serving MSC starts the registration/authentication process with an Authentication Request.
  • the serving MSC By sending the Authentication Request, the serving MSC tells the HLR/AC whether it is capable of doing CAVE calculations.
  • the AC controls which of the serving MSC's as well as device capabilities will be used out of those available.
  • the SSD cannot be shared between the AC and MSC and therefore all authentication processes are performed in the AC.
  • the purpose of the Authentication Request is to authenticate the phone and request SSD.
  • the AUTHREQ contains two parameters for authentication, the AUTHR and RAND parameters.
  • the AC gets the AUTHREQ it uses the RAND and the last known SSD to calculate AUTHR. If it matches the AUTHR sent in the AUTHREQ then authentication is successful.
  • the return result to the AUTHREQ will contain the SSD if it can be shared.
  • the Authentication process consists of a challenge and response dialog. If SSD is shared, the dialog runs between the MSC and the device. If SSD is not shared, the dialog runs between the HLR/AC and the device.
  • the MSC may be capable of either a Unique Challenge, a Global Challenge, or both. Some MSCs are currently not capable of global challenge.
  • the Unique Challenge is a challenge that occurs during call attempts only, because it uses the voice channel. Unique challenge presents an authentication to a single device during call origination and call delivery.
  • the Global Challenge is a challenge that occurs during registration, call origination, and call delivery.
  • the Global challenge presents an authentication challenge to all MSs that are using a particular radio control channel. It is called global challenge because it is broadcast on the radio control channel, and the challenge is used by all phones accessing that control channel.
  • the device responds to a random number provided by the MSC or AC.
  • the device uses the random number and shared secret data stored in the device to calculate a response to the MSC.
  • the MSC also uses the random number and shared secret data to calculate what the response from the device should be. These calculations are done through the CAVE algorithm. If the responses are not the same, service is denied.
  • the challenge process does not increase the amount of time it takes to connect the call. In fact, the call may proceed in some cases, only to be torn down when authentication fails.
  • WLANs have gained tremendous popularity as a means of providing users with untethered access to IP data networks.
  • High Data Rate (HDR) networks such as 1xEV-DO networks and other third generation (3G) networks are also designed to offer high-speed data access; although the data rates they support are typically lower than those of WLANs, 3G networks offer data coverage over a much wider area.
  • WLAN and HDR networks may be complementary: WLANs offer high-capacity “hot-spot” coverage in public areas such as airport lounges and hotel lobbies, while HDR networks can provide users with nearly ubiquitous data service while on the move. Therefore, the same carrier may provide both HDR and WLAN access services under a single user subscription. This means that the MS uses the same authentication method and secret to both types of access authentication.
  • CHAP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
  • MD5-Challenge a protocol that is also referred to as MD5-Challenge
  • CHAP specifically uses the RADIUS protocol to authenticate a terminal without sending security data.
  • the MS is authenticated by its home RADIUS server, wherein the home RADIUS server and the MS share a root secret.
  • the MS and the home or HDR network derive the same encryption keys that are to be used to protect traffic exchanged between the MS and the WLAN Access Point (AP).
  • AP WLAN Access Point
  • the home RADIUS server and the MS After successful WLAN access authentication via a CHAP challenge, the home RADIUS server and the MS generate the same Master Session Key (MSK) from the shared root secret.
  • the MSK will be used to derive encryptions keys for the protection of actual traffic between the MS and the AP of the WLAN.
  • the shared root secret is configured to the MS and is static. The MSK is generated on a per packet data session and is only constant during the session. For a new session, a new MSK is generated from the shared root secret using a different random number.
  • one embodiment provides a mechanism to allow the home RADIUS server to determine whether the MS is accessing WLAN or the HDR network.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates a communication system 100 including an HDR network 106 , a WLAN 104 , and an MS 102 .
  • the MS 102 is able to access the HDR network 106 , and has roamed into a WLAN 104 coverage area.
  • the MS 102 seeks access to the WLAN 104 via the AP 110 within the WLAN 104 .
  • WLAN 104 may include any number of APs (not shown).
  • the WLAN 104 also includes an Authentication Authorization and Accounting entity or server 112 .
  • the HDR network 106 also includes an AAA server 108 .
  • FIG. 2 illustrates the message flow for access authentication to a WLAN when CHAP or the MD5-Challenge is used in the communication system 100 .
  • the MS 102 uses a Network Access Identifier (NAI) for identification.
  • NAI Network Access Identifier
  • the NAI has the format of username@realm, where realm identifies the home network of the MS, which in this instance is HDR network 106 .
  • the AAA server 112 in the WLAN network 104 initiates a RADIUS Access-Request message to the AAA server 108 at the home network of the MS 102 , i.e., to the HDR network 106 .
  • the HDR network 106 may be any network that supports high data rate transmissions.
  • the AAA 108 then issues a CHAP Challenge to the MS 102 via the WLAN 104 .
  • the MS 102 calculates a response based on the challenge, such as a random number, and the response is conveyed as a RADIUS Access-Request request to the AAA 108 via the WLAN 104 .
  • the home AAA server 108 acknowledges such with a RADIUS Access-Accept message granting the MS 102 access to the WLAN network 104 .
  • both the home AAA server 108 and the MS 102 generate a same Master Session Key (MSK) from a shared root secret.
  • MSK Master Session Key
  • the CAVE algorithm is commonly used for cellular communications and therefore, is well used and distributed. Alternate algorithms for authentication are also used. Specifically in data communications a variety of algorithms exist of varying complexity and application. To coordinate these mechanisms, the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) has been developed as a general protocol framework that supports multiple authentication and key distribution mechanisms. The EAP is described in “PPP Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)” by L. Blunk et al, RFC 2284, published March 1998.
  • EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
  • EAP AKA Authentication One such mechanism supported by the EAP as defined in “EAP AKA Authentication” by J. Arkko et al., published as an Internet Draft in February 2002, is the AKA algorithm. There is a need therefore to extend EAP to include the cellular algorithm CAVE. This is desirable to provide back compatibility for new systems and networks.
  • the Extensible Authentication Protocol is a general protocol for authentication which supports multiple authentication mechanisms. EAP does not select a specific authentication mechanism during link set up and control, but rather postpones this until the authentication procedure begins. This allows the authenticator to request more information before determining the specific authentication mechanism.
  • the authenticator is defined as the end of the link requiring the authentication. The authenticator specifies the authentication protocol to be used in the during link establishment.
  • a key hierarchy is the sequence of steps that are used to generate from a root key a set of encryption keys that are used to either encrypt/decrypt messages or authenticate messages.
  • a key hierarchy should include some time varying information so that the same set of encryption keys is not generated each time the hierarchy is used.
  • a key hierarchy should also be set up such that if the derived encryption keys were to become known, the root key could not be obtained from the encryption keys.
  • an overall key hierarchy consists of three smaller layered key hierarchies: master key hierarchy; rekeying key hierarchy; and per-packet key hierarchy.
  • the master key hierarchy may include EAP keying, pre-shared key, or random number, depending on the hierarchy and authentication method. If EAP keying is used for the master key hierarchy, the master key hierarchy will normally reside on the RADIUS server.
  • the rekeying key hierarchy has two types which are called Pairwise key hierarchies and Group key hierarchies. The steps in these two types of hierarchies are similar; only the inputs to the two types are different.
  • the per-packet key hierarchy This may be either for TKIP (using an RC4 encryption engine), or for AES.
  • Pairwise key hierarchies are used to derive the keys that are used between two entities in a wireless network (AP and associated station, or a pair of stations in a network).
  • Group key hierarchies are used to derive and transfer keys that are used by all entities in a wireless group (an AP and all stations associated with that AP in a network, or all entities in a network).
  • Pairwise key hierarchies are instantiated in parallel on the two entities that are using the Pairwise key, with each entity calculating the same set of encryption keys using shared information.
  • One of the two entities drives the Pairwise key hierarchy, that entity is known as the Pairwise key owner.
  • the Pairwise key owner is the AP; for other networks each possible pair of stations will have a Pairwise key hierarchy, and the Pairwise key owner is the station of the pair with the lower Medium Access Control layer address.
  • Group key hierarchies are instantiated only on one entity, and the derived encryption keys are promulgated to all the other entities; the entity that drives the Group key hierarchy is the Group key owner.
  • the Group key owner For a given network, such as referred to as a Basic Service Set (BSS), the Group key owner is the AP; for an Independent Basic Service Set (IBSS) network the Group key owner is the current beacon transmitter.
  • BSS Basic Service Set
  • IBSS Independent Basic Service Set
  • a BSS network is made up of an AP and associated stations
  • an IBSS network is made up of a set of stations, all of which are peers of one another.
  • station is a workstation, and includes a mobile station or other wireless device capable of accessing a local area network.
  • Each station will have at least two key hierarchies' instantiated, and quite probably more.
  • the AP will have a Pairwise key hierarchy instantiated for each station that is associated, and also at least one Group key hierarchy; the AP will be the key owner for all these hierarchies.
  • Each associated station will have one Pairwise key hierarchy instantiated, and at least one Group key hierarchy.
  • For the IBSS network each station will have a Pairwise key hierarchy instantiated for every other station in the network, as well as a single Group key hierarchy.
  • the key owner will have a single Group rekeying hierarchy instantiation for the Group keys, and a Pairwise rekeying hierarchy instantiation for each association.
  • a key owner will have a per-packet key hierarchy per Temporary Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) temporal key for both Group and Pairwise temporal keys (if any).
  • TKIP Temporary Key Integrity Protocol
  • a non-key owner will have a rekeying hierarchy instantiation for Group keys and Pairwise keys per association, and a perpacket key hierarchy per TKIP temporal key for both Group and Pairwise temporal keys (if any).
  • the MSK includes the Cellular Message Encryption Algorithm (CMEA) key, which is used for protecting MS traffic such as to a WLAN, and a Cipher Key (CK).
  • CMEA Cellular Message Encryption Algorithm
  • CK Cipher Key
  • FIG. 3 illustrates the key hierarchy for generating encryption keys to protect traffic between the MS 102 and WLAN network 104 .
  • the process begins with the negotiation of the MS 102 identity.
  • the WLAN 104 then sends a RADIUS access request message to the AAA 108 , which responds with a RADIUS access challenge message.
  • the WLAN 104 passes the challenge to the MS 102 , which calculates a response therefrom.
  • the MS 102 response to the challenge is then provided to the WLAN 104 .
  • step 4 a after the MS 102 sends the authentication response to the WLAN 104 , the MS 102 uses the root secret to generate the Master Session Key (MSK).
  • MSK Master Session Key
  • the WLAN 104 sends the RADIUS access request message to the AAA 108 , including the challenge response.
  • the home AAA server 108 uses the MS 102 root secret to generate the same MSK as generated by the MS 102 at step 4 a .
  • the home AAA server 108 includes the MSK in the RADIUS Access-Accept message, using an attribute, such as the MS-MPPE-Recv-Key attribute.
  • the MS 102 and WLAN network 104 use the procedures such as those specified in the document entitled “Draft Supplement to Standard for Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between Systems—LAN/MAN Specific Requirements—Part 11: Wireless Medium Access Control (MAC) and physical layer (PHY) specifications: Specification for Enhanced Security” IEEE Std 802.11i/D2.0, March 2002, (herein referred to as “the 802.11i standard), to generate encryption keys from the MSK.
  • MAC Medium Access Control
  • PHY physical layer
  • the MSK is defined as:
  • MSK hashing function (secret, challenge, NAI, secret) (1)
  • MSK is the result of applying a hashing function (e.g., CHAP, HMAC) using the following parameters:
  • a hashing function e.g., CHAP, HMAC
  • the MS 102 and home AAA server 108 have all the key materials necessary to generate the same MSK independently. In other words, no additional key materials need be exchanged between the MS 102 and home AAA server 108 for MSK generation. Note that the MSK and the MS 102 access authentication response are generated from a same challenge value. An alternate embodiment generates the MSK from a different random value.
  • a second example according to another embodiment, defines the MSK as:
  • MSK hashing function (secret, NAI, random number) (2)
  • MSK is the result of applying a hashing function (e.g., CHAP, HMAC) on the following parameters:
  • a hashing function e.g., CHAP, HMAC
  • the random number is different from the challenge value.
  • the MSK is generated from a random number that is different from the challenge value used in the MS 102 access authentication.
  • the use of independent challenge values provides less correlation between the MSK and the MS 102 access authentication, and therefore, provides improved security.
  • the random number is sent to the MS 102 and the MSK generated therefrom.
  • the random number is sent to the MS 102 via a RADIUS Access-Accept (step 6 in FIG. 3) and the mechanisms defined in the 802.11i standard (step 7 in FIG. 3).
  • the procedure to generate MSK is used when the MS 102 is accessing a WLAN 104 , and is not used when the MS is accessing 1xEV-DO or other HDR network. This is due to the over the air encryption provided by the HDR system. As the MS initiates the access to either the WLAN network 104 or the HDR network 106 , the MS 102 is able to determine whether MSK generation is needed. However, the home AAA server must also determine when to generate the MSK.
  • a special RADIUS attribute is implemented to notify the AAA 108 to generate an MSK.
  • the WLAN network 104 sends the RADIUS Access-Request message containing a special or designated attribute indicating the MS 102 desires or is requesting WLAN 104 access.
  • the attribute status will trigger the home AAA server 108 to perform MSK generation (if the MS 102 authentication was successful).
  • the home AAA server 108 will not perform MSK generation. Note that for implementation in a system consistent with 3GPP2, the designated attribute is specific to 3GPP2 and thus may be defined as a vendor-specific attribute with the vendor ID of 3GPP2.
  • FIG. 4 illustrates the RADIUS format described in RFC 2865 entitled “Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)” by C. Rigney et al, published June 2000.
  • the data format 200 includes: a code field 202 identifying the type of RADIUS packet (e.g., access request, access reject, etc.); an ID field 204 to coordinate matching requests and responses; and a length field 206 to indicate the length of the associated packet.
  • An attribute 220 is also illustrated, including: a type field 222 identifying the contents of the value field 226 ; a length field 224 giving the length of the attribute; and a value field providing the specific information of this attribute.
  • RADIUS supports vendor-specific attributes, wherein the value field 226 is used to provide the vendor identification, followed by the attribute information.
  • the vendor-specific type may be as described in RFC 2548 entitled “Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS Attributes” by G. Zorn, published March 1999, for application to CHAP messages.
  • An alternate embodiment implements a standard attribute called the Network Access Server (NAS) Internet Protocol (IP) address in the RADIUS Access-Request message.
  • the standard attribute identifies the IP address of the RADIUS client originating the RADIUS Access-Request message.
  • the home AAA server 108 is configured with a database containing the IP addresses of all the RADIUS clients in the WLAN network 104 . If the IP address indicated in the NAS IP address attribute matches an address in the database, then the RADIUS Access-Request message is originated from the WLAN network 104 , and the home AAA server 108 will perform MSK generation (if the MS authentication was successful). Otherwise, the home AAA server 108 will not perform MSK generation.
  • the format for the standard attribute is illustrated in FIG. 5, with an example superimposed over the value field.
  • the attribute format 300 includes a type field 302 identifying the contents of a value field 306 ; a length field 304 giving the length of the attribute; and a value field 306 containing the attribute information.
  • the value field 306 may be partitioned into significant fields for type 322 indicating the type of sub-attribute, such as an MSK generation instruction; a length field 324 giving the length of the sub-attribute; and a value field 326 containing the sub-attribute information, such as an MSK generation indicator.
  • the type filed 322 may identify this sub-attribute as an MSK generation instruction using a corresponding predefined code.
  • the value field 326 would then have a value either: 1—instructing the AAA 108 to generate an MSK; or 2—instructing the AAA 108 to not generate the MSK.
  • a wireless device such as MS 102
  • the device 600 includes receive circuitry 602 and transmit circuitry 604 for receiving transmissions and sending transmissions, respectively.
  • the receive circuitry 602 and the transmit circuitry 604 are both coupled to a communication bus 612 .
  • the device 600 also includes a Central Processing Unit (CPU) 606 for controlling operations within the device 600 .
  • the CPU 606 is responsive to computer-readable instructions stored in memory storage devices within the device 600 . Two such storage devices are illustrated as storing the authentication procedure(s) 608 and the MSK generation 610 . Note that alternate embodiments may implement the procedure in hardware, software, firmware, or a combination thereof.
  • the CPU 606 is then responsive to authentication processing instructions from the authentication procedure 608 .
  • the CPU 606 places the authentication procedure 608 messages into a transport format, such as an EAP format. Upon authentication to a WLAN, the CPU 606 is responsive to the MSK generation unit 610 to generate the MSK. The CPU 606 further processes received transport format messages to extract the authentication messages therefrom.
  • a transport format such as an EAP format.
  • the present invention provides a method of enabling a system entity to provide encryption to a communication.
  • a home server By using the home server to generate the MSK, and providing the MSK to a system entity, that entity is provided sufficient information for secure transmissions to a user, such as a MS.
  • DSP digital signal processor
  • ASIC application specific integrated circuit
  • FPGA field programmable gate array
  • a general purpose processor may be a microprocessor, but in the alternative, the processor may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine.
  • a processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration.
  • a software module may reside in RAM memory, flash memory, ROM memory, EPROM memory, EEPROM memory, registers, hard disk, a removable disk, a CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art.
  • An exemplary storage medium is coupled to the processor such the processor can read information from, and write information to, the storage medium.
  • the storage medium may be integral to the processor.
  • the processor and the storage medium may reside in an ASIC.
  • the ASIC may reside in a user terminal.
  • the processor and the storage medium may reside as discrete components in a user terminal.

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  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Small-Scale Networks (AREA)
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US10/177,017 US20030235305A1 (en) 2002-06-20 2002-06-20 Key generation in a communication system
AU2003243680A AU2003243680B2 (en) 2002-06-20 2003-06-20 Key generation in a communication system
RU2005101217/09A RU2333607C2 (ru) 2002-06-20 2003-06-20 Генерирование ключей в системе связи
CN201410439953.8A CN104243145A (zh) 2002-06-20 2003-06-20 通信系统中的密钥生成
CNA038192977A CN1720688A (zh) 2002-06-20 2003-06-20 通信系统中的密钥生成
BRPI0311994-7A BR0311994A (pt) 2002-06-20 2003-06-20 geração de chave em um sistema de comunicação
PCT/US2003/019465 WO2004002056A1 (en) 2002-06-20 2003-06-20 Key generation in a communication system
CN201310460165.2A CN103532939B (zh) 2002-06-20 2003-06-20 用于通信系统中的密钥生成的方法和设备
TW092116837A TWI360975B (en) 2002-06-20 2003-06-20 Key generation in a communication system
TW101126108A TWI388180B (zh) 2002-06-20 2003-06-20 通信系統中之金鑰產生
JP2004516007A JP4897215B2 (ja) 2002-06-20 2003-06-20 通信システムにおけるキー発生方法及び装置
EP03761176A EP1525706A4 (en) 2002-06-20 2003-06-20 GENERATING KEYS IN A COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
KR1020047020774A KR101062781B1 (ko) 2002-06-20 2003-06-20 통신 시스템에서의 키 생성
CA2490131A CA2490131C (en) 2002-06-20 2003-06-20 Key generation in a communication system
CA2792490A CA2792490C (en) 2002-06-20 2003-06-20 Key generation in a communication system
CA2862069A CA2862069C (en) 2002-06-20 2003-06-20 Key generation in a communication system
US10/912,898 US7190793B2 (en) 2002-06-20 2004-08-06 Key generation in a communication system
HK15103526.0A HK1203706A1 (zh) 2002-06-20 2006-04-12 通信系統中的密鑰生成
JP2010092578A JP5313200B2 (ja) 2002-06-20 2010-04-13 通信システムにおけるキー発生方法及び装置
TW099142508A TWI376905B (en) 2002-06-20 2010-06-20 Key generation in a communication system
JP2012012031A JP5512709B2 (ja) 2002-06-20 2012-01-24 通信システムにおけるキー発生方法及び装置

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