US20020049677A1 - Information recording medium, recording apparatus, information transmission system, and decryption apparatus - Google Patents
Information recording medium, recording apparatus, information transmission system, and decryption apparatus Download PDFInfo
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- US20020049677A1 US20020049677A1 US09/396,477 US39647799A US2002049677A1 US 20020049677 A1 US20020049677 A1 US 20020049677A1 US 39647799 A US39647799 A US 39647799A US 2002049677 A1 US2002049677 A1 US 2002049677A1
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- G—PHYSICS
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- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
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Definitions
- the present invention relates to an information recording medium on which encrypted information and encrypted key information obtained by encrypting key information used for decrypting the encrypted information to restore original information, a recording apparatus for the information recording medium, an information transmission system for transmitting information from the information recording medium to another device to decrypt the information, and a decryption apparatus for decrypting the encrypted information using the encrypted key information to obtain original information.
- Objectives of security include:
- the network computer under development has no HDD and downloads even an OS from a host server via radio upon startup.
- the user executes his or her jobs while installing required functional programs via radio when he or she requires application software programs.
- the user uses the network computer, he or she need not purchase such programs in advance; the user uses a required functional program by downloading it when he or she wants to use it. In this case, the user is charged each time he or she downloads the functional program.
- the functional program is not a large-size program unlike a package program but is a function-limited, very small-size program described in, e.g., JAVA.
- the user issues a public key and secret key, and transmits the public key to an information service provider together with an information service request.
- the information service provider encrypts service information on the basis of the public key sent from the user, and sends it to the user.
- the user decrypts the encrypted information using the secret key issued by himself or herself, and uses the service information.
- the following method may be used. That is, symmetric or single-key encryption using a common key common to encryption and decryption is adopted, the encrypted common key is sent to the user together with encrypted service information, and only the user who knows the common key can decrypt the encrypted information.
- the key may be illicitly copied by a third party during its transfer.
- the destination user can easily alter encrypted data itself. More specifically, after the destination user decrypts the encrypted data using the common key and alters it, he or she can easily encrypt the data using the common key again.
- the information service provider must inquire public keys of a CA center (authentication center) in units of users every time the provider sends information to the users.
- the key used in encryption is not directly transmitted or recorded to make the key secret, but is transmitted or recorded as key information which is independently encrypted using an encryption means different from that for the information.
- the encrypted information is decrypted using a decryption means for the information.
- the information reproduction side must decrypt the key information to know the reproduction control information, and this entails a serious problem in case of the following information reproduction system.
- the disk drive device must have the decryption means for key information, resulting in high cost of the disk drive device. Furthermore, security of the whole system may lower since the disk drive device must have the decryption means for the key information which is not originally required for the disk drive device.
- Both the information service provider and user can encrypt/decrypt within a relatively short period of time.
- the information service provider need only set a master key alone, and need not inquire public keys of a management center in units of users, the information provision efficiency to the users can be greatly improved.
- the information service provider records information encrypted in advance in an IC card, and can deliver it directly. For this reason, the load on the information service provider can be greatly lightened as compared to conventional encryption that encrypts information upon receipt of each user's request, and delivers the encrypted information.
- Preparation for decryption can be done by only a conventional authentication procedure using an IC card, i.e., by inputting a user's password for personal authentication.
- the encryption technique can be adopted without imposing any extra loads on the user to assure security.
- control information of encrypted information includes device information and region information, the user cannot copy the encrypted information to an HDD or optical disk and cannot illicitly use it.
- the present invention provides an information recording medium comprising which records:
- non-encrypted condition information used upon decrypting the encrypted information is recorded in the encrypted key information.
- the present invention also provides a recording apparatus comprising:
- setting means for setting encrypted key draft information and condition information used upon decryption
- first generation means for generating encrypted key information on the basis of the encrypted key draft information and the condition information which is not encrypted
- second generation means for generating key information by decrypting the encrypted key information generated by the first generation means using the common key information recorded in the recording means;
- input means for inputting information to be encrypted
- third generation means for generating encrypted information by encrypting the information to be encrypted input by the input means using the key information generated by the second generation means;
- recording means for recording the encrypted key information including the condition information generated by the first generation means and the encrypted information generated by the third generation means on an information recording medium in correspondence with each other.
- the present invention further provides an information transmission system, which comprises a first apparatus having an information recording medium that records encrypted information, and encrypted key information obtained by encrypting key information for decrypting the encrypted information to obtain original information, and a second apparatus which is connected to the first apparatus via a communication line and receives the encrypted information and encrypted key information transmitted from the information recording medium of the first apparatus,
- non-encrypted condition information used upon decrypting the encrypted information is recorded in the encrypted key information recorded on the information recording medium of the first apparatus
- the first apparatus comprises:
- transmission means for transmitting the encrypted key information including the condition information and the encrypted information recorded on the information recording medium to the second apparatus
- the second apparatus comprises:
- first output means for outputting the condition information, encrypted key information, and encrypted information received from the first apparatus to a processing medium for performing decryption;
- execution means for executing processing in accordance with decrypted information from the processing medium
- the processing medium comprises:
- determination means for determining based on the condition information from the second apparatus if decryption is granted
- decryption means for, when the determination means determines that decryption is granted, decrypting the encrypted information on the basis of the encrypted key information from the second apparatus;
- second output means for outputting the information decrypted by the decryption means to the second apparatus.
- the present invention further provides a decipher apparatus that processes encrypted information, and encrypted key information obtained by encrypting key information for decrypting the encrypted information to obtain original information, comprising:
- recording means which records second specific information generated based on first specific information and common key information
- generation means for generating the common key information on the basis of the first specific information set by the setting means and the second specific information recorded on the recording means;
- first decryption means for obtaining key information by decrypting the encrypted key information using the common key information generated by the generation means
- second decryption means for obtaining information before encryption by decrypting the encrypted information using the key information obtained by the first decryption means.
- the present invention further provides a decipher apparatus of a portable medium that processes encrypted information, and encrypted key information obtained by encrypting key information for decrypting the encrypted information to obtain original information, comprising:
- an input unit at which first specific information and common key information are input
- first generation means for generating second specific information on the basis of the first specific information and the common key information input at the input unit;
- recording means for recording the second specific information generated by the first generation means
- inhibition means for inhibiting input from the input unit after recording on the recording means
- second generation means for generating the common key information on the basis of the first specific information set by the setting means and second specific information recorded on the recording means;
- first decryption means for obtaining key information by decrypting the encrypted key information using the common key information generated by the second generation means
- second decryption means for obtaining information before encryption by decrypting the encrypted information using the key information obtained by the first decryption means.
- the present invention further provides a decipher apparatus that processes encrypted information, and encrypted key information including condition information used upon decrypting the encrypted information and obtained by encrypting key information for decrypting the encrypted information to obtain original information, comprising:
- recording means which records second specific information generated based on first specific information and common key information
- generation means for generating the common key information on the basis of the first specific information set by the setting means and the second specific information recorded on the recording means;
- first decryption means for obtaining key information by decrypting the encrypted key information using the common key information generated by the generation means
- second decryption means for obtaining information before encryption by decrypting the encrypted information using the key information obtained by the first decryption means
- determination means for determining based on the condition information if decryption is granted.
- control means for controlling execution of decryption by the first and second decryption means on the basis of the determination result of the determination means.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram showing the arrangement of an information transmission system used for explaining an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 2 shows an example of the format of service information
- FIG. 3 shows an example of the format of control information
- FIG. 4 is a perspective view showing the arrangement of an IC card shown in FIG. 1;
- FIG. 5 is a schematic block diagram showing the arrangement of a client machine shown in FIG. 1;
- FIG. 6 is a schematic block diagram showing the arrangement of a host server shown in FIG. 1;
- FIG. 7 is a schematic block diagram showing the arrangement of a key information multiplexer shown in FIG. 6;
- FIG. 8 is a schematic block diagram showing the arrangement of an encrypter and decrypter shown in FIG. 6;
- FIG. 9 is a schematic block diagram showing the arrangement of the IC card shown in FIG. 1;
- FIG. 10 is a flow chart for explaining the recording method of service information
- FIG. 11 is a chart showing the generation process of encrypted key information and encrypted information
- FIG. 12 is a flow chart for explaining the registration method of user corresponding key information into the IC card
- FIG. 13 is a flow chart for explaining the processing for decrypting the encrypted information obtained in response to a request by the IC card and setting the decrypted information as a functional program;
- FIG. 14 is a flow chart for explaining decryption processing of encrypted information
- FIGS. 15A to 15 K are sectional views for explaining the method of manufacturing a DVD-ROM
- FIG. 16 is a schematic diagram for explaining the arrangement of a master disk recording apparatus
- FIG. 17 is a schematic block diagram showing the arrangement of a network system to explain another embodiment.
- FIG. 18 is a diagram showing an example using a broadcast satellite to explain still another embodiment.
- FIG. 1 shows an information transmission system of the present invention.
- the information transmission system is constituted by a client machine 1 , a host server 3 connected to the client machine 1 via a communication line 2 , and an IC card 4 as a decipher unit, which is loaded or built in the client machine 1 .
- the client machine 1 transmits a transfer request for a program such as wordprocessing software as predetermined data to the host server 3 .
- the host server 3 sends back an encrypted program (encrypted information) such as wordprocessing software recorded in a hard disk device (HDD) 29 as a recording unit (to be described later) to the client machine 1 that issued the transfer request together with encrypted key information (encrypted information for decryption).
- the client machine 1 decrypts (breaks) the encrypted information using the encrypted key information using the IC card 4 , and can perform processing using the decrypted program such as wordprocessing software.
- the hard disk device (HDD) 29 records service information to be provided to the users.
- the service information includes not only specific data but also small-unit functional programs described in, e.g., a programming language (JAVA).
- HDD hard disk device
- information containing an encrypted program (information used by the user) 40 such as wordprocessing software as encrypted information and encrypted key information 41 used for decrypting (breaking) the encrypted information 40 is recorded.
- the encrypted key information 41 includes non-encrypted control information 42 (that can be read without decryption).
- the control information 42 is condition information upon decrypting (breaking) the corresponding encrypted information 40 .
- the control information 42 consists of 119 bits, i.e., a 1-bit copy grant code 43 , a 4-bit drive code 44 , a 32-bit address code 45 , a 3-bit region code 46 , 16-bit information created date information 47 , 7-bit copy inhibition period information 48 after information creation, 24-bit specific password information 49 , and 32-bit specific user/organization information 50 .
- the drive code 44 and address code 45 are called device information 51 .
- the region code 46 is called region information.
- the information created date information 47 and copy inhibition period information 48 are called temporal information 52 .
- the specific password information 49 and specific user/organization information 50 are called user specifying information 53 .
- the copy grant code 43 indicates copy grant or denial: if the code 43 is “1”, it indicates copy grant; if the code 43 is “0”, it indicates copy denial.
- the drive code 44 indicates the information transmission path or drive used.
- the code 44 is “1H (hexa; hexadecimal notation)”, it indicates that the information transmission path corresponds to an ISDN (LAN network) up to 10 MHz.
- the code 44 is “2H”, it indicates that the information transmission path corresponds to an ISDN (LAN network) up to 100 MHz.
- the code 44 is “3H”, it indicates that the information transmission path corresponds to an ISDN (LAN network) up to 500 MHz.
- the code 44 is “7H”, it indicates that the information transmission path is a radio communication (PHS, cordless phone network).
- the code 44 is “8H”, it indicates that the information transmission path is a local radio communication (intra-home communication, intra-office communication).
- code 44 is “9H”, it indicates that the information transmission path is a cable network. If the code 44 is “AH”, it indicates that the information transmission path (drive used) is an FDD.
- code 44 is “CH”, it indicates that the information transmission path (drive used) is a boot HDD (that stores an operating system used upon startup).
- the code 44 is “DH”, it indicates that the information transmission path (drive used) is an optical disk such as an MO, PD, or the like.
- the code 44 is “FH”, it indicates that the information transmission path (drive used) is a DVD video or DVD-ROM.
- the address code 45 indicates address data (IP address) for identifying the destination or source, and consists of, e.g., a network address and host address. This address code 45 is given when information is sent via the ISDN (LAN network).
- the region code 46 is one of numbers 1 H to 8 H in hexadecimal notation assigned to eight divided regions on the Earth.
- the region code 46 corresponds to region information.
- the information created date information 47 indicates the information created date, and is described by 7-bit year information, 4-bit month information, and 5-bit day information.
- the copy inhibition period information 48 indicates a copy inhibition period, i.e., a copy denial period, and is given when the copy grant code is “0” indicating copy denial.
- the specific password information 49 indicates a specific password represented by four characters including English letters and numerals, and each character can be selected from 36 different characters. In this case, each character is described by a 6-bit code.
- the specific user/organization information 50 indicates a specific user or organization.
- control information 42 may be simplified depending on the information contents to be processed by the information transmission system.
- the control information 42 may consist of a 1-bit copy grant code 43 alone.
- the control information 42 having the format shown in FIG. 3 is encapsulated in the encrypted key information 41 shown in FIG. 2 without any encryption.
- the size of the encrypted key information 41 is larger than that of the control information 42 .
- the encrypted key information 41 requires a size at least twice that of the control information 42 , and preferably, three times or more.
- the encrypted key information 41 requires at least 238 bits, normally, 357 bits or more.
- the encrypted key information 41 requires at least 2 bits, normally, 3 bits or more.
- the IC card 4 has an electrode portion 5 as a connect portion to be connected to an IC card reader/writer 13 (to be described later), a user password input terminal hole 6 , and a master key input terminal hole 7 .
- a user password input terminal 6 a is present inside the user password input terminal hole 6
- a master key input terminal 7 a is present inside the master key input terminal hole 7 .
- the user password input terminal hole 6 and master key input terminal hole 7 are filled up with a resin or the like after user corresponding key information (second specific information) is generated by inputting a user password (first specific information) and master key information (common key information) when the IC card 4 is issued by an issuance device, and is recorded on an EEPROM 34 (to be described later).
- second specific information user corresponding key information
- master key information common key information
- the user password input terminal 6 a and master key input terminal 7 a themselves may be removed or their electrode portions may be removed to prevent the user corresponding key information from being altered at a later time.
- lead lines may be used instead of the input terminals, and may be removed upon issuance.
- the client machine 1 is an information processing apparatus such as a personal computer, and comprises a CPU 10 for controlling the overall client machine 1 , a ROM 11 that records control programs, a RAM 12 for data recording, the IC card reader/writer 13 for exchanging data with the above-mentioned IC card 4 , a display unit 14 , a keyboard 15 as an input unit, a hard disk device (HDD) 16 as a recording unit (information recording medium), an optical disk device 17 as a recording unit that receives an optical disk 17 a, and a communication interface 18 connected to the host server 3 via the communication line 2 , as shown in FIG. 5.
- a CPU 10 for controlling the overall client machine 1
- a ROM 11 that records control programs
- a RAM 12 for data recording
- the IC card reader/writer 13 for exchanging data with the above-mentioned IC card 4
- a display unit 14 a keyboard 15 as an input unit
- a hard disk device (HDD) 16 as a recording unit (information recording medium)
- the hard disk device (HDD) 16 and the optical disk device 17 can be connected later as optional devices.
- the host server 3 comprises a CPU 20 for controlling the entire host server 3 , a ROM 21 that records control programs, a RAM 22 for data recording, an EEPROM 23 which records master key information in advance, an encrypter 24 for encrypting raw information to obtain the encrypted information 40 using key information, a decrypter 25 for decrypting the encrypted key information 41 using the master key information to obtain key information, a key information multiplexer 26 for generating the encrypted key information 41 , a CRT display 27 as a display unit, a keyboard 28 as an input unit at which the user inputs a user password, a hard disk device (HDD) 29 as a recording unit (information recording medium) which records information consisting of an encrypted program (encrypted information) such as wordprocessing program, and encrypted key information corresponding to that encrypted information, and a communication interface 30 connected to the client machine 1 via the communication line 2 .
- a CPU 20 for controlling the entire host server 3
- a ROM 21 that records control programs
- a RAM 22 for data recording
- an optical disk device may be used. If a larger-capacity recording unit is required, a disk array such as a RAID (redundant arrays inexpensive disk) or the like may be used.
- a disk array such as a RAID (redundant arrays inexpensive disk) or the like may be used.
- the key information multiplexer 26 multiplexes encrypted key draft information as a temporary encrypted key and the control information 42 to generate the encrypted key information 41 as a mixing result, and comprises, e.g., two shift registers 26 a and 26 b, as shown in FIG. 7.
- the shift registers 26 a and 26 b sequentially output supplied encrypted key draft information, and load the control information 41 upon reception of a load signal supplied from the CPU 20 , thus encapsulating the control information 41 in the encrypted key draft information and outputting the obtained information.
- the CPU 20 outputs the load signal on the basis of the address of the encrypted key draft information read out from the RAM 22 .
- Each of the encrypter 24 and decrypter 25 comprises seven shift registers 60 a to 60 g, and three operators 61 a to 61 c for operating exclusive ORs, as shown in FIG. 8.
- the decrypter 25 for example, when master key information “110100000110” as a random number is supplied to the shift registers 60 a to 60 g, and encrypted key information “1000011100101” is supplied to the operator 61 c, the operator 61 c outputs key information “1010010001011” as decrypted information, i.e., the decryption result.
- the keyboard 28 is used as the input unit used for inputting the user password.
- a voiceprint may be used instead of the user password, and a microphone and a voiceprint feature detector may be used as the input unit.
- facial information may be used instead of the user password, and a face image reader comprising a CCD and the like, and a facial information feature extractor may be used as the input unit.
- speech recognition of the user password may be used, and a microphone and speech recognition apparatus may be used as the input device.
- a fingerprint may be used in place of the user password, and a fingerprint reader comprising a CCD and the like, and an image feature extractor may be used as the input unit.
- finger information may be used in place of the user password, and finger surface resistance measurement device at individual points using an electrode array, and a finger information feature extractor may be used as the input unit.
- the IC card 4 comprises a CPU 31 for controlling the entire IC card 4 , a ROM 32 that records control programs, a RAM 33 for data recording, the EEPROM 34 for recording user corresponding key information, user password, user ID, and the like, a user corresponding key information generator 35 for generating user corresponding key information, a master key generator 36 for generating master key information, a decrypter 37 for decrypting the encrypted key information 41 using the master key information to obtain key information, a decrypter 38 for decrypting the encrypted information 40 using the key information to obtain raw information, an interface 39 , the connect portion 5 , the user password input terminal 6 a at which the user password is input, and the master key input terminal 7 a at which the master key information is input.
- the IC card 4 is provided to each user as an authentication IC card to prevent breaches of security, and incorporates all the decryption circuits. With this system, neither master key information nor key information never go out of an IC, thus preventing illicit acts by a hacker. Hence, in the information transmission system shown in FIG. 1, the IC card 4 that incorporates the decryption circuits serves as a decipher device, and corresponds to a decipher unit when viewed from the entire information transmission system.
- the user corresponding key information generator 35 comprises an operator for operating an exclusive OR, and exclusively ORs the user password input from the user password input terminal 6 a and the master key information input from the master key input terminal 7 a to generate user corresponding key information as the operation result.
- the generator 35 generates user corresponding key information “ 1001 ” by exclusively ORing user password “1100” and master key information “1010”.
- the master key generator 36 comprises an operator for operating an exclusive OR, and exclusively ORs the user corresponding key information read out from the EEPROM 34 and an externally supplied user password to generate master key information as the operation result.
- the generator 36 generates master key information “1010” by exclusively ORing user corresponding key information “1001” and user password “1100”.
- Each of the decrypters 37 and 38 comprises a random number generator made up of seven shift registers 60 a to 60 g and three operators 61 a to 61 c for operating exclusive ORs, as shown in FIG. 8. With this arrangement, each decrypter operates information loaded in the shift registers 60 a to 60 g on the basis of the information successively supplied to the operator 61 c.
- the decrypter 37 for example, when master key information “110100000110” as a random number is supplied to the shift registers 60 a to 60 g, and encrypted key information “1000011100101” is supplied to the operator 61 c, the operator 61 c outputs key information “1010010001011” as decrypted information, i.e., the decryption result.
- the decrypter 38 for example, when key information “1010010001011” as a random number is supplied to the shift registers 60 a to 60 g, and encrypted information “1011100000101” is supplied to the operator 61 c, the operator 61 c outputs raw information “1110001110001” as decrypted information, i.e., the decryption result.
- a method of recording the above-mentioned service information (to be provided to the user) onto the hard disk device (HDD) 29 by the host server 3 will be described below with reference to the flow chart shown in FIG. 10 and FIG. 11 that shows the generation process of the encrypted key information 41 and the encrypted information 40 .
- the provider (who provides the service information to the users) of the host server 3 inputs raw information as a small-unit functional program for an application described in, e.g., a programming language (JAVA) (ST 1 ) using a user interface including the CRT display 27 and keyboard 28 .
- This raw information is recorded on the RAM 22 by the CPU 20 (ST 2 ).
- the provider of the host server 3 inputs the contents of the above-mentioned control information 42 including the copy grant code 43 and the like, as shown in FIG. 7, using the user interface (ST 3 ).
- This control information 42 is recorded on the RAM 22 by the CPU 20 (ST 4 ).
- the provider of the host server 3 inputs encrypted key draft information as a temporary encrypted key using the user interface (ST 5 ).
- the encrypted key draft information is recorded on the RAM 22 by the CPU 20 (ST 6 ).
- the CPU 20 reads out the encrypted key draft information and control information 42 recorded on the RAM 22 , and outputs them to the key information multiplexer 26 , which mixes the encrypted key draft information and control information 42 to generate the encrypted key information 41 (ST 7 ). Subsequently, the CPU 20 records the generated encrypted key information 41 on the RAM 22 , and also the hard disk device (HDD) 29 (ST 8 ).
- HDD hard disk device
- the CPU 20 reads out the generated encrypted key information 41 recorded on the RAM 22 , and master key information recorded on the EEPROM 23 , and outputs them to the decrypter 25 , which decrypts (breaks) the encrypted key information 41 using the master key information to generate key information (ST 9 ).
- the CPU 20 then records the generated key information on the RAM 22 (ST 1 O).
- the CPU 20 reads out raw information recorded on the RAM 22 and the generated key information, and outputs them to the encrypter 24 , which encrypts the raw information using the key information, thus generating the encrypted information 40 (ST 11 ). Finally, the CPU 20 records the generated encrypted information 40 on the hard disk device (HDD) 29 in correspondence with the encrypted key information 41 (ST 12 ).
- HDD hard disk device
- the encrypted key information 41 is generated first, and after that, the key information is supplied by supply the encrypted key information to the decrypter.
- the encrypter uses the generated key information, the encrypter generates the encrypted information 40 as service information to be provided to the user, and the generated encrypted information 40 is recorded on the HDD 29 together with the encrypted key information 40 .
- the information service provider sets the IC card 4 before the IC card 4 is delivered to the user.
- An issuance machine that issues the IC card 4 comprises a card reader/writer which can exchange data with the IC card 4 via its connect portion 5 , and can input data via the user password input terminal 6 a and master key input terminal 7 a, a user interface including a display unit and input unit, and a control unit for controlling the issuance.
- the information service provider inserts an IC card 4 on which nothing is recorded into the issuance machine (ST 21 ).
- the card reader/writer of the issuance machine is connected to the connect portion 5 , user password input terminal 6 a, and master key input terminal 7 a of the IC card 4 (ST 22 ).
- the information service provider directs issuance of an IC card, and inputs a password determined by the information service provider upon contract with the user, and master key information that only the information service provider knows, using the user interface (ST 23 ).
- the user password and master key information are supplied to the user corresponding key information generator 35 via the IC card reader/writer 13 , user password input terminal 6 a, master key input terminal 7 a (ST 24 ).
- the user corresponding key information generator 35 exclusively ORs the input information in units of bits to generate user corresponding key information, and outputs the generated information to the EEPROM 34 (ST 25 ).
- the user corresponding key information is then recorded on the EEPROM 34 (ST 26 ).
- the information service provider inputs the user password and user ID determined upon contract with the user.
- the CPU 10 outputs the user password and user ID to the CPU 31 via the IC card reader/writer 13 , connect portion 5 , and user interface 39 .
- the CPU 31 records the received user password and user ID on the EEPROM 34 .
- the issuance machine issues the IC card 4 .
- the provider fills up the user password input terminal hole 6 and master key input terminal hole 7 of the issued IC card 4 with, e.g., a resin.
- a resin e.g., a resin
- the power switch (not shown) of the client machine 1 is turned on to start up the client machine (ST 31 ).
- the client machine 1 communicates with the host server 3 to confirm if there is wanted data in a specific group (charging system or the like) (ST 32 ). For example, a request for a program such as wordprocessing software as an information service is generated.
- the CPU 10 displays a guidance for insertion of an IC card 4 that can download (break) the data on the display unit 14 (ST 33 ). In accordance with this guidance, the user inserts the corresponding IC card 4 (ST 34 ).
- the CPU 10 then displays a guidance for input of the user ID and user password on the display unit 14 (ST 35 ). In accordance with this guidance, the user inputs the user ID and user password (ST 36 ).
- the CPU 10 supplies the input user ID and user password to the CPU 31 in the IC card 4 via the IC card reader/writer 13 , connect portion 5 , and interface 39 (ST 37 ).
- the CPU 31 compares the supplied user ID and user password with those recorded in advance on the EEPROM 23 to check if they coincide with each other (ST 38 ). If a coincidence is determined, the CPU 31 informs the client machine 1 of the user ID (ST 39 ); otherwise, the CPU 31 determines an unauthorized user, stops operation, and informs the client machine 1 of an NG signal (ST 40 ).
- the CPU 31 Upon determining the coincidence in step 38 , parallel to the processing in step 39 , the CPU 31 exclusively ORs the user password and the user corresponding key information recorded in advance on the EEPROM 34 using the master key generator 36 to generate master key information as the operation result, and records it on the RAM 33 (ST 41 ).
- the client machine 1 that received the user ID in step 39 adds an IP address of the client machine 1 to an information service request based on the request for the program such as wordprocessing software as the information service issued by the user and the user ID received from the IC card 4 , and transmits them to the host server 3 (ST 42 ).
- the host server 3 authenticates the user ID.
- the host server 3 forms a communication packet which includes the program (encrypted information) such as wordprocessing software as the information service, which is encrypted and recorded on the hard disk device (HDD) 29 , the encrypted key information 41 (encrypted information for decryption) corresponding to that encrypted information, and an IP address with the source and destination addresses, and sends back the packet to the client machine 1 that issued the transfer request (ST 43 ).
- the contents of charge for the user corresponding to the user ID for transmission of the information service are recorded on a recording unit (not shown).
- the client machine 1 Upon reception of the sent-back packet, the client machine 1 decrypts (breaks) the encrypted information 40 by the encrypted key information 41 and the control information 42 in the encrypted key information 41 using the IC card 4 (ST 44 ), and allows the user to perform processing using the decrypted program such as wordprocessing software (ST 45 ).
- the CPU 10 of the client machine 1 checks the region code of a region where the host server 3 is installed on the basis of the IP address in the received communication packet, generates client machine generated information including the source IP address and the checked region code and added with “1H” as the value of the drive code 44 if the communication line 2 is a 10-MHz LAN network, and sends it to the IC card 4 (ST 51 ).
- the CPU 31 of the IC card 4 records the received client machine generated information on the RAM 33 (ST 52 ).
- the CPU 31 exclusively ORs the user password for which the coincidence has been determined, and the user corresponding key information recorded in advance on the EEPROM 34 using the master key generator 36 to generate master key information as the operation result, and records it on the RAM 33 (ST 53 ).
- the CPU 31 of the IC card 4 transmits a transmission request for the copy grant code 43 to the CPU 10 of the client machine 1 (ST 54 ).
- the CPU 10 of the client machine 1 extracts the copy grant code 43 from the control information 42 encapsulated in the encrypted key information 41 , and transmits it to the CPU 31 of the IC card 4 (ST 55 ).
- the CPU 31 of the IC card 4 checks if the copy grant code 43 is “1” or “0” to determine whether copying is granted (ST 56 ).
- the CPU 31 If it is determined that copying is granted, the CPU 31 unconditionally accepts the encrypted information 40 and the like independently of its source even when they are copied on the HDD 16 or a disk of the optical disk device 17 , and advances to step 61 to execute decryption.
- step 56 the CPU 31 transmits a transmission request for the drive code 44 , address code 45 , and region code 46 to the CPU 10 of the client machine 1 (ST 57 ).
- the CPU 10 of the client machine 1 extracts the drive code 44 , address code 45 , and region code 46 from the control information 42 encapsulated in the encrypted key information 41 , and transmits them to the CPU 31 of the IC card 4 (ST 58 ).
- the CPU 31 of the IC card 4 checks if the drive code 44 , address code 45 , and region code 46 supplied from the client machine 1 coincide with the client machine generated information recorded on the RAM 33 (ST 59 ).
- the source of the encrypted information and the like is a 10-MHz ISDN
- the drive code in the client machine generated information is “1H”, and coincides with “1H” of the drive code 44 in the control information 42 , thus determining the source of the encrypted information and the like as an authentic one.
- the encrypted information and the like is a reconstruction from the HDD 16
- the drive code in the client machine generated information is “CH”, and does not coincide with “1H” of the drive code 44 in the control information 42 , thus determining the source of the encrypted information and the like as an unauthorized one, i.e., illicitly copied information.
- step 59 If a non-coincidence is determined in step 59 , the CPU 31 determines an unauthorized user, stops operation, and informs the client machine 1 of an NG signal (ST 60 ).
- step 59 if a coincidence is determined in step 59 (i.e., if it is determined that the encrypted information and the like are original ones), or if it is determined in step 56 that copying is granted, the CPU 31 grants decryption and determines decryption start. Then, the CPU 31 transmits a transmission request for the encrypted key information 41 to the CPU 10 of the client machine 1 (ST 61 ). In response to this transmission request, the CPU 10 of the client machine 1 transmits the encrypted key information 41 to the IC card 4 (ST 62 ).
- the CPU 31 of the IC card 4 directs the decrypter 37 to decrypt (break) the encrypted key information 41 supplied from the client machine 1 using the master key information recorded on the RAM 33 to generate key information, and records it on the RAM 33 (ST 63 ).
- the CPU 31 transmits a transmission request for the encrypted information 40 to the CPU 10 of the client machine 1 (ST 64 ).
- the CPU 10 of the client machine 1 transmits the encrypted information 40 to the IC card 4 (ST 65 ).
- the CPU 31 of the IC card 4 instructs the decrypter 38 to decrypt (break) the encrypted information 40 supplied from the client machine 1 using the key information recorded on the RAM 33 to generate raw information, and transmits it to the client machine 1 (ST 66 ).
- the CPU 10 of the client machine 1 Upon reception of the raw information, the CPU 10 of the client machine 1 records the program such as wordprocessing software as the received raw information on the RAM 22 (ST 67 ). As a result, the user can perform processing using the program such as wordprocessing software recorded on the RAM 22 at the client machine 1 .
- the master key generator can generate the master key information as a common key using the user password in the IC card 4 , i.e., in a place not accessible by the user.
- the user corresponding key information is recorded in advance on the EEPROM, and the master key generator generates master key information as a common key on the basis of the user corresponding key information and the password input by the user. Using the generated master key information, the decrypter can decrypt the encrypted information.
- the key can be easily managed (the user need only have only one IC card).
- the destination user can hardly alter encrypted data.
- the information service provider can record encrypted information in advance on an IC card, and can deliver the IC card directly. For this reason, as compared to conventional encryption that encrypts information in response to each user's request and delivers the encrypted information, the load on the information service provider can be greatly lightened.
- Preparation for decryption can be done by only a conventional authentication procedure using an IC card, i.e., by inputting a user's password for personal authentication. Hence, the encryption technique can be adopted without imposing any extra loads on the user to assure security.
- control information of encrypted information includes device information and region information, the user cannot copy the encrypted information to an HDD or optical disk and cannot illicitly use it.
- information consisting of encrypted information 40 and encrypted key information 41 containing control information 42 like that recorded on the recording unit (HDD 29 ) of the host server 3 in the first embodiment is recorded on an optical disk 17 a such as a DVD-ROM or the like, and is loaded into the optical disk device (ROM drive) 17 of the client machine 1 of the first embodiment so as to reproduce information.
- an optical disk 17 a such as a DVD-ROM or the like
- “FH” indicating the DVD-ROM is described as a drive code in the control information
- the manufacturing date indicating the time of creation of a master disk of an optical disk is described as time information.
- the encrypted information 40 , the encrypted key information 41 containing the control information 42 , and the IP address from the host server in the first embodiment are reproduced from the DVD-ROM 17 a loaded in the optical disk device 17 .
- the subsequent operations are done in substantially the same manner as in the flow charts shown in FIGS. 13 and 14, except that the drive code in the client machine generated information is “FH”, and only when it coincides with “FH” of the drive code 44 in the control information 42 , it is determined that the encrypted information and the like are obtained from an authorized source.
- Information such as video data and the like may be recorded as the encrypted information to be recorded on the optical disk (DVD-ROM) 17 a, in addition to the program and the like.
- processing portion (step 53 ) associated with the user password may be omitted.
- the EEPROM 34 of the IC card 4 records in advance master key information in place of the user corresponding key information.
- the optical disk (DVD-ROM) 17 a is prepared by recording the encrypted information 40 and the encrypted key information 41 containing the control information 42 onto a master disk 70 used in the manufacture of the optical disk (DVD-ROM) 17 a in the same manner as in the recording method of such information described above with reference to FIGS. 10 to 12 in the first embodiment.
- a glass plate 71 formed of reinforced glass having a thickness of 0.5 to 30 mm to guarantee high surface precision is placed on a spindle motor 72 (FIG. 15A), and is rotated at a specific rotational speed.
- a photoresist solution dissolved in an organic solvent is applied onto the rotating plate, and is uniformly spread by utilizing the centrifugal force upon rotation of the glass plate 71 .
- This coating method is generally called spinner coating.
- the glass plate 71 is left to stand in a high-temperature environment ranging from 60 to 300° C. to evaporate the organic solvent, thus forming a photoresist layer 73 with a uniform thickness dr (FIG. 15B).
- the transfer efficiency normally drops in the processes shown in FIGS. 15F to 15 I to be described later, if the transfer efficiency of 100% is maintained throughout the processes, the thickness dr of the photoresist layer 73 becomes the pit depth or pre-groove depth on a recording film 84 of a final information recording medium.
- a laser beam 75 is focused by an objective lens 76 of a master disk recording apparatus (to be described later) and is intermittently irradiated onto the photoresist layer 73 so as to form exposed portions 74 by exposure (FIG. 15C).
- the glass plate 71 is detached from the master disk recording apparatus, and a developing solution 77 is applied for a specific period of time while rotating the glass plate 71 , as shown in FIG. 15D.
- the exposed portions 74 dissolve and are removed, as shown in FIG. 15E, thus forming small grooves (ridges) with the depth dr.
- the formed glass plate 71 and photoresist layer 73 are called a master disk 70 of an optical disk.
- the formed master disk 70 is detached from the spindle motor 72 , and a replica of the three-dimensional pattern of the master disk 70 is formed by electroless plating using Ni and electrolytic plating (electroforming). As shown in FIG. 15F, the formed replica is called a master plate 78 .
- the structure i.e., the master disk 70 and the master plate 78 are dipped into an organic solvent such as acetone to dissolve the photoresist layer 73 , thus peeling the master plate 78 from the master disk 70 .
- a mother plate 79 is formed based on the master plate 78 by electrolytic plating (electroforming) (FIG. 15G), and the mother plate 79 is then stripped from the master plate 78 . Placing the mother plate 79 back in position, a stamper 80 is formed by electrolytic plating (electroforming) (FIG. 15H).
- a transparent plastic substrate 83 for an information recording medium is formed by a method called “injection molding”. More specifically, molds A 81 and B 82 are set, as shown in FIG. 15I, and a high-temperature molten resin material (polycarbonate, PMMA, ABS, or the like is normally used) is filled in the gap between these molds. Since the stamper 80 formed in the previous process is attached to the mold A 81 , the small three-dimensional pattern on the stamper 80 is transferred to the resin material when the resin material is filled. After that, the molds A 81 and B 82 , and the resin material are left to stand to cool the resin material to ordinary temperature together with these molds. After the resin material is cooled and solidifies, a plastic substrate 83 (the cooled and solidified resin material transferred with the three-dimensional pattern is called a “plastic substrate 83”) is released by opening the molds A 81 and B 82 .
- a plastic substrate 83 the cooled and solidified resin material transferred with the three-dimensional pattern is called a
- the obtained plastic substrate 83 is placed in vacuum, and a recording film 84 is formed on the plastic substrate 83 by deposition such as sputtering, vacuum deposition, ion plating, or the like, thus forming a structure shown in FIG. 15J.
- Two such structures are set so that their recording films 84 and 86 face each other, and an adhesive film 85 is filled into a gap therebetween, thus completing an information recording medium shown in FIG. 15K.
- FIG. 16 shows the structure of the master disk recording apparatus for locally exposing the photoresist layer 73 shown in FIG. 15C.
- the glass plate 71 is rotated on the spindle motor 72 at a specific rotational speed.
- the laser beam 75 is reflected by a return mirror 88 , and is focused on the photoresist layer 73 via the objective lens 76 .
- the return mirror 88 and objective lens 76 move together as a movable portion 89 in the radial direction of the glass plate 71 .
- the movable portion 89 is driven to move by a feed motor 90 and a feed gear 91 .
- the movable portion 89 has a monitor portion (not shown) for optically monitoring the focused spot position on the glass plate 71 , and the rotational speed of the spindle motor 72 changes in correspondence with the monitor output.
- a master disk recording control unit 50 controls the relative moving speed (linear velocity) of the focused spot on the glass plate 71 to become constant.
- the laser beam 75 emitted by a laser source 97 passes through an E.O. modulator 94 and A.O. modulator 93 , and then reaches the return mirror 88 .
- a pre-pit signal representing a small, three-dimensional pit pattern turns on/off a high-speed switch 96 in accordance with a signal supplied from a pre-pit signal generator 99 , thus applying or releasing a voltage from a variable voltage generator 95 onto or from the E.O. modulator 94 .
- the amount of laser beam that passes through the E.O. modulator 94 changes. In this manner, the amount of laser beam that reaches the photoresist layer 73 is changed to form exposed portions 74 and non-exposed portions on the photoresist layer 73 .
- a specific frequency oscillator 92 applies a voltage of specific frequency to the A.O. modulator 93 , a standing wave having a specific spatial period (a compression wave among molecules in the A.O. modulator 93 ) in the A.O. modulator 93 is produced.
- the laser beam 75 undergoes Bragg reflection, and is deflected in a specific direction.
- the spatial period of the standing wave changes, the Bragg condition changes, and the deflection angle of the laser beam 75 changes accordingly. That is, upon changing the output frequency of the specific frequency oscillator 92 , the traveling direction of the laser beam 75 changes, and as a consequence, the focal point position on the photoresist layer 73 moves radially.
- the frequency of the frequency oscillator 92 changes at a specific period in accordance with the output from a wobble groove generator/groove pit switch 98 .
- the frequency of the specific frequency oscillator 92 is changed to radially displace the focused spot on the photoresist layer 73 by half the track pitch (the pitch between lands and grooves).
- the ROM drive 17 (client machine 1 ) that has no decryption means for decrypting encrypted information can solely determine whether or not information reproduction is granted.
- information which are inhibited from being reproduced and transferred can be inhibited from being transferred to an apparatus such as a personal computer that attempts to decrypt and reproduce the information.
- the ROM drive when the encrypted key includes control information, the ROM drive must have decryption means for decrypting the key information, resulting in high cost. Also, such ROM drive loses compatibility with conventional ones.
- the second embodiment can alleviate such shortcomings.
- This embodiment exemplifies a network system in which a host server 101 and user server 102 are connected to a network computer 105 via networks 103 and 104 , respectively, as shown in FIG. 17.
- the host server 101 has the same arrangement as that of the host server 3 of the first embodiment, and has an HDD 29 which records information consisting of an encrypted program (information used by the user) 40 such as wordprocessing software as encrypted information, and encrypted key information 41 containing non-encrypted control information 42 and obtained by encrypting key information for decrypting (breaking) the encrypted information 40 .
- an encrypted program information used by the user
- encrypted key information 41 containing non-encrypted control information 42 and obtained by encrypting key information for decrypting (breaking) the encrypted information 40 .
- the network computer 105 comprises a control unit 106 for controlling the overall network computer 105 , a reception unit 107 for receiving the encrypted information and the like from the host server 101 , a decipher unit 108 for breaking codes such as the encrypted information and the like received at the reception unit 107 , a RAM memory 109 for storing the information broken by the decipher unit 108 , an encrypter 110 for encrypting the processing result of the control unit 106 , and a transmission unit 111 for transmitting the processing result encrypted by the encrypter 110 to the user server 102 as information.
- the decipher unit 108 has the same arrangement and function as those of the IC card 4 of the first embodiment, and the encrypter 110 also has the same arrangement and function as those of the encrypter 24 of the first embodiment.
- encrypted information and the like shown in FIG. 2 of the first embodiment are sent from a key station 121 via a broadcast satellite 122 .
- a reception unit 124 in an information reproduction apparatus 123 converts the received information into an electrical signal, and the converted signal is decrypted by a decipher unit 125 formed by the IC card of the first embodiment to obtain a raw signal.
- the decrypted information is displayed on a display unit 126 .
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Abstract
In the invention, an information recording medium records encrypted information, encrypted key information obtained by encrypting key information for decrypting the encrypted information to obtain original information, and non-encrypted condition information used upon decrypting the encrypted information and recorded in the encrypted key information, and the encrypted information from the information recording medium is decrypted inside an IC card using the encrypted key information and condition information. Upon decrypting the encrypted information from the information recording medium, information that requires security protection or copyright protection can be prevented from being illicitly copied.
Description
- The present invention relates to an information recording medium on which encrypted information and encrypted key information obtained by encrypting key information used for decrypting the encrypted information to restore original information, a recording apparatus for the information recording medium, an information transmission system for transmitting information from the information recording medium to another device to decrypt the information, and a decryption apparatus for decrypting the encrypted information using the encrypted key information to obtain original information.
- At present, we can get information worldwide via the Internet. Recently, some charging systems for information services within specific domains (regions, areas) have been put into practice. Along with the penetration of the Internet into our society, it is of urgent necessity to assure security for the purpose of preventing unauthorized use.
- Objectives of security include:
- A) to specify each user who is entitled to the service the provider intends to provide, and prevent eavesdroppers from connecting themselves to the information transmission path and stealing service information (information steal protection); and
- B) to prevent a third party other than the service provider from using original service information for other commercial purposes, which is a violation of the copyright (information copy protection).
- Especially, demands associated with information copy protection described in (B) are expected to increase rapidly in the future, since network computers are being enthusiastically developed.
- The network computer under development has no HDD and downloads even an OS from a host server via radio upon startup. At the network computer, the user executes his or her jobs while installing required functional programs via radio when he or she requires application software programs.
- Hence, conventionally, the user purchases various application package software programs and installs them in an HDD so as to use these programs.
- However, when the user uses the network computer, he or she need not purchase such programs in advance; the user uses a required functional program by downloading it when he or she wants to use it. In this case, the user is charged each time he or she downloads the functional program. The functional program is not a large-size program unlike a package program but is a function-limited, very small-size program described in, e.g., JAVA.
- Hence, when the user uses the network computer, the functional program must be prevented from being copied and re-used by the user in terms of the above-mentioned specific charging method.
- As the methods of providing security, the following three methods using asymmetric or two-key encryption are known.
- 1. The user issues a public key and secret key, and transmits the public key to an information service provider together with an information service request.
- 2. The information service provider encrypts service information on the basis of the public key sent from the user, and sends it to the user.
- 3. The user decrypts the encrypted information using the secret key issued by himself or herself, and uses the service information.
- However, when these methods are used, the information service provider must encrypt information every time it receives user's request, resulting in very high service cost.
- To avoid such problem, the following method may be used. That is, symmetric or single-key encryption using a common key common to encryption and decryption is adopted, the encrypted common key is sent to the user together with encrypted service information, and only the user who knows the common key can decrypt the encrypted information.
- However, this method has the following problem.
- a] If the user copies the service information to an HDD or optical disk, he or she cannot be charged for each information service provided.
- b] As long as the common key is used, a third party other than the information service provider can easily illicitly use the encrypted information for commercial purposes.
- In the above description, information services using a network computer have been mainly described. Likewise, services using satellite broadcast are also available. When broadcast is used, an asymmetric cryptosystem (a method using a public key and secret key) cannot be used. So, a symmetric cryptosystem using a public key is adopted, so that only a specific user who knows the public key can receive services.
- However, in this case as well, problems [a] and [b] mentioned above commonly recur.
- The above-mentioned problems will be elaborated in terms of the encryption technique.
- As is conventionally known, the common key (symmetric) scheme in which the source and destination use an identical key suffer the following three shortcomings.
- 1) The key may be illicitly copied by a third party during its transfer.
- 2) Key management is complicated.
- 3) The destination user can easily alter encrypted data itself. More specifically, after the destination user decrypts the encrypted data using the common key and alters it, he or she can easily encrypt the data using the common key again.
- By contrast, the asymmetric scheme using a public key and secret key can solve the above-mentioned problems but suffers the following shortcomings.
- I] Encryption/decryption is time intensive.
- II] The information service provider must inquire public keys of a CA center (authentication center) in units of users every time the provider sends information to the users.
- These shortcomings make the load on the information service provider heavier.
- Also, this system poses the following problem.
- III] The system heavily loads the user in terms of the custody of the secret key.
- For example, if the secret key is stolen, it becomes impossible to assure security. Also, since the user can easily copy an FD or IC card that stores the secret key, the copied key information may be illicitly used.
- As a method of solving the above-mentioned problems, a hybrid system for encrypting data itself using a common key and encrypting only the common key using a public key has been proposed. This method can relax “[I] increase in encryption/decryption time” but cannot reduce the complexity of [II] and [III].
- In a system for encrypting information and transmitting or recording the encrypted information, when a key used upon encrypting the information is also transmitted or recorded, the key used in encryption is not directly transmitted or recorded to make the key secret, but is transmitted or recorded as key information which is independently encrypted using an encryption means different from that for the information. On the information reproduction side, using the key obtained by decrypting the key information by a decryption means for the key, the encrypted information is decrypted using a decryption means for the information.
- Using this system, a method of preventing reproduction control information from being altered by including the reproduction control information in the key before encryption is proposed.
- However, with this method, the information reproduction side must decrypt the key information to know the reproduction control information, and this entails a serious problem in case of the following information reproduction system.
- For example, an information reproduction system in which a disk drive device, which has neither decryption means for key information nor decryption means for encrypted information and merely reads recorded data, is made to determine reproduction inhibition information so as to control data transfer to an information reproduction apparatus with the decryption means will be described below.
- In this case, the disk drive device must have the decryption means for key information, resulting in high cost of the disk drive device. Furthermore, security of the whole system may lower since the disk drive device must have the decryption means for the key information which is not originally required for the disk drive device.
- It is an object of the present invention to attain low-cost information delivery since a host server need not encrypt information upon receipt of each user's request.
- It is another object of the present invention to greatly improve security since an illicit copy of information can be very easily found.
- It is still another object of the present invention to remove the shortcomings of the common key system since the key can be prevented from being illicitly copied by a third party during its transfer, the key can be easily managed, and the destination user can hardly alter encrypted data.
- It is still another object of the present invention to provide the following improvements as compared to the asymmetric scheme.
- Both the information service provider and user can encrypt/decrypt within a relatively short period of time.
- Since the information service provider need only set a master key alone, and need not inquire public keys of a management center in units of users, the information provision efficiency to the users can be greatly improved.
- The information service provider records information encrypted in advance in an IC card, and can deliver it directly. For this reason, the load on the information service provider can be greatly lightened as compared to conventional encryption that encrypts information upon receipt of each user's request, and delivers the encrypted information.
- Preparation for decryption can be done by only a conventional authentication procedure using an IC card, i.e., by inputting a user's password for personal authentication. Hence, the encryption technique can be adopted without imposing any extra loads on the user to assure security.
- Since control information of encrypted information includes device information and region information, the user cannot copy the encrypted information to an HDD or optical disk and cannot illicitly use it.
- As a result, all the shortcomings of the conventional encryption technique can be removed, processing at both the information source and destination can be greatly simplified, and the security function can be guaranteed.
- To achieve the above object, the present invention provides an information recording medium comprising which records:
- encrypted information; and
- encrypted key information obtained by encrypting key information for decrypting the encrypted information to obtain original information,
- wherein non-encrypted condition information used upon decrypting the encrypted information is recorded in the encrypted key information.
- The present invention also provides a recording apparatus comprising:
- setting means for setting encrypted key draft information and condition information used upon decryption;
- first generation means for generating encrypted key information on the basis of the encrypted key draft information and the condition information which is not encrypted;
- recording means for recording common key information;
- second generation means for generating key information by decrypting the encrypted key information generated by the first generation means using the common key information recorded in the recording means;
- input means for inputting information to be encrypted;
- third generation means for generating encrypted information by encrypting the information to be encrypted input by the input means using the key information generated by the second generation means; and
- recording means for recording the encrypted key information including the condition information generated by the first generation means and the encrypted information generated by the third generation means on an information recording medium in correspondence with each other.
- The present invention further provides an information transmission system, which comprises a first apparatus having an information recording medium that records encrypted information, and encrypted key information obtained by encrypting key information for decrypting the encrypted information to obtain original information, and a second apparatus which is connected to the first apparatus via a communication line and receives the encrypted information and encrypted key information transmitted from the information recording medium of the first apparatus,
- wherein non-encrypted condition information used upon decrypting the encrypted information is recorded in the encrypted key information recorded on the information recording medium of the first apparatus,
- the first apparatus comprises:
- transmission means for transmitting the encrypted key information including the condition information and the encrypted information recorded on the information recording medium to the second apparatus,
- the second apparatus comprises:
- first output means for outputting the condition information, encrypted key information, and encrypted information received from the first apparatus to a processing medium for performing decryption; and
- execution means for executing processing in accordance with decrypted information from the processing medium, and
- the processing medium comprises:
- determination means for determining based on the condition information from the second apparatus if decryption is granted;
- decryption means for, when the determination means determines that decryption is granted, decrypting the encrypted information on the basis of the encrypted key information from the second apparatus; and
- second output means for outputting the information decrypted by the decryption means to the second apparatus.
- The present invention further provides a decipher apparatus that processes encrypted information, and encrypted key information obtained by encrypting key information for decrypting the encrypted information to obtain original information, comprising:
- recording means which records second specific information generated based on first specific information and common key information;
- setting means for setting the first specific information;
- generation means for generating the common key information on the basis of the first specific information set by the setting means and the second specific information recorded on the recording means;
- first decryption means for obtaining key information by decrypting the encrypted key information using the common key information generated by the generation means; and
- second decryption means for obtaining information before encryption by decrypting the encrypted information using the key information obtained by the first decryption means.
- The present invention further provides a decipher apparatus of a portable medium that processes encrypted information, and encrypted key information obtained by encrypting key information for decrypting the encrypted information to obtain original information, comprising:
- an input unit at which first specific information and common key information are input;
- first generation means for generating second specific information on the basis of the first specific information and the common key information input at the input unit;
- recording means for recording the second specific information generated by the first generation means;
- inhibition means for inhibiting input from the input unit after recording on the recording means;
- setting means for setting the first specific information;
- second generation means for generating the common key information on the basis of the first specific information set by the setting means and second specific information recorded on the recording means;
- first decryption means for obtaining key information by decrypting the encrypted key information using the common key information generated by the second generation means; and
- second decryption means for obtaining information before encryption by decrypting the encrypted information using the key information obtained by the first decryption means.
- The present invention further provides a decipher apparatus that processes encrypted information, and encrypted key information including condition information used upon decrypting the encrypted information and obtained by encrypting key information for decrypting the encrypted information to obtain original information, comprising:
- recording means which records second specific information generated based on first specific information and common key information;
- setting means for setting the first specific information;
- generation means for generating the common key information on the basis of the first specific information set by the setting means and the second specific information recorded on the recording means;
- first decryption means for obtaining key information by decrypting the encrypted key information using the common key information generated by the generation means;
- second decryption means for obtaining information before encryption by decrypting the encrypted information using the key information obtained by the first decryption means;
- determination means for determining based on the condition information if decryption is granted; and
- control means for controlling execution of decryption by the first and second decryption means on the basis of the determination result of the determination means.
- Additional object and advantages of the invention will be set forth in the description which follows, and in part will be obvious from the description, or may be learned by practice of the invention. The object and advantages of the invention may be realized and obtained by means of the instrumentalities and combinations particularly pointed out in the appended claims.
- The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and constitute a part of the specification, illustrate presently preferred embodiments of the invention, and together with the general description given above and the detailed description of the preferred embodiments given below, serve to explain the principles of the invention.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram showing the arrangement of an information transmission system used for explaining an embodiment of the present invention;
- FIG. 2 shows an example of the format of service information;
- FIG. 3 shows an example of the format of control information;
- FIG. 4 is a perspective view showing the arrangement of an IC card shown in FIG. 1;
- FIG. 5 is a schematic block diagram showing the arrangement of a client machine shown in FIG. 1;
- FIG. 6 is a schematic block diagram showing the arrangement of a host server shown in FIG. 1;
- FIG. 7 is a schematic block diagram showing the arrangement of a key information multiplexer shown in FIG. 6;
- FIG. 8 is a schematic block diagram showing the arrangement of an encrypter and decrypter shown in FIG. 6;
- FIG. 9 is a schematic block diagram showing the arrangement of the IC card shown in FIG. 1;
- FIG. 10 is a flow chart for explaining the recording method of service information;
- FIG. 11 is a chart showing the generation process of encrypted key information and encrypted information;
- FIG. 12 is a flow chart for explaining the registration method of user corresponding key information into the IC card;
- FIG. 13 is a flow chart for explaining the processing for decrypting the encrypted information obtained in response to a request by the IC card and setting the decrypted information as a functional program;
- FIG. 14 is a flow chart for explaining decryption processing of encrypted information;
- FIGS. 15A to15K are sectional views for explaining the method of manufacturing a DVD-ROM;
- FIG. 16 is a schematic diagram for explaining the arrangement of a master disk recording apparatus;
- FIG. 17 is a schematic block diagram showing the arrangement of a network system to explain another embodiment; and
- FIG. 18 is a diagram showing an example using a broadcast satellite to explain still another embodiment.
- The first embodiment of the present invention will be described hereinafter with reference to the accompanying drawings.
- FIG. 1 shows an information transmission system of the present invention. The information transmission system is constituted by a
client machine 1, ahost server 3 connected to theclient machine 1 via acommunication line 2, and anIC card 4 as a decipher unit, which is loaded or built in theclient machine 1. - More specifically, the
client machine 1 transmits a transfer request for a program such as wordprocessing software as predetermined data to thehost server 3. In response to this transfer request, thehost server 3 sends back an encrypted program (encrypted information) such as wordprocessing software recorded in a hard disk device (HDD) 29 as a recording unit (to be described later) to theclient machine 1 that issued the transfer request together with encrypted key information (encrypted information for decryption). In response to the sent-back information, theclient machine 1 decrypts (breaks) the encrypted information using the encrypted key information using theIC card 4, and can perform processing using the decrypted program such as wordprocessing software. - The hard disk device (HDD)29 records service information to be provided to the users. The service information includes not only specific data but also small-unit functional programs described in, e.g., a programming language (JAVA).
- An example of the format of one service information recorded in the hard disk device (HDD)29 will be explained below with reference to FIG. 2.
- More specifically, information containing an encrypted program (information used by the user)40 such as wordprocessing software as encrypted information and encrypted
key information 41 used for decrypting (breaking) theencrypted information 40 is recorded. - The encrypted
key information 41 includes non-encrypted control information 42 (that can be read without decryption). Thecontrol information 42 is condition information upon decrypting (breaking) the correspondingencrypted information 40. - As shown in FIG. 3, the
control information 42 consists of 119 bits, i.e., a 1-bitcopy grant code 43, a 4-bit drive code 44, a 32-bit address code 45, a 3-bit region code 46, 16-bit information createddate information 47, 7-bit copyinhibition period information 48 after information creation, 24-bitspecific password information 49, and 32-bit specific user/organization information 50. - The
drive code 44 andaddress code 45 are calleddevice information 51. Theregion code 46 is called region information. The information createddate information 47 and copyinhibition period information 48 are calledtemporal information 52. Thespecific password information 49 and specific user/organization information 50 are called user specifying information 53. - The
copy grant code 43 indicates copy grant or denial: if thecode 43 is “1”, it indicates copy grant; if thecode 43 is “0”, it indicates copy denial. - The
drive code 44 indicates the information transmission path or drive used. - If the
code 44 is “1H (hexa; hexadecimal notation)”, it indicates that the information transmission path corresponds to an ISDN (LAN network) up to 10 MHz. - If the
code 44 is “2H”, it indicates that the information transmission path corresponds to an ISDN (LAN network) up to 100 MHz. - If the
code 44 is “3H”, it indicates that the information transmission path corresponds to an ISDN (LAN network) up to 500 MHz. - If the
code 44 is “4H”, it indicates that the information transmission path is a public telephone line (using a modem). - If the
code 44 is “5H”, it indicates that the information transmission path is a ground wave (multiplexed TV channel). - If the
code 44 is “6H”, it indicates that the information transmission path is satellite broadcast. - If the
code 44 is “7H”, it indicates that the information transmission path is a radio communication (PHS, cordless phone network). - If the
code 44 is “8H”, it indicates that the information transmission path is a local radio communication (intra-home communication, intra-office communication). - If the
code 44 is “9H”, it indicates that the information transmission path is a cable network. If thecode 44 is “AH”, it indicates that the information transmission path (drive used) is an FDD. - If the
code 44 is “CH”, it indicates that the information transmission path (drive used) is a boot HDD (that stores an operating system used upon startup). - If the
code 44 is “DH”, it indicates that the information transmission path (drive used) is an optical disk such as an MO, PD, or the like. - If the
code 44 is “EH”, it indicates that the information transmission path (drive used) is a CD-ROM or CD-R. - If the
code 44 is “FH”, it indicates that the information transmission path (drive used) is a DVD video or DVD-ROM. - If the
code 44 is “0H”, it indicates that the information transmission path (drive used) is a DVD-RAM or DVD-R. - The
address code 45 indicates address data (IP address) for identifying the destination or source, and consists of, e.g., a network address and host address. Thisaddress code 45 is given when information is sent via the ISDN (LAN network). - The
region code 46 is one of numbers 1H to 8H in hexadecimal notation assigned to eight divided regions on the Earth. Theregion code 46 corresponds to region information. - The information created
date information 47 indicates the information created date, and is described by 7-bit year information, 4-bit month information, and 5-bit day information. - The copy
inhibition period information 48 indicates a copy inhibition period, i.e., a copy denial period, and is given when the copy grant code is “0” indicating copy denial. This copyinhibition period information 48 can describe a maximum of 10years 7 months=127 months, and if the code is “0000000”, it indicates permanent copy denial. - The
specific password information 49 indicates a specific password represented by four characters including English letters and numerals, and each character can be selected from 36 different characters. In this case, each character is described by a 6-bit code. - The specific user/
organization information 50 indicates a specific user or organization. - The contents of the
control information 42 may be simplified depending on the information contents to be processed by the information transmission system. For example, in the simplest system, thecontrol information 42 may consist of a 1-bitcopy grant code 43 alone. - The
control information 42 having the format shown in FIG. 3 is encapsulated in the encryptedkey information 41 shown in FIG. 2 without any encryption. The size of the encryptedkey information 41 is larger than that of thecontrol information 42. In order to prevent a hacker from breaking the encryptedkey information 41, the encryptedkey information 41 requires a size at least twice that of thecontrol information 42, and preferably, three times or more. - Hence, when the
control information 42 has the 119-bit configuration, the encryptedkey information 41 requires at least 238 bits, normally, 357 bits or more. - When the
control information 42 consists of the 1-bitcopy grant code 43 alone, the encryptedkey information 41 requires at least 2 bits, normally, 3 bits or more. - As shown in FIG. 4, the
IC card 4 has anelectrode portion 5 as a connect portion to be connected to an IC card reader/writer 13 (to be described later), a user passwordinput terminal hole 6, and a master keyinput terminal hole 7. A userpassword input terminal 6 a is present inside the user passwordinput terminal hole 6, and a masterkey input terminal 7 a is present inside the master keyinput terminal hole 7. - The user password
input terminal hole 6 and master keyinput terminal hole 7 are filled up with a resin or the like after user corresponding key information (second specific information) is generated by inputting a user password (first specific information) and master key information (common key information) when theIC card 4 is issued by an issuance device, and is recorded on an EEPROM 34 (to be described later). With this structure, the user corresponding key information cannot be changed later, i.e., cannot be deliberately altered. - More specifically, after the user corresponding key information as the second specific information is formed by inputting the user password as the first specific information and the master key by the user, i.e., the provider as an issuer of the
IC card 4, an external input route to those input portions (input terminals) is cut off to prevent alteration. - In place of filling up the user password
input terminal hole 6 and master keyinput terminal hole 7, the userpassword input terminal 6 a and masterkey input terminal 7 a themselves may be removed or their electrode portions may be removed to prevent the user corresponding key information from being altered at a later time. In this case, lead lines may be used instead of the input terminals, and may be removed upon issuance. - The
client machine 1 is an information processing apparatus such as a personal computer, and comprises aCPU 10 for controlling theoverall client machine 1, aROM 11 that records control programs, aRAM 12 for data recording, the IC card reader/writer 13 for exchanging data with the above-mentionedIC card 4, adisplay unit 14, akeyboard 15 as an input unit, a hard disk device (HDD) 16 as a recording unit (information recording medium), anoptical disk device 17 as a recording unit that receives anoptical disk 17 a, and acommunication interface 18 connected to thehost server 3 via thecommunication line 2, as shown in FIG. 5. - The hard disk device (HDD)16 and the
optical disk device 17 can be connected later as optional devices. - As shown in FIG. 6, the
host server 3 comprises aCPU 20 for controlling theentire host server 3, aROM 21 that records control programs, aRAM 22 for data recording, anEEPROM 23 which records master key information in advance, anencrypter 24 for encrypting raw information to obtain theencrypted information 40 using key information, adecrypter 25 for decrypting the encryptedkey information 41 using the master key information to obtain key information, akey information multiplexer 26 for generating the encryptedkey information 41, aCRT display 27 as a display unit, akeyboard 28 as an input unit at which the user inputs a user password, a hard disk device (HDD) 29 as a recording unit (information recording medium) which records information consisting of an encrypted program (encrypted information) such as wordprocessing program, and encrypted key information corresponding to that encrypted information, and acommunication interface 30 connected to theclient machine 1 via thecommunication line 2. - In place of the hard disk device (HDD)29, an optical disk device may be used. If a larger-capacity recording unit is required, a disk array such as a RAID (redundant arrays inexpensive disk) or the like may be used.
- The
key information multiplexer 26 multiplexes encrypted key draft information as a temporary encrypted key and thecontrol information 42 to generate the encryptedkey information 41 as a mixing result, and comprises, e.g., twoshift registers - The shift registers26 a and 26 b sequentially output supplied encrypted key draft information, and load the
control information 41 upon reception of a load signal supplied from theCPU 20, thus encapsulating thecontrol information 41 in the encrypted key draft information and outputting the obtained information. In this case, theCPU 20 outputs the load signal on the basis of the address of the encrypted key draft information read out from theRAM 22. - Each of the
encrypter 24 anddecrypter 25 comprises sevenshift registers 60 a to 60 g, and threeoperators 61 a to 61 c for operating exclusive ORs, as shown in FIG. 8. - In case of the
encrypter 24, for example, when key information “1010010001011” as a random number is supplied to the shift registers 60 a to 60 g, and raw information “1110001110001” is supplied to theoperator 61 c, theoperator 61 c outputs encrypted information “1011100000101” as the encryption result. - In case of the
decrypter 25, for example, when master key information “110100000110” as a random number is supplied to the shift registers 60 a to 60 g, and encrypted key information “1000011100101” is supplied to theoperator 61 c, theoperator 61 c outputs key information “1010010001011” as decrypted information, i.e., the decryption result. - Note that the
keyboard 28 is used as the input unit used for inputting the user password. A voiceprint may be used instead of the user password, and a microphone and a voiceprint feature detector may be used as the input unit. On the other hand, facial information may be used instead of the user password, and a face image reader comprising a CCD and the like, and a facial information feature extractor may be used as the input unit. Furthermore, in place of key input of the user password, speech recognition of the user password may be used, and a microphone and speech recognition apparatus may be used as the input device. Moreover, a fingerprint may be used in place of the user password, and a fingerprint reader comprising a CCD and the like, and an image feature extractor may be used as the input unit. In addition, finger information may be used in place of the user password, and finger surface resistance measurement device at individual points using an electrode array, and a finger information feature extractor may be used as the input unit. - As shown in FIG. 9, the
IC card 4 comprises aCPU 31 for controlling theentire IC card 4, aROM 32 that records control programs, aRAM 33 for data recording, theEEPROM 34 for recording user corresponding key information, user password, user ID, and the like, a user correspondingkey information generator 35 for generating user corresponding key information, amaster key generator 36 for generating master key information, adecrypter 37 for decrypting the encryptedkey information 41 using the master key information to obtain key information, adecrypter 38 for decrypting theencrypted information 40 using the key information to obtain raw information, aninterface 39, theconnect portion 5, the userpassword input terminal 6 a at which the user password is input, and the masterkey input terminal 7 a at which the master key information is input. - The
IC card 4 is provided to each user as an authentication IC card to prevent breaches of security, and incorporates all the decryption circuits. With this system, neither master key information nor key information never go out of an IC, thus preventing illicit acts by a hacker. Hence, in the information transmission system shown in FIG. 1, theIC card 4 that incorporates the decryption circuits serves as a decipher device, and corresponds to a decipher unit when viewed from the entire information transmission system. - The user corresponding
key information generator 35 comprises an operator for operating an exclusive OR, and exclusively ORs the user password input from the userpassword input terminal 6 a and the master key information input from the masterkey input terminal 7 a to generate user corresponding key information as the operation result. - For example, the
generator 35 generates user corresponding key information “1001” by exclusively ORing user password “1100” and master key information “1010”. - The
master key generator 36 comprises an operator for operating an exclusive OR, and exclusively ORs the user corresponding key information read out from theEEPROM 34 and an externally supplied user password to generate master key information as the operation result. - For example, the
generator 36 generates master key information “1010” by exclusively ORing user corresponding key information “1001” and user password “1100”. - Each of the
decrypters shift registers 60 a to 60 g and threeoperators 61 a to 61 c for operating exclusive ORs, as shown in FIG. 8. With this arrangement, each decrypter operates information loaded in the shift registers 60 a to 60 g on the basis of the information successively supplied to theoperator 61 c. - In case of the
decrypter 37, for example, when master key information “110100000110” as a random number is supplied to the shift registers 60 a to 60 g, and encrypted key information “1000011100101” is supplied to theoperator 61 c, theoperator 61 c outputs key information “1010010001011” as decrypted information, i.e., the decryption result. - In case of the
decrypter 38, for example, when key information “1010010001011” as a random number is supplied to the shift registers 60 a to 60 g, and encrypted information “1011100000101” is supplied to theoperator 61 c, theoperator 61 c outputs raw information “1110001110001” as decrypted information, i.e., the decryption result. - A method of recording the above-mentioned service information (to be provided to the user) onto the hard disk device (HDD)29 by the
host server 3 will be described below with reference to the flow chart shown in FIG. 10 and FIG. 11 that shows the generation process of the encryptedkey information 41 and theencrypted information 40. - For example, the provider (who provides the service information to the users) of the
host server 3 inputs raw information as a small-unit functional program for an application described in, e.g., a programming language (JAVA) (ST1) using a user interface including theCRT display 27 andkeyboard 28. This raw information is recorded on theRAM 22 by the CPU 20 (ST2). - Furthermore, the provider of the
host server 3 inputs the contents of the above-mentionedcontrol information 42 including thecopy grant code 43 and the like, as shown in FIG. 7, using the user interface (ST3). Thiscontrol information 42 is recorded on theRAM 22 by the CPU 20 (ST4). - The provider of the
host server 3 inputs encrypted key draft information as a temporary encrypted key using the user interface (ST5). The encrypted key draft information is recorded on theRAM 22 by the CPU 20 (ST6). - The
CPU 20 reads out the encrypted key draft information and controlinformation 42 recorded on theRAM 22, and outputs them to thekey information multiplexer 26, which mixes the encrypted key draft information and controlinformation 42 to generate the encrypted key information 41 (ST7). Subsequently, theCPU 20 records the generated encryptedkey information 41 on theRAM 22, and also the hard disk device (HDD) 29 (ST8). - The
CPU 20 reads out the generated encryptedkey information 41 recorded on theRAM 22, and master key information recorded on theEEPROM 23, and outputs them to thedecrypter 25, which decrypts (breaks) the encryptedkey information 41 using the master key information to generate key information (ST9). TheCPU 20 then records the generated key information on the RAM 22 (ST1O). - The
CPU 20 reads out raw information recorded on theRAM 22 and the generated key information, and outputs them to theencrypter 24, which encrypts the raw information using the key information, thus generating the encrypted information 40 (ST11). Finally, theCPU 20 records the generatedencrypted information 40 on the hard disk device (HDD) 29 in correspondence with the encrypted key information 41 (ST12). - In this case, the encrypted
key information 41 is generated first, and after that, the key information is supplied by supply the encrypted key information to the decrypter. Using the generated key information, the encrypter generates theencrypted information 40 as service information to be provided to the user, and the generatedencrypted information 40 is recorded on theHDD 29 together with the encryptedkey information 40. - Issuance of the
IC card 4 by the information service provider, i.e., the method of registering the user corresponding information into theIC card 4 will be explained below with reference to the flow chart shown in FIG. 12. Basically, the information service provider sets theIC card 4 before theIC card 4 is delivered to the user. - An issuance machine that issues the
IC card 4 comprises a card reader/writer which can exchange data with theIC card 4 via itsconnect portion 5, and can input data via the userpassword input terminal 6 a and masterkey input terminal 7 a, a user interface including a display unit and input unit, and a control unit for controlling the issuance. - More specifically, the information service provider inserts an
IC card 4 on which nothing is recorded into the issuance machine (ST21). Upon card insertion, the card reader/writer of the issuance machine is connected to theconnect portion 5, userpassword input terminal 6 a, and masterkey input terminal 7 a of the IC card 4 (ST22). - Furthermore, the information service provider directs issuance of an IC card, and inputs a password determined by the information service provider upon contract with the user, and master key information that only the information service provider knows, using the user interface (ST23). The user password and master key information are supplied to the user corresponding
key information generator 35 via the IC card reader/writer 13, userpassword input terminal 6 a, masterkey input terminal 7 a (ST24). The user correspondingkey information generator 35 exclusively ORs the input information in units of bits to generate user corresponding key information, and outputs the generated information to the EEPROM 34 (ST25). The user corresponding key information is then recorded on the EEPROM 34 (ST26). - After the user corresponding key information is recorded, the information service provider inputs the user password and user ID determined upon contract with the user. The
CPU 10 outputs the user password and user ID to theCPU 31 via the IC card reader/writer 13, connectportion 5, anduser interface 39. TheCPU 31 records the received user password and user ID on theEEPROM 34. - After the corresponding key information and the like are recorded, the issuance machine issues the
IC card 4. The provider fills up the user passwordinput terminal hole 6 and master keyinput terminal hole 7 of the issuedIC card 4 with, e.g., a resin. In this manner, an external input route to the user correspondingkey information generator 35 can be cut off, and the user corresponding key information can never be changed later, i.e., can be prevented from being illicitly altered. - The processing for transmitting a transfer request for a program such as wordprocessing software to the
host server 3 by startup processing at theclient machine 1, breaking encrypted information obtained in response to the request using theIC card 4, and setting the decrypted information as a functional program will be explained below with reference to the flow chart shown in FIG. 13. - The power switch (not shown) of the
client machine 1 is turned on to start up the client machine (ST31). Theclient machine 1 communicates with thehost server 3 to confirm if there is wanted data in a specific group (charging system or the like) (ST32). For example, a request for a program such as wordprocessing software as an information service is generated. When this confirmation (request) is directed, theCPU 10 displays a guidance for insertion of anIC card 4 that can download (break) the data on the display unit 14 (ST33). In accordance with this guidance, the user inserts the corresponding IC card 4 (ST34). - The
CPU 10 then displays a guidance for input of the user ID and user password on the display unit 14 (ST35). In accordance with this guidance, the user inputs the user ID and user password (ST36). - The
CPU 10 supplies the input user ID and user password to theCPU 31 in theIC card 4 via the IC card reader/writer 13, connectportion 5, and interface 39 (ST37). TheCPU 31 compares the supplied user ID and user password with those recorded in advance on theEEPROM 23 to check if they coincide with each other (ST38). If a coincidence is determined, theCPU 31 informs theclient machine 1 of the user ID (ST39); otherwise, theCPU 31 determines an unauthorized user, stops operation, and informs theclient machine 1 of an NG signal (ST40). - Upon determining the coincidence in
step 38, parallel to the processing instep 39, theCPU 31 exclusively ORs the user password and the user corresponding key information recorded in advance on theEEPROM 34 using themaster key generator 36 to generate master key information as the operation result, and records it on the RAM 33 (ST41). - The
client machine 1 that received the user ID instep 39 adds an IP address of theclient machine 1 to an information service request based on the request for the program such as wordprocessing software as the information service issued by the user and the user ID received from theIC card 4, and transmits them to the host server 3 (ST42). In response to the transfer request, thehost server 3 authenticates the user ID. After that, thehost server 3 forms a communication packet which includes the program (encrypted information) such as wordprocessing software as the information service, which is encrypted and recorded on the hard disk device (HDD) 29, the encrypted key information 41 (encrypted information for decryption) corresponding to that encrypted information, and an IP address with the source and destination addresses, and sends back the packet to theclient machine 1 that issued the transfer request (ST43). In this case, the contents of charge for the user corresponding to the user ID for transmission of the information service are recorded on a recording unit (not shown). - Upon reception of the sent-back packet, the
client machine 1 decrypts (breaks) theencrypted information 40 by the encryptedkey information 41 and thecontrol information 42 in the encryptedkey information 41 using the IC card 4 (ST44), and allows the user to perform processing using the decrypted program such as wordprocessing software (ST45). - Decryption of the
encrypted information 40 will be described below with reference to the flow chart shown in FIG. 14. - More specifically, the
CPU 10 of theclient machine 1 checks the region code of a region where thehost server 3 is installed on the basis of the IP address in the received communication packet, generates client machine generated information including the source IP address and the checked region code and added with “1H” as the value of thedrive code 44 if thecommunication line 2 is a 10-MHz LAN network, and sends it to the IC card 4 (ST51). - The
CPU 31 of theIC card 4 records the received client machine generated information on the RAM 33 (ST52). - Parallel to supply of that information, the
CPU 31 exclusively ORs the user password for which the coincidence has been determined, and the user corresponding key information recorded in advance on theEEPROM 34 using themaster key generator 36 to generate master key information as the operation result, and records it on the RAM 33 (ST53). - After the above-mentioned preparation has been done, the
CPU 31 of theIC card 4 transmits a transmission request for thecopy grant code 43 to theCPU 10 of the client machine 1 (ST54). In response to this transmission request, theCPU 10 of theclient machine 1 extracts thecopy grant code 43 from thecontrol information 42 encapsulated in the encryptedkey information 41, and transmits it to theCPU 31 of the IC card 4 (ST55). - The
CPU 31 of theIC card 4 checks if thecopy grant code 43 is “1” or “0” to determine whether copying is granted (ST56). - If it is determined that copying is granted, the
CPU 31 unconditionally accepts theencrypted information 40 and the like independently of its source even when they are copied on theHDD 16 or a disk of theoptical disk device 17, and advances to step 61 to execute decryption. - On the other hand, if it is determined in step56 that copying is denied, since the source of the
encrypted information 40 and the like must be confirmed, theCPU 31 transmits a transmission request for thedrive code 44,address code 45, andregion code 46 to theCPU 10 of the client machine 1 (ST57). In response to this transmission request, theCPU 10 of theclient machine 1 extracts thedrive code 44,address code 45, andregion code 46 from thecontrol information 42 encapsulated in the encryptedkey information 41, and transmits them to theCPU 31 of the IC card 4 (ST58). - The
CPU 31 of theIC card 4 checks if thedrive code 44,address code 45, andregion code 46 supplied from theclient machine 1 coincide with the client machine generated information recorded on the RAM 33 (ST59). - More specifically, if the source of the encrypted information and the like is a 10-MHz ISDN, the drive code in the client machine generated information is “1H”, and coincides with “1H” of the
drive code 44 in thecontrol information 42, thus determining the source of the encrypted information and the like as an authentic one. - On the other hand, if the encrypted information and the like is a reconstruction from the
HDD 16, the drive code in the client machine generated information is “CH”, and does not coincide with “1H” of thedrive code 44 in thecontrol information 42, thus determining the source of the encrypted information and the like as an unauthorized one, i.e., illicitly copied information. - Also, whether or not the source IP address in the client machine generated information coincides with the
address code 45 in thecontrol information 42 is checked to determine if the encrypted information and the like are original ones or illicitly copied ones for commercial use as a pirated edition. - If a non-coincidence is determined in step59, the
CPU 31 determines an unauthorized user, stops operation, and informs theclient machine 1 of an NG signal (ST60). - On the other hand, if a coincidence is determined in step59 (i.e., if it is determined that the encrypted information and the like are original ones), or if it is determined in step 56 that copying is granted, the
CPU 31 grants decryption and determines decryption start. Then, theCPU 31 transmits a transmission request for the encryptedkey information 41 to theCPU 10 of the client machine 1 (ST61). In response to this transmission request, theCPU 10 of theclient machine 1 transmits the encryptedkey information 41 to the IC card 4 (ST62). - The
CPU 31 of theIC card 4 directs thedecrypter 37 to decrypt (break) the encryptedkey information 41 supplied from theclient machine 1 using the master key information recorded on theRAM 33 to generate key information, and records it on the RAM 33 (ST63). - Subsequently, the
CPU 31 transmits a transmission request for theencrypted information 40 to theCPU 10 of the client machine 1 (ST64). In response to this transmission request, theCPU 10 of theclient machine 1 transmits theencrypted information 40 to the IC card 4 (ST65). - The
CPU 31 of theIC card 4 instructs thedecrypter 38 to decrypt (break) theencrypted information 40 supplied from theclient machine 1 using the key information recorded on theRAM 33 to generate raw information, and transmits it to the client machine 1 (ST66). - Upon reception of the raw information, the
CPU 10 of theclient machine 1 records the program such as wordprocessing software as the received raw information on the RAM 22 (ST67). As a result, the user can perform processing using the program such as wordprocessing software recorded on theRAM 22 at theclient machine 1. - As described above, the master key generator can generate the master key information as a common key using the user password in the
IC card 4, i.e., in a place not accessible by the user. - The user corresponding key information is recorded in advance on the EEPROM, and the master key generator generates master key information as a common key on the basis of the user corresponding key information and the password input by the user. Using the generated master key information, the decrypter can decrypt the encrypted information.
- As described above, since the host server need not encrypt information upon receipt of each user's request, low-cost information delivery can be realized.
- Illicitly copied information can be very easily found, thus greatly improving security.
- In the technical view of encryption, as compared to the conventional hybrid system that encrypts data itself using a common key, and encrypts the common key alone using a public key again, two common keys are issued, one common key is encrypted and is transmitted (transfer of the encrypted common key) together with the encrypted data, and the other common key is decrypted inside the
IC card 4 using specific information input by the user. For this reason, the common key is exposed neither in the middle of the transmission path nor to the user himself or herself. - Hence, not only the following remarkable improvements can be obtained as compared to the shortcomings of the common key scheme:
- 1. A key is unlikely to be illicitly copied by a third party during its transfer.
- 2. The key can be easily managed (the user need only have only one IC card).
- 3. The destination user can hardly alter encrypted data.
- But also as compared to the asymmetric scheme:
- 4. Both the information service provider and user can readily encrypt/decrypt within a relatively short period of time.
- 5. Since the information service provider need only set a master key alone, and need not inquire public keys of a management center in units of users, the information provision efficiency to the users can be markedly improved.
- 6. The information service provider can record encrypted information in advance on an IC card, and can deliver the IC card directly. For this reason, as compared to conventional encryption that encrypts information in response to each user's request and delivers the encrypted information, the load on the information service provider can be greatly lightened.
- 7. Preparation for decryption can be done by only a conventional authentication procedure using an IC card, i.e., by inputting a user's password for personal authentication. Hence, the encryption technique can be adopted without imposing any extra loads on the user to assure security.
- 8. Since control information of encrypted information includes device information and region information, the user cannot copy the encrypted information to an HDD or optical disk and cannot illicitly use it.
- Consequently, all the shortcomings of the conventional encryption technique can be removed, processing at both the information source and destination can be greatly simplified, and the security function can be enhanced.
- The second embodiment will be described below. In this embodiment, information (see FIG. 2) consisting of
encrypted information 40 and encryptedkey information 41 containingcontrol information 42 like that recorded on the recording unit (HDD 29) of thehost server 3 in the first embodiment is recorded on anoptical disk 17 a such as a DVD-ROM or the like, and is loaded into the optical disk device (ROM drive) 17 of theclient machine 1 of the first embodiment so as to reproduce information. - In this case, “FH” indicating the DVD-ROM is described as a drive code in the control information, and the manufacturing date indicating the time of creation of a master disk of an optical disk is described as time information.
- More specifically, in place of transmitting the communication packet formed by the
encrypted information 40, the encryptedkey information 41 containing thecontrol information 42, and the IP address from the host server in the first embodiment, theencrypted information 40, the encryptedkey information 41 containing thecontrol information 42 are reproduced from the DVD-ROM 17 a loaded in theoptical disk device 17. The subsequent operations are done in substantially the same manner as in the flow charts shown in FIGS. 13 and 14, except that the drive code in the client machine generated information is “FH”, and only when it coincides with “FH” of thedrive code 44 in thecontrol information 42, it is determined that the encrypted information and the like are obtained from an authorized source. - Information such as video data and the like may be recorded as the encrypted information to be recorded on the optical disk (DVD-ROM)17 a, in addition to the program and the like.
- Of the operations shown in FIGS. 13 and 14, processing portion (step53) associated with the user password may be omitted. In this case, the
EEPROM 34 of theIC card 4 records in advance master key information in place of the user corresponding key information. - As will be described in detail below, the optical disk (DVD-ROM)17 a is prepared by recording the
encrypted information 40 and the encryptedkey information 41 containing thecontrol information 42 onto amaster disk 70 used in the manufacture of the optical disk (DVD-ROM) 17 a in the same manner as in the recording method of such information described above with reference to FIGS. 10 to 12 in the first embodiment. - The method of manufacturing the optical disk (DVD-ROM)17 a will be explained below with reference to FIGS. 15A to 15K.
- A
glass plate 71 formed of reinforced glass having a thickness of 0.5 to 30 mm to guarantee high surface precision is placed on a spindle motor 72 (FIG. 15A), and is rotated at a specific rotational speed. A photoresist solution dissolved in an organic solvent is applied onto the rotating plate, and is uniformly spread by utilizing the centrifugal force upon rotation of theglass plate 71. This coating method is generally called spinner coating. After that, theglass plate 71 is left to stand in a high-temperature environment ranging from 60 to 300° C. to evaporate the organic solvent, thus forming aphotoresist layer 73 with a uniform thickness dr (FIG. 15B). - Although the transfer efficiency normally drops in the processes shown in FIGS. 15F to15I to be described later, if the transfer efficiency of 100% is maintained throughout the processes, the thickness dr of the
photoresist layer 73 becomes the pit depth or pre-groove depth on arecording film 84 of a final information recording medium. - A
laser beam 75 is focused by anobjective lens 76 of a master disk recording apparatus (to be described later) and is intermittently irradiated onto thephotoresist layer 73 so as to form exposedportions 74 by exposure (FIG. 15C). Upon completion of exposure over the entire perimeter, theglass plate 71 is detached from the master disk recording apparatus, and a developingsolution 77 is applied for a specific period of time while rotating theglass plate 71, as shown in FIG. 15D. - As a result, the exposed
portions 74 dissolve and are removed, as shown in FIG. 15E, thus forming small grooves (ridges) with the depth dr. The formedglass plate 71 andphotoresist layer 73 are called amaster disk 70 of an optical disk. The formedmaster disk 70 is detached from thespindle motor 72, and a replica of the three-dimensional pattern of themaster disk 70 is formed by electroless plating using Ni and electrolytic plating (electroforming). As shown in FIG. 15F, the formed replica is called amaster plate 78. Upon completion of formation of themaster plate 78, the structure, i.e., themaster disk 70 and themaster plate 78 are dipped into an organic solvent such as acetone to dissolve thephotoresist layer 73, thus peeling themaster plate 78 from themaster disk 70. After that, amother plate 79 is formed based on themaster plate 78 by electrolytic plating (electroforming) (FIG. 15G), and themother plate 79 is then stripped from themaster plate 78. Placing themother plate 79 back in position, astamper 80 is formed by electrolytic plating (electroforming) (FIG. 15H). - In general, a transparent
plastic substrate 83 for an information recording medium is formed by a method called “injection molding”. More specifically, molds A 81 andB 82 are set, as shown in FIG. 15I, and a high-temperature molten resin material (polycarbonate, PMMA, ABS, or the like is normally used) is filled in the gap between these molds. Since thestamper 80 formed in the previous process is attached to themold A 81, the small three-dimensional pattern on thestamper 80 is transferred to the resin material when the resin material is filled. After that, the molds A 81 andB 82, and the resin material are left to stand to cool the resin material to ordinary temperature together with these molds. After the resin material is cooled and solidifies, a plastic substrate 83 (the cooled and solidified resin material transferred with the three-dimensional pattern is called a “plastic substrate 83”) is released by opening the molds A 81 andB 82. - The obtained
plastic substrate 83 is placed in vacuum, and arecording film 84 is formed on theplastic substrate 83 by deposition such as sputtering, vacuum deposition, ion plating, or the like, thus forming a structure shown in FIG. 15J. Two such structures are set so that theirrecording films adhesive film 85 is filled into a gap therebetween, thus completing an information recording medium shown in FIG. 15K. - FIG. 16 shows the structure of the master disk recording apparatus for locally exposing the
photoresist layer 73 shown in FIG. 15C. As described above, theglass plate 71 is rotated on thespindle motor 72 at a specific rotational speed. Thelaser beam 75 is reflected by areturn mirror 88, and is focused on thephotoresist layer 73 via theobjective lens 76. Thereturn mirror 88 andobjective lens 76 move together as amovable portion 89 in the radial direction of theglass plate 71. Themovable portion 89 is driven to move by afeed motor 90 and afeed gear 91. Themovable portion 89 has a monitor portion (not shown) for optically monitoring the focused spot position on theglass plate 71, and the rotational speed of thespindle motor 72 changes in correspondence with the monitor output. In this way, a master diskrecording control unit 50 controls the relative moving speed (linear velocity) of the focused spot on theglass plate 71 to become constant. - The
laser beam 75 emitted by alaser source 97 passes through an E.O.modulator 94 and A.O.modulator 93, and then reaches thereturn mirror 88. A pre-pit signal representing a small, three-dimensional pit pattern turns on/off a high-speed switch 96 in accordance with a signal supplied from apre-pit signal generator 99, thus applying or releasing a voltage from avariable voltage generator 95 onto or from the E.O.modulator 94. By changing the voltage to be applied to the E.O.modulator 94, the amount of laser beam that passes through the E.O.modulator 94 changes. In this manner, the amount of laser beam that reaches thephotoresist layer 73 is changed to form exposedportions 74 and non-exposed portions on thephotoresist layer 73. - When a
specific frequency oscillator 92 applies a voltage of specific frequency to the A.O.modulator 93, a standing wave having a specific spatial period (a compression wave among molecules in the A.O. modulator 93) in the A.O.modulator 93 is produced. With this standing wave, thelaser beam 75 undergoes Bragg reflection, and is deflected in a specific direction. Hence, when the spatial period of the standing wave changes, the Bragg condition changes, and the deflection angle of thelaser beam 75 changes accordingly. That is, upon changing the output frequency of thespecific frequency oscillator 92, the traveling direction of thelaser beam 75 changes, and as a consequence, the focal point position on thephotoresist layer 73 moves radially. - In case of an information recording medium having wobble pre-grooves at a specific period, the frequency of the
frequency oscillator 92 changes at a specific period in accordance with the output from a wobble groove generator/groove pit switch 98. In case of wobble pits, the frequency of thespecific frequency oscillator 92 is changed to radially displace the focused spot on thephotoresist layer 73 by half the track pitch (the pitch between lands and grooves). - As described above, the ROM drive17 (client machine 1) that has no decryption means for decrypting encrypted information can solely determine whether or not information reproduction is granted. With this arrangement, when it is detected that information reproduction is inhibited, information which are inhibited from being reproduced and transferred can be inhibited from being transferred to an apparatus such as a personal computer that attempts to decrypt and reproduce the information.
- In the conventional system, when the encrypted key includes control information, the ROM drive must have decryption means for decrypting the key information, resulting in high cost. Also, such ROM drive loses compatibility with conventional ones. However, the second embodiment can alleviate such shortcomings.
- Still another embodiment will be described below. This embodiment exemplifies a network system in which a
host server 101 anduser server 102 are connected to anetwork computer 105 vianetworks - For example, the
host server 101 has the same arrangement as that of thehost server 3 of the first embodiment, and has anHDD 29 which records information consisting of an encrypted program (information used by the user) 40 such as wordprocessing software as encrypted information, and encryptedkey information 41 containingnon-encrypted control information 42 and obtained by encrypting key information for decrypting (breaking) theencrypted information 40. - The
network computer 105 comprises acontrol unit 106 for controlling theoverall network computer 105, areception unit 107 for receiving the encrypted information and the like from thehost server 101, a decipherunit 108 for breaking codes such as the encrypted information and the like received at thereception unit 107, aRAM memory 109 for storing the information broken by the decipherunit 108, anencrypter 110 for encrypting the processing result of thecontrol unit 106, and atransmission unit 111 for transmitting the processing result encrypted by theencrypter 110 to theuser server 102 as information. The decipherunit 108 has the same arrangement and function as those of theIC card 4 of the first embodiment, and theencrypter 110 also has the same arrangement and function as those of theencrypter 24 of the first embodiment. - With this arrangement, encrypted information of a small-size functional program and the like described in JAVA or the like sent from the
host server 101 via thenetwork 102 is converted into an electrical signal by thereception unit 107, and the converted signal is directly input to the decipherunit 108. The decrypted functional program is input to theRAM memory 109. Thecontrol unit 106 executes arithmetic processing while reading out the functional program from theRAM memory 109. The result after the processing is encrypted by theencrypter 110, and the encrypted information is sent from thetransmission unit 111 to theuser server 102 via thenetwork 103. - Since all the circuits except for the
reception unit 107 andtransmission unit 111 in thenetwork computer 105 are realized by a single chip, a raw signal after decryption cannot be directly output outside the chip, thus improving the security function. - As still another embodiment, an example using a broadcast satellite will be described below with reference to FIG. 18.
- More specifically, encrypted information and the like shown in FIG. 2 of the first embodiment are sent from a
key station 121 via abroadcast satellite 122. Areception unit 124 in an information reproduction apparatus 123 converts the received information into an electrical signal, and the converted signal is decrypted by a decipherunit 125 formed by the IC card of the first embodiment to obtain a raw signal. The decrypted information is displayed on adisplay unit 126. - According to the above embodiments, information that requires security protection or copyright protection can be prevented from being illicitly copied.
- Additional advantages and modifications will readily occur to those skilled in the art. Therefore, the invention in its broader aspects is not limited to the specific details and representative embodiments shown and described herein. Accordingly, various modifications may be made without departing from the spirit or scope of the general inventive concept as defined by the appended claims and their equivalent.
Claims (26)
1. An information recording medium which records:
encrypted information; and
encrypted key information obtained by encrypting key information for decrypting the encrypted information to obtain original information,
wherein non-encrypted condition information used upon decrypting the encrypted information is recorded in the encrypted key information.
2. A medium according to claim 1 , wherein the condition information is a condition for granting decryption of the encrypted information.
3. A medium according to claim 2 , wherein the condition information includes device information indicating a transmission path of the encrypted information and a device that uses information obtained by decrypting the encrypted information.
4. A medium according to claim 2 , wherein the condition information includes region information.
5. A medium according to claim 2 , wherein the condition information includes temporal information.
6. A medium according to claim 2 , wherein the condition information includes information for specifying a user.
7. A medium according to claim 1 , wherein the condition information is device information indicating a transmission path of the encrypted information and a device that uses information obtained by decrypting the encrypted information.
8. A medium according to claim 7 , wherein the condition information includes region information.
9. A medium according to claim 7 , wherein the condition information includes temporal information.
10. A medium according to claim 7 , wherein the condition information includes information for specifying a user.
11. A medium according to claim 1 , wherein the condition information is region information.
12. A medium according to claim 11 , wherein the condition information includes temporal information.
13. A medium according to claim 11 , wherein the condition information includes information for specifying a user.
14. A medium according to claim 1 , wherein the condition information is temporal information.
15. A medium according to claim 14 , wherein the condition information includes information for specifying a user.
16. A medium according to claim 1 , wherein the condition information is information for specifying a user.
17. A recording apparatus comprising:
setting means for setting encrypted key draft information and condition information used upon decryption;
first generation means for generating encrypted key information on the basis of the encrypted key draft information and the condition information which is not encrypted;
recording means for recording common key information;
second generation means for generating key information by decrypting the encrypted key information generated by said first generation means using the common key information recorded in said recording means;
input means for inputting information to be encrypted;
third generation means for generating encrypted information by encrypting the information to be encrypted input by said input means using the key information generated by said second generation means; and
recording means for recording the encrypted key information including the condition information generated by said first generation means and the encrypted information generated by said third generation means on an information recording medium in correspondence with each other.
18. An apparatus according to claim 17 , wherein the condition information is a condition for granting decryption of the encrypted information.
19. An apparatus according to claim 17 , wherein the condition information is device information indicating a transmission path of the encrypted information and a device that uses information obtained by decrypting the encrypted information.
20. An apparatus according to claim 17 , wherein the condition information is region information.
21. An apparatus according to claim 17 , wherein the condition information is temporal information.
22. An apparatus according to claim 17 , wherein the condition information is information for specifying a user.
23. An information transmission system, which comprises a first apparatus having an information recording medium that records encrypted information, and encrypted key information obtained by encrypting key information for decrypting the encrypted information to obtain original information, and a second apparatus which is connected to said first apparatus via a communication line and receives the encrypted information and encrypted key information transmitted from said information recording medium of the first apparatus,
wherein non-encrypted condition information used upon decrypting the encrypted information is recorded in the encrypted key information recorded on said information recording medium of said first apparatus,
said first apparatus comprises:
transmission means for transmitting the encrypted key information including the condition information and the encrypted information recorded on said information recording medium to said second apparatus,
said second apparatus comprises:
first output means for outputting the condition information, encrypted key information, and encrypted information received from said first apparatus to a processing medium for performing decryption; and
execution means for executing processing in accordance with decrypted information from said processing medium, and
said processing medium comprises:
determination means for determining based on the condition information from said second apparatus if decryption is granted;
decryption means for, when said determination means determines that decryption is granted, decrypting the encrypted information on the basis of the encrypted key information from said second apparatus; and
second output means for outputting the information decrypted by said decryption means to said second apparatus.
24. A decipher apparatus that processes encrypted information, and encrypted key information obtained by encrypting key information for decrypting the encrypted information to obtain original information, comprising:
recording means which records second specific information generated based on first specific information and common key information;
setting means for setting the first specific information;
generation means for generating the common key information on the basis of the first specific information set by said setting means and the second specific information recorded on said recording means;
first decryption means for obtaining key information by decrypting the encrypted key information using the common key information generated by said generation means; and
second decryption means for obtaining information before encryption by decrypting the encrypted information using the key information obtained by said first decryption means.
25. A decipher apparatus of a portable medium that processes encrypted information, and encrypted key information obtained by encrypting key information for decrypting the encrypted information to obtain original information, comprising:
an input unit at which first specific information and common key information are input;
first generation means for generating second specific information on the basis of the first specific information and the common key information input at said input unit;
recording means for recording the second specific information generated by said first generation means;
inhibition means for inhibiting input from said input unit after recording on said recording means;
setting means for setting the first specific information;
second generation means for generating the common key information on the basis of the first specific information set by said setting means and second specific information recorded on said recording means;
first decryption means for obtaining key information by decrypting the encrypted key information using the common key information generated by said second generation means; and
second decryption means for obtaining information before encryption by decrypting the encrypted information using the key information obtained by said first decryption means.
26. A decipher apparatus that processes encrypted information, and encrypted key information including condition information used upon decrypting the encrypted information and obtained by encrypting key information for decrypting the encrypted information to obtain original information, comprising:
recording means which records second specific information generated based on first specific information and common key information;
setting means for setting the first specific information;
generation means for generating the common key information on the basis of the first specific information set by said setting means and the second specific information recorded on said recording means;
first decryption means for obtaining key information by decrypting the encrypted key information using the common key information generated by said generation means;
second decryption means for obtaining information before encryption by decrypting the encrypted information using the key information obtained by said first decryption means;
determination means for determining based on the condition information if decryption is granted; and
control means for controlling execution of decryption by said first and second decryption means on the basis of the determination result of said determination means.
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---|---|---|---|
US09/396,477 US20020049677A1 (en) | 1997-02-07 | 1999-09-15 | Information recording medium, recording apparatus, information transmission system, and decryption apparatus |
US10/133,802 US20020120576A1 (en) | 1997-02-07 | 2002-04-29 | Information recording medium, recording apparatus, information transmission system, and decryption apparatus |
Applications Claiming Priority (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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JP9-025303 | 1997-02-07 | ||
JP2530397 | 1997-02-07 | ||
US09/019,586 US6144743A (en) | 1997-02-07 | 1998-02-06 | Information recording medium, recording apparatus, information transmission system, and decryption apparatus |
US09/396,477 US20020049677A1 (en) | 1997-02-07 | 1999-09-15 | Information recording medium, recording apparatus, information transmission system, and decryption apparatus |
Related Parent Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
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US09/019,586 Continuation US6144743A (en) | 1997-02-07 | 1998-02-06 | Information recording medium, recording apparatus, information transmission system, and decryption apparatus |
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US10/133,802 Continuation US20020120576A1 (en) | 1997-02-07 | 2002-04-29 | Information recording medium, recording apparatus, information transmission system, and decryption apparatus |
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US20020049677A1 true US20020049677A1 (en) | 2002-04-25 |
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US09/396,477 Abandoned US20020049677A1 (en) | 1997-02-07 | 1999-09-15 | Information recording medium, recording apparatus, information transmission system, and decryption apparatus |
US10/133,802 Abandoned US20020120576A1 (en) | 1997-02-07 | 2002-04-29 | Information recording medium, recording apparatus, information transmission system, and decryption apparatus |
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US09/019,586 Expired - Lifetime US6144743A (en) | 1997-02-07 | 1998-02-06 | Information recording medium, recording apparatus, information transmission system, and decryption apparatus |
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US10/133,802 Abandoned US20020120576A1 (en) | 1997-02-07 | 2002-04-29 | Information recording medium, recording apparatus, information transmission system, and decryption apparatus |
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US (3) | US6144743A (en) |
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US20020120576A1 (en) | 2002-08-29 |
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