US11716166B2 - Handheld portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems - Google Patents
Handheld portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- US11716166B2 US11716166B2 US17/387,631 US202117387631A US11716166B2 US 11716166 B2 US11716166 B2 US 11716166B2 US 202117387631 A US202117387631 A US 202117387631A US 11716166 B2 US11716166 B2 US 11716166B2
- Authority
- US
- United States
- Prior art keywords
- countermeasure device
- handheld
- signal
- processor
- portable
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Active, expires
Links
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims description 20
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims description 7
- 239000012190 activator Substances 0.000 description 22
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 9
- 230000008878 coupling Effects 0.000 description 7
- 238000010168 coupling process Methods 0.000 description 7
- 238000005859 coupling reaction Methods 0.000 description 7
- 230000009977 dual effect Effects 0.000 description 7
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 6
- 230000000670 limiting effect Effects 0.000 description 6
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 description 6
- 230000004913 activation Effects 0.000 description 5
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 5
- 238000009877 rendering Methods 0.000 description 5
- XEEYBQQBJWHFJM-UHFFFAOYSA-N Iron Chemical compound [Fe] XEEYBQQBJWHFJM-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 4
- HBBGRARXTFLTSG-UHFFFAOYSA-N Lithium ion Chemical compound [Li+] HBBGRARXTFLTSG-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 3
- 230000003321 amplification Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000004458 analytical method Methods 0.000 description 3
- 229910052799 carbon Inorganic materials 0.000 description 3
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 description 3
- 229910001416 lithium ion Inorganic materials 0.000 description 3
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000003199 nucleic acid amplification method Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000003287 optical effect Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000000007 visual effect Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000004075 alteration Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000001413 cellular effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000013500 data storage Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000003247 decreasing effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000010304 firing Methods 0.000 description 2
- 229910052742 iron Inorganic materials 0.000 description 2
- 238000012423 maintenance Methods 0.000 description 2
- 239000007769 metal material Substances 0.000 description 2
- 230000008439 repair process Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000012549 training Methods 0.000 description 2
- 229920000049 Carbon (fiber) Polymers 0.000 description 1
- WHXSMMKQMYFTQS-UHFFFAOYSA-N Lithium Chemical compound [Li] WHXSMMKQMYFTQS-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 1
- 229910005813 NiMH Inorganic materials 0.000 description 1
- 241000321728 Tritogonia verrucosa Species 0.000 description 1
- 239000002253 acid Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000009471 action Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000006978 adaptation Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000002411 adverse Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000013459 approach Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000002238 attenuated effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- OJIJEKBXJYRIBZ-UHFFFAOYSA-N cadmium nickel Chemical compound [Ni].[Cd] OJIJEKBXJYRIBZ-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 1
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000004917 carbon fiber Substances 0.000 description 1
- 239000000919 ceramic Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000000295 complement effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 239000002131 composite material Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000001419 dependent effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000006073 displacement reaction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000002360 explosive Substances 0.000 description 1
- 239000000446 fuel Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000007274 generation of a signal involved in cell-cell signaling Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000003116 impacting effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000006872 improvement Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000003780 insertion Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000037431 insertion Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000009434 installation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000009545 invasion Effects 0.000 description 1
- 229910052744 lithium Inorganic materials 0.000 description 1
- 238000007726 management method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 description 1
- 229910052987 metal hydride Inorganic materials 0.000 description 1
- VNWKTOKETHGBQD-UHFFFAOYSA-N methane Chemical compound C VNWKTOKETHGBQD-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 description 1
- 230000000737 periodic effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 239000004033 plastic Substances 0.000 description 1
- 229920000642 polymer Polymers 0.000 description 1
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000002829 reductive effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000010079 rubber tapping Methods 0.000 description 1
- 231100000241 scar Toxicity 0.000 description 1
- 230000008054 signal transmission Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000005236 sound signal Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000003068 static effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000008685 targeting Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/80—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function
- H04K3/92—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to allowing or preventing remote control
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
- G08B6/00—Tactile signalling systems, e.g. personal calling systems
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G08—SIGNALLING
- G08B—SIGNALLING OR CALLING SYSTEMS; ORDER TELEGRAPHS; ALARM SYSTEMS
- G08B7/00—Signalling systems according to more than one of groups G08B3/00 - G08B6/00; Personal calling systems according to more than one of groups G08B3/00 - G08B6/00
- G08B7/06—Signalling systems according to more than one of groups G08B3/00 - G08B6/00; Personal calling systems according to more than one of groups G08B3/00 - G08B6/00 using electric transmission, e.g. involving audible and visible signalling through the use of sound and light sources
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H01—ELECTRIC ELEMENTS
- H01Q—ANTENNAS, i.e. RADIO AERIALS
- H01Q21/00—Antenna arrays or systems
- H01Q21/06—Arrays of individually energised antenna units similarly polarised and spaced apart
- H01Q21/22—Antenna units of the array energised non-uniformly in amplitude or phase, e.g. tapered array or binomial array
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
- H04K3/41—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by the control of the jamming activation or deactivation time
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/60—Jamming involving special techniques
- H04K3/65—Jamming involving special techniques using deceptive jamming or spoofing, e.g. transmission of false signals for premature triggering of RCIED, for forced connection or disconnection to/from a network or for generation of dummy target signal
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/80—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function
- H04K3/82—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to preventing surveillance, interception or detection
- H04K3/825—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to preventing surveillance, interception or detection by jamming
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
- H04K2203/10—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application
- H04K2203/22—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application for communication related to vehicles
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
- H04K2203/10—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application
- H04K2203/24—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application for communication related to weapons
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
- H04K2203/30—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by the infrastructure components
- H04K2203/32—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by the infrastructure components including a particular configuration of antennas
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
- H04K3/42—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by the control of the jamming frequency or wavelength
Definitions
- the following relates generally to the electronic countermeasure arts, the unmanned autonomous vehicle arts, signal jamming arts, communications arts, satellite navigation and communication arts, law enforcement arts, military science arts, and the like. It finds particular application in conjunction with the jamming and hijacking of drones and will be described with particular reference thereto. However, it will be understood that it also finds application in other usage scenarios and is not necessarily limited to the aforementioned application.
- Unmanned or autonomous aerial vehicles (“UAV), more commonly known as “drones”, have become more and more prevalent in both the military and civilian context.
- UAV Unmanned or autonomous aerial vehicles
- Current, commercially available drones embody technology that was until recently, solely within the purview of governmental entities.
- the drones available to the civilian and military markets include navigation systems, various types of eavesdropping components, high-definition or real-time video output, long-life lithium batteries, and the like.
- current civilian models may be operated by any individual, without regard to licensing or regulation.
- the drones in use typically operate using multiple frequency bands, some bands used for control signals between the drone and the pilot, bands for Global Navigation Satellite System (“GNSS”) signals for navigation including, for example and without limitation, GPS, GLONASS, Galileo (EU), BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (“BDS”), and other public/proprietary satellite-based navigation systems, and other frequency bands for video and/or audio signal transmissions.
- GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
- GLONASS Galileo
- BDS BeiDou Navigation Satellite System
- This use of multiple frequencies results in difficulty in effectively tailoring a jamming signal directed solely to the offending drone, without negatively impacting other, non-offensive radio-frequency devices.
- jammers for Wi-Fi or satellite navigation will propagate a jamming signal circularly outward, rendering the operator's own devices inoperable while within that radius.
- the unintended consequences of such jamming may cause vehicle accidents or aircraft issues, depending upon the strength and radius of the jammer being used.
- a ruggedized form factor directional drone jammer that provides a soldier or law enforcement officer with simple, targeted anti-drone capabilities.
- a jammer is portable, including a power supply, and comprises a rifle-like form allowing the soldier or law enforcement officer to aim via optic, electronic or open sights at a target drone for jamming of the drone control and/or GNSS signals, while preventing interference for other devices utilizing the jammed frequencies.
- a suitable form-factor that relieves arm strain while maintaining aim on a targeted drone.
- the following discloses a new and improved portable countermeasure device, utilizing a dual-grip embodiment, with directional targeting which addresses the above referenced issues, and others.
- a portable countermeasure device comprising at least one directional antenna, at least one disruption component and at least one activator.
- the countermeasure device further includes a processor and memory in communication therewith wherein the memory stores instructions which are executed by the processor to monitor a system performance by measuring at least one performance indicator of the countermeasure device.
- the portable countermeasure device includes a haptic feedback component in communication with the processor configured to generate a haptic feedback pattern associated with the measured performance indicator.
- the measured performance indicator is at least one of a temperature, a machine state log, a battery power level, a transmission signal, a GNSS position, a time count, or an output power level
- the device further comprises a GNSS receiver or at least one temperature sensor in communication with the processor configured to detect a temperature of the countermeasure device.
- the measured performance indicator is recorded to a data log within the memory or onto a removable data storage device.
- a portable countermeasure device having a hand-held form factor with dual-grips, the grips located adjacent each other.
- a dual-grip portable countermeasure device includes a body having a first grip and a second grip, with the second grip adjacent to the first grip located on a bottom portion of the body.
- the dual-grip portable countermeasure device further includes at least one directional antenna affixed to a plated removably coupled to a front portion of the body, and at least one signal disruption component disposed within an interior of the body, the at least one signal disruption component in electronic communication with the at least one directional antenna.
- a dual-grip portable countermeasure device in accordance with another embodiment, includes a body that has a first grip located on a bottom portion of the body, a second grip adjacent the first grip located on the bottom portion of the body, and a hollow buttstock with a buttstock cavity formed in a rear portion of the body, with the first grip angled toward a buttstock of the body, and the second grip is angled opposite the first grip toward the front of the body.
- the dual-grip portable countermeasure device also includes a connector located within the buttstock cavity, the connector configured to removably couple with a power supply.
- Disruption components are located within the body and are in communication with the external power supply via the connector, the disruption components configured to generate a disruption signals on corresponding associated frequency bands.
- the dual-grip portable countermeasure device also includes a first activator coupled to the body adjacent the first grip and in operable communication with the external power supply and at least one of the disruption components.
- the dual-grip portable countermeasure device also includes multiple directional antennae in communication with the disruption components, the directional antennae configured to emit a corresponding plurality of disruption signals generated by the plurality of disruption components.
- the portable countermeasure device further comprises a firearm form factor body, wherein the directional antenna is affixed to removable plate removably attached to a front portion of the firearm form factor body.
- the one or more disruption components may be externally or internally mounted to the firearm form factor body.
- a power source is capable of being inserted into the buttstock cavity so as to supply power to the disruption components.
- a battery pack may comprise a lithium-ion battery, NiMH battery, or the like.
- the disruption components generate disruptive signals across multiple frequency bands via at least one antenna.
- the multiple frequency bands include GNSS, control signals, and/or Wi-Fi signals.
- multiple antennae are used for different frequency bands.
- a measured performance indicator is recorded to a data log within a memory or removable data storage device.
- the processor is further configured to attenuate the output power of the amplified signal by one of pulse width modulation, voltage control of the at least one amplifier, a variable voltage attenuator, and waveform control.
- the disruption signals including at least one of noise, spoofing, or alternate control commands are stored within the memory.
- FIG. 1 illustrates a cross section of a portable countermeasure device in accordance with one aspect of the exemplary embodiment.
- FIG. 2 A illustrates a right-side three-dimensional view of an example portable countermeasure device according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 2 B illustrates a left side three-dimensional view of the example portable countermeasure device of FIG. 2 A according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 2 C illustrates a top three-dimensional view of the example portable countermeasure device of FIG. 2 A according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 2 D illustrates a bottom three-dimensional view of the example portable countermeasure device of FIG. 2 A according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 2 E illustrates a front three-dimensional view of the example portable countermeasure device of FIG. 2 A according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 2 F illustrates a rear three-dimensional view of the example portable countermeasure device of FIG. 2 A according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 3 A illustrates a right-side view of the example portable countermeasure device of FIG. 2 A according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 3 B illustrates a left-side view of the example portable countermeasure device of FIG. 3 A according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 3 C illustrates a top view of the example portable countermeasure device of FIG. 3 A according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 3 D illustrates a bottom view of the example portable countermeasure device of FIG. 3 A according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 3 E illustrates a front view of the example portable countermeasure device of FIG. 3 A according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 3 F illustrates a back view of the example portable countermeasure device of FIG. 3 A according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 4 illustrates an external backpack containing the jammer components utilized by the example portable countermeasure device of FIG. 2 .
- FIG. 5 illustrates a close up view of jammer components utilized by the portable countermeasure device of the example embodiment of FIG. 2 .
- FIG. 6 A illustrates a three-dimensional rendering of the portable countermeasure device of FIGS. 2 A- 3 F in accordance with one aspect of the exemplary embodiment.
- FIG. 6 B illustrates a three-dimensional rendering of an alternate embodiment of the portable countermeasure device of FIGS. 2 A- 3 F in accordance with one aspect disclosed herein.
- FIG. 6 C illustrates a three-dimensional rendering of another alternate embodiment of the portable countermeasure device of FIGS. 2 A- 3 F in accordance with one aspect disclosed herein.
- FIG. 7 A illustrates a three-dimensional side view of a yagi antenna utilized by the portable countermeasure device of FIGS. 2 A- 3 F in accordance with one embodiment.
- FIG. 7 B illustrates a three-dimensional top view of the yagi antenna utilized by the portable countermeasure device of FIG. 7 A in accordance with one embodiment.
- FIG. 7 C illustrates a three-dimensional bottom view of the yagi antenna utilized by the portable countermeasure device of FIG. 7 A in accordance with one embodiment.
- FIG. 7 D illustrates a three-dimensional front view of the yagi antenna utilized by the portable countermeasure device of FIG. 7 A in accordance with one embodiment.
- FIG. 7 E illustrates a three-dimensional rear view of the yagi antenna utilized by the portable countermeasure device of FIG. 7 A in accordance with one embodiment.
- FIG. 8 A illustrates a side view of the yagi antenna depicted in FIG. 7 A utilized by the portable countermeasure device in accordance with one embodiment.
- FIG. 8 B illustrates a top view of the yagi antenna depicted in FIG. 7 A utilized by the portable countermeasure device in accordance with one embodiment.
- FIG. 8 C illustrates a bottom view of the yagi antenna depicted in FIG. 7 A utilized by the portable countermeasure device in accordance with one embodiment.
- FIG. 8 D illustrates a front view of the yagi antenna depicted in FIG. 7 A utilized by the portable countermeasure device in accordance with one embodiment.
- FIG. 8 E illustrates a rear view of the yagi antenna depicted in FIG. 7 A utilized by the portable countermeasure device in accordance with one embodiment.
- FIG. 9 A illustrates a close-up view of the dual-grip configuration of the portable countermeasure device of FIGS. 2 A- 3 F in accordance with one aspect of the exemplary embodiment.
- FIG. 9 B illustrates another close-up view of the dual-grip configuration of the portable countermeasure device of FIGS. 2 A- 3 F in accordance with one aspect of the exemplary embodiment.
- FIG. 10 A illustrates a three-dimensional left side view of the dual-grip configuration of the portable countermeasure device of FIGS. 9 A- 9 B in accordance with one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 10 B illustrates a three-dimensional right-side view of the dual-grip configuration of the portable countermeasure device of FIGS. 9 A- 9 B in accordance with one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 10 C illustrates a three-dimensional top view of the dual-grip configuration of the portable countermeasure device of FIGS. 9 A- 9 B in accordance with one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 10 D illustrates a three-dimensional bottom view of the dual-grip configuration of the portable countermeasure device of FIGS. 9 A- 9 B in accordance with one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 10 E illustrates a three-dimensional rear view of the dual-grip configuration of the portable countermeasure device of FIGS. 9 A- 9 B in accordance with one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 10 F illustrates a three-dimensional front view of the dual-grip configuration of the portable countermeasure device of FIGS. 9 A- 9 B in accordance with one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 11 A illustrates a left-side view of the dual-grip configuration of the portable countermeasure device of FIGS. 9 A- 9 B in accordance with one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 11 B illustrates a right-side view of the dual-grip configuration of the portable countermeasure device of FIGS. 9 A- 9 B in accordance with one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 11 C illustrates a top view of the dual-grip configuration of the portable countermeasure device of FIGS. 9 A- 9 B in accordance with one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 11 D illustrates a bottom view of the dual-grip configuration of the portable countermeasure device of FIGS. 9 A- 9 B in accordance with one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 11 E illustrates a rear view of the dual-grip configuration of the portable countermeasure device of FIGS. 9 A- 9 B in accordance with one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 11 F illustrates a front view of the dual-grip configuration of the portable countermeasure device of FIGS. 9 A- 9 B in accordance with one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 12 A illustrates a perspective of the portable countermeasure device of FIG. 1 in accordance with one aspect of the exemplary embodiment.
- FIG. 12 B illustrates a left-side view of the example portable countermeasure device of FIG. 12 A according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 12 C illustrates a front three-dimensional view of the example portable countermeasure device of FIG. 12 A according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 12 D illustrates a rear three-dimensional view of the example portable countermeasure device of FIG. 12 A according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 12 E illustrates a right-side view of the example portable countermeasure device of FIG. 12 A according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 12 F illustrates a top three-dimensional view of the example portable countermeasure device of FIG. 12 A according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 12 G illustrates a bottom three-dimensional view of the example portable countermeasure device of FIG. 12 A according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 13 A illustrates a rear perspective view of a buttstock according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 13 B illustrates a top perspective view of a buttstock and battery according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 13 C illustrates a perspective view of a buttstock according to one embodiment of the subject application.
- the portable countermeasure device such as rifle-like or firearm form factor jammer, that can be aimed by an operator at a drone, resulting in the disruption of control and/or navigation signals.
- the portable countermeasure device includes multiple signal generators and associated amplifiers, producing disruptive, spoofing and/or jamming signals across multiple frequency bands.
- suitable disruptive signals may include, for example and without limitation, multi- or single frequency noise signals, alternative command signals, false data signals, and the like.
- at least one antenna is coupled to the portable countermeasure device, capable of directing multiple frequency bands of disruptive signals toward a single target, forming a cone around the target.
- the portable countermeasure device may be self-contained, with replaceable battery packs, or receive power from an external source.
- the various components of the portable countermeasure device may be added to an existing fire arm, an aftermarket rifle stock, or a firearm-like form factor having a customized body incorporating the various components.
- the portable countermeasure device may be aimed via at least one sight device including, iron sights, an optical scope, or other means for directing the disruptive signals toward a targeted drone.
- the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented without complex software, hardware, enabling a soldier or law enforcement officer to use the portable countermeasure device without substantial training. Such a simplified implementation further ruggedizes the portable countermeasure device for use in harsh environments where weather, lack of resupply, insurgents, criminals, or the like, may operate.
- FIG. 1 there is shown a cross-section of a portable countermeasure device 100 in accordance with one exemplary embodiment of the subject application.
- the portable countermeasure device 100 may be implemented in a firearm-like form factor, providing ease of use and familiarization to the operator. Accordingly, the portable countermeasure device 100 provides a soldier or law enforcement officer (operator) with the ability to specifically target a particular drone with disruptive signals, while minimizing the impact of the generated signal on other, non-targeted devices.
- the various components depicted in FIG. 1 are for purposes of illustrating aspects of the exemplary hardware are capable of being substituted therein.
- the portable countermeasure device 100 of FIG. 1 is capable of implementation in a variety of handheld or portable form factors and the illustrations depicted and discussed hereinafter provide exemplary, and non-limiting, form factors contemplated hereunder.
- the portable countermeasure device 100 comprises a body 102 including a processor 101 that executes, a memory 103 that stores computer-executable instructions for providing the various functions, calculations, selections and the like described herein, and signal disruption components 104 in communication therewith, e.g., at least one signal generator 106 and at least one amplifier 108 .
- the processor 101 and memory 103 are physically coupled together with various other electronic components via microprocessor board 105 .
- the processor 101 can be any of various commercially available processors.
- the at least one processor 101 can be variously embodied, such as by a single-core processor, a dual-core processor (or more generally by a multiple-core processor), a digital processor and cooperating math coprocessor, a digital controller, or the like.
- the processor 101 in addition to controlling the operation of the countermeasure device 100 , executes instructions stored in memory 103 for performing the various functions described more fully below.
- the memory 103 may represent any type of non-transitory computer readable medium such as random-access memory (RAM), magnetic disk or tape, optical disk, flash memory, or holographic memory. In one embodiment, the memory 103 comprises a combination of random-access memory and read only memory. In some embodiments, the processor 101 and memory 103 may be combined in a single chip. Memory 103 may store data the processed in the method as well as the instructions for performing various exemplary functions.
- RAM random-access memory
- magnetic disk or tape magnetic disk or tape
- optical disk optical disk
- flash memory or holographic memory.
- the memory 103 comprises a combination of random-access memory and read only memory.
- the processor 101 and memory 103 may be combined in a single chip.
- Memory 103 may store data the processed in the method as well as the instructions for performing various exemplary functions.
- the memory 103 suitably includes firmware, such as static data or fixed instructions, such as BIOS, system functions, configuration data, and other routines used for the operation of the countermeasure device 100 via the processor 101 .
- the memory 103 is further capable of providing a storage area for data and instructions associated with applications and data handling accomplished by the processor 101 .
- the memory 103 may further include one or more instructions, or modules, configured to be executed by the processor 101 to perform one or more operations, such as operations associated with the countermeasure device 100 , which operations are described in greater detail below.
- FIG. 1 depicts a portable countermeasure device 100 that utilizes a dual-grip configuration, having a first grip 114 in location typical with the typical pistol-grip rifle, and second grip 115 in relatively close proximity to the first grip 114 .
- the first and second grips 114 and 115 may be adjacent to each other, with the second grip 115 cantilevered or angled forward, towards the front 10 of the device 110 and the first grip 114 cantilevered or angled back towards the rear 11 of the device 110 .
- the body 102 may, for example and without limitation, resemble a commonly used rifle, including, without limitation, M4 carbine, M14, AR-platform, or the like, comprising an upper receiver and a lower receiver, as well as other rifle designs, as will be appreciated by those skilled in the art including, for example, modular rifle designs, standard rifle designs, and the like.
- the microprocessor board 105 and/or the signal disruption components 104 may be contained in the upper receiver, the lower receiver, or both.
- the body 102 may be constructed of non-metallic materials, i.e., ballistic plastic, carbon fiber, ceramics, etc., or suitable non-transmissive metallic composites.
- the body 102 may be implemented in a suitable form factor with which soldiers and/or law enforcement personnel are already familiar, e.g., the aforementioned M4 carbine, AR-platform, AK-platform, SCAR, bullpup, etc. It will be appreciated that the width, length, and height of the body 102 may be dependent upon the size and number of generators 106 and amplifiers 108 either integral therein or externally affixed thereto.
- a multifunctional cell is formed as the body 102 to provide both structural support/shape of the portable countermeasure device 100 as well as supply power to the components therein.
- a suitable example of such a multifunctional cell is provided in PCT/US2013/040149, filed May 8, 2013 and titled MULTIFUNCTIONAL CELL FOR STRUCTURAL APPLICATIONS, the entire disclosure of which is incorporated by reference herein.
- the portable countermeasure device 100 may include multiple signal disruption components 104 to combat a variety of potential targets, e.g., receivers of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), commercial drones, military drones, or other portable electronic devices of enemy combatants or suspects, e.g., cellular phones, GNSS-based navigation devices, remote control detonators, etc.
- IEDs improvised explosive devices
- FIG. 12 A et seq.
- the portable countermeasure device 100 includes a first activator 110 , located adjacent to the first grip 114 .
- a portable countermeasure device 200 may also include a second activator 112 , located adjacent to the second grip 115 on underside of the body 102 . It will be understood that the portable countermeasure device 100 may be implemented with a single activator, whereby multiple disruptive signals are generated via the activation of the single activator.
- the activator such as activator 110 and/or 112 , as will be appreciated, is operable to close a circuit or “firing mechanism” (not shown) to allow power to flow from the power source, e.g., backpack (not shown), AC power (not shown), or optional, battery pack (not shown), to the signal generator 106 and amplifier 108 of the signal disruption components 104 .
- the activator 110 or 112 may be implemented as typical firearm triggers, toggle switches, spring-loaded buttons, or the like.
- the first activator 110 is operable to activate control circuitry for transmitting signals for the disruption of control frequency bands
- the second activator 112 is operable to activate control circuitry for disruption of GNSS/navigation bands.
- activator 110 , 112 may active the control circuitry for transmitting any desired signal or combination of signals.
- an operator of the countermeasure device 100 may, via operator input, select a desired transmitting signal.
- An example implementation of the dual activators 110 - 112 is embodied in the portable countermeasure device 200 of FIGS. 2 A- 3 F , discussed below.
- the signal generator 106 and corresponding amplifier 108 may be configured to generate signals from DC to 30 GHz.
- a signal generator 106 with a corresponding amplifier 108 , is configured to generate disruptive signals in the, 70-75 MHz, 400-500 MHz, 800-900 MHz, 900-1000 MHz, 1000 MHz-1.8 GHz, 2.0 GHz-2.6 GHz, 5.0-5.6 GHz frequency ranges, common cellular frequency bands, IEEE HF, VHF, UHF, L, S, C, X, K u , K, K a , V, W, or mm bands, or other known control/navigation signal frequency ranges.
- a signal generator 106 for each of the 72 MHz frequency band, the 433 MHz frequency band, the 800 MHz frequency band, the 915 MHz frequency band, the 1.2 GHz frequency band, 1.3 GHz frequency band, the 1.5 GHz frequency band, the 2.4 GHz frequency band, and the 5.8 GHz frequency band, with corresponding amplifiers 108 are incorporated into the portable countermeasure device 100 .
- the signal generator 106 may be in communication with memory 103 that stores alternative command signals for spoofing or hacking, as will be known in the art, at a particular control frequency.
- the signal generator 106 may be operable to transmit a different navigation signal (altering the coordinates the drone is receiving from navigation satellites/commands), transmit a control signal indicating the drone should land or return to home, or the like. It will be appreciated that such signals generated via the signal generator 106 may be output in addition to noise, jamming, or the like, or in place thereof.
- a power supply (not shown) supplies suitable power to the microprocessor board 105 and disruption components 104 of the portable countermeasure device 100 .
- the power supply may be implemented as a rechargeable battery, including, for example and without limitation, a lithium-ion battery, a lithium ion polymer battery, a nickel-metal hydride battery, lead-acid battery, nickel-cadmium cell battery, or other suitable, high-capacity source of power.
- a non-rechargeable battery may be utilized, as will be appreciated by those skilled in the art.
- the power supply is implemented in a magazine form factor, capable of insertion into a battery well (similar to the magazine well of the lower receiver of a rifle). It will be appreciated that such an implementation will be natural to a soldier or law enforcement officer, allowing utilization of existing magazine carrying devices for carrying additional battery packs, familiarity with changing a battery pack, as well as maintain the balance of the portable countermeasure device 100 similar to those rifles with which the soldier or law enforcement officer is most familiar.
- the portable countermeasure device 100 includes a buttstock cavity 116 within a buttstock 113 .
- the buttstock cavity 116 is configured to receive and accept a portable, i.e. removable battery (e.g., replaceable battery 150 of FIG. 13 C ) to power the countermeasure device 100 .
- the buttstock cavity 116 may be accessed by opening a hinged buttstock door 118 .
- the buttstock door 118 at the rear end 11 of the buttstock 113 is capable of pivoting from a closed position, shown in FIG. 1 , to an open position about hinge 119 , illustrated and described in greater detail with respect to FIGS. 13 A-C .
- the removable battery 150 When the buttstock door 118 is in the open position, the removable battery 150 is able to be placed within the buttstock cavity 116 and engage a suitable coupling 117 A. Closing the buttstock door 118 secures the removable battery 150 within the buttstock cavity 116 ensures proper connectivity between a battery connection and coupling 117 A. In some embodiments, the closed buttstock door 118 , provides a force that urges the removable battery 150 to engage connector 117 A. Providing a removable/replaceable/rechargeable battery 150 within the buttstock cavity 116 may aid in weight balancing the countermeasure device 100 about the dual-grip portions 114 and 115 .
- the portable countermeasure device 100 may utilize an auxiliary cable to a backpack power supply, a remote power source, a portable generator, fuel cell, vehicle interface, or the like.
- a suitable coupling 117 A is illustrated as positioned within the buttstock cavity 116 , enabling the attachment of a replaceable battery 150 or a suitable power cable from various sources, e.g., a battery stored in a backpack, hip/fanny pack, secured to MOLLE webbing, or the like.
- the battery pack is not limited in form and can be complementary to the form-factor of the portable countermeasure device 100 , for example, similar to a rectangular magazine, tubular magazine, and the like, as well as being integrated within the body 102 of the portable countermeasure device 100 , i.e., a structural battery as discussed above.
- the portable countermeasure device 100 may include a display 120 operable to display remaining power levels of the battery pack, effective range of the output of the signal disruption components 104 relative to power supply level, or the like.
- This optional display 120 may be connected to control components such as those components present on microprocessor board 105 and be customized to display the frequency selected for output by the jammer components 104 .
- the display 120 may be implemented as an LED, LCD, OLED, or other suitable display type.
- the display 120 of the portable countermeasure device 100 may be implemented as a visual indicator associated with operation of the various components of the device 100 . It will be appreciated that as the portable countermeasure device 100 does not provide physical recoil when operated, the display 120 provides visual feedback to the operator.
- one or more LEDs may be utilized, indicating, for example and without limitation that individual circuit cards are powered up, that individual circuit cards are within specified limits, that power is on to the operating/selected antennae, which antennae are operating, and the like.
- the portable countermeasure device 100 is equipped with a haptic feedback component 121 , configured to provide haptic feedback through the body 102 (or grips 114 , 115 ) to the operator when the portable countermeasure device 100 is active.
- the haptic feedback component 121 may be activated when one or more triggers 110 , 112 are engaged and power to the signal disruption components 104 is on.
- the haptic feedback generated by the component 121 may differ so as to indicate which antenna(e) 122 A-C of FIGS. 1 and 12 A -G (see also antenna(e) 202 , 204 , and 206 of FIG. 2 A- 3 F ) is engaged.
- the portable countermeasure device 100 of the subject application does not provide any observable recoil when activated. Accordingly, the haptic feedback component 121 may provide varying feedback to triggers 110 and/or 112 , grips 114 and/or 115 , buttstock 113 , etc., indicating activation of the portable countermeasure device 100 .
- the haptic feedback component 121 is a haptic activator placed within the grip 114 . While illustrated within the grip 114 , it is to be appreciated that the haptic activator may be placed in other locations, for example and without limitation, grip 115 and buttstock cavity 116 .
- the haptic feedback component 121 may be variously embodied for example and without limitation, as an eccentric rotating mass (ERM) actuator composed of an unbalanced weight attached to a motor shaft; a linear resonant actuator (LRA), which provides feedback by moving a mass in a reciprocal manner by means of a magnetic voice coil; a piezoelectric actuator; and/or, a combination of haptic actuators.
- ECM eccentric rotating mass
- LRA linear resonant actuator
- the haptic feedback component 121 is in communication with the processor 101 . That is, the processor 101 may control the activity of the haptic component 121 in order to create at least one haptic feedback pattern intended to communicate information to an operator of the countermeasure device 100 . For example, the processor 101 may cause the haptic feedback component 121 , to vibrate continuously for a period of time. As another example of a haptic feedback pattern, the processor 101 may cause the haptic feedback component 121 to vibrate in short pulses, the short pluses may be spaced within a predetermined time. That is, the haptic feedback component 121 may provide a haptic feedback pattern of pulsing twice, pausing for a period of time (1 second), and repeating.
- the memory 103 may store the instructions for producing various haptic feedback patterns. It is to be understood that the example haptic feedback patterns are non-limiting and that any combination of duration of pulsing and pauses may be used.
- the haptic feedback component 121 generates a haptic feedback pattern associated with an operational state of the countermeasure device 100 . For example, if the processor 101 detects an issue with the operation of the device 100 , a haptic feedback pattern associated with a particular issue may be generated. In this way, an operator of the countermeasure device 100 is alerted to the issue and may take corrective action. For example, the processor 101 may detect that a battery of the countermeasure device is low and cause the haptic feedback component 121 to generate a haptic feedback pattern associated with low battery power (e.g., two short pluses, followed by a two second pause, repeating).
- low battery power e.g., two short pluses, followed by a two second pause, repeating
- the operator recognizing the haptic feedback pattern, is alerted to the low power issue and may replace the battery on the countermeasure device 100 .
- the haptic feedback component 121 and processor 101 generate a haptic feedback pattern associated with a self-monitoring state described in greater detail below.
- the haptic feedback component 121 may be in communication with a selector (e.g., shown at 130 in FIG. 12 A ), such that the haptic feedback pattern generated corresponds to a mode of operation selected with the selector upon activation of the portable countermeasure device 100 .
- the portable countermeasure device 100 depicted in FIGS. 1 and 12 A -G utilizes at least one directional antenna 122 A-C, extending outward from the body 102 in a direction away from the operator. It will be understood that the countermeasure device 100 may utilize multiple directional antennae 122 A, 122 B, 122 C, in accordance with the number of disruptive signals to be generated, the types of disruptive signals, desired range, and the like, as described below. It will be appreciated that, maintaining a suitable comparison to a rifle, the at least one antenna 122 A-C replaces the barrel of a rifle, thereby maintaining familiarity and ease of operation by the soldier or law enforcement officer.
- the at least one antenna 122 A-C may be “hot-swappable” or “replaceable” in the field, allowing for different directional antennae to be used by the portable countermeasure device 100 in accordance with the battlefield conditions.
- the distances involved in commercial drone disruption may utilize less power-intensive disruptive signals than military drone disruption.
- a suitable antenna may not need to be as large, or a different design antenna may be used.
- an expedient repair capable of being performed by the soldier or law enforcement officer is replacement of the at least one antenna 122 A-C, as opposed to having to submit the portable countermeasure device 100 to an armorer or electronics specialist for repair, thereby keeping the portable countermeasure device 100 operative.
- the at least one antenna 122 A-C is/are attached to a plate 123 .
- the plate 123 may be removably attachable to the body 102 of the countermeasure device 100 . That is, the single plate 123 containing at least one antenna, is able to be removed from the countermeasure device 100 and replaced with another plate, similar to plate 123 , containing at least one antenna.
- the plate 123 and at least one antenna 122 A-C are plug and play components allowing for “hot swap” in the field.
- the at least antenna 122 A-C is implemented as a combined, high-gain, directional antenna having a helical cross-section.
- Other suitable directional antenna e.g., Yagi, cylindrical, parabolic, log periodic array, spiral, phased array, conical, patch, etc., are also capable of being utilized in accordance with the disclosure set forth herein.
- At least one sight 124 Affixed to the top of the body 102 , either fixed thereto, or removably attached, e.g., attachments to a rail, is at least one sight 124 , allowing for aiming by the soldier or law enforcement officer of the portable countermeasure device 100 at a target drone.
- a wide or narrow field of view optical sight may be utilized to allow the soldier or law enforcement officer to target drones beyond the normal field of vision.
- the at least one sight 124 may be constructed of a suitable non-metallic material.
- the disruption cone 126 may range from 0 degrees to 180 degrees, including for example and without limitation, 0 to 120 degrees, 0 to 90 degrees, 0-45 degrees, 20 to 30 degrees or variations thereof.
- the effective range of the portable countermeasure device 100 may extend outward from the at least one antenna 122 A-C at varying ranges, from 0 meters outward greater than or equal to 400 meters in accordance with the power supplied to the disruption components 104 . Accordingly, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the maximum range of the portable countermeasure device 100 may be extended or reduced in accordance with the amount of power supplied to the disruption components 104 , the ratio of power to time on target, and the like.
- the soldier or law enforcement officer will target a drone hovering or flying in an unauthorized area by aiming the at least one antenna 122 A-C of the portable countermeasure device 100 in a manner similar to a regular firearm. That is, the soldier or law enforcement officer, using the at least one sight 124 , directs the at least one antenna 122 A-C of the portable countermeasure device 100 toward the drone. After ensuring that sufficient power is available, and the drone is within the effective range of the portable countermeasure device 100 , the soldier or law enforcement officer activates the activator 110 to activate the control circuit (not shown), which regulates the power from a battery or other power source to the disruption components 104 .
- a single activator may control activation of all disruption components 104 , thereupon simultaneously or sequentially generating disruptions signals as described herein when the activators 110 and 112 are activated.
- multiple disruption signal generators 106 and amplifiers 108 are activated to produce the desired disruption signal, e.g., noise, spoofing, alternate commands, alternate coordinates, etc., on the selected frequency bands.
- the disruptive signal is then directed through the at least one antenna 122 A-C (capable of handling multiple frequency bands) or multiple antennae and transmitted toward the drone at which the portable countermeasure device 100 is aimed.
- the disruption cone 126 then extends outward from the portable countermeasure device 100 toward the drone, disrupting control and GNSS signals effectively negating the presence of the drone in the unauthorized area.
- Alternative embodiments disclosed herein include generating, via the signal generator 106 , alternative commands to the drone, instructing the drone to land, change direction, change video broadcast stream, stop video streaming/recording, thereby overriding the original control signals.
- the portable countermeasure device 100 may be configured to transmit altered navigation coordinates, confusing the drone or forcing the drone to leave (or travel to) a particular area.
- the soldier or law enforcement officer then maintains his/her aim on the drone until the drone falls, retreats, loses power, or the like.
- the activator(s) 110 - 112 may then be deactivated by the law enforcement officer or soldier and the disabled drone may then be recovered by the appropriate authority for determination of the owner.
- the portable countermeasure device 100 includes hardware, software, and/or any suitable combination thereof, configured to interact with an associated operator, a networked device, networked storage, remote devices, detector systems, tracking systems, and the like.
- the portable countermeasure device 100 may include a processor 101 , which performs signal analysis, ballistic analysis, or the like, as well as execution of processing instructions which are stored in memory 103 connected to the processor 101 for determining appropriate signal generation for disruption, power supply management, and the like.
- a processor 101 which performs signal analysis, ballistic analysis, or the like, as well as execution of processing instructions which are stored in memory 103 connected to the processor 101 for determining appropriate signal generation for disruption, power supply management, and the like.
- separate, integrated control circuitry, or the like may be incorporated into the portable countermeasure device 100 so as to avoid interference of operations by the disruption components 104 , or the like.
- the processor 101 is an internal microprocessor that is further configured to run internal self-monitoring operations. That is, the countermeasure device 100 includes internal components that verify that the system is operating correctly before radiating out a disruption signal to the at least one antenna 122 A-C. The internal monitoring may occur at one of many points inside the RF chain (source—filtering—amplification—transmission). In some embodiments, the system verification is monitored between amplification and transmission of a signal. When the signal is monitored between amplification and transmission, a high level of confidence of performance is achieved without an external capture device.
- the internal self-monitoring is achieved by tapping off a small portion of the signal after amplification. That is, the frequency or frequencies generated by the at least one signal generator 106 and amplified by the corresponding at least one amplifier 108 , is measured by the processor 101 to ensure that the proper power level is in the right frequency band. Each transmitted frequency may be measured by the processor 101 simultaneously. In some embodiments, the wideband signal going to each antenna is measured to ensure there are no spurious transmissions out-of-band.
- the countermeasure device 100 includes at least one temperature sensor 127 in communication with the processor 101 configured to measure a temperature at a desired location of the device.
- the at least one temperature sensor 127 may be variously embodied for example and without limitation as a thermistor, thermocouple, resistance temperature detector (RTD), and/or a combination thereof.
- the at least one temperature sensor 127 is placed within a reading distance to the amplifier 108 , such that an approximate temperature of the amplifier 108 may be measured.
- the at least one temperature sensor 127 is placed in proximity to the replaceable battery 150 , such that an approximate temperature of the battery 150 may be measured.
- the processor 101 is configured to receive a temperature from the at least one temperature sensor 127 . If the received temperature is above a predetermined threshold temperature, the processor 101 may selectively remove power to the high temperature amplifier 108 or may power down the countermeasure device 100 entirely. In some embodiments, upon detection of a temperature greater than a predetermined threshold temperature, the processor 101 generates a haptic feedback pattern communicated by the haptic feedback component 121 and processor 101 , to inform the operator of the temperature issue. In some embodiments, the processor 101 , is configured to both send haptic feedback as described as well as remove power from the hot detected amplifier. In some embodiments, the processor 101 is further configured to record the measured temperatures of the countermeasure device 100 and store the temperature information in a data log described in greater detail below.
- the countermeasure device 100 includes a GNSS receiver 128 in communication with the processor 101 to monitor the geographic position of the device 100 and provide, change, or unlock features associated with a determined position. For example and without limitation, a geolocation of the countermeasure device 100 may be detected and the processor 101 , memory 103 , and associated software may load a particular device profile set for that particular geolocation. A particular device profile may include instructions executed by the processor 101 for the countermeasure device 100 to radiate a disruption signal at a particular power and/or at a predetermined frequency band. In this way, the countermeasure device 100 may automatically select a device profile associated with a particular power and frequency band based on a profile tied to a geolocation.
- the processor 101 determining the geolocation of the device may communicate to the operator via the haptic feedback component 121 , when the operator holding the countermeasure device 100 , enters or leaves a geographic location.
- haptic feedback may be provided to the operator upon entering or leaving defined enemy territory, restricted areas, or areas defined by geofencing.
- the processor 101 is further configured to record the measured geolocation of the countermeasure device 100 and store the geolocation information in a data log described in greater detail below.
- the countermeasure device 100 includes a time module that counts the operational time of the countermeasure device 100 .
- the operational time may be stored and updated into the system memory 103 for example and without limitation, diagnostic and maintenance purposes.
- a time count reaches a certain threshold (e.g., 10 hours)
- the countermeasure device 100 may communicate to the operator (via display 120 and/or haptic feedback 121 ) that a maintenance is set to be performed.
- the processor 101 is further configured to record the measured time counts of the countermeasure device 100 and store the time information in a data log described in greater detail below.
- the internal self-monitoring is performed continuously while radiating and reported back to the operator (e.g., via haptic feedback 121 ).
- the data created during the internal self-monitoring may be logged and stored in the memory 103 for system performance analysis at a later time.
- the countermeasure device 100 includes internal components configured to log system performance.
- the system performance information may correspond to machine state logs, which provide a capture of the state of the countermeasure device 100 at a particular point in time.
- the machine state log may include the position of a trigger (e.g., activated/inactive), power level, internal switch position, length of trigger activation, selector switch position, and the like.
- a trigger e.g., activated/inactive
- power level e.g., activated/inactive
- internal switch position e.g., length of trigger activation, selector switch position, and the like.
- other commonly recorded system operation information may be included herein, such as the configuration of the countermeasure device 100 , e.g., settings, power levels, switch positions, temperatures, etc., and the preceding listings are intended as nonlimiting examples thereof.
- the system performance information may be recorded to the internal memory 103 or to a portable memory (e.g., a micro-SD card). That is, the microprocessor board 105 , includes a receptacle (e.g., a memory card slot) configured to accept and read a portable memory inserted therein.
- the memory card slot is located on the edge of the microprocessor board 105 closest to the antennas. In other embodiments, the memory card slot is located in the buttstock cavity 116 and accessible when opening the buttstock door 118 . In other embodiments, the memory card slot is located within the body 102 , requiring removal of a portion of the body for access. It is to be appreciated that the exemplary locations are for example purposes only and are not to be considered limiting.
- the portable countermeasure device 100 may include a selector control ( 130 of FIG. 12 A ), which may be located on the exterior of the portable countermeasure device 100 and easily accessible by the operator. Such a selector control may be operable to select a frequency or frequencies to be generated by the at least one signal generator and amplified by the corresponding at least one amplifier 108 .
- a variable amplifier may be used, whereupon power supplied to the signal generators 106 is modified, without increasing the power drain of the portable countermeasure device 100 . It will be appreciated that the selector control may be implemented to provide ease of use to the soldier or law enforcement official in the field to reflect the desired target of the portable countermeasure device 100 .
- the portable counter measure device 100 includes a variable output attenuation feature. That is, the processor 101 controls the total outpower power of the countermeasure device 100 .
- the total output 103 power may be implemented by software instructions stored in the memory and executed by the processor 101 , or by hardware with an integrated processor or in communication with processor 101 .
- the power is attenuated by Pulse-Width Modulation (PWM) or Pulse-Duration Modulation.
- PWM Pulse-Width Modulation
- Pulse-Duration Modulation Pulse-Duration Modulation
- attenuation is achieved by voltage control of the at least one amplifier 108 .
- attenuation is achieved by source waveform control.
- attenuation is achieved via a variable voltage attenuator.
- the selector control 130 is in communication with the processor 101 .
- the selector control 130 may be manipulated by the operator to attenuate the output signal, e.g., via PWM.
- FIGS. 2 A- 3 F therein are illustrated three-dimensional and line views of an example portable countermeasure device 200 utilizing a multi-antenna ( 202 , 204 , and 206 ) implementation of according to one embodiment of the subject disclosure.
- the portable countermeasure device 200 instead of utilizing an existing firearm, utilizes a suitable dual-grip firearm-like form factor body 208 to which the various components are attached, e.g., custom rifle stock.
- the dual-grip form factor body 208 includes an attachment rail 212 for affixing optics, e.g., red dot sights, iron sights, holographic sights, or the like, as well as additional components.
- Suitable rails 212 include, for example and without limitation, Picatinny, Weaver, NATO accessory rail, KeyMod, M-LOK, and the like.
- the disruption components are inserted within the dual-grip, firearm-like, form factor body 208 in place of the standard firearm components, e.g., the receiver(s) and barrel. This reduces the cost of implementation of the subject disclosure, while preserving the familiarity with a common weapon for the soldier and/or law enforcement personnel.
- the multiple antennae 202 , 204 , and 206 illustrated in FIGS. 2 A- 3 F are coupled to the body 208 adjacent a reflector 214 , which directs signals away from the operator and toward the target.
- the antennae 202 , 204 , and 206 may correspond, for example and without limitation, to a Yagi antenna, a proprietary double helical antenna, an LPA, and/or various combinations thereof, depending upon the frequencies being targeted by the portable countermeasure device 200 .
- the body 206 further includes a buttstock section 210 incorporating a connector 117 B, as discussed supra.
- 2 A- 3 F utilizes the above-mentioned dual-grips 114 and 115 . It will be appreciated that the configuration of the first grip 114 angled toward the buttstock 210 and the second grip 115 angled toward the antennae 202 , 204 , and 206 allow the operator to easily control and aim the device 200 towards an intended target. As shown, the second grip 115 extends downward from the trigger guard of the first trigger 110 and allows an operator easy access to the second trigger 112 , without requiring the operator to adjust his/her grip on the device 200 . Also depicted in FIGS. 2 A- 3 F is a selector switch 216 , optionally included to allow for the operator to select which frequency or frequencies to be jammed by the portable countermeasure device 200 .
- the selector 216 is communicatively coupled to the internal disruptor components 104 of the portable countermeasure device 200 , allowing the operator to enable jamming of one or more frequencies.
- FIGS. 6 A, 6 B, and 6 C provide three-dimensional depictions illustrating varying embodiments of the portable countermeasure device 200 , including the aforementioned dual-grips 114 and 115 .
- the portable countermeasure device 200 may utilize varying embodiments of the antenna 206 , as shown therein.
- the antenna 206 is representative of a Yagi antenna, suitably configured, in one embodiment, to transmit signals in the 400-500 MHz range, with particular emphasis on the 433 MHz frequency.
- the antenna 206 as shown in FIGS. 6 A- 6 C is capable of implementation using a variety of shields, protecting the antenna from damage during transport and use.
- a more detailed illustration of one embodiment of the antenna 206 is shown in the three-dimensional views of FIGS. 7 A- 7 E , and the line drawings of FIGS. 8 A- 8 E .
- FIGS. 2 A- 3 F , and FIGS. 6 A- 6 C utilizes disruption components 104 located within the body 208 of the portable countermeasure device 200 .
- the disruption components 104 may be removably coupled via connector 117 B to the portable countermeasure device 200 externally, as shown.
- the portable countermeasure device 200 of FIGS. 2 A- 3 F utilizes dual grips 114 and 115 with corresponding dual activators 110 and 112 for respective disruption of control signals and GPS/navigation signals.
- FIGS. 9 A and 9 B provide close-up views of an example implementation of the dual grips 114 and 115 with associated dual activators 110 and 112 on the portable countermeasure device 200 .
- the rendering in FIGS. 9 A- 9 B further illustrate the dual grips 114 and 115 of the portable countermeasure device 200 .
- the first grip 114 is configured to enable the operator to engage the first trigger 110 .
- the cantilevered or forward-angled second grip 115 is configured to enable the operator to engage the second trigger 112 , without requiring the operator to adjust his stance or wielding of the device 200 , i.e., the operator does not have to move his hands from the grips 114 or 115 in order to engage the disruption components 104 .
- the portable countermeasure device 200 may be modular, rugged, and portable, capable of being transported by a soldier or law enforcement official without damage to the antenna 202 - 206 , the body 208 , optics, rail attachments, etc., may be disassembled and stored in the backpack depicted in FIG. 5 .
- FIGS. 10 A- 10 F provide a three-dimensional view of the body 208 of the portable countermeasure device 200 in accordance with one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIGS. 11 A- 11 F provide a further detailed line view of the body 208 of the portable countermeasure device 200 in accordance with the embodiment of FIGS. 10 A- 10 F .
- the body 208 comprising the dual grips 114 and 115 , buttstock 203 , rails 212 , dual-triggers 110 - 112 , and connection 117 B is illustrated without the reflector 214 , or antennae 202 - 206 . Accordingly, the body 208 comprising the above-identified components, as illustrated in FIGS.
- FIGS. 1 - 11 F are non-limiting examples of possible firearm-like form factors implemented as the portable countermeasure device 100 according to the disclosures contained herein.
- FIGS. 12 A- 12 G provide a three-dimensional view of the body 102 of the portable countermeasure device 100 of the exemplary embodiment of FIG. 1 .
- the exemplary embodiment of FIGS. 12 A- 12 G illustrate a single trigger 110 system, at least one antenna 122 A-C and buttstock 113 , with a buttstock cavity enclosed by buttstock door 118 .
- the countermeasure device 100 includes a plate 123 with at least one antenna attached thereto.
- the plate 123 is removable from the body 102 of the countermeasure device 100 and allows for another similarly shaped plate to removably connect thereto in order to switch antenna of the countermeasure device 100 (in case the first set of antennae are damaged).
- the countermeasure device 100 includes at least one removable side panel 125 A, 125 B.
- the at least one removable side panel 125 may be attached to the body 102 by at least one fastener.
- the at least one removable side panel 125 is secured to the body 102 via a locking fastener 129 .
- Unlocking the locking fastener 129 and removing the at least one removable side panel 125 provides access to the internal components shown in the cross section of FIG. 1 .
- the operator upon removal of the at least one removable side panel 125 , the operator has access to at least one fastener for securing the plate 123 to the body 102 .
- each the left and right side may include a removable side panel, and that one or both panels may each be secured to the body 102 via separate fasteners.
- either panel or both panels may be removed to provide access to the internal components (e.g., amplifies 108 , signal source 106 , etc.).
- FIGS. 13 A- 13 C provide a three-dimensional view of a buttstock 113 accordance with one embodiment of the subject application.
- FIG. 13 A illustrates the buttstock 113 in an open position. That is, the buttstock door 118 is pivoted about the hinge 119 such that access to the buttstock cavity 116 is provided.
- coupling 117 A configured to engage a corresponding connector 152 associated with a power source, such as replaceable battery 150 .
- the coupling 117 A may include a plurality of pins 1171 (six pins are illustrated).
- the replaceable battery 150 likewise may include a corresponding connector 152 having a plurality of apertures 1521 each configured to receive and electronically connect to a pin 1171 of coupling 117 A. As illustrated in FIG. 13 B , the replaceable battery 150 may be inserted into the buttstock cavity 116 , such that the coupling 117 A engages the battery connector 152 , providing electrical power to the countermeasure device 100 .
- the buttstock 113 includes a buttstock fastener 132 .
- the buttstock fastener 132 is configured to secure the buttstock door 118 in a closed position such that the buttstock door does not unexpectedly open allowing the contents of the buttstock cavity 116 to fall out.
- the buttstock fastener 132 is configured to engage a fastener structure 133 located on a top portion of the buttstock 113 .
- the buttstock fastener 132 includes a spring clip 134 . When the buttstock door 118 is in the closed position, the spring clip 134 of the fastener 132 may engage a catch structure 133 such that the buttstock door 118 is urged into a secure closed position.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Position Fixing By Use Of Radio Waves (AREA)
- Transceivers (AREA)
- Details Of Aerials (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims (20)
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US17/387,631 US11716166B2 (en) | 2015-09-23 | 2021-07-28 | Handheld portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems |
Applications Claiming Priority (7)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US201562222475P | 2015-09-23 | 2015-09-23 | |
US15/274,021 US10103835B2 (en) | 2015-09-23 | 2016-09-23 | Portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems |
US15/596,842 US10020909B2 (en) | 2015-09-23 | 2017-05-16 | Dual-grip portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems |
US16/005,905 US10790925B2 (en) | 2015-09-23 | 2018-06-12 | Dual-grip portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems |
US16/274,325 US10574384B2 (en) | 2015-09-23 | 2019-02-13 | Dual-grip portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems |
US16/793,597 US11095392B2 (en) | 2015-09-23 | 2020-02-18 | Handheld portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems |
US17/387,631 US11716166B2 (en) | 2015-09-23 | 2021-07-28 | Handheld portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems |
Related Parent Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US16/793,597 Continuation US11095392B2 (en) | 2015-09-23 | 2020-02-18 | Handheld portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
US20210359781A1 US20210359781A1 (en) | 2021-11-18 |
US11716166B2 true US11716166B2 (en) | 2023-08-01 |
Family
ID=66659599
Family Applications (3)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US16/274,325 Active US10574384B2 (en) | 2015-09-23 | 2019-02-13 | Dual-grip portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems |
US16/793,597 Active US11095392B2 (en) | 2015-09-23 | 2020-02-18 | Handheld portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems |
US17/387,631 Active 2036-12-03 US11716166B2 (en) | 2015-09-23 | 2021-07-28 | Handheld portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems |
Family Applications Before (2)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US16/274,325 Active US10574384B2 (en) | 2015-09-23 | 2019-02-13 | Dual-grip portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems |
US16/793,597 Active US11095392B2 (en) | 2015-09-23 | 2020-02-18 | Handheld portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems |
Country Status (1)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (3) | US10574384B2 (en) |
Families Citing this family (11)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US10574384B2 (en) * | 2015-09-23 | 2020-02-25 | Dedrone Holdings, Inc. | Dual-grip portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems |
US11488385B2 (en) | 2015-09-23 | 2022-11-01 | Dedrone Holdings, Inc. | Identifying, tracking, and disrupting unmanned aerial vehicles |
US11022407B2 (en) * | 2015-12-15 | 2021-06-01 | Tradewinds Technology, Llc | UAV defense system |
US10900755B1 (en) * | 2018-06-26 | 2021-01-26 | Applied Research Associates, Inc. | Laser weapon system |
AU2020294508B2 (en) * | 2019-05-24 | 2023-07-27 | Battelle Memorial Institute | Ultra-wide band electromagnetic jamming projector |
US20230006478A1 (en) * | 2021-07-01 | 2023-01-05 | Epirus, Inc. | Systems and methods for compact directed energy systems |
CN111835453B (en) * | 2020-07-01 | 2022-09-20 | 中国人民解放军空军工程大学 | Communication countermeasure process modeling method |
US11995992B2 (en) | 2020-09-15 | 2024-05-28 | Tradewinds Technology, Llc | Artificially intelligent skyway |
US11054525B1 (en) * | 2020-11-19 | 2021-07-06 | Flex Force Enterprises Inc. | GNSS simulation to disrupt unmanned vehicle operation |
KR102539822B1 (en) * | 2021-08-24 | 2023-06-07 | (주)링크텍 | Jamming device for personal firearms |
KR102428558B1 (en) * | 2021-08-25 | 2022-08-04 | 주식회사 뉴젠테크 | Anti-Drone Gun |
Citations (52)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US3001901A (en) | 1955-12-01 | 1961-09-26 | Libbey Owens Ford Glass Co | Method of producing electrically conductive articles |
US4584578A (en) | 1983-03-18 | 1986-04-22 | Novatronics, Inc. | Programmable interference blanking system |
US5001771A (en) | 1987-05-27 | 1991-03-19 | British Aerospace Public Limited Company | Communications jammer |
US5287110A (en) | 1992-11-17 | 1994-02-15 | Honeywell Inc. | Complementary threat sensor data fusion method and apparatus |
US5822429A (en) | 1996-09-17 | 1998-10-13 | Electro-Radiation Incorporated | System for preventing global positioning satellite signal reception to unauthorized personnel |
US5896105A (en) | 1997-06-23 | 1999-04-20 | Northrop Grumman Corporation | Distributed phased array antenna system |
US6230371B1 (en) | 1999-07-19 | 2001-05-15 | Stephen Chu | Paintball pistol gravity center compensation device |
US6396432B2 (en) | 1998-06-16 | 2002-05-28 | C. Plath Gmbh, Nautisch-Elektronische Technik | Method and apparatus for the deception of satellite navigation |
US6480144B1 (en) | 2002-01-30 | 2002-11-12 | Ford Global Technologies, Inc. | Wireless communication between countermeasure devices |
US20030058112A1 (en) | 2001-09-21 | 2003-03-27 | Wolfgang Gleine | Aircraft anti-terrorism security system |
US20050011101A1 (en) | 2003-06-24 | 2005-01-20 | Gooder, William Penty | Firearm stock |
US20050041728A1 (en) | 2003-08-18 | 2005-02-24 | Lars Karlsson | System and method to autonomously and selectively jam frequency hopping signals in near real-time |
US6977598B2 (en) | 2003-03-07 | 2005-12-20 | Lockheed Martin Corporation | Aircraft protection system and method |
US7050755B2 (en) | 2002-01-24 | 2006-05-23 | Pctel Maryland, Inc. | Targeted mobile terminal communication blocker |
US7099369B2 (en) | 2004-08-06 | 2006-08-29 | Networkfab Corporation | Method and apparatus for surgical high speed follower jamming based on selectable target direction |
US20060226950A1 (en) | 2005-03-25 | 2006-10-12 | Fujitsu Limited | Authentication system, method of controlling the authentication system, and portable authentication apparatus |
WO2007012148A1 (en) | 2005-07-28 | 2007-02-01 | Samel 90 Ad | Transmitter of active barrage radio jamming transmission and method for manufacturing the same |
WO2007012147A2 (en) | 2005-07-27 | 2007-02-01 | Ion Beam Applications S.A. | Dosimetry device for verification of a radiation therapy apparatus |
US20070063886A1 (en) | 2004-09-17 | 2007-03-22 | Pegasus Global Strategic Solutions Llc | System and method for suppressing radio frequency transmissions |
US7318368B2 (en) | 2004-02-11 | 2008-01-15 | Tmc Design Corporation | Radio frequency jammer |
US20080174469A1 (en) | 2006-09-02 | 2008-07-24 | Diehl Bgt Defence Gmbh & Co., Kg | Method and system for defence against surface-to-air missiles |
US7423575B2 (en) | 2005-01-26 | 2008-09-09 | Sentel Corporation | Method and apparatus for protecting personnel and material from RF-based threats using ultra-wideband (UWB) transmission |
US7489264B2 (en) | 2005-01-20 | 2009-02-10 | Saab Ab | Coordination of electronic counter measures |
US7554481B2 (en) | 2006-05-18 | 2009-06-30 | The Boeing Company | Localized jamming of navigation signals |
US7574168B2 (en) | 2005-06-16 | 2009-08-11 | Terahop Networks, Inc. | Selective GPS denial system |
US20090214205A1 (en) | 2005-12-07 | 2009-08-27 | Sierra Nevada Corporation , A Corporation | Communications and data link jammer incorporating fiber-optic delay line technology |
US20090287363A1 (en) | 2004-09-29 | 2009-11-19 | Young Stuart H | Weapon integrated controller |
US7697885B2 (en) | 2006-09-15 | 2010-04-13 | Aeroflex High Speed Test Solutions, Inc. | Multi-band jammer |
US7698846B2 (en) | 2004-09-02 | 2010-04-20 | Do Amarante Jose Carlos Albano | Owner recognition by portable guns |
US7783246B2 (en) | 2005-06-16 | 2010-08-24 | Terahop Networks, Inc. | Tactical GPS denial and denial detection system |
US20110000389A1 (en) | 2006-04-17 | 2011-01-06 | Soundblast Technologies LLC. | System and method for generating and directing very loud sounds |
US20110176674A1 (en) | 2010-01-19 | 2011-07-21 | Stmicroelectronics (Rousset) Sas | Countermeasure method and device for protecting data circulating in an electronic component |
US8135661B2 (en) | 2004-03-16 | 2012-03-13 | Kjell Olsson | Electronic system with methods for early detection and prediction of external forces' harmful intentions |
US8145119B2 (en) | 2006-07-14 | 2012-03-27 | Kaonetics Technologies, Inc. | Method of jamming |
US8203109B2 (en) | 2009-05-08 | 2012-06-19 | Raytheon Company | High energy laser beam director system and method |
US8269957B2 (en) | 2006-11-21 | 2012-09-18 | Rafael—Armament Development Authority Ltd. | Laser based countermeasures system and method |
US8301075B2 (en) | 2009-05-14 | 2012-10-30 | Bae Systems Information And Electronic Systems Integration Inc. | Tactical radio and radio network with electronic countermeasures |
US20130015260A1 (en) | 2004-10-07 | 2013-01-17 | David Joseph Schulte | Concept and model for utilizing high-frequency or radar or microwave producing or emitting devices to produce, effect, create or induce lightning or lightspeed or visible to naked eye electromagnetic pulse or pulses, acoustic or ultrasonic shockwaves or booms in the air, space, enclosed, or upon any object or mass, to be used solely or as part of a system, platform or device including weaponry and weather modification |
US20130023201A1 (en) | 2011-06-23 | 2013-01-24 | Coleman Timothy W | Systems and methods for radio frequency hopping communications jamming utilizing software defined radio platforms |
US8388243B1 (en) | 2010-06-28 | 2013-03-05 | Harold Bernard Smith | Apparatus for holding a portable media device |
US8615190B2 (en) | 2011-05-31 | 2013-12-24 | Exelis Inc. | System and method for allocating jamming energy based on three-dimensional geolocation of emitters |
US20140147116A1 (en) | 2010-10-20 | 2014-05-29 | Active Air Ltd. | Countermeasure system |
US20140145993A1 (en) | 2011-06-27 | 2014-05-29 | Kyocera Corporation | Portable electronic device |
US20140266851A1 (en) | 2013-03-14 | 2014-09-18 | Counter Echo Solutions LLC | System and Methods for Countering Satellite-Navigated Munitions |
US8971441B2 (en) | 2009-06-08 | 2015-03-03 | Lawrence Livermore National Security, Llc | Transmit-reference methods in software defined radio platforms for communication in harsh propagation environments and systems thereof |
US9071385B2 (en) | 2011-11-24 | 2015-06-30 | Thales | Method for jamming communications in a closed-loop control network |
US20150229434A1 (en) | 2012-10-31 | 2015-08-13 | Sky Industries Inc. | Electronic countermeasures transponder system |
US20150350914A1 (en) | 2014-06-02 | 2015-12-03 | Bastille Networks, Inc. | Ground and air vehicle electromagnetic signature detection and localization |
US9207049B2 (en) | 2012-01-10 | 2015-12-08 | Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd. | Anti-rocket system |
US9404750B2 (en) | 2009-12-18 | 2016-08-02 | Aerovironment, Inc. | High altitude, long endurance, unmanned aircraft and methods of operation thereof |
WO2017053693A1 (en) | 2015-09-23 | 2017-03-30 | Battelle Memorial Institute | Portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems |
US11095392B2 (en) * | 2015-09-23 | 2021-08-17 | Dedrone Defense, Inc. | Handheld portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems |
Family Cites Families (7)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US6598330B2 (en) | 2000-09-14 | 2003-07-29 | Robert Hudson Garrett | Sling attachment hardware for firearms |
US7784390B1 (en) | 2005-08-18 | 2010-08-31 | Raytheon Company | Solid-state non-lethal directed energy weapon |
US8001902B2 (en) | 2008-10-09 | 2011-08-23 | The United States Of America As Represented By The Secretary Of The Navy | Signal transmission surveillance system |
US9689976B2 (en) | 2014-12-19 | 2017-06-27 | Xidrone Systems, Inc. | Deterent for unmanned aerial systems |
US9715009B1 (en) | 2014-12-19 | 2017-07-25 | Xidrone Systems, Inc. | Deterent for unmanned aerial systems |
US10020909B2 (en) | 2015-09-23 | 2018-07-10 | Battelle Memorial Institute | Dual-grip portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems |
US10907940B1 (en) | 2017-12-12 | 2021-02-02 | Xidrone Systems, Inc. | Deterrent for unmanned aerial systems using data mining and/or machine learning for improved target detection and classification |
-
2019
- 2019-02-13 US US16/274,325 patent/US10574384B2/en active Active
-
2020
- 2020-02-18 US US16/793,597 patent/US11095392B2/en active Active
-
2021
- 2021-07-28 US US17/387,631 patent/US11716166B2/en active Active
Patent Citations (54)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US3001901A (en) | 1955-12-01 | 1961-09-26 | Libbey Owens Ford Glass Co | Method of producing electrically conductive articles |
US4584578A (en) | 1983-03-18 | 1986-04-22 | Novatronics, Inc. | Programmable interference blanking system |
US5001771A (en) | 1987-05-27 | 1991-03-19 | British Aerospace Public Limited Company | Communications jammer |
US5287110A (en) | 1992-11-17 | 1994-02-15 | Honeywell Inc. | Complementary threat sensor data fusion method and apparatus |
US5822429A (en) | 1996-09-17 | 1998-10-13 | Electro-Radiation Incorporated | System for preventing global positioning satellite signal reception to unauthorized personnel |
US5896105A (en) | 1997-06-23 | 1999-04-20 | Northrop Grumman Corporation | Distributed phased array antenna system |
US6396432B2 (en) | 1998-06-16 | 2002-05-28 | C. Plath Gmbh, Nautisch-Elektronische Technik | Method and apparatus for the deception of satellite navigation |
US6230371B1 (en) | 1999-07-19 | 2001-05-15 | Stephen Chu | Paintball pistol gravity center compensation device |
US20030058112A1 (en) | 2001-09-21 | 2003-03-27 | Wolfgang Gleine | Aircraft anti-terrorism security system |
US7050755B2 (en) | 2002-01-24 | 2006-05-23 | Pctel Maryland, Inc. | Targeted mobile terminal communication blocker |
US6480144B1 (en) | 2002-01-30 | 2002-11-12 | Ford Global Technologies, Inc. | Wireless communication between countermeasure devices |
US6977598B2 (en) | 2003-03-07 | 2005-12-20 | Lockheed Martin Corporation | Aircraft protection system and method |
US20050011101A1 (en) | 2003-06-24 | 2005-01-20 | Gooder, William Penty | Firearm stock |
US20050041728A1 (en) | 2003-08-18 | 2005-02-24 | Lars Karlsson | System and method to autonomously and selectively jam frequency hopping signals in near real-time |
US7318368B2 (en) | 2004-02-11 | 2008-01-15 | Tmc Design Corporation | Radio frequency jammer |
US8135661B2 (en) | 2004-03-16 | 2012-03-13 | Kjell Olsson | Electronic system with methods for early detection and prediction of external forces' harmful intentions |
US7099369B2 (en) | 2004-08-06 | 2006-08-29 | Networkfab Corporation | Method and apparatus for surgical high speed follower jamming based on selectable target direction |
US7698846B2 (en) | 2004-09-02 | 2010-04-20 | Do Amarante Jose Carlos Albano | Owner recognition by portable guns |
US20070063886A1 (en) | 2004-09-17 | 2007-03-22 | Pegasus Global Strategic Solutions Llc | System and method for suppressing radio frequency transmissions |
US20090287363A1 (en) | 2004-09-29 | 2009-11-19 | Young Stuart H | Weapon integrated controller |
US20130015260A1 (en) | 2004-10-07 | 2013-01-17 | David Joseph Schulte | Concept and model for utilizing high-frequency or radar or microwave producing or emitting devices to produce, effect, create or induce lightning or lightspeed or visible to naked eye electromagnetic pulse or pulses, acoustic or ultrasonic shockwaves or booms in the air, space, enclosed, or upon any object or mass, to be used solely or as part of a system, platform or device including weaponry and weather modification |
US7489264B2 (en) | 2005-01-20 | 2009-02-10 | Saab Ab | Coordination of electronic counter measures |
US7423575B2 (en) | 2005-01-26 | 2008-09-09 | Sentel Corporation | Method and apparatus for protecting personnel and material from RF-based threats using ultra-wideband (UWB) transmission |
US20060226950A1 (en) | 2005-03-25 | 2006-10-12 | Fujitsu Limited | Authentication system, method of controlling the authentication system, and portable authentication apparatus |
US7574168B2 (en) | 2005-06-16 | 2009-08-11 | Terahop Networks, Inc. | Selective GPS denial system |
US7783246B2 (en) | 2005-06-16 | 2010-08-24 | Terahop Networks, Inc. | Tactical GPS denial and denial detection system |
WO2007012147A2 (en) | 2005-07-27 | 2007-02-01 | Ion Beam Applications S.A. | Dosimetry device for verification of a radiation therapy apparatus |
WO2007012148A1 (en) | 2005-07-28 | 2007-02-01 | Samel 90 Ad | Transmitter of active barrage radio jamming transmission and method for manufacturing the same |
US20090214205A1 (en) | 2005-12-07 | 2009-08-27 | Sierra Nevada Corporation , A Corporation | Communications and data link jammer incorporating fiber-optic delay line technology |
US20110000389A1 (en) | 2006-04-17 | 2011-01-06 | Soundblast Technologies LLC. | System and method for generating and directing very loud sounds |
US7554481B2 (en) | 2006-05-18 | 2009-06-30 | The Boeing Company | Localized jamming of navigation signals |
US8145119B2 (en) | 2006-07-14 | 2012-03-27 | Kaonetics Technologies, Inc. | Method of jamming |
US20080174469A1 (en) | 2006-09-02 | 2008-07-24 | Diehl Bgt Defence Gmbh & Co., Kg | Method and system for defence against surface-to-air missiles |
US8170467B2 (en) | 2006-09-15 | 2012-05-01 | Aeroflex High Speed Test Solutions, Inc. | Multi-band jammer including airborne systems |
US7697885B2 (en) | 2006-09-15 | 2010-04-13 | Aeroflex High Speed Test Solutions, Inc. | Multi-band jammer |
US8269957B2 (en) | 2006-11-21 | 2012-09-18 | Rafael—Armament Development Authority Ltd. | Laser based countermeasures system and method |
US8203109B2 (en) | 2009-05-08 | 2012-06-19 | Raytheon Company | High energy laser beam director system and method |
US8301075B2 (en) | 2009-05-14 | 2012-10-30 | Bae Systems Information And Electronic Systems Integration Inc. | Tactical radio and radio network with electronic countermeasures |
US8971441B2 (en) | 2009-06-08 | 2015-03-03 | Lawrence Livermore National Security, Llc | Transmit-reference methods in software defined radio platforms for communication in harsh propagation environments and systems thereof |
US9404750B2 (en) | 2009-12-18 | 2016-08-02 | Aerovironment, Inc. | High altitude, long endurance, unmanned aircraft and methods of operation thereof |
US20110176674A1 (en) | 2010-01-19 | 2011-07-21 | Stmicroelectronics (Rousset) Sas | Countermeasure method and device for protecting data circulating in an electronic component |
US8388243B1 (en) | 2010-06-28 | 2013-03-05 | Harold Bernard Smith | Apparatus for holding a portable media device |
US20140147116A1 (en) | 2010-10-20 | 2014-05-29 | Active Air Ltd. | Countermeasure system |
US8615190B2 (en) | 2011-05-31 | 2013-12-24 | Exelis Inc. | System and method for allocating jamming energy based on three-dimensional geolocation of emitters |
US8903304B2 (en) | 2011-06-23 | 2014-12-02 | Talpha Technologies, Inc. | Systems and methods for radio frequency hopping communications jamming utilizing software defined radio platforms |
US20130023201A1 (en) | 2011-06-23 | 2013-01-24 | Coleman Timothy W | Systems and methods for radio frequency hopping communications jamming utilizing software defined radio platforms |
US20140145993A1 (en) | 2011-06-27 | 2014-05-29 | Kyocera Corporation | Portable electronic device |
US9071385B2 (en) | 2011-11-24 | 2015-06-30 | Thales | Method for jamming communications in a closed-loop control network |
US9207049B2 (en) | 2012-01-10 | 2015-12-08 | Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd. | Anti-rocket system |
US20150229434A1 (en) | 2012-10-31 | 2015-08-13 | Sky Industries Inc. | Electronic countermeasures transponder system |
US20140266851A1 (en) | 2013-03-14 | 2014-09-18 | Counter Echo Solutions LLC | System and Methods for Countering Satellite-Navigated Munitions |
US20150350914A1 (en) | 2014-06-02 | 2015-12-03 | Bastille Networks, Inc. | Ground and air vehicle electromagnetic signature detection and localization |
WO2017053693A1 (en) | 2015-09-23 | 2017-03-30 | Battelle Memorial Institute | Portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems |
US11095392B2 (en) * | 2015-09-23 | 2021-08-17 | Dedrone Defense, Inc. | Handheld portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems |
Non-Patent Citations (9)
Title |
---|
"AUDS—Anti-UAV Defence System"; May 11, 2019; https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=66&v=P8aZ0zWX3SA. |
"World's First Fully Integrated Anti-UAV Defence System (Auds) Now Features Quad Band RF Inhibitor and Optical Disruptor"; Sep. 8, 2015; https://www.blighter.com/worlds-first-fully-integrated-anti-uav-defence-system-auds-now-features-quad-band-rf-inhibitor-and-optical-disruptor/. |
BlueSniper Rifle; Aug. 6, 2004; https://tinyurl.com/bluesniperrifle. |
Fitriyani et al.; Yagi antenna design for signal phone jammer; 2012. |
How to Build a BlueSniper Rifle; Mar. 8, 2005; https://tinyurl.com/bluesniperrifle1. |
Hunter Scott Hack Rifle; Jan. 19, 2015; https://www.hscott.net/hack-rifle. |
International Search Report for PCT Application No. PCT/US2018/032732 dated Aug. 8, 2018. |
Sniping 2.4GHZ; Apr. 21, 2014; https://tinyurl.com/sniping2-4ghz. |
WiFi Sniper Rifle; Jun. 21, 2011; https://tinyurl.com/wifisniperrifle. |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US20210359781A1 (en) | 2021-11-18 |
US20190173605A1 (en) | 2019-06-06 |
US10574384B2 (en) | 2020-02-25 |
US11095392B2 (en) | 2021-08-17 |
US20200343992A1 (en) | 2020-10-29 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
US11716166B2 (en) | Handheld portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems | |
US10567107B2 (en) | Portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems | |
US10790925B2 (en) | Dual-grip portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems | |
US11488385B2 (en) | Identifying, tracking, and disrupting unmanned aerial vehicles | |
US8225542B2 (en) | Firearm assembly | |
US20220397375A1 (en) | Anti-drone weapon | |
US20150241153A1 (en) | Firearm safety systems and methods | |
US11233978B1 (en) | Identifying, tracking, and disrupting unmanned aerial vehicles | |
AU2018273752B2 (en) | Dual-grip portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems | |
US20050115385A1 (en) | Radio frequency triggered directed energy munition | |
WO2019240850A1 (en) | Dual-grip portable countermeasure device against unmanned systems | |
RU2820537C1 (en) | Electronic jamming device for unmanned aerial vehicles in short-range anti-aircraft missile system | |
KR20230134219A (en) | Jammer for anti-drone having firearm mounting and dismounting structure |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
FEPP | Fee payment procedure |
Free format text: ENTITY STATUS SET TO UNDISCOUNTED (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: BIG.); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: SMALL ENTITY |
|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: DEDRONE HOLDINGS, INC., CALIFORNIA Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:BATTELLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE;REEL/FRAME:057020/0282 Effective date: 20191003 Owner name: DEDRONE DEFENSE, INC., CALIFORNIA Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:DEDRONE HOLDINGS, INC.;REEL/FRAME:057019/0431 Effective date: 20191004 Owner name: BATTELLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE, OHIO Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNORS:STAMM, DANIEL E.;MORROW, ALEXANDER;WALSH, RAPHAEL J.;AND OTHERS;SIGNING DATES FROM 20191003 TO 20191010;REEL/FRAME:057019/0063 |
|
FEPP | Fee payment procedure |
Free format text: ENTITY STATUS SET TO SMALL (ORIGINAL EVENT CODE: SMAL); ENTITY STATUS OF PATENT OWNER: SMALL ENTITY |
|
STPP | Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general |
Free format text: DOCKETED NEW CASE - READY FOR EXAMINATION |
|
STPP | Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general |
Free format text: NON FINAL ACTION MAILED |
|
STPP | Information on status: patent application and granting procedure in general |
Free format text: PUBLICATIONS -- ISSUE FEE PAYMENT VERIFIED |
|
STCF | Information on status: patent grant |
Free format text: PATENTED CASE |
|
AS | Assignment |
Owner name: BATTELLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE, OHIO Free format text: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST;ASSIGNOR:DEDRONE DEFENSE, INC.;REEL/FRAME:066244/0295 Effective date: 20240119 |