TWI464616B - Apparatus for processing information, and computor program - Google Patents

Description

Information processing device and program

The present invention relates to an inter-machine certification mechanism and an authentication method for preventing countermeasures against counterfeit products, and more particularly to a certification authority and an authentication method for performing device authentication while eliminating the risk of leaking secret keys by using an inexpensive structure.

Since counterfeit goods or pirated goods increase the number of victims, it is a matter of urgency for manufacturers to seek countermeasures against counterfeit products.

Imitations not only cause a loss of potential market and a reduction in brand image, but also increase the productivity of formal products due to increased disputes over product liability.

In order to prevent countermeasures against counterfeit products, it is necessary to set up a certain certification body.

However, since the certification authority is used to prevent the use of counterfeit goods, it has no direct benefit to the user regardless of the original function of the device belonging to the product.

On the other hand, in order to prevent countermeasures, it is necessary to raise costs such as parts and development costs, and the costs required to prevent such counterfeit products are included in the manufacturing cost of the products.

However, when the price of the device is raised for the purpose of preventing the counterfeit product, the function that is unnecessary for the user becomes a burden on the user, and it is usually not available to the user of the market.

As a result, although manufacturers have realized the fact that countermeasures against counterfeit products are needed, the introduction of the idea is often broken due to cost constraints, so how to achieve them at low cost becomes very important.

On the other hand, the authentication method using the challenge/response method is generally employed in the art. The following is a brief description of the question-response method.

In addition, as for the authentication technique using the question-response method described below, for example, there is a technique disclosed in Patent Document 1.

The action of the question-response method is shown in Figure 14.

In the case of assuming that the host machine authenticates the slave machine, it is premised that the master and the slave machine share the secret key with each other in advance.

In addition, it is assumed that both have the same calculation HASH calculation logic.

In many cases, the HASH calculation logic uses SHA-1 calculus, but any calculus can be used as long as it is unidirectional.

Here, when the master device and the slave machine have the same secret key and HASH calculation logic, the secret key and the arbitrary information are used as the arguments. When the HASH calculation logic is executed in both, it should be possible. Obtain the same HASH value.

Any value at this time is used as the query code, so that the host device tries to ask whether the slave device is the function of the other party sharing the same secret key.

Next, the action of Fig. 14 will be explained.

In order to authenticate the slave machine, the host machine generates a random number in the host machine and hands it over to the slave machine (= 诘).

At the same time, the host machine inputs the generated information of the random number and the secret key into the HASH calculation logic to calculate the HASH value.

On the slave side, the same calculation is performed using the random number of the autonomous machine, and the HASH value is transmitted to the host (=response).

In the case where the slave machine is a regular slave machine, since the secret key is shared with the master, the same HASH value should be obtained at the master and the slave.

In the question-response method, it is assumed that the aggressor observes on the communication path.

Since only the random value and the HASH value according to the random value are given on the communication path, it is difficult to specifically define the secret key because the value on the communication path often changes irregularly every time the generated random number changes.

Therefore, since the third party does not know the secret key, it is possible to know whether it is a regular product if the slave device is authenticated first by using the challenge-response method before using the slave machine.

Since the main unit is usually used for complicated processing, it has a calculation device such as a CPU (Central Processing Unit).

However, the slave device does not necessarily have an arithmetic device. For example, the memory device usually has only a memory circuit on the substrate.

Therefore, in the case where authentication of the challenge-response method is performed between the host device and the slave device in recent years, the host device side uses the calculation device, and the slave device side uses the IC to which the authentication IC (integrated circuit) for authentication is mounted. One of the interrogation-response methods is coherent.

In recent years, due to the popularity of mobile phones, the inferior illegal batteries used in mobile phones have been plagued by the fires of such illegal batteries, which have threatened the lives of human beings.

Due to this social background, in the mobile phone battery regulations, it is necessary to set up a certification body that can confirm whether it is a formal product.

Due to such social requirements, the certification ICs for slave machines are oriented toward low price and high functionality.

An example of a slave device IC is disclosed in Non-Patent Document 1.

The slave device IC generally has a HASH calculation logic, a memory area of a secret key that cannot be observed from the outside, and a non-volatile memory area that can be observed from the outside, and the IC of such a structure is very inexpensive and sufficiently circulated in the market.

Among the subordinate machine ICs, the authentication ICs used in the mainframes are generally not circulated in the market, and they require high costs in the case of creation, so it is not feasible in reality.

The reason for this is presumably that the usual host device has a calculation device and does not require a certification IC in function.

In addition, it is presumed that when compared with the IC for the slave device, the number of ICs for the host device can be predicted to be small, so the unit price becomes high, and the IC supplier does not develop or use for general use. goods.

(previous technical literature) (Patent Literature)

Patent Document 1: Japanese Laid-Open Patent Publication No. 2009-086795

(Non-patent literature)

Non-Patent Document 1: MAXIM Corporation, "DS28CN01 Data Sheet" http://japan.maxim-ic.com/getds.cfm/pk/5369/In/jp

In a system consisting of one main unit 2 and a plurality of slave devices connected thereto, the countermeasure for preventing counterfeit products means that the counterfeit subordinate machine cannot be connected to the regular product main machine, and the regular subordinate machine Cannot connect to the fake mainframe.

To achieve this purpose, you can use the challenge-response method, and you can use the authentication IC for inexpensive slave machines on the slave side.

On the other hand, in the assembly of the prior art, the main unit side is dominated by the S/W (Software) assembly of the calculation device.

However, in the assembly of the prior art, on the host side, there is a case where the memory data is observed from the debug output and the value of the secret key is leaked.

In addition, as described above, the countermeasure against the counterfeit product is not only technically difficult, but also the ease of introduction in terms of cost becomes a problem. Therefore, it is preferable to seek countermeasures for not being able to introduce the authentication IC for the host device.

The main object of the present invention is to design a machine construction and authentication method for such problems, and to perform authentication processing in a simple configuration and to prevent key value leakage.

The information processing device of the present invention includes a communication unit for receiving an IC inherent value unique to each IC from an IC (Integrated Circuit) and a comparison value for comparison; a secret key a memory unit for storing a secret key; the one-way calculation unit performs one-way calculation on the secret key stored in the secret key storage unit and the IC-specific value received by the communication unit; and a determination unit The comparison value received by the communication unit and the calculated value calculated by the one-way calculation unit are compared, and it is determined whether the comparison value and the calculated value match.

According to the present invention, when the IC to be authenticated is a regular IC, the memory is compared with the calculated value obtained by performing the one-way calculation of the IC unique value and the secret key. The comparison between the comparison value of the IC and the calculated value can determine the legitimacy of the object to be authenticated.

Embodiment 1

Fig. 1 shows an example of the structure of the apparatus of the present embodiment.

The authentication ICs are the same ICs that are mounted on the host device 2 and the slave devices 3, respectively.

The host device 2 includes an authentication IC 21 and an arithmetic device 22, and the computing device 22 includes an inward communication path 23 and an outward communication path 24.

The authentication IC 21 used by the host device is connected to the inward communication path 23.

Further, the outgoing communication path 24 is a communication path for communicating with the slave device 3, and the slave device 3 is further connected with the authentication IC 31.

The authentication IC 21 and the authentication IC 31 are physically different, but are the same in the organization.

The organization that certifies the IC will be described in Figure 2, which will be described later.

Further, the host device 2 is an example of an information processing device, and the slave device 3 is an example of an authentication object.

Further, the authentication IC 31 is an example of an authentication target IC, and the authentication IC 21 is an example of a supplementary IC.

The slave device 3 does not have to be one, and as long as it can be connected to the communication path 24, there may be a plurality of stations.

In the description of the present specification, it is assumed that one slave device 3 is connected, but the same operation is performed when a plurality of slaves are connected.

The authentication IC 31 may also exist on the communication path 24 or at a gateway across the communication path, and its positional condition is a position that can be controlled from the calculation device 22 in the main unit 2.

The location of the authentication IC 21 does not have to be the inbound communication path 23, but can also be connected to the outward communication path 24 on the main unit 2. The positional condition is a position that can be controlled from the computing device 22.

Fig. 2 is a functional block diagram showing the authentication IC of the present embodiment.

The authentication IC 1 includes therein a data transmission/reception unit 11, a response code holding unit 12, an IC unique number storage unit 13, a HASH calculation logic unit 14, a secret key storage area 15, and a non-volatile memory area 16.

As shown in Fig. 6, both the authentication IC 21 and the authentication IC 31 are assumed to be the authentication IC 1 of Fig. 2.

Further, in the authentication IC 21, the HASH calculation logic unit 2114 has a function as a one-way calculation unit, and the secret key storage area 2115 has a function as a secret key storage unit.

Each constituent element of the authentication IC 1 of Fig. 2 will be described below.

The data transfer receiving unit 11 is for interpreting eight types of instructors, and the issuer of the command is the arithmetic unit 22 on the main machine 2.

In the present specification, commands (command) are represented by COM1 to 8.

The contents of COM1 to 8 are as follows.

COM1 is an instruction for the host device 2 to specify a communication object.

In the COM1 command system, the host device 2 outputs the IC-specific number of the communication target to the communication path, and holds the authentication IC having the same IC-specific number, and recognizes that it is specified.

The authentication IC assigned by COM1 waits for the next instruction, and when it receives the instruction, it performs processing according to the received instruction.

When the processing is completed, the authentication IC releases itself to be identified.

The host device 2 needs to specifically define the authentication IC again with COM1 before instructing other processing by the instruction.

When the unique number of the authentication IC is unknown, the authentication IC cannot be specifically defined.

Therefore, the COM8 command is prepared, and all the authentication ICs existing on the communication path output their own unique numbers to the communication path.

In a manner in which electrical signals do not compete, the communication path is subjected to contention control at a physical level such as a CSMA (Carrier Sense Multiple Access) method.

The main unit 2 periodically outputs a COM8 command for confirming the existence of the authentication IC on the communication path.

COM2 is a command that accepts the challenge code from the host device 2 and executes the HASH calculation logic.

The calculated HASH value is stored in the response code holding unit 12.

There are two kinds of execution of HASH calculation logic, including the case where the key value and the value transmitted by the host side (= 诘 - 回应 回应 回应 ) ) ) 回应 回应 回应 回应 回应 回应 回应 回应 回应 回应 回应 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; The value of the non-volatile memory region 16 is used as an argument to perform the HASH calculation logic.

The difference is as follows.

First, the host side outputs the value transmitted to the slave machine side to the communication path 24 after outputting the COM2 command.

In the case where the HASH calculation is performed immediately, the predetermined code for performing the next HASH calculation is output to the communication path 24.

Or if the value of the non-volatile memory area 16 is included, following the COM2 command, after the transmission value is output to the slave machine side, the predetermined code using the non-volatile memory area 16 is caused to be output to the communication path 24, and finally The code for performing the HASH calculation is output to the communication path 24.

COM3 is an instruction used by the host device 2 to read the HASH calculation result.

When the authentication IC receives this command, it outputs the value stored in the response code holding unit 12 to the communication path.

When the calculation is not completed, the output value 0 or the like indicates a special value that the predetermined calculation is not completed, and is used to notify the host 2 of the uncompleted information.

COM4 is an instruction for the host to store the secret key in the authentication IC.

After the command code of COM4, the host device 2 causes the authentication IC to accept its value in order to output the secret key to the communication path.

In addition, it can also be a mechanism that can be set twice after the secret key is set once.

Or it can be the organization of the following methods.

The secret key is once set in the authentication IC by COM4 before shipment, and the value of the secret key is unconditionally used as the secret key.

Then, when the authentication IC has kept the secret key, the host 2 outputs the secret key to the communication path after the instruction code of COM4, and then outputs the HASH value of the current secret key to the communication path.

The COM 5 is a command for causing the host device 2 to read the IC unique number from the IC unique number storage unit 13.

When the authentication IC receives the instruction, the IC unique number is output to the communication path.

COM8 is usually issued by the host device, and COM5 is used to immediately confirm the IC unique number. When the COM5 response is not obtained, the connection of the device having the authentication IC is released.

COM6 is an instruction for causing the host device 2 to transfer the value stored in the non-volatile memory area 16.

After outputting the instruction code to the communication path, the host device subsequently outputs the storage object address and the stored value, and then outputs the value of the HASH calculation result using the stored value and the secret key as an argument.

In addition, the stored value is set to 1 Byte or the like, and the transfer amount is determined in advance.

When the authentication IC receives the instruction, the subsequent value is temporarily stored, and the HASH calculation is performed together with the secret key.

The received value is stored in the specified address only when the HASH calculation result is consistent with the HASH value output by the host device 2.

COM7 is an instruction for causing the main unit 2 to read the value stored in the non-volatile memory area 16.

The host device 2 outputs the address of the read object to the communication path after the instruction. After accepting the address, the authentication IC outputs the value of the specified address stored in the non-volatile memory area 16 to the communication path.

In the same manner as COM6, the data length is set to 1 Byte, etc., and the amount of transmission is determined in advance.

The above is the description of the instructions.

The response code holding unit 12 is an area for temporarily storing the HASH calculation result in the authentication IC until the host device 2 reads the response code.

When the value of one degree is read from the host device 2 via the material transfer receiving unit 11, the value is cleared to become zero.

The reason is that the third party other than the host device 2 cannot read the value when attempting to read the value at an arbitrary timing.

The IC unique number storage unit 13 is used to store the IC unique number.

The IC unique number is the serial number assigned to the IC at the time of manufacture of the IC, and the manufacturer of the IC guarantees that the number is the only number in the world.

The HASH calculation logic unit 14 is a mechanism for performing HASH calculation such as challenge-response.

The assembled HASH function can be any function as long as the certifiers assemble the same function with each other.

That is, the authentication IC 21 and the authentication IC 31 in Fig. 1 are the authentication IC 1 and have the same HASH calculation logic unit.

The secret key storage area 15 is an area for storing secret keys.

It is necessary to be able to read out the stored value from the outside, and therefore does not respond to the read request from the outside.

The storage of the secret key is performed in accordance with the action described in the instruction COM4.

The non-volatile memory area 16 is an area for storing information accompanying the slave machine 3, and it is preferable to store any value.

An example of utilization of the nonvolatile memory region 16 will be described below.

When the IC1 is used in the countermeasure against counterfeit products of the printer toner, the printer is the main machine, and the toner is the slave.

In the case of using such a method, the number of times of use of the toner or the like is generally stored in the non-volatile memory region 16.

Next, an internal configuration example of the arithmetic unit 22 of the main unit 2 will be described with reference to FIG.

The control unit 221 performs overall control of the calculation device 22.

The communication unit 222 receives, from the authentication IC 31 of the slave device 3, the IC unique number (the authentication target IC unique value) stored in advance in the authentication IC 31 and the HASH value (the authentication target IC comparison value) for comparison with the authentication IC 31. ).

Further, the COM1 to COM8 described above are issued by the communication unit 222.

The determination unit 223 compares the HASH value received by the communication unit 222 with the HASH value (calculated value) calculated by the HASH calculation logic unit 2114 of the authentication IC 21, and determines whether or not the two match.

That is, the HASH calculation logic unit 2114 of the authentication IC 21 performs HASH calculation (one-way calculation) on the secret key stored in the secret key storage area 2115 and the IC-specific number of the authentication IC 31 received by the communication unit 222, and is used for The HASH value is calculated, and the determination unit 223 compares the HASH value received from the authentication IC 31 with the HASH value calculated by the HASH calculation logic unit 2114 of the authentication IC 21.

Res1 (224) is a register for storing the HASH value calculated by the HASH calculation logic unit 2114 of the authentication IC 21.

Res1 (225) is a register for storing the HASH value received from the authentication IC 31.

4 and 5 show the operation of the host device 2 to authenticate the slave device 3.

In the present embodiment, the authentication of the slave device 2 by the host device 2 is divided into two stages.

First, in accordance with FIG. 4, it is confirmed that the authentication IC 31 is an IC at the time of shipment of a genuine product, and then the challenge-response authentication is performed in accordance with FIG.

The operations of Figs. 4 and 5 are performed once when the host device 2 detects that a new slave device 3 is present on the communication path 24.

In the fourth drawing, first, the secret keys of the main unit 2 and the slave machine 3 of the regular product are stored, and the non-volatile memory area 3116 existing inside the authentication IC 31 of the slave machine 3 is stored in the IC. The value of the unique number and the secret key are used as the HASH value of the argument.

For the convenience of explanation, the operation of FIG. 4 is referred to as the first stage of authentication, and the operation of FIG. 5 is referred to as the second stage of authentication.

The first phase of certification is a process that is not related to the challenge-response certification. The second phase of the certification is the challenge-response to the certification itself.

The reasons for the need to authenticate Phase 1 are described later.

The operation of the first stage of the authentication in Fig. 4 will be described below.

Further, the main operations of the operations of Figs. 4 and 5 are the arithmetic unit 22 on the main unit, and the authentication IC 21 and the authentication IC 31 are driven in accordance with various commands issued by the communication unit 222 of the arithmetic unit 22.

Upon detecting the host device 2 of the new slave device, the communication unit 222 reads the IC unique number of the authentication IC 31 existing on the detected slave device 3, and transmits the value to the host device 2 using the value as the challenge code. Certification IC21.

In the authentication IC 21, the value of the IC unique number of the authentication IC 31 and the secret key are used as arguments, and the HASH calculation logic unit 2114 performs an inquiry-response process for obtaining the HASH calculation result.

In the calculation device 22, the communication unit 222 receives the response code (HASH calculation value) from the authentication IC 21.

Next, the communication unit 222 reads the HASH value of the non-volatile memory area 3116 which is stored in advance in the authentication IC 31.

The HASH value in the non-volatile memory area 3116 in the authentication IC 31 is a value stored in advance at the time of shipment, and the determination unit 223 performs the response code (HASH calculation value) previously obtained by the authentication IC 21 and the HASH value received from the authentication IC 31. Comparison.

When the two are identical, the processing of the first stage of the authentication is completed, and the processing of the second stage of the authentication is performed.

On the other hand, when the two are inconsistent, the counterfeit product is detected, and the slave device is not used.

Next, the action of the second stage of the authentication in Fig. 5 will be described.

As mentioned earlier, Phase 2 of the certification implements the so-called challenge-response certification.

In the calculation device 22, the determination unit 223 generates a random number as a challenge code, and the communication unit 222 transmits the challenge code to both the authentication IC 21 on the host device 2 and the authentication IC 31 on the slave device 3.

In order to calculate the response code, the authentication IC 21 and the authentication IC 31 obtain the response codes of the two and compare them. If they are equal values, it can be judged that the newly connected slave devices 3 are regular products.

In the second stage of authentication, if there is no data corruption in the communication path 23 or the communication path 24 when the response codes of the two are different, there is only one case where the secret key is inconsistent.

In the first stage of certification, the correctness of the value of the secret key is confirmed, and whether the authentication IC itself is a regular product at the time of shipment of the regular product.

The reason is for physical or logical machine certification.

Question-response authentication is a method of authenticating objects with the correctness of each other's secret keys, but is limited to logical calculations and has no correlation with physical information.

Therefore, if the infringer has a slave machine of a regular product and a counterfeit product, the authentication IC on the regular product main unit is replaced with the commercial product authentication IC that maintains the initial state, and the slave device of the counterfeit product is also the same. Ground, install the commercial certification IC in the initial state.

That is, in the configuration of Fig. 1, it is assumed that the authentication IC 21 and the authentication IC 31 are in an initial state at the time of purchase of a commercial product.

When the challenge-response authentication is performed only by this condition, the authentication is limited to the logical information, and the secret key is consistent in the initial value on both the host side and the slave side, so that the authentication is established.

Therefore, in order to make the authentication and physical information relevant, in order to prevent the use of counterfeit goods in the exchange of authentication ICs, it is necessary to implement the first stage of certification.

As described above, when the host device 2 detects the connection of the new slave device 3, the arithmetic device 22 performs the authentication process of the slave device in accordance with FIGS. 4 and 5.

In a series of actions, the authentication IC 21 on the main unit 2 has an important task in the sense of performing the maintenance of the secret key and the execution of the HASH calculation.

Therefore, when the power source is turned on, the host device 2 confirms the legitimacy of the authentication IC 21 that it has, and becomes a normal operation state at the stage of obtaining the confirmation. Whenever a connection of the new slave device 3 is detected, it is necessary to perform the following. The actions of the authentication process in Figure 4 and Figure 5.

Next, the operation of confirming the legitimacy of the authentication IC 21 possessed by the host device 2 will be described.

Fig. 7 is a diagram for explaining the authentication operation of the authentication IC 21 on the main unit 2.

4 and 5 of the foregoing, that is, the authentication operation of the slave device 3 by the host device 2 is based on the premise that the authentication IC 21 on the host device 2 is the correct regular product, and the authentication IC 31 on the slave device 3 is performed. The certification action.

When compared with this action, the authentication of the authentication IC 21 on the host device 2 does not exist at this point in time when there is no authentication IC 21 that can be guaranteed to be a regular product (that is, the master-sub-machine-to-machine authentication).

Therefore, similarly to the fourth stage, that is, in the non-volatile memory area 2116 of the authentication IC 21, the HASH value is stored in advance at the time of shipment.

The HASH value is stored in the same manner as the first stage of the authentication, and the HASH value obtained by taking the value of the secret key and the IC-specific number of the authentication IC 21 as an argument is stored at the time of shipment of the device.

The authentication operation of the authentication IC 21 is substantially the same as the first phase of the authentication described in FIG. 4, and the difference is that the authentication target of the host device 2 is the authentication IC 21 on the master device 2.

The communication unit 222 of the calculation device 22 first receives the value of the IC-specific number (subsidized IC-specific value) from the authentication IC 21, and inputs the value as an inquiry code to the authentication IC 21 to obtain a response code (subsidized IC calculation value).

On the other hand, in the non-volatile memory area 2116 of the authentication IC 21, the HASH value (subsidized IC comparison value) is stored in advance, and the communication unit 222 of the calculation device 22 reads the HASH value, and the determination unit 223 makes the response code obtained previously. Compare.

In the case of the certification IC 21 at the time of shipment, since the value of the IC unique number does not change, the same HASH value should be obtained.

Therefore, if the values match, the operation is shifted to the normal operation state, and when the values are not identical, the replacement of the authentication IC is detected, and the authentication of the authentication IC 21 is not performed.

If the infringer replaces the authentication IC 21 with the commercial IC, since the value of the non-volatile memory area of the original authentication IC can be read, the read value can be stored in the replaced authentication IC.

However, since the IC unique numbers are not the same, the HASH calculation result is different from the value stored in the non-volatile memory area 2116.

The authentication operation of the authentication IC 21 described in FIG. 7 uses the HASH value stored in the authentication IC 21 itself and the value calculated by the authentication IC 21 itself.

The infringer who manufactures the counterfeit product can confirm the legitimacy in Figure 7 when using the certification IC of the commercial product described in Figure 2, but in the replacement of the IC, if the installation is performed, the same value is returned. The device of both COM3 and COM7 will make the authentication of Figure 7 establish.

However, in this case, at this time, the correct operation is not performed at the time of authentication with the slave device 3.

That is, since the normal slave machine cannot be connected to the counterfeit main machine, the result is that the countermeasure against the counterfeit product can be established in this case.

As described above, according to the present embodiment, the authentication IC uses only the inexpensive structure of the slave device IC, that is, the countermeasure against the counterfeit product can be realized without placing the secret key in a place that can be observed from the outside.

Further, according to the present embodiment, even if the authentication ICs of both the host device and the slave device are replaced, countermeasures against the counterfeit product can be realized. Therefore, it is possible to prevent the use of the replacement of the parts to avoid the certification mechanism.

In addition, the authentication IC on the host device is a certified IC that is installed by a regular installer and is installed at the time of shipment, that is, the legitimacy of the authentication IC is of great significance, and according to the embodiment, it is possible to authenticate the host device. The legitimacy of the certification IC.

In the above-described embodiment, in the present embodiment, only a relatively inexpensive authentication IC that does not have a special function is used, and countermeasures against the counterfeit product in which the secret key does not leak are realized.

More specifically, both the host device and the slave device are provided with a certification IC from the host computer that controls the overall system calculation device, and the authentication IC has a data transmission/reception unit and a response code hold. Department, IC unique number, HASH calculation logic, secret key storage area, and non-volatile memory area.

In addition, the method for preventing the counterfeit product is described in the non-volatile memory area of the authentication IC, and the HASH calculation result using the secret key and the IC unique number as an argument is stored in advance at the time of shipment, and the host device is used at the time of operation. Each time a new slave device is detected, the HICA calculation is performed again by the authentication IC of the slave device using the IC-specific number and the secret key of the slave device, and is read from the non-volatile memory area of the authentication IC of the slave device. The HASH value stored at the time of shipment, and whether the recalculated HASH value and the read HASH value are consistent, to verify whether the slave machine is a regular product.

Further, the method for preventing the counterfeit product described above further includes means for authenticating the authentication IC on the host device to be a regular installer and installing the authentication IC at the time of shipment, that is, the authentication can be performed. The legitimacy of the certification IC.

In addition, the above-described countermeasures for preventing counterfeit products can prevent the counterfeit products from being replaced even if the authentication ICs of both the main unit and the slave devices are replaced. Therefore, it is possible to prevent the replacement of the parts by means of the parts. Certification body.

Embodiment 2

When there is a unique number other than the IC-specific number of the authentication IC 21 on the host device 2, and the non-volatile memory area 2116 in the authentication IC 21 can store two kinds of HASH values, the authentication can be enhanced. The steps of the authentication IC 21 on the host device shown in the figure.

This processing is shown in Figs. 8 and 9.

In the present embodiment, since the process of authenticating the authentication IC 21 on the authentication host device 2 is configured in two stages, the eighth picture is referred to as the first stage of authentication, and the ninth picture is referred to as the second stage of authentication.

In addition, in the fourth and fifth figures, the terms of the first stage of certification and the second stage of certification are also used, but the fourth and fifth figures above are the authentication between the main unit 2 and the slave machine 3, Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 is the authentication of the authentication IC 21 on the main unit 2, and therefore has different meanings.

In addition, Fig. 8 is the same processing as Fig. 7, and Fig. 9 is performed thereafter.

In addition, the second stage of the certification of Fig. 9 may be performed first, and the first stage of the certification of Fig. 8 may be performed.

In both the first phase of the certification and the second phase of the certification, it is necessary to be authenticated. Even if it is authenticated at one stage and not certified at the other stage, the certification IC 21 is improper.

In addition, the structure of the device assumed in the present embodiment is shown in Fig. 10, and the structure of the authentication IC is shown in Fig. 11.

The structure of the calculation device 22 is the same as that of Fig. 3.

The ASIC 25 described in FIG. 10 does not have to be an ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit), and a mechanism other than the authentication IC 21 can be used as long as it has the unique number 251.

Further, the position of the ASIC 25 does not have to be on the communication path 24, and the calculation device 22 can acquire the value of the unique number 251.

The unique number 251 is an example of a backup unique value, and the ASIC 25 is an example of a backup unique value memory unit.

11 is an authentication IC 21 similar to FIG. 2, which can be used as two areas #1 and #2 of the non-volatile memory area 2116, and the arithmetic unit 22 specifies the access object address of the non-volatile memory area 2116. Can be used to distinguish access to #1 or #2.

The non-volatile memory area #1 (21161) and the non-volatile memory area #2 (21162) in Fig. 11 store the HASH value preset at the time of shipment. Both are different HASH values.

First, in the non-volatile memory area #1 (21161), as in the seventh figure, the result of the HASH calculation using the IC-specific number and the secret key of the authentication IC 21 as an argument is stored.

Next, in the non-volatile memory area #2 (21162), the result of the HASH calculation using the unique number 251 of the ASIC and the secret key as an argument (backup comparison value) is stored.

The description of Fig. 8 will be made below.

The first stage of the authentication is almost the same as the seventh drawing, and only the portion of the non-volatile memory area #1 (21161) is read by COM7.

However, the stored value is the same as the value stored in the non-volatile memory area of Figure 7.

In the first stage of the authentication in Fig. 8, if the HASH values match, the process proceeds to the second stage of the authentication in Fig. 2.

The description of Fig. 9 is made below.

In the first stage of the authentication in Fig. 8, if the authentication IC 21 is the authentication IC described in Fig. 2, it is possible to sufficiently authenticate the IC at the time of shipment. However, since it is self-certified, it may be as described in Fig. 2. Different ICs.

Therefore, the authentication IC 21 itself calculates the HASH value using the unique number 251 of the ASIC 25 which is not related to itself.

In the calculation device 22, the communication unit 222 inputs the unique number 251 of the ASIC 25 as the challenge code to the authentication IC 21, receives the HASH value (backup calculation value) for the unique number 251 and the secret key, and keeps the response of the received message in the calculation. A register of device 22.

Then, the communication unit 222 reads out the HASH value (backup comparison value) stored in advance in the non-volatile memory area #2 (21162), and the determination unit 223 responds to the previous (backup calculated value) and from the non-volatile memory area #2 ( 21162) The HASH value (backup comparison value) is compared.

When the two match, the determination unit 223 determines that the authentication IC 21 is legitimate.

In the case of simply making the responses of COM3 and COM7 the same, the aggressor cannot cope with the second-stage authentication, and uses information other than the authentication IC21 on the host device (inherent number 251), so it is impossible to authenticate from another host device. The IC is removed and used for improper repair.

As described above, according to the present embodiment, when the mechanism other than the authentication IC on the host device has a certain unique number, the method of authenticating the authentication IC on the authentication host can be enhanced by using it.

The manner in which the authentication IC of the authentication master device is justified in the present embodiment has been described above.

More specifically, the method described above may be such that when there is a unique number other than the IC-specific number of the authentication IC on the host device, and the non-volatile memory area in the authentication IC can store two kinds of HASH values, Strengthen the strength of certification.

In addition, this method is used to authenticate the authenticity of the authentication IC on the host computer by using two stages of authentication according to the IC-specific number of the authentication IC and authentication according to the unique number on the host device.

Embodiment 3

In the first embodiment and the second embodiment, the example in which the authentication IC 21 is used is described. However, in the present embodiment, the configuration in which the authentication IC 21 is not used to authenticate the slave device will be described.

Fig. 12 is a view showing an example of the structure of the main unit 2 of the embodiment.

Further, the configuration of the slave device 3 is as shown in Fig. 1, and the configuration of the authentication IC 31 is as shown in Figs. 2 and 6.

In Fig. 12, the control unit 221, the communication unit 222, the determination unit 223, the res1 (224), and the res2 (225) are the same as those shown in Fig. 3, and therefore their description will be omitted.

The secret key storage unit 226 has the same function as the secret key storage area 2115 of the authentication IC 21.

That is, the secret key storage unit 226 stores a secret key that is secretly shared with the authentication IC 31 of the slave device 3.

Further, the HASH calculation logic unit 227 has the same function as the HASH calculation logic unit 2114 of the authentication IC 21.

That is, the HASH calculation logic unit 227 performs the HASH calculation using the same HASH function as the HASH calculation logic unit 3114 of the authentication IC 31.

Further, the HASH calculation logic unit 227 is an example of a one-way calculation unit.

The operation of the calculation device 22 of the present embodiment is the same as that of the first embodiment except that the operation of the authentication IC 21 of the first embodiment is performed in the calculation device 22.

In other words, in the first stage of the authentication, the communication unit 222 reads the IC-specific number of the authentication IC 31 from the authentication IC 31 of the slave device 3, and transmits the value as the challenge code to the HASH calculation logic unit 227, and the HASH calculation logic unit 227 The value of the IC unique number of the authentication IC 31 and the secret key of the secret key storage unit 226 are used as arguments to perform HASH calculation for obtaining the HASH calculation value.

Next, the communication unit 222 reads out the HASH value of the non-volatile memory area 3116 stored in advance in the authentication IC 31.

Then, the determination unit 223 compares the response code (HASH calculation value) obtained by the HASH calculation logic unit 227 with the HASH value received from the authentication IC 31.

When the two are the same, the processing of the first stage of the authentication is completed, and the processing of the second stage of the authentication is performed.

On the other hand, when the two do not match, the counterfeit product is detected and the slave device is not used.

In the second stage of authentication, the determination unit 223 generates a random number as the challenge code, and the communication unit 222 transmits the challenge code to both the HASH calculation logic unit 227 and the authentication IC 31 on the slave device 3.

The HASH calculation logic unit 227 and the authentication IC 31 respectively calculate the response code, and thus obtain the response codes of the two and perform comparison. If they are equal values, it can be determined that the newly connected slave device 3 is a regular product.

In the third embodiment, the authentication IC 21 of the first embodiment and the second embodiment is not used, and the authenticity of the slave device is determined by the S/W assembly of the arithmetic device.

As described above, in the case of S/W assembly, there is a possibility that the value of the secret key is leaked from the memory of the debug I/O on the host side, provided that the secret key is provided. In the case of the leaking mechanism, as in the embodiment, the legitimacy of the slave device can be determined without using the authentication IC 21.

The structure for judging the legitimacy of the slave device 3 in the unused authentication IC 21 in the present embodiment has been described above.

Finally, an example of the hardware configuration of the main unit 2 shown in the first to third embodiments will be described.

As shown in FIG. 1 and the like, the main unit 2 may be a device including the calculation device 22, and may be a computer such as a personal computer, a photocopying machine, a mobile phone, a car guide, or the like in addition to the above-described printer. An information machine such as a machine with software and hardware is incorporated.

Fig. 13 is a view showing an example of the hardware resources of the main unit 2 shown in the first to third embodiments.

The structure of Fig. 13 is merely an example of the hardware structure of the main unit 2. The hardware structure of the main unit 2 is not limited to the structure described in Fig. 13, and may be other configurations.

In Fig. 13, the main unit 2 is provided with a CPU 911 (also referred to as a Central Processing Unit, a central processing unit, a processing unit, a microprocessor, a microcomputer, and a processor) that is useful for executing programs.

The CPU 911 corresponds to the calculation device 22.

The CPU 911 is connected to the authentication IC 906 via the bus bar 912. The authentication IC 906 corresponds to the authentication IC 21 of FIG. 1 and the like.

Further, as long as the host device 2 is an information device, for example, a ROM (Read Only Memory) 913, a RAM (Random Access Memory) 914, a communication port 915, a display device 901, a keyboard 902, a mouse 903, and an FDD 904 (Flexible Disk Drive) are provided. The optical disk device 905 (CDD), the magnetic disk device 920, and the like are connected, that is, the hardware devices are controlled.

The communication port 915 may also correspond to either wired communication or wireless communication, for example, may be connected to a LAN (Regional Network), an Internet, a WAN (Wide Area Network), a SAN (Storage Area Network), or the like.

The operating system 921 (OS), the window system 922, the program group 923, and the file group 924 can also be stored in the disk device 920.

The program group of the program group 923 is executed by the CPU 911.

In the program group 923, a program is stored to perform the function of the "~ part" (excluding those included in the authentication IC) in the description of the first to third embodiments. The program is read and executed by the CPU 911.

In addition, in the description of the first to third embodiments, the description may be "~circuit", "~device", "~machine", or "~step", "~program", "~ processing". "."

That is, the information processing method of the present invention can be realized by the steps, procedures, and processes shown in the flowcharts of the first to third embodiments.

1. . . Certification IC

2. . . Host machine

3. . . Slave machine

11. . . Data transmission and reception department

12. . . Response code holding unit

13. . . IC unique number storage unit

14. . . HASH calculation logic

15. . . Secret key storage area

16. . . Non-volatile memory area

twenty one. . . Certification IC

twenty two. . . Arithmetic device

twenty three. . . Communication road

twenty four. . . Communication road

25. . . ASIC

31. . . Certification IC

221. . . Control department

222. . . Communication department

223. . . Judgment department

224. . . Res1

225. . . Res2

251. . . Inherent number

2111. . . Data transmission and reception department

2112. . . Response code holding unit

2113. . . IC unique number storage unit

2114. . . HASH calculation logic

2115. . . Secret key storage area

2116. . . Non-volatile memory area

3111. . . Data transmission and reception department

3112. . . Response code holding unit

3113. . . IC unique number storage unit

3114. . . HASH calculation logic

3115. . . Secret key storage area

3116. . . Non-volatile memory area

Fig. 1 shows an example of the structure of the apparatus of the first embodiment.

Fig. 2 is a diagram showing an example of the internal structure of the authentication IC of the first embodiment.

Fig. 3 is a view showing an example of the internal structure of the arithmetic unit of the first embodiment.

Fig. 4 is a view showing an operation corresponding to the first stage of authentication in the operation of the authentication slave device of the first embodiment.

Fig. 5 is a view showing an operation corresponding to the second stage of authentication in the operation of the authentication slave device of the first embodiment.

Fig. 6 is a view showing an example of the internal structure of the authentication IC of the first embodiment.

Fig. 7 is a view showing the operation of the authenticity of the authentication IC on the authentication host device of the first embodiment.

Fig. 8 is a view showing an operation corresponding to the first stage of authentication in the operation of authenticating the authentication IC on the authentication host device in the second embodiment.

Fig. 9 is a view showing an operation corresponding to the second stage of authentication in the operation of authenticating the authentication IC on the authentication host device in the second embodiment.

Fig. 10 is a view showing an example of the structure of the apparatus of the second embodiment.

Fig. 11 is a view showing an example of the internal structure of the authentication IC of the second embodiment.

Fig. 12 is a view showing an example of the configuration of the main unit of the third embodiment.

Fig. 13 is a view showing an example of the hardware configuration of the main body of the first to third embodiments.

Figure 14 shows the question-response method.

twenty one. . . Certification IC

31. . . Certification IC

2111. . . Data transmission and reception department

2112. . . Response code holding unit

2113. . . IC unique number storage unit

2114. . . HASH calculation logic

2115. . . Secret key storage area

2116. . . Non-volatile memory area

3111. . . Data transmission and reception department

3112. . . Response code holding unit

3113. . . IC unique number storage unit

3114. . . HASH calculation logic

3115. . . Secret key storage area

3116. . . Non-volatile memory area

Claims (10)

An information processing device, comprising: a communication unit configured to receive, in advance, an authentication target IC (integrated circuit) of an authentication target other than the information processing device The IC inherent value and the comparison value for the IC are used as the IC value of the authentication target and the comparison value of the authentication target IC; the auxiliary IC includes the secret key memory unit for memorizing the secret key, and the pair is a one-way calculation unit that performs one-way calculation by the secret key of the secret key storage unit and the authentication target IC unique value received by the communication unit; and a determination unit that receives the authentication received by the communication unit The target IC comparison value is compared with the calculated value calculated by the one-way calculation unit of the auxiliary IC, and it is determined whether the authentication target IC comparison value and the calculated value are identical; in the auxiliary IC, the auxiliary IC is stored in advance The auxiliary IC inherent value of the IC inherent value of the auxiliary IC and the auxiliary IC comparison value belonging to the comparison value for comparison, the communication unit from the auxiliary The IC receives the auxiliary IC unique value, transmits the received auxiliary IC unique value to the one-way calculation unit of the auxiliary IC, and receives the auxiliary IC unique value from the one-way calculation unit of the auxiliary IC and the The value calculated by the secret key in one-way calculation is used as the auxiliary IC calculation value, and the complex reception is from The auxiliary IC comparison value of the auxiliary IC; the determination unit compares the auxiliary IC comparison value received by the communication unit with the auxiliary IC calculation value, and determines the auxiliary IC comparison value and the auxiliary Whether the calculated values of the IC are consistent. The information processing device according to claim 1, wherein the determination unit compares the authentication target IC comparison value with a calculated value calculated by the one-way calculation unit, and compares the authentication target IC comparison value with When the calculated values do not match, the authentication target is not authenticated. The information processing device of claim 2, wherein the secret key and the authentication target IC unique value that are the same as the secret key stored in the secret key storage unit are the same as the one-way calculation unit When the value calculated by the calculation is received as the authentication target IC comparison value, the determination unit determines that the authentication target IC comparison value and the calculated value match. The information processing device according to claim 1, wherein the determination unit does not authenticate the auxiliary IC when the auxiliary IC comparison value and the auxiliary IC calculation value do not match. The information processing device of claim 1, wherein the secret key and the auxiliary IC unique value are subjected to the same one-way calculation as the one-way calculation unit, and the calculated value is received as the auxiliary IC comparison. In the case of a value, the determination unit determines that the auxiliary IC comparison value and the auxiliary IC calculation value match. For example, the information processing device of claim 1 of the patent scope, wherein The information processing device is provided with an auxiliary IC for pre-storing two comparison values as the auxiliary IC comparison value and the backup comparison value; the information processing device has a backup inherent value memory unit in addition to the auxiliary IC, The unique value other than the auxiliary IC inherent value is stored as a backup unique value, and the communication unit receives the auxiliary IC unique value from the auxiliary IC, and the received auxiliary IC unique value is transmitted to the one-way calculation unit of the auxiliary IC. Transmitting and receiving the auxiliary IC calculation value from the one-way calculation unit of the auxiliary IC, receiving the auxiliary IC comparison value from the auxiliary IC, and receiving the backup inherent value from the backup unique value storage unit, And transmitting the received backup unique value to the one-way calculation unit of the auxiliary IC, and receiving, by the one-way calculation unit of the auxiliary IC, a value calculated by performing one-way calculation on the backup unique value and the secret key. Receiving, as a backup calculation value, the backup comparison value from the auxiliary IC; and the determination unit is received by the communication unit Comparing the auxiliary IC comparison value with the auxiliary IC calculated value, determining whether the auxiliary IC comparison value and the auxiliary IC calculated value match, and the backup comparison value and the backup received by the communication unit The calculated values are compared, and it is determined whether the backup comparison value and the backup calculated value match. The information processing device of claim 6, wherein the determination unit is inconsistent between the auxiliary IC comparison value and the auxiliary IC calculation value, and the backup comparison value and the backup calculation When there is at least one inconsistency between the out-of-values, the above-mentioned auxiliary IC is not authenticated. The information processing device of claim 6, wherein the value calculated by performing the one-way calculation on the secret key and the auxiliary IC unique value in the same manner as the one-way calculation unit is received as the auxiliary IC comparison value. In the case where the determination unit determines that the auxiliary IC comparison value and the auxiliary IC calculation value match, the secret key and the backup unique value are calculated in the same way as the one-way calculation unit. When the value is received as the backup comparison value, the determination unit determines that the backup comparison value and the backup calculation value match. The information processing device of claim 1, wherein the auxiliary IC is an IC of the same mechanism as the authentication target IC. A program characterized by causing a computer to function as an information processing device, the information processing device being the information processing device described in claim 1.