TW201314607A - Integrated analysis method of process risk evaluation - Google Patents

Integrated analysis method of process risk evaluation Download PDF

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TW201314607A
TW201314607A TW100133420A TW100133420A TW201314607A TW 201314607 A TW201314607 A TW 201314607A TW 100133420 A TW100133420 A TW 100133420A TW 100133420 A TW100133420 A TW 100133420A TW 201314607 A TW201314607 A TW 201314607A
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Taiwan
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risk
analysis
level
tolerable
severity
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TW100133420A
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Chinese (zh)
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guang-hai Jin
shi-huang Wang
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Advanced Control & Systems Inc
China Technical Consultants Inc Foundation
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Priority to TW100133420A priority Critical patent/TW201314607A/en
Priority to CN2012103337624A priority patent/CN102999785A/en
Publication of TW201314607A publication Critical patent/TW201314607A/en

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Abstract

This invention provides an integrated analysis method of process risk evaluation to be cooperatively executed by a server or program. First, deviation guidewords are used to examine process deviation and list all causes, followed by analyzing associated hazard results and current safety measures and evaluating the severity level of the risk. A tolerable risk target frequency is determined according to the severity level. If the severity level is significant or higher, protection layer analysis is carried out, followed by the risk evaluation. If the tolerable risk target frequency is reached, likelihood and risk level are determined, and operative improvement recommendations are proposed as needed. If the tolerable risk target frequency is not reached yet, safety level requirement should be determined to further determine the suggestions for other risk prevention or risk elimination measures. Accordingly, a risk evaluation analysis method with consistent evaluation criterion and high efficiency can be achieved.

Description

製程風險評估之整合分析方法Integrated analysis method for process risk assessment

本發明係關於一種製程風險評估之整合分析方法,尤指可可達到評估基準一致以及高效率之風險評估分析方法者。The present invention relates to an integrated analysis method for process risk assessment, especially for a risk assessment analysis method in which cocoa achieves consistent assessment criteria and high efficiency.

按,一般危害與可操作性分析(Hazard and Operability Study,HAZOP)是石油化工與製造、使用危害性物質製程工業的主要製程安全評估與風險分析方法,而此一習知技術係運用偏離引導字(Deviation Guidewords)結合製程參數(Process Parameters)發展製程偏離,並由製程安全評估小組系統性、地毯式的找出所有可能的製程危害原因、危害後果,評估安全防護措施的需求與有效性,及風險是否可接受。According to Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), it is the main process safety assessment and risk analysis method for petrochemicals and manufacturing and hazardous chemicals process industries, and this prior art uses deviation guidance words. (Deviation Guidewords) combines process parameters to develop process deviations, and the process safety assessment team systematically and carpet-likely identifies all possible process hazards, hazards, and assesses the need and effectiveness of safety precautions. Whether the risk is acceptable.

雖然,前述之安全評估方法,具有全面性、可追溯性的優點,但評估時耗費人力龐大,且風險評估中對於風險可能性的估計因欠缺統計數據的支持,往往流於臆測,而導致風險評估之基準無法具有一致性。Although the aforementioned safety assessment method has the advantages of comprehensiveness and traceability, it is costly to evaluate, and the estimation of risk possibility in risk assessment is often supported by lack of statistical data, which leads to risk. The benchmark for evaluation cannot be consistent.

有鑑於上述習知製程風險評估之整合分析方法之缺憾,發明人有感其未臻於完善,遂竭其心智悉心研究克服,憑其從事該項產業多年之累積經驗,進而研發出一種製程風險評估之整合分析方法,以期可達到評估基準一致以及高效率之風險評估分析方法。In view of the shortcomings of the above-mentioned integrated analysis method of process risk assessment, the inventor feels that he has not perfected it, exhausted his mental research and overcome it, and developed a process risk based on his accumulated experience in the industry for many years. The integrated analysis method of the assessment, in order to achieve a risk assessment analysis method with consistent benchmarks and high efficiency.

為達上述目之,本發明之製程風險評估之整合分析方法,係配合相關伺服器或軟體加以執行,其包含下列步驟:步驟一:以製程偏離引導字檢驗節點中之製程偏離,並列出造成各製程偏離之所有可能原因,且分析相關危害後果及辨識防止偏離之既有安全措施;步驟二:評估風險之嚴重性等級;步驟三:由嚴重性等級決定可容忍之風險目標頻率;步驟四:若嚴重性等級為重大及重大以上者,將執行保護層分析;步驟五:再次進行風險評估,若已達可容忍之風險目標頻率,則決定可能性等級與風險等級,之後視需要提出操作性改善建議;以及步驟六:若步驟五中未達可容忍的風險目標頻率,則應決定安全等級需求,進而決定其他風險預防或風險消減措施,並據此提出安全改善建議。To achieve the above objectives, the integrated analysis method of the process risk assessment of the present invention is performed in conjunction with a related server or software, and includes the following steps: Step 1: Deviating from the process in the process by the process deviation test word, and listing All possible causes of deviation of each process, and analysis of relevant hazard consequences and identification of deviations from existing security measures; Step 2: assess the severity level of risk; Step 3: Determine the tolerable risk target frequency by severity level; Step 4 : If the severity level is significant or significant, the protection layer analysis will be performed; Step 5: The risk assessment will be carried out again. If the risk target frequency has been tolerated, the probability level and risk level will be determined, and then the operation will be carried out as needed. Sexual improvement recommendations; and Step 6: If the tolerable risk target frequency is not met in Step 5, the safety level requirements should be determined, and then other risk prevention or risk mitigation measures should be determined, and safety improvement recommendations should be made accordingly.

為充分瞭解本發明之目之、特徵及功效,茲藉由下述具體之實施例,並配合所附之圖式,對本發明做一詳細說明,說明如後:請參閱『第1圖~第7圖』,係分別為本發明之實施架構示意圖、本發明之流程狀態示意圖、本發明之嚴重性分類資料示意圖、本發明之可容忍風險目標資料示意圖、本發明之保護層分析資料示意圖、本發明之可能性定義資料示意圖及本發明之風險評估矩陣資料示意圖。如圖所示:本發明製程風險評估之整合分析方法,係配合相關伺服器1或軟體加以執行,可將該軟體建立於電腦2中並配合伺服器1進行下列步驟之分析,而分析時其至少包含下列步驟:步驟一:以製程偏離引導字檢驗節點中之製程偏離,並列出造成各製程偏離之所有可能原因,且分析相關危害後果及辨識防止偏離之既有安全措施。In order to fully understand the objects, features and advantages of the present invention, the present invention will be described in detail by the following specific embodiments and the accompanying drawings. 7 is a schematic diagram of an implementation structure of the present invention, a schematic diagram of a flow state of the present invention, a schematic diagram of a severity classification data of the present invention, a schematic diagram of a tolerable risk target data of the present invention, a schematic diagram of a protective layer analysis data of the present invention, and a schematic diagram of the present invention The possibility of defining the invention is a schematic diagram of the data and a schematic diagram of the risk assessment matrix of the present invention. As shown in the figure: the integrated analysis method of the process risk assessment of the present invention is executed in conjunction with the relevant server 1 or software, and the software can be built in the computer 2 and analyzed by the server 1 in the following steps, and the analysis is performed. At least the following steps are included: Step 1: Deviate from the process in the process to test the deviation of the process in the node, and list all possible causes of deviation of each process, and analyze the relevant hazard consequences and identify the existing safety measures to prevent deviation.

步驟二:評估風險之嚴重性等級。Step 2: Assess the severity level of the risk.

步驟三:由嚴重性等級決定可容忍之風險目標頻率。Step 3: Determine the risk target frequency that can be tolerated by the severity level.

步驟四:若嚴重性等級為重大及重大以上者,將執行保護層分析。Step 4: If the severity level is significant or significant, a protective layer analysis will be performed.

步驟五:再次進行風險評估,若已達可容忍之風險目標頻率,則決定可能性等級與風險等級,之後視需要提出操作性改善建議。Step 5: Perform a risk assessment again. If the target frequency of the tolerable risk has been reached, determine the probability level and risk level, and then propose operational improvements as needed.

步驟六:若步驟五中未達可容忍的風險目標頻率,則應決定安全等級需求,進而決定其他風險預防或風險消減措施,並據此提出安全改善建議。Step 6: If the tolerable risk target frequency is not met in step 5, the safety level requirement should be determined, and then other risk prevention or risk reduction measures should be decided, and safety improvement suggestions should be proposed accordingly.

而今以上述各步驟為基礎,作一實施流程說明如下:先選擇節點開始分析S100(此處所提之節點係為某個製程之其中一階段),待選定之後,則以製程偏離引導字檢驗節點中的可能製程偏離s101(而該引導字係為事件發生之關鍵字),並列出所有可能原因s102,再分析與偏離相關的危害後果(假設所有保護失效)s103,且辨識防止偏離的既有安全措施s104,此時,可配合嚴重性分類資料3評估後果的嚴重性等級s105,並配合可容忍風險目標資料4判斷是否可決定嚴重性s106,若否則進行結果分析s107,若是則判斷是否嚴重性達4/5 s108,若達嚴重性達4/5時則執行保護層分析s109,而保護層分析時係配合保護層分析資料5,並依據下列原則進行考慮與判斷:Based on the above steps, an implementation flow is described as follows: first select the node to start analyzing S100 (the node mentioned here is one of the stages of a certain process), and after the selection, the process deviation test is used to test The possible process in the node deviates from s101 (and the boot word is the keyword of the event occurrence), lists all possible causes s102, analyzes the hazard consequences associated with the deviation (assuming all protection fails) s103, and identifies the deviation prevention There are security measures s104. At this time, the severity level s105 of the consequences can be evaluated in conjunction with the severity classification data 3, and the tolerable risk target data 4 can be used to determine whether the severity s106 can be determined. Otherwise, the result analysis s107, if yes, determine whether The severity is 4/5 s108. If the severity reaches 4/5, the protective layer analysis s109 is performed, and the protective layer analysis is combined with the protective layer analysis data 5, and the following principles are considered and judged:

(1) 事件後果分析(Impact event description):複製並延用評估後果的嚴重性等級之分析後果。(1) Impact event description: Copy and extend the analytical consequences of assessing the severity level of the consequences.

(2) 嚴重性分析(Severity):複製並延用嚴重性之等級。(2) Severity: The level of severity is copied and extended.

(3) 起始失效事件分析(Initiating cause):所有可能原因應逐項討論。(3) Initiating cause: All possible causes should be discussed item by item.

(4) 起始失效事件可能性分析(Initiation lidelihood):連結並查尋起始事件故障率資料庫。(4) Initiation lidelihood: Link and search the initial event failure rate database.

(5) 一般製程設計分析(General process design):是否依循一般安全設計規範,如API、ASME、NFPA、區域防爆等級等工業標準或規範執行設計?有(0.1);無(1)。(5) General process design: Does it follow the general safety design specifications, such as API, ASME, NFPA, regional explosion-proof grades and other industrial standards or specifications to implement the design? There are (0.1); none (1).

(6) 基本程序控制系統分析(BPCS):失效的控制系統外,其化相關的監控系統,如:DCS、PLC、PANEL。有(0.1);無(1)。(6) Basic Program Control System Analysis (BPCS): In addition to the failed control system, it is related to monitoring systems such as DCS, PLC, and PANEL. There are (0.1); none (1).

(7) 警報分析(Alarms,ect.):獨立之安全系統警,第(4)項與第(6)項自動化操作系統以外的警報,並且要有對應事件的SOP,有(0.1);無(1)。(7) Alarm analysis (Alarms, ect.): independent security system alarm, alarms other than the automated operating systems in items (4) and (6), and SOPs with corresponding events, (0.1); (1).

(8) 操作安全管理分析(Addittioal mitigation,restricted access):例如製程安全管理程序、作業許可、廠區人員管制,但須針對起始事件,有(0.1);無(1)。(8) Addittioal mitigation (restricted access): for example, process safety management procedures, work permits, and plant personnel control, but for the initial event, there are (0.1); none (1).

(9) 獨立保護層分析(IPL additional mitigation,dike,pressure relief):消減系統,例如:防溢堤、安全閥、爆破片、自動消防灑水系統,連結並查尋保護層事件資料庫。(9) Independent protection layer analysis (IPL additional mitigation, dike, pressure relief): reduction system, for example: anti-overflow, safety valve, rupture disc, automatic fire sprinkler system, link and search the protective layer event database.

(10)中間事件可能性分析(Intermediate event likelihood):第(4)到第(9)項乘積。(10) Intermediate event likelihood: the product of items (4) to (9).

(11)安全儀器系統完全性等級分析(SIF integrity level):SIL所對應的故障機率(PFD)。(11) Safety instrument system SIF integrity level: The probability of failure (PFD) corresponding to SIL.

(12)消減後的事件可能性分析(Mitigated event lidelihood):風險控制後的失效事件可能性,即風險須小於可容忍風險目標,詳如嚴重性分類資料3。(12) Mitigated event lidelihood: The probability of failure event after risk control, that is, the risk must be less than the tolerable risk target, as detailed in the severity classification data3.

待完成保護層分析s109之後,再確認是否已達可容忍的風險目標s110,若是則配合可能性定義資料6評估後果的可能性等級s111,並配合風險評估矩陣資料7評估風險等級s112,之後再判斷該風險是否小於等於4 S113,若是小於等於4則決定安全等級需求s114,之後再決定SIF的SIL或其他風險預防/消減策略s115,並提出安全改善建議s116,最後再重覆所有引導字s117進行再次分析,若風險非小於等於4則提出操作性改善建議s118後再重覆所有引導字s117;而當判斷是否嚴重性達4/5 s108時,若嚴重性未達4/5,則直接配合風險評估矩陣資料7評估風險等級s112。After the protection layer analysis s109 is completed, it is confirmed whether the tolerable risk target s110 has been reached, and if so, the probability definition data 6 is used to evaluate the probability level s111 of the consequences, and the risk assessment matrix data 7 is used to evaluate the risk level s112, and then It is judged whether the risk is less than or equal to 4 S113, and if it is less than or equal to 4, the security level requirement s114 is determined, and then the SIF of the SIF or other risk prevention/reduction strategy s115 is determined, and the safety improvement suggestion s116 is proposed, and finally all the guide words s117 are repeated. Perform another analysis. If the risk is not less than or equal to 4, the operational improvement suggestion s118 is proposed and then all guide words s117 are repeated; and when it is judged whether the severity is 4/5 s108, if the severity is less than 4/5, then directly The risk level s112 is evaluated in conjunction with the risk assessment matrix data 7.

如上所述,本發明完全符合專利三要件:新穎性、進步性和產業上之可利用性。以新穎性和進步性而言,本發明係一種製程風險評估之整合分析方法,可達到評估基準一致以及高效率之風險評估分析方法;就產業上之可利用性而言,利用本發明所衍生之產品,當可充分滿足目前市場之需求。As described above, the present invention fully complies with the three requirements of the patent: novelty, advancement, and industrial applicability. In terms of novelty and advancement, the present invention is an integrated analysis method for process risk assessment, which can achieve a risk assessment analysis method with consistent benchmarks and high efficiency; and in terms of industrial availability, the invention is derived The products can fully meet the needs of the current market.

本發明在上文中已以較佳實施例揭露,然熟習本項技術者應理解之是,該實施例僅用於描繪本發明,而不應解讀為限制本發明之範圍。應注意之是,舉凡與該實施例等效之變化與置圍當以下文之申請專利範圍所界定者為準。The invention has been described above in terms of preferred embodiments, and it should be understood by those skilled in the art that the present invention is not intended to limit the scope of the invention. It should be noted that variations and limitations equivalent to the embodiments are subject to the definition of the scope of the following claims.

1...伺服器1. . . server

2...電腦2. . . computer

3...嚴重性分類資料3. . . Severity classification data

4...可容忍風險目標資料4. . . Tolerable risk target data

5...保護層分析資料5. . . Protective layer analysis data

6...可能性定義資料6. . . Probability definition data

7...風險評估矩陣資料7. . . Risk assessment matrix data

S100...選擇節點開始分析S100. . . Select node to start analysis

s101...以製程偏離引導字檢驗節點中的可能製程偏離S101. . . Deviation of possible process deviations in the node by the process deviation guide word

s102...列出所有可能原因S102. . . List all possible causes

s103...分析與偏離相關的危害後果(假設所有保護失效)S103. . . Analyze the hazard consequences associated with deviations (assuming all protections fail)

s104...辨識防止偏離的既有安全措施S104. . . Identify existing security measures to prevent deviations

s105...評估後果的嚴重性等級S105. . . Assess the severity level of the consequences

s106...是否可決定嚴重性S106. . . Whether it can determine the severity

s107...結果分析S107. . . Result analysis

s108...嚴重性達4/5S108. . . Severity up to 4/5

s109...執行保護層分析S109. . . Performing protection layer analysis

s110...是否已達可容忍的風險目標S110. . . Has it reached a tolerable risk target?

s111...評估後果的可能性等級S111. . . Assess the likelihood level of the consequences

s112...評估風險等級S112. . . Assess risk level

S113...風險是否小於等於4S113. . . Whether the risk is less than or equal to 4

s114...決定安全等級需求S114. . . Determine security level requirements

s115...決定SIF的SIL或其他風險預防/消減策略S115. . . Determine SIF's SIL or other risk prevention/reduction strategies

s116...提出安全改善建議S116. . . Propose safety improvement recommendations

s117...重覆所有引導字S117. . . Repeat all guide words

s118...提出操作性改善建議S118. . . Proposed operational improvement recommendations

第1圖為本發明之實施架構示意圖。Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of an implementation architecture of the present invention.

第2圖為本發明之流程狀態示意圖。Figure 2 is a schematic view of the flow state of the present invention.

第3圖為本發明之嚴重性分類資料示意圖。Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of the severity classification data of the present invention.

第4圖為本發明之可容忍風險目標資料示意圖。Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of the tolerable risk target data of the present invention.

第5圖為本發明之保護層分析資料示意圖。Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of the protective layer analysis data of the present invention.

第6圖為本發明之可能性定義資料示意圖。Figure 6 is a schematic diagram of the definition of the possibilities of the present invention.

第7圖為本發明之風險評估矩陣資料示意圖。Figure 7 is a schematic diagram of the risk assessment matrix of the present invention.

S100...選擇節點開始分析S100. . . Select node to start analysis

s101...以製程偏離引導字檢驗節點中的可能製程偏離S101. . . Deviation of possible process deviations in the node by the process deviation guide word

s102...列出所有可能原因S102. . . List all possible causes

s103...分析與偏離相關的危害後果(假設所有保護失效)S103. . . Analyze the hazard consequences associated with deviations (assuming all protections fail)

s104...辨識防止偏離的既有安全措施S104. . . Identify existing security measures to prevent deviations

s105...評估後果的嚴重性等級S105. . . Assess the severity level of the consequences

s106...是否可決定嚴重性S106. . . Whether it can determine the severity

s107...結果分析S107. . . Result analysis

s108...嚴重性達4/5S108. . . Severity up to 4/5

s109...執行保護層分析S109. . . Performing protection layer analysis

s110...是否已達可容忍的風險目標S110. . . Has it reached a tolerable risk target?

s111...評估後果的可能性等級S111. . . Assess the likelihood level of the consequences

s112...評估風險等級S112. . . Assess risk level

S113...風險是否小於等於4S113. . . Whether the risk is less than or equal to 4

s114...決定安全等級需求S114. . . Determine security level requirements

s115...決定SIF的SIL或其他風險預防/消減策略S115. . . Determine SIF's SIL or other risk prevention/reduction strategies

s116...提出安全改善建議S116. . . Propose safety improvement recommendations

s117...重覆所有引導字S117. . . Repeat all guide words

s118...提出操作性改善建議S118. . . Proposed operational improvement recommendations

Claims (6)

一種製程風險評估之整合分析方法,係配合相關伺服器或軟體加以執行,其包含下列步驟:步驟一:以製程偏離引導字檢驗節點中之製程偏離,並列出造成各製程偏離之所有可能原因,且分析相關危害後果及辨識防止偏離之既有安全措施;步驟二:評估風險之嚴重性等級;步驟三:由嚴重性等級決定可容忍之風險目標頻率;步驟四:若嚴重性等級為重大及重大以上者,將執行保護層分析;步驟五:再次進行風險評估,若已達可容忍之風險目標頻率,則決定可能性等級與風險等級,之後視需要提出操作性改善建議;以及步驟六:若步驟五中未達可容忍的風險目標頻率,則應決定安全等級需求,進而決定其他風險預防或風險消減措施,並據此提出安全改善建議。An integrated analysis method for process risk assessment is performed in conjunction with a related server or software, and includes the following steps: Step 1: Deviate the process deviation in the process by the process deviation guide word, and list all possible causes of deviation of each process. And analyze the relevant hazard consequences and identify the existing safety measures to prevent deviation; Step 2: Evaluate the severity level of the risk; Step 3: Determine the tolerable risk target frequency by the severity level; Step 4: If the severity level is significant and If the major is above, the protection layer analysis will be performed; Step 5: The risk assessment will be carried out again. If the tolerable risk target frequency has been reached, the probability level and risk level will be determined, and then the operational improvement suggestions will be proposed as needed; and Step 6: If the tolerable risk target frequency is not met in step 5, the safety level requirement should be determined, and then other risk prevention or risk reduction measures should be decided, and safety improvement suggestions should be proposed accordingly. 如申請專利範圍第1項所述之製程風險評估之整合分析方法,其中,該步驟二中係配合嚴重性分類資料評估風險之嚴重性等級。For example, the integrated analysis method of the process risk assessment described in claim 1 of the patent scope, wherein the second step is to evaluate the severity level of the risk by using the severity classification data. 如申請專利範圍第1項所述之製程風險評估之整合分析方法,其中,該步驟三中係配合可容忍風險目標資料決定可容忍之風險目標頻率。For example, the integrated analysis method for process risk assessment described in item 1 of the patent application scope, wherein the third step is to match the tolerable risk target data to determine the tolerable risk target frequency. 如申請專利範圍第1項所述之製程風險評估之整合分析方法,其中,該步驟四中係配合保護層分析資料及可容忍風險目標資料執行保護層分析。For example, the integrated analysis method of the process risk assessment described in the first application of the patent scope, wherein the fourth step is performed with the protection layer analysis data and the tolerable risk target data to perform the protection layer analysis. 如申請專利範圍第1項所述之製程風險評估之整合分析方法,其中,該步驟四於執行保護層分析時,至少可進行事件後果分析、嚴重性分析、起始失效事件分析、起始失效事件可能性分析、一般製程設計分析、基本程序控制系統分析、警報分析、操作安全管理分析、獨立保護層分析、中間事件可能性分析、安全儀器系統完全性等級分析以及消減後的事件可能性分析。For example, the integrated analysis method of the process risk assessment described in claim 1 of the patent scope, wherein the step 4 performs at least the event consequence analysis, the severity analysis, the initial failure event analysis, and the initial failure when performing the protection layer analysis. Event probability analysis, general process design analysis, basic program control system analysis, alarm analysis, operational safety management analysis, independent protection layer analysis, intermediate event possibility analysis, safety instrument system completeness level analysis, and event likelihood analysis after reduction . 如申請專利範圍第1項所述之製程風險評估之整合分析方法,其中,該步驟五中係以可能性定義資料及風險評估矩陣資料決定可能性等級與風險等級。For example, the integrated analysis method of the process risk assessment described in the first paragraph of the patent application, wherein the fifth step determines the probability level and the risk level by using the possibility definition data and the risk assessment matrix data.
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