CN111489076B - Integrated process hazard analysis method, system and storage medium - Google Patents
Integrated process hazard analysis method, system and storage medium Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses an integrated process hazard analysis method, an integrated process hazard analysis system and a storage medium, wherein the integrated process hazard analysis method comprises the following steps: acquiring reasons for deviation and initiation of deviation under different production conditions; calculating the potential probability of occurrence of the unexpected event according to the probability of the deviation reason, the enabling event and the condition correction; generating a consequence severity level for the undesired event based on the cause of the deviation and the consequence severity matrix; performing preventive measure actions on the unexpected event according to the potential risk level; acquiring the residual probability of an unexpected event after preventive measure action is implemented; performing protective measure actions on the unexpected event according to the potential risk level; acquiring the severity level of the residual consequence of the unexpected event after the protective measure action is implemented; the residual risk level is generated based on the residual probability, the residual outcome severity, and the risk matrix of the undesired event. The invention effectively avoids the defects and shortcomings of the traditional analysis method.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the field of chemical production, and particularly relates to an integrated process hazard analysis method, an integrated process hazard analysis system and a storage medium.
Background
In recent years, along with the rapid development of industrialization, particularly the development of high-risk industries such as chemical industry, medicine industry and the like, disastrous accidents occur, such as particularly serious fire explosion accidents occurring in Tianjin Ruihai in 2015, particularly serious fire explosion accidents of salt city water in 2019, serious explosion accidents in the state of being full of water in the North of the river in 2018 and the like. In order to avoid such catastrophic accidents, scientific methods are needed to perform scientific process hazard identification and assessment on such high risk industries, including performing comprehensive systematic process hazard identification on new rebuilding projects in design, on-service pharmaceutical and chemical devices and the like, evaluating whether existing safety measures can control risks to acceptable levels, if not, how to propose practical and effective safety measures, and finally controlling risks to acceptable levels, and finally achieving the aim of avoiding occurrence of such serious or heavy oversized accidents.
Currently, conventional process hazard analysis methods cannot effectively perform semi-quantitative analysis on all deviations in the production process and all causes of the deviations, which can result in deviations with high potential risk levels being missed at the beginning of the analysis. At present, the conventional process hazard analysis cannot classify the safety measures corresponding to each deviation from the angles of reducing the severity of the consequences and the probability of occurrence of the consequences, evaluate whether the existing safety measures can control risks to an acceptable level or not for each deviation, and the conventional hazard analysis cannot evaluate the effectiveness, the independence and the auditability of the safety measures of each analysis case; traditional analysis can lead to improper use of security measures in process hazard analysis, even abuse of security measures in process hazard analysis; traditional analysis does not include the case of interactions between devices; this is why many businesses employ traditional process hazard analysis methods, but serious accidents still occur at times.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the defects of the prior art, the invention aims to provide an integrated process hazard analysis method, an integrated process hazard analysis system and a storage medium, so as to solve the problem that the conventional process hazard analysis in the prior art cannot consider security measures corresponding to each deviation.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the invention is realized by the following technical methods:
an integrated process hazard analysis method, the method comprising:
acquiring reasons for deviation and initiation of deviation under different production conditions;
calculating the potential probability of occurrence of the unexpected event according to the probability of the deviation reason, the enabling event and the condition correction;
generating a potential outcome severity level for the undesired event based on the cause of the deviation and the outcome severity matrix;
generating a potential risk level according to the potential probability of the unexpected event, the potential result severity level and the risk matrix;
performing preventive measure actions on the unexpected event according to the potential risk level;
acquiring the residual probability of an unexpected event after preventive measure action is implemented;
performing protective measure actions on the unexpected event according to the potential risk level;
acquiring the severity level of the residual consequence of the unexpected event after the protective measure action is implemented;
The residual risk level is generated based on the residual probability, the residual outcome severity level, and the risk matrix of the undesired event.
Further, the method for generating the risk matrix comprises the following steps:
setting a consequence severity matrix of the unexpected event and a probability level of occurrence of the unexpected event;
and generating a risk matrix according to the result severity matrix and the probability level.
Further, the outcome severity matrix is set based on hazards of personal injury, environmental pollution, property damage, and corporate reputation damage.
Further, the probability level includes: 1 to 10 -1 、10 -1 ～10 -2 、10 -2 ～10 -3 、10 -3 ～10 -4 、10 -4 ～10 -5 、10 -5 ～10 -6 、10 -6 ～10 -7 。
Further, the potential probability calculation formula is as follows:
pF＝f*Pc*P，
where pF represents the potential probability of the potential occurrence of an unexpected event, f represents the product of the probabilities of all the deviation causes, pc represents the enabling event correction factor, and P represents the condition correction factor.
Further, historical statistics are obtained from the probabilistic country-related regulations, industry or company internal to the cause of the deviation.
An integrated process hazard analysis system, the system comprising:
the acquisition module is used for: the method is used for acquiring reasons for deviation and induced deviation under different production conditions;
the calculation module: for calculating a potential probability of occurrence of an unexpected event based on the probability of the cause of the deviation, the enable event, and the condition correction;
The consequence severity level generation module: generating a potential outcome severity level for the undesired event based on the cause of the deviation and the outcome severity matrix;
a potential risk level generation module: for generating a potential risk level based on the potential probability, the potential outcome severity level, and the risk matrix;
a preventive measure action module for performing preventive measure action on the unexpected event according to the potential risk level;
residual probability acquisition module: for obtaining a residual probability of occurrence of an unexpected event after the preventive measure action is performed;
protective measure action module: for taking protective action on the undesired event according to the potential risk level;
residual consequence severity acquisition module: for obtaining a residual outcome severity level for the outcome of the unexpected event after the protective measure action was performed;
residual risk level generation module: for generating a residual risk level based on the residual probability, the residual outcome severity level, and the risk matrix.
An integrated process hazard analysis system, the system comprising a processor and a storage medium;
the storage medium is used for storing instructions;
the processor is configured to operate according to the instructions to perform the steps of the method described above.
A computer readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program which when executed by a processor realizes the steps of the method described above.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects:
according to the method, the potential probability and the potential risk level of an unexpected event are calculated and generated by combining the deviation reasons, the residual result severity level of the unexpected event is generated according to the implementation calculation of protective measures, the residual probability of the unexpected event is generated according to the implementation calculation of preventive measures, and the residual risk level is generated according to the residual probability and the residual result severity level; the potential risk level and the residual risk level review organically integrates the safety measures and the target safety integrity level confirmation function, so that the defects and the shortcomings of the traditional analysis method are effectively avoided.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention is further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. The following examples are only for more clearly illustrating the technical aspects of the present invention, and should not be construed as limiting the scope of the present invention.
Based on years of relevant working experience, the inventor develops an integrated process hazard analysis method, and semi-quantitative analysis is carried out on all possible deviations of process production and all causes of the deviations caused by the deviations for each production state of the production by the system for in-service devices from design.
Aiming at different hazard results, the invention formulates different risk matrixes. The dictionary function in the invention enables an administrator to make customized modifications to rules according to user requirements and changes in regulations. The requirements of setting related risk matrixes and the like according to the requirements of different users when laws and regulations are updated or different users have different requirements are met.
The process hazard analysis aims to comprehensively, completely and systematically identify the process hazard of a newly designed project or in-service device by a scientific and systematic method, identify the hazard (also called as an unexpected event in hazard analysis) which possibly occurs and causes personnel injury, environmental pollution, property damage and company reputation damage, analyze the severity level and occurrence probability of the unexpected event, and analyze the corresponding risk level according to 'risk=unexpected event severity x unexpected event occurrence probability'. The invention realizes comprehensive, complete and systematic process hazard analysis on newly designed projects or in-service devices by an integrated, systematic, scientific and semi-quantitative analysis method. As shown in fig. 1, the following is a detailed description of the scheme of the invention:
Step 1: determining basic criteria for process hazard analysis, including determining a consequence severity matrix for an undesired event, determining a probability of occurrence of the undesired event for process hazard analysis, determining a process hazard analysis risk matrix in combination with national regulations, related standards and specific requirements of the enterprise, and determining a target safety integrity level SILN that reduces unacceptable risk to an acceptable risk level.
Step 1 is the basis of the process hazard analysis and is the criterion that must be determined before the process hazard analysis can begin. The method is different from the design of the traditional method, 0 and E are added to the design of the results, 0 represents that after analysis by a process hazard analysis team, no results occur, for example, a storage tank with a full vacuum design aims at low pressure deviation because of the intrinsically safe design of the storage tank, when the low pressure deviation is analyzed, no results are needed, and the process hazard analysis team still records the case corresponding to the deviation at the moment to ensure the integrity of the process hazard analysis, which is critical to ensure the quality of the process hazard analysis. As represented by E, the deviation analyzed will not have any effect on the equipment being analyzed, but the domino effect will have an effect on other production devices or units downstream, in order to ensure that the analysis of the affected devices includes all possible deviations, including deviations from other devices, by E ensuring that the affected devices process jeopardizes the integrity of the analysis. The severity of the consequences is specifically rated as shown in table 1 below.
TABLE 1
The probability level of occurrence of the unexpected event in the step 1 is divided into the following seven intervals, specifically as follows: interval 1:1 to 10 -1 Interval 2:10 -1 ～10 -2 Interval 3:10 -2 ～10 -3 Interval 4:10 -3 ～10 -4 Interval 5:10 -4 ～10 -5 Interval 6:10 -5 ～10 -6 Interval 7:10 -6 ～10 -7 。
According to the principle of 'risk=severity of unexpected event and probability of occurrence', the risk matrix of 5*7 is used, the risk class is divided into C,2H, M and L, wherein the risk class represented by C is highest, 2H is next, and then H, M and L are sequentially carried out, wherein C,2H and H are unacceptable risk classes, M is medium risk, and L is acceptable risk. Of course, in practical application, the invention can provide customized risk matrixes for customers, the risk levels in the matrixes can be divided into more levels, and the risk levels can be modified correspondingly according to the requirements of different users. Table 2 below is a risk matrix tailored for a certain user:
TABLE 2
The confirmation matrix of the target SIL grade (safety integrity grade) is combined with different requirements of different users on acceptable risk grades according to national regulations, and the confirmation matrix of the target SIL grade is also included in the setting of the rule of the step 1, as shown in the following table 3, table 3 SILD e t erm i na tio n fo r Confirmation of PHA process hazard analysis target SIL
Unlike traditional analysis methods, an administrator can set a customized risk matrix and customized target SIL level according to different needs of a user. For example, acceptable risk levels for personal injury correspond to lower probabilities than environmental pollution and property damage. The invention sets different risk matrixes respectively, and the risk levels in the risk matrixes can be modified timely according to the requirements of different users, and the risk matrixes and target Safety Integrity (SIL) levels customized for a certain user are shown in the following tables 4, 5 and 6:
TABLE 4 customized risk matrix for a user
TABLE 5
TABLE 6
Target SIL level customized by a user
SIL d e termi na tio n fo r Confirmation of PHA process hazard analysis target SIL
Step 2: the equipment or process to be analyzed is determined, and all deviations that may occur and all causes of the deviations that occur under all different production conditions are identified. It is necessary to identify all possible reasons for each deviation to occur independently, necessarily and sufficiently.
Step 2 is a key step in process hazard analysis, requiring an analysis team to find all possible deviations in combination with specific process characteristics, identify all possible causes of each deviation, and analyze all possible causes of each deviation one by one, requiring that the causes of the deviations must be independent, necessary and sufficient. In the present invention, it is ensured that cases where there may be two or three or even four independent causes of deviations in the process hazard analysis can be analyzed. Such cases typically account for 1% to 2% of the total analysis cases, but in current conventional process hazard analysis, no setup or description of such functions is included.
Step 3: according to the reasons for causing the deviation, determining the occurrence probability of each different reason, and simultaneously combining the enabling event and the condition correction, determining the enabling event and determining the potential probability of unexpected event occurrence under the conditions of different reasons;
on the basis of step 2, the analysis team is required to determine the probability of each cause of the deviation occurring, the probability being confirmed in accordance with historical statistics within generally state-relevant regulations such as the GB32857 protective layer analysis (LOPA) application guide, industry or company. For the enabling event and condition correction, the enabling event must exist as it does not directly lead to the occurrence of the undesired event, but for the continued development of the undesired event, that is, the eventual occurrence of the undesired event, the enabling event and condition must exist. For example, if some type of undesirable event-crystallization of the material causes pipe breakage to occur only when the winter temperature is below 10 ℃, then this case may be corrected on a time basis, i.e., with a percentage of the year's time that is below 10 ℃. In the present invention, an enable event and a condition correction factor are set. To avoid misuse of the enabling event and the condition correction factor, once the user has used either the enabling event and the condition correction factor, a detailed description must be made in the initial event of the case analysis (i.e., the cause of the deviation), which helps to review whether the enabling event and the condition correction factor are misused when performing a quality review of the process hazard analysis. This function is not included in conventional hazard analysis methods.
With pf=f×pc×p, where pF represents the potential probability of the potential occurrence of an undesired event, f represents the PRODUCT of the probabilities of all independent, necessary, sufficient causes, f=product (cause 1: cause 4), pc represents the enabling event correction factor, and P represents the (ignition/person exposure/death) condition correction factor (Pig/Pex/Pd).
Step 4: starting from the reasons, analyzing the deviation, identifying possible unexpected events, analyzing four aspects of personnel injury, environmental pollution, property damage and company reputation aiming at the severity of the unexpected events, and determining the result severity level of the unexpected events of the process hazard analysis according to the result severity matrix determined in the step 1;
the process hazard analysis team is required to start from the cause and analyze the progress of the undesired event until the consequences severity level of personnel injury, environmental pollution, property damage, corporate reputation damage are identified. Because the acceptable risk levels for the different categories of serious consequences are not the same, team members of the process hazard analysis are required to have to explicitly analyze the level of the outcome and the corresponding outcome classification for each analysis case. When the analyzed case has no harm result, recording the analyzed case by selecting the mode that the result is 0; when the case being analyzed has no effect on the device being analyzed, but has a domino effect on other devices, the case being analyzed can be recorded by selecting the result as E. For example, all cases with a final residual risk level of E, with a final residual risk level of H, represent that the final risk level is unacceptable, and generate all cases list with a final level of E alone, which requires the user to track each case until the affected unit completes the corresponding process hazard analysis, and the final residual risk level is acceptable, such cases with a final level of E cannot be finally shut down.
Step 5: combining step 3 and step 4, namely the potential probability pF of occurrence of an unexpected event and the potential consequence severity pS and the classification of the consequence of occurrence of the unexpected event, determining a potential risk level pR according to the risk matrix determined in step 1;
according to the "risk=undesired event severity x undesired event occurrence probability", according to the potential probability of undesired event occurrence and the potential outcome severity and outcome classification of undesired event occurrence, according to the risk matrix determined in step 1, the potential risk level pR corresponding to each case, that is, the risk level without considering the security measures in step 6, is automatically located and determined.
Step 6: identifying all safety measures in a process design or in-service device, classifying the safety measures according to actions, evaluating whether the safety measures can be used as independent effective protection layers IPL for preventive safety capable of reducing the probability of unexpected events, and if so, giving different risk reduction factors-RRF (Risk Reduction Factor) to each effective independent protection layer, namely giving corresponding PFD (hazard failure probability when required) values; for protective safety measures that can effectively reduce the consequences of an undesired event, whether they are protective layers that effectively reduce the severity of the consequences is reviewed, if so, the residual outcome severity level rS after the protective measure is taken.
In step 6, the process hazard analysis team is required to review to confirm whether it can act as an effective independent protective layer, depending on the technical and regulatory requirements associated with the various independent protective layers specified by the regulations and established by the user themselves. After judging that the protective layer can be used as an independent protective layer, a process hazard analysis team gives corresponding PFD (hazard failure probability when in need) values to the preventive independent protective layer according to relevant national standards and enterprise standards, judges as a protective safety measure for effectively reducing the severity of the consequences, and judges the severity rS of the residual consequences of the unexpected event after the protective measure is implemented by the analysis team
Step 7: the residual probability rF under the condition that the effective independent protection layers in the step 6 are considered is reviewed, the residual risk level rR is determined according to the residual probability rF and the residual severity rS, whether the final risk level is acceptable is judged according to the risk matrix determined in the step 1, once the corresponding PFD value of the independent protection layers is given in the step 6, the residual probability rF of unexpected events is calculated according to the principle that the residual probability rF=the potential probability pF is the PFD value of all the independent protection layers.
As in step 5, according to "risk=severity of unexpected event × probability of occurrence of unexpected event", according to the probability of occurrence of residual of unexpected event and the severity of residual consequence and classification of consequence of occurrence of unexpected event, the residual risk level rR corresponding to each case is automatically determined according to the risk matrix determined in step 1. The residual risk level rR here is the risk level after the effective independent protection layer in step 6 is included, and is also the final risk level for process hazard analysis.
Step 8: if the final residual risk level in the step 7 is acceptable, the process hazard analysis in the case is completed;
step 9: if the final residual risk level in step 7 is unacceptable, the process hazard analysis team needs to identify the additional independent protective layer and its corresponding risk reduction factor, i.e., the required PFD value, and determine the specific additional independent protective layer until the risk is reduced to an acceptable level.
Final risk etc. in step 7When the level is unacceptable, the software automatically generates a target SIL (safety integrity level) SILn to be reached by the added independent protection layer, and the relationship between the SIL (safety integrity level) SILn and the PFD is based on: 10 -(n+1) <PFD<10 -n Where n is equivalent to n in SIL (safety integrity level) SILn.
There is a need to purposely propose a need for an added independent protective layer. The design of this step also meets the SIL level (safety integrity level) required for the user to identify the desired safety instrumented system SIS and the corresponding safety instrumented system.
A case screenshot of the software analysis is as follows, with a target SIL rating of SIL2, which requires the process hazard analysis team to propose: 10 -3 <PFD<10 -2 Such that the risk of a possible drop to an acceptable level.
Until now, the analysis of one case of a certain deviation, which is caused by the analyzed device-related reasons, is only done. Because the method performs a semi-quantitative risk analysis of a percentage of all reasons for the deviation of a new design project or all the deviations of in-service devices, one set of devices is used for analyzing more than one hundred cases, and more than four and five hundred cases. Compared with the traditional method, only ten or more cases in the method can be semi-quantitatively analyzed at most.
Deviation: process conditions outside of set design limits, safe operating limits or standard operating regulations
Initial event: causes of production deviation from normal state
Hazard: hazards are physical and chemical characteristics or conditions present in materials, systems, processes or apparatus that may cause personnel injury, environmental pollution or equipment damage
Risk: combinations of probabilities of occurrence of undesired events (hazards) and severity of their consequences
PFD (Probability of failure on demand) hazard failure probability at demand: i.e. the security unavailability of a separate protection layer performing the prescribed security functions, when a request is made by the protected device or the protected system.
pS potential severity: the potential severity of the consequences of the occurrence of an undesired event is based on the possible consequences of the undesired event by deriving corresponding values from the severity matrix, with the consequence that no consideration is given to the existing active safety measures, only the consequences of passive safety measures with zero PFD are considered
rS residual severity is a consequence of taking into account the occurrence of undesirable events following existing safety measures, including prophylactic and protective safety measures
pF potential occurrence probability the frequency of potential occurrence of unexpected event is based on the frequency of occurrence of initial event or cause and the result of modification of enabling event and condition
Probability of rF residual occurrence taking into account the frequency of occurrence of undesired events after preventive safety measures
pR risk potential grade, which is obtained from the corresponding risk matrix according to the occurrence potential severity of the unexpected event and the occurrence frequency of the unexpected event
rR residual risk level, also called final risk level, corresponding to the risk level obtained from the risk matrix based on rF residual probability and rS residual severity after taking into account the security measures
Enable event-enabling condition: conditions or events that do not directly lead to undesirable scenes, but which should exist for continued development of the scene; the enabling event may include an environmental condition (e.g., an effect of a season), a process condition, or other conditions. Such enabling events do not directly lead to the occurrence of an accident, but lead to the necessary conditions for the occurrence of a scene
Condition correction condition modifier: one of several factors included in the scene risk probability calculation, typically in process hazard analysis, if the undesired event scene ends up with injury or death of a person, can be corrected in the probability calculation using factors such as the probability of ignition source occurrence, the probability of explosion occurrence, the probability of person presence in the field, and the probability of person injury or death. This probability is called conditional correction
Preventive safety measures: safety measures protective safety measures capable of effectively reducing occurrence probability of unexpected events: safety measures effective to reduce the severity of the consequences of an undesired event
And (3) an independent protective layer: a device, system, or action that effectively prevents a scene from evolving towards undesirable consequences, independent of the initial events of the scene or other protective layer actions. Independence means that the effective performance capability of a protective layer is not affected by the initial event or other protective layer. The effectiveness and independence of the independent protective layers can be examined.
SIS (Safety Instrument System) safety instrumented system: a meter system for performing one or several meter safety functions, SIS may consist of any combination of sensors, logic operators and final elements.
SIF (Safety Instrumented Function) safety instrument function: the safety function with a specific safety integrity level SIL for achieving functional safety can be either a meter protection function or a meter safety control function.
SILn (Safety Integrity Level) security integrity rating: the safety instrumented system meets the average probability of performing the required instrumented safety function under all specified conditions over a specified period of time. Four discrete levels (1, 2,3, 4) to specify the safety integrity requirements of each safety instrumented function loop of an assigned level safety instrumented system, wherein SIL4 is the highest level and SIL1 is the lowest level.
The invention realizes the organic integration of deviation recognition, reason analysis, probability confirmation, result analysis and judgment, potential probability calculation of unexpected events, safety measure recognition and classification, independent protection layer evaluation, unexpected event residual probability, unexpected event residual result severity evaluation, potential risk level and residual risk level evaluation, and the proposal safety measure and target safety level confirmation function, thereby effectively avoiding the defects and shortcomings of the traditional analysis method and greatly improving the process hazard analysis quality.
The invention performs semi-quantitative analysis on all analysis cases in percentage. Regardless of the result level, the probability of each case, the severity of unexpected events, the independence of safety measures and the safety measures in the existing or designed package are systematically reviewed to determine whether the final residual risk level is acceptable, thereby avoiding the defect that only a few cases are semi-quantitatively analyzed in the traditional analysis.
The invention has the advantages that the result grade is divided, 0 and E are added, so that when domino effect influence exists among devices in the process hazard analysis, the mutual influence among all devices can be ensured to be included in the hazard analysis in percentage. The 0's are added to the result rating to ensure that each deviation is included in the process hazard analysis and that an effective method is recorded even if the deviation does not cause any undesirable events. The method plays a vital role in improving the quality of the process hazard analysis and ensuring the integrity of the process hazard analysis.
The invention provides a customizing function meeting different user requirements.
The invention organically integrates the logics of qualitative identification process hazard and semi-quantitative analysis process hazard through systematic, scientific and complete design, and achieves semi-quantitative hazard analysis of all cases in percentage. Starting from the reasons, each deviation is analyzed one by one, the probability of occurrence of an unexpected event without considering the safety measures is called potential probability pF, the consequence severity is called potential severity pS, and the corresponding risk level is potential risk level pR. The probability after taking preventive safety measures into consideration is the residual probability rF, the severity after taking protective safety measures into consideration is the residual severity rS, and the corresponding risk level is the residual risk level rR. By using "potential" and "residual" it is ensured that the process hazard analysis can logically and clearly complete the process hazard analysis. Such stringent analysis logic has not been used in conventional process hazard analysis.
The invention classifies the safety measures according to the actions, namely, the safety measures which can effectively reduce the severity of the consequences and the probability of occurrence of the consequences are classified as protective safety measures, and the safety measures which can effectively reduce the probability of occurrence of the consequences are classified as preventive safety measures. Thus, the process hazard analysis team can evaluate from the aspects of probability reduction and severity reduction respectively, and confirm whether the safety measure E is effective or not.
The invention adds 0 and E to the severity classification except common classification, records the severity classification as 0 for cases without harmful effects, records the severity classification as E for cases with domino effects, and finally analyzes and checks whether the internal process hazard analysis is performed at the later stage. Moreover, in the future, both the internal and third party reviews of the process hazard analysis, including whether all deviations E severity are recorded in 0 and E fashion, are clearly reviewed and not used in conventional analysis.
In the risk matrix, instead of simply using a single matrix, the probability corresponding to the acceptable risk level is not necessarily the same for different kinds of hazard results, the requirements of different users on the risk matrix are not necessarily the same, and an administrator can perform customized modification and setting according to the change of regulations and the different requirements of different users.
For the case where the conventional semi-quantitative process hazard analysis may misuse the enable event modifier and the condition modifier, by pop-up dialog, it is mandatory that the process hazard analysis team have detailed explanation of the enable event and condition modifier causes when the relevant modifier is used. Otherwise, in the quality review stage of the process hazard analysis report, the analysis quality of the case is determined to be insufficient, and the improvement is required.
The invention can help enterprises and design houses to carry out comprehensive, complete and systematic process hazard analysis on newly designed projects or in-service devices through an integrated, systematic, scientific and semi-quantitative analysis method whether the newly designed projects or the in-service devices are in service. By identifying all possible deviations which may occur outside the normal operating range, i.e. finding all possible deviations, finding all possible causes for each deviation, for each cause of the deviation, the different consequences of each deviation occurring under different causes are evaluated and analyzed individually from personnel injury, environmental pollution, property damage and company reputation, respectively. From the perspective of reducing the severity of the consequences of an unexpected event and reducing the probability of the consequences of an unexpected event, the safety measures are classified into preventive and protective measures for evaluation and analysis, and each safety measure is subjected to validity, independence and auditability evaluation, whether the evaluation can be used as an effective independent protection layer, whether the existing design or the existing effective independent protection layer in the in-service device can control risks to acceptable levels or not is evaluated, and if not, what level of safety measures are needed can reduce risks to acceptable levels. When there is a domino effect interaction between devices, it is ensured by effective technical means that the process hazard analysis of the affected units includes effects from other devices.
At present, the process hazard analysis of the industries such as chemical engineering, medicine and the like is respectively completed by two independent methods. The related industries at present basically complete the process hazard analysis of the device in a two-step manner, the first step is purely qualitative process hazard analysis, and the method includes HAZOP (hazard and operability research), checklist (check list method), FMEA (potential failure mode and impact analysis) and the like, and the method mainly used in the industry at present is the HAZOP method. By the qualitative method, the possible deviation is identified, and the risk level generated by the deviation is subjected to risk grading by means of a brain storm. The second step is to semi-quantitatively analyze a small number of cases in the first qualitative analysis, for example, semi-quantitatively analyze a few cases with higher risk level in the first qualitative analysis by a semi-quantitatively hazard analysis method, for example, by a LOPA (protective layer analysis) and Event Tree (Event Tree) method. The statistics of the industry show that the number of cases in the second semi-quantitative process hazard analysis is only about 3% to about 10% of the number of cases in the first qualitative process hazard analysis. The main disadvantages of the traditional method are as follows:
The traditional process hazard adopts a step-by-step implementation mode, the first qualitative analysis stage does not carry out semi-quantitative analysis, the risk grading is completely determined by a brain storm method, the result can be different from person to person, the judgment of the risk grade is unreasonable, and the real risk grade can be higher than the risk grade in the qualitative analysis from the aspects of science, rigorousness and technical rationality. However, such cases would not be included in the second semi-quantitative hazard analysis because of the lower risk level determination in the qualitative analysis. Such missed cases with a high level of risk potential are likely to be the greatest risk potential in the field. For example, abnormal conditions of sodium hydroxide leakage may lead to injury of personnel due to exposure to sodium hydroxide, and currently, the severity is graded in the traditional qualitative process hazard analysis in China, and most analysis results are considered as follows: alkaline corrosions of sodium hydroxide can cause short-time work impact for personnel. A small portion of qualitative analysis is considered: the severity of the consequences is severe injury to the person, who may need hospitalization to receive treatment, but will not result in disability or death of the person. The qualitative analysis results can lead to lower risk levels, so that the case cannot be further analyzed in the second semi-quantitative process hazard analysis;
The present invention will semi-quantitatively analyze each deviation, each cause of the deviation. By semi-quantitative process hazard analysis, it is desirable to classify the sodium hydroxide toxicity of the leaked chemical, in combination with the severity of the consequences of the leakage rational analysis. From the point of view of personnel exposure to sodium hydroxide, sodium hydroxide should be classified as a highly toxic chemical, not just as simple as what we consider in our usual qualitative analysis as an alkaline chemical. When personnel are exposed to highly toxic chemicals such as sodium hydroxide, the amount of leakage may lead to permanent disability of the personnel and even serious consequences of personnel death. Such analysis results may result in the need for additional independent protective layers to the process design or in-service equipment.
At present, the conventional process hazard analysis, even the semi-quantitative risk analysis in the second step, does not classify the safety measures corresponding to each deviation from the angles of reducing the severity of the consequences and the probability of occurrence of the consequences, and basically analyzes according to the angles of the probability of occurrence of the consequences. For example, after the ammonia toxic gas detector reaches a certain concentration, the liquid ammonia leakage is designed, a water curtain spraying system of the device is triggered, and the conventional analysis can uniformly consider the safety measure according to the measure for reducing the probability of the consequences, so that a certain risk reduction factor, namely a PFD (hazard failure probability) value is given, and misjudgment on the risk level can be caused. However, from the technical point of view, it is obvious that the toxic gas detector water curtain spraying system cannot reduce the probability of leakage of liquid ammonia, and such measures are obviously used for reducing the severity of the occurrence of the consequences, because without a water curtain, the leakage of liquid ammonia leads to ammonia diffusion, because ammonia is a high-toxic chemical, and a large amount of surrounding casualties can be caused. When there is a water curtain, because the water absorbability of ammonia is very good, the leaked liquid ammonia can not cause injury to personnel outside the water curtain, and only relevant personnel in the liquid ammonia device can cause casualties due to exposure to ammonia, it is obvious that the toxic gas detector and the water curtain system are protective measures for effectively reducing the consequences, but not preventive measures for reducing the occurrence probability of unexpected events.
In conventional process hazard analysis, when there is an effect of domino effect between devices, there is no effective way to ensure that the process hazard analysis of the affected devices is a percentage of and includes the effects from other devices. Particularly when the process hazard analysis of different devices is done by different personnel, the effect of domino effects between the devices is almost completely neglected in conventional analysis. For example: the heat conducting oil used for heating in the field of the chemical plant is mainly cooled to the temperature required by each using device through the temperature regulating device because the operating conditions of each device are different, but when the temperature regulating device of the heat conducting oil unit fails, high-temperature heat conducting oil (such as 350 ℃) can enter a downstream device, such deviation is completely dependent on related personnel of process hazard analysis in traditional process hazard analysis, whether the deviation is informed of the fact that the related device E using the heat conducting oil is not informed, and for a new project, the design temperature of the affected device can be designed according to (270+10) DEG C instead of being designed according to 350+10=360℃; for in-service devices, it is possible to cause the high temperature conduction oil (350C) to exceed the design temperature of the device, but the affected device does not analyze the deviation, and therefore, no related safety measures are installed to prevent the deviation, which ultimately leads to a series of undesirable events such as over-temperature deformation of the equipment, fire disaster caused by high temperature conduction oil leakage, etc.
In the invention, when the process hazard analysis of a certain device possibly affects other devices, the software forms a special report by the result severity E and the risk level of unacceptable H (high) risk level, and requires the site to carry out special personnel tracking on each case with the result level of H, and only when the process hazard analysis of the affected device comprises relevant deviation and the final risk level is acceptable, the cases with the result severity E and the risk level of unacceptable H (high) risk level can be finally closed. Such a design ensures that all domino effects are included in the integrated semi-quantitative process hazard analysis. For the new project, the design temperature of the affected device is increased from the original 280 ℃ to 360 ℃ so as to realize the intrinsically safe design; for in-service devices, the affected devices are required to be additionally provided with a safety interlocking loop, and when the temperature is detected to be high (such as 275 ℃, the interlocking is used for cutting off the heat conducting oil).
In the traditional semi-quantitative hazard analysis tool or software, the acceptable risk levels corresponding to different hazard results are not necessarily considered to be different, for example, the hazard results with the same level of personnel injury and property damage are different in acceptable probability, but the traditional semi-quantitative process hazard analysis usually only adopts one risk matrix, the acceptable risk levels corresponding to different types of hazard results are not considered to be different, the acceptable risks formulated by different users are not considered, and the like The different levels do not necessarily provide customized services to the user. Specific examples are: for personal injury, environmental pollution, property damage and company reputation damage, when the severity level of the consequences is the same, the probability corresponding to the acceptable risk level is often different, and the probability of acceptable personal injury is far lower than other consequences. An acceptable probability of 10 for the consequences of group death (death of 3 or more) in personal injury -6 Acceptable probability of environmental pollution corresponding to equivalent grade result 10 -5 And (3) obtaining the product. The acceptable risk levels in the risk matrix will often be set differently for different customers, assuming that the severity is divided into five levels 1,2,3,4,5 being the highest level, and the severity of injury is 3 being the case, some companies will be 3 x 10 -2 Let H (high), some companies will be 3 x 10 -2 Given M (intermediate risk), conventional analysis methods tend to lack a process hazard analysis matrix that provides customization to the user.
The traditional semi-quantitative process hazard analysis cannot identify the hazard, and only the hazard identified in the first qualitative analysis can be subjected to semi-quantitative hazard analysis. Thus, no hazard identified in the first qualitative step was found by the second semi-quantitative process hazard analysis.
The technology of the invention organically integrates qualitative and semi-quantitative, namely realizes the integration of qualitative identification hazard analysis and semi-quantitative analysis hazard analysis, analyzes each deviation and each cause of the deviation by strict step design, also requires analysis and record even if the hazard result is zero, and when certain deviation does not generate hazard result on the analyzed equipment, other devices can generate the result, and the defects existing in the traditional analysis method are solved by special design.
The foregoing is merely illustrative of the present invention and not restrictive, and other modifications and equivalents thereof may occur to those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention.
Claims (8)
1. An integrated process hazard analysis method, the method comprising:
acquiring reasons for deviation and initiation of deviation under different production conditions;
calculating the potential probability of occurrence of the unexpected event according to the probability of the deviation reason, the enabling event and the condition correction;
generating a potential outcome severity level for the undesired event based on the cause of the deviation and the outcome severity matrix;
Generating a potential risk level according to the potential probability of the unexpected event, the potential result severity level and the risk matrix;
performing preventive measure actions on the unexpected event according to the potential risk level;
acquiring the residual probability of an unexpected event after preventive measure action is implemented;
performing protective measure actions on the unexpected event according to the potential risk level;
acquiring the severity level of the residual consequence of the unexpected event after the protective measure action is implemented;
generating a residual risk level according to the residual probability of the unexpected event, the residual consequence severity level and the risk matrix;
the potential probability calculation formula is as follows:
pF＝f*Pc*P，
where pF represents the potential probability of the potential occurrence of an unexpected event, f represents the product of the probabilities of all the deviation causes, pc represents the enabling event correction factor, and P represents the condition correction factor.
2. The integrated process hazard analysis method of claim 1, wherein,
the risk matrix generation method comprises the following steps:
setting a consequence severity matrix of the unexpected event and a probability level of occurrence of the unexpected event;
and generating a risk matrix according to the result severity matrix and the probability level.
3. The integrated process hazard analysis method according to claim 2, wherein said consequence severity matrix is set according to hazards of personnel injury, environmental pollution, property damage, and corporate reputation damage.
4. The integrated process hazard analysis method of claim 2, wherein said probability level comprises: 1 to 10 -1 、10 -1 ～10 -2 、10 -2 ～10 -3 、10 -3 ～10 -4 、10 -4 ～10 -5 、10 -5 ～10 -6 、10 -6 ～10 -7 。
5. The integrated process hazard analysis method of claim 1, wherein said probability of a departure cause is obtained from historical statistics within related regulations, industry or company.
6. An integrated process hazard analysis system, said system comprising:
the acquisition module is used for: the method is used for acquiring reasons for deviation and induced deviation under different production conditions;
the calculation module: for calculating a potential probability of occurrence of an unexpected event based on the probability of the cause of the deviation, the enable event, and the condition correction;
the consequence severity level generation module: generating a potential outcome severity level for the undesired event based on the cause of the deviation and the outcome severity matrix;
a potential risk level generation module: for generating a potential risk level based on the potential probability, the potential outcome severity level, and the risk matrix;
a preventive measure action module for performing preventive measure action on the unexpected event according to the potential risk level;
residual probability acquisition module: for obtaining a residual probability of occurrence of an unexpected event after the preventive measure action is performed;
Protective measure action module: for taking protective action on the undesired event according to the potential risk level;
residual consequence severity acquisition module: for obtaining a residual outcome severity level for the outcome of the unexpected event after the protective measure action was performed;
residual risk level generation module: the method comprises the steps of generating a residual risk level according to the residual probability, the residual consequence severity level and the risk matrix;
the potential probability calculation formula is as follows:
pF＝f*Pc*P，
where pF represents the potential probability of the potential occurrence of an unexpected event, f represents the product of the probabilities of all the deviation causes, pc represents the enabling event correction factor, and P represents the condition correction factor.
7. An integrated process hazard analysis system, said system comprising a processor and a storage medium;
the storage medium is used for storing instructions;
the processor being operative according to the instructions to perform the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1-5.
8. Computer readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, characterized in that the program, when being executed by a processor, implements the steps of the method according to any of claims 1-5.
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| CN103955786A (en) * | 2014-04-11 | 2014-07-30 | 中国石油化工股份有限公司 | Risk oriented hazard analysis method for chemical process device |
| CN106600008A (en) * | 2016-11-30 | 2017-04-26 | 中国直升机设计研究所 | HAZOP-based aircraft use maintenance process safety analysis method |
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