RU92593U1 - DEVICE FOR MONITORING THE ACTIVITY OF A MOBILE PHONE AND PROTECTING IT FROM AN UNAUTHORIZED ACTIVATION - Google Patents

Abstract

The device relates to electrical communication technology, and more specifically, to auxiliary terminal equipment that provides eavesdropping prevention, and can be used in information security systems, mainly to protect various objects and individuals from secret acoustic monitoring, organized by unauthorized activation of mobile communication devices located at various facilities and used by the mentioned individuals. The essence of the utility model lies in the fact that in the known device for protecting a mobile phone (MT), consisting of a state sensor of a controlled mobile phone (DC KMT) and series-connected power detector (DM) 5 made with the possibility of fixing the electromagnetic field (EMF) emitted by the transmitter controlled mobile phone (KMT), processing and control unit (BOW) and switching unit (CC), which is configured to connect to KMT, an additional battery, display and panel are introduced control, the output of which is connected to the second input of the processing and control unit, which is connected by the second and third outputs, respectively, to the display and to the KMT DS node, which is configured as a signaling device, in addition, the UK node is made with the functions of the Bluetooth interface, which provides wireless connection to KMT, which is equipped with a similar interface, the BOW node is made with the functions of a microcontroller, which provides the opportunity to analyze electromagnetic fields detected by a power detector and to establish their correlation with KMT activity by means of information exchange with its modem using the Bluetooth interface, emulation of a virtual computer port with the transmission of AT commands necessary for checking activity, transmitter, ringtone and KMT keyboard through it; identifying the operation of the KMT in the non-standard telephone connection (NST) mode, established without activating its call or keypad, followed by blocking the NST by sending the AT command to the KMT modem commands that ensure its switching to standby mode, followed by activation of the KMT DS node signaling device; emulation of the drivers necessary for the operation of the control panel and display, providing the configuration of the Bluetooth interface, monitoring the KMT activity, visualization of statistics of blocked NTS and indication of the state of battery charge. The essential features introduced provide an increase in the level of protection of a mobile phone and other mobile communication devices against unauthorized activation, an improvement in the quality of the interface used, and an extension of the functionality for remote monitoring of mobile phone operating modes. This allows you to significantly increase the level of protection of individuals from secret acoustic control, organized through cellular channels by unauthorized activation of their mobile devices.

Description

The device relates to electrical communication technology, and more specifically, to auxiliary terminal equipment that provides eavesdropping prevention, and can be used in information security systems, mainly to protect various objects and individuals from secret acoustic control, organized by unauthorized activation of mobile phones and other mobile communication devices used by said individuals.

Mobile communications of the 21st century is characterized by the provision of wide communication services that ensure the transmission of both voice messages and information of various content. Mobile phones (MTs), communicators, and other mobile communication devices (UMCs) have become sophisticated smart devices that can act as a camera, video recorder, camcorder, high-speed modem for Internet browsing, etc. All this contributes to the fact that these devices have become a constant companion and an integral attribute of modern man, regardless of his age and nature of activity. We can say that the need of people to "always be in touch" is provided by UMS with high reliability.

According to sources [L1-L4], secret control technologies are currently being developed, which are based on unauthorized activation of UMCs and transmission of data from a user device to remote subscribers (intruders) of a telephone network via cellular communication channels.

For example, according to the source [L4], one of the ways to implement control of objects and individuals is to use specialized software (STR) for mobile phones. After installing such an open source software on a mobile phone or other mobile communication device, its user falls under the “hood” of remote control.

In one of the options for organizing such control, STRs of the type spyware analyze the state of the mobile phone and find out that it is in standby mode. To monitor the state of the MT, usually the user uses visual control of the display status, call activity and keyboard backlight. And if there are no corresponding signs, then the user MT decides that his device is in standby mode. Having found that the MT is switched to standby mode, a spyware-based software system "paralyzes" the hardware nodes associated with the MT activity display (turns off the display, call, keyboard, etc.), then dials up to the programmed number, establishes a telephone connection with the remote subscriber and starts broadcasting to him MT microphone signals. Since a mobile phone, as a rule, is always always “at hand” with his user, his conversations and other activities become available for remote control. As a result of the application of various methods of unauthorized activation of UMCs, it is possible to secretly listen to the remote telephone subscriber of the acoustic situation near a controlled mobile phone and other UMCs. Moreover, the range of such control, given the possibility of roaming, is practically unlimited.

The effectiveness of tacit monitoring is based on the possibility of unauthorized activation of a mobile phone (NSA MT), which is in use by individuals, even in the “on-hook” mode. At the same time, the secrecy of the tacit control is ensured by the fact that there are no signs by which the UMS user can determine the presence of such control. That is, the fact of the presence of control of mobile communication devices is practically impossible to determine, since the connection with a remote telephone subscriber is established without activating his call, display, or other UMC indicators.

It is noted that the more perfect the UMS, the more the number of functions can be used to organize tacit control. So, on the basis of unauthorized activation of UMCs like communicators, various types of control can be implemented, including listening through a mobile phone’s microphone to conversations within the premises and photo / video shooting of objects located in the video camera sector of the mobile phone.

A contradictory situation is created in which, on the one hand, mobile phones and other mobile communication devices are a necessary means of communication, without which individuals cannot carry out their activities. And at the same time, UMS for intended use should be next to its user. And on the other hand, to prevent threats associated with tacit control, the UMS must be removed from the user.

Based on the studies, it was found that the well-known technical solutions (TP) used to protect mobile communication devices from their unauthorized activation (NSA) have insufficient efficiency, which significantly limits their use for solving problems related to the protection of individuals from tacit control, organized by the NSA of the UMS used by them. Therefore, the search for technical solutions aimed at improving the level of protection of individuals (FL) from behind-the-scenes acoustic monitoring, carried out by unauthorized activation of mobile (cellular) telephones and other mobile communication devices used by these PLs, is an urgent task.

In the process of research it was found that to protect mobile communication devices from unauthorized activation and protect users of the said UMC from secret monitoring, various devices, systems and technical solutions have been developed and are widely used, which can be conditionally divided into three groups: cellular communications blockers (BSS) , electromagnetic field indicators (IEDs) and combined devices.

It has been established that each of these groups has significant shortcomings that reduce the effectiveness of using these devices to protect objects and individuals from their tacit control, implemented through unauthorized activation of UMC.

A typical representative of the first group is, known from the technique [L5], a cellular communication blocker (BSS), consisting of an activity indicator, a control unit (BO) and an electromagnetic noise generator (GES), configured to generate an electromagnetic field (EMF) that causes a violation communication of a mobile phone (MT) with a base station of cellular communication, when placing the specified MT in close proximity to the GES antenna.

This device operates as follows. To ensure the protection of the mobile phone from unauthorized activation, the specified device is activated. At the same time, the GES transmitter begins to form and broadcast signals that fall into the range of the cellular communication system. GES signals interfere with the mobile communication channel, therefore, the operation of the UMC, which are close to the GES antenna, is disrupted.

This device allows you to reduce the likelihood of unauthorized activation of the UMC by creating radio interference in the cellular communication range (control channel), which may interfere with the communication between the MT and the base station of the cellular communication. In cases when this device is activated (GES is turned on), then when you try to create an NSA MT, there will be no broadcasting of microphone signals MT at all (MT will be in BS search mode) or the connection will be noisy.

The main disadvantage of this device is the low level of protection of the mobile phone from its unauthorized activation. This is reflected in the fact that this device does not provide guaranteed suppression (blocking) of mobile communications. This is especially true for large facilities, large conference rooms, etc. Under these conditions, a situation is often created in which mobile phones are located at a considerable distance from the antenna of the FSU transmitter. In these cases, a nearby cellular base station can create a signal level at the point of reception that ensures stable (not suppressed) operation of mobile phones and other UMCs.

In addition, the use of BSS is in the nature of “total” suppression of cell phones, in which the UMC user is deprived of the opportunity to make mobile communications, that is, make and receive calls, “go out” to the Internet, etc. Therefore, the use of BSS, as a rule, is periodic. To provide the ability to use cellular services, the FSU must be turned off. At this time, the protection of the mobile phone from its unauthorized activation is absent! In this case, mobile phone users become vulnerable from the point of view of tacit acoustic control organized through the channels of cellular communication systems.

In addition, the inconvenience of the interface associated with the periodic manual turning on and off of the GES of this device reduces the effectiveness of its use to protect the UMC from their NSA.

A more advanced device belonging to the first group is the well-known from the technique [L6], an intelligent blocker consisting of an activity indicator, a power detector (DM), an electromagnetic noise generator (GES) and a control unit (ECU) made in the form of a microcontroller, which the first, second and third ports are connected respectively with an activity indicator, DM and GES, while the DM is configured to detect active transmitters of mobile communication devices (UMS) in the local area and automatically activate GES, ying to emit electromagnetic interference suppression performing channel signals in the base station controller.

This device operates as follows. To ensure the protection of the mobile phone from unauthorized activation, the specified device is activated. At the same time, the power detector responds to the appearance of radio emissions in the local zone. As soon as such radiation is detected, the GES transmitter is turned on, which begins to form and radiate signals that fall into the range of the cellular communication system. GES signals interfere with the mobile communication channel, therefore, the operation of the UMC, which are close to the GES antenna, is disrupted.

This device partially eliminates the disadvantages of the previous product. So, the presence of a power detector allows you to monitor the radio air, to determine the presence of emissions of UMC transmitters operating in the local area, and to block them by emitting electromagnetic interference, which suppresses signals in the control channel of the base station. At the same time, the GES blocker radiation is strictly targeted in nature and affects only active mobile phones that are located inside the local area determined by the sensitivity of the DM node, without affecting the operation of the cellular network and extraneous UMCs. In addition, automation of the GES activation process by the signals of the DM node helps to improve the quality of the device interface in terms of ease of use (on / off).

However, this device has a low level of protection for the mobile phone from unauthorized activation. This is due to the following objective factors.

Firstly, this is the operation of a power detector with a fixed threshold, the lack of optimality of which leads to two types of errors such as “skipping alarms” and “false alarms”. So, radiation from UMC transmitters, the radiation intensity of which is less than a predetermined threshold, will be ignored. This will lead to the fact that the facts of the NSA UMS will be skipped (errors such as "skipping alarms") and the user will be subjected to covert control. In the case of errors such as "false alarms", the GES will turn on according to the signals of extraneous UMC. The indicated drawback is fundamental and practically impossible to eliminate. This is due to the fact that the level of radiation from a transmitter of a controlled mobile phone (a phone that is protected from its NSA) entering the power detector of this device and causing GES activation can be lower than signals from an external analogous mobile communication device. This is due to the automatic change in the power of the UMC transmitters depending on the radio conditions, including the action of factors associated with the interference of radio waves.

Secondly, this is the absence of guaranteed suppression of the UMC in cases similar to the previous device. That is, when the device is placed close to the base station, the efficiency of cellular blocking decreases, which can lead to the fact that when the GES is activated, the functioning of the UMC is preserved and its protection from the NSA is not provided.

Thirdly, this is the inconvenience of the interface associated with the need to turn this device on and off to receive incoming and outgoing phone calls, which reduces the effectiveness of using this device to protect UMS from NSA.

Analysis of the effectiveness of the use of devices of the first group of devices (cellular blockers) to protect UMC users from secret monitoring, carried out by their covert activation, showed the following. The use of FSN does not eliminate the controversial situation in which, on the one hand, in order to exclude hidden acoustic monitoring of objects, the performance of mobile communication devices must be impaired. That is, the UMC must be deactivated (blocked). And on the other hand, in order to provide “communication with the outside world”, to make normal use of mobile communication, mobile communication devices must be activated (unlocked).

The presence of the noted drawbacks inherent in cellular jammers causes low efficiency of the use of devices of this group for solving problems related to the protection of various objects and individuals from tacit control implemented by the NSA of mobile communication devices used by the aforementioned PLs.

The representative of the second group of devices that can be used to protect various objects and individuals from tacit control implemented by the NSA of the UMS used by them is a method known from the technique [L7] for detecting and identifying a radio transmitter by its radiation in the nearest zone and a device for its implementation consisting of a power detector (DM), an indicator and a processing unit (BO), which is connected to the output of the DM and the input of the indicator, respectively, by the input and output, while the BO is configured to analyze for signals coming from the DM output and identification of structures that comply with the GSM standard.

A device made according to this technical solution (TP) operates as follows. Upon receipt of radio signals at the DM input, their broadband detection occurs. To neutralize the effect of radio emissions from third-party sources and radio broadcasting noises, a limiting threshold is set in the DM. If the EMF level at the DM input is exceeded, the value of the set energy threshold is set, analysis and identification of the received signals begins. Using the threshold allows you to identify the operation of transmitters that are located in close proximity to the DM, and the recognition of the structure corresponding to the GSM standard, allows you to identify the source of radio emissions as a mobile communication device. The fact of detection in the near zone of the active UMS is displayed on the indicator, which allows you to attract the attention of the mobile phone user to the fact that his mobile device is in active mode. And if MT is transferred to the state of the NSA, then this fact will be revealed by the indications of the indicator.

The disadvantage of this TP and the device implemented on its basis is the low reliability of identification of the active state of the UMC transmitter. This is due to the fact that the receiving device operates using the threshold principle of action, in which the radiation from the UMC transmitters, the radiation intensity of which is less than the specified threshold, will be ignored. This can lead to the omission of unauthorized activation of the user UMS, for the organization of tacit control of the said user. With a decrease in the threshold of DM, the number of false alarms increases, which reduces the effectiveness of the device and also causes stress for the user of UMC.

In addition, the device does not eliminate the fact of the NSA UMS, but only “tells” with the help of its indicator that in the immediate vicinity of it the operation of the mobile communication device was detected.

The inconvenience of the interface associated with the need for the MT user to constantly monitor the indicator readings reduces the effectiveness of using this device to protect the MT from its NSA and to ensure information security of the PL from secret monitoring organized using the mentioned MT.

From the technique [L8], a field indicator is known - a frequency meter, consisting of a power detector (DM), an indicator, an alarm, a keyboard and a processing unit (BO), which is connected to the DM by the first input, second input, first output and second output, respectively with a keyboard, with an alarm and with an indicator, it is possible to detect and identify electromagnetic fields (EMFs) created by transmitters of mobile communication devices.

This device operates as follows. The DM unit performs broadband signal detection in the same way as in the previous technical solution. When signals occur, the level of which exceeds the threshold, an alarm is activated, which indicates the presence of intense EMF. At the same time, on the indicator, made in the form of an LCD display, a message appears about the type of detected source of electromagnetic radiation. If the UMS turns on near the device, its EMR will be detected and a message like “GSM signal detected” will appear on the indicator display.

This device partially eliminates the disadvantages of the previous device. So, the presence of the signaling device allows you to draw the attention of the user of the UMC to the facts of detection and identification of radiation from the transmitter of a mobile phone and / or other UMC located in the near zone. At the same time, informational messages displayed on the device’s indicator allow the user of this device to assess the degree of threats associated with the unauthorized activation of his mobile phone or other UMC. In addition, the presence of a keyboard and a display allows for more precise adjustment of the detector threshold for various conditions of its application (adaptive to the level of ethereal electromagnetic background), which increases the reliability of identification of emissions of UMC transmitters located in the near range of this device.

The main disadvantage of this device is the low reliability of the identification of the active state of the transmitter controlled by the UMC. This is due to the fact that the DM node responds only to that external EMF, the level of which at the receiving point is higher than a given threshold. Here situations are possible that will lead to errors such as “skip alarms” and “false alarms”, which are similar to the previous device. So, a case is possible when the threshold of the DM detector is set such that the electromagnetic field generated by the transmitter of the secretly activated UMS will be less than the specified threshold. In this case, errors such as “skip alarms” will occur, in which the facts of tacit control implemented by the NSA UMS will not be revealed. This case may be due to a high level of airborne noise, which will require the UMS user to set a high threshold for the DM node. On the other hand, lowering the threshold for “activation” of the DM node leads to the formation of frequent false alarms, which are caused by the intensive use of mobile communication devices that create a fairly high level of electromagnetic field strength in the cellular wavelength range. The presence of such errors (“false alarms”) reduces the effectiveness of the use of this device, forces the user to often adjust the threshold for “triggering” the DM, as a rule, increase it, which can lead to the formation of errors such as “skipping alarms”.

The inconvenience of the interface associated with the need to manipulate with this device, including adjusting the threshold of the DM when changing its spatial position to adapt the threshold to the ethereal background of the EMF, periodically respond to the signaling device and monitor the indicator messages - all this, given the presence of false alarms, that is, frequent user calls to this device, significantly reduce the effectiveness of the use of this device to protect MT from its NSA and ensure the protection of individuals from secret monitoring, organizing uemogo via cellular communication.

Analysis of the effectiveness of the use of devices of the second group (field indicators, indicators, frequency meters, etc.) to protect UMC users from secret monitoring by their unauthorized activation showed the following. The use of field indicators (IP) is also associated with the presence of a controversial situation, in which, on the one hand, in order to increase the reliability of identification of NSA UMS, it is necessary to lower the detection threshold of EMF created by UMS transmitters. This causes an increase in false alarms. In order to reduce the number of these errors, it is necessary to increase the threshold of the IP response to EMF, which leads to the formation of more serious errors such as “missed alarms”, in which the facts of the NSA UMS are not detected.

It should also be noted that a feature of the devices of this group is that they perform the function of only indicators, on the basis of the testimony of which the user of the UMC decides on further actions and manipulations with the UMC. That is, these devices do not provide automatic protection for the UMC user from secret monitoring over the cellular communication channel, but “give out” only warnings about the presence of active UMC transmitters in the local area.

The presence of these shortcomings inherent in the field indicators, as well as the features of their application, it follows that these products have low efficiency in solving problems related to the protection of various objects and individuals from secret monitoring, implemented by the NSA of the UMS used by them.

According to the authors, the most effective for solving these problems are technical solutions and devices belonging to the third group. So, from the technology [L9], a device is known for protecting a mobile phone (MT) during its unauthorized activation, consisting of a power detector (DM), an electromagnetic noise generator (GES), a state sensor of a mobile phone (MT MT) configured to pick up acoustic the ringing signals of a mobile phone (MT) and a processing unit (BO), which, with its first input, second input and output, is connected, respectively, to the MT MT, to the DM and to the GES, which is capable of emitting electromagnetic interference by applying eniya signals in the control channel of the base station.

A device implemented on the basis of this TP operates as follows. In the initial state, the monitored mobile phone (MT) is in standby mode for incoming calls. The MT transmitter is turned off and its bell does not emit acoustic signals. At the outputs of the nodes of the MT MT and DM signals are absent. If there are no incoming signals at the first and second inputs of the BO node, there is no output signal at its output either, so the GES block is turned off.

When organizing authorized connections with telephone subscribers, the MT transmitter is turned on and its bell rings. The electromagnetic field induced in the MT antenna is fixed by the DM node and a signal appears at its output, which is fed to the first input of the BO node. The MT call signal is fixed by the MT MT node and a signal appears at its output, which is fed to the second input of the BO node. The presence of simultaneously acting signals from the DM and DS MT at the inputs of the BO node leads to the absence of a control signal at the output of the BO node, therefore, the GES block is turned off.

When organizing an unauthorized connection with a telephone subscriber, that is, for the case of unauthorized activation of a mobile phone or other UMC, its transmitter is turned on, and the call does not ring. At the same time, the transmitter EMF is fixed by the DM node and a signal appears at its output, which is fed to the first input of the BO node. Since there is no MT call signal, there is no signal at the output of the MT MT node. The logic of operation of the BO node is that if there is a signal at its first input, but not at the second, then the GES node activation signal appears at the output. The GES node forms a noise electromagnetic interference that suppresses the synchronization channel of cellular communications, which leads to the disconnection of the MT with the telephone subscriber. After this, the MT returns to its original state.

This device allows you to partially eliminate the disadvantages of the previously considered devices of the first and second groups. This is achieved by the fact that to identify the state of the UMC associated with the unauthorized activation of its transmitter, a larger number of signs are involved and joint events are analyzed related to the assessment of the EMF intensity in the near field and the state of the acoustic site of the UMC. After the NSA MT is detected, automatic shutdown of the mobile phone is implemented.

Instead of “total suppression” of mobile communication channels, which is typical for devices of the first group (cellular blockers), this device provides for the identification and blocking of unauthorized activation of the specific (controlled) mobile phone to which it is connected.

Instead of issuing a mass of calls and indicating various messages on the indicator, to which the MT user must somehow react, which is typical for the second group of devices (field indicators), this device automatically eliminates the attempts of an NSA-controlled mobile communication device without the participation of an operator (UMS user).

However, the main disadvantage of this technical solution is also the low level of protection of the mobile phone from its unauthorized activation, due to the low reliability of identification of the active state of the transmitter and the acoustic node of the mobile communication device.

The low reliability of identifying the active state of the MT transmitter and the activity of its acoustic unit is due to interference from extraneous mobile communication devices. MT operates in conditions where similar UMCs are used everywhere, the transmitters and calls of which create both electromagnetic and acoustic fields that can cause malfunctions (errors) in the operation of the DM, DC MT and BO nodes of this device. Such errors may cause the reset of authorized calls, which corresponds to a situation of complete blocking of communication. With another type of error, the facts of establishing an unauthorized connection of MT with another telephone subscriber can be skipped.

This device also has a disadvantage associated with the principle of identification of MT states corresponding to its NSA. This principle is based on the detection of MT transmitter activity by the DM node and call activity by the MT node of the MT, followed by a comparison of these events. The fact of NSA is considered identified in cases when only a signal from the DM arrived, and at this time there are no signals from the MT MT. That is, if a telephone connection is established without turning on the call.

An analysis of the typical states (operating modes) that the mobile phone goes into during its intended use has shown that the sign by which the state corresponding to the NSA MT is determined is not reliable. This is because there are several MT states that can be identified as false NSA MTs. Firstly, this is the state in which the MT is installed during the forced disconnection of its call. Such a need for MT users arises quite often (meetings, negotiations, important meetings, etc.). When the MT call is turned off, all incoming calls will be automatically blocked, as they will be identified as attempts by the NSA MT. Secondly, this is the state that the MT goes into when dialing a number. When you try to dial a number and establish a connection with a subscriber of the telephone network, the DM node will work, but the MT MT node will not, which will cause the communication to fail. That is, the MT user is unable to make outgoing calls.

The inconvenience of the interface associated with the need to connect and transport this device with a mobile phone, as well as constantly turn it off to make outgoing calls and enable it to activate protective functions, significantly reduces the effectiveness of this device.

The closest in technical essence to the claimed object (prototype) is, known from the technique [L5], a mobile phone protection device consisting of a power detector (DM), a mobile phone status sensor (MT MT), a switching unit (CC) and a processing unit and control (BOW), which is connected with its first input, second input and output, respectively, to the DM, to the MT MT and to the UK input, which is configured to connect to the standard MT connector.

Functional diagram of this device is shown in figure 1. The MT protection device (Fig. 1) consists of a power detector (DM) 1, an MT state sensor (MT MT) 2, a processing and control unit (BOW) 3, and a switching unit (UK) 4. In this case, the BOW 3 is the first input, the second input and output is connected, respectively, with DM 1, with MT MT 2 and with UK 4.

The protection device of a mobile phone (figure 1) operates as follows. In the initial state, when the MT is in the standby state, that is, in the state of readiness to receive incoming calls from telephone subscribers, the MT transmitter and the MT acoustic signal generation path are turned off. Therefore, at the outputs of the nodes DM 1 and DS MT 2 there are no signals.

When you receive incoming calls, the call is turned on and the MT transmitter is activated. This leads to the operation of both sensors - DM 1 and MT MT 2. The DM 1 node generates an output signal under the influence of the electromagnetic field generated by the MT transmitter, and the MT 2 node generates an output signal under the action of an acoustic signal generated by the MT call. The signals from both sensors are sent to the processing unit of the BOW 3. The logic of this unit: if there are signals from two of these sensors at the same time, it is decided that the MT is activated authorized, therefore, there are no control signals at the output of the BOW 3 node.

If MT is activated secretly from the user of this mobile device, that is, unauthorized activation of the mobile phone is realized, then without turning on the call, the MT transmitter is activated. The electromagnetic field created by the MT transmitter is detected by DM 1 and a logical signal corresponding to “1” appears at its output. Since the call did not turn on, a logical signal corresponding to “0” is present at the output of the MT 2 DS node.

As a result of this, two signals are simultaneously input to the BOW 4: a logical signal corresponding to “1” (with DM 1) and a logical signal corresponding to “0” (with DM MT 2). The logic of work of BO 3: if DM 1 = “1” and DS MT 2 = “0”, then a decision is made on the presence of NSA MT. After detecting such a state of the sensors, a signal is generated at the output of the BOW 3, which activates the UK 4. The switching node of the UK 4 is connected to the standard MT jack and, when a control signal is received from the BOW 3, implements a reset function, i.e., disconnecting the MT from the telephone network. After that, the MT goes into standby mode.

This device partially eliminates the disadvantages of the previous device. This is achieved through the use of a more reliable method of forced breaking the telephone connection with the transfer of MT in standby mode. As noted, the previous device implements communication blocking based on electromagnetic interference radiation, which suppresses signals in the control channel of the base station. This method has low reliability. In this device, this drawback is completely eliminated, since the forced disconnection of telephone communications is carried out in a different, more reliable way, providing for the emulation of keystrokes on a telephone headset that performs the standard function of "hang up" communication.

The main disadvantage of this device is the low level of protection of the mobile phone from its unauthorized activation. This is due to the following objective factors.

Identification of the NSA MT is carried out on the basis of signal processing of sensors that register the electromagnetic field and the activity of the formation of acoustic signals (ringing signals) that are generated by the MT. Both of these sensors operate using pre-set thresholds, the negative impact of which on the reliability of the results is similar to that of the previously considered devices. That is, the nodes DM 1 and DS MT 2 are subject to interference and can generate signals that cause the formation of errors such as “skip alarms” and “false alarms”. In case of “skip alarm” errors, the presence of secret audio control will not be detected. In case of “false alarms” errors, an alarm is made about the presence of an NSA MT, in case of its actual absence or an erroneous reset of the connection with an authorized subscriber. So, the node DM 1 is exposed to many ether sources of electromagnetic fields (EMF), including closely spaced mobile communication devices. And if the level of these EMFs exceeds a predetermined level, then the processing unit BOW 3, a decision is made that the MT transmitter is turned on, which leads to the formation of errors of the type “false alarm”. And if the level of these EMFs is lower than the threshold value, then the device makes a decision that the MT transmitter is off, while it can be turned on, which generates errors such as “skip alarms”, in which the state of the NSA MT is not detected.

It is known that the power of mobile phone transmitters varies adaptively to radio conditions over a wide range. In the immediate vicinity of the base station - it is minimal and when moving away from it - it increases. In this regard, situations may arise in which the power of the electromagnetic fields created by extraneous mobile communication devices at the input of the DM 1 node exceeds the permissible threshold - this will create errors of the type “false alarms”. To eliminate this type of error, the threshold level in the device should be increased. However, an increase in the threshold level leads to the fact that the probability of missing cases of covert activation of a mobile phone transmitter increases.

That is, there is a contradiction: on the one hand, in order to reduce the level of false alarms caused by third-party sources (other mobile devices), you need to increase the threshold (that is, the value of the EMF level at which the DM node is activated), and on the other hand, so as not to miss EMF created by the controlled transmitter MT, it is necessary to reduce the threshold.

Similarly, the reliability of the identification of the NSA MT is affected by the operation of the node MT MT 2, which also operates on the threshold principle of action in conditions of external acoustic noise. In the practical activities of MT users, situations often arise in which it is necessary to reduce the sound intensity (volume) of the built-in call or turn it off completely. In this case, the sensor MT MT 2 may not respond to calls MT, which leads to the fact that all incoming calls will be identified as attempts to establish unauthorized acoustic control. In this case, the signal from the node of the MT MT 2 will be absent and UK 4 will reset the connection with the subscriber. In fact, this leads to the fact that no one can reach the user of such an MT, since all incoming calls are automatically reset.

Also, this device has inherent disadvantages regarding the inconvenience of its interface, which are similar to the previous device.

Studies have shown that a further increase in the reliability level of identification of UMC states associated with the unauthorized activation of this device can be achieved by increasing the information content of signs based on which appropriate decisions are made. Since the low information content of the signs used to make a decision about the state of the transmitter is mainly due to the influence of the external environment, in order to exclude the influence of external factors, it is necessary to use a different method of monitoring the operating modes of the UMC that would not be exposed to external factors related first of all, with the activity of extraneous mobile communication devices. At the same time, the effectiveness of the interface used can be improved on the basis of non-contact control of the states (operation modes) of mobile communication devices.

An information search showed that technical solutions used to monitor the activity of mobile communication devices and protect them from unauthorized activation that implement reliable methods for monitoring the states (operating modes) of controlled UMS, that is, methods that can eliminate the effect of external factors associated with the work of outsiders UMS, and which simultaneously combine these properties with high interface efficiency and ease of use, are not known from the technique.

The purpose of the utility model is to increase the level of protection of a mobile phone against its unauthorized activation, improve the quality of the interface used and expand the functionality for remote monitoring of mobile phone operating modes.

This goal is achieved due to the fact that in a known device consisting of a state sensor of a controlled mobile phone (DC KMT) and series-connected power detector (DM), configured to fix the electromagnetic field (EMF) emitted by the transmitter of a controlled mobile phone (KMT) , a processing and control unit (BOC) and a switching unit (CC), which is configured to be connected to the CMT, an additional battery is introduced that provides the possibility of autonomous functioning, with the free movement and use of the device during its operation, a display and a control panel, the output of which is connected to the second input of the BOC, which is connected by the second and third outputs, respectively, to the display and the KMT DS node, which is made with the functions of the signaling device, in addition, the UK node made with the possibility of forming a Bluetooth interface for wireless connection to KMT, which is equipped with a similar interface, the BOW node is made in the form of a microcontroller, operating according to the program, providing the ability to use of the DM node for monitoring the EMF created in the KMT location zone with establishing that the fixed EMF belongs to the KMT operation by connecting to it via Bluetooth with emulation of a virtual computer port and communicating with the KMT modem using AT commands necessary to verify activity KMT transmitter, call and keypad, identification of non-standard KMT telephone connections established without activating its call or keypad with subsequent automatic blocking You can send out non-standard telephone connections by transmitting AT command to the KMT modem to make it standby, emulate the control panel and display drivers used to configure the Bluetooth interface, monitor the KMT activity, view statistics of blocked non-standard telephone connections and indicate battery charge status

The proposed device provides the following combination of distinctive features and properties.

The device is additionally introduced a battery, which provides the possibility of autonomous functioning, free movement and use of the device during its operation.

The device is additionally introduced a display and a control panel (PU), the output of which is connected to the second input of the BOW, which is connected by the second and third outputs, respectively, to the display and to the KMT DS node.

The switching node is configured to form a Bluetooth interface for wireless connection to KMT, which is equipped with a similar interface. The implementation of contactless monitoring of the states (operating modes) of a controlled mobile phone using the standard wireless Bluetooth interface significantly increases the usability of this device. There is no need for mechanical articulation of the device with KMT. The inconvenience associated with the connection and joint transportation of this device together with the CMT is eliminated. There is no need for additional manipulations to turn the device off / on, which is typical of a prototype in which such actions are necessary to enable outgoing calls. The level of comfortable use of the KMT increases, since the device can be spatially separated and placed separately from the KMT. A new property is being implemented that will increase the effectiveness of protecting KMT users from secret monitoring, organized by the KMT NSA. This property is expressed in the fact that this device can retain its protective functions (protection of KMT from its NSA), with its hidden placement, protected from external observation. The use of this feature and its attendant properties eliminates all the above-mentioned disadvantages of the prototype interface, which reduce the efficiency of the device.

The status sensor of the monitored mobile phone is made with the functions of a signaling device. This allows you to increase the effectiveness of protecting the user from secret monitoring by activating the detector. The activity of the signaling device allows attracting the attention of the KMT user to the revealed fact of transferring his mobile communication device to the unauthorized activation mode. Having received a warning from the warning device, the user can take the necessary protective measures.

The processing and control unit is made in the form of a microcontroller that operates according to the program, which makes it possible to use the DM unit for monitoring the EMF created in the CMT location zone with establishing the ownership of the fixed EMF as the CMT by connecting to it via Bluetooth with emulation of a virtual computer port and implementing exchange information with the KMT modem using the AT commands necessary to check the activity of the transmitter, the call and the KMT keyboard, identify non-standard KMT telephone connections established without activating its call or keypad, followed by automatic blocking of the aforementioned non-standard telephone connections by transmitting AT command to the KMT modem, which ensure its transfer to standby mode. The indicated signs and properties improve the reliability of identifying KMT states (operating modes) corresponding his NSA. This is due to the fact that, compared with the prototype, obtaining information about the activity of controlled nodes (transmitter, keyboard and call) is carried out in a more reliable way, based on the use of AT commands [L11]. At the same time, the influence of external factors is absent on the identification result of NSA CMT. The BOW node implements the analysis of EMFs recorded by the DM node, and checks the correlation between the detected EMT and the activity of the CMT. That is, a new property is used, which is based on the formation and use of feedback, which allows for “personal” monitoring of the activity of CMT and “weed out” EMF created by extraneous sources. As a result of the use of new features and properties, there are no errors in the identification of states of CMT. This provides a significant increase in the reliability of identification of NSA KMT.

Emulation of drivers that support the functions of the control panel and display used to configure the wireless interface, visually monitor the activity of the monitored mobile phone, display statistics of forcibly deactivated non-standard telephone connections, display alarm messages associated with a change in the activity of the CMT, disruption of wireless connection with it and battery discharge - all this helps to increase the efficiency of both the device interface and the overall efficiency of the device.

Achievable technical result is to increase the reliability of monitoring the status (operation modes) of the mobile phone and the effectiveness of the interface used. At the same time, the effectiveness of the interface means the achievement of new properties that contribute to:

- improving the reliability of connecting the switching node to a controlled mobile phone, achieved by replacing the mechanical connection of the UK node to KMT wireless communication between them;

- unification of the method of pairing the switching node with a mobile phone, achieved by replacing many different types of connectors corresponding to various models of mobile communication devices, the same type of wireless connection type Bluetooth;

- improving the convenience of use, due to the fact that the controlled mobile phone gains wide freedom of spatial movement during its intended use, without the need for mechanical connection of additional wires and devices to it.

The combination of distinctive features and properties of the proposed device to protect a mobile phone from unauthorized activation is not known from the technology, therefore it meets the novelty criterion.

At the same time, in order to achieve the maximum effect of increasing the level of protection of a mobile phone against its unauthorized activation and expanding the functionality associated with the interface functions for remote monitoring and control of a mobile phone, it is necessary to use the whole set of distinguishing features and properties mentioned above.

Figure 2 shows the functional diagram of the proposed device to protect the mobile phone from its unauthorized activation.

A device for monitoring the activity of a mobile phone and protecting it from unauthorized activation (Fig. 2), contains a power detector DM 1, a processing and control unit BOW 2 made in the form of a microcontroller, display 3, a state sensor of a controlled mobile phone ДС КМТ 4 with signaling functions, control panel PU 5, battery 6 and switching unit UK 7, made with the functions of wireless communication Bluetooth 8, through which the device can be connected to a controlled mobile phone KMT 9. The microcontroller node BOU 2 ne the first, second, third, fourth and fifth ports are connected, respectively, from the KMT DS node 4, with the output of the DM 1 node, with the input of the display 3, with the output of the PU 4 node and the UK 7 node, which can establish a wireless connection via Bluetooth 8 with KMT 9 mobile phone.

A device for monitoring the activity of a mobile phone and protecting it from unauthorized activation (hereinafter referred to as the device), the generalized functional diagram of which is presented in FIG. 2, operates as follows. The controlled mobile phone (KMT 9) is set to standby mode. Here, controlled means the MT that is protected by the device from its NSA. To put KMT 9 in a mode that protects it from NSA, the Bluetooth 8 wireless interface is configured. The device is located in close proximity to KMT 9 (within the wireless coverage area), which is about 10 for Bluetooth class “0” transceivers m. The device is paired with KMT 9 by setting up a wireless connection between them via Bluetooth. It is assumed that the controlled mobile phone KMT 9 supports the standard Bluetooth wireless standard, which has become the standard interface for the information exchange of mobile phones with other UMCs. In this case, the configuration of the Bluetooth interface between the UK 7 device and KMT 9 is carried out in a typical way, characteristic of Bluetooth wireless technology. When performing this procedure, the necessary operations are performed using the control panel of the PU 5 and display 3. After setting up wireless communication, the device automatically “tests” the state (operating modes) of the CMT 9. For this, the microcontroller of the BOW 2 node emulates a virtual computer port via a wireless channel Bluetooth, a communication connection is established with the modem of the controlled mobile phone, information exchange is carried out using AT commands. According to the responses of the KMT 9 modem to AT commands sent by the microcontroller of the BOU 2 node, it “finds out” the activity of the hardware of the monitored mobile phone, that is, this determines its state (operation mode). The result of "testing" KMT 9, that is, the operation mode of KMT 9 is displayed on display 3 in one way or another, for example, in the form of messages such as "standby mode", "dialing", etc.

After configuring the Bluetooth 8 interface and testing KMT 9, the device enters the monitoring mode of KMT 9 activity. When in this mode, the device continuously monitors the radio air using the DM 1 node. When radio emissions occur in the near zone (in a local zone with a radius of about 10 m) in the range of cellular communications that correspond to the signals of the mobile communication device, the “testing” of KMT 9 is started. If KMT 9 is in standby mode, dialing mode using the keyboard or ringing activity is detected Since KMT 9, then the normal mode of operation of KMT 9 does not change. To visually monitor the activity of the KMT 9 mobile phone, a message is displayed on display 3 that reflects (status) the operation mode of the KMT 9.

If, in the process of monitoring the states (operating modes) of the KMT 9 mobile phone, the activity of its transmitter is detected without activating a call or keyboard, it is decided that a non-standard telephone connection (NTS) of the KMT 9 mobile phone has been identified. In this case, the procedure for automatically blocking the KMT connection is started 9 with a telephone network subscriber. To this end, the ATC host microcontroller sends Bluetooth control commands to the modem of the KMT 9 mobile phone via the Bluetooth interface, causing the telephone connection to break and the KMT 9 mobile phone to enter standby mode. To draw attention to the fact of the NSA KMT 9, the annunciator of the node of the KMT 4 DS is activated. In addition, the number, date and time of detected NTS is recorded in the internal memory of the microcontroller of the BOU 2 node. Statistics of forcibly deactivated non-standard telephone connections of KMT 9 with telephone subscribers (cellular communication systems) ) can be viewed using the control panel 5 and display 3.

In addition to the above-mentioned case related to the detection of STS, the activation of the KMT 4 DS signaling device can also be performed if the Bluetooth 8 wireless connection is interrupted and the battery 6 is discharged. This control ensures high reliability of the monitoring of KMT 9 activity and the effectiveness of the use of this device as a whole.

The generalized algorithm of the functioning of the device for monitoring the activity of a mobile phone and protecting it from unauthorized activation, when identifying the states of KMT 9 corresponding to its unauthorized activation (NSA), can be presented in the following form.

- Start;

- Initialization: setting up the wireless interface Bluetooth 8, testing KMT 9, displaying the current activity status of KMT 9 on display 3;

- Check: work of mobile communication devices in the near field - is there? call (bell and / or vibration) - is there? - If NO, then return, if YES, then activate the testing procedure of KMT 9;

- Test procedure of KMT 9: emulation of a serial port via a Bluetooth wireless channel 8. establishing communication with the KMT 9 modem, transmitting AT commands to “ascertain” the activity of the KMT 9 hardware nodes; transition to verification of the results of "testing" KMT 9;

- Check 1 “test” KMT 9: KMT 9 transmitter is active? If not, then return, if YES, then go to the next check;

- Check 2 of the “test” of KMT 9: is the keyboard or ringtone of KMT 9 activated? If YES, then return, if not, go to the blocking procedure of KMT 9;

- KMT 9 blocking procedure: sending the necessary AT commands to the KMT 9 modem via Bluetooth 8, which cause the KMT 9 telephone connection to the telephone network to “hang up” and put the KMT 9 in standby mode; activation of the signaling device of the KMT 4 DS node, generation of NTS statistics with its display on display 3; return;

- The end.

The node of the power detector DM 1 is similar to the corresponding features of the prototype and does not require refinement during its implementation.

The display unit 3 and the control panel 5 can be implemented by analogy with similar nodes that are widely used in portable household appliances (MP3 players, digital radios, pagers, mobile phones, etc.) and in specialized products, for example, type of indicator-frequency meters [L8].

In the simplest case, the KMT 4 DS signaling unit can be made in the form of an electromagnetic sound emitter of the KSS-75 type [L 12], which are distinguished by their miniature size and a sufficient level of sound pressure (about 90 dB) generated by acoustic signals.

The battery assembly 6 can be implemented by analogy with typical portable devices. An advantageous solution is the use of nickel-metal hydride batteries [L13], for example, size AA, which are distinguished by high energy density and ease of charging.

Node UK 7 can be implemented on the basis of Bluetooth modules [L14]. At the same time, the advantageous solution is the use of the small-sized built-in Bluetooth module WT12 type from Bluegiga Technologies, which is distinguished by support for the Bluetooth v2.0 specification, which allows transferring data at high speed, has pre-installed software that is responsible for controlling the operation of the module and communication with external devices , which ensures the functioning of the module both under the control of an external controller, and autonomously, with the ability to independently establish a Bluetooth connection and provide the “transparent” mode of data transfer, as well as products of this type are characterized by small size, low power consumption and the ability to work in the industrial temperature range.

Node BOW 2 can be implemented on the basis of P1C-controllers, known from [L15].

To implement the algorithms for the functioning of the microcontroller of the BOU 2 node associated with the organization of wireless communication with a mobile phone via the Bluetooth interface, procedures known from the PC program [L16] can be used.

To implement the functioning algorithms of the microcontroller of the BOU 2 node associated with the processing of signals of the DM 1 node, controlling the display 3 and the PU 5 and DS KMT 4 nodes, emulating a virtual computer port, emulating drivers that support the functions of the control panel and display used to configure the wireless interface, visual monitoring of the activity of a mobile phone, displaying statistics of forcibly deactivated non-standard telephone connections, indication of alarm messages associated with a change in asset the mobile phone, disruption of the wireless connection with it, and battery drain, procedures known from personal computer programs can be used [L 17-L20].

To implement the functioning algorithms of the microcontroller of the BOU 2 node related to establishing a communication connection with the KMT 9 modem and performing information exchange with it using AT commands, monitoring the status (operation modes) of the KMT 9 by monitoring the activity of its transmitter, call and keypad to identify non-standard telephone mobile phone connections established without activating his call or keyboard, automatically blocking the above-mentioned non-standard telephone connections by means of transfers and on the virtual port of control AT commands to the KMT 9 modem, which enable the KMT 9 to enter standby mode, procedures known from PC programs can be used [L21, L22].

When implementing the main nodes of the proposed device, solutions known from [L23, L24] can also be used. In the practical implementation of the device, the preferred solution is to implement it in the form of a portable device with a compact body, which will ensure the convenience and efficiency of its use.

Based on the data presented, we can conclude that the proposed utility model of a device for monitoring the activity of a mobile phone and protecting it from unauthorized activation, through the use of the above distinguishing features and properties, as well as using the achieved technical result, can significantly increase the level of protection of a mobile phone from its unauthorized activation, improve the quality of the interface used and expand the functionality for remote control of the operating modes mobile phone bots.

The above means, with which it is possible to implement a utility model, make it possible to ensure its industrial applicability.

The main nodes of the proposed utility model of a device for monitoring the activity of a mobile phone and protecting it from unauthorized activation are manufactured, experimentally tested and can be used to create serial samples. The manufactured products can be used in the interests of ensuring information security, including to protect users of mobile communication devices from behind-the-scenes acoustic control, organized by means of hidden activation of mobile communication devices used by them with subsequent broadcasting of acoustic and other information through the channels of cellular communication systems.

Thus, the technical solution developed by the authors provides an increase in the level of protection of mobile phones and other mobile communication devices (communicators, etc.) that are equipped with a Bluetooth interface from their unauthorized activation, which can be used by unauthorized individuals (intruders) to tacit control of users of the mentioned MT / UMS.

Improving the quality of the interface used and expanding the functionality for remote control of the mobile phone operating modes, implemented in this technical solution, provides high efficiency and ease of use of the device when using it in various conditions.

This device will be in demand by a wide range of users of mobile phones, communicators and other mobile communication devices, especially in applications where it is required to ensure the confidentiality of conversations and other acoustic conditions in the coverage area of microphones and other sensors of used mobile communication devices.

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Claims (1)

A mobile phone protection device consisting of a state sensor of a controlled mobile phone (DC KMT) and series-connected power detector (DM) configured to fix the electromagnetic field (EMF) emitted by the transmitter of a controlled mobile phone (KMT), a processing and control unit (BOW ) and a switching unit (CC), which is configured to connect to a controlled mobile phone, characterized in that it additionally includes a battery, a display and a control panel the output of which is connected to the second input of the processing and control unit, which is connected by the second and third outputs to the display and to the KMT DS node, which is configured as a signaling device, in addition, the UK node is made with the functions of the Bluetooth interface, which provides wireless connection to the KMT , which is equipped with a similar interface, the BOW node is made with the functions of a microcontroller, which provides the ability to analyze electromagnetic fields detected by a power detector and to establish their correlation with activity KMT through information exchange with its modem using a Bluetooth interface, emulating a virtual computer port to transfer on it AT commands required to verify the activity of the transmitter, call KMT and keyboard; identifying the operation of the KMT in the non-standard telephone connection (NTS) mode, established without activating its call or keypad, followed by blocking the NTS by sending the AT command to the KMT modem commands that ensure its transfer to standby mode, with the subsequent activation of the signaling device of the KMT DS node; emulation of the drivers necessary for the operation of the control panel and display, providing the configuration of the Bluetooth interface, monitoring the KMT activity, visualization of statistics of blocked NTS and indication of the state of battery charge.