RU95934U1 - MOBILE PHONE ACTIVITY REMOTE CONTROL DEVICE - Google Patents

Abstract

 A device for remote monitoring the activity of a mobile phone, consisting of a radio unit (RB), a display, an alarm, control keys and a processing and control unit made in the form of a microcontroller (MK), which is connected with its first, second, third, and fourth ports to the RB node, with a display, with an alarm and with control keys, and configured to receive radiation from mobile communication devices and display various information messages on the display, characterized in that it includes a real-time clock (RTC) and a memory connected to the fifth port of the MK node, which is connected to the RV node by the sixth port, are introduced; the RB node is configured to form a Bluetooth wireless communication interface (MBT) and establish information communications with a controlled device using it mobile communications (KUMS), which is equipped with a similar interface, in addition, the MK node is configured to operate according to a program that provides support for the functions of the control panel and display necessary for setting up fishing MBT and RTC, view and modify the information in memory and install activity control modes of said GMSC; management of monitoring the status and operating modes of the KUMS using the software module installed in the KUMS operating system that monitors the activity of the KUMS hardware nodes, generating and transmitting data on the status of the controlled hardware nodes via Bluetooth, both on request and in automatic mode; conducting information exchange with KUMS via Bluetooth with re

Description

The device relates to electrical communication technology, and more specifically, to auxiliary terminal equipment that provides eavesdropping prevention, and can be used in information security systems, mainly to protect various objects and individuals from secret monitoring, which can be organized by unauthorized activation of mobile phones and other mobile devices.

The communication needs of modern society have turned mobile phones, communicators, smartphones and similar devices into permanent “satellites” of people for whom these devices can serve as communication, communication, entertainment and image facilities at the same time. At the same time, the unique achievement of technological progress, which is mobile communications in general, and mobile subscriber devices that play the role of the said “satellites” of people, in particular, can be used for unseemly purposes and pose a threat to information security for users of these technical devices.

So, it is known to technicians [L1] that hackers are making more and more efforts aimed at breaking into cellular networks to organize control over mobile phones. At the same time, according to Bell Labs, the most vulnerable are the latest generations of mobile devices, which are increasingly approaching their technical characteristics and capabilities of laptop computers. According to statistics, in recent years, cellular network subscribers have preferred smartphones and similar devices, abandoning "classic" phones.

In [L2] it is noted that recently there has been an increase in virus attacks on mobile phones. For example, a “Trojan” program like QDial26 can infect mobile phones running an operating system such as Symbian OS 6.0. and perform unauthorized actions on this device.

Cases of mass infection of mobile devices with various computer viruses are known, so, according to [LZ], a case has been recorded when about 110 thousand devices like Nokia, based on the Symbian operating system, were attacked. It is noted that the mentioned viruses can spread through SMS, MMS, audio, video and image files.

A source [L4] notes the intensification of the activities of cybercriminals. So, experts at PandaLabs laboratory daily detect the appearance of about 50 thousand new trojans, spyware and adware, viruses, rootkits and other malicious software with its expansion through spam, social networks and search engines that lead to fake WEB-pages for downloading spyware [L5].

According to Symantec’s research [L6], tens of millions of computers and mobile devices currently contain fake antiviruses. Suggestions for installing such programs come from sites controlled by cybercriminals. According to Symantec estimates, there are more than 250 types of malware disguised as security tools on the Internet. The most common types of programs are SpywareGuard 2008, AntiVirus 2008, AntiVirus 2009, SpywareSecure and XP AntiVirus. Once on a computer or communicator, smartphone and similar devices, a fake antivirus simulates a system scan, but in fact, implements spyware and unauthorized actions.

According to studies [L7], which were carried out by experts in the field of information security from Microsoft, Kaspersky Lab, Ernst & Young, Symantec, McAfee and others, countless social networks, mobile phones and other mobile communication devices are under the special eye of cybercriminals, that use malicious codes to gain control over remote smart devices and perform various unauthorized actions on them. For example, there are known cases of using telephone tricks of cyber fraudsters who, using the Trojans [L8], secretly from the owners of mobile phones, carried out unauthorized actions on these devices.

According to [L9], in the firmware of mobile phones, the developers of these devices have hidden features that can be used to solve “police problems”, including remote control of mobile phones and their users. These features can be used by both special services and attackers. It is also reported on the production of mobile phones that incorporate the ability to remotely turn on other “victim” mobile phones, which can be unauthorizedly switched to the transmission mode of acoustic signals affecting the microphone of these devices. That is, there are opportunities to use cellular communication channels and mobile phones to organize and conduct tacit monitoring of remote objects and individuals through NSA user UMS. It is noted that the problem of unauthorized activation of a mobile phone by using the undeclared capabilities of this product is extremely urgent, since mobile communication devices are constant companions of their owners and confidential information can leak at any time while this device is in the coverage area of a cellular network.

According to the source [L10], any mobile phone can be taken under control, even when this device is in the “handset” mode. At the same time, the MT can be switched on forcibly and its microphone is set to maximum sensitivity to increase the control zone of acoustic signals up to 5-7 m from a mobile phone. A feature of secret monitoring is the ability to perform covert MT activation, in which there are no external signs of MT activity, including no ringing and visible changes in the display, and the quality of telephone communications is fully preserved. That is, the user of a mobile phone cannot visually detect the presence of unauthorized activation (NSA) of his mobile phone. As an example, the mentioned source presents a device in the form of a modified mobile phone such as Siemens S55, which has all the standard functions of a mobile phone of a similar type and, in addition, this device allows you to perform additional functions that turn it into a “radio bookmark” with remote control and transmission information on cellular channels. To implement additional functions, this product is provided with a telephone number, which acts as an “identifier”, by which a remote subscriber of a cellular communication network is recognized, to which functions of remote control over a victim phone are available. For example, when a call comes in from a number - an “identifier”, a call is blocked, a display is established, a telephone connection is established, a microphone is activated, and its signals are transmitted over the telephone network. Since there are no unmasking signs in the form of a call or display indication with an NSA phone, this achieves high stealthiness of the tacit monitoring.

In [L11] it is reported that tacit acoustic monitoring of objects and individuals can be carried out through a “spy phone” donated to them or through complexes for intercepting networks of standards like GSM. The source claims that there are enough funds on the market that can be used by attackers to control cell phones. It is also reported that with the help of the mentioned products various unauthorized actions can be carried out with remote mobile communication devices, including their transfer to the modes providing control of telephone conversations, control of acoustic signals around the device, tracking of SMS messages, determination of the spatial location of the mobile device - “victims”, reading the contents of the notebook, monitoring lists of dialed numbers, received and missed calls, etc. Moreover, to implement these features it is enough to an individual, for whom control is installed, to give (give in use) mobile phone with installed on it a special program that operates in the background without affecting the regular functions of the device. It is reported that "spy phones" are usually performed on the basis of ordinary phones of popular models such as Siemens, Samsung, Nokia, etc., therefore, it is difficult to suspect these products in the performance of spy-functions. According to the source, the user of a mobile phone with a "Trojan stuffing" can be anywhere and change the settings of his device, even change the SIM card, but this will not save him from remote control, which can be carried out using a cell phone, as well as using a computer equipped with a GSM modem.

According to [L12], software (software) of the Spyphone type is available on the Internet, oriented for installation in mobile communication devices operating under the control of an operating system such as Symbian. This software allows you to turn a regular Nokia series phone into a spy phone. It allows you to perform covert automatic MT activation on an incoming call from a previously known telephone network subscriber, broadcast MT microphone signals over the established telephone connection, that is, provide acoustic monitoring of the object where this MT is located, forward SMS messages, and control incoming and outgoing SMS messages , incoming and outgoing calls of the monitored subscriber, intercept calls, listen to telephone conversations, monitor the location of the phone “victims” "Et al.

According to the source [L13], software such as ALL-in-ONE Spyphone is available on the Internet and can be installed on any Nokia communicator and allows you to intercept phone calls, SMS messages, and also act as a listening device.

The above facts indicate that the information security of users of mobile communication devices is exposed to real threats, which are expressed in the possibility of establishing secret covert control over objects and individuals by covert activation of their mobile phones and other similar equipment.

In this regard, the protection of facilities and individuals from tacit control by unauthorized activation of mobile communication devices is an urgent task.

Studies have shown that well-known technical solutions have low efficiency in solving the problem, due to the complexity and inconsistency of this problem.

On the one hand, mobile phones and other mobile communication devices are a necessary means of communication, without which individuals cannot carry out their activities, therefore, these devices should be next to its user. On the other hand, to prevent threats associated with the tacit control of objects and individuals by the NSA of these devices, they must be removed from its user or removed from the object.

The subject of this research is the search for technical solutions that increase the level of protection of objects and individuals from secret monitoring, carried out by unauthorized activation of mobile communication devices.

Studies have shown that the solution of the problem can be based on the achievement of a technical result (TP), expressed in increasing the efficiency of monitoring the activity of a mobile communication device (UMC). This TP can be achieved, firstly, by increasing the reliability of monitoring the modes and / or states of the monitored mobile communications device (CIMS), and secondly, by increasing the reliability of identifying its states and / or operating modes of the CMSs corresponding to its unauthorized activation (NSA), which can be obtained both by increasing the number and by increasing the reliability of the signs and properties used to identify the NSA KUMS, and thirdly, through the use of reliable methods of blocking the detected NSA GMSC-mentioned.

From the technology [L14], a cellular communication blocker (BSS) is known, consisting of an indicator, a control unit (BO) and a radio unit (RB) made in the form of an electromagnetic noise transmitter causing a disruption in the communication of a mobile phone (MT) with a cellular base station, when placed specified MT in near the RB antenna.

This device operates as follows. To ensure the protection of the mobile phone from unauthorized activation, the specified device is activated. In this case, the RB node begins to form and broadcast signals that fall into the range of the cellular communication system. RB signals create interference in the mobile communication channel, therefore, the operation of the UMC, which are close to the antenna of the RB node, is disrupted. The indicator acts as a light signaling device that displays the active state of this node.

This device allows you to reduce the likelihood of unauthorized activation of the UMC by creating radio interference in the cellular communication range (control channel), which in the local area of the space (LZP) causes a disruption in communication between the MT and the cellular base station.

This device has a low level of protection of objects and individuals from secret monitoring, which can be organized by unauthorized activation of mobile communication devices. This is due to the low reliability of the prevention (protection) of unauthorized activation (NSA) of mobile communication devices that can be placed at the facilities or used by the mentioned individuals. This, in turn, is explained by the property that this device does not provide guaranteed suppression (blocking) of mobile communication devices located in a controlled local area zone, especially when these zones are large (rooms for meetings and conferences, conference rooms and etc.). In such areas, mobile phones can be located at a considerable distance from the antenna of the FSU transmitter, which creates favorable conditions for stable reception of signals from closely located cellular base stations, so blocking of these MTs is not provided, and these devices can be unauthorized activated for organizing a vowel control of objects and individuals using these devices.

The use of this device is based on the use of the cardinal method of protection of UMC from their NSA. This method has the character of "total" suppression of mobile communication devices. When using it, both possible unauthorized and demanded authorized activations of the UMC are “blocked”. At the same time, a legitimate UMC user is deprived of the opportunity to make mobile communications, that is, make and receive calls, "go out" to the Internet, etc.

The low efficiency of using FSU to solve the problem is due to the following contradiction. On the one hand, to prevent the unauthorized activation of mobile phones, this device must be turned on. During his work, mobile communication is “paralyzed” and its services are unavailable to individuals who need mobile communications. On the other hand, in order to access mobile services, this device must be turned off. When the FSN is turned off, objects and individuals become vulnerable to tacit control, which can be organized by unauthorized activation of the mobile communication devices they use.

From the point of view of implementation, with the help of this device, the technical result mentioned, the possibility of blocking the NSA KUMS is only partially (indirectly) ensured, and the monitoring of the states and / or operating modes of the mobile phone and the possibility of identifying its unauthorized activation are not provided.

From the technology [L15] there is a known method for detecting and identifying a radio transmitter by its radiation in the immediate area and a device for its implementation, consisting of an indicator, a radio unit (RB) and a processing unit (BO), made in the form of a microprocessor, which is connected to the first and second ports, accordingly, with the output of the RB node and the indicator input, the BO node is configured to identify signals generated by mobile phones.

A device made according to this technical solution (TP) operates as follows. Upon receipt of radio signals at the input of the RB node, their broadband detection occurs. For the "screening" of radio radio noise and low-level radio emissions generated by sources that are significantly removed from the controlled LZP, the RB node has a restrictive threshold. That is, all signals that, after their detection, have an amplitude value lower than the limiting threshold, are eliminated and are not passed for further processing by the BO node. If the operation of the MT transmitter located in the KLZP is activated, then the intense EMF created by this device is fixed by the RB unit, detected and fed for further processing to the BO unit, which provides analysis of the signals arriving to it and their identification. If signals from mobile communication devices arrive at the input of the BO node, they are identified, which is displayed by the activation of the indicator node.

This device partially eliminates the disadvantages of the previous device. So, in this device, the contradiction inherent in the previous device is eliminated. The use of this device does not prevent individuals from using mobile communication services and using MT for its intended purpose and at the same time monitor the presence of active transmitters in the LZP by the activity of the indicator node.

This device has a low level of protection of objects and individuals from secret monitoring, which can be organized by unauthorized activation of mobile communication devices. This is due to the low reliability of detection of active transmitters of mobile communication devices that can be placed on objects or used by the mentioned individuals. The low reliability of detection of active UMC transmitters is explained by the threshold principle of operation of this device and the presence of the following contradiction.

On the one hand, in order to increase the reliability of the results, to reduce the number of “false target” type alarms caused by the action of mobile phone signals that are far removed from the CLLP, the restrictive threshold of the RB node must be increased. When the restrictive threshold of the RB node is increased, errors like “missed targets” may occur in this device, in which the operation of mobile phones in the NSA mode may not be detected (skipped). The low radiation level of the MT transmitter, which varies adaptively to radio conditions, may be due to the proximity of this device to the cellular base station. On the other hand, in order to reduce the likelihood of errors such as “missing a target, the bounding threshold of RB must be reduced. When the restriction threshold of the RB node is reduced, it begins to pass weak signals from a large number of MTs that are located at a great distance from the CLS, resulting in an increase in the number of false target alarms.

From the point of view of implementation, with the help of this device, the technical result mentioned, the control of the states and / or operating modes of the mobile phone is partially achieved, and the possibility of identifying its unauthorized activation and protecting the CMS from its NSA is not provided

The closest in technical essence to the claimed object (prototype) is, known from the technique [L 16], the indicator of the field-frequency meter, consisting of a radio unit (RB), a display, an alarm, control keys and a processing and control unit (BOW), made in in the form of a microcontroller, which is connected by its first, second, third and fourth ports, respectively, to the RB unit, with a display, with a signaling device and with control keys, while the RB unit is configured to receive electromagnetic fields (EMFs) generated by mob devices Flax connection, moreover, the desalting unit configured to identify the received signals according to their belonging to the mobile communication devices, and the display is configured to display various informational messages.

A generalized functional diagram of this device is presented in figure 1. The device comprises a display 1, a control panel (PU) 2, a processing and control unit (BOW) 3, a radio unit (RB) 4, a signaling device 5. The BOW 3 is made in the form of a microcontroller, which is connected by its first, second, third and fourth ports, respectively , with a display 1, with a node PU 2, with a node RB 4 and a signaling device 5. Moreover, the node RB 4 is made with the possibility of registering electromagnetic fields (EMF) 6, which are created by transmitters of mobile phones (MT) 7.

This device (figure 1) operates as follows. The RB 4 node carries out broadband detection of EMFs arriving at it 6. If the level of signals received by the RB 4 node exceeds a restrictive threshold, then these signals are sent to the BOW 3 node, which performs their identification according to GSM standard. If the received signals are recognized by belonging to sources such as mobile communication devices, that is, if the structure of the received signals corresponds to the GSM type standard, then it is decided that MT 7 is detected in the local area of the space (LZP). This fact is fixed and the signaling device 5 is turned on, which attracts attention of individuals to the fact of detecting a source of intense EMF 6. At the same time, a message appears on the device’s display about the type of detected source of EMF 6. If an EMF 6 formed by the MT 7 transmitter is detected, then a message like “GSM signal detected” appears on the display.

This device partially eliminates the disadvantages of the previous device. So, the presence of the signaling device allows you to draw the attention of the user of the UMC to the facts of detection of EMF 7 and identification of MT 7, which is located in a controlled LZP. At the same time, informational messages displayed on the device’s indicator allow the user of this device to assess the degree of threats associated with the unauthorized activation of his personal mobile phone. In addition, the presence of a keyboard and a display allows for more precise adjustment of the detector threshold for various conditions of its application (adaptive to the level of ethereal electromagnetic background), which increases the reliability of identification of emissions of UMC transmitters (MT 7) located in a controlled LZP.

This device has inherent disadvantages similar to the previous device, therefore, it has low efficiency in solving problems related to the protection of various objects and individuals from secret monitoring, implemented by the NSA of the UMS used by them.

From the point of view of implementation, with the help of this device, the technical result mentioned, the control of the states (operating modes) of the mobile phone is partially achieved, and the possibility of identifying its unauthorized activation and protection from these NSAs is not provided.

Studies have shown that increasing the level of protection of objects and individuals from secret monitoring, organized by the unauthorized activation of mobile phones, with the help of which the aforementioned PLs carry out mobile communications, can be achieved through the use of more reliable methods for monitoring the states and operating modes of these devices, as well as increasing the reliability identification of unauthorized activation of UMC in combination with the ability to block the "dangerous" modes of operation of these UMC.

To achieve the aforementioned positive effect and technical result, the authors proposed an idea, the essence of which is to use the potential intellectual resource and technological capabilities of mobile phones operating under operating systems and equipped with a wireless interface such as Bluetooth. Effective software algorithms can be created on the basis of such devices for monitoring the activity of UMS hardware nodes with the possibility of transmitting the results of the mentioned monitoring to an external device, which can be used as an indicator of reliable UMS states and a lock of its unauthorized activation (NSA). At the same time, it is proposed to realize the possibility of providing the UMS user with operational information about the activity of his personal mobile communication device with the indication and recording of the NSA facts of this device, as well as the possibility of automatically remotely blocking the unauthorized activity of the UMC with the accumulation of statistics on attempts to establish tacit control over this object or an individual.

It should be noted that shifting the emphasis to protecting, first of all, “advanced” UMCs from potential threats of their NSA is very relevant, which is confirmed by both the trends in the development of mobile communications technology and the features of its use. In this case, speaking of trends, the following circumstances are in mind. So, according to the report [L17] published by Gartner, the sales of cell phones worldwide in the first quarter of this year were steadily declining, and “advanced” MT-type smartphones continued to grow, despite the deepening recession in the economy. In addition, according to well-known statistics, subscribers of cellular networks in recent years prefer smartphones and similar devices, abandoning the "classic" mobile phones. Further, speaking about the features of using mobile phones, we have in mind the fact that these devices in modern society have become important both as a means of communication and as a means of reflecting the image and status of their owners. Therefore, the vast majority of objects and individuals whose mobile communication devices will be secretly activated first of all, due to objective and subjective factors and most likely to be equipped with precisely “advanced” mobile communication devices such as communicators and smartphones.

Given the above arguments, we can assume that the use of a distributed intellectual resource and the advanced technological capabilities that characterize communicators and similar mobile communication devices to achieve the specified technical result and based on it to solve the problem is a very original and new approach.

The purpose of the utility model is to expand the functionality of a known device for remote monitoring of the activity of a mobile communication device with the ability to identify and block its unauthorized activation.

This goal is achieved due to the fact that in the known device, consisting of a radio unit (RB), a display, an alarm, control keys and a processing and control unit (BOW), made in the form of a microcontroller, which is connected by its first, second, third and fourth ports respectively, with a RB unit, with a display, with an alarm and with control keys, and configured to receive emissions from mobile communication devices and display various information messages on the display, an additional real-time clock has been introduced (RTC) and memory connected to the fifth port of the microcontroller of the BOW node, which is connected to the RTH node by the sixth port, in addition, the radio unit is made in the form of a Bluetooth wireless module (MBT), which provides the formation of a Bluetooth interface for information communications with a controlled mobile communication device (KUMS) equipped with a similar interface, in this case, the microcontroller of the BOW unit operates according to a program that provides the ability to use the control panel and display to enter the data necessary for setting up la MBT node RTC, view and modify the information in memory, as well as activity control mode setting of the mobile communication device; monitoring the status (operating modes) of the CMS, the Bluetooth interface of which is configured for joint information communications with the office of the Office, and which operates under the control of an operating system that supports the operation of a software module (PM) that monitors the activity of the CMS hardware nodes (for example, control of keyboard activity, call , transceiver and other nodes), and which, under the control of the aforementioned PM, provides data transmission on changes in the activity of the KUMS hardware nodes via its Bluetooth interface; support for information communications with the KUMS via the Bluetooth interface, receiving data, including information about the activity of the KUMS hardware nodes, registering them in memory with fixing the date and time read from the CRV node, processing received data about the activity of the KUMS hardware nodes and identification of the states (operating modes) of the CMSS corresponding to its unauthorized activation (NSA); displaying information messages and / or symbolic information characterizing the activity of the KUMS hardware nodes and finding it in states corresponding to authorized and / or unauthorized activation; installation and support of the passive protection mode of the KUMS, which provides, based on the facts of identification of its NSA, the formation on the display of the corresponding information messages, for example, “Attention: secretive activation!”, entering data about this fact into memory with fixing the date and time determined by the node data CRV, as well as activation of the signaling device to attract the attention of the operator; installation and support of the active protection mode, which provides for the identification of the NSA KUMS, the execution of actions corresponding to the passive protection mode, and further including the transfer of control messages via the Bluetooth interface, interpreted by the KUMS software module as control commands that cause the KUMS hardware nodes to be deactivated, including rupture (“hang up") of the telephone connection and transfer the KUMS into standby mode.

The proposed device provides the following combination of distinctive features and properties.

Firstly, a real-time clock (RTC) and a memory connected to the fifth port of the microcontroller of the BOW node, which is connected to the RTC node by the sixth port, are additionally introduced into the device.

Secondly, the radio unit is made in the form of a Bluetooth wireless module (MBT), which provides the formation of a Bluetooth interface for information communications with a controlled mobile communications device (KUMS) equipped with a similar interface.

Thirdly, the microcontroller of the BOW unit operates according to a program that provides the following features:

- using the control panel and display to enter the data necessary for setting up the Office node, the CRV node, viewing and editing the information contained in the memory, as well as setting modes for monitoring the activity of the mobile communication device;

- monitoring the states (operating modes) of the monitored mobile communications device, the Bluetooth interface of which is configured for joint information communications with the office of the Office, and which operates under the control of an operating system that supports the operation of a software module (PM) that monitors the activity of the CMS hardware nodes (for example, keyboard activity, ringing, transceiver and other nodes), and which under the control of the above-mentioned PM ensures the transmission of data on changes in the activity of hardware nodes to the GMSC of its Bluetooth interface;

- support of informational communications with the KUMS via the Bluetooth interface, receiving data on it, including data containing information about the activity of the KUMS hardware nodes, registering them in memory with fixing the date and time read from the CRV node, processing received data about the activity of the KUMS hardware nodes and identifying by them the states (operating modes) of the KUMS corresponding to its unauthorized activation (NSA);

- display on the display of information messages and / or symbolic information characterizing the activity of the KUMS hardware nodes and its presence in the states corresponding to the authorized and / or unauthorized activation;

- installation and support of the passive protection mode of the KUMS, providing, based on the facts of identification of its NSA, the formation on the display of the corresponding information messages, for example, “Attention: secretive activation!”, entering data about this fact into memory with fixing the date and time determined by the data ChRV node, as well as activation of the signaling device to attract the attention of the operator;

- installation and support of the active protection mode, which provides for the identification of the KUMS NSA, the implementation of actions corresponding to the passive protection mode, and further including the transmission of control messages via the Bluetooth interface, interpreted by the KUMS program module as control commands that cause the KUMS hardware nodes to be deactivated, including , disconnection (“hang up") of the telephone connection and transfer of the KUMS into standby mode.

Using the above signs and properties makes it possible to increase the reliability of monitoring the modes and / or states of a monitored mobile communication device (KUMS), to increase the reliability of identifying the states and / or modes of operation of a KUMS corresponding to its unauthorized activation (NSA), since resident software (software module ) operates in the environment of the KUMS operating system without environmental influences (interference from extraneous sources, etc.) and provides the formation of reliable signs indicating and the activity of the KUMS nodes. In addition, in order to make a decision on the onset of a regime and / or a state corresponding to the NSA of the KUMS, conditions are provided for activating both reliable signs and their required number.

The use of these signs and properties provides the ability to both remotely monitor the activity of the KUMS and reliably block the NSA of this device via the Bluetooth wireless communication interface.

The combination of distinguishing features and properties of the proposed device for monitoring the activity of a mobile phone is not known from the technology, therefore it meets the criterion of novelty.

Moreover, in order to achieve maximum efficiency in expanding the functionality of the known device for remote monitoring the activity of a mobile communication device with the possibility of identifying and blocking its unauthorized activation, it is necessary to use the whole set of distinguishing features and properties mentioned above.

Figure 2 shows the functional diagram of the proposed device for remote monitoring of the activity of a mobile phone (hereinafter - the device).

The device (figure 2) consists of a memory 1, a processing and control unit (BOC), made in the form of a microcontroller 2, a display 3, a real-time clock (RTC) 4, a signaling device 5, a radio unit made in the form of a Bluetooth module (MBT) 6 , control panels (PU) 7. In this case, the microcontroller 2 is connected, with its first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth ports, to the memory 1, to the display 3, to the CRV node 4, to the signaling device 5, to the MBT node bis node PU 7. In addition, node MBT 6 provides the possibility of forming a wireless interface Bluetooth 8 and establishing information communications with a mobile phone (MT) 9 and other mobile communication devices (UMCs) that are equipped with a similar wireless communication interface.

The device (figure 2) operates as follows.

First, the device is prepared for operation. It includes the installation of a software module (PM) in the operating environment (OS) of a MT 9 mobile phone or other mobile communication device (UMC), which must be monitored and protected from unauthorized activation. Installation of PM in MT 9 OS is carried out in a standard way.

Next, the Bluetooth 8 interfaces are configured, which is necessary to ensure the joint operation of the device through the MBT node 6 and the MT 9 monitored mobile communication device (hereinafter - KUMS 9). These settings are also performed in a typical way.

After completing the necessary settings, the device enters the operating mode. At the same time, the software module operates in the background, without affecting the standard functions of the KUMS 9, and monitors the activity of its hardware nodes, including determining the status of modem activity, controlling keystrokes on the keyboard, and detecting the activity of calls and other hardware nodes. The status of the controlled KUMS 9 hardware nodes is recorded by the software module in the form of a file, which is then automatically transferred to the device via the Bluetooth 8 wireless connection. The received data is recorded in memory 1 with the addition of date and time attributes received from the RTC node 4, and the display 3 is displayed information that displays the current state of activity of the hardware nodes of KUMS 9. In addition, the received data is processed by the microcontroller 2, and they identify the states of the KUMS 9, corresponding to x its unauthorized activation (NSA). The presence and / or absence of the KUMS 9 NSA is displayed as symbols or text messages on the display 3. Each change in the activity of the KUMS 9 hardware nodes is recorded by the software module and transmitted to the device, which provides constant monitoring of the KUMS 9 activity and the assessment of threats associated with its NSA. If during the processing of the received data, the state (operation mode) of KUMS 9 is identified, which corresponds to its NSA, then two main modes are possible that determine the operation algorithm of the device.

Firstly, if the device is set to passive control / protection mode (hereinafter referred to as passive mode), then according to the identification facts of NSA KUMS 9, the corresponding symbolic and / or informational messages will be displayed on display 3, for example, “Attention: secretive activation!”, Further, data on this fact will be entered into memory 1 with the date and time fixed, determined according to the data of the CRV node 4, and the indicator 5 will be activated to attract the attention of the owner of KUMS 9.

Secondly, if the device is set to the active control / protection mode (hereinafter referred to as the active mode), then, based on the identification facts of the NSA KUMS 9, operations will be performed in the volume corresponding to the passive control / protection mode, and the device will additionally transfer via the MVT node 6 via the Bluetooth interface of information messages interpreted by the KUMS 9 software module as control commands that cause the KUMS 9 hardware nodes to be deactivated, including disconnecting (“hanging up”) the telephone connection and putting the KUMS 9 in standby mode, what provides blocking the NSA of this device.

A generalized algorithm for the operation of the device can be represented as follows.

- Start;

- Initialization: input of initial data into memory 1 using display 3 and control panel 7, including setting the modes of the CRV 4 node (setting the current date and time), setting monitoring modes of KUMS 9, installing the software module (PM) in the operating environment KUMS 9, setting up the Bluetooth 8 wireless interface of the MBT 6 node and KUMS 9, testing the communication channel of the communication between the device and KUMS 9 via Bluetooth 8, displaying the current activity status of the KUMS 9 hardware nodes on display 3;

- Check - 1: Is there a Bluetooth 8 connection? - If NO, then activation of the indicator 5 and the display of the corresponding message on display 3; - Eat YES, then go to the next check;

- Check - 2: is the transfer of data on the state of activity of KUMS 9 completed? - If NO, then return to Check - 1; - If - YES, then the transition to the procedure for processing data received from the PM KUMS 9;

- Data processing procedure: processing the data received from the KUMS 9 software module (PM) using a microcontroller (MK) 2 with identification of the presence of the KUMS 9 NSA, outputting the processing results to display 3, when it is detected that the KUMS 9 is in a state corresponding to its NSA, transition to the KUMS 9 protection procedure;

- Procedure for protecting KUMS 9 from its NSA: if the device is set to passive control / protection mode (passive mode), then, upon identification of the NSA KUMS 9, a symbolic and / or informational message is displayed on display 3, for example, “Attention: secretive activation! ", Data on this fact is entered into memory 1 with fixing the date and time using the data of the CRV node 4, the signaling device 5 is activated; If the device is set to the active control / protection mode (active mode), operations are performed in the amount corresponding to the passive control / protection mode, and the NSA KUMS 9 is additionally blocked, for which the device transfers via Bluetooth via the MBT node 6 8 informational messages interpreted by the KUMS 9 software module as control commands that cause the KUMS 9 hardware nodes to be deactivated, including disconnecting (disconnecting) the telephone connection and transferring the KUMS 9 to standby mode a hedgehog; return to Check - 1;

- The end.

The display unit 1, the control panel 2, and the signaling device 5 are similar to the corresponding features of the prototype and do not require refinement during its implementation. As an alternative embodiment, the display nodes 1 and control panels 2 can be implemented by analogy with similar nodes widely used in portable household appliances (MP3 players, digital radios, pagers, mobile phones, etc.). An alternative embodiment of the signaling unit 5 is its implementation in the form of an electromagnetic sound emitter of the KSS-75 type [L18], which are distinguished by their miniature size and a sufficient level of sound pressure (about 90 dB) generated by the acoustic signals.

The office of the Office 6 can be implemented on the basis of Bluetooth modules [L19]. At the same time, the advantageous solution is the use of the small-sized built-in Bluetooth module WT12 type from Bluegiga Technologies, which is distinguished by support for the Bluetooth v2.0 specification, which allows transferring data at high speed, has pre-installed software that is responsible for controlling the operation of the module and communication with external devices , which ensures the functioning of the module both under the control of an external controller, and autonomously, with the ability to independently establish a Bluetooth connection and provide the “transparent” mode of data transfer, as well as products of this type are characterized by small size, low power consumption and the ability to work in the industrial temperature range.

The microcontroller (MK) 2 assembly can be implemented on the basis of PIC controllers known from [L20].

To implement the functioning algorithms of the MK 2 node associated with the formation of the Bluetooth interface for information communications with a controlled mobile communications device (KUMS 9) equipped with a similar interface, procedures known from the PC program can be used [L21, L22].

To implement the functioning algorithms of the MK 2 unit, associated with the processing of signals from the KUMS 9 software module, memory management 1, display 3, signaling device 5, CRV nodes 4, MBT 6 and PU 7, as well as providing opportunities for using the control panel and display for entering data necessary for setting up the office of the Office 7, the site of the RTC 4, viewing and editing the information contained in memory 1, as well as setting the modes of monitoring the activity of the mobile communication device KUMS 9; by registering in memory 1 events and data with fixing the attributes of the date and time read from the CRV node 4, on the display of information messages and / or symbolic information characterizing the activity of the KUMS 9 hardware nodes and its presence in the states corresponding to the authorized and / or unauthorized activation, procedures known from personal computer programs [L23-L25] can be used.

To implement the functioning algorithms of the MK 2 node, related to monitoring the state (operating modes) of KUMS 9, which operates under the control of an operating system that supports the operation of a software module (PM) that monitors the activity of KUMS 9 hardware nodes (for example, control of keyboard activity, ringing, transceiver and other nodes), with the processing of received data about the activity of the hardware nodes of the KUMS 9 and identification of the states (operating modes) of the KUMS 9 corresponding to its unauthorized activation (NSA); transmitting control messages via Bluetooth interface that are interpreted by the KUMS 9 software module as control commands that cause the KUMS 9 hardware nodes to be deactivated, including disconnecting (disconnecting) the telephone connection and putting the KUMS 9 in standby mode, procedures known from PC programs [L22, L26, L27].

When implementing the main nodes of the proposed device, solutions known from [L28-L30] can also be used.

When implementing a software module that monitors the activity of the KUMS 9 hardware nodes, as well as supports communication with the device via the Bluetooth interface, capabilities based on the creation of application software can be used. At the same time, to create programs with the necessary capabilities to monitor the activity of the hardware nodes of handheld computers and smartphones, technologies such as the NET Compact Framework, known from [L31], as well as the control and management capabilities of KUMS 9 using AT commands [L32] can be used.

In the practical implementation of the device, the preferred solution is to implement it in the form of a portable device with a compact body, which will ensure the convenience and efficiency of its use.

Based on the data presented, we can conclude that the proposed utility model of a device for monitoring the activity of a mobile phone, through the use of the above distinguishing features, properties and the achieved technical result, can significantly increase the level of protection of objects and individuals from secret monitoring, which can be organized by unauthorized activation of mobile devices. The solution to this problem is provided by expanding the functionality of a known device (prototype) for monitoring the unauthorized activation of a mobile communication device and protecting it from these conditions and / or operating modes.

The above means, with which it is possible to implement a utility model, make it possible to ensure its industrial applicability.

The main nodes of the proposed utility model of the device for remote monitoring of the activity of a mobile phone are manufactured, experimentally tested and can be used to create serial samples. The manufactured products can be used in the interests of ensuring information security, including to protect objects and individuals from secret monitoring, which can be organized by means of hidden from the users (secret) activation of the mobile communication devices they use. At the same time, the technical solution developed by the authors is aimed at providing protection against unauthorized activation, mainly of “advanced” mobile phones (such as smartphones and communicators), operating under the control of the operating system and equipped with the Bluetooth interface, from their unauthorized activation. It can be assumed that the device for remote monitoring of mobile phone activity will be in demand by a wide range of users of mobile communication devices, especially in applications where it is necessary to ensure the confidentiality of conversations and other acoustic conditions in the coverage area of microphones and other sensors of used mobile communication devices.

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Claims (1)

A device for remote monitoring the activity of a mobile phone, consisting of a radio unit (RB), a display, an alarm, control keys and a processing and control unit made in the form of a microcontroller (MK), which is connected with its first, second, third, and fourth ports to the RB node, with a display, with an alarm and with control keys, and configured to receive radiation from mobile communication devices and display various information messages on the display, characterized in that it includes a real-time clock (RTC) and a memory connected to the fifth port of the MK node, which is connected to the RV node by the sixth port, are introduced; the RB node is configured to form a Bluetooth wireless communication interface (MBT) and establish information communications with a controlled device using it mobile communications (KUMS), which is equipped with a similar interface, in addition, the MK node is configured to operate according to a program that provides support for the functions of the control panel and display necessary for setting up fishing MBT and RTC, view and modify the information in memory and install activity control modes of said GMSC; management of monitoring the status and operating modes of the KUMS using the software module installed in the KUMS operating system that monitors the activity of the KUMS hardware nodes, generating and transmitting data on the status of the controlled hardware nodes via Bluetooth, both on request and in automatic mode; conducting information exchange with the KUMS via Bluetooth with registering the received data in memory, fixing the date and time read from the CRV node, processing data about the activity of the KUMS hardware nodes and identifying the states (modes) of the KUMS corresponding to its unauthorized activation (NSA) ; display on the display of information messages and / or symbolic information characterizing the activity of the KUMS hardware nodes and its presence in states corresponding to both authorized and unauthorized activation; installation and support of the KUMS passive protection mode, providing for the facts of its NSA identification, the formation on the display of relevant information messages, the registration of these facts in memory with the fixation of the date and time read from the CRV node, and the activation of the signaling device; installation and support of the KUMS active protection mode, which, based on the facts of identifying its NSA, performs actions in the volume of the KUMS passive protection mode and activates the transmission of information messages via the Bluetooth interface, interpreted by the mentioned program module, functioning as part of the KUMS software, as control commands that cause deactivation of the main KUMS hardware nodes providing a break (“hang up") of the telephone connection and transfer of the monitored mobile communication device to standby mode.