RU73992U1 - MASKABLE MONITORING SYSTEM FOR THE CONDITION OF UNDERGROUND MAIN PIPELINES - Google Patents

Abstract

A masked underground monitoring system for underground pipelines is designed to detect, recognize and record unauthorized access to underground pipelines, oil pipelines and oil pipelines. The security zone of the system is divided into separate sections that are connected to the computer of the operator’s workstation by a trunk cable. The areas of the protection zone contain two magnetometric and one vibration detection means.

Magnetometric detection tools are located underground, on two sides of the pipeline, at the borders of its placement zone, and form volumetric detection zones at the approaches to the pipeline placement zone.

Magnetometric detection tools make it possible to identify, from all violators of the pipeline placement zone, vehicles and people with metal objects that could potentially carry out unauthorized access to the pipeline and determine the direction of their movement. Detection of attempts to unauthorized access to the pipeline at an early stage of the invasion, before the start of excavation, is provided by the location of magnetometric detection tools on the approaches to the zone of the pipeline.

The vibration detection means comprises two sensor cables armored with steel tapes that are located underground, on both sides of the pipeline, and form a detection zone above the pipeline. Vibratory detection means records attempts to open the ground near a pipeline using a hand tool or hardware.

The presence in the system of detection tools based on different principles of action, the ability to detect intruders at an early stage of the invasion, identifying potential offenders from their number and determining the direction of their movement, can significantly reduce the number of false alarms.

Description

The present invention relates to technical means for monitoring the status of trunk pipelines, in particular to systems for monitoring the status of underground trunk gas pipelines, oil pipelines and oil product pipelines, and can be used to detect, recognize and record unauthorized access to pipelines.

There is a well-known technical tool for protecting underground oil pipelines - the PipeGuard system of the Israeli company Magal, which contains a set of autonomous sensor modules mounted at a depth (50 ... 80) cm below the earth's surface (Peace and Security Magazine No. 6 (56 ) November-December 2004. The article "Technologies for perimeter protection: new applications. Publishing Center LLC" Vityaz-M "). Each sensor unit contains 4 geophonic seismic sensors, their signals are processed by a local analyzer, which is also underground. In the same housing as the analyzer, an RF transceiver for alarms and batteries is placed. Geophonic sensors are located along a line perpendicular to the axis of the pipeline. The applied method of coherent signal processing of individual geophones allowed us to provide a sensitivity diagram of the sensor module in the form of two narrow petals oriented along the pipeline line. The length of the sensitive area of the sensor module is up to 150 m in both directions. This allows you to place the sensor blocks at distances of about 300 m from each other. Alarms from a separate module are transmitted over the air to two neighboring modules, and they, in turn, sequentially transmit them further, to

the nearest regional monitoring and control station, which are located at distances up to 20 km from each other.

The PipeGuard system recognizes seismic signals that are characteristic of attempts to intrude into an underground pipeline - opening the earth with a shovel, hoe, drill rig, etc. The system does not respond to "non-disturbing" factors, such as the movement of people, vehicles, precipitation. The analyzer is trained to recognize real intrusion signals directly at the installation site and allows not only to classify the type of intrusion, but also to determine the probability of coincidence of recorded signals with typical images stored in the data bank of each system.

The PipeGuard system self-testing device uses the source of pulsed acoustic signals that are part of the module, which are recorded by the geophones of this module. Autotesting allows not only monitoring the operability of the sensor module, but also periodically measuring the propagation speed of seismic signals, which largely depends on the soil parameters at the moment (density, temperature, humidity, etc.). Autotesting results are taken into account by the analyzer during signal processing and ensure the reliability of signal recognition and classification, as well as determine the angular coordinate of the invasion point. The PipeGuard Touch Module is powered by specially designed high capacity lithium batteries. The battery life is at least one year.

The Magal geophonic system eliminates the need for cabling and provides localization of intrusion with an acceptable accuracy of 300 m.

Signs of an analogue that match the features of the invention:

1. Signals that are characteristic of attempts to intrude into an underground pipeline — digging the ground with a shovel, hoe, drill rig, etc., are recognized.

2. The system does not respond to precipitation.

3. Sensitive elements are mounted below the ground.

The disadvantages of this device are:

1. A radio channel is used to transmit alarms, which reduces the reliability of the system under the influence of industrial and radio interference, power lines, thunderstorms, and can lead to a complete failure of the system modules when intruders use radio countermeasures.

2. Alarms are transmitted sequentially, through adjacent modules, which can lead to partial or complete loss of information in the system in case of failure of the equipment of only one electronic unit or autonomous power source, intentional or accidental breakdown of the antenna of the transceiver.

3. The antenna of the transceiver is located above the surface of the earth, which unmasks the electronic unit with the local analyzer and thereby creates ideal conditions for its theft or deliberate failure. In addition, the location of the antenna of the transceiver practically at ground level eliminates the possibility of using this system on pipelines located on long wetlands or exposed to flood waters, as well as covered with deep snow.

4. This device does not detect the movement of vehicles and people carrying metal objects at the border of the pipeline placement zone, which excludes the possibility of detecting attempts of unauthorized access to the pipeline at an early stage of the invasion, before the start of excavation, and puts the system operator in front of the fact of a direct invasion without giving him the opportunity to objectively assess the current situation, taking into account the dynamics of its development, to take adequate measures to curb unauthorized actions.

5. Training of analyzers to recognize real intrusion signals is carried out directly at the place of their installation, which significantly increases the complexity of the work in preparing the system for use,

given their large number and location of pipelines in remote, undeveloped regions.

6. Power supply of the sensor modules is carried out from autonomous power sources (lithium batteries), which requires constant monitoring of their condition and their replacement when they fail, or after the expiration date, and accordingly increases the cost of maintaining the system.

The SecurePipe system of the Australian company Future Fiber Technologies (FFT), consisting of a sensor cable located above the pipeline at a depth of (30 ... 90) cm underground, an initial module, an end module, and a Secure Pipe controller, was chosen as a prototype , industrial computer and connecting cable (Peace and Security Magazine No. 6 (56) November – December 2004. Article “Perimeter Protection Technologies: New Applications. Publishing Center LLC Vityaz-M”). The sensor cable meets military specifications for “tactical” applications, i.e. for underground installation without additional mechanical protection. The cable is characterized by high strength: permissible short-term tensile loads are from 160 to 480 kg. The width of the sensitive area of the sensor cable is approximately 6 meters.

Under the influence of mechanical vibrations, the sensor cable gives a response in the frequency range from 1 Hz to 1 MHz. For practical purposes, the system uses a band of 200 Hz - 10 kHz.

FFT technology is based on the principle of detecting microstresses in an optical fiber. The sensor cable consists of two sensitive fibers: they are fed by radiation from a semiconductor laser operating in a continuous mode. In the initial module, the radiation is split into two beams, which are fed to both fibers. In the terminal module, interference of both beams occurs, i.e. The optical system is a two-beam interferometer. If both arms of the system are in an unperturbed state, then the interference pattern on the terminal module remains unchanged. In case of deformation or vibration

cable, the optical path difference in the sensitive fibers (arms of the interferometer) changes, and the terminal module registers the variable component of the signal, passing it to the analyzer. A semiconductor laser with an output power of (12 ... 50) mW operating at a wavelength of 1.31 or 1.55 μm is used as a light source. High radiation power and low losses in the sensor cable allow increasing the length of a separate security zone up to 60 km. Three active sensory fibers combined in a multicore optical cable are used to determine the site of intrusion. Two fibers are used to detect intrusion by the interferometric method, and the third fiber is used to determine the distance from the beginning of the cable to the point of microdeformation. The accuracy of determining the location of the invasion is ± 150 m.

The SecurePipe system is distinguished by the absence of any electronic equipment, power sources or metal elements throughout the security zone. The operating temperature range of the sensor cables is from -55 ° C to + 85 ° C.

The processor of the system, made on the basis of an industrial computer and equipped with optoelectronic modules of emitters and photodetectors, is installed in the guard room. The system software allows you to configure sensitivity, analyze alarm events, filter background noise, transmit signals using standard protocols, and configure the system in accordance with the parameters of the protected communication network.

The SecurePipe system detects and recognizes various intrusion attempts: digging the ground with a pick or shovel, crawler or wheeled excavator operation, vertical or horizontal drilling, bullet impact, pipe drilling, etc. The intelligent self-learning controller also allows you to distinguish between dangerous natural influences - floods, deformations and earthquakes, earthquakes, water currents, etc. Under certain conditions, the SecurePipe system can also be used to detect leaks of liquid or gas from the pipeline.

Signs of an analogue that match the features of the invention:

1. Various attempts at intrusion are detected: opening the earth with a pickaxe or a shovel, the operation of a crawler or wheeled excavator, vertical or horizontal drilling.

2. An analysis of alarm events, filtering of background noise, signal transmission according to standard protocols is provided.

The disadvantages of this prototype device include:

1. This device does not detect the movement of vehicles and people carrying metal objects at the border of the pipeline placement zone, which excludes the possibility of detecting attempts of unauthorized access to the pipeline at an early stage of the invasion, before the start of excavation, and puts the system operator before the fact of a direct invasion without giving him the opportunity to objectively assess the current situation, taking into account the dynamics of its development, to take adequate measures to curb unauthorized actions.

2. The security zone of this device, which has a large extent, is not divided into separate sections. The sensor cable is the main element of the optical system of this device, and its accidental or deliberate breakage anywhere in the protection zone will lead to the failure of the entire device, the length of the protection zone of which can reach 60 km. To repair a single-mode optical fiber cable in the field, in case of breakage, it is technologically very difficult.

The use of this device for small security zones is disadvantageous due to the high cost of a processor with software that exceeds $ 100 thousand. The device becomes effective only when the security zone is longer than 30 km, when the unit cost of one meter of the security zone does not exceed

$ 10 (SECURITY SYSTEMS Magazine No. 4 (70) August-September 2006. The article “Perimeter security systems are the novelties of the 2006 season.” Grotek LLC).

3. Soil shocks caused by the movement of large animals in the area of the sensor cable, especially along its route, can trigger frequent false positives of this device. To recognize and classify the signals coming from the sensor cable, in this case, it will be necessary to create a large number of standard images, which is technically difficult to perform, given the number of animal species, their movement individually, in groups, quickly, slowly, as well as the unsteadiness of the signals caused by seasonal changes in climatic environmental factors on the physical and mechanical properties of soils.

The objective of the invention is the creation of a monitoring system that provides detection of attempts to unauthorized access to the underground pipeline at an early stage of the invasion, before excavation.

The technical result obtained by carrying out the invention is the detection of attempts to unauthorized access to the underground pipeline at an early stage of the invasion, before the start of excavation, reducing the number of false alarms and increasing the reliability of the system.

The problem is solved due to the fact that the SecurePipe system, which contains a sensor cable located underground above the pipeline, a controller and an industrial computer, has the following difference: two magnetometric detection tools have been introduced, which are located underground, on both sides of the pipeline, at the borders its zones of placement, and form volumetric zones of detection at the approaches to the zone of placement of the pipeline.

In addition, the proposed masked system for monitoring the status of underground trunk pipelines is characterized in that it is made with the possibility of dividing its protection zone into separate sections, which

connected to the computer of the automated workstation of the system operator by a trunk cable, equipped with a second sensor cable, and the sensor cables are located underground above the pipeline and are located on different sides of it, and the sensor cable is armored with steel tapes.

Between the set of essential features of the claimed object and the achieved technical result there is a causal relationship, namely:

1. In the proposed masked system for monitoring the state of underground trunk pipelines, in addition to vibration detection means, which records such intrusion attempts as opening the earth at the location of the pipeline using a hand tool (pickax, spade, etc.), or using technical means ( drilling rig, excavator, etc.), two magnetometric detection tools have been introduced.

A magnetometric detection tool detects changes in the Earth’s existing magnetic field that are made when crossing its detection zone by vehicles or people carrying objects that have residual or induced magnetization (metal tools, tapping equipment, etc.). These funds are located underground, on both sides of the pipeline, at the borders of its deployment zone, and form volumetric detection zones at the approaches to the pipeline deployment zone. When crossing the detection zone of the magnetometric detection means by motor vehicles or by people carrying metal objects, a response signal is sent to the computer of the workstation of the system operator, indicating the intersection and the direction of movement of the intruder.

The presence in the monitoring system of magnetometric detection means makes it possible to identify from all violators the zones of the pipeline, including large animals, only vehicles and people with metal

items that could potentially allow unauthorized access to the pipeline.

The location of the magnetometric detection means at the borders of the pipeline placement zone makes it possible to detect an attempt of unauthorized access to the pipeline at an early stage of the invasion, before the start of excavation.

The detection of an attempt of unauthorized access to the pipeline at an early stage of the invasion, even at the approaches to the zone where the pipeline is located, allows the operator of the monitoring system to objectively assess the situation, taking into account the subsequent dynamics of its development, in order to take adequate measures to prevent unauthorized actions.

2. The presence in the monitoring system of detection tools based on different principles of operation, their relative position in the zone of the pipeline placement, the possibility of detecting violators at the border of the pipeline placement zone and identifying potential violators from them: vehicles and people carrying metal objects with the determination of the direction of their movement, the analysis of the sequence of occurrence of the operation signals from the detection means and the classification of events that occur, can significantly s the number of false alarms.

3. The monitoring system is made with the possibility of dividing its security zone into separate sections, which are connected to the computer of the operator’s workstation with a trunk cable and to a remote power supply device with a power cable. Dividing the protection zone of the monitoring system into separate sections significantly increases the reliability of its operation, as failure of one section does not lead to a failure of the entire system, as is the case with the prototype device, where a break in the sensor cable, anywhere, leads to a failure of the system, the length of the protection zone of which can reach 60 km.

4. The monitoring system is equipped with a second sensor cable, both sensor cables being located underground above the pipeline and located on opposite sides of it.

The presence of two sensor cables, and their location on opposite sides of the pipeline, expand the detection zone, which makes it possible to detect intrusion attempts when opening the ground not only above the pipeline, but also to the side of it, and also increases the reliability of the system, because in case of accidental or intentional breakage of one sensor cable, the second will continue to function.

5. Sensor cable is armored with steel tapes. Additional mechanical protection of the sensor cable with steel tapes increases the reliability of the vibration detection means, as protects it from accidental breakage during earthwork at the location of the cable.

The invention allows:

1. To find, at the border of the zone where the pipeline is located (at an early stage of the invasion, before the start of excavation), vehicles and people carrying metal objects, and determine the direction of their movement (to or from the pipeline).

2. The system operator objectively assess the current alarming situation in a particular section of the pipeline protection zone, taking into account the dynamics of its development.

3. Reduce the number of false alarms.

4. Improve system reliability.

The technical nature and principle of operation of the proposed system are illustrated by drawings, which depict:

Figure 1 is a structural diagram of a masked system for monitoring the status of underground pipelines.

Figure 2 is a structural diagram of a section of the protection zone of a masked system for monitoring the status of underground trunk pipelines.

Figure 3 - connection diagram of the protection zone of the masked system for monitoring the status of underground trunk pipelines.

On the structural diagram (Figure 1) of a masked system for monitoring the status of underground trunk pipelines, the following notation:

1 - section of the security zone of the masked system for monitoring the status of underground trunk pipelines;

2 - the border of the zone of the pipeline;

3 - pipeline;

4 - trunk cable;

5 - power cable;

6 - premises of the central guard post;

7 - AWP of the system operator;

8 - remote power device.

On the structural diagram (Figure 2) of the protection zone of the masked system for monitoring the status of underground trunk pipelines, the following notation is given:

1 - section of the security zone of the masked system for monitoring the status of underground trunk pipelines;

2 - the border of the zone of the pipeline;

3 - pipeline;

4 - trunk cable;

5 - power cable;

9 - magnetometric detection means;

10 - vibration detection means;

11 - peripheral controller;

12 - connecting cables.

On the connection diagram (Figure 3) of the protection zone of the masked system for monitoring the status of underground trunk pipelines, the following notation is given:

1 - section of the security zone of the masked system for monitoring the status of underground trunk pipelines;

2 - the border of the zone of the pipeline;

3 - pipeline;

4 - trunk cable;

5 - power cable;

11 - peripheral controller;

12 - connecting cables;

13 - magnetometric induction sensitive element;

14 - cable segments magnetometric induction sensitive element;

15 - terminal coupling;

16 - cable sensing element;

17 - terminal coupling;

18 - segments of the sensor cable;

19 - coupling;

20 - connecting cable;

21 is a processing unit magnetometric detection means;

22 is a processing unit of a vibration detection means.

The proposed masked system for monitoring the status of underground pipelines consists of:

- sections of the protection zone;

- AWP system operator;

- devices of remote power supply.

The above structural elements are made as follows:

1. Each section of protection zone 1 of the masked system for monitoring the status of underground trunk pipelines contains:

- two magnetometric detection means 9;

- vibration detection means 10;

- peripheral controller 11.

2. Magnetometric detection means 9 consists of a magnetometric induction sensitive element 13 and a unit

processing 21. The magnetometric induction sensing element 13 contains six identical segments of the cable 14, consisting of two insulated conductors twisted into a pair, two end couplings 15, a coupling 19, and is located in the ground, at a depth of (20 ... 30) cm. Cable segments 14 are located in the same plane in pairs and sequentially along the border of the pipeline placement zone, at the same distance from each other, are connected at their ends with the help of terminal 15 and the coupling 19 and form two single-turn “8” - braznyh differential sensor signal. These sensors are spaced some distance along the route of probable movement of the intruder and configured so that their conductors form spatially distributed contours that are sensitive to changes in the magnetic flux caused by the intruder having objects with residual or induced magnetization. The detection zone of the magnetometric induction sensitive element 13 is a strip up to 6 m wide, relative to its longitudinal axis, and a length (500 ... 1000) m.

As terminal 15 couplings and connecting couplings 19, unified polyethylene couplings for electric communication cables are used. The input of cable segments 14 to the terminal 15 couplings and the coupling 19, as well as the input of the connecting cable 20 is carried out through the nozzles with which the coupling housings are equipped.

3. The vibration detection means 10 consists of a cable sensing element 16 and a processing unit 22.

The cable sensing element 16 contains four end couplings 17, four segments of the sensor cable 18 and is located in the ground, at a depth of (40 ... 50) cm. The segments of the sensor cable 18 are pieces of a pair cable telephone cable, with polyethylene insulation, with a screen of aluminum-polymer tape, armored with steel tapes, with an external protective hose made of polyethylene. The segments of the sensor cable 18 are connected in pairs to the processing unit 22 and form two flanks,

symmetrically located relative to the installation site of the processing unit 22. The flange pair connection of the segments of the sensor cable 18 to the processing unit 22, symmetrically relative to the location of its installation, ensures the accuracy of determining the intrusion location to 1/2 the length of the security zone 1 and increases the noise immunity of the vibration detection means 10.

Conductors and shielding conductors of the segments of the sensor cable 18 are shunted at their ends, in the terminations 17, resistors to ensure control over their health. In the event of a break or short circuit in the segment of the sensor cable 18, the processing unit 22 provides a response signal to the peripheral controller 11, constantly for the duration of the malfunction.

The detection zone of the vibration detection means 10 is a strip up to 2 m wide, relative to the longitudinal axis of the pipeline 3, and a length (500 ... 1000) m.

As the terminal 17 couplings, unified polyethylene couplings for electric communication cables are used. The input of the segment of the sensor cable 18 into the terminal sleeve 17 is carried out through the pipe with which the coupling body is equipped.

4. The peripheral controller 11 provides the interaction of the magnetometric detection means 9 and the vibration detection means 10 of the security zone 1 section with the operator’s AWP of the system 7. The peripheral controller 11 and processing units 21, 22 are structurally made in standardized waterproof housing made of high-strength plastic. The housings of the peripheral controller 11 and processing units 21, 22 are equipped with valves for checking tightness under excessive pressure (0.5 bar) and contact sensors monitoring the opening of the units. The input of the main cable 4, the power cable 5 and the connecting cables 12, 20 into the housing is carried out through sealed cable entries.

The DC voltage (10 ... 30) V is supplied to the processing units 21 and 22 from the peripheral controller 11 via connecting

cables 12.

5. Workstation of the system operator 7 is a specialized hardware-software complex based on an industrial computer. The computer is powered by an uninterruptible power supply. The computer system unit and uninterruptible power supply are housed in a standard 19-inch hardware rack. The peripheral controllers 11 are connected to the operator’s AWS of the system 7 via the trunk cable 4. The trunk cable 4 is located in the ground, at a depth of (80 ... 90) cm.

6. Power supply to the peripheral controllers 11 is carried out from the remote power supply device 8 via the power cable 5. As the remote power supply device 8, a standard 110 V DC power supply is used, which is located in the equipment rack of the operator of the system 7 operator.

Power cable 5 is located in the ground, at a depth of (80 ... 90) cm.

7. Workstation of the system operator 7 and the remote power supply device 8 are located in the premises of the central guard post 6.

The masked system for monitoring the status of underground trunk pipelines described above is used as follows:

The preparation of the monitoring system of the state of underground trunk pipelines for operation is as follows. An external inspection of the AWP equipment of the system 7 operator and the remote power supply device 8 is carried out for the correctness and reliability of connecting electrical circuits when the power is off. They turn on the system’s power supply and use the system operator’s AWS to remotely monitor the health of the equipment in the areas of protection zone 1. To check the performance of the monitoring system, control actions are made by crossing the transportation zone of the pipeline with a vehicle and people with a hand-held metal tool for opening the ground, at three any parts of protection zone 1, with simulated earthworks near pipeline 3.

Use the monitoring system of the state of underground pipelines as follows. Organize round-the-clock duty of shift operators for the AWP of the system operator 7.

If there are no vehicles or people carrying metal objects in the zone where the pipeline 3 is located, and the monitoring system equipment is in good working order, the graphical plan of the pipeline 3 route and the current state of the system are displayed on the monitor screen of the operator’s AWP. In the event of a malfunction of the monitoring system equipment, a message about the type of equipment and its location is displayed on the monitor screen of the operator of the system 7 operator.

When crossing the detection zone of the magnetometric means 9 by a motor vehicle or by a person carrying metal objects, electrical signals appear at the outputs of the differential signal sensors of the magnetometric induction sensing element 13, due to electromagnetic induction. These signals appear sequentially in time, due to the fact that the signal sensors are spaced a certain distance along the route of movement of the intruder. The electrical signals coming from the magnetometric induction sensing element 13 through the connecting cable 20 to the processing unit 21 are amplified, filtered and processed by the processing unit 21 so that, in accordance with the distinguishing features, the interference is eliminated and the signals initiated by the intruder are isolated from them. The processing unit 21 analyzes the sequence of occurrence of signals from the differential signal sensors of the magnetometric induction sensing element 13 and generates a response signal through the connecting cable 12 to the peripheral controller 11, in the form of opening normally closed contacts of one of the relays corresponding to the direction of movement of the intruder towards the pipeline. The response signal of the magnetometric detection means 9 from the peripheral controller 11 is received via the main cable 4 to the computer of the operator of the system 7.

When you try to open the soil in the area near the pipeline 3 using a hand tool (shovels, hoes, etc.), or using technical means (drilling rig, excavator, etc.), the vibration of the soil is transmitted to the cable sensing element 16 vibration detection means 10. Vibration or deformation of the segment of the sensor cable 18 of the cable sensing element 16 causes the appearance of electrical signals (due to the effect of contact electrification) at its output. The electrical signals coming from the segment of the sensor cable 18 of the cable sensing element 16 to the processing unit 22 are amplified, filtered and processed by the processing unit 22 in such a way that, in accordance with the distinguishing features, the interference is eliminated and the signals triggered by the action of the intruder on the ground are isolated. The processing unit 22 provides a response signal through the connecting cable 12 to the peripheral controller 11, in the form of opening normally closed relay contacts. The response signal of the vibration detection means 10 from the peripheral controller 11 is received via the main cable 4 to the computer of the operator of the system 7.

AWP of the system 7 operator provides the following functions:

- collection, processing and analysis of information received from sections of protection zone 1;

- classification of ongoing alarming and abnormal events;

- sound notification of the system operator about the occurrence of disturbing and abnormal events;

- formation and display on the monitor screen of warning and alarm messages;

- display on the monitor screen text prompts and brief instructions to the operator when changing the operating environment;

- monitoring the performance of system equipment;

- registration of reception / delivery of shifts by duty operators;

- registration of system events and operator control actions;

- storage of information about events and operator actions.

The occurrence of a response signal from the magnetometric detection means 9, indicating the movement of the intruder towards the pipeline, is classified by the computer of the operator of the system 7 operator as an attempt to unauthorized access to the pipeline 3. A warning message appears on the monitor screen of the operator of the system 7 operator on the appearance of vehicles in the area of the pipeline 3 or people carrying metal objects, indicating the place of violation, the direction of their movement, time, and yellow highlighting, respectively stvuyuschego plot on the graphic plane pipeline route, as well as a brief instruction operator.

Time-consistent occurrence of actuation signals, first from one magnetometric detection means 9, indicating the movement of the intruder towards the pipeline 3, and then from another located on the opposite border of the zone of placement of the pipeline 3, indicating the movement of the intruder from the pipeline 3, in the absence of the response signal from the vibration detection means 10 is classified by the computer of the operator of the system 7 as the intersection of the zone 3 of the pipeline, without the purpose of tapping into the pipe od. A warning message appears on the monitor screen of the operator’s automated workplace of the system 7 operator about the intersection of the pipeline 3 zone with motor vehicles or people carrying metal objects, indicating the intersection, their direction of movement, time, and the corresponding section on the graphical plan of the pipeline highlighting in yellow.

The successive occurrence of actuation signals, first from the magnetometric detection means 9, indicating the movement of the intruder towards the pipeline, and then from the vibration detection means 10, is classified by the computer of the operator of the system 7 operator as an attempt to insert into the pipeline 3. On the monitor screen the operator of the system 7 operator appears An alarm message about an attempt to tie into pipeline 3, indicating the place of intrusion, time, and backlighting in red

the corresponding section on the graphical plan of the pipeline route 3, as well as a brief instruction to the operator.

The short-term occurrence of actuation signals from the vibration detection means 10, in the absence of a response signal from the magnetometric detection means 9, is classified by the computer of the operator of the system 7 as the intersection of the pipeline zone 3 by large animals, or by a group of people without metal objects. A warning message appears on the monitor screen of the operator’s AWP of system 7 about the intersection of the pipeline placement zone 3 by animals or a group of people, indicating the intersection, time, and yellow highlighting of the corresponding section on the graphical plan of the pipeline 3 route.

The successive occurrence in time of operation signals, first from one vibration detection means 10, and then from another located on an adjacent section of security zone 1, in the absence of a response signal from magnetometric detection means 9, is classified by the computer of the operator of the system 7 operator as moving along the pipeline placement zone 3 large animals, or groups of people without metal objects. On the monitor screen of the operator’s AWP system 7, a warning message appears about the movement along the zone of placement of the pipeline 3 animals, or groups of people, indicating the locations of movement, time, and yellow highlighting of the corresponding sections on the graphical plan of the pipeline 3 route.

Claims (4)

1. A camouflaged system for monitoring the status of underground pipelines, comprising a sensor cable located underground above the pipeline, controllers and an industrial computer, characterized in that two magnetometric detection tools are introduced that are located underground, on both sides of the pipeline, at its borders placement zones, and form volumetric detection zones on the approaches to the pipeline placement zone. 2. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that it is made with the possibility of dividing its security zone into separate sections that are connected to the computer of the workstation of the system operator by a trunk cable. 3. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that it is equipped with a second sensor cable, wherein the sensor cables are located underground above the pipeline and are located on opposite sides of it. 4. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that the sensor cable is armored with steel tapes.