RU2743891C1 - Information protection method for random antennas - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: information security.SUBSTANCE: invention relates to the field of confidential information (CI) protection and can be used to eliminate channels of CI leakage in radio systems, united by the term "random antennas" (RA). A method for information protection of random antennas in the conditions of an attacker using the HF intrusion method, including placing a source of a stochastic signal in the room to be protected, while in the outer loop of the HF intrusion signal generator, which includes a random antenna, a signal source containing confidential information, and other elements of the premises to be protected, near the source of the signal containing confidential information, a metallized surface should be located. Between the source of the signal containing confidential information and the metallized surface, a reaction circuit should be operated, which is controlled by the source of the stochastic signal.EFFECT: increased efficiency of protecting the CI from leakage through the RA in the case of HF imposition, ensured protection of the CI equipment without increasing the energy level of the signal used to protect the CI.1 cl, 4 dwg

Description

The invention relates to the field of protection of confidential information (CI) and can be used to eliminate channels of leakage CI in radio systems, united by the term "random antennas" (SA).

To ensure the protection of IC by preventing unauthorized access to it, it is important to identify and consistently block all technical channels of its leakage into the external environment [1-7]. There are two types of CI leakage channels: of natural origin, which themselves are present in the room to be protected (PPP), and artificially formed from the outside. An example of the latter is the leakage channel obtained by the method of high-frequency (HF) imposition [6].

Reliable and universal methods of passive protection of CI are not always applicable for the protection of SA: electromagnetic shielding, grounding, filtering of CI signals, organizational, technical and other measures [3-4]. At the same time, the CI signals through the SA are capable of going far beyond the PZP with low attenuation, where highly efficient stationary equipment that implements new scientific and technical ideas can be used to intercept them [5-7; 12]. Therefore, when organizing the protection of CI, it is necessary to take adequate actions - in particular, the analysis and modeling of methods and means of artificial formation of CI leakage channels through the CA are of great importance: these include the equipment that is the source of CI (hereinafter CI-equipment), auxiliary equipment, components interior and other structural elements of the PZP.

From the prior art, methods for the formation of channels of leakage of the CI are known, which include different versions of the implementation of the RF-imposition method [4, p. 102-103, Fig. 3.9]. One of the most effective is the method, which involves the use of an oscillator connected to the CA, the signal of which ensures the leakage of the CI beyond the PZP outside the frequency band where the CI protection system operates. The structure of the circuit of this oscillator, as elements of the external virtual circuit, can include the CA, including the source of the dangerous CI signal, as well as the CI protection means located in the PZP.

The protection of the CI in these conditions meets serious difficulties - even in the case of the use of other equipment in the PZP, designed to protect the CI signals of acoustic, electric, magnetic, electromagnetic, etc. type, since this equipment also takes part in the formation of an artificial channel for the leakage of CI. Of the known protection methods, the closest in technical essence is an active method of simultaneous spatial and linear noise (prototype of the proposed invention) [3, p. 157], which assumes the placement of an emitter of an electromagnetic signal in the PZP, the field of which affects the SA located in the PZP.

The prototype method has the following disadvantages:

- the signal used to protect the CI, if it acts as a noise barrage interference, must be sufficiently large in energy level, which requires additional costs for the operation of the CI protection system;

- CI protection using low-energy signals of a special type, acting as aiming imitating interference, requires the correspondence of their informative signs to the CI signal signs, which negatively affects both the cost and the universality of the CI protection system;

- placement of a signal emitter with an energy level necessary for effective protection of the IC in the PPP has an extremely negative effect on the ecological and ergonomic safety of the PPP in terms of the electromagnetic factor for the personnel and users of the IC.

The technical result of the proposed invention is the elimination of these disadvantages of the prototype method and as a result:

- increasing the efficiency of the IC protection against leakage through the SA in the case of the implementation of the HF-imposing method by using an oscillator connected to the SA, the signal of which ensures the IC leakage outside the PZP outside the frequency band where the IC equipment protection system operates;

- ensuring effective protection of the CI equipment without increasing the energy level of the signal used to protect the CI from leakage through the SA.

The essence of the proposed method of information protection of random antennas in the conditions of an attacker using the HF intrusion method, including the placement of a source of a stochastic signal in the room to be protected, consists in the fact that the external circuit of the oscillator of the RF intrusion signal, which includes a random antenna, contains a signal source containing confidential information, as well as other elements of the premises to be protected, near the signal source containing confidential information, have a metallized surface between the signal source containing confidential information and the metallized surface, include a reactance circuit controlled by a stochastic signal source.

FIG. 1 shows a diagram of the implementation of a prototype - a known method of active protection of CI in conditions of HF-imposition by means of simultaneous spatial and linear noise of the PZP, where 1 - CI-equipment, 2 - an oscillator of the HF-intrusion signal; 3 - technical means of intercepting CI; 4 - emitter of the electromagnetic signal of the KI protection.

FIG. 2 shows a diagram of the implementation of the proposed method for protecting the IC from leakage through the CA, where 1 is the IC equipment; 5 - metallized plate; 6 - reactance circuit; 7 - generator of a stochastic electrical signal.

FIG. 3 represents a generalized potentiometric diagram of a three-point auto-generator of a leakage signal KI as part of a transistor element Tr, elements of a three-point circuit in the form of loops with reactances X _1-2 and an external loop with reactance X ₃ (highlighted by a dashed line), where the designations correspond to Figs 1-2 ...

FIG. 4 illustrates the principle of IC protection by the proposed method, where X ₄ is the reactance introduced by the reactance circuit 6 into the external circuit with the reactance X ₃ , other designations correspond to Figs 1-3.

The known prototype method is carried out as follows.

In the immediate vicinity of the KI-equipment 1 (see Fig. 1), grounded and protected with the help of other devices available in the PZP, KI-equipment 1 (see Fig. 1) there is a radiator of an electromagnetic signal of active protection KI 4 - for example, of the GSh-1000M type; GSh-2500, etc. Autogenerator 2 of the HF-intrusion signal forms a channel for leakage of the CI beyond the PZP - up to the technical means 3 of intercepting the CI by an intruder outside the frequency band where the CI protection system operates. The structure of the virtual outer contour of the autogenerator 2 includes the CA: CI-equipment 1, including the source of the dangerous CI signal and the CI protection equipment located in the PZP, as well as interior components and structural elements of the PZP.

The emitter 4 of the electromagnetic signal carries out active protection of the IC by energetic action on the SA located in the PZP. The need for mutual convergence of 1 and 4 is due to the desirable coincidence of the structures of the electromagnetic fields generated by the dangerous CI signal and the active protection signal of the CI. If 1 is a distributed CA, 4 is a lumped element of the CI protection system and it is difficult to ensure the coincidence of their fields, it is necessary to introduce an additional energy reserve for the CI protection signal, which leads to a decrease in the ecological and ergonomic safety of the CI by the electromagnetic factor for the CI personnel and users.

Other disadvantages of the prototype method are due to the fact that for effective protection of the IC, the signal used in the role of noise barrage interference must be sufficiently large in energy level, which requires additional costs for the operation of the IC protection system, and if it is formed using low-energy signals of a special type acting in the role of sighting imitating interference, this requires the correspondence of their informative features to the features of the CI signal, which negatively affects both the cost and the universality of the CI protection system.

In order to eliminate these shortcomings, it is also proposed in the immediate vicinity of the KI equipment 1, which is grounded and protected with the help of other devices available in the PZP (see Fig. 2), to arrange the metallized plate 5 and connect a reactance plate between it and the grounded case of the KI equipment. electronic circuit 6, controlled from the generator of the stochastic electrical signal 7 (see Fig. 4).

The proposed method is carried out as follows.

A reactance electronic circuit 6 is connected to the grounded body of the CI equipment 1, on the one hand, and the metallized plate 5, on the other hand, which is acted upon by a stochastic electrical signal generator 7, as shown in FIG. 2. The three-point potentiometric circuit of the oscillator, the signal of which ensures the leakage of the CI outside the frequency band where the CI protection system works, in a simplified form according to [8, Fig. 16-33, p. 698] and [9, Fig. 4-03; fig. 4-04, p. 144] shows FIG. 3: it includes an active transistor element Tr and elements of a three-point circuit in the form of circuits with reactances X ₁ ; X ₂ , as well as an external circuit with equivalent reactance X ₃ , which is formed by the CA: CI equipment, including a source of a dangerous CI signal, CI protection equipment located in the PZP, auxiliary equipment, interior components and other structural elements of the PZP. _{Elements 5-7 enter the reactance X 4} into the external circuit of the oscillator (see Fig. 4), which is a time-varying random variable.

, где

– критическое значение коэффициента обратной связи, необходимой для самовозбуждения автогенератора [8, с. 699]. From the prior art, variants of the implementation of the reactance circuit 6, controlled by an external electrical signal, are known, which provide the values of the reactance X _{4 of} both inductive and capacitive nature [10; 11, p. 246]. With the inductive resistance of the external circuit X ₃ > 0, the phase balance condition requires X ₁ >0; X ₂ <0, that is, the oscillator is an inductive three-point. With the capacitive resistance of the external circuit X ₃ <0, in the same way X ₁ <0; X ₂ > 0 and the oscillator is a capacitive three-point. The amplitude balance condition is

where

- the critical value of the feedback coefficient required for self-excitation of the autogenerator [8, p. 699].

определяется схемой его реализации и значениями параметров Х_1-3. Для емкостной трехточки, например,

, где

и

– резонансные частоты, соответственно, контуров с сопротивлениями Х₁ и Х₂ [8, с. 724]. Введение в состав внешнего контура стохастического реактивного сопротивления Х₄ делает

случайной величиной и либо нарушает баланс фаз вообще, то есть срывает генерацию, либо изменяет частоту, на которой может иметь место утечка КИ, непредсказуемым образом. В обоих этих случаях перехват КИ становится невозможным. Управляющий реактансной схемой 6 генератор стохастического электрического сигнала 7 (см. Фиг. 2 и Фиг. 4) является маломощным и не представляет опасности для персонала и пользователей КИ в эколого-эргономическом плане. Circular operating frequency of the oscillator

is determined by the scheme of its implementation and the values of the parameters X _1-3 . For a capacitive three-point, for example,

where

and

- resonant frequencies, respectively, of circuits with resistances X ₁ and X ₂ [8, p. 724]. The introduction of the stochastic reactance X ₄ into the external circuit makes

random variable and either disturbs the phase balance altogether, that is, disrupts generation, or changes the frequency at which the IC leakage can occur in an unpredictable manner. In both of these cases, the interception of the CI becomes impossible. The generator of the stochastic electrical signal 7 controlling the reactance circuit 6 (see Fig. 2 and Fig. 4) is low-power and does not pose a danger to the personnel and users of the CI in ecological and ergonomic terms.

The proposed method is universal and simple, it is convenient for implementation and automation, and allows to increase the efficiency of protection of the IC from leakage through the SA in real conditions.

LITERATURE

1. Maslov ON Theory of random antennas: the first 10 years of development and application // Antennas. No. 9 (241), 2017. - pp. 37-59.

2. Maslov ON Application of the method of statistical simulation for the study of random antennas and the design of active information protection systems // Success of modern radio electronics. No. 6, 2011. S. 42-55.

3. Buzov G.A., Kalinin S.V., Kondratyev A.V. Protection against information leakage through technical channels. M .: Hot line - Telecom, 2005 .-- 416 p.

4. Petrakov A.V., Lagutin V.S. Leakage and protection of information in telephone channels. M .: Energoatomizdat, 1997 .-- 304 p.

5. Maslov O.N. Principles of modeling information protection systems against leakage through random antennas // Special equipment. No. 6, 2016. - S. 45-55.

6. Maslov ON Protection of a distributed random antenna from information leakage through an HF-intrusion channel // Special technique. No. 2, 2017. - S. 38-48.

7. Maslov O.N., Shashenkov V.F. Low Energy Protection of Random Antennas: Concept and Implementation Principles. // Protection of information. Inside. No. 1, 2016. - S. 10-14.

8. Zernov N.V., Karpov V.G. Theory of radio engineering circuits. L .: Energy, 1972 .-- 816 p.

9. Schwartz S. Semiconductor circuits. Per. from English M .: IIL, 1962 .-- 440 p.

10. Controlled reactance // Fedotov IM, Prosetskiy AI, Zharkoy TN. Auth. St. USSR SU 190469 A from 1983.04.04, publ. 1985.11.07, bul. No. 35.

11. Mandl M. 200 selected circuits of electronics. Per. from English M .: Mir, 1985 .-- 350 p.

12. Method of information protection of a distributed random antenna // Alyshev Yu.V., Maslov ON, Shashenkov V.F. Patent RU 2470465 from 2010.20.12., Publ. 2012.20.12., Bul. No. 35.

Claims (1)

A method of information protection of random antennas in the conditions of an attacker using the HF-intrusion method, including placing a source of a stochastic signal in the room to be protected, characterized in that the external circuit of the HF-intrusion signal autogenerator, which includes a random antenna, is a signal source containing confidential information, as well as other elements of the premises to be protected, near the signal source containing confidential information, place a metallized surface between the signal source containing confidential information and the metallized surface, include a reaction circuit controlled by a stochastic signal source.

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