RU2749728C1 - Method for electromagnetic protection of distributed random antenna - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: confidential information protection.

SUBSTANCE: invention relates to the field of protection of confidential information and can be used to protect radio engineering systems, united by the term "distributed random antennas". The claimed method includes placing N generators of intentional interference in the room to be protected near a distributed random antenna and differs in that at the first stage of its implementation in the room to be protected, the levels of three orthogonal components of the electric field strength vector and the levels of three orthogonal components of the signal magnetic field strength vector are measured containing confidential information, at M points, the choice of which is determined by information about the composition and structure, as well as the place and method of excitation of the distributed random antenna; at the second stage, N generators of intentional interference are placed in the room to be protected, providing, on the one hand, a given value of the interference / signal ratio at the specified M points for each of the specified orthogonal components of the signal field strengths containing confidential information.

EFFECT: invention increases efficiency of protecting a distributed random antenna from leakage of confidential information and electromagnetic protection of workplaces.

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Description

The invention relates to the field of protection of confidential information (CI) and can be used to protect radio engineering systems, united by the term "distributed random antennas" (RSA).

Examples of PCA are power supply, grounding, warning, burglar and fire alarm systems; cable lines for external, intra-office and computer communications; pipes for ventilation and central heating systems; metal parts of load-bearing structures in buildings, etc. [one]. The negative features of the channels of CI leakage through the SAR include:

- a complex and often ambiguous (unpredictable in advance) nature of the excitation associated with the transformation of the original signal created by the source of the CI (hereinafter CI signal) into CI signals diverging along the SAR. The sources of CI can be both the main (directly involved in the processing, transmission and reception of CI signals) CI equipment, and auxiliary equipment located in the PZP;

- usually, a fundamentally different nature of the propagation of the CI signal inside the PZP and the KI signals in the SAR, with the help of which the vehicles located in the PZP are connected to external publicly available equipment. As a result, the CI signals with low attenuation can go through the SAR far beyond the PZP and become available to the attacker;

- Difficulties in modeling (mathematical, physical, computer) of both sources of CI and elements of SAR;

- significant cost, weight and dimensions of equipment for the protection of CI, etc.

From the point of view of ensuring effective protection of the IC from leakage through the SAR, the main disadvantages are the uncertainty (incompleteness, inaccuracy, unreliability, inadequacy) of information about the composition and structure of the SAR, including the place and method of its excitation, as well as the inability to control the effectiveness of the protection of the SAR circulating in SAR outside the PZP.

Reliable and universal methods of passive protection of CI (electromagnetic shielding, grounding, filtration [2-4]) are often inapplicable for the protection of SAR. Therefore, when organizing the protection of CI from leakage through the SAR beyond the PZP, active protection methods are used based on the use of signals of a special type (deliberate interference), designed by the energy method (for masking noise interference) or by causing maximum information damage (for imitating interference) "suppress »CI signals in all available and potentially possible leakage channels, in order to make it difficult for an attacker to intercept and process CI [2-3]:

- linear noise, which is realized with the help of a noise generator, which supplies a signal to the elements of the SAR to be protected;

- spatial noise, which means the creation of an electromagnetic field with a structure and characteristics that ensure the protection of the IC within the PZP from interception through the channels of electromagnetic leakage.

Variants of active protection of SAR with the use of different types of interference are demonstrated [7-11]. The closest in technical essence is the method of linear noise [5, p. 188, fig. 8.9] (prototype of the present invention), which, in relation to the conditions of the problem being solved, provides for the connection to the PCA through N interface devices of N generators of deliberate interference that provide protection to the IC. Generators designed for linear noise are known from the prior art [6].

The disadvantage of the prototype method is the impossibility to ensure and control the effectiveness of the protection of the CI circulating in the RSA outside the PZP, including due to the uncertainty of information about the composition and structure, as well as the place and method of excitation of the RSA, as well as the electromagnetic safety of the information protection system of the KI within the PZP for CI personnel and users.

The proposed solution in the conditions of the specified uncertainty at the first stage of its implementation provides for the measurement of the levels of three orthogonal components of the electric field strength vector and the levels of three orthogonal components of the magnetic field strength vector of the CI signal within the PZP at M points, the choice of which depends on the uncertainty of information about the composition and structure , as well as the place and method of X-ray excitation. In the presence of such information, the indicated points are selected near the assumed locations of the SAR excitation, in the absence of such information, at the grid nodes uniformly covering the BHZ area. At the second stage, N generators of deliberate interference are placed in the PZP, providing, on the one hand, a given value of the "interference / signal" ratio at the specified M points, on the other hand, the ecological and ergonomic safety of workplaces located in the PZP.

The technical result of the proposed invention is to provide the specified effectiveness of the electromagnetic protection of the SAR, regardless of the uncertainty of information about its composition and structure, as well as the place and method of excitation of the SAR. The need to control the effectiveness of the protection of the CI circulating in the SAR outside the PZP disappears, it becomes possible to improve the ecological and ergonomic situation inside the PZP by coordinated placement of workplaces and N generators of intentional jammers.

The essence of the proposed method of electromagnetic protection of a distributed random antenna, including placing N generators of deliberate interference in the room to be protected near the distributed random antenna, is that at the first stage of its implementation in the room to be protected, the levels of three orthogonal components of the electric field strength vector and levels are measured three orthogonal components of the magnetic field strength vector of a signal containing confidential information at M points, the choice of which is determined by information about the composition and structure, as well as the place and method of excitation of a distributed random antenna; at the second stage, N generators of intentional interference are placed in the room to be protected, providing, on the one hand, a given value of the "interference / signal" ratio at the specified M points for each of the specified orthogonal components of the signal field strengths containing confidential information, on the other hand, the greatest ecological and ergonomic safety of workplaces located in the premises to be protected.

FIG. 1 demonstrates a prototype method for linear noise reduction of a PCA of a known type with a complex multi-storey structure, where 1 - PCA in the form of a branched network of heterogeneous connecting lines; 2 - interface device (total number N, marked with dashed lines); 3 - jammer (total number N); 4 - the source of the CI signal.

FIG. 2 illustrates the proposed method of information protection of RSA: shows the location in the PPP points, in each m [1; M] from which the levels of the three orthogonal components of the electric field strength vector E _{X; Y; Z} and the levels of the three orthogonal components of the magnetic field strength vector H _{X; Y; Z of the} signal containing confidential information are measured, and then the effectiveness of the electromagnetic protection of the SAR is monitored.

FIG. 3 by the example of histograms E _{X; Y; Z} and H _{X; Y; Z of the} field of a computer CI signal demonstrates the need for electromagnetic protection of SAR for all six specified orthogonal components.

The known prototype method is carried out as follows.

To the elements of the PCA 1 (see Fig. 1) through N interface devices 2 are connected N generators of intentional interference 3, which provide active protection of the IC by forming a mixture of the IC signal and interference circulating in the PCA. The disadvantage of the prototype method is the complexity (almost impossibility) of ensuring and monitoring the effectiveness of the protection of the IC circulating in the SAR - since this requires either the placement of control and measuring equipment outside the BHZ when using experimental methods, or the availability of sufficient in terms of volume of reliable information about the composition and structure, the place and method of RSA excitation, as well as the means of intercepting the CI by an intruder - when using calculation and analytical methods. In addition, interference for the protection of SAR, the energy levels of which are determined practically "blindly", must be sufficiently intense, which is directly related to the ecological and ergonomic insecurity of the protection system for personnel and users of the CI by the electromagnetic factor. The aim of the present invention is to eliminate these disadvantages.

The proposed method is carried out as follows.

At the first stage of the implementation of the proposed method of electromagnetic protection of the SAR (see Fig. 2), the levels of three orthogonal components of the electric field strength vector E _{X; Y; Z} and the levels of three orthogonal components of the magnetic field strength vector H _{X; Y; Z of the} CI signal are measured within the BZP at M points, the choice of which depends on the uncertainty of information about the composition and structure, as well as the place and method of excitation of SAR. In the presence of such information, the indicated points are selected near the assumed places of excitation of the SAR, in the absence of it, at the nodes of the grid, uniformly covering the area of the BHZ (see Fig. 2). At the second stage, N generators of deliberate interference are placed in the PPP, providing, on the one hand, a given value of the "interference / signal" ratio at the specified M points, and on the other hand, the ecological and ergonomic safety of the workplaces of personnel and users of the CI located in the PPP.

Since all these actions are carried out inside the PZP, the need to remove the control and measuring equipment outside of its limits in this case disappears. In accordance with the spatial analogue of the Huygens-Kirchhoff principle [12], the electromagnetic fields created outside the BZP by the SAR elements and the set of M points at which the measurements were made are structurally the same - therefore, the provision of a given “interference / signal” ratio at the specified M points inside The PPP guarantees the effectiveness of the protection of the PCA outside of it. By changing the location of N generators and workstations inside the PPP, it is possible to choose the option that is the safest for the personnel and users of the CI.

The proposed method is universal and simple, it is convenient for implementation and automation, it allows to increase the efficiency and environmental-ergonomic safety in terms of the electromagnetic factor of the information protection of the RSA.

LITERATURE

1. Maslov ON Theory of random antennas: the first 10 years of development and application // Antennas. No. 9 (241), 2017. - S. 37-59.

2. Buzov G.A., Kalinin S.V., Kondratyev A.V. Protection against information leakage through technical channels. M .: Hot line - Telecom, 2005 .-- 416 p.

3. Maslov ON Principles of modeling information protection systems against leakage through random antennas // Special equipment. No. 6, 2016. - S. 45-55.

4. Kechiev L.N., Stepanov P.V. EMC and information security in telecommunication systems. M .: Publishing House "Technologies", 2005. - 320 p.

5. Sobolev A.N., Kirillov V.M. Physical foundations of technical means of ensuring information security. M .: Helios ARV, 2004 .-- 224 p.

6. Product P218-1M // http://www.kalugapribor.ru/print/produce/p218_1m.html

7. Method of information protection of a distributed random antenna // Alyshev Yu.V., Maslov ON, Shashenkov V.F. Patent RU 2470465 from 20.12.2010, publ. 12/20/2012, bull. No. 35.

8. Method of information protection in a distributed random antenna // Maslov ON, Zasedateleva PS. Patent RU 2492581 from 30.11.2011, publ. 10.09.2013, bull. No. 25.

9. Device for information protection of a distributed random antenna // Maslov ON, Shashenkov VF, Borisova IE. Patent RU 2502195 from 02.09.2011, publ. 20.12.2013, bull. No. 35.

10. Method of protecting a distributed random antenna // Maslov ON, Shcherbakova T.A. Patent RU 2503132 from 30.11.2011, publ. 12/27/2013, bull. No. 36.

11. Method of information protection of a distributed random antenna element // Maslov ON, Shashenkov V.F. Patent RU 2707385 dated 07.19.2018, publ. 11/26/2019, bull. No. 33.

12. Alychev Y.V, Maslov O.N., Shatalov I.S. Spatial Analogue of the Huygens-Kirchhoff Principle and its Application for Simulation of Random Radiating Systems // Optical Technologies in Telecommunications 2019. SPIE Proceedings. 2020. Vol. 11516. - P. 1151618. doi: 10.1117 / 12.2565377

Claims (1)

A method of electromagnetic protection of a distributed random antenna, including placing N generators of intentional interference in a room to be protected near a distributed random antenna, characterized in that at the first stage of its implementation in the room to be protected, the levels of three orthogonal components of the electric field strength vector and the levels of three orthogonal components are measured the vector of the magnetic field strength of the signal containing confidential information, at M points, the choice of which is determined by information about the composition and structure, as well as the place and method of excitation of the distributed random antenna; at the second stage, N generators of intentional interference are placed in the room to be protected, providing, on the one hand, a given value of the "interference / signal" ratio at the specified M points for each of the specified orthogonal components of the signal field strengths containing confidential information, on the other hand, the greatest ecological and ergonomic safety of workplaces located in the premises to be protected.

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