RU2680350C2 - Method and system of distributed storage of recoverable data with ensuring integrity and confidentiality of information - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: calculating; counting.SUBSTANCE: invention relates to computer equipment. Technical result is achieved by the fact that the distributed information storage system (DISS) consists of k data processing units with the corresponding data storage nodes, including files to be stored. Control unit monitors the availability of the storage nodes, their location, the amount of permissible memory of the storage nodes with the data recovery block. Interaction in the DISS is carried out via a local or wireless network. Physical loss of any storage node (degradation of the DISS) or its inability to connect to the network under conditions of deliberate (imitating) actions of the attacker will result in partial loss or complete loss of information. Lot of information data with calculated redundant data distributed over the data storage nodes allows the data recovery unit to completely restore the lost data files even if one or more data storage nodes fail. Inaccessible storage node may be replaced by another storage node, the available storage nodes together with the newly introduced storage node form a lot of information and redundant data for the entered storage node and re-allocate it (system reconfiguration). Set of distributed data storage nodes is considered as a unified system of storage devices, which provides for the introduction of redundancy in the stored information. In one embodiment, the method (system) of distributed storage of recoverable data with ensuring integrity and confidentiality of information can be implemented using redundant modular codes.EFFECT: technical result is to increase the sustainability of the distributed information storage system.5 cl, 7 dwg, 2 tbl

Description

Technical field

The present invention relates to the field of radio and telecommunications and can be used for distributed storage of information.

State of the art

Known methods of data storage, protection against loss of which is provided by means of data backup using software, hardware or software implementation, for example, RAID technology (Redundant Array of Independent Disks) [US Patent No. 7392458 publ. 06/24/2008; U.S. Patent No. 7,437,658 publ. 10/14/2008; US patent No. 7600176 publ. 10/06/2009; US Patent Application No. 20090132851 publ. 05/21/2009: Application for US patent No. 2010229033 publ. 09/09/2010; US Patent Application No. 201101145677 publ. 06/16/2011; US Patent Application No. 20110167294 publ. 07/07/2011].

The disadvantages of these methods are:

complicated procedure for recovering lost data;

data distribution between storage nodes (disks), made in a single structural unit (RAID-array).

The known method [RF Patent No. 2502124 C1 publ. December 20, 2013] distributed data storage on several data storage nodes, which allows to build a storage device (storage) based on a set of data storage nodes (hard disks, flash drives, etc.) that is resistant to data loss even if some the number of media forming a storage device (storage).

The disadvantages of this method are:

a fixed level of recoverable data in case of a single occurrence of failures and malfunctions;

placement of information storage devices in a single design:

lack of security mechanisms for stored information.

Known methods of integrated information protection used both in storage systems made in a single design and in distributed systems [Application for US patent No. 200550081048 A1 publ. 04/14/2005; Application for US patent No. 8209551 B2 publ. 06/26/2012], for which information security requirements: confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility are ensured by the consistent use of cryptographic data conversion tools and their backup technologies.

The disadvantages of these methods are:

the constructive ability to propagate errors, which is characteristic of many operating modes of cryptographic information protection means, when one or more erroneous bits in a cryptogram block has (are) an effect when decrypting the following message blocks:

sufficiently high redundancy of stored information.

The closest in technical essence to the claimed technical solution and adopted for the prototype is the method described in [RF Patent No. 2501072 C2 publ. 12/10/2013].

In the prototype method under consideration, distributed data is stored distributed by replacing a failed node storing distributed data, comprising the steps of: first using the first data storage node to receive the first set of quotas (checksums) generated from the data file, each checksum being the first set includes a linear combination of parts of the data file along with a set of coefficients used to generate this linear combination; by means of the first data storage node, an indication of a new data storage node replacing the failed node is received, wherein the failed node includes a second set of checksums generated from the data file; a first replacement checksum is generated by the first data storage node in response to said instruction, wherein a first replacement checksum is generated by multiplying each checksum in the first set and a set of coefficients by a random scaling value and combining the multiplied first set of checksums and the multiplied set of coefficients ; and by means of the first data storage unit, the generated first replacement checksum is transmitted to the new data storage unit, wherein the first replacement checksum and at least one other replacement checksum form a second set of checksums in the new data storage unit, this other replacement checksum generated by the second data storage node (Fig. 1). However, this prototype method has the following disadvantages. Starting from a node that has distorted one element of at least one checksum, an “avalanche” error propagation occurs in a distributed information storage system. And all nodes of data storage associated with the formation of checksums through such a node accept some or even all of the checksums distorted. When restoring the source file from the resulting linear checksum combinations, the source file will be highly likely to be distorted. The proposed solutions to ensure the integrity of checksums involve the use of additional information for verification by performing checksum requests from other data storage nodes, which, in turn, reduces the system throughput under the conditions of deliberate imitating influences of an attacker.

Distributed secure storage systems are widely known in the art. So, in [US Patent No. US 7945784 B1 publ. 05/17/2011] a distributed data storage system with the possibility of data recovery is proposed, which is based on a (n, k) secret sharing scheme containing at least one server, a processor that performs the corresponding data processing for subsequent storage on n media.

The disadvantages of this system include:

dependence of recovery parameters of protected k data on the number of nodes n of data storage into which they are distributed;

the absence of explicitly expressed solutions for information recovery during the physical loss of a data storage node or system reconfiguration.

The closest in technical essence is a computer system for distributed storage of data on various network nodes [RF Patent No. 2501072 C2 publ. 12/10/2013], which consists of functional components: an unloading unit, a loading unit, a tracking unit, and data storage units, implemented by means of computer technology (computer systems) containing a central processing unit (CPU), memory, hard disk, or other device storage (non-temporary computer-readable storage medium on which executable instructions of a computer program executed by a processor are stored), a network interface, peripheral interfaces and a number of other known components. Storage nodes may include large amounts of available storage space. In addition, there may also be many unloading units and loading units accessing data storage nodes. There may also be many tracking units (for example, redundant tracking units may exist in the event of a failure of the main tracking unit). In this case, the unloading unit, the loading unit, the control unit and the data storage nodes communicate via the network. The network may be in the form of the Internet, a local area network, a wireless network, and various other types of networks.

The disadvantage of this system is the lack of mechanisms for ensuring data confidentiality, which is especially important in conditions of simulating the effects of an attacker.

The aim of the proposed technical solution is to increase the stability of the distributed information storage system.

Disclosure of invention

The technical result of the invention is achieved by the fact that:

1. In the known method of distributed data storage at various network nodes, recovery is ensured by replacing a failed node storing data related to a part of the data file, with each of the many available data storage nodes receiving an indication from the control unit to replace the failed node with a new data storage node, each of the available data storage nodes contains a lot of checksums generated from the data file, which can be generated based on the frequency data file using erasure coding techniques, and a replacement checksum is generated on each of the many available data storage nodes by creating a linear combination of checksums on each data storage node using random coefficients, in the future these replacement checksums are used to recover the lost data file. New is that each of the available data processing units with a corresponding data storage unit contains a plurality of data generated from files corresponding to data processing units with data storage units; that a lot of data is previously subjected to a block encryption procedure with non-linear bijective transformations; that the formed set of cryptogram blocks of data processing blocks with data storage nodes is distributed between data storage nodes, in which, using multi-valued noise-resistant coding methods, a corresponding set of redundant data is generated, then cryptogram blocks removed from other data processing blocks with data storage nodes are deleted in order to reduce total redundancy. It is also new that the generated set of redundant data with cryptogram blocks of the data processing unit with the data storage unit that generated them is used to recover lost data files, while the data recovery unit receives information from the control unit regarding which data processing units with the corresponding data storage nodes are currently available and, accordingly, have a lot of information and redundant file data, then the data recovery unit by takes into account a lot of information and redundant data from the indicated data processing units with data storage nodes, the data recovery unit performs a complete recovery of lost data files, the data recovered by the data recovery unit, together with the data of available data processing units with the corresponding data storage nodes, are transferred to the newly entered unit controlling a data processing unit with a data storage unit for generating redundant data blocks.

2. A distributed information storage system (RCI) at various network nodes is a computer system containing central processor (s), memory, a hard disk, or other storage device that stores the necessary encryption keys and executable software instructions that are executed a processor, a network interface, peripheral interfaces, consisting of the following functional components: k data processing units including data storage nodes containing files to be stored; a control unit that monitors the availability of data processing units and corresponding data storage nodes, their location, permissible memory volumes of data storage nodes; data recovery unit, the interaction of which is carried out through a local or wireless network.

Additionally entered data processing units are of the same type and include: data storage nodes, data input device, data receiving device, cryptographic information conversion device, multi-valued coding device for generated cryptogram blocks, data transfer device, and the output of the data input device is connected to: the input of the device cryptographic information conversion, the output of which is connected: to the input of the data transmission device, to the input of the data storage node, to the first input the multi-valued encoding device, to the second input of which the output of the data receiving device is connected, while the output of the multi-valued encoding device is connected to the data storage unit.

The data recovery unit includes: a data receiving device; multivalued data decoding device; a restored data transmission device, wherein the output of the data receiving device is connected to an input of a multi-valued data decoding device, the output of which is connected to an input of a data transmission device.

Due to the introduction of a set of essential distinguishing features into a well-known object, the method and system of distributed storage of recoverable data with the integrity and confidentiality of information allows:

detect intentional (imitating) the impact of an attacker;

ensure integrity throughout the system by restoring information subjected to intentional (imitating) influences of an attacker:

ensure integrity throughout the system by restoring lost information in the event of the physical loss of some predetermined limit number of data storage nodes;

to reconfigure the system, evenly redistributing the stored information with the corresponding redundant data to the data storage nodes when the maximum permissible memory capacity of the data storage node is full or its physical loss.

These distinctive features of the claimed invention in comparison with the prototype allow us to conclude that the claimed technical solution meets the criterion of "novelty."

Description of drawings

The drawings show:

in FIG. 1 shows a diagram explaining the essence of the prototype method:

in FIG. 2 shows a diagram of a distributed information storage system with centralized management;

in FIG. 3 shows a diagram of the structural components of a data processing unit:

in FIG. 4 shows a diagram of the structural components of a data recovery unit;

in FIG. 5 shows a diagram of a system for distributed storage of information at time t in the conditions of intentional (imitating) influences of an attacker:

in FIG. 6 is a structural diagram explaining the principle of generating a plurality of cryptogram information blocks in an S _i data processing unit and its corresponding data storage unit;

in FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating a procedure for recovering lost or distorted information.

Implementation of the claimed (s) method, system

For greater clarity, the description of the invention, allowing a specialist to carry out the implementation of the proposed invention and showing the effect of the features given in the claims on the above technical result, will be performed as follows: first, we will reveal the structure of the system, and then describe the implementation of the method within the framework of the proposed system.

A system for distributed storage of recoverable data with the integrity and confidentiality of information is a computer system containing a CPU (central processor), memory, hard disk or other storage device on which executable software instructions executed by the processor and the necessary key material, network interface are stored , peripheral interfaces, consisting of the following functional components (Fig. 2): k data processing units 11, including data storage nodes 10 ny containing files to be stored; a control unit 13 monitoring the availability of data processing units 11 and corresponding data storage units 10, their location, allowable memory sizes of data storage units 10; block 14 data recovery, the interaction of which is carried out through a local or wireless network 12.

The data processing units include (Fig. 3): a data storage unit 10, a data input device 111, a data receiving device 114, a cryptographic information conversion device 112, a multi-valued encoding device 115 of generated cryptogram blocks, a data transmission device 113.

The control unit is a hardware-software or software complex based on computer technology with special software connected to the network (executable software instructions that track the availability of data processing units and corresponding data storage nodes, their location, and the amount of permissible memory within this inventions are not considered).

The data recovery unit includes (Fig. 4): a data receiving device 141, a multi-valued data decoding device 142, a restored data transmission device 143.

At time t, under the conditions of destructive (imitating) influences of an attacker, the structure of the RSI network can be represented in the form of a graph G (S, U), where edges (S _i , S _j ) ∈ U (are adjacent) when S _i and S _j (i ≠ j; i, j = 1, 2, ..., k) the data processing units 11 with the corresponding data storage nodes 10 operate within the network 12 (the transmission range is provided) (Fig. 5). The physical loss (loss) of any data processing unit 11 with the corresponding data storage unit 10 (degradation of the RCI), inability to connect to the network 12, due to the deliberate (imitating) actions of the attacker, will lead to a partial loss or complete loss of information. At the same time, a plurality of information data distributed over the data storage nodes 10 with the calculated redundant data allows the data recovery unit 14 to perform a complete recovery of lost data files even if one or more data processing units 11 with data storage nodes 10 fail. An inaccessible data processing unit 11 with a corresponding data storage unit 10 may be replaced by another data processing unit 11 with a data storage unit 10 inputted by the control unit 13. In this case, the available data processing units 11 with the corresponding data storage units 10, together with the newly introduced data processing unit 11 with the data storage unit 10, perform the procedure of generating a plurality of information and redundant data and redistributing the generated information, the system is reconfigured. Moreover, the set of distributed nodes 10 data storage is considered as a single system of storage devices, providing for the introduction of redundancy in the stored information.

In addition, the present invention provides a method for distributed storage of recoverable data with the integrity and confidentiality of information.

In one embodiment, a method (system) for distributed storage of recoverable data while ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of information can be implemented (a) using modular polynomial codes.

Тогда отображение ϕ устанавливает взаимно-однозначное соответствие между полиномами a(z), не превосходящими по степени P(z) (deg a(z)<deg P(z)), и наборами остатков по приведенной выше системе оснований полиномов (модулей):The mathematical apparatus of modular polynomial codes is based on the fundamental principles of the Chinese remainder theorem for polynomials [Mandelbaum DM On Efficient Burst Correcting Residue Polynomial Codes // Information and control. 1970.16 p. 319-330]. Let m ₁ (z), m ₂ (z), ..., m _k (z) ∈ F [z] be irreducible polynomials ordered by increasing degrees, that is, deg m ₁ (z) ≤ deg m ₂ (z) ≤ ... ≤ deg m _k (z), where deg m _i (z) is the degree of the polynomial. Moreover, gcd (m _i (z), m _j (z)) = 1, i ≠ j; i, j = 1, 2, ..., k. Put

Then the map ϕ establishes a one-to-one correspondence between the polynomials a (z) not exceeding in degree P (z) (deg a (z) <deg P (z)) and the sets of residuals in the above system of bases of polynomials (modules):

where ϕ _i ( a (z)): = a (z) mod m _i (z) (i = 1, 2, ..., k). In accordance with the Chinese remainder theorem for polynomials, there is an inverse transformation ϕ ^-1 , which allows us to translate a set of residues from the polynomial base system to the positional representation [Mandelbaum DM On Efficient Burst Correcting Residue Polynomial Codes // Information and control. 1970.16 p. 319-330]:

r(z) - ранг a(z) (i = 1, 2, …, k). Введем вдобавок к имеющимся k еще r избыточных оснований полиномов с соблюдением условия упорядоченности:where B _i (z) = k _i (z) P _i (z) are polynomial orthogonal bases. k _i (z) = P ^-l (z) mod m _i (z),

r (z) is the rank of a (z) (i = 1, 2, ..., k). Let us introduce, in addition to the available k more r redundant bases of polynomials, subject to the ordering condition:

then we get an extended modular polynomial code (IPC) - a set of the form:

. Назовем

- рабочим диапазоном системы,

- полным диапазоном системы. При этом если а(z) ∈ ^F[z]/_(P(z)), то считается, что данная комбинация содержит ошибку. Следовательно, местоположение полинома a(z) позволяет определить, является ли кодовая комбинация a(z) = (c₁(z), …, c_k(z), c_k+1(z), …, c_n(z)) разрешенной, или она содержит ошибочные символы. Введем метрику. Весом кодового слова расширенного МПК С является количество ненулевых символов (вычетов) c_i(z), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, обозначается как ω (С). Кодовое расстояние между С и D определяется как вес их разности d(C, D) = ω(C - D). Минимальное кодовое расстояние - наименьшее расстояние между двумя любыми кодовыми векторами по Хэммингу с учетом данного определения веса:where n = k + r, c _i (z) ≡ a (z) mod m _i (z) (i = 1, 2, ..., k), a (z) ∈ ^{F [z]} / _{(P (z) )} Elements of the code c _i (z) are called symbols, each of which is the essence of polynomials from the quotient ring of polynomials modulo

. Call

- the operating range of the system,

- the full range of the system. Moreover, if a (z) ∈ ^{F [z]} / _{(P (z))} , then this combination is considered to contain an error. Therefore, the location of the polynomial a (z) allows us to determine whether the code combination a (z) = (c ₁ (z), ..., c _k (z), c _{k + 1} (z), ..., c _n (z) ) resolved, or it contains erroneous characters. We introduce the metric. The weight of the codeword of the extended IPC C is the number of nonzero characters (residues) c _i (z), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, denoted by ω (C). The code distance between C and D is defined as the weight of their difference d (C, D) = ω (C - D). Minimum code distance - the smallest distance between any two Hamming code vectors, taking into account this definition of weight:

where ζ is the code space. The minimum code distance d _min is associated with the corrective capabilities of the extended IPC. Since the two codewords differ in at least d _min residues, it is impossible to change one code word to another by replacing d _min - 1 or fewer residues. Thus, advanced IPC can guarantee any detection

erroneous deductions. If b is the largest integer less than or equal to

then for b or fewer error residues, the resulting codeword remains closer to the original, which allows the extended IPC to guarantee the correction of b error residues.

Let S _j block 11 data processing generates a data file W, presented in polynomial form:

where ω _j ∈ {0,1} (j = s - 1, s - 2, ..., 0).

In order to ensure the necessary level of information confidentiality, the generated data set W (z) by the data processing unit 11 is subject to a block encryption procedure that performs non-linear bijective transformations (for example, key hashing). Moreover, W (z) is divided into blocks of fixed length W (z) = W ₁ (z) || W ₂ (z) || ... || W _k (z), where || - concatenation operation. Moreover, the length of the data block is determined by the encryption algorithm used, for example, GOST 34.12-2015 with blocks of 64, 128 bits, respectively. Next, the control unit 13 based on the connectivity of the network 12 at time t distributes the blocks of cryptograms generated by S _{j by} the data processing unit 11 (transmitting) between other (available) data processing units 11, i.e. S _i the data processing unit 11 (receiving) receives and stores the set of cryptogram blocks Ω _i (z) (i = 1, 2, ..., k) from other data processing units 11 in the data storage unit 10. The resulting set of information blocks of cryptograms Ω _i (z) (i = 1, 2, ..., k) S _i of the data processing unit 11 is represented as the smallest residues on the bases of the polynomials m _i (z), where i = 1, 2, ..., k. Moreover, deg Ω _i (z) <deg m _i (z) (Fig. 6).

Further, in S _i block 11 data processing in accordance with expression (3) for the additionally introduced r redundant bases of polynomials m _{k + 1} (z), m _{k + 2} (z), ..., m _n (z) satisfying condition (2 ) such that gcd (m _i (z), m _j (z)) = 1 for i ≠ j; i, j = 1, 2, ..., n, excess residues are generated, which we denote by ω _i (z) (i = k + 1, k + 2, ..., n). The resulting set of information blocks of cryptograms and excess residues forms an extended IPC: {Ω ₁ (z), ..., Ω _k (z), ω _{k + 1} (z), ..., ω _n (z)} _IPC . A block diagram explaining the principle of forming a set of information blocks of cryptograms in S _i block 11 data processing and its corresponding node 10 data storage, is presented in figure 6.

After calculating S _{i by} the data processing unit 11 of the excess IPC elements, the received set of information blocks of cryptograms from other data processing units 11 is deleted from the data storage unit 10 to reduce the total amount of memory. Further, the obtained excess deductions ω _{k + 1} (z), ω _{k + 2} (z), ..., ω _n (z) go to the data storage unit 10.

The centralized control implemented by the control unit 13, which monitors the availability of the data processing units 11 with the corresponding data storage nodes 10, their location, the maximum allowable memory volumes, allows us to consider the set of data storage nodes 10 as a single data storage node, and present its contents in the form of information matrices:

Taking into account the calculated redundant blocks of cryptograms S _{i by} the data processing unit 11, the information matrix A will take an “expanded” form (table 1).

Then the integrity of the RCI information is determined by the system of functions of the variables c _{i, j} (z) (blocks of cryptograms, data) of the expanded matrix A:

To find the polynomial values a _i (z) through the coordinate values of the functions ƒ _{i, we} use the expression (1). Codeword Elements

могут содержать искажения. Критерием отсутствия обнаруживаемых ошибок является выполнение условия:

. Критерием существования обнаруживаемой ошибки - выполнение условия:

, где символ «*» указывает на наличие возможных искажений в кодовом слове. В случае физической утраты некоторой предельной численности блоков 11 обработки данных и, соответственно, узлов 10 хранения данных из их совокупности, расширенная матрицы А примет вид (таблица 2).(i = t, t + 1, t + h; j = 1, 2, ..., h) from the set of data storage nodes 10 and, accordingly, data blocks

may contain distortion. The criterion for the absence of detected errors is the fulfillment of the condition:

. The criterion for the existence of a detected error is the fulfillment of the condition:

, where the symbol "*" indicates the presence of possible distortions in the codeword. In the case of physical loss of a certain limiting number of data processing blocks 11 and, accordingly, data storage nodes 10 from their totality, the expanded matrix A will take the form (table 2).

Given the previously introduced redundancy in the stored information, the physical loss of some data processing units 11 with the corresponding data storage units 10 or the unsuitability of the information stored on them, due to the deliberate (imitating) actions of the attacker, does not lead to complete or partial loss of information. The data recovery unit 14 receives information from the control unit 13 as to which data processing units 11 with the corresponding data storage units 10 are currently available and, accordingly, have a lot of information and redundant file data. Then, the data recovery unit 14 can directly receive a plurality of information and redundant data from these data processing units 11 with data storage units 10 (Fig. 7). Block 14 data recovery performs the detection of distorted (simulated) by the attacker data, where their number is due to the expression (4). Recovery of lost or distorted information is carried out taking into account (5)

by calculating the smallest residues or by any other known method of decoding excess MPC:

where the symbols "**" indicate the probabilistic nature of the recovery.

The data recovered by unit 14, together with the data of the available data processing units 11 and the corresponding data storage units 10, is transmitted to the data processing unit 11 newly entered by the control unit 13 with the data storage unit 10 to form redundant data units.

The claimed invention can be carried out using the means and methods described in available sources of information. This allows us to conclude that the claimed invention meets the signs of "industrial applicability".

Consider an example. Choose a base system of polynomials for data processing units 11 with the corresponding data storage nodes 10:

m ₁ (z) = 1 + z + z ⁷

m ₂ (z) = 1 + z + z ² + z ⁷ + z ⁹ ;

m ₃ (z) = 1 + z ⁹ + z ¹⁰ + z ¹² + z ¹³ ;

m ₄ (z) = 1 + z + z ² + z ⁴ + z ⁶ + z ⁷ + z ¹² + z ¹⁴ + z ¹⁶ .

We introduce the control (excess) base polynomial:

m ₅ (z) = 1 + z ¹² + z ¹⁷ .

Represent the contents of the data storage nodes 10 in the following form (in the considered example, the excess residues are represented only by S _{1 by} the data processing unit 11 and the corresponding data storage node 10):

Let S ₃ the data processing unit 11 with the corresponding data storage unit 10 is considered lost. Then the source data for block 14 data recovery will take the following form:

для момента времени t:To restore the original data corresponding to the file of the data processing unit S _{3, the} data recovery unit 14 calculates

for time t:

Polynomial orthogonal bases of the system at time t:

mod m₃(z):Source polynomial

mod m ₃ (z):

для момента времени t + 1:Next calculates

for time t + 1:

Polynomial orthogonal bases of the system at time t + 1:

mod m₃(z):Source polynomial

mod m ₃ (z):

для момента времени t + 2:Next calculates

for time t + 2:

Polynomial orthogonal bases of the system at time t + 2:

mod m₃(z):Source polynomial

mod m ₃ (z):

для момента времени t + 3:Next calculates

for time t + 3:

Polynomial orthogonal bases of the system at time t + 3:

mod m₃(z):Source polynomial

mod m ₃ (z):

Let the nodes 10 data storage contain simulated by the attacker data. Then, the initial data for the data recovery unit 14 will be presented in the following form (in the considered example, the excess residues are represented only by S _{1 by} the data processing unit 11 and the corresponding data storage unit 10):

Block 14 data recovery performs the verification procedure of the IPC.

For time t:

Since a _t (z) ∈ ^{F [z]} / _{(P (z))} , the polynomial a _t (z) is regular and does not contain distortions.

For time t + 1:

Since a _{t + 1} (z) ∉ ^{F [z]} / _{(P (z))} , the polynomial a _{t + 1} (z) is incorrect and contains distortions.

For time t + 2:

Поскольку a _t+2(z) ∉ ^F[z]/_(P(z)), то полином a _t+2(z) является неправильным и содержит искажения.

Since a _{t + 2} (z) ∉ ^{F [z]} / _{(P (z))} , the polynomial a _{t + 2} (z) is incorrect and contains distortions.

For time t + 3:

Since a _{t + 3} (z) ∈ ^{F [z]} / _{(P (z))} , the polynomial a _{t + 3} (z) is correct and does not contain distortion.

The above example showed that the claimed (s) method and system for the distributed storage of recoverable data while ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of information is functioning correctly, we are technically feasible (a) and can solve the problem.

Claims (5)

1. A method for distributed storage of recoverable data with the integrity and confidentiality of information, which consists in replacing a failed node storing data related to a part of the data file, with each of the many available data storage nodes receiving an indication from the control unit to replace the failed node with a new data storage node, each of the available data storage nodes contains a lot of checksums generated from a data file that can be generated and based on the parts of the data file, using erasure coding techniques, a replacement checksum is generated on each of the many available data storage nodes by creating a linear combination of checksums on each data storage node using random coefficients, hereinafter these replacement checksums are used to recovery of a lost data file, characterized in that each of the available data processing units with corresponding data storage nodes contains sets data generated from files corresponding to data processing units with data storage nodes, while the set of data is preliminarily subjected to block encryption with non-linear bijective transformations, and the generated set of cryptogram blocks of data processing units with data storage nodes is distributed among available data storage nodes, in which, using multivalued error-correcting coding methods, the corresponding set of redundant data is generated, further received from ugly data processing blocks with data storage nodes, cryptogram blocks are deleted in order to reduce the total redundancy, while the generated set of redundant data with cryptogram blocks of the data processing block with the data storage node that generated them is used to recover lost data files, while the data recovery block receives information from the control unit regarding which data processing units with corresponding data storage nodes are currently available and, accordingly Of course, they have a lot of information and redundant file data, then the data recovery unit receives a lot of information and redundant data from the specified data processing units with data storage nodes, the data recovery unit performs a complete recovery of lost data files, the data restored by the data recovery unit, together with the data available data processing units with corresponding data storage nodes are transmitted to a data processing unit with a storage node newly introduced by the control unit Data tions for generating redundant data blocks. 2. The method according to claim 1, in which the total number of redundant blocks of cryptograms generated to recover lost files or generate data in a new data storage node is equal to a parameter that is based on the correcting properties of the multi-valued error-correcting code used and the total number of data storage nodes required so that the data files remain recoverable. 3. A system for distributed storage of recoverable data with the integrity and confidentiality of information, ensuring the implementation of the method according to claim 1, wherein the system contains k data processing units 11, including data storage units 10 containing files to be stored, a control unit 13 monitoring availability data processing units 11 and corresponding data storage nodes 10, their location, allowable memory volumes of data storage nodes 10, data recovery unit 14, the interaction of which via a local or wireless network 12. 4. The system according to p. 3, characterized in that the data processing units include: data storage units, a data input device, a data receiving device, a cryptographic information conversion device, a multi-valued encoding device for the generated cryptogram blocks, a data transmission device, the device output data input is connected to the input of the cryptographic information conversion device, the output of which is connected: to the input of the data transmission device, to the input of the data storage node, to the first input of the device and multivalued coding to the second input of which is connected to the output data receiving device, wherein the output multivalue coding apparatus connected to the storage node. 5. The system according to claim 3, characterized in that the data recovery unit includes: a data receiving device, a multi-valued data decoding device, a restored data transmission device, the output of the data receiving device being connected to an input of the multi-valued data decoding device, the output of which is connected to input device data.

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