RU2436114C1 - Method of protecting radar stations from anti-radar missiles - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: physics.

SUBSTANCE: invention can be used to protect ground-based radar stations from self-homing anti-radar missiles (ARM), using an additional radiation source (ARS) by distracting the ARM to the ARS, consisting of two transceivers and a passive radiation source (PRS), spaced apart on the plane of the earth's surface.

EFFECT: reduced probability of the ARS being struck by an anti-radar missile with a passive radar homing head by shifting the energy centre of the radiation from the region lying between the additional transceiver and the PRS to the PRS itself.

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Description

The invention relates to the field of radar and radio countermeasures and can be used to protect ground-based radar stations (radar) from being hit by anti-radar missiles (PRR).

The following methods are known for protecting radar from PRR.

A method of protecting a radar from PRS, based on turning off radar radiation when detecting PRS and turning on a false transmitter emitting signals in the direction of PRS (German patent No. 3341069, Japanese application No. 2-40193).

The disadvantage of this method is the violation of the radar.

The radar protection method, based on the redirection of the PRR to an additional radiation source (DII), ensures the continuous operation of the radar (RF patent No. 2099734. Ivasechkin AA, Leonov GA. Method of protecting a group of radar stations from anti-radar missiles using additional radiation sources and device for its implementation).

The disadvantage of this method is the lack of guaranteed redirection of PRR on DII, because missile homing head distinguishes signals by their arrival time and angular coordinates, i.e. provides temporary and angular target selection.

The radar protection method, which ensures guaranteed diversion of the PRR to one of the DII due to the use of pulses, provides cover for the probe signal in space (UK patent No. 2252464).

The disadvantage of this method of protection is the ineffective protection of the radar when starting several PRRs, the number of which is one more than the number of DII, covering the radar.

Closest to the technical nature of the claimed invention is a method of protection, which includes receiving the probing signals (RS) of the radar protected by an additional transceiver (PDD), which generates simulating pulses at the frequency of the ES; the formation of masking pulses, the delay time of which is relative to the received ZS, is defined as the repetition period of the ZS, reduced by the sum of the lead time and the time taken by the ZS to travel at a speed of light of known distances from the radar to the RPD, from the RPD to the remote passive radiation source (FDI) and from the outward FDI to the radar, and the duration of the masking pulses relative to the received ES is defined as the sum of the lead time, the duration of the ES and the doubled time spent at the speed of light p Normal distance from the radar to the pronounced FDI; amplification of masking and imitating pulses and their emission in the direction of the transferred FDI and re-emission of masking and imitating pulses by the transferred FDI in a given solid angle (RF Patent No. 2152051. Alekseev VG, Grigorenko AB, Lebedev NV, Marchenko I.N., Sentsov A.K., Pashchenko K.K., Fursov Yu.S. A method for protecting radar stations from anti-radar missiles and a system for its implementation).

The disadvantage of this method is the ability to direct PRR on the PDP, which is part of the day, and defeat him. This is due to the fact that the electromagnetic wave (EMW) emitted by the transceiver in the direction of FDI will irradiate the underlying surface, forming the so-called “light path” located near the PDD, and will fall into the homing head of the PRR before the EMF coming from the FDI. Therefore, the energy center of radiation will lie in the area between the SPD and FDI, where the PRR will be induced, which will hit the SPD with a probability close to unity, thereby incapacitating the DII.

The technical result of this invention is to reduce the likelihood of DII being hit by an anti-radar missile with a passive radar homing head (PRGSN) by shifting the energy center of radiation from the area located between the PSD and FDI to the FDI itself.

The essence of the invention lies in the fact that in the known method, in which imitating and masking pulses are generated in the transceiver, are emitted in the direction of the issued FDI and re-emitted by this FDI in a given solid angle, the probability of defeat of DII is reduced due to the fact that the imitating and masking pulses are generated two identical transceivers located in different half-planes of the earth’s surface and spaced at distances from FDI, which ensure further operability of FDI pr PRR hit in FDI.

In this method, the elimination of the influence of the "light path" on the probability of damage to the transceiver by an anti-radar missile is achieved by using two transceivers. The “light path” formed by the second transceiver will “compensate” for the influence of the “light path” of the first transceiver, thereby shifting the energy center of the radiation to FDI. This will reduce the likelihood of DII damage.

The drawing schematically shows the relative location of the radar, PRR, FDI and PPD, where: 1 - transceiver PPD1, 6 - transceiver PPD2, 2 - radar, 3 - FDI, 4 - sector DII, 5 - PRR.

Transmitters PPD1 and PPD2 are located in different half-planes of the earth’s surface at distances a ₁ and a ₂ from the FDI, respectively, of a large radius of damage to the PRR, which ensures the further operability of the DII when the direct penetration of the RRS into FDI. FDI is made from materials that are not penetrable by fragments of the warhead of the PRR and capable of withstanding the impact of a high-explosive component arising from the explosion of the PRR. PPD2 and PPD1 are completely identical and perform similar functions.

The formation of simulating pulses is carried out by re-emission of the received and previously amplified transceivers PPD1 and PPD2 of the probing signals of the protected radar. The radiation moments by the transceivers of the simulating pulses are selected so that these pulses arrive at the FDI simultaneously and are re-emitted by the FDI data at time points that coincide with the radiation moments of the radar station. Based on these conditions, the moments of radiation of simulating pulses t _AI1 and t _AI2 (PPD1 and PPD2, respectively) are determined by the expressions:

;

;

,

,

where T _ZS - the period following the ZS radar; b ₁ - the distance between the radar and PPD1;

b ₁ - the distance between the radar and PPD2; and ₁ is the distance between PPD1 and FDI;

a ₂ is the distance between PPD2 and FDI; c is the speed of light.

The duration of the simulating pulses is equal to the duration of the ES radar.

The radiation moments of the masking pulse transceivers are selected so that these pulses arrive at the FDI simultaneously and are re-emitted by the FDI data at time instants providing cover for the radar station. Based on these conditions, the masking pulse emission moments t and t _{Mil Mi-1 Mil Mi-2} (PPD1 and PPD2 respectively) defined by the inequalities:

t _MI1 ≥t _II1 -τ _ZS ;

_{Mil Mi-2} t ≥t _II2 -τ _AP.

The duration of the generated masking pulses τ _MI is determined by the inequality:

,

,

where k is the distance between the radar and FDI; τ _AP - the duration of the AP radar.

The repetition period of simulating and masking pulses is equal to the repetition period of the pulses of the protected radar T _ZS .

The generated imitating and masking pulses are re-emitted by FDI in a given sector of action of FDI.

The implementation of the method is not in doubt, since the first and second transceivers are identical and perform similar functions.

Claims (1)

A method of protecting a radar station from anti-radar missiles, based on the use of an additional radiation source, consisting of a passive radiation source and a transceiver, and performing the reception of sounding signals of the protected radar station, the formation of emulating and masking pulses on their basis and their re-emission by a passive radiation source in a given solid angle characterized in that they install an additional identical transceiver, have both transceivers ika in different half-planes of the earth’s surface at distances a _i ≥R _then from the passive radiation source, where R _then is the radius of damage to the warhead of the anti-radar missile,

, while the radiation moments t _{AIi by the} i-th transceiver and the duration τ _AI simulating pulses are determined respectively from the relations:

;
τ _II = τ _ЗС ,
The radiation moments t _{MIi by the} i-th transceiver and the duration τ _{MI of} masking pulses are determined respectively from the inequalities:
t _MIi ≥t _IIi -τ _ЗС ,

,
where τ _ZS - the period of the probing signals of the radar station; b _i is the distance between the radar and the i-th transceiver; a _i is the distance between the ith transceiver and a passive radiation source; c is the speed of light; k is the distance between the radar and the passive radiation source; τ _ZS - the duration of the radar probe signal.

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