RU102266U1 - AIR CONTROL SYSTEM OF CONTROL OF RADIO TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT - Google Patents

Abstract

 A monitoring system for radio engineering airborne surveillance equipment, comprising an analogue radar information processing unit (1) intended for processing primary radar information, a digital information processing unit (2) intended for receiving digital signals in an information protocol defined for a given system and decoding digital information, telemetry information collection unit (3), the inputs of which are inputs of the monitoring system and are connected to the outputs of controlled radio engineering monitoring systems, which also contains a documenting unit (4), a statistical information processing unit (7), an express analysis unit (8), a control unit (9), designed to select a specific radar station at the direction of the user to control it, an information presentation unit (10) and a common data bus (11), characterized in that it is equipped with a multisensor trajectory processing unit (5) and a flight safety assessment unit (6), the first output of the multisensor trajectory processing (5) being directly connected with the input of the flight safety assessment unit (6), the outputs of the analogue radar information processing units (1), digital information processing (2) and telemetry information collection (3) are connected to the inputs of the documentation units (4) through a common data bus (11), multisensor trajectory processing (5), statistical processing of information (7) and express analysis (8), the second output of the multisensor trajectory processing unit (5) and the output of the flight safety level block (6) are connected to the inputs of the blocks via a common data bus (11) documented

Description

The utility model relates to the field of air traffic control (ATC), and in particular to control systems for radio engineering airborne surveillance equipment, and assessments of the level of flight safety in the areas of responsibility of air traffic control centers can be used.

As the main means of air traffic control (ATC) in all countries, radio surveillance equipment (RTSN) of the air situation (primary and secondary radars, automatic dependent surveillance systems AZN, multilateration MLAT systems) is used. The safety of aircraft operations depends on the stability of their technical parameters and the reliability of their operation. Therefore, constant monitoring of their performance, technical characteristics and reliability of the assessment of the current air situation is necessary.

In general, the quality of air traffic control system functioning is evaluated by such an integral parameter as the flight safety level. This indicator, according to the ICAO definition of the International Civil Aviation Committee, is equal to the number of accidents recorded during a given time interval in the airspace controlled by the air traffic control system to the total amount of flight time for this interval. Measuring this parameter in real time allows you to quickly monitor the degree of compliance of the air traffic control system with the established standards.

The built-in RTSN diagnostic tools mainly monitor the technical condition of its blocks and units and do not give an idea of such integral characteristics as the visibility range, the probability of detection, the accuracy of determining the coordinates of the aircraft, the number of false alarms, etc. The current mechanism of flight inspections of the RTSN allows evaluating the listed tactical and technical characteristics only for the period of the inspection (1-2 times a year) and does not guarantee that for the rest of the time the radar operates, these characteristics will satisfy the established standards. In addition, the existing flight verification methodology is cumbersome and time-consuming, since it involves calculations, graphing and comparative analysis of the results with the reference ones. The current methodology is described in the document “Programs and methods for ground and flight inspections of airborne radar equipment”, approved by the USSR Minister of Civil Aviation (Air Transport Publishing House, Moscow, 1989, 112 pp.).

The assessment of the flight safety level in the controlled area also does not meet the requirement of efficiency, since it takes place by counting the detected air incidents and incidents for a certain calendar period (six months, a year).

Thus, one of the serious drawbacks of the existing air traffic control system is the lack of tools that provide objective comprehensive, constant and operational control of the quality and reliability of information about the technical state of the RTSN and the level of flight safety in real time.

Attempts to rectify the situation were made by the developers of both domestic and foreign radio equipment and automated air traffic control systems (AS). So, for example, it is known a device for monitoring a pulsed radar all-round vision (RF patent for the invention No. 2025741 dated 12.30.94, MKI class G10S 7/4 0), which is intended for operational monitoring of the health of the air traffic control radar according to two general diagnostic criteria. As the first, service pulses formed by the radar are used, as the second - signals received as a result of the reflection of the probe pulses from some characteristic local object.

The specified device is designed to work with only one radar station and involves embedding its units directly in the radar. This circumstance is a significant drawback of the device, especially in the case of joint operation of the entire radar system, containing from 10 (at present) to 20 (in the short term) radar, as is customary in air traffic control centers.

In addition, the control method used in the aforementioned invention provides an operational assessment of the operability of radar units and blocks, but does not provide information on the reliability of the assessment of the current air situation, that is, it does not provide an idea of the tactical and technical characteristics of the radar, such as visibility range , the probability of detection, the accuracy of determining the coordinates of the aircraft, the number of false alarms, etc.

Known radar monitoring system "Modern Radar System Testing", developed by the Swedish company "AerotechTelub" and presented at the annual International Exhibition of ATC Equipment Manufacturers in 2001 (Holland, Maastrift). The named system is a hardware-software complex that connects to the digital outputs of the radar and contains a digital radar information processing unit, a documenting unit (or memory), a control unit, and an information presentation unit having an output to the monitor.

The disadvantages of this radar monitoring system are:

- the ability to pair with only one radar;

- analysis of radar information only by recording in the memory unit, and not in real time;

- lack of control of the radar visibility range, the number of false alarms, the probability of distortion of flight information;

- display of radar information on only one plane in the local coordinate system;

- the inability to measure the level of safety in the controlled area.

An automated radar monitoring system is also known according to the utility model certificate No. 22560 of 11/05/2001, which contains an analogue radar information processing unit, a digital radar information processing unit, a telemetry information collection unit, a documenting unit, a radar information secondary processing unit, a tertiary processing unit radar information, block for statistical processing of radar information, express analysis unit, control unit and pres information davleniya.

This system allows, through the use of secondary and tertiary processing of radar information, to quickly monitor the tactical parameters of radar means for monitoring the air situation.

The disadvantages of this system are:

- the inability to control the parameters of such RTSN as AZN and MLAT;

- insufficient accuracy and reliability of estimates of tactical parameters of the radar, associated with low accuracy of trajectory measurements;

- the inability to measure the level of safety in the controlled area.

To date, several ATC AS systems are known where, based on the developed mathematical models for the occurrence of potentially dangerous situations in the air, an operational assessment of the flight safety level is made.

So, for example, in the USA there is a CTAS system (Center / Tracon Automation System), the main task of which is to help air traffic control system dispatchers in organizing and managing air traffic in airport zones. The system was developed by the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). One of the main elements of the system is the subsystem for assessing the probability of conflicts during aircraft flights. However, the mathematical model of a conflict situation used in the subsystem developed by Paielli and Erzberger (see Paielli, RAC Conflict Probability Estimation Generalized to Non-Level Flight / RAPaielli, H. Erzberger. - Air Traffic Control Quarterly, vol. 7, no. 3, Oct. 1999. - pp 195-222.), Is not very sensitive to rapid changes in air conditions. The method does not take into account the existence of errors in measuring the speed of mutual approach of a pair of aircraft. In this regard, the assessment of the probability of conflicts occurs with a big mistake. In addition, there is an increased risk of false alarms in the system.

The European Organization for the Safety of Air of Navigation (EUROCONTROL), which brings together 38 European countries, has developed a program for the deployment of ground based and airborne networks for ensuring safety of air transport (safety nets). The air network provides the pilots of aircraft (aircraft) with the necessary information on the optimal resolution of the conflict in the air. The ground-based network is an integrated part of the air traffic management system, in which based on the information received from the RTSN air traffic control system, the dispatchers of the centers receive operational information on air traffic and the possibility of anticipatory response to conflict situations, the possibility of which is evaluated by the network. If the possibility of a conflict is great, the network gives the dispatcher a warning signal at least 2 minutes before its climax. However, neither the degree of danger of the conflict nor its likelihood is assessed, which does not allow an objective assessment of the detected conflict.

The Netherlands National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) has developed its own method for assessing flight safety (see Blom, H. Conflict probability and incrossing probability in air traffic management / H.Blom, GJBakker. - IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Las Vegas . - NV. - December. - 10-13, 2002.). This method is a generalization of the Reich method known since the 60s (see, Reich, PGA Analysis of Long Range Air Traffic Systems / PGReich. - Separation Standards - I, II, and III. - Journal of the Institute of Navigation 19. - 1966. - No., pp. 88-96; No.2, pp. 169-176; No.3, pp. 313-338.). The authors of the method removed some of the most burdensome axioms of the Reich model, but the main features of the model were retained. In particular, on the basis of data on the position of the aircraft, a collision risk is determined, which in the general case is not equal to the probability of an aircraft collision, but is only an estimate from below. The advantage of the method under consideration is that it takes into account the uncertainties (errors) in determining the coordinates and speeds of the aircraft. The disadvantage of this method is the inability to determine the probability of a collision, since the risk only roughly corresponds to the probability. In addition, the method requires large computational costs, therefore, at the moment it is not used to quickly evaluate the level of flight safety, but to evaluate this parameter in the TOPAZ (Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer) air traffic planning and modeling system.

The closest technical solution to the claimed control system is the system according to certificate No. 22560 (see above).

The objective of the proposed solution is to increase the reliability and reliability of the assessment of the current air situation during air traffic control due to the joint objective control of the tactical and technical characteristics of the RTSN and the assessment of the level of flight safety in real time.

To solve this problem, a control system for radio engineering airborne surveillance equipment containing an analogue radar information processing unit (1), a digital information processing unit (2), a telemetry information collection unit (3), a documenting unit (4), a statistical information processing unit ( 7), an express analysis unit (8), a control unit (9), an information presentation unit (10) and a common data bus (11), the design solution of some of the blocks has been changed. A block has been introduced with a multi-sensory processing path (5) and flight safety level assessment (6). Moreover, the first output of the unit with a multi-sensory processing path (5) is directly connected to the input of the flight safety assessment unit (6), the outputs of the processing units for analog radar information (1), digital information processing (2) and telemetry information collection (3) via a common data bus (11) connected to the inputs of the documentation units (4), the multi-sensory processing path (5), statistical information processing (7) and express analysis (8), the second output of the multi-sensory processing path (5) and the output of the level block for flight safety (6) through a common data bus (11) are connected to the inputs of documentation units (4), statistical information processing (7) and express analysis (8), control (9) and information presentation (10), while the output express analysis unit (8) through a common data bus (11) is connected to the input of the documentation unit (4), the first output of the control unit (9) is directly connected to the second input of the documentation unit (4), the second output of the control unit (9) is directly connected with the second input of the information presentation unit (10), the output of which th is the output system and is adapted to connect to a monitor and printer.

The introduction of new units into the system allows analyzing the quality of functioning of both individual units and units of the RTSN aggregate, and objectively monitoring their tactical and technical parameters in real time. In addition, the proposed system allows us to assess the level of flight safety and determine the severity of conflict situations detected in a controlled space. Thus, the application of the proposed system guarantees an increase in the reliability and reliability of information about the current air situation in air traffic control.

The inventive automated radar monitoring system is illustrated by the following illustrations:

figure 1 presents the structural diagram of the system;

figure 2-8 presents copies of documents prepared using the proposed system for one of the controlled radar systems. The illustrations show:

figure 2 - zone of visibility and probability of detection in projection on a horizontal plane;

figure 3 is the same in projection on a vertical plane;

4 is an example of an act of flight inspections;

5 is a real radar situation in the projection on a horizontal plane;

6 is a real radar situation in the projection on a vertical plane;

Fig.7 - An example of the display of information in the mode of "3-D";

Fig. 8 is an example of displaying information about a standard deviation in range as a function of range and angle and about resolution in range.

The proposed automated control system for radio engineering airborne surveillance devices contains (see Fig. 1) an analogue radar information processing unit 1, a digital information processing unit 2, a telemetry information collection unit 3, a documenting unit 4, a multisensor path processing unit 5, a safety level assessment unit flights 6, a unit for statistical processing of radar information 7, an express analysis unit 8, a control unit 9, an information presentation unit 10, and a data transfer bus 11.

In this case, the inputs of blocks 1, 2, and 3, which are the inputs of the monitoring system, are connected to the outputs of the monitored radio monitoring systems (their number depends on the equipment of a specific ATC center and can be 10-20), and the outputs of the information presentation unit 10, which are the output of the monitoring system connected to the monitor and printer. The outputs of blocks 1, 2, 3 through the data bus 11 are connected to the inputs of blocks 4, 5, 7, 8. The first output of block 5 is directly connected to the input of block 6. In addition, the second output of block 5 and the output of block 6 through a common data bus 11 connected to the inputs of blocks 4, 7, 8, 9 and 10. The output of block 8 through a common data bus 11 is connected to the first input of block 4, the first output of block 9 is directly connected to the second input of block 4, the second output of block 9 is directly connected to the second input block 10.

Units 1 and 2 for processing primary radar information can be implemented in hardware based on programmable logic integrated circuits in the form of expansion cards for industrially produced computers.

The telemetry information collection unit 3 can be implemented on the basis of industrially produced modules for collecting and processing analog and discrete signals.

The documenting unit 4 may be performed on the basis of standard magnetic information carriers.

Blocks 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 with a multisensory path of processing, statistical processing of radar data, express analysis, control and presentation of information, respectively, can be implemented programmatically on the basis of modern high-level programming languages.

The inventive system operates as follows.

Data on aircraft located in the controlled area from the outputs of the RTSN enter the control system (SC). In this case, the signals are separated: when the SC is coupled with the radar via the analog output of the radar, analog signals are fed to the input of the analog information processing unit 1, when coupled via the digital output, to the input of the digital processing unit 2. The signals from the AZN and MLAT systems are digital, therefore they always fed to the digital processing unit 2. Signals characterizing the technical condition of the blocks and nodes of the RTSN are fed to the input of the telemetry information collection unit 3.

Block 1 carries out primary processing of radar information, distinguishes active targets from the background of noise, decodes the responses of airborne transponders and provides information about moving targets and azimuth marks in digital form.

Block 2 receives digital signals in the information protocol defined for this system and decodes the digital information contained in the signal. At the output of block 2, the signal also has a digital format.

Block 3 processes the telemetry signals arriving at it, combines them and also issues them in digital form.

The digital signals received from the outputs of blocks 1, 2, and 3 are fed to a common data bus 11 and transmitted through it to the documentation blocks 4, multisensor path processing 5, statistical processing 7, and the express analysis block 8.

In the documenting unit 4, the received information is synchronized according to the coordinated universal time signals coming from an external or integrated time system (CEB) and archived onto magnetic media. Thus, block 4 serves as a memory block in the described system.

In block 5 of multi-sensory trajectory processing, the aircraft marks from the RTSN received the detection, tying and confirmation of new tracks; identification of marks and tracks existing at a given time; destruction of false tracks; smoothing and extrapolation using the filter-extrapolator of existing tracks that are accompanied. The extrapolator filter results in extrapolated and smoothed marks on the position of the escorted aircraft and correlation matrices of measurement errors. Joint processing of data from radar (satellite), satellite (AZN) and ground multi-position navigation systems (MLAT) on the position of aircraft allows to significantly improve the quality of the processing path and thereby objectively control the tactical and technical parameters of the RTSN in real time and with high accuracy.

Information about the position of the escorted aircraft through the data bus 11 is transmitted to the documentation blocks 4, statistical processing 7 and the presentation of information 10. Complete information about the aircraft trajectory (extrapolated and smoothed position marks and correlation matrices of measurement errors) are sent to the safety level assessment unit 6 flights, where on the basis of the received data the probability of a collision is determined, the level of flight safety by sectors and echelons of controlled air is estimated space, violations of the rules for the use of airspace (separation rules) are detected. Thus, the introduction of block 6 guarantees increased reliability and reliability of information about the current air situation in air traffic control. The information received in blocks 5 and 6 goes to a common bus 11 and then is also transmitted to the blocks of documenting 4, statistical processing 7 and presentation of information 10.

The processing of information received in the statistical information processing unit 7 is carried out in accordance with the methods of ground and flight checks of radar and other air traffic control equipment (see the title of the document above), as well as with the methodology for assessing the level of flight safety. From the output of block 7, automatically generated acts of flight checks of the radar and the following characteristics of the RTSN and safety characteristics of flights in the controlled area are transmitted to bus 11:

- visibility zones in horizontal and vertical planes;

- theoretical RTSN visibility zones at the closing angles of a specific position;

- probability of detection of an aircraft;

- maximum and minimum detection ranges;

- average and maximum number of false alarms per one radar survey;

- RMS errors in range and azimuth;

- resolution in range and azimuth;

- level of security by sector and echelon;

- probability and risk of collision of aircraft.

The information received in block 8 of the express analysis is processed and a special analysis for each period of updating information RTSN. As a result, the operational information expressed by the following characteristics of the RTSN and flight safety for the current period comes from the output of block 8 to the common bus 11:

- probability of detection;

- the likelihood of additional information;

- the probability of a bit error in the communication channel,

- detected conflict situations and violations of airspace use standards;

- probabilities of collision of aircraft at the current moment.

Thus, on the common bus 11 at any given time there is all the current information from the RTSN, as well as information from the documenting unit 4, the statistical processing unit 7, and the express analysis unit 8.

From the outputs of blocks 4, 7 and 8, information through the bus 11 enters the control unit 9, which processes it and transfers it to the information presentation (display) block 10.

The control unit 9 performs the following functions:

- the choice of a particular radar and the desired time interval for playing the radar and tactical and technical characteristics from the documenting unit 4 for this time interval;

- selection of a specific radar to display the current radar, or the current characteristics and the act of flight checks;

- the choice of a specific radar to obtain hard copies of the above documents;

- selection of a security parameter, reporting interval, information presentation form in the display unit (charts, graphs, text document).

The selection is made as directed by the user. For its implementation, two additional signal circuits are introduced: a feedback circuit 12 connecting one of the outputs of the control unit 9 with the second input of the documenting unit 4, and a circuit 13 through which special settings are received at the second input of the information presentation unit 10 from the control unit 9.

In the presentation block 10, the radar information depending on the choice of the user can be represented as follows:

- in tabular form;

- in the form of graphs;

- in the form of diagrams;

- in the form of a projection of three-dimensional space on a horizontal plane in a local coordinate system;

- in the form of a projection of three-dimensional space on a vertical plane in the local coordinate system;

- display of three-dimensional space with reference to geodetic coordinates;

- display of the radar visibility range in the vertical and horizontal planes, where the detection probability for the visibility element is encoded in color with shades.

To create hard copies of documents, information from block 10 is displayed on a monitor or on a printer. Examples of hard copies of some types of radar images are presented in figure 2-9.

The proposed monitoring system of radio equipment is capable of interfacing with 10-20 sources of information at the same time and can analyze their functioning both by record (from a memory unit) and in real time. This enables operational monitoring of the characteristics of technical means of air traffic control and safety performance in a controlled area of airspace.

Claims (1)

A control system for radio engineering airborne surveillance equipment, comprising an analogue radar information processing unit (1) designed to process primary radar information, a digital information processing unit (2) designed to receive digital signals in an information protocol specific to this system and decode digital information, telemetry information collection unit (3), the inputs of which are inputs of the monitoring system and are connected to the outputs of controlled radio engineering monitoring systems, which also contains a documenting unit (4), a statistical information processing unit (7), an express analysis unit (8), a control unit (9), designed to select a specific radar station at the direction of the user to control it, an information presentation unit (10) and a common data bus (11), characterized in that it is equipped with a multisensor trajectory processing unit (5) and a flight safety assessment unit (6), the first output of the multisensor trajectory processing (5) being directly connected with the input of the flight safety assessment unit (6), the outputs of the analogue radar information processing units (1), digital information processing (2) and telemetry information collection (3) are connected to the inputs of the documentation units (4) through a common data bus (11), multisensor trajectory processing (5), statistical processing of information (7) and express analysis (8), the second output of the multisensor trajectory processing unit (5) and the output of the flight safety level block (6) are connected to the inputs of the blocks via a common data bus (11) documented (4), statistical processing of information (7), express analysis (8), control (9) and presentation of information (10), while the output of the express analysis block (8) is connected to the input via a common data bus (11) of the documentation unit (4), the first output of the control unit (9) is directly connected to the second input of the documentation unit (4), the second output of the control unit (9) is directly connected to the second input of the information presentation unit (10), the output of which is the system output and is made with the ability to connect to a monitor and printer.