KR102140519B1 - Unmanned aerial vehicle defense system - Google Patents

Abstract

Disclosed is an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system. According to one embodiment of an application of the present invention, the unmanned aerial vehicle defense system comprises: an unmanned aerial vehicle detection device which generates a detection signal including location information, direction information, and speed information of an unmanned aerial vehicle approaching within a preset distance from a protected area; and an unmanned aerial vehicle deception device which receives the detection signal from the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device, generates a guide path enabling the unmanned aerial vehicle toward a preset safety zone by the detection signal, obtains a navigation signal linked to the operation of the unmanned aerial vehicle, and generates a deception signal responding to the generated guide path and simulating the navigation signal to apply the deception signal to the unmanned aerial vehicle.

Description

Unmanned aerial vehicle defense system {UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE DEFENSE SYSTEM}

The present invention relates to an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system.

The Global Navigation Satellite System including GPS provides relatively simple and accurate location information and is used in various fields such as smart devices, vehicle navigation, surveying, cartography, geodetic, unmanned aerial vehicles, and visual synchronization. As such, the satellite navigation system is conveniently used for useful purposes in real life, but when used according to the military/tactical purpose of the enemy, it can cause much damage.

In particular, since unmanned aerial vehicles such as drones were introduced for the initial military purpose, the fields of application have been extensively expanded to logistics, broadcasting, and leisure. Many of the side effects of immatureness are also occurring.

For example, it may be damaged by missiles guided by a satellite navigation system for military purposes, or may be monitored by unmanned aerial vehicles such as drones equipped with satellite navigation receivers for tactical/malicious purposes. Accordingly, it is necessary to reduce and prevent damage from enemies by spoofing target targets equipped with satellite navigation receivers for military/tactical purposes.

The spoofing of the satellite navigation system is to generate a simulated signal of the satellite navigation signal and transmit it slightly higher than the intensity of the actual satellite navigation signal. The satellite navigation receiver mounted on the target target acquires a simulated signal, not the actual signal, and It means to induce to calculate the wrong location and visual information by tracking.

For example, during the military operations conducted by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, some of the guided weapons fell to areas that were not originally targeted by the deception of these satellite navigation systems, causing civilian damage. The navigation receiver will not even detect whether the radio wave has been disturbed.

However, in the case of currently used satellite navigation deception signal generation-related technology, only a simple jamming signal is generated instead of a spoofing signal, so that the spoofer receives a satellite navigation receiver of the target target. There is a limit to directing to the intended location and route

The background technology of the present application is disclosed in Korean Patent Registration No. 10-2100967.

The present application is intended to solve the problems of the prior art described above, and the defense of the unmanned aerial vehicle that can be captured by moving the unmanned aerial vehicle detected through a deceptive signal to a predetermined safety zone, rather than physically neutralizing the detected unmanned aerial vehicle or crashing it. The aim is to provide a system.

However, the technical problems to be achieved by the embodiments of the present application are not limited to the technical problems as described above, and other technical problems may exist.

As a technical means for achieving the above technical problem, the unmanned aerial vehicle defense system according to an embodiment of the present application includes a detection signal including location information, direction information, and speed information of an unmanned aerial vehicle approaching within a predetermined distance from a protected area The unmanned aerial vehicle detection device and the detection signal are generated from the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device, and based on the detection signal, the unmanned aerial vehicle generates an induction path set to a predetermined safety zone, and the unmanned aerial vehicle It may include an unmanned aerial vehicle deception device for acquiring a navigation signal associated with driving, generating a deception signal corresponding to the generated guidance path and simulating the navigation signal, and applying it to the unmanned aerial vehicle.

In addition, the unmanned aerial vehicle detection apparatus includes a transmitter for transmitting a transmission signal toward the unmanned aerial vehicle, a waveform setting unit for determining a waveform of the transmission signal, and a receiving unit for receiving a received signal from which the transmission signal is reflected from the unmanned aerial vehicle. It can contain.

In addition, the transmitter may determine a transmission mode of the transmission signal based on at least one of the detected distance to the unmanned aerial vehicle and the number of unmanned aerial vehicles detected.

In addition, the transmission mode may be determined as one of a long range detection mode and a short range detection mode based on the detected distance to the unmanned aerial vehicle.

In addition, when the plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles are detected, the transmission mode may be determined as a multiple detection mode.

In addition, when the transmission mode is the remote detection mode, the waveform setting unit may determine a waveform of the transmission signal such that the transmission signal includes a linear frequency modulation (LFM)-based waveform.

In addition, when the transmission mode is the short-range detection mode, the waveform setting unit may determine a waveform of the transmission signal such that the transmission signal includes an FMCW (Frequency Modulated Continuous Waveform)-based waveform.

In addition, when the transmission mode is the multiple detection mode, the waveform setting unit may determine a waveform of the transmission signal such that the transmission signal includes a CW (Continuous Waveform) based waveform.

In addition, the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device includes a photographing unit that photographs the unmanned aerial vehicle based on the location information, the direction information, and the speed information, and transmits an image secured to the unmanned aerial vehicle to the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device. can do.

In addition, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device may estimate a photographing direction by the unmanned aerial vehicle based on the image, and generate the guided path based on the photographing direction and location information of the protected area.

In addition, when the detection signal is received from a plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device includes two or more unmanned aerial vehicles among the detected plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles, and estimates at least one group of flying groups flying into the cluster. Can.

In addition, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device may set a guided path for each of the cluster flight groups differently.

Further, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device may estimate an expected route of the unmanned aerial vehicle based on the detection signal collected during a predetermined monitoring period.

In addition, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device calculates first error information of the actual moving path and the expected path of the unmanned aerial vehicle and the second error information of the actual moving path and the guided path after the deception signal is applied. Can.

Further, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device may determine whether spoofing is successful for the unmanned aerial vehicle based on the first error information and the second error information.

Further, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device may generate a corrected deception signal in which the signal content of the deception signal is changed based on whether the determined spoofing is successful, and apply the corrected deception signal to the unmanned aerial vehicle.

The above-described problem solving means are merely exemplary and should not be construed as limiting the present application. In addition to the exemplary embodiments described above, additional embodiments may exist in the drawings and detailed description of the invention.

According to the above-described problem solving means of the present application, it is possible to provide an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system capable of moving and capturing an unmanned aerial vehicle detected through a deception signal, rather than physically neutralizing or destroying the detected unmanned aerial vehicle. Can.

According to the above-mentioned problem solving means of the present application, the conventional anti-drone solution deceives the satellite signal associated with the unmanned aerial vehicle unlike blocking the satellite signal through the high-power jammer of the detected unmanned aerial vehicle such as a drone. It is possible to build a defense system for unmanned aerial vehicles detected with deceptive signals for small output.

According to the above-mentioned problem solving means of the present application, by using a low-power deception signal, there is little radio wave interference, and the risk of unintended damage to the surrounding area can be significantly reduced.

However, the effects obtainable herein are not limited to the effects described above, and other effects may exist.

1 is a schematic configuration diagram of an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system according to an embodiment of the present application.
FIG. 2 is a conceptual diagram for explaining a guided path that is individually set for each group of cluster flights when a plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles is detected.
3 is an operation flowchart for an unmanned aerial vehicle deception method for constructing an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system according to an embodiment of the present application.
4 is a detailed operation flow diagram of a process of generating a guided route for the detected unmanned aerial vehicle.
FIG. 5 is an operation flowchart of an unmanned aerial vehicle deception method in consideration of a cluster flight group when a plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles is detected.
6 is a schematic configuration diagram of an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system according to another embodiment of the present application.
7A to 10 are views for explaining an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system and a spoofing device for constructing an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system according to another embodiment of the present application.
11A and 11B are views exemplarily showing an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system mounted on a vehicle.
12 is an operational flow diagram of a spoofing method for constructing an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system according to another embodiment of the present application.

Hereinafter, embodiments of the present application will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings so that those skilled in the art to which the present application pertains may easily practice. However, the present application may be implemented in various different forms and is not limited to the embodiments described herein. In addition, in order to clearly describe the present application in the drawings, parts irrelevant to the description are omitted, and like reference numerals are assigned to similar parts throughout the specification.

Throughout this specification, when a part is "connected" to another part, it is not only "directly connected", but also "electrically connected" or "indirectly connected" with another element in between. "It includes the case where it is.

Throughout this specification, when one member is positioned on another member “on”, “on top”, “top”, “bottom”, “bottom”, “bottom”, it means that one member is on another member This includes cases where there is another member between the two members as well as when in contact.

Throughout the present specification, when a part “includes” a certain component, it means that the component may further include other components, not to exclude other components, unless otherwise stated.

The present invention relates to an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system. For reference, in the description of the embodiment of the present application,'unmanned aerial vehicles' may include drones. However, the present invention is not limited thereto, and the unmanned aerial vehicle may include an unmanned aerial vehicle having various shapes and sizes, such as an unmanned aerial vehicle and an unmanned helicopter, as well as an autonomous vehicle.

1 is a schematic configuration diagram of an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system according to an embodiment of the present application.

Referring to FIG. 1, the unmanned aerial vehicle defense system 10 according to an embodiment of the present application may include an unmanned aerial vehicle detection device 100 and an unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200.

The unmanned aerial vehicle detection device 100 may generate a detection signal including location information, direction information, and speed information of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 approaching within a predetermined distance from the protected area.

In addition, referring to FIG. 1, the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device 100 may include a transmitter 110, a waveform setter 120, a receiver 130, and a photographing unit 140.

The transmitter 110 may transmit a predetermined transmission signal toward the unmanned aerial vehicle 1. Also, the reception unit 130 may receive a reception signal from which the transmission signal is reflected from the unmanned aerial vehicle 1.

According to an embodiment of the present application, the transmitter 110 may determine a transmission mode for a transmission signal based on at least one of the distance to the detected unmanned aerial vehicle 1 and the number of detected unmanned aerial vehicles 1.

The waveform setting unit 120 may determine a waveform of a transmission signal transmitted by the transmission unit 110. Specifically, the waveform setting unit 120 may determine the waveform of the transmission signal according to the transmission mode associated with the transmission unit 110.

When describing the detailed type of the transmission mode, the transmission mode may include a remote detection mode and a short-range detection mode determined based on the detected distance to the unmanned aerial vehicle 1. In addition, the transmission mode may include multiple detection modes when a plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles 1 are detected.

In this regard, the waveform setting unit 120 may determine the waveform of the transmission signal so that the transmission signal includes a linear frequency modulation (LFM)-based waveform when the transmission mode is a remote detection mode. In addition, when the transmission mode is a short-range detection mode, the waveform setting unit 120 may determine a waveform of the transmission signal such that the transmission signal includes a frequency modulated continuous waveform (FMCW)-based waveform. In addition, when the transmission mode is the multiple detection mode, the waveform setting unit 120 may determine the waveform of the transmission signal such that the transmission signal includes a CW (Continuous Waveform) based waveform.

According to an exemplary embodiment of the present application, after the LFM (Linear Frequency Modulation) transmits a signal, the distance and speed to the target using reflected waves from which the transmitted signal is reflected back from the target (for example, an unmanned aerial vehicle, etc.) It is used for radar to measure, and is mainly used for monitoring of targets with very long distances. In the case of LFM, when the transmitted signal and the received signal overlap, ambiguity occurs, so it is difficult to distinguish the transmitted signal and the received signal to detect long-range targets. This is because it is useful, but it is difficult to use at a short distance. In addition, FMCW (Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave) is a time using a frequency difference between the frequency of the transmitted signal and the received signal through a process of linearly increasing the frequency of the transmitted signal to a predetermined frequency range over time and then decreasing it again. And a method of calculating the Doppler frequency and calculating the distance to the target and the speed of the target using the derived time and Doppler frequency. In addition, CW (Continuous Wave) may refer to a method of calculating an object (target) approaching speed using a Doppler effect through a Doppler frequency.

In addition, according to an embodiment of the present application, when the detected unmanned aerial vehicle 1 enters within a preset threshold distance from the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device 100, the waveform setting unit 120 is short-distance from the existing remote detection mode. The transmission mode can be variably changed to switch to the detection mode. Likewise, the waveform setting unit 120 may switch the transmission mode from the existing short-range detection mode to the long-range detection mode when the detected unmanned aerial vehicle 1 deviates from a preset threshold distance from the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device 100.

The photographing unit 140 may photograph the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 based on the detected location information, direction information, and speed information of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1. Also, the photographing unit 140 may transmit the image secured to the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 to the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200.

The unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 may receive a detection signal from the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device 100. According to an embodiment of the present application, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 receives an input signal reflected by the detected unmanned aerial vehicle 1 into the reception unit 130 of the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device 100, and the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device ( 100).

In addition, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 may generate an induction path that is set so that the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 is set to a predetermined safety zone based on the received detection signal.

According to one embodiment of the present application, the safety zone means a destination that is set to fly the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 toward the corresponding area through deception on the detected unmanned aerial vehicle 1, the safety zone being spaced apart from the protected area It may be a region, but is not limited thereto. In addition, according to an embodiment of the present application, the safety zone may be divided into a plurality of sections, and identification information may be assigned to each section. For example, each of the plurality of sections of the safe zone may have different areas, relative positions in the safe zone, and a section shape, and identification information may be assigned according to the shape and location information of each of these sections.

In this regard, according to an embodiment of the present application, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 is an image secured for the detected unmanned aerial vehicle 1 (for example, the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 photographed by the photographing unit 140) ) Video) to determine the specification information, model information, etc. of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1, and the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 to a predetermined section in a pre-partitioned safety zone based on the identified specification information, model information, etc. You can set up a guided route to point.

As another example, a specific section of a plurality of sections of the safety zone is a protection that is induced when the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 is judged to be carrying an explosive or the unsafe aircraft 1 is considered to have a high risk of reaching the ground. It may be a zone, and the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 is determined to have a higher risk than the predetermined level when the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 reaches the ground based on the image obtained for the detected unmanned aerial vehicle 1 or is unmanned If it is determined that the aircraft 1 has a separate load, a guided path may be generated for the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 to face a preset protection zone.

Specifically, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 may estimate a photographing direction or a traveling direction of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 based on an image of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 captured and received by the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device 100. have. In addition, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 may be to generate a guided route based on the estimated or grasped shooting direction or the traveling direction of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 and the location information of the protected area.

According to one embodiment of the present application, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 is the orientation of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 from the image secured with respect to the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 detected based on image analysis, image analysis, etc., unmanned aerial vehicle 1 The photographing direction of the aforementioned unmanned aerial vehicle 1 may be estimated by analyzing the location and arrangement of the camera module mounted on the camera. For example, the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 is often flying to acquire an image of a predetermined space, and since such an unmanned aerial vehicle 1 is equipped with photographing equipment such as a camera, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 Creates an induction path so that the photographing direction of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 does not face the protected area so that information about the protected area is not exposed by the detected unmanned aerial vehicle 1, and generates a deception signal based thereon to generate the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 ).

FIG. 2 is a conceptual diagram for explaining a guided path that is individually set for each of the group of flight groups when a plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles is detected.

Referring to FIG. 2, when a detection signal is received from a plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 includes at least two unmanned aerial vehicles among the plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles detected, and at least one or more group flying groups flying into the cluster (1A, 1B) can be estimated.

In addition, referring to FIG. 2, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 may set a guided path for each of the estimated group flight groups 1A and 1B differently. For example, referring to FIG. 2, the safety zones Z1 and Z2, which are destinations reflected in the guided paths for different cluster flight groups, may be determined differently for each cluster flight group.

In addition, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 acquires a navigation signal associated with the operation of the detected unmanned aerial vehicle 1, generates a deception signal corresponding to the previously generated guidance path and simulates the navigation signal, and generates an unmanned aerial vehicle 1 ).

In addition, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 may estimate an expected route of the unmanned aerial vehicle based on detection signals collected during a predetermined monitoring period. In addition, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 includes first error information and actual error corresponding to the error between the actual moving path and the estimated expected path of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 after the generated deception signal is applied to the unmanned aerial vehicle 1. The second error information corresponding to the error of the moving path and the guided path can be calculated.

Also, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 may determine whether spoofing is successful for the unmanned aerial vehicle based on the calculated first error information and second error information.

According to one embodiment of the present application, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 may determine that spoofing (deception) is successful when the first error information is greater than the second error information. As another example, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 may determine that spoofing (deception) is successful when the continuously collected first error information tends to increase. Alternatively, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 may determine that spoofing (deception) has failed when the first error information is smaller than the second error information. As another example, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 may determine that spoofing (deception) has failed when the continuously collected first error information maintains a predetermined first threshold or lower.

In addition, according to an embodiment of the present application, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 continuously maintains the second error information collected below a preset second threshold value, and then exceeds the second threshold value at a predetermined time point. It is determined that the deception signal removal (defense) process of the aircraft 1 has been activated, and may operate to generate a corrected deception signal that corrects the signal content of the previously applied deception signal. As another example, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 determines that the deception signal removal (defense) process of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 is activated when the rate of change of the second error information over time exceeds a preset threshold slope. Thus, it is possible to operate to generate a corrected deception signal by modifying the signal content of the previously applied deception signal.

In other words, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 may regenerate a corrected deception signal in which the content of the previously applied deception signal is changed based on the determined success or failure of spoofing. In addition, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 may re-apply the regenerated corrected deception signal to the unmanned aerial vehicle 1.

In addition, referring to FIG. 1 described above, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 may include a detection signal receiving unit 210, a route setting unit 220, a deception signal generating unit 230, and an output unit 240. .

The detection signal receiving unit 210 may receive an unmanned aerial vehicle detection signal including the location information, direction information, and speed information of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 approaching within a predetermined distance from the protected area from the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device 100. have.

According to one embodiment of the present application, the detection signal receiving unit 210, when receiving a detection signal corresponding to a plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles 1, includes two or more unmanned aerial vehicles among the plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles detected, and flying in a cluster At least one cluster flight group can be estimated.

The route setting unit 220 may generate an induction route that is set so that the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 faces a preset safety zone based on the received detection signal.

According to one embodiment of the present application, the route setting unit 220 is attached to the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 secured by photographing the unmanned aerial vehicle based on the location information, the direction information, and the speed information of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 included in the detection signal. The photographing direction by the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 may be estimated based on the Korean image. In addition, the route setting unit 220 may be to generate a guided route based on the captured (estimated) unmanned aerial vehicle 1 photographing direction and the location information of the protected area.

Specifically, the route setting unit 220 is based on the location information of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 included in the detection signal and the location information of the protected area, when the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 proceeds based on the guided route by the deception signal In addition, it is possible to set a guided path that does not face the protected area but points to a predetermined safety area.

Also, the route setting unit 220 may generate an induction route so that the photographing direction of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 traveling along the generated induction route does not face the protection zone. Accordingly, it is possible to prevent the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 from being photographed for the protected area.

In this regard, the route setting unit 220 primarily sets the shortest path between the location information of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 and the safety zone, but is preset in the protected area when the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 proceeds along the shortest path. If it is determined to approach within a critical distance or the photographing direction of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 falls within a predetermined threshold angle range for the protected area, the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 does not approach the protected area within a critical distance and the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 ), it is possible to create a guided path to include a predetermined transit zone between the position of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 so that the protected area is not photographed and the set safety zone.

In addition, according to an embodiment of the present application, when at least one group of cluster flights is estimated, the route setting unit 220 may set a guided path for each group of cluster flights differently. For example, the route setting unit 220 is safe for the group flight group based on the area information and shape information of a plurality of sections in the preset safety zone and the number information of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 included in the identified group flight group. It is possible to set a derivation route with a destination set to point to a predetermined section in the zone.

The deception signal generation unit 230 may acquire a navigation signal associated with the operation of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1. In addition, the deception signal generation unit 230 may generate a deception signal that corresponds to the guided path generated by the route setting unit 220 and simulates the obtained navigation signal.

According to an embodiment of the present application, the deception signal generation unit 230 is based on the position information, direction information, and speed information of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 included in the detection signal of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1, and the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 is The deception signal may be generated based on a pseudo-random number (PRN) code delay value and a Doppler variation value calculated to simulate a navigation signal actually received from a predetermined navigation satellite, but is not limited thereto.

The output unit 240 may apply a deception signal generated by the detected unmanned aerial vehicle 1.

According to one embodiment of the present application, the output unit 240 may apply a deception signal generated to correspond to a pre-allocated frequency band for each group of unmanned aerial vehicles included in the group of unmanned aerial vehicles. Accordingly, the deceptive signal generated differently according to the guided path set differently for each group of clustered flights is targeted and applied to the unmanned aerial vehicle in the corresponding group of flying groups, so that even if multiple unmanned aerial vehicles are detected, each of the unmanned aerial vehicles is guided to an appropriate safety zone. Can be.

In addition, according to an embodiment of the present application, the output unit 240 each unmanned aircraft to prevent collision between a plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles (1) in the crowded flight group while the unmanned aerial vehicle (1) of the crowded flight group faces the safety zone. The aircraft 1 may be operated to apply each deception signal with a predetermined delay time.

Hereinafter, based on the details described above, the operation flow of the present application will be briefly described.

3 is an operation flowchart for an unmanned aerial vehicle deception method for constructing an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system according to an embodiment of the present application.

The unmanned aerial vehicle deception method for constructing the unmanned aerial vehicle defense system illustrated in FIG. 3 may be performed by the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 described above. Therefore, even if omitted, the description of the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 may be equally applied to the description of the unmanned aerial vehicle deception method for constructing an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system.

Referring to FIG. 3, in step S11, the detection signal receiving unit 210 detects an unmanned aerial vehicle detection signal including location information, direction information, and speed information of an unmanned aerial vehicle approaching within a predetermined distance from a protected area. ).

Next, in step S12, the route setting unit 220 may estimate the predicted route of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 based on the detection signal collected during a predetermined monitoring period for the detected unmanned aerial vehicle 1.

Next, in step S13, the route setting unit 220 may generate an induction route that is set so that the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 faces a preset safety zone based on the detection signal.

Next, in step S14, the deception signal generation unit 230 may acquire a navigation signal associated with the operation of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1.

Next, in step S15, the deception signal generation unit 230 may generate a deception signal that corresponds to the induction path generated in step S13 and simulates the navigation signal obtained in step S14.

Next, in step S16, the output unit 240 may apply the deception signal generated by the unmanned aerial vehicle 1.

Next, in step S171, the determination unit 250 may calculate first error information of the actual moving path and the expected path of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1.

Also, in step S172, the determination unit 250 may calculate second error information of the actual moving path and the guided path of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1.

Next, in step S18, the determination unit 250 may determine whether the spoofing (deception) of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 is successful based on the calculated first error information and second error information.

If, as a result of the determination in step S18, it is determined that spoofing of the detected unmanned aerial vehicle 1 has failed ('NO' in step S18), the deception signal generation unit 230 changes the signal content of the deception signal in step S19. A deceptor signal can be generated and re-applied to the unmanned aerial vehicle 1. In addition, steps S16 to S18 described above may be repeated so that the success or failure of spoofing (deception) by the corrected deception signal applied again can be determined again.

In the above description, steps S11 to S19 may be further divided into additional steps or combined into fewer steps, depending on the implementation herein. In addition, some steps may be omitted if necessary, and the order between the steps may be changed.

4 is a detailed operation flow diagram of a process of generating a guided route for the detected unmanned aerial vehicle.

The process of generating the guided route shown in FIG. 4 may be performed by the route setting unit 220 of the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 described above. Therefore, even if omitted, the description of the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 or the route setting unit 220 may be equally applied to the description of FIG. 4.

Referring to FIG. 4, in step S131, the route setting unit 220 photographs the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 based on at least one of position information, direction information, and speed information of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 included in the detection signal An image of the secured unmanned aerial vehicle 1 can be obtained.

Next, in step S132, the route setting unit 220 may estimate a photographing direction by the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 based on the acquired image.

Next, in step S133, the route setting unit 220 may generate a guided route based on the estimated photographing direction of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 and location information of the protected area.

Specifically, in step S133, the route setting unit 220 may generate an induction route so that the photographing direction of the unmanned aerial vehicle 1 does not face the protected area.

In the above description, steps S131 to S133 may be further divided into additional steps or combined into fewer steps, according to an embodiment of the present application. In addition, some steps may be omitted if necessary, and the order between the steps may be changed.

5 is an operation flowchart of an unmanned aerial vehicle deception method considering a group of flying groups when a plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles is detected.

The unmanned aerial vehicle deception method considering the cluster flight group illustrated in FIG. 5 may be performed by the route setting unit 220 of the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 described above. Therefore, even if omitted, the description of the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device 200 or the route setting unit 220 may be equally applied to the description of FIG. 4.

Referring to FIG. 5, in step S21, the detection signal receiving unit 210 may receive detection signals for a plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles from the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device 100.

Next, in step S22, the detection signal receiving unit 210 may include at least two unmanned aerial vehicles among the plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles detected, and may estimate at least one cluster flight group flying into the cluster.

Next, in step S23, the route setting unit 220 may set a guided route for each cluster flight group differently.

Next, in step S24, the deception signal generation unit 230 may individually generate a deception signal corresponding to a frequency band allocated to each of the group flight groups.

In addition, in step S24, the output unit 240 may apply the deception signal generated to correspond to the frequency band allocated for each group of the group flight in step S23 to the unmanned aerial vehicle included in the group of flight groups.

In the above description, steps S21 to S24 may be further divided into additional steps, or combined into fewer steps, according to embodiments herein. In addition, some steps may be omitted if necessary, and the order between the steps may be changed.

The description of the unmanned aerial vehicle defense system 10 according to an embodiment of the present application described above is through the description of the unmanned aerial vehicle defense system according to another embodiment of the present application described below according to the embodiment of the present application. Can be understood. Therefore, hereinafter, even if omitted, the contents described with respect to the unmanned aerial vehicle defense system 10 according to an embodiment of the present application described above may be equally applied to the unmanned aerial vehicle defense system according to another embodiment of the present application. .

6 is a schematic configuration diagram of an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system according to another embodiment of the present application.

Referring to FIG. 6, an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system according to another embodiment of the present application may include an unmanned aerial vehicle detection device and a spoofing device (hereinafter referred to as a'spoofing device') for constructing an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system.

In addition, referring to FIG. 6, according to another embodiment of the present application, the unmanned aerial vehicle defense system operates in conjunction with a single unmanned aerial vehicle detection device (Drone detecting RADAR) and a corresponding unmanned aerial vehicle detection device (for example, Referring to 6, 3) may include a spoof device (Drone Spoofer).

In addition, although not shown in the drawing, the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device and the spoofing device may communicate with an interconnected network.

7A to 10 are views for explaining an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system and a spoofing device for constructing an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system according to another embodiment of the present application.

7A to 10, the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device may detect location information and speed information of an unmanned aerial vehicle approaching within a predetermined distance from a protected area. According to another embodiment of the present application, the location of the unmanned aerial vehicle recognized by the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device may be 3D location information including latitude information, warning information, and altitude information.

In particular, referring to FIG. 10, according to another embodiment of the present application, the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device is predetermined outside the protection zone of a predetermined predetermined radius (eg, referring to FIG. 10, 2 km radius). It can be operated to detect an unmanned aerial vehicle located within the range of (for example, referring to FIG. 10, 3 to 5 km outside the protected area).

According to another embodiment of the present application, the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device may be a Ku band RADAR, but is not limited thereto. Specifically, the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device, which is a Ku band RADAR, can detect an unmanned aerial vehicle based on three fixed directions (axes) and acquire location information and speed information of the unmanned aerial vehicle. In addition, the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device, Ku band RADAR, can simultaneously detect a plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles within a detection range.

In addition, the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device according to another embodiment of the present application may have a detection azimuth angle in a predetermined angle range within a range of 0 degrees to 360 degrees based on a position where the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device is installed. For example, the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device may be operated in a state where the detection ratio (frequency, degree, etc.) for a predetermined angle range is set higher than the remaining angle ranges except for the predetermined angle range.

As another example, the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device may be a BS2500RF RF scanner. The unmanned aerial vehicle detection device in the form of an RF scanner may be advantageous for detecting a more accurate position of the unmanned aerial vehicle, and may have a function of automatically blocking a signal (for example, a drone signal) applied from the unmanned aerial vehicle, You can monitor the spectrum of the RF signal emitted from the aircraft. In addition, the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device in the form of an RF scanner may additionally detect (infer) the location of a user controlling the detected unmanned aerial vehicle.

In addition, the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device in the form of an RF scanner according to another embodiment of the present application may have a search frequency value corresponding to a first frequency range of 2400 to 2500 MHz or a second frequency range of 5150 to 5850 MHz. It is not limited. In addition, an unmanned aerial vehicle detection device in the form of an RF scanner can simultaneously detect at least four unmanned aerial vehicles within a detection area. In addition, the unmanned aerial vehicle detection autonomous form of the RF scanner may satisfy a power consumption of 50 W or less and an operating temperature range of -20 to 60°C.

7A to 10, the spoofing device may receive an unmanned aerial vehicle detection signal including an unmanned aerial vehicle location information and speed information detected by the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device from the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device.

In addition, referring to FIGS. 7A to 10, the spoofing device may acquire a navigation signal associated with the operation of the detected unmanned aerial vehicle and generate a deception signal simulating the obtained navigation signal. In other words, the spoofing device can generate a deception signal to disturb the detected unmanned aerial vehicle location and communication information. Specifically, the spoofing device may induce at least one of the detected unmanned aerial vehicle's GPS signal and communication signal to simulate and disturb similar to the actual signal, thereby preventing the unmanned aerial vehicle from recognizing jamming.

In addition, referring to FIGS. 7A to 10, the spoofing device may apply the generated deception signal to the detected unmanned aerial vehicle to induce the unmanned aerial vehicle to move to a preset safety zone. That is, the spoofing device may control the position of the unmanned aerial vehicle, such as an intrusion drone, by modifying the content of at least one of the detected unmanned aerial vehicle GPS signal and communication signal. In addition, referring to FIG. 10, the spoofing device according to another embodiment of the present application moves the detected unmanned aerial vehicle to a safety zone preset for the protection zone, wherein the safety zone is 2 to 5 km from outside of the protection zone. It may be provided within the scope, but is not limited thereto.

That is, referring to FIG. 8, the spoofing device generates and applies a deception signal associated with the detected unmanned aerial vehicle's GPS control communication channel, thereby controlling the unmanned aerial vehicle's movement direction adjacent to the protected area, thereby setting the unmanned aerial vehicle's preset safety. Spoofing Jamming can be performed to capture in the zone (safety zone) but not to recognize jamming signals for the unmanned aerial vehicle.

According to another embodiment of the present disclosure, the spoofing device may include a detection signal reception unit, a deception signal generation unit, and an induction unit.

The detection signal receiving unit may receive an unmanned aerial vehicle detection signal including location information and speed information of an unmanned aerial vehicle approaching a predetermined distance from a protected area.

In addition, the deception signal generation unit may acquire a navigation signal associated with the operation of the unmanned aerial vehicle and generate a deception signal simulating the obtained navigation signal.

In addition, the induction unit may induce the unmanned aerial vehicle to move to a preset safety zone by applying the generated deception signal to the unmanned aerial vehicle.

In addition, the spoofing device according to the embodiment of the present application may include a jamming unit that operates to block a satellite signal (satellite navigation signal) associated with the detected unmanned aerial vehicle.

Specifically, referring to FIG. 8, the jamming unit according to another embodiment of the present disclosure applies a predetermined jamming signal (disruption propagation) to the unmanned aerial vehicle to allow the detected unmanned aerial vehicle to escape outside the protected area (defense area) Return-to-Home Jamming can be performed.

In addition, according to another embodiment of the present application, the jamming unit restricts communication associated with the detected unmanned aerial vehicle to transmit a predetermined jamming signal (disruption propagation) to the unmanned aerial vehicle to stop (hover) the unmanned aerial vehicle in the corresponding area. Hovering Jamming can be performed.

In addition, according to another embodiment of the present application, the jamming unit applies a predetermined jamming signal (disruption propagation) to the unmanned aerial vehicle by restricting control channel communication associated with the detected unmanned aerial vehicle so that the unmanned aerial vehicle lands in the corresponding area. Can do Landing Jamming.

11A and 11B are views exemplarily showing an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system mounted on a vehicle.

11A and 11B, the unmanned aerial vehicle defense system disclosed herein may be mounted on a vehicle to construct a defense system for an unmanned aerial vehicle approaching the vehicle. Such a vehicle-mounted unmanned aerial vehicle defense system may increase the safety of a vehicle in a predetermined driving route by constructing a dynamic unmanned aerial vehicle non-flying zone. For example, such a vehicle-mounted unmanned aerial vehicle defense system may be used for reconnaissance and factor protection.

12 is an operation flow diagram of a spoofing method for constructing an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system according to another embodiment of the present application.

The spoofing method for constructing an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system shown in FIG. 12 may be performed by the spoofing device described above. Therefore, even if omitted, the description of the spoofing device can be equally applied to the description of the spoofing method for constructing an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system.

First, the detection signal receiving unit may receive an unmanned aerial vehicle detection signal including location information and speed information of an unmanned aerial vehicle approaching a predetermined distance from a protected area (Drone detection).

Next, the jamming unit may block a satellite signal (satellite navigation signal) associated with the detected unmanned aerial vehicle (GPS jamming).

Next, the deception signal generation unit may acquire a navigation signal associated with the operation of the detected unmanned aerial vehicle and generate a deception signal that mimics the obtained navigation signal (satellite signal deception).

Next, the induction unit may apply the generated deception signal to the detected unmanned aerial vehicle to induce the unmanned aerial vehicle to move to a preset safety zone (Drone Spoofering).

In other words, when using the spoofing method for constructing an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system performed by the spoofing device of the present application, an unmanned aerial vehicle finally approaching a protected area may be captured (Drone capture).

Each step in the spoofing method for constructing an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system described above with reference to FIG. 12 may be further divided into additional steps or combined with fewer steps according to an embodiment of the present application. In addition, some steps may be omitted if necessary, and the order between the steps may be changed.

The unmanned aerial vehicle deception method for constructing an unmanned aerial vehicle defense system according to an embodiment of the present application may be implemented in a form of program instructions that can be executed through various computer means and may be recorded on a computer readable medium. The computer-readable medium may include program instructions, data files, data structures, or the like alone or in combination. The program instructions recorded on the medium may be specially designed and configured for the present invention or may be known and usable by those skilled in computer software. Examples of computer-readable recording media include magnetic media such as hard disks, floppy disks, and magnetic tapes, optical media such as CD-ROMs, DVDs, and magnetic media such as floptical disks. -Hardware devices specially configured to store and execute program instructions such as magneto-optical media, and ROM, RAM, flash memory, and the like. Examples of program instructions include high-level language code that can be executed by a computer using an interpreter, etc., as well as machine language codes produced by a compiler. The hardware device described above may be configured to operate as one or more software modules to perform the operation of the present invention, and vice versa.

In addition, the unmanned aerial vehicle deception method for constructing the above-described unmanned aerial vehicle defense system may also be implemented in the form of a computer program or application executed by a computer stored in a recording medium.

The above description of the present application is for illustrative purposes, and those skilled in the art to which the present application pertains will understand that it is possible to easily modify to other specific forms without changing the technical spirit or essential features of the present application. Therefore, it should be understood that the embodiments described above are illustrative in all respects and not restrictive. For example, each component described as a single type may be implemented in a distributed manner, and similarly, components described as distributed may be implemented in a combined form.

The scope of the present application is indicated by the claims, which will be described later, rather than the detailed description, and all modifications or variations derived from the meaning and scope of the claims and equivalent concepts should be interpreted to be included in the scope of the present application.

10: UAV defense system
100: unmanned aerial vehicle detection device
110: transmitter
120: waveform setting unit
130: receiver
140: filming unit
200: drone deception device
210: detection signal receiver
220: route setting unit
230: deception signal generation unit
240: output
250: judgment unit
1: unmanned aerial vehicle

Claims (6)

In the UAV defense system,
An unmanned aerial vehicle detection device for generating a detection signal including location information, direction information, and speed information of an unmanned aerial vehicle approaching a predetermined distance from a protected area; And
The detection signal is received from the unmanned aerial vehicle detection device, and based on the detection signal, an unmanned aerial vehicle is configured to generate a guided route set to a predetermined safety zone, and a navigation signal associated with the operation of the unmanned aerial vehicle is acquired. And, the unmanned aircraft deception device corresponding to the generated induction path and generating a deception signal simulating the navigation signal and applying it to the unmanned aerial vehicle,
Including,
The unmanned aerial vehicle detection device,
Transmitting a transmission signal for generating the detection signal based on a transmission mode determined based on at least one of the detected distance to the unmanned aerial vehicle and the number of unmanned aerial vehicles detected,
When the transmission mode is a remote detection mode, the transmission signal includes a LFM (Linear Frequency Modulation) based waveform, and when the transmission mode is a short range detection mode, the transmission signal is a FMCW (Frequency Modulated Continuous Waveform) based waveform. Including, if the transmission mode is a multiple detection mode, the transmission signal is characterized in that it comprises a CW (Continuous Waveform) based waveform,
The unmanned aerial vehicle deception device,
Estimating the photographing direction by the unmanned aerial vehicle based on the image secured for the unmanned aerial vehicle, and generating the guided route based on the photographing direction and the location information of the protected area,
When the detection signal is received from a plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles, including at least two unmanned aerial vehicles among the detected plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles, estimating at least one group of flying groups flying into a cluster, and deriving for each of the group of flying groups Unmanned aerial vehicle defense system, characterized in that the path is set differently. According to claim 1,
The unmanned aerial vehicle detection device,
A transmitter for transmitting the transmission signal toward the unmanned aerial vehicle;
A waveform setting unit that determines a waveform of the transmission signal; And
Receiving unit for receiving the received signal reflected from the transmission signal from the unmanned aerial vehicle,
Including,
The transmitting unit,
And determining the transmission mode based on at least one of the detected distance to the unmanned aerial vehicle and the number of detected unmanned aerial vehicles. According to claim 2,
The transmission mode,
Based on the detected distance to the unmanned aerial vehicle, it is determined to be one of the long range detection mode and the short range detection mode,
If a plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles are detected, it is determined by the multiple detection mode, the unmanned aerial vehicle defense system. According to claim 2,
The unmanned aerial vehicle detection device,
A photographing unit that photographs the unmanned aerial vehicle based on the location information, the direction information, and the speed information, and transmits an image secured to the unmanned aerial vehicle to the unmanned aerial vehicle deception device,
It further comprises, unmanned aerial vehicle defense system. According to claim 4,
The unmanned aerial vehicle deception device,
Estimate the predicted route of the unmanned aerial vehicle based on the detection signal collected during a predetermined monitoring section, and the first error information of the actual route and the predicted route of the unmanned aerial vehicle after the deception signal is applied and the actual An unmanned aerial vehicle defense system that calculates second error information of a moving route and the guided route, and determines whether spoofing for the unmanned aerial vehicle is successful based on the first error information and the second error information. The method of claim 5,
The unmanned aerial vehicle deception device,
An unmanned aerial vehicle defense system that generates a corrected deception signal that changes the signal content of the deception signal based on whether the determined spoofing is successful, and applies the corrected deception signal to the unmanned aerial vehicle.

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