KR101986553B1 - Global navigation satellite system using variance of tangent angle of baseline vector components and spoofing signal identification method thereof - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention relates to a satellite navigation system capable of effectively identifying a deception signal by using a variance of a tangent angle of a reception period base vector component and a dequeue signal identification method thereof, First and second receivers for classifying groups and deception signal groups; A group management unit for generating a plurality of double difference combinations by combining the GPS signal group and the deception signal group respectively classified by the first and second receivers; And a hypothesis test that estimates a basis vector by applying a least squares method to the measured values of the generated plurality of double difference combinations and sets a tangent angle variance between two components of the estimated base vector as a test statistic, And the like.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD [0001] The present invention relates to a satellite navigation system using a tangent angle variance of a base vector component, and a method for identifying a tangent angle of a base vector component, and a method of identifying the tangent angular dispersion.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to a satellite navigation system capable of effectively identifying a deception signal by using a variance of a tangent angle of a receiving period base vector component and a deception signal identification method thereof.

The satellite navigation system receives navigation signals from satellites orbiting the earth and provides navigational information that allows users to easily and accurately calculate positions from anywhere in the world. In the case of GPS (Global Positioning System) signal, which is the most commonly used navigation information, it can be broadly divided into civil C / A code and military P code. In case of civil C / A code, Have been widely used throughout society.

However, GPS satellites are orbiting about 20000 km away from the surface of the earth. Therefore, when a satellite signal reaches the ground surface, the intensity is generally weaker than the thermal noise component. Therefore, the satellite signal is likely to deteriorate due to natural signal interference and jamming, and is particularly vulnerable to deception.

Deception refers to the emission of a signal, similar to a raw GPS signal, to a target receiver with the intention of disturbing the target receiver intentionally by a spoofer. In the case of civilian signals, since the C / A code is open, anyone can simulate GPS signals and generate deception signals. In the case of military P-code, it is encrypted and can not generate the signal directly, but it can disturb the receiver that receives the raw GPS signal by storing the original GPS signal and re-radiation after a certain time delay have.

In the case of such deception, since the location of the expiration date is located relatively close to the GPS satellite, the receiver receives a stronger deception signal than the original GPS signal. This can result in paralysis of some channels of the receiver's acquisition and tracking loops and, in severe cases, all channels track deceptive signals, and the receiver calculates the navigation solution for the intended de-interrogation location. Therefore, in the case of civilian, malfunction of vehicle navigation and marine navigation and financial paralysis may occur. In the case of military, serious problems such as a malfunction of precision guided weapon and a mistake of military operation system may occur.

In the past, studies on the influence analysis and countermeasure method of the private GPS system by the degenerative device have mainly been conducted, and a method of detecting the deception signal using the single difference and double difference measurement values of the reception period has been studied. However, in the conventional de-icing signal detection method, it is necessary to identify the de-icing signal after the de-icing signal detection and remove the de-icing signal to restore the original GPS signal normally so that the normal navigation function can be performed. Therefore, there is a need for a method that can more effectively identify a deception signal under deceptive circumstances.

It is an object of the present invention to provide a satellite navigation system using a tangent angle variance of a base vector component capable of performing a normal navigation function by restoring a raw GPS signal even in a tricky environment,

Another object of the present invention is to provide a tangent of a base vector component capable of improving navigation performance and reliability by correctly identifying a deception signal through a tangent angle distribution of an estimated base vector component from a multiple receiver, A satellite navigation system using each variance, and a method for identifying a malicious signal.

In order to achieve the above object, a method of identifying a fake signal of a satellite navigation system according to an embodiment of the present invention includes: tracking a signal transmitted by a GPS satellite and a de-interrogator using a multi-correlator for each of two or more receivers under a non- Classifying a GPS signal group and a deceptive signal group; Estimating a reception period basis vector by calculating measurements of a reception period double differential combination for the classified GPS signal group and the deception signal group; And performing a hypothesis test to set a tangent angle variance between the estimated reception period base vector components as a test statistic to identify a primitive signal group.

According to an embodiment of the present invention, the step of estimating the basis vector comprises: classifying a GPS signal group and a deceptive signal group by combining GPS signals and deception signals of a plurality of channels in each receiver; Generating a plurality of double differential combinations by combining the GPS signal group and the dequeue signal group classified by each of the receivers; And estimating a basis vector by applying a least squares method to the measured values of the plurality of generated double differential combinations.

The step of identifying the deception signal according to an embodiment of the present invention includes the steps of setting a specific double differential combination among the plurality of double differential combinations as an alternative hypothesis and setting the remaining double differential combinations as a null hypothesis; Calculating a tangent angle variance for each component of the basis vector for the base vector for the dual difference combination set by the allele hypothesis and the double difference combinations set for the null hypothesis; Setting a test statistic by calculating a ratio of a tangent angle variance of an alternate hypothesis to the calculated null hypothesis; And comparing the set test statistic with a predetermined threshold value to determine whether the specific double differential combination set to the hypothesis hypothesis is a deception group.

According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method for identifying a malicious signal in a satellite navigation system, the method comprising: combining first and second GPS signals and a deception signal in a first and a second receiver, Classifying the group; Generating a plurality of double differential combinations by combining the GPS signal group and the dequeue signal group classified at the first and second receivers; Estimating a basis vector by applying a least squares method to the measurements of the generated plurality of double difference combinations; And performing a hypothesis test using a tangent angle variance between the components of the estimated basis vector as a test statistic, thereby identifying the idle signal group.

According to an embodiment of the present invention, the grouping of the GPS signal group and the deception signal group includes: generating a navigation solution by combining GPS signals and deemed signals of a plurality of channels; And selecting a combination having the smallest residual of the navigation solution among the generated combinations to classify the GPS signal group and the deception signal group.

According to an embodiment of the present invention, the plurality of double differential combinations may be selected from a group consisting of an NG-NG group, a NG-SG group, a GPS-NG group, (GG) combinations.

In accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, identifying the idle signal group comprises: setting a particular dual differential combination to an alternate hypothesis and the remaining double differential combinations to a null hypothesis; Calculating a tangent angle variance for the three components of the base vector for the double differential combination set by the opposite hypothesis and the base vector for the double differential combinations set by the null hypothesis; Setting a test statistic by calculating a ratio of a tangent angle variance of an alternate hypothesis to the calculated null hypothesis; And comparing the set test statistic with a predetermined threshold value to determine whether the specific double differential combination set to the hypothesis hypothesis is a deception group.

According to an embodiment of the present invention, the particular combination of differentiations may be set to a de-nested group combination (SS).

According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a satellite navigation system including first and second receivers for classifying a GPS signal group and a dequeue signal group by combining GPS signals and dequeous signals of a plurality of channels; A group management unit for generating a plurality of double difference combinations by combining the GPS signal group and the deception signal group respectively classified by the first and second receivers; And a hypothesis test that estimates a basis vector by applying a least squares method to the measured values of the generated plurality of double difference combinations and sets a tangent angle variance between two components of the estimated base vector as a test statistic, And the like.

According to an embodiment of the present invention, the first and second receivers include multiple correlators for tracking GPS signals and deceptive signals of a plurality of channels, respectively; And a GPS receiver for generating a navigation solution by combining the plurality of GPS signals and deception signals tracked by the multiple correlator and generating a navigation solution, And an analysis unit.

According to the embodiment of the present invention, the group management unit includes a combination of a de-nested group SS, a de-group signal SG group, a group of GPS de-signal group GS, Combinations can be created.

According to an embodiment of the present invention, the idle signal discriminator may be configured to (a) set a specific double differential combination to an alternate hypothesis H1 and set the remaining double differential combinations to a null hypothesis H0, and (b) (C) calculating the tangent angular variance for the three components of the base vector for the double difference combination set to the base pair vector and the double difference combinations set to the null hypothesis H0, and (c) (D) comparing the set test statistic with a predetermined threshold value to calculate a specific double differential combination (H1) set to the alternate hypothesis (H1) by calculating a ratio of the tangent angle variance of the alternate hypothesis It can be discriminated whether this is a fragile signal group.

According to the above embodiment, the present invention estimates a base vector using a dual difference measurement of two or more receivers under a degenerative environment, and performs a hypothesis test using a tangent angle variance between the estimated base vector components as a test statistic Thereby discriminating the deception signal more accurately and efficiently. In particular, since the tangent angle variance of the base vector components in the present invention is in the range of 0 to 2 [pi], the reliability of the test statistic is high, which can reduce the error in the identification of the malignant signal. Thus, do.

In addition, since the present invention has recently become a big issue as well as the performance of the satellite navigation system due to the development of the UAV and the unmanned vehicle system, the embodiment of the present invention as described above can be applied not only to the satellite navigation system, The stability of the unmanned infrastructure such as the system can be guaranteed.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a satellite navigation system for identifying a tamper signal using a tangent angle variance of a basis vector component according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG.
2 is an exemplary view showing a tangent angle of a base vector component used in the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a conceptual diagram showing an alternative hypothesis (H1) and a null hypothesis (H0) for hypothesis testing according to the present invention.
FIG. 4 is a graph showing the performance of the fragile signal identification according to the variation of the base vector length when the false detection probability is fixed and the variance of the base vector component is 0.2 m.
5 is a graph showing a result of performing a hypothesis test using simulation data according to the present invention.

The terms and words used in the specification and claims of the present invention should not be construed to be limited to ordinary or dictionary meanings and the inventor should appropriately define the concept of the term to describe its invention in the best way It should be construed in the meaning and concept consistent with the technical idea of the present invention.

Therefore, the embodiments and the drawings described in the specification of the present invention are merely the most preferred embodiments of the present invention, and are not intended to represent all of the technical ideas of the present invention. Therefore, It should be understood that there may be variations.

The suffix "module" and " part "for the components used in the following description are given or mixed in consideration of ease of specification, and do not have their own meaning or role.

The terms including ordinal such as first, second, etc. in the specification of the present invention can be used to describe various elements, but the constituent elements are not limited by the terms. The terms are used only for the purpose of distinguishing one component from another. In addition, the singular forms "a," "an," and "the" include plural referents unless the context clearly dictates otherwise.

In the specification of the present invention, when a component is referred to as "comprising ", it means that it can further include other components as long as there is no particular contrary description.

In order to identify a spoofing signal that causes the most lethal deterioration of navigation performance among various types of signal interference of a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), the present invention uses a base vector component estimated through multiple correlators of multiple receivers We use the tangent angle variance as a test statistic to test hypotheses.

To this end, the present invention estimates a base vector using a dual difference measurement of two or more receivers under a degenerative environment, performs a hypothesis test using the tangent angle variance between the estimated base vector components as a test statistic, If it exceeds a certain threshold value, it can be identified as a false signal.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS FIG. 1 is a configuration diagram of a satellite navigation system for identifying a tamper signal using a tangent angle variance of a base vector component according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG.

1, a satellite navigation system according to an embodiment of the present invention receives a raw GPS signal and a deception signal simultaneously from a GPS satellite and an expiration date, and then classifies the deaf and GPS signal group into a plurality of deaf The first and second receivers 100 and 110 and the first and second receivers 100 and 110 are combined to obtain a measurement value of the reception period double difference combination A group difference value (hereinafter referred to as " double difference measurement value "); a reception unit 120 that calculates a reception period basis vector using the reception period double difference measurement value output from the group management unit (GMU) 120, (Or a deceptive signal group) by performing a hypothesis test using a tangent angle variance of a component as a test statistic.

The first and second receivers 100 and 110 may receive a raw GPS signal from at least four or more GPS satellites and may receive the same signal only from the terminal termination, similar to the raw GPS signal.

The first and second receivers 100 and 110 include a multi-correlator that tracks a plurality of channels of raw GPS signals and deaf signals, respectively, and a combination of a plurality of channels of raw GPS signals and deceased signals tracked by the multi- And a residual analysis unit for classifying the GPS signal group and the degenerate signal group into a GPS signal group and a degenerate signal group, respectively, in such a manner that a residual solution analysis of the navigation solution after generating the navigation solution selects the smallest combination.

The priming signal identifying unit 130 may estimate the basis vector through a Weighed Least-Square method using the reception period double difference measurement value output from the GMU 120. [

The priming signal identification unit 130 performs hypothesis testing using the alternate hypothesis H1 and the null hypothesis H0. At this time, the dequeue signal identification unit 130 sets the de-noun dealing signal group combination SS among the plurality of signal group combinations output from the signal group management unit 120 as an alternative hypothesis H1 for hypothesis testing , And the remaining signal group combinations can be set to the null hypothesis (H0).

The operation of the satellite navigation system according to the embodiment of the present invention will now be described.

1, the first and second receivers 100 and 110 use a dual difference of the reception period to assume a degenerate environment in which the same deception signal is received from a single time expiration. Therefore, the first and second receivers 100 and 110 receive the raw GPS signal and the deception signal simultaneously. The received signal is simultaneously tracked by multiple correlators within the first and second receivers 100,110. At this time, the residual analyzing unit generates a navigation solution by combining the raw GPS signals and the deaf-mute signals of the plurality of channels tracked in the multicorrelator, and selects a combination having the smallest residual through the analysis of the generated navigation solution, And deceptive signal group. That is, when a combination having the smallest residual is selected, two signal groups constituting the combination, that is, a GPS signal group and a deception signal group are classified.

However, even if the combination with the smallest residual is selected, since the characteristics of the GPS signal and the structure are almost similar to each other in the nature of the deception signal, any of the two signal groups (signal groups # 1 and # 2) Can not be identified. For convenience of explanation, the present invention assumes that the signal group # 1 is the deception signal group S and the signal group # 2 is the GPS signal group G. In this case, the signal group # 3 will be the deceptive signal group S and the signal group # 4 will be assumed to be the GPS signal group G. [

Accordingly, the group management unit 120 divides two signal groups (signal groups # 1 and # 2) classified by the first receiver 100 and two signal groups (signal group # 3 , # 4) to generate a plurality of double differential combinations. In FIG. 1, there are four signal groups (signal group # 1 to signal group # 4) in total, since the first and second receivers 100 and 110 generate deception and GPS signal groups, respectively. (SS, 2SG, 2GS, and GG) of four types (SS, SG, GS, and GG) are generated by combining four signal groups (signal group # 1 to signal group # do.

Therefore, the fraud signal identification unit 130 can calculate the basis vector between the first and second receivers 100 and 110 using the measurement of the double differential combination output from the group management unit 130, And identifies each GPS group and deceptive signal group through a hypothesis testing method 500 that uses the tangent angle variance of each component of the basis vector as a test statistic.

Figure 2 shows the tangent angle of the basis vector component used in the present invention.

)는 수학식 1과 같이 나타낼 수 있다. The basis vector between receivers in a three-dimensional space has three components (x, y, z), for example, the tangent angle between two components can be calculated. That is, the double difference measurement values measured from the first and second receivers 100 and 110

) Can be expressed by Equation (1).

[Equation 1]

)를 이용한 최소자승법(Weigthed Least-Square) 방법을 통해 아래의 수학식 2와 같이 기저벡터(

)를 추정한다. Then, the measured double difference measurement value (

) Using the least square method (Weigthed Least-Square method)

).

&Quot; (2) "

)를 이용하여 수학식 3과 같이 기저벡터의 각 성분에 의한 탄젠트각(

)을 계산한다. 이때, 상기 계산된 탄젠트각 (

)의 분산은 기저벡터의 각 성분에 의한 탄젠트각의 분산의 합으로 수학식 4와 같이 표현되며, 측정치의 개수가 증가함에 따라 가우시안 분포를 가진다. Subsequently, the estimated basis vector (

), A tangent angle (tangent) of each component of the base vector

). At this time, the calculated tangent angle (

) Is the sum of the variances of the tangent angles due to the respective components of the basis vector, expressed as Equation (4), and has a Gaussian distribution as the number of measured values increases.

&Quot; (3) "

&Quot; (4) "

FIG. 3 is a conceptual diagram showing an alternate hypothesis (H1) and a null hypothesis (H0) for the hypothesis test according to the present invention.

In FIG. 1, the first and second receivers 100 and 110 receive the same dequeue signal from one expiration date and classify the same dequeue signal through a multi-correlator so that a total of four signal groups (two GPS signal groups and two deception Signal group). At this time, the four signal groups include a degeneracy-only signal group SS, a deception-GPS signal group SG, a GPS-only signal group GS and a GPS-GPS signal group GG. Of the four signal groups SS, SG, GS, and GG, the degenerate-only signal group SS may be set to Alternative Hypothesis (H1) for hypothesis verification. In this case, since the navigation solution generated in the corresponding signal group (SS) is generated targeting the same position (position of the maturity), the calculated navigation solution is matched with each receiver, so theoretically, . This is because although the first and second receivers 100 and 110 are located apart from each other (A, B), they receive the same deceptive signal, resulting in the same position.

However, due to various error factors such as propagation error, time delay error, and thermal noise, the base vector does not converge to zero exactly. Therefore, the variance of the tangent angle of the base vector component (VTB) Is in the range of 0 to 2 [pi] as shown on the left side of Fig.

On the contrary, the signal groups (SG, GS, GG combinations) of the different combinations are set to the null hypothesis (H0), and the basis vectors by the respective combinations are transmitted to the first and second receivers 100, Since both the signal and the deception signal are received, the two navigation solutions in each combination do not coincide with each other as shown in the right side of FIG. 3, so that they have a constant basis vector. When the base vector is estimated within a certain range, the tangent angle variance has a relatively small value compared to the allergic hypothesis. Therefore, if the hypothesis test is performed through this characteristic, the tamper signal can be identified with high probability.

In the case of the method proposed in the present invention, the performance may vary depending on the dispersion of the base vector components and the length of the base vector. Generally, the variance of the base vector components obtained through the double difference measurement is very low cm), the present invention is effective even at short base distances.

Therefore, the test statistic using the tangent angle variance can be expressed as a ratio of the alternative hypothesis and the null hypothesis as shown in Equation (5).

&Quot; (5) "

Since the tangent angle variance has a Gaussian distribution for each case according to Equation (4), Equation (5) can be simplified as shown in Equation (6). In the case of the test statistic of the present invention, since the ratio between the hypotheses is an important factor rather than an absolute value, the multiplication and addition terms that do not affect the performance are removed at the time of the expression expansion. The mean components of the tangent angles of the antagonistic and null hypotheses, which can not be calculated in the equation, are estimated using the Maximum Likelihood Estimation technique.

&Quot; (6) "

The final test statistic summarized by Equation (6) is shown in Equation (7). In this case, α is a set value for the variance of the base vector component and the length of the base vector, and is a value that needs to be adjusted to improve the performance of the merit signal discrimination based on the signal quality of the deception signal and the GPS signal and the length of the base vector.

&Quot; (7) "

Therefore, when the final test statistic is larger than the threshold value (lambda) by comparing the final test statistic with the threshold value (lambda), the deception signal discrimination unit 130 judges that the deceptive signal is identified, The initial signal reception step is performed again. If the test statistic is larger than the threshold value (?), The deception signal discrimination unit 130 finally classifies it into a GPS group and a deceptive signal group, and then outputs the position, navigation, time (PNT) Calculate the information.

The degenerate-only signal group SS among the four signal groups SS, SG, GS and GG is first set to the alternate hypothesis H1 for the hypothesis verification and the signal groups SG, combinations are set to the null hypothesis H0, but are not limited thereto. For example, if one of the SGs, the GS, and the GG combinations of the other combinations is set to the first hypothesis H1 and the remaining signal groups GS, GG, and SS are set to the null hypothesis H0, The signal group GS of the other combination is set to the null hypothesis H1 and the signal groups SG, GG, and SS of the remaining combinations are set to the null hypothesis H1 because the test statistic is smaller than the threshold value lambda. The null hypothesis (H0) is set and the operation of comparing the test statistic with the threshold value (?) Is repeated. Finally, we can compare the test statistic with the threshold (λ) after setting the deception-deception signal group (SS) to the alternative hypothesis (H1). At this time, if the test statistic is smaller than the threshold value (λ), the initial signal receiving step is performed again.

The threshold value (?) Shown in Equation (7) can be calculated by Equations (8) and (9), which are relational expressions between the detection probability (P _D ) and the false detection probability (P _FA ). For example, in FIG. 4, as the false detection probability P _FA increases, the detection probability P _D increases. From this point on, even if the false detection probability P _FA increases, the detection probability P _D becomes almost constant do. Therefore, the threshold value? Can be set using the detection probability P _D in a state where the false detection probability P _FA is fixed to the predetermined value. When the false detection probability is fixed, the detection probability can be expressed by Equation (10).

&Quot; (8) "

&Quot; (9) "

&Quot; (10) "

In summary, the deception signal identification unit 130 sets the double differential combination SS to the alternate hypothesis H1 and sets the remaining double differential combinations GS, SG, GG to the null hypothesis H0, (X, y, z) of the basis vector generated from measurements of the difference pair SS and the measurements of the double difference combination (GS, SG, GG) Once the tangent angular variance is calculated, a tangent angle variance ratio of the allotropic hypothesis (H1) to the null hypothesis (H0), that is, a double differential combination of the tangent angle variance of the base vector of the double differential combination (SS) The gag signal discriminator 130 compares the set test statistic with a predetermined threshold value to calculate the overt hypothesis H1 (GS, SG, GG) ) Is judged to be a deceptive signal group or not .

FIG. 4 is a graph showing the merit signal discrimination performance according to the variation of the base vector length when the false detection probability is fixed and the variance of the base vector component is 0.2 m.

As is generally known, the longer the distance of the base vector is, the higher the accuracy of the measurement value is. However, as shown in FIG. 4, the base vector length of 0.4 m is generally a very short length compared with the case of using the double difference scheme, which shows that the technique of the present invention can alleviate the spatial constraint.

FIG. 5 shows a result of performing a hypothesis test using simulation data derived from Equation (7). At this time, the base vector length is set to a value two times larger than the variance of the base vector component.

As shown in FIG. 5, in the case of the alternative hypothesis H1 (SS combination), the tangent angle variance has a larger value than the null hypothesis H0 (GS, SG, GG combination) ) The test statistic (T) using the tangent angle variance is also larger than that of the null hypothesis (H0). Also, since the threshold value can be set within the range of about 0.1 to 2.1, the probability of false detection is very low. This is because the variance of the tangent angle used in the test statistic is the sum of the three tangent angular distributions in a single Epoch by the three basis vector components (x, y, z) It is because it appears. By this characteristic, the technique of the present invention can reduce the initial convergence time of the algorithm required in the previously-studied deception detection and identification technique. In addition, since the test statistic has a specific limit due to the geometric arrangement between the receivers, it is possible to identify the deception signal with high reliability and effectively.

As described above, the present invention is applicable to other signal combinations (GS, SG, and GG combinations) in which the tangent angle variance of the base vector with respect to the degenerate-only signal combination (SS combination) set to the alternative hypothesis H1 is set to the null hypothesis H0. The tangent angle variance between the base vector components is used as a test statistic based on the characteristic having a larger value than the tangent angle variance of the baseband for the baseband. In particular, in the present invention, since the tangent angle variance of the base vector components is in the range of 0 to 2 [pi], the reliability of the test statistic is high and it is possible to reduce the error of the only signal identification so that the receiver, It is expected to be.

In addition, since the present invention has recently become an issue of reliability as well as performance of satellite navigation system due to development of UAV and unmanned vehicle system, stability of unmanned infrastructure such as UAV and unmanned vehicle system as well as satellite navigation system is guaranteed It is expected to be able to do.

The satellite navigation system using the tangent angle variance of the basis vector component according to the present invention described above and the method for identifying a malicious signal thereof are not limited to the configuration and method of the embodiments described above, It will be understood that the invention may be embodied in other specific forms without departing from the spirit or essential characteristics thereof. Therefore, it should be understood that the above-described embodiments are to be considered in all respects as illustrative and not restrictive.

100, 110: receiver 120: group management unit
130:

Claims (12)

CLAIMS 1. A deception signal identification method for a satellite navigation system having two or more receivers under a degenerate environment,
Tracking signals transmitted by GPS satellites and de-icers using a multi-correlator for each receiver;
Dividing the tracked signal into a GPS signal group and a deceptive signal group, generating a double differential combination, and calculating a measurement value of the generated double differential combination to estimate a reception period basis vector; And
And performing a hypothesis test to set a tangent angle variance between the estimated reception period base vector components as a test statistic to identify a deceptive signal group. 2. The method of claim 1, wherein estimating the basis vector comprises:
Generating a navigation solution by combining a GPS signal and a deception signal of a plurality of channels at each receiver, and classifying the GPS signal group and the deceptive signal group through a residual analysis of the navigation solution;
Generating a plurality of double differential combinations by combining the GPS signal group and the dequeue signal group classified by each of the receivers; And
And estimating a basis vector by applying a least squares method to the measured values of the plurality of double differential combinations. 2. The method of claim 1, wherein identifying the deception signal comprises:
Setting a specific double differential combination among the plurality of double differential combinations to the hypothesis H1 and setting the remaining double differential combinations to the null hypothesis H0;
Calculating a tangent angle variance for each component of the basis vector for the base difference vector for the double difference combination set by the allele hypothesis H1 and the double difference combinations set for the null hypothesis H0;
Setting a test statistic by calculating a ratio of a tangent angle variance of an alternate hypothesis H1 to the calculated null hypothesis H0; And
And comparing the set test statistic with a preset threshold to determine whether a specific double differential combination set to the alternate hypothesis H1 is a deceptive signal group. A method for identifying a deception of a satellite navigation system having first and second receivers,
Classifying a GPS signal group and a deceptive signal group by combining GPS signals and deceptive signals of a plurality of channels in the first and second receivers;
Generating a plurality of double differential combinations by combining the GPS signal group and the deception signal group classified by the first and second receivers;
Estimating a basis vector by applying a least squares method to the measurements of the generated plurality of double difference combinations; And
And performing a hypothesis test using a tangent angle variance between the components of the estimated base vector as a test statistic to identify a deceptive signal group. 5. The method of claim 4, wherein classifying the GPS signal group and the deceptive signal group comprises:
Generating a navigation solution by combining a GPS signal and a deception signal of a plurality of channels; And
And selecting a combination having the smallest residual of the navigation solution among the generated combinations to classify the GPS signal group and the deception signal group. 5. The apparatus of claim 4, wherein the plurality of double differencing combinations
(SG) combination, a combination of GPS-only signal group (GS), and a combination of GPS-GPS signal group (GG) A method for identifying a fraudulent signal. 5. The method of claim 4, wherein identifying the deceptive signal group comprises:
Setting a specific double differential combination to the alternative hypothesis (H1) and setting the remaining double differential combinations to the null hypothesis (H0);
Calculating a tangent angle variance for the three components of the base vector for the double difference combination set by the allele hypothesis H1 and the base vector for the double difference combinations set by the null hypothesis H0;
Setting a test statistic by calculating a ratio of a tangent angle variance of an alternate hypothesis H1 to the calculated null hypothesis H0; And
And comparing the set test statistic with a preset threshold to determine whether a specific double differential combination set to the alternate hypothesis H1 is a deceptive signal group. 8. The method of claim 7,
And a degenerate-deceptive signal group combination (SS). First and second receivers for classifying a GPS signal group and a degenerate signal group by combining a plurality of channels of GPS signals and deception signals;
A group management unit for combining the GPS signal group and the deception signal group classified by the first and second receivers to generate a plurality of double difference combinations; And
A hypothesis test is performed by estimating a basis vector by applying a least squares method to the measured values of the generated plurality of double difference combinations and using a tangent angle variance between the two components of the estimated base vector as a test statistic, And a signal-identifying unit for identifying a deception signal. 10. The receiver of claim 9, wherein the first and second receivers
A multiple correlator for tracking a plurality of channels of GPS signals and deception signals respectively, and
A GPS signal and a degenerate signal tracked by the multi-correlator are combined with each other to generate a navigation solution, and a residual solution analysis of the navigation solution selects the smallest combination. And a satellite navigation system. The apparatus of claim 9, wherein the group management unit
GPS signal group (GG) combination, a combination of a deaf-and-deactivated signal group (SS), a deception signal-GPS signal group (SG) combination, a GPS- . The apparatus as claimed in claim 9,
(a) set a specific double differential combination to the alternative hypothesis (H1), set the remaining double differential combinations to the null hypothesis (H0)
(b) calculating a tangent angle variance for the three components of the base vector for the double difference combination set by the allele hypothesis H1 and the base vector for the double difference combinations set by the null hypothesis H0,
(c) setting a test statistic by calculating the ratio of the tangent angle variance of the alternative hypothesis H1 to the calculated null hypothesis H0,
(d) comparing the set test statistic with a preset threshold value to determine whether a specific double differential combination set to the alternate hypothesis (H1) is a deceptive signal group.

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