KR101938378B1 - Low frequency hacking determinig apparatus and method for vehicle - Google Patents

Abstract

Disclosed are a wireless signal hacking determining apparatus and a method for a vehicle. According to the present invention, the wireless signal hacking determining apparatus for a vehicle comprises: a smart key (SMK) unit individually transmitting a verification signal, and further, a coupling signal coupled by the verification signal; and a FOB key receiving the verification signal and the coupling signal from the SMK unit, and detecting strength of the verification signal and the coupling signal to be transmitted to the SMK unit. The SMK unit determines whether a wireless signal is hacked for FOB verification by using the strength of the verification signal and the coupling signal, transmitted from the FOB key.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD [0001] The present invention relates to a radio frequency signal hacking determination apparatus and method,

The present invention relates to an apparatus and method for determining a radio signal hack for a vehicle and, more particularly, to a radio signal hacking determination apparatus and method for a vehicle that prevent hacking of an LF signal used for a door or starting of a vehicle.

In general, the radio signal anti-hacking technique determines whether or not an LF radio signal is hacked by using a ratio of two LF signal intensities transmitted from one antenna to another intensity. If the intensity ratio of the two LF signals is not within the predetermined range, it is important that the FOB accurately recognize the strength of the transmitted LF signal because it is recognized as an LF radio signal hacking.

In order to allow the FOB to correctly recognize the strength of the received LF signal, the FOB performs an LF signal calibration operation. Here, calibration refers to the operation of making the intensity of the received LF signal equal to the intensity of the LF signal recognizing FOB. Ideally, when the LF correction process is performed, the relationship between the received LF intensity and the LF intensity recognized by the FOB becomes linear. In order to apply the existing LF radio signal anti-hacking technique, the received LF intensity and FOB It is important that the relationship of the LF intensity to the LF signal strength has a linear characteristic for all the sections irrespective of the strength / weakness of the LF signal strength.

However, the FOB used in the smart key system is performing the LF calibration correction only for a period in which the intensity of the received LF signal is weak. Even if the LF correction operation is performed for this interval, . However, in order to apply the conventional LF radio signal hacking prevention technology, an additional LF correction operation is required for a region where the received LF signal intensity is strong. To do this, a high-performance calibration device is required. You have to invest additional time. In addition, the LF intensity region recognized by the FOB saturates in a region where the received LF intensity is very strong, which may result in a problem that the existing technique can not be applied.

BACKGROUND ART [0002] The background art of the present invention is disclosed in Korean Patent Registration No. 10-1734947 (May 2017.05.04) entitled " Smart key system and method for preventing hacking in the system ".

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The present invention has been made to solve the above-mentioned problems, and it is an object of the present invention to provide a vehicular wireless signal hacking apparatus and method for accurately determining whether a hacking of an LF signal is accurately performed using a coupling signal by a verification signal and a verification signal, And to provide a determination apparatus and method.

A wireless signal hacking determination apparatus for a vehicle according to an aspect of the present invention includes: a SMK (Smark Key) unit for transmitting a verification signal and transmitting a coupling signal coupled by the verification signal, respectively; And a FOB key for receiving the verification signal and the coupling signal from the SMK unit, detecting a strength of the verification signal and an intensity of the coupling signal, and transmitting the detection signal to the SMK unit, The unit determines whether or not the radio signal for hoc authentication is hacked by using the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal received from the pod key.

The SMK unit of the present invention includes: a first antenna for transmitting the verification signal; A second antenna coupled by the verify signal transmitted from the first antenna to transmit the coupling signal; A receiving unit for receiving the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal from the Pod key; And an SMK for determining whether the radio signal is hacked by using the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal transmitted from the Pod key via the receiver, And an ECU.

The first antenna of the present invention is characterized in that the verification signal is transmitted as a sine signal having different amplitudes continuously for different times.

The first antenna of the present invention is characterized in that the second antenna transmits the radio signal and then transmits the verification signal.

The SMK ECU of the present invention determines whether or not the radio signal is hacked according to whether a ratio of the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal is within a predetermined setting range.

The SMK ECU of the present invention determines that a hacking has been performed on the radio signal when the ratio of the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal is out of the setting range.

According to an aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method for determining radio signal hacking for a vehicle, the method comprising: transmitting a coupling signal coupled to the verification signal by a Smark Key (SMK) unit with a probe key; Receiving the verification signal and the coupling signal from the SMK unit, detecting the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal, and transmitting the strength of the verification signal to the SMK unit; And determining whether the radio signal for hoc authentication is hacked by using the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal received from the pod key by the SMK unit.

The SMK unit transmits the verification signal to the first antenna and the SMK unit transmits the verification signal to the first antenna in the step of transmitting the coupling signal coupled by the verification signal to the Pove key, respectively, And transmits the coupling signal coupled by the verification signal to the two antennas.

The first antenna of the present invention is characterized in that the verification signal is transmitted as a sine signal having different amplitudes continuously for different times.

The first antenna of the present invention is characterized in that the second antenna transmits the radio signal and then transmits the verification signal.

In the step of determining whether or not the wireless signal is hacked, the SMK ECU determines whether the wireless signal is hacked using the strength of the verification signal received from the Pove key and the strength of the coupling signal .

The SMK ECU of the present invention determines whether or not the radio signal is hacked according to whether a ratio of the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal is within a predetermined setting range.

The SMK ECU of the present invention determines that a hacking has been performed on the radio signal when the ratio of the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal is out of the setting range.

An apparatus and method for determining radio signal hacking for vehicles according to an aspect of the present invention accurately determines whether or not an LF signal is hacked by using a ratio of an original LF signal intensity and a coupled LF signal intensity from each of a plurality of antennas.

The apparatus and method for determining a radio signal hack for a vehicle according to another aspect of the present invention are characterized in that the coupled LF signal uses relatively small characteristics compared to the original LF signal so that the saturation region of the smart key and the LF signal It is possible to minimize the possibility of a hacking misjudgment.

According to another aspect of the present invention, there is provided an apparatus and method for determining radio signal hacking for vehicles, comprising: a high-performance calibration device for calibrating an LF signal separately or eliminating an additional LF calibration operation; .

1 is a block diagram of a vehicular wireless signal hacking determination apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.
2 is a diagram illustrating an example of transmission of an LF signal in a first antenna and a second antenna according to an embodiment of the present invention.
3 is a flowchart of a method for determining a radio signal hack for a vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention.
4 is experimental data showing the signal strength and the ratio of the LF signal recognized by the Pove key.
5 is experimental data showing signal strengths and ratios of the LF signal in which the pod key is recognized according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Hereinafter, a vehicle wireless signal hacking determination apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. In this process, the thicknesses of the lines and the sizes of the components shown in the drawings may be exaggerated for clarity and convenience of explanation. Further, the terms described below are defined in consideration of the functions of the present invention, which may vary depending on the user, the intention or custom of the operator. Therefore, definitions of these terms should be made based on the contents throughout this specification.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a radio signal hacking determination apparatus for a vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an example of transmission of an LF signal in a first antenna and a second antenna according to an embodiment of the present invention. FIG. 3 is a flow chart of a radio signal hacking determination method for a vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention, FIG. 4 is experimental data showing a signal strength and a ratio of an LF signal recognized by the Pove key, Experimental data showing the signal strength and the ratio of the LF signal in which the Pawkey according to an embodiment is recognized.

Referring to FIG. 1, an apparatus for determining a radio signal hack for a vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention includes an SMK unit 10 and a FOB key 20.

The SMK unit 10 includes a first antenna 11, a second antenna 12, a receiving unit 13, and an SMK ECU 14. [

The first antenna 11 transmits a radio signal for the FoB authentication to the Fooby 20. The first antenna 11 is coupled by a verification signal transmitted from the second antenna 12 and transmits a coupling signal to the Pobey key 20. [

Here, the radio signal, the verification signal, and the coupling signal may be LF (Low Frequency) signals.

The verification signal and the coupling signal will be described later.

The second antenna 12 transmits a verification signal to the pod key 20. The first antenna 11 is coupled by the verification signal by the second antenna 12 and the coupling signal is transmitted from the first antenna 11 to the pod key 20. [

In this case, the second antenna 12 may transmit the verification signal after the wireless signal transmission of the first antenna 11, or may transmit the verification signal before the wireless signal transmission of the first antenna 11 . That is, the verification signal transmission of the second antenna 12 is possible before and after the transmission of the radio signal of the first antenna 11.

For reference, in this embodiment, an example in which the second antenna 12 transmits a verification signal after the first antenna 11 transmits a radio signal will be described as an example.

In addition, the radio signal for the FoB authentication may be the same as the verification signal.

On the other hand, the second antenna 12 transmits the verification signal as a sine signal having different amplitudes continuously for different times. That is, as shown in FIG. 2, the second antenna 12 transmits a radio signal for t1 and t2 after the first antenna 11 transmits a radio signal for t3 and t4, and sequentially transmits at time t3 and time t4.

Thus, as the verification signal is transmitted for t3 and t4, the first antenna 11 is coupled and the coupling signal is sequentially transmitted at the time t3 and t4 at the first antenna 11. [

Here, the strength of the coupling signal is relatively small compared to the strength of the verification signal, and the ratio of the coupling signal (intensity of the coupling signal / intensity of the verification signal) is constant regardless of the strength of the verification signal. Thus, it is possible to judge whether or not the radio signal is hacked through the ratio of the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal.

Also, since the intensity of the coupling signal is very small, the strength of the coupling signal recognized by the forbey key 20 becomes smaller than that of the saturation area and the comparison area of the pob, so that there is no possibility of hacking the radio signal.

The receiving unit 13 receives the strength of the verification signal and the intensity of the radio signal from the pod key 20. [ Here, the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the radio signal may be an RF (Radio Frequency) signal.

The SMK ECU 14 controls the first antenna 11 to transmit a radio signal.

Further, the SMK ECU 14 transmits a radio signal and then transmits a verification signal using the second antenna 12. [ The SMK ECU 14 receives the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal from the Pove key 20 through the receiving unit 13, ≪ / RTI >

In this case, the SMK ECU 14 determines whether or not the radio signal is hacked, depending on whether the ratio of the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal is within a predetermined setting range. When the ratio of the intensity deviates from the set range, it is determined that a hacking has been performed on the wireless signal.

That is, since the intensity of the coupling signal is included within the range of the verification signal and the setting range, the SMK ECU 14 determines whether the ratio of the strength of the verification signal to the strength of the coupling signal is within the setting range. It is possible to judge whether or not it is hacked.

The pod key 20 receives a radio signal from the first antenna 11.

Further, the pod key 20 receives the verification signal from the second antenna 12, detects the strength of the verification signal, receives the coupling signal from the first antenna 11, detects the strength of the coupling signal , And transmits the strength of the detected verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal to the SMK unit (10).

Accordingly, the SMK unit 10 determines whether the radio signal is hacked by using the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal transmitted from the Pawkey 20.

4 shows the LF signal recognition intensity of the Pawb key 20 according to the distance between the first antenna 11 and the Pawkey 20 when the first antenna 11 transmits LF signals of different sizes, Respectively.

5 is a graph showing the relationship between the distance between the first antenna 11 and the pod keys 20 when the second antenna 12 transmits LF signals of different sizes, LF recognition intensity and the ratio of the signal.

The current applied to each antenna in this experiment is as follows.

And 550 mAp when the intensity of the first antenna 11 and the second antenna 12 is 100%. The first antenna 11 and the second antenna 12 have the intensity of 330 mAp when the intensity is 60% and the first antenna 11 and the second antenna 12 have the intensity (60%) of the first antenna 11 and the second antenna 12, (100%) of the second antenna 12 is about 0.6.

4, when the distance between the first antenna 11 and the pod key 20 is 0 cm (the first antenna and the pod key 20 are in close contact with each other) (100%, 60%) included in the saturation region of the LF signal, the ratio of the strengths recognized by the forbey key 20 shows a similar value, and the ratio of the two signals is close to 1 Can be seen. Further, when the distance between the first antenna 11 and the pawb key 20 is 1 cm, the calibration operation does not proceed and the ratio (about 0.11) of the strength recognized by the forbey key 20 is the ratio of the intensity of the LF signal ).

5, regardless of the distance between the first antenna 11 and the pod key 20, the ratio of the strength recognized by the pod key 20 is within a predetermined range (0.58-0.61) .

Therefore, it is possible to prevent hacking of the LF radio signal in the LF comparison area and the saturation area of the pod key 20 by properly setting the setting range for preventing the LF radio signal hacking by using such a characteristic.

In this test, the output intensity of each antenna and the amount of the coupled signal may vary depending on the state of the vehicle wiring and the antenna circuit.

Hereinafter, a vehicle radio signal hacking determination method according to an embodiment of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to FIG.

3 is a flowchart of a method for determining a radio signal hack for a vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Referring to FIG. 3, the SMK ECU 14 controls the first antenna 11 to transmit a radio signal. Further, the SMK ECU 14 transmits a radio signal and then transmits a verification signal using the second antenna 12. [

In this case, the first antenna 11 is coupled by the verification signal transmitted from the second antenna 12, and transmits the coupling signal to the Pod key 20 (S10).

As the verification signal and the coupling signal are transmitted, the pod key 20 detects the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal (S20), and outputs the strength of the detected verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal to the SMK unit 10 (S30).

The strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal transmitted from the Poab key 20 are received by the receiving unit 13 and the SMK ECU 14 compares the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal It is judged whether or not it is hacked (S40).

In this case, the SMK ECU 14 determines whether or not the hacking is based on whether the ratio of the strength of the verification signal to the strength of the coupling signal is within the setting range. The ratio of the strength of the verification signal to the strength of the coupling signal is set It is determined that a hacking to the wireless signal has occurred.

An apparatus and method for determining a radio signal hack for a vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention accurately determines whether or not an LF signal is hacked using a ratio of an original LF signal intensity and a coupled LF signal intensity from each of a plurality of antennas.

In addition, the apparatus and method for determining a radio signal hack for a vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention uses a relatively small characteristic of the coupled LF signal as compared with the original LF signal, It is possible to minimize the possibility of the LF signal hacking mistake.

In addition, the apparatus and method for determining radio signal hacking for vehicles according to an embodiment of the present invention do not require high-performance calibration equipment for LF signal calibration or perform additional LF calibration operations, Can be saved.

While the present invention has been particularly shown and described with reference to exemplary embodiments thereof, it is clearly understood that the same is by way of illustration and example only and is not to be taken by way of limitation, I will understand. Accordingly, the true scope of the present invention should be determined by the following claims.

10: SMK unit 11: first antenna
12: second antenna 13:
14: SMK ECU 20: fork key

Claims (13)

A SMK (Smark Key) unit for transmitting a verification signal and coupling signals coupled by the verification signal, respectively; And
And a FOB key for receiving the verification signal and the coupling signal from the SMK unit, detecting the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal, and transmitting the detection signal to the SMK unit,
Wherein the SMK unit determines whether or not a radio signal for hoc authentication is hacked by using the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal transmitted from the pod key.
The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the SMK unit
A first antenna for transmitting the verification signal;
A second antenna coupled by the verify signal transmitted from the first antenna to transmit the coupling signal;
A receiving unit for receiving the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal from the Pod key; And
A SMK ECU for controlling the first antenna to transmit the verification signal and determining whether the radio signal is hacked using the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal received from the Pod key through the receiver, And a control unit for controlling the wireless signal hacking determination unit.
3. The radio signal hacking determination apparatus according to claim 2, wherein the first antenna transmits the verification signal as a sine signal having different amplitudes continuously for different times.
3. The vehicular wireless signal hacking determination apparatus according to claim 2, wherein the first antenna transmits the radio signal at the second antenna and then transmits the verification signal.
The SMK ECU according to claim 2, wherein the SMK ECU determines whether or not the radio signal is hacked according to whether a ratio of the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal is within a predetermined setting range. Signal hacking determination device.
The SMK ECU according to claim 5, wherein the SMK ECU determines that a hacking has been performed on the radio signal when the ratio of the strength of the verification signal to the strength of the coupling signal is out of the setting range Determination device.
SMK (Smark Key) ECU transmits the verification signal and the coupling signal coupled by the verification signal to each of the POV keys;
Receiving the verification signal and the coupling signal from the SMK ECU, detecting the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal, and transmitting the strength of the verification signal to the SMK ECU; And
And determining whether the radio signal for hoc authentication is hacked, using the strength of the verification signal received from the SMK ECU and the strength of the coupling signal.
8. The method as claimed in claim 7, wherein, in the step of the SMK ECU transmitting the verification signal and the coupling signal coupled by the verification signal to the Pove key, respectively,
Wherein the SMK ECU transmits the verification signal to the first antenna and transmits the coupling signal coupled by the verification signal to the second antenna.
9. The method according to claim 8, wherein the first antenna transmits the verification signal as a sine signal having different amplitudes continuously for different time periods.
The method according to claim 8, wherein the first antenna transmits the radio signal at the second antenna and then transmits the verification signal.
8. The method of claim 7, wherein, in the step of determining whether the radio signal is hacked,
Wherein the SMK ECU determines whether or not the radio signal is hacked by using the strength of the verification signal received from the Pove key and the strength of the coupling signal.
The SMK ECU according to claim 11, wherein the SMK ECU determines whether or not the radio signal is hacked according to whether a ratio of the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal is within a predetermined setting range. Signal hacking determination method.
The wireless communication system according to claim 12, wherein the SMK ECU determines that a hacking has been performed on the radio signal if the ratio of the strength of the verification signal and the strength of the coupling signal is out of the setting range Determination method.

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