JPS60153581A - Ic card having function inhibiting illegal use - Google Patents

Abstract

PURPOSE:To obtain an IC card enabled to detect and prevent surely illegal access by storing owner's collating information, and when an owner is decided as an illegal owner as the result of collating, actuating an erasing means to erase the stored contents. CONSTITUTION:A main power supply 5 drives a CPU3 and a memory 1. The voltage of a writing power supply 2 is divided by a voltage dividing circuit 6 and inputted to the CPU3. A program in the memory 1 is set up so that collating operation is started after confirming that the writing power supply 2 is set up to a voltage enabling writing operation by the CPU3. If it is discriminated as the result of collating that the card owner is not the real card owner, reinput of PIN (personal identification No.) is requested to the owner. When it is discriminated as the result of collating of the prescribed number of times that the owner is not the real owner and the card is illegally used, the data in the memory 1 are erased by an instruction from the CPU3. The card is disabled to be used as the result of data erasing from the memory 1, so that illegal use can be prevented.

Description

[Detailed Description of the Invention] <Industrial Application Field> The present invention provides a verification IC with a function to prevent unauthorized use.
It is related to Kerr meter.

<Prior art> An IC card stores the owner's verification information in the memory of the IC chip embedded in the card. 1. The card is inserted into a reading device, the information is read, and the holder inputs it into the reading device. The owner's information is verified against the stored verification information.

In new IC cards, the I
A CPU (Central Processing Unit) and memory are installed in the C chip, and the CPU verifies the information entered by the owner from the reading device with the owner information stored in the memory, and the owner is determined to be the correct owner. In this case, the processing device connected to the reading device performs the following operations.

If the CPU determines that the owner is not the correct owner, the processing device does not perform the next operation and forces the reader to re-enter the owner's information.

However, as shown in FIG. 1, the conventional IC card requires a writing power source 2 in order to write data into the memory 1. 6 is CPU, 4 is input/output terminal, 5 is CPU
3. This is the main power supply that drives the memory 1.

Therefore, it is not possible to write to the memory 1 unless the write power supply 2 is supplied from the outside, so even if the CPU commands to destroy the data in the memory 1, the data cannot be destroyed.

Therefore, the person who fraudulently uses the IC card will not be provided with the power supply 2 for writing, and will access the card many times in order to search for the PIN (Hersonal Identification Number 2) of the IC card. P
I was able to repeat this process until I found out the IN.

In this way, for conventional IC cards, the power source for writing is the CPU.
Because it was installed separately from the main power supply that drives the computer, it is difficult to prevent misuse, as errors caused by erroneous operations caused by misuse cannot be recorded in the memory without a power supply for writing. They were almost defenseless against the PIN detection system combined with this.

OBJECTS OF THE INVENTION It is an object of the present invention to provide an IC card that reliably detects unauthorized access as described above and is equipped with protective measures such as memory destruction.

<Structure of the present invention> The present invention provides storage means for storing verification information of the owner, input means for inputting information given to the owner from the outside, and information input from the input means and storage means. a collation means for collating the collation information stored in the collation means, an output means for outputting a signal from the collation means, an erasing means for erasing the memory contents of the storage means, the storage means, the input means, the collation means, This IC card has an unauthorized use prevention function and includes an output means and a control means for controlling an erasing means.

<Example> An example of the present invention is shown in FIG. 11 is a storage means, 12
13 is an input means, 13 is a collation means, 14 is an output means, 15 is an erasing means, and 16 is a control means.

Verification information of the owner is stored in the storage means 11 in advance.

When the holder inserts the IC card into the reading device and inputs the holder's PIN into the reading device, the input information is sent from the input means 12 to the verification means 16 via the control means 16. The verification means 13 verifies the information input from the input means 12 and the PIN stored in the storage means 11.

If it is determined through the verification that the person is the genuine owner, the verification means 13 outputs a signal to that effect via the control means 16 and through the output means 14.

If it is determined through verification that the owner is not the true owner, the verification means 16 and control means 16 operate the erasing means 15 to erase the memory contents of the storage means 11 to prevent unauthorized use. It is.

Furthermore, a means (not shown) for recording in a storage means that there has been unauthorized use may be added.

Therefore, the method for erasing the memory contents of the storage means 11 is as follows.
The control means 16 indicates that the erasing means 15 is in an operable state.
The verification means 13 may start the verification operation after verifying the identity of the owner, or the control means 16 may operate the erasure means 15 when the verification means 13 determines that the owner is not the true owner. It may also be a state.

Next, more specific embodiments of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings. FIG. 3 is a block diagram of one embodiment of the present invention. 1 is a memory, 2 is a power source for writing, 3 is a CPU, 4 is an input/output terminal, and 5 is a main power source for driving the CPU 3 and the memory 1. 6 is a voltage dividing circuit) which divides the voltage of the write power supply 2 and inputs it to the CPU 3.

This embodiment is similar to the conventional example (FIG. 1) in that the memory write power supply 2 is provided separately from the main power supply 5, but the voltage of the write power supply 2 is determined by the voltage dividing circuit 6. After confirming that the writing power supply 2 is set to a voltage that allows writing operation in the CPU 3, set the R of the memory 1 to start the verification operation.
Set the program in OM (not shown).

As a result of the verification, if it is determined that the owner is not the true owner, the owner is required to re-enter the PIN.

If it is determined that the owner is not the true owner after a predetermined number of verifications and it is determined that unauthorized use has occurred, the data in the memory 1 is erased by an instruction from the CPU 3.

Since the write power supply 2 is set to a voltage that enables write operation, the power necessary for erasing is provided in advance. By erasing the data in the memory 1, the card becomes unusable and unauthorized use can be prevented.

According to this embodiment, if the write power source 2 is not supplied, the PIN cannot be verified, so the PIN cannot be verified many times in order to search for the PIN without supplying the write power source 2. .

Or CPU 5 if it is determined to be unauthorized use.
The unauthorized use may be stored in the memory 1 according to an instruction from the user.

The specific configuration of this embodiment is shown in FIG. 4(b).

FIG. 4(a) shows an example of the configuration of a conventional IC card.

In the conventional IC card shown in FIG. 4(a), the main power supply for driving the CPU 5 and memory 1 is connected to the terminal VCC and the terminal GND.
The write power for memory 1 is supplied to the terminal Vp.
J is applied to the memory 1 independently from the CPU 3 by the terminal GND and the terminal GND.

According to the embodiment of the present invention shown in FIG.
The write power supply voltage PP is divided by the resistor RPH and the resistor RPL through the resistor PH and the resistor RPL, and is inputted to the vpp check terminal VPPCHECK of the CPU 5. The voltage VPP of the write power supply is, for example, 25V, and the voltage dividing resistor is, for example, RPH = 20 kΩ,
It is sufficient to set RpL=5 and Ω.

After confirming that the divided and input write voltage VPP is in a writable state, the CPU 5 verifies the PIN.

SIO is a serial input/output terminal, CLK is a clock signal input terminal, R8 is a reset terminal, MCTL is a memory control terminal, AB is an address bus terminal, and DB is a data bus terminal.

FIG. 5 is a block diagram of another embodiment of the invention. Reference numeral 7 is a booster circuit that boosts the voltage of the main power supply 5 and uses it as a voltage for memory writing. Then to CPU3! 1) PIN
If it is determined that it is unauthorized use, C.
According to the command to operate the booster circuit 7 from the PU 3, the booster circuit 7 boosts the voltage of the main power supply 5 to supply the voltage for memory writing, erases the data in the memory 1, and prevents unauthorized use of the card. To prevent.

According to this embodiment, when the PLN is verified a predetermined number of times in order to find the PIN, the booster circuit 7 operates and the data in the memory 1 is erased, so it is impossible to perform the υ PIN verification many times.

Alternatively, if it is determined that the unauthorized use has occurred, the unauthorized use may be stored in the memory 1 by a command from the CPU 3.

The specific configuration of this embodiment is shown in FIG. 4(c).

A main power supply terminal VCC is connected to a write terminal VPP of the memory 1 through a booster circuit 7, and the CPU 5 and the booster circuit 7 are connected by a write power supply control terminal VPPCTL.

As a result of the PIN verification in the CPU 3, if it is determined that the PIN has been used illegally, the CPU 3 issues a command to operate the booster circuit 7 through the write power supply control terminal VPPCTL, and the booster circuit 7 switches the main power supply VC.
A write voltage obtained by boosting C is supplied to the write terminal VPP of the memory 1, and data in the memory 1 is erased by a command input from C'PU5 to the memory 1 through the memory control terminal MCTL.

The booster circuit 7 can be realized by an IC, but commercially available memories with a built-in booster circuit (for example, 12817, HN38064
etc.) It may be incorporated into a t-Ic card module.

FIG. 6 is a flowchart of a program in an embodiment in which a voltage dividing circuit is provided.

Read the divided voltage (step ■), judge whether it matches the set voltage value (step ■), and if it matches, have the owner enter the PIN (step ■)
), the entered PIN and the PIN stored in memory
If the input is determined to be correct, the processing device starts the subsequent operation (step ■). P
If the IN does not have -iL, it is determined whether the mismatch is within a predetermined number of times (Step ■), and if it is within the predetermined number of times, the holder is made to enter the PIN again (Step ■). If they do not match, erase the data in the memory (step ■). If the voltage divided and read in step (2) does not match the set value, the process returns to step (2) and does not proceed to 9, inputting the PIN (step (2)).

After confirming that the writing power supply is in an operational state in this way, the PIN will be verified, and if it is determined that unauthorized use has occurred as a result of verification, the data will be erased to ensure correct use of the cine. To prevent.

FIG. 7 is a flowchart of a program according to an embodiment in which unauthorized use is stored in the memory without erasing the data in the memory.

To explain the difference from the 70-chart in Figure 6, if there is a mismatch exceeding a predetermined number of times, it is recorded in the memory that there has been unauthorized use (step ■), and the next time the card is used, Next, it is determined whether or not there is a record of unauthorized use in the memory (step (2)), and if there is no record of unauthorized use, the divided voltage is read (step (2)). If there is a record of unauthorized use, the program does not execute the subsequent program, but processes the fraudulently used card (for example, collecting the card, reporting, etc.) (step ■), and ends (step ■).

In this way, unauthorized use is prevented.

FIG. 8 shows a flowchart of a program in an embodiment in which a booster circuit is provided.

The holder enters the PIN (Step ◎), compares the entered PIN with the PIN stored in the memory (Step 0), and if the input is determined to be correct, the processing device starts the subsequent operation (Step 0). 0).

If the PINs do not match, it is determined whether the mismatch occurs within a predetermined number of times (Step 0), and if it is within the predetermined number of times, the holder is made to enter the PIN again (Step ■);
If the mismatch exceeds a predetermined number of times, the booster circuit is operated (step [phase]) and the data in the memory is erased (step [phase]).

As a result of the verification, if it is determined that the data has been used illegally, the data is deleted to prevent unauthorized use. In the embodiment shown in FIG. 8 as well, the fact that there has been unauthorized use may be recorded in the memory as shown in FIG.

The above explanation uses unauthorized PIN access as an example, but it is also possible to encrypt communication between the IC card and the terminal device to prevent data from being lost in the same way even if the encryption is unauthorized. It may be allowed to self-destruct.

Effects of the Invention According to the present invention, it is possible to obtain an IC card with improved confidentiality by not allowing unauthorized access, and the manufacturing process is easy, with only slight changes to the conventional one. In practical terms, it has a heavenly effect.

[Brief explanation of the drawing]

Fig. 1 is a block diagram of a conventional IC card, Fig. 2 is a block diagram of an IC card of the present invention, Fig. 3 is a block diagram of an embodiment of the present invention, and Fig. 4(a) is a block diagram of a conventional IC card. FIG. 4(b) is a circuit diagram of an embodiment of the present invention.
Figure (c) is a circuit diagram of another embodiment of the invention, Figure 5 is a block diagram of another embodiment of the invention, and Figures 6, 7, and 8 are programs of the embodiment of the invention. This is a flowchart. 1...Memory, 2...Writing power supply, 3...C
PU, 4... Input/output terminal, 5... Main power supply, 6...
Voltage dividing circuit, 7... Boosting circuit, 11... Storage means, 1
2... Input means, 13... Collation means, 14... Output means, 15... Erasing means, 16... Control means. C4 Addiction

Claims (1)

[Claims] ・1. A storage means for storing verification information of the owner, an input means for inputting information given to the owner from the outside, and a verification method for comparing the information inputted from the input means with the verification information stored in the storage means. collation means; output means for outputting a signal from the collation means; erasure means for erasing the memory contents of the storage means; control means for controlling the storage means, input means, collation means, output means, and erasure means. An IC card with functions to prevent unauthorized use. 2. The IC card according to claim 1, wherein the control means operates the erasing means when the verification means detects any unauthorized use. '3. The M control means includes a detection means for detecting the operable state of the erasing means, and a means for starting the operation of the collation means in response to a detection signal from the detection means indicating that the erasing means is in the operable state. IC canid according to claim 2.